Immigration-Related Worksite Enforcement Performance Measures

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

Over the past few years, the media have been filled with reports about worksite enforcement
operations, commonly referred to as immigration raids. These operations represent the public face
of efforts by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to curtail the employment of
unauthorized immigrants (illegal aliens). According to 2006 estimates, there are some 7.8 million
unauthorized workers in the U.S. civilian workforce.
DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for immigration-related
worksite enforcement, or enforcement of the prohibitions on unauthorized employment in Section
274A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The INA §274A provisions, sometimes
referred to as employer sanctions, make it unlawful for an employer to knowingly hire, recruit or
refer for a fee, or continue to employ an alien who is not authorized to be so employed. Today,
ICE’s worksite enforcement program is focused primarily on cases that involve critical
infrastructure facilities and cases involving employers who commit “egregious violations” of
criminal statutes and engage in worker exploitation.
Employers who violate INA prohibitions on the unlawful employment of aliens may be subject to
civil monetary penalties and/or criminal penalties. Criminal investigations may result in
defendants being charged with crimes beyond unlawful employment and being subject to the
relevant penalties for those violations.
Various measures are available to examine the performance of ICE’s worksite enforcement
program. They include Final Orders for civil monetary penalties, administrative fines,
administrative arrests, criminal arrests, criminal indictments and convictions, and criminal fines
and forfeitures. In recent years, ICE has generally focused less on administrative fines and more
on administrative and criminal arrests, criminal prosecutions, and criminal fines and forfeitures.
The data presented here show increases in these latter measures in recent years. At the same time,
however, when considered in terms of the estimated size of the unauthorized workforce or the
potential number of employers employing these workers in violation of the law, ICE’s worksite
enforcement program can seem quite small.
Enforcement activity by the Department of Labor (DOL) is also relevant to a discussion of
federal efforts to curtail unauthorized employment. DOL, which is responsible for enforcing
minimum wage, overtime pay, and related requirements, focuses a significant percentage of its
enforcement resources on a group of low-wage industries that employ large numbers of
immigrant—and presumably large numbers of unauthorized—workers.
Related background information can be found in CRS Report RL33973, Unauthorized
Employment in the United States: Issues and Options, and a discussion of related legislation can
be found in CRS Report RL34204, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 110th Congress.
This report will be updated when new data become available.

Introduc tion ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Unauthorized Workers.....................................................................................................................1
DHS Enforcement...........................................................................................................................2
Penalt ie s ...................................................................................................................... .............. 4
Civil Penalties.....................................................................................................................4
Criminal Penalties...............................................................................................................4
Program Performance................................................................................................................5
Administrative Fines...........................................................................................................5
Administrative and Criminal Arrests..................................................................................6
Criminal Prosecutions and Fines........................................................................................7
DOL Enforcement...........................................................................................................................9
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 11
Table 1. Estimates of Unauthorized Employment in Selected Industries, 2005..............................2
Table 2. Final Orders and Administrative Fine Collections, FY2003-FY2008...............................5
Table 3. Administrative and Criminal Arrests in Worksite Enforcement Operations,
FY2001-FY2008 .......................................................................................................................... 6
Table 4. Criminal Indictments and Convictions Related to Worksite Enforcement
Investigations, FY2005-FY2008..................................................................................................7
Table 5. Criminal Fines and Forfeitures Related to Worksite Enforcement Investigations,
FY2003-FY2008 .......................................................................................................................... 8
Table 6. Cases and Back Wage Collections in Low-Wage Industries: FY2007.............................11
Table 7. Cases and Back Wage Collections in Low-Wage Industries: FY2003-FY2007...............11
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................12

“Feds Step Up Enforcement at Work Sites.” “Raids Turn Focus to the Workplace.” “Raid Reflects
Feds’ New Tack: Target Workers.” As these newspaper headlines illustrate, the media have been
filled with reports over the past few years about worksite enforcement operations, commonly
referred to as immigration raids. These operations—which have been conducted at workplaces
across the country—represent the public face of efforts by the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) to curtail the employment of unauthorized (illegal) aliens. According to 2006 estimates, ¹
there are some 7.8 million unauthorized workers in the U.S. civilian workforce.
Questions arise as to how rigorous and effective DHS’s worksite enforcement efforts have been
overall. The department maintains data on several measures that can be used to examine the
performance of its worksite enforcement program. Enforcement activity by the Department of
Labor (DOL) is also relevant to a discussion of federal efforts to address unauthorized
employment. DOL, which is responsible for enforcing minimum wage, overtime pay, and related
requirements, focuses a significant percentage of its enforcement resources on a group of low-
wage industries that employ large numbers of immigrant—and presumably large numbers of
unauthori ze d—worke rs.

According to the most recent estimates by DHS, some 11.8 million unauthorized immigrants were ²
living in the United States in January 2007. The Pew Hispanic Center’s (the Center)
unauthorized alien population estimate for March 2007 was a somewhat higher 12.4 million, and ³
its estimate for March 2008 was 11.9 million. While this one-year change is not statistically
significant and thus no conclusions can be drawn about whether the unauthorized alien population
is in fact shrinking, many do believe that the unauthorized alien population has started decreasing.
For example, a report by the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) states, based on an analysis of
data through May 2008, that “the illegal immigrant population may have declined by over one ⁴
million in the last year.” If such a decline has in fact occurred, contributing factors may include
enforcement activity as well as the current economic downturn. Regardless of whether or not the
unauthorized alien population is decreasing, this population remains sizeable.
It is widely believed that most unauthorized aliens enter and remain in the United States in order
to work. While the most recent DHS and Pew Hispanic Center estimates did not include estimates
of the unauthorized alien workforce, the Center has provided such worker estimates in the past.
According to the Center, there were an estimated 7.2 million unauthorized workers in the U.S.

¹^Jeff^re^{y S}^.^P^a^ssel,^Uⁿ^au^th^or^iz^e^d^I^m^mⁱ^gr^ants^:^Tr^e^nds^{, C}^har^ac^te^rⁱ^s^tic^s^&^Sur^pr^is^e^s^,^Coⁿ^f^eren^{ce o}ⁿ^“T^h^e^Ro^l^e^o^f^L^o^cal
^P^o^lⁱ^ce,^{” S}^p^on^so^red^b^y^t^h^{e P}^o^lⁱ^ce^F^o^un^d^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^,^W^a^shⁱⁿ^gt^oⁿ^,^DC,^A^u^gu^st²¹^,²⁰⁰⁸^(h^ereaf^t^e^{r ci}^t^e^d^{as P}^a^ssel^,
^U^naut^hor^iz^e^d^I^m^mⁱ^gr^aⁿ^ts^{, 20}⁰⁸⁾^.
²^{U.S. De}^pa^rtm^e^{nt of}^Hom^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^rity^{, O}^f^fⁱ^c^e^o^f^I^m^mⁱ^g^r^a^{tion St}^a^tistic^s,^Estimate^s^of^the^Uⁿ^a^u^th^o^r^ize^d^Immigran^t
^Pop^u^latⁱ^oⁿ^Re^sⁱ^di^ngⁱⁿ^the^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^:^J^a^nu^ar^y²⁰⁰⁷^,^b^y^Mⁱ^ch^ael^Ho^ef^er,^Nan^c^y^R^y^tⁱⁿ^a,^an^d^Bryan^C.^Baker,
^Se^pte^m^be^r²⁰⁰⁸^.
³^Jeff^re^y^{S. P}^a^{ssel an}^d^D’V^e^{ra C}^o^hⁿ^,^Tr^e^nds^{in U}ⁿ^a^u^th^or^iz^e^d^I^m^mⁱ^gr^ati^on:^Uⁿ^d^o^c^u^m^e^nte^d^Iⁿ^fl^ow^N^o^w^Tr^ai^ls^Le^g^a^l
^Inflow^,^P^e^w^Hⁱ^s^p^aⁿ^ic^Ce^nte^r^{, O}^c^t^obe^{r 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
⁴^Ste^v^eⁿ^A^.^C^a^m^a^r^o^ta^a^{nd K}^a^r^e^{n J}^e^ns^eⁿ^ius^,^H^o^mewa^rd^B^o^un^d^:^R^ecen^t^Immi^g^r^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^Eⁿ^f^o^rcemen^t^an^{d t}^h^{e Decl}ⁱⁿ^{e i}ⁿ^t^h^e
^I^lle^{gal Alie}^{n Po}^pul^ati^oⁿ^,^B^a^c^k^g^r^o^unde^r^,^C^e^nte^r^f^o^r^I^m^mⁱ^g^r^a^{tion St}^udie^s^{, J}^u^ly²⁰⁰⁸^.

civilian labor force in March 2005 and an estimated 7.8 million in March 2006, representing
about two-thirds of the estimated unauthorized population each year. In both 2005 and 2006, ⁵
these unauthorized workers accounted for about 5% of the labor force.
As part of its 2005 unauthorized immigrant estimates, the Pew Hispanic Center analyzed the
unauthorized workforce. It found that in some occupations and industries, the unauthorized alien
share of the labor force was considerably higher than its 5% overall share. Table 1 presents 2005
data from the Center on industries with high concentrations of unauthorized workers.
Unauthorized immigrants accounted for about one in five workers in private households and ⁶
between 10% and 15% in the other industries shown.
Table 1. Estimates of Unauthorized Employment in Selected Industries, 2005
^{Industry Gr}^oup^Unautho^{rized Wo}^rkers^{(in Industry)}
^{Private Households}^21%
^{Food Manufactu}^ring^14%
^Agriculture^13%
^Furnitur^{e Ma}^nufa^cturing^13%
^Construction^12%
^{Textile, Apparel, and Leather}^Ma^nufact^uring^12%
^{Food Services}^12%
^{Administrative and Support}^Services^11%
^{Accommodation 10%}
^Source:^Jef^{frey S. Passel, Size and Characteristics of the}^Una^utho^{rized Migrant Population in the U}^.S.^{, Pew}
^{Hispanic Cente}^{r, Marc}^{h 7,}²⁰^06.

Section 274A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)⁷ prohibits employers from employing
individuals who they know are not authorized to work. More specifically, the INA §274A
provisions, sometimes referred to as employer sanctions, make it unlawful for an employer to
knowingly hire, recruit or refer for a fee, or continue to employ an alien who is not authorized to
be so employed. These provisions also make it unlawful for an employer to hire an individual for
employment without examining documents to verify his or her identity and work eligibility, and
completing and retaining verification forms, known as I-9 forms. These verification procedures,
commonly referred to as the I-9 process or the I-9 requirements, are separate from the largely

⁵^T^h^e^P^e^w^Hispaⁿ^ic^Ce^nte^{r’s una}^ut^horiz^e^d^a^lie^{n p}^o^p^u^la^ti^{on e}^s^tim^a^t^e^f^o^{r Ma}^rc^{h 20}⁰⁵^w^a^{s 11.1 m}^illion^a^{nd its e}^s^tim^a^t^e
^f^o^{r Ma}^rc^{h 20}⁰⁶^w^a^{s 11.5 m}^illion^.^Je^ff^re^y^{S. P}^a^sse^l,^Siz^e^an^{d C}^har^a^c^te^rⁱ^s^tic^s^{of the}^Uⁿ^aut^hor^iz^e^d^Mⁱ^gr^ant^Po^pu^lati^on
^{in t}^h^e^U^.^S.;^Es^tim^ate^s^B^a^s^e^d^on^t^h^e^M^a^r^c^{h 2}⁰⁰⁵^C^u^r^r^e^nt^Po^pu^lati^on^Sur^v^e^y^,^P^e^w^Hⁱ^s^p^aⁿ^ic^C^e^nte^r^,^Ma^r^c^{h 7,}²⁰⁰⁶
^(h^ereaf^t^e^{r ci}^t^e^d^{as P}^a^ssel^,^Siz^e^an^{d C}^h^ar^ac^te^rⁱ^s^tic^s^of^the^Uⁿ^aut^hor^iz^e^d^Mⁱ^gr^an^{t Po}^pu^lati^onⁱⁿ^the^U^.^S.^{, 20}⁰⁶⁾^{. P}^a^s^s^e^l,
^U^naut^hor^iz^e^d^I^m^mⁱ^gr^aⁿ^ts^{, 20}⁰⁸^.
⁶^P^a^ssel,^Siz^e^a^{nd C}^har^ac^te^rⁱ^s^tic^s^{of t}^h^e^Uⁿ^a^u^t^hor^iz^e^d^Mⁱ^gr^ant^Po^p^u^lati^onⁱⁿ^the^U^.^S.^{, 20}⁰⁶^.
⁷^A^c^{t of}^J^une^27,¹⁹^52,^c^h^.⁴⁷^{7, a}^s^am^e^nde^{d. T}^h^e^I^N^A^is^the^ba^sⁱ^s^of^c^u^r^r^e^{nt im}^mⁱ^g^r^a^{tion la}^w^.

voluntary E-Verify electronic employment eligibility verification system, which is administered ⁸
by DHS’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).
Enforcement of the prohibitions on unauthorized employment in INA §274A—or worksite
enforcement—has been the job of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) of the ⁹
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) since March 2003. Worksite enforcement is one
component of ICE’s responsibility to enforce federal immigration laws within the United States,
known as interior enforcement. Employers violating the INA §274A prohibitions on unlawful
employment may be subject to civil and/or criminal penalties.
The federal government’s approach to immigration-related worksite enforcement has changed
over the years. In 1999, for example, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) unveiled
a new interior enforcement strategy, which, as explained by an INS official at the time, gave
priority in the area of worksite enforcement to two types of cases: (1) criminal employer cases, in
which there was a pattern or practice of knowingly employing unauthorized workers, and (2) ¹⁰
cases of employers who abused their workers and who violated multiple laws. In the aftermath
of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, interior enforcement priorities again shifted.
Resources were redirected from traditional program areas, including worksite enforcement, to
national security-related investigations, and the primary focus of worksite enforcement became
removal of unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure facilities such as airports and ¹¹
military bases.
Homeland security remains a paramount concern of ICE’s worksite enforcement program today.
As described by ICE:
^T^h^{e W}^o^r^k^{site En}^f^o^r^c^e^m^en^{t U}ⁿ^it’^s^mⁱ^ss^ioⁿ^eⁿ^co^m^p^as^{ses e}ⁿ^f^o^r^c^e^m^en^{t ac}^tiv^itiesⁱⁿ^teⁿ^d^ed^to
^m^iti^g^a^{te t}^h^{e ris}^k^of^terroris^{t att}^ack^s^pos^{ed by}^un^a^u^t^h^orized^w^o^rk^er^s^em^p^l^oy^e^dⁱⁿ^s^e^cu^r^e^a^r^e^a^s
^o^f^o^u^rⁿ^a^tioⁿ^’^{s cr}^{itical i}ⁿ^f^r^a^s^tr^u^c^tu^r^e^{. I}ⁿ^o^r^d^e^r^to^f^u^lf^{ill t}^h^is^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^,^I^C^E^s^p^e^cⁱ^a^l^a^g^eⁿ^ts^a^p^p^l^y
^rⁱ^sk^a^sse^ss^m^eⁿ^t^p^rⁱⁿ^cip^l^es^to^t^h^eir^cr^iticalⁱⁿ^f^r^a^s^tr^u^c^t^u^r^e^aⁿ^d^w^o^r^k^{site e}ⁿ^f^o^r^c^e^m^eⁿ^{t ca}^sesⁱⁿ
^order^t^o^m^a^xi^mⁱ^{ze t}^h^{e i}^m^pact^o^f^ou^{r l}ⁱ^mⁱ^t^e^{d res}^o^u^r^ce^s^a^g^aⁱⁿ^s^t^t^h^e^m^o^s^t^sⁱ^gⁿⁱ^fⁱ^c^an^t^t^h^r^e^a^t^s^aⁿ^d¹²
^vⁱ^ol^at^ors^.
According to ICE, its worksite enforcement program also targets employers who commit
“egregious violations” of criminal statutes and engage in worker exploitation.

⁸^Forⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion a}^{nd r}^e^la^te^d^le^gⁱ^s^l^a^tion^on^E-^Ve^rⁱ^f^y^{, s}^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³⁴²^04,^I^m^mⁱ^gr^at^io^{n Le}^gis^l^at^ion^an^{d I}^s^s^u^e^sⁱⁿ
^the¹¹⁰^th^C^o^ng^ress^{, by}^A^ndor^r^a^B^r^un^{o e}^t^a^l^.
⁹^P^r^ior^to^Ma^rc^{h 1}^,²⁰⁰³^,^the^Im^mⁱ^g^r^a^{tion a}ⁿ^d^Na^tura^li^z^a^tio^{n Se}^r^v^ic^e⁽^I^N^S)^of^the^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^J^u^s^tic^e^w^a^s
^r^e^s^ponsⁱ^b^le^f^o^r^inte^rⁱ^or^eⁿ^f^o^r^c^e^m^{ent. T}^h^e^H^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^A^c^{t of}²⁰⁰²⁽^P^.L^{. 1}^07-²⁹⁶⁾^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^25,²⁰⁰²⁾
^a^bolis^he^{d I}^N^{S a}ⁿ^{d tr}^aⁿ^s^f^e^r^r^e^d^m^o^s^t^of^its^f^unc^tions^{to D}^H^S^a^s^of^Ma^r^c^{h 1,}²⁰^03.
¹⁰^Se^e^w^r^itte^{n sta}^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^Robe^rt^Ba^c^h^{, Ex}^e^c^u^tiv^e^Assocⁱ^a^t^e^Com^m^is^sione^{r f}^o^r^P^o^lic^y^a^nd^P^l^aⁿⁿⁱ^ng^{, INS, i}ⁿ^U.S^.
^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,^H^ous^e^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on the}^J^udicⁱ^a^r^y^,^Subc^om^m^itte^e^{on I}^m^mⁱ^g^r^a^{tion a}^{nd C}^l^aⁱ^m^s^,^I^m^mⁱ^gr^a^tion^a^nd^th^st
^Natura^lizati^oⁿ^Se^rv^ic^e^’^{s Inte}^{rior Enforc}^e^m^eⁿ^{t Strate}^gy^{, 10}⁶^Cong^{., 1}^s^e^s^s^{., J}^u^ly^1,¹⁹^{99 (}^W^a^s^hing^t^{on: G}^P^O^,²⁰⁰⁰⁾^,
^{p. 1}³^.
¹¹^For^f^u^r^t^he^r^dis^c^us^sⁱ^oⁿ^of^the^s^e^p^o^lic^y^s^h^if^ts^{, s}^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³³³⁵^1,^Immigrati^oⁿ^En^forc^e^m^eⁿ^t^W^{ithin t}^h^e^Uni^t^e^d
^State^s^,^by^A^lis^{on Sis}^k^{in e}^t^a^l^.
¹²^A^de^s^c^rⁱ^ption^of^the^I^C^{E w}^o^r^k^s^ite^eⁿ^f^o^r^c^em^eⁿ^{t pr}^og^r^a^m^is^avai^l^a^b^l^{e o}ⁿ^t^h^{e agen}^cy^’^s^web^sⁱ^t^e^,^at^h^t^t^p^:^/^/^www^.ⁱ^ce.^go^v.

As discussed above, employers who violate INA prohibitions on the unlawful employment of
aliens may be subject to civil and/or criminal penalties.
Under INA §274A, civil money penalties can be imposed for failing to comply with the I-9
employment verification requirements and for knowingly hiring, recruiting or referring for a fee, ¹³
or continuing to employ an unauthorized alien. A person or entity determined to have violated
the I-9 requirements may be subject to a fine of not less than $110 and not more than $1,100 for
each individual with respect to whom a violation occurred. A person or entity found to have
engaged in hiring, recruiting, referring, or employing violations may be subject to a cease and
desist order and to fines, as follows:
• for a first offense, not less than $275 and not more than $2,200 for each
unauthorized alien with respect to whom the offense occurred before March 27,
2008, and not less than $375 and not more than $3,200 for each unauthorized
alien with respect to whom the offense occurred on or after March 27, 2008;
• for a second offense, not less than $2,200 and not more than $5,500 for each
unauthorized alien with respect to whom the offense occurred before March 27,
2008, and not less than $3,200 and not more than $6,500 for each unauthorized
alien with respect to whom the offense occurred on or after March 27, 2008; and
• for more than two offenses, not less than $3,300 and not more than $11,000 for
each unauthorized alien with respect to whom the third or later offense occurred
before March 27, 2008, and not less than $4,300 and not more than $16,000 for
each unauthorized alien with respect to whom the third or subsequent offense
occurred on or after March 27, 2008.
If ICE believes that an employer has committed a civil violation, the agency may issue the
employer a Notice of Intent to Fine (NIF). A NIF may result in a Final Order for civil money
penalties, a settlement, or a dismissal.
Under INA §274A, employers convicted of having engaged in a pattern or practice of knowingly
hiring or continuing to employ unauthorized aliens may face criminal fines and/or imprisonment.
They may be fined not more than $3,000 for each unauthorized alien with respect to whom the
violation occurred and/or imprisoned for not more than six months for the entire pattern or
practice.
Criminal investigations may result in employers and other individuals being charged with crimes
other than unlawful employment, such as document fraud or harboring unauthorized aliens, and
being subject to the relevant penalties for those violations.

¹³^C^u^r^r^e^{nt f}ⁱ^ne^a^m^ounts^a^r^e^s^e^{t f}^o^r^t^{h in}^{8 C}^.^F.R^.^§²⁷⁴^a^.¹⁰^{. T}^h^e^y^r^e^f^l^e^c^t^inc^r^e^a^s^e^s^tha^t^took^e^f^f^e^c^t^{in 1}⁹⁹⁹^aⁿ^d²⁰⁰⁸
^pur^s^u^aⁿ^{t t}^o^t^h^e^D^e^{bt C}^o^lle^c^tion^I^m^pr^ov^em^eⁿ^{t A}^c^{t of}^{1996 (}^P^.L^{. 10}^4-¹^34,^A^p^r^{il 26}^{, 1}⁹⁹⁶⁾^.

A variety of measures can be used to assess the performance of the DHS worksite enforcement
program. Over the years, such assessments have been complicated by data reporting problems,
the existence of conflicting data, and other issues. Unless otherwise noted, all data presented here
were provided directly to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) by ICE on July 1, 2008. The
paucity of comparable and/or reliable data for the pre-ICE worksite enforcement program, as
indicated by ICE to CRS, however, limits the ability to place the recent performance data in
historical context.
As discussed above, INA §274A establishes civil penalties for violations of the I-9 requirements
and for unlawful employment. According to ICE, from the beginning of FY2003 through June 16,
2008, the agency issued Final Orders against 85 employers for civil monetary penalties (also
known as civil or administrative fines) totaling $1,428,179. Table 2 provides annual data on Final ¹⁴
Orders for civil money penalties and associated administrative fine collections for this period. ¹⁵
As of June 16, 2008, ICE had collected $633,143 of the original fine total of $1,428,179.
As shown in Table 2, issuances of Final Orders and administrative fine collections decreased
from FY2003 to FY2006, when both measures equaled “0.” Since FY2006, both measures have
posted gains. At the same time, employers receiving Final Orders in any year shown represent ¹⁶
less than .001% of U.S. employers.
Table 2. Final Orders and Administrative Fine Collections, FY2003-FY2008
^Fiscal^{Number of Final}^{Administrative}
^Year^{Orders Issued}^{Fines Collected}
²⁰⁰^{3 52}^$26^7,48⁰
²⁰⁰^{4 10}^$87,9⁴⁶
²⁰⁰^{5 10}^$27,5⁴⁷
²⁰⁰^{6 0}^$0
²⁰⁰^{7 2}^$26,5⁶⁰
²⁰⁰⁸^a¹¹^$22^3,61⁰
^Source:^{CRS prese}^{ntation of data from U.S. Department of Hom}^{eland Security, Immigration and}^Customs
^Enforce^{ment, J}^{uly 1, 2}⁰⁰^8.

¹⁴^I^C^{E w}^a^s^una^ble^to^pr^ov^ide^aⁿ^y^da^ta^{in J}^u^ly²⁰⁰⁸^{on N}^o^tic^e^s^of^Iⁿ^t^e^{nt to}^Fine⁽^N^I^F^s⁾^{; c}^o^nf^lic^ting^N^I^{F da}^ta^a^p^pe^a^rⁱⁿ
^dif^f^e^r^eⁿ^{t r}^e^por^ts^aⁿ^{d c}^o^ng^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l te}^s^tim^ony^{. I}^C^{E a}^l^s^o^w^a^s^una^ble^{to pr}^ov^ide^da^ta^on^Fi^na^{l O}^r^de^r^s^a^{nd f}ⁱ^ne^c^o^lle^c^tⁱ^ons
^pr^ior^to^FY²⁰⁰³^“^due^{to s}^y^s^t^em^cons^tr^aⁱⁿ^t^s^aⁿ^d^the^m^e^r^g^e^r^of^I^N^S^a^{nd C}^u^s^t^om^s^dur^ing^FY^03.”^A^c^c^o^r^d^ing^t^o^da^ta
^c^onf^ir^m^e^{d by}^I^C^{E in Fe}^br^ua^r^y^2008,^how^e^v^e^r^{, the}^r^e^w^e^r^e^be^tw^ee^{n 500}^aⁿ^d^1,¹⁰^{0 F}ⁱ^na^{l O}^r^de^r^s^f^o^r^cⁱ^v^{il m}^oney
^p^eⁿ^a^{lties issu}^ed^each^y^ear^f^r^o^m^F^Y¹⁹⁹¹^t^o^FY¹⁹⁹⁸^,^b^e^tw^een²⁰⁰^an^d³⁵⁰^Fiⁿ^a^{l Ord}^e^{rs issu}^e^d^each^y^{ear f}^r^o^m^FY¹⁹⁹⁹
^{to FY}²⁰^01,^a^nd⁹¹^Fi^na^{l O}^r^de^r^sⁱ^s^s^u^e^dⁱⁿ^FY²⁰⁰²^.
¹⁵^Som^e^e^m^ploy^e^r^{s a}^r^e^{on pa}^y^m^eⁿ^{t sc}^he^dule^s^tha^t^eⁿ^a^b^le^t^h^e^m^{to pa}^y^cⁱ^v^{il m}^one^y^pe^na^ltie^{s ov}^e^r^a^num^be^{r of}^y^e^a^r^s.
¹⁶^A^c^c^o^rding^t^o^the^U^.^{S. Ce}^ns^{us Bu}^re^a^u^{’s Sta}^tistic^{s of}^U.^{S. Busi}^ne^sse^{s (SUSB), the}^r^e^w^e^re^a^l^m^o^{st 6 m}^illio^{n f}ⁱ^rm^{s in}
^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^{es i}ⁿ²⁰⁰⁵^.^S^U^S^B^d^a^t^a^{are avai}^l^a^b^l^{e o}ⁿ^t^h^{e Ce}ⁿ^s^u^s^Bu^reau^{’s w}^e^b^sⁱ^t^e^,^at^h^t^t^p^:^/^/^www^.^c^en^su^s.^go^v.

^Note:^{Administrative fines may b}^e^{collected in the same fiscal year}^{that the}^{associated final order is issued, or in}
^{one or more su}^bse^que^{nt years.}
^a.^{As of Ju}^{ne 1}^{6, 20}^08.
ICE maintains that relying mainly on administrative fines to deter unlawful employment is not an
effective strategy and that administrative fine collections do not adequately reflect the agency’s ¹⁷
worksite enforcement efforts. In April 2008 congressional testimony, DHS Secretary Michael
Chertoff highlighted administrative and criminal arrests in worksite enforcement operations as ¹⁸
evidence of the progress being made by ICE on the worksite enforcement front. Administrative
arrests are for civil violations of the INA, such as being illegally present in the United States.
Only a noncitizen can be the subject of an administrative arrest, which represents an initial step in
the process of removing an alien from the United States. Criminal arrests include arrests for
illegal hiring as well as for identity theft, alien harboring, money laundering, and other criminal
violations. Both citizens and noncitizens can be the subject of criminal arrests.
Table 3. Administrative and Criminal Arrests in Worksite Enforcement Operations,
FY2001-FY2008
^Fiscal^{Number of I}^{ndividuals A}^rres^ted^{Number of I}^{ndividuals A}^rres^ted
^Year^{on A}^{dministrative Charges}^{on Criminal C}^har^ges
²⁰⁰^{3 445}⁷²
²⁰⁰^{4 685}¹⁶⁵
²⁰⁰^{5 1,11}⁶¹⁷⁶
²⁰⁰^{6 3,66}⁷⁷¹⁶
²⁰⁰^{7 4,07}⁸⁶³
²⁰⁰⁸^a^3,05¹⁸⁸²
^Sources:^{CRS prese}^{ntation of data from Statement of t}^{he Ho}^{norable Michael Chertof}^{f, Secretary}^U.S.
^Department^{of Homeland Securit}^{y Before the U}^{nited States Senat}^{e Judiciary Committee, Februar}^y^{28, 2}⁰⁰⁷
^(FY2003-FY20⁰⁴^{data), and Depa}^{rtment of}^{Homeland Security, Im}^{migration and Customs E}^nforcem^{ent, July 1,}
²⁰⁰^{8 (FY20}^05-FY2⁰⁰^{8 data).}
^a.^{As of Ju}^{ne 1}^{4, 20}^08.
During FY2003-FY2006, the number of administrative and criminal arrests in worksite
enforcement operations increased markedly (see Table 3). Since then, there has been steady ¹⁹
growth in both types of arrests. These arrests, however, represent a very small percentage of the
potential population of violators. For example, Table 3 shows 3,667 administrative arrests in
worksite operations in FY2006, while, according to the Pew Hispanic Center, there were an

¹⁷^Se^e^,^f^o^{r e}^x^a^m^ple^,^w^r^itte^{n sta}^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^ICE^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^Ma^tthe^w^A^lle^{n, in U.S}^.^Co^ng^re^{ss, House}^Com^m^itte^e^on
^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt R}^e^f^o^r^m^{, Subc}^om^mⁱ^t^t^e^e^{on R}^e^g^u^la^tor^y^A^f^f^a^ir^s^,^{Is the}^Fe^de^{ral Gov}^e^r^nmeⁿ^{t D}^oⁱⁿ^{g Al}^{l It}^{Can t}^o^Ste^m^the^th^nd
^Tide^o^f^I^lle^g^a^{l I}^m^mⁱ^gr^ati^oⁿ^?^h^earⁱⁿ^g,¹⁰⁹^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,²^s^e^s^s^{., J}^u^l^y^{25, 20}^{06 (}^W^a^s^hing^t^{on: G}^P^O^,²⁰⁰⁷⁾^,^pp.⁴³^-⁵^3.
¹⁸^Se^e^T^e^sti^m^on^y^of^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^Mic^h^a^e^l^Che^r^tof^f^be^f^o^re^the^House^S^ubc^om^m^itte^e^{on Hom}^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity
^A^ppropria^ti^{ons, A}^p^ril¹⁰^{, 2}⁰⁰⁸^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^{on t}^h^e^{DHS w}^e^bsite^{, a}^t^h^ttp://w^ww^.dhs.g^ov^.
¹⁹^ICEⁿ^e^w^s^rel^ease^s^oⁿ^recen^t^w^o^rksi^t^e^en^f^o^rce^m^en^tⁱⁿ^vestⁱ^g^atⁱ^oⁿ^s^{are avai}^l^a^b^l^{e o}ⁿ^t^h^{e agen}^cy^’s^w^e^b^sⁱ^t^e^,^at
^http:^//www^.ic^e^.^g^o^v^.

estimated 7.8 million unauthorized aliens in the U.S. civilian labor force that year.²⁰ With respect
to criminal arrests, the potential population of employers and workers committing worksite-
related criminal violations is not known.
In its FY2006 annual report, ICE described using criminal prosecution and asset forfeiture as
tools against employers of unauthorized aliens. According to the report,
^IC^{E bel}ⁱ^e^v^e^s^t^h^at^cri^mⁱⁿ^a^l^l^y^c^h^argⁱ^ng^an^{d s}^eⁱ^zⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{e as}^s^e^t^s^{of u}ⁿ^s^c^ru^pul^ou^s^e^m^pl^o^y^ers^wⁱ^l^l²¹
^{create th}^{e k}ⁱⁿ^d^of^deterren^{ce t}^h^at^w^a^s^prev^io^u^s^l^y^abs^eⁿ^tⁱⁿ^w^o^rks^{ite e}ⁿ^f^o^rce^m^eⁿ^{t e}^f^f^o^rts^.
Table 4 provides data on criminal prosecutions related to worksite enforcement investigations for
FY2005-FY2008. These data build on the criminal arrest data in Table 3. It is difficult to draw ²²
conclusions from these data, however, because they cover such a short period.
Table 4. Criminal Indictments and Convictions Related to Worksite Enforcement
Investigations, FY2005-FY2008
^{Fiscal Year}^Indictments^Convictions
²⁰⁰^{5 254}¹⁵⁶
²⁰⁰^{6 411}³⁴⁰
²⁰⁰^{7 750}⁵⁶¹
²⁰⁰⁸^a^{596 631}
^Source:^{CRS prese}^{ntation of data from U.S. Department of Hom}^{eland Security, Immigration and}^Customs
^Enforce^{ment, J}^{uly 1, 2}⁰⁰^8.
^Note:^{A conviction may occur in}^{the same}^{year as t}^{he r}^{elated indi}^{ctment or in a}^su^bseq^uent^year.
^a.^{As of Ju}^{ne 1}^{4, 20}^08.
It is important to note that the decision to seek an indictment and/or conviction rests with the
Department of Justice’s U.S. Attorneys, not with ICE. In a September 2008 Washington Post
article on the federal government’s worksite enforcement strategy, an ICE spokeswoman was
quoted as saying that “prosecutorial discretion is certainly a key issue.” She noted that different
U.S. Attorneys set “different thresholds and different bars based on different ... priorities or ²³
degrees of interest in pursuing those sorts of cases.”

²⁰^Je^ff^re^y^{S. P}^a^sse^{l, S}ⁱ^z^e^a^{nd C}^h^a^r^a^c^t^e^r^istic^{s of}^the^Una^u^th^oriz^e^d^Mⁱ^g^r^aⁿ^{t Pop}^u^la^ti^on^{in t}^h^e^U.S.^{; Esti}^m^a^te^{s Ba}^s^e^{d on}
^the^Ma^r^c^h²⁰^{05 C}^u^r^r^e^nt^Po^pula^tⁱ^on^Sur^v^e^y^{, P}^e^w^Hⁱ^s^p^aⁿ^ic^C^e^nte^r^,^Ma^r^c^{h 7,}²⁰⁰⁶^{. F}^o^r^f^u^r^t^he^r^dis^c^us^sⁱ^on^of^the^s^e
^e^s^ti^m^a^te^s^,^s^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³³⁹^73,^Uⁿ^a^u^th^or^iz^e^d^Em^ploy^m^e^ntⁱⁿ^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^:^I^s^s^u^e^s^a^{nd O}^p^ti^ons^{, by}^A^ndor^r^a
^B^r^uno^.
²¹^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^H^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{, U}^.^{S. I}^m^mⁱ^g^r^a^{tion a}^{nd C}^u^s^t^om^s^Enf^o^r^c^em^eⁿ^t,^I^C^{E Fis}^c^al^Y^e^ar²⁰⁰⁶^An^nu^al
^Re^por^t^{, p. 7.}
²²^Co^m^p^arab^l^e^d^a^t^a^{are n}^o^t^avai^l^a^b^l^{e f}^o^{r earl}ⁱ^e^r^y^e^ars.
²³^Quote^dⁱⁿ^Speⁿ^c^e^r^{S. Hsu,}^“^R^aⁱ^d^’^{s Outc}^om^e^Ma^y^Sigⁿ^a^l^a^Re^tre^a^t^{in Im}^mⁱ^g^r^a^{tion Stra}^te^gy^{, Critic}^{s Sa}^y^,^”^W^a^s^h^ingt^on
^Post^{, Se}^pte^m^be^r^{2, 2}⁰⁰⁸^,^{p. A}^13.

Table 5 provides data on criminal fines and forfeitures related to worksite enforcement
investigations that were imposed in FY2003-FY2008. ICE characterizes these data as follows:
^C^rⁱ^mⁱⁿ^al^fin^e^s^aⁿ^d^f^o^rf^eit^u^resⁱⁿ^clu^d^e^fⁱⁿ^e^sⁱ^m^pos^{ed b}^y^{a U.S.}^Dis^t^rict^C^o^u^r^{t as}^{a res}^u^lt^{of a}
^c^rⁱ^mⁱⁿ^a^l^c^o^nvi^c^tⁱ^o^n,^seⁱ^z^ur^e^s^ma^d^e^b^y^I^C^E^aⁿ^d^fo^r^f^eⁱ^t^e^d^t^o^t^h^e^U^.^S.^go^ve^rⁿ^me^nt^,^p^a^ymeⁿ^t^s
^m^a^d^e^to^I^C^{E in}^lieu^o^f^th^{e seiz}^u^r^{e an}^d^f^o^r^f^eit^u^r^e^o^f^r^{eal o}^r^p^e^r^s^oⁿ^{al p}^r^o^p^e^r^t^y^,^an^d^r^e^stitu^tioⁿ
^p^a^ymeⁿ^t^s^ma^d^e^b^y^aⁿ^e^m^p^l^o^y^e^r^t^o^t^h^eⁱ^r^una^ut^ho^rⁱ^z^e^d^a^lⁱ^e^{n e}^m^pl^oy^ee^s^as^a^res^u^l^t^of^l^a^bor^l^a^w
^vⁱ^olations^{. Du}^{e to s}^y^s^t^e^m^coⁿ^s^traiⁿ^t^s^,^IC^E^m^a^nu^all^y^tracks^cri^mⁱⁿ^{al f}ⁱⁿ^e^an^{d f}^o^rf^e^itu^re²⁴
^statistⁱ^cs.
As shown in Table 5, worksite enforcement-related criminal fines and forfeitures have varied
dramatically during FY2003-FY2008, although they have remained well above the FY2003 level
in all subsequent years. In light of the number of factors that contribute to determining the total
for any year (as indicated in the above description from ICE), which presumably helps explain the
great annual variability, it may be that the total for any particular year is less significant than the
fact that criminal fines and forfeitures were being pursued.
Table 5. Criminal Fines and Forfeitures Related to Worksite Enforcement
Investigations, FY2003-FY2008
^{Fiscal Year}^{Criminal Fines and For}^{feitures Imposed}
²⁰⁰³^$3^7,51⁴
²⁰⁰⁴^$2,9^29,0⁰⁰
²⁰⁰^{5 $15,8}^22,1
²⁰⁰⁶^$2^33,0⁴⁴
²⁰⁰^{7 $31,4}^26,4⁴³
²⁰⁰⁸^a^$9,4^22,7⁵⁷
^Source:^{CRS prese}^{ntation of data from U.S. Department of Hom}^{eland Security, Immigration and}^Customs
^Enforce^{ment, J}^{uly 1, 2}⁰⁰^8.
^a.^{As of Ju}^{ne 3}^{0, 20}^08.
In summary, the data presented here offer an available, but limited, means to examine the
performance of ICE’s worksite enforcement program. Some measures, namely issuances of Final
Orders, administrative fine collections, and administrative arrests, follow a downward trend in the
initial years included and then an upward trend in more recent years. Other measures, namely
criminal indictments and criminal convictions for which data are available only for more recent
years, as well as criminal arrests, register increases throughout the period included. The data on
criminal fines and forfeitures imposed, the remaining measure, reveal no discernible pattern.
More generally, the values of the various measures for the years shown seem quite small relative
to the estimated size of the unauthorized alien workforce.

²⁴^E-^m^a^il^f^r^om^I^C^{E to C}^R^S^{, J}^u^ly^1,²⁰⁰^8.

While the authority to enforce the employer sanctions provisions rests with DHS, INA §274A
does grant DOL the authority to review I-9 verification forms (see above). Under INA
§274A(b)(3), employers must make completed I-9 forms available to DOL officers for inspection.
DOL has separate authority to enforce federal labor laws, including the Fair Labor Standards Act ²⁵
(FLSA), which establishes minimum wage, overtime pay, youth employment, and other
standards.
The Wage and Hour Division (WHD) of the DOL’s Employment Standards Administration (ESA)
administers and enforces the FLSA with respect to private sector workers, state and local
government employees, and certain federal employees. In 2006 congressional hearing testimony,
a WHD official described the agency’s “primary responsibility” as “the effective enforcement of
labor laws to ensure that all covered workers, irrespective of their immigration status, are ²⁶
afforded full benefits and protections.” In light of this mission, DOL officials historically have
been cautious about delving into questions of work authorization. As reported in a 2007 paper by
Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of International Migration (ISIM):
^L^a^{bor inv}^e^s^t^ig^ators^e^x^pres^s^con^cern^th^at^th^eⁱ^rⁱⁿ^cr^ea^sedⁱⁿ^v^o^l^v^e^m^eⁿ^tⁱⁿ^e^m^p^l^o^y^er^saⁿ^c^tioⁿ^s
^mⁱ^g^h^tⁱ^m^p^e^d^e^th^eir^ab^ili^t^y^to^g^aⁱⁿ^t^h^{e tr}^u^s^t^o^f^illeg^a^{l alie}ⁿ^s^wh^o^m^a^y^b^e^th^e^vⁱ^ctⁱ^m^{s o}^f^lab^o^r²⁷
^vⁱ^ol^atⁱ^ons^an^{d pot}^en^tⁱ^a^l^wⁱ^tⁿ^e^s^s^e^s^ag^ai^ns^t^e^m^pl^o^y^ers^.
A memorandum of understanding between DOL and DHS that has been in effect since 1998²⁸
describes the respective enforcement roles and responsibilities of each agency. Under the 1998
MOU, WHD investigators are to inspect employer compliance with I-9 requirements in
conjunction with labor standards enforcement only in directed investigations, that is,
investigations not based on complaints. According to the MOU, this limitation “is intended and
will be implemented so as to avoid discouraging complaints from unauthorized workers who may
be victims of labor standards violations by their employer.” During these compliance inspections,
WHD investigators are not to make inquiries about workers’ immigration status and are not to
issue warning notices or Notices of Intent to Fine. All suspected serious violations uncovered by
WHD during these investigations are to be promptly referred to DHS.
While DOL’s direct role in immigration-related worksite enforcement is quite limited, some
maintain that the agency helps reduce unauthorized employment indirectly through its
enforcement of labor laws. This argument is premised on the belief that many employers who
employ unauthorized aliens also violate labor laws. The 2007 ISIM paper notes that employers
have different propensities to hire unauthorized workers, and describes a category of employers

²⁵^A^c^{t of}^J^une^25,¹⁹^38,^c^h^.⁶⁷^{6, a}^s^am^e^nde^d.
²⁶^W^r^itte^{n sta}^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^W^HD^A^c^tin^g^A^d^mⁱ^nistra^{tor A}^l^f^r^e^d^{B. Robi}^ns^{on, Jr}^{., i}ⁿ^U.S^.^Co^ng^re^{ss, House}^Com^m^itte^e^on
^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt R}^e^f^o^r^m^{, Subc}^om^mⁱ^t^t^e^e^{on R}^e^g^u^la^tor^y^A^f^f^a^ir^s^,^{Is the}^Fe^de^{ral Gov}^e^r^nmeⁿ^{t D}^oⁱⁿ^{g Al}^{l It}^{Can t}^o^Ste^m^the^th^nd
^Flow^{of I}^lle^{gal I}^m^mⁱ^gr^ati^oⁿ^?^h^earⁱⁿ^g,¹⁰⁹^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,²^s^e^s^s^{., J}^u^l^y^{25, 20}^{06 (}^W^a^s^hing^t^{on: G}^P^O^,²⁰⁰⁷⁾^,^p.^28.
²⁷^{B. L}ⁱ^nds^a^y^L^o^w^e^{ll, Sus}^a^{n F.}^Ma^{rtin, a}^nd^Mic^a^h^N^.^B^u^m^p^,^W^o^r^k^s^ite^Sol^utio^ns^t^o^Uⁿ^aut^hor^iz^e^d^Mⁱ^gr^atioⁿ^{, I}ⁿ^stit^ute
^f^o^{r the}^Stu^d^y^of^Inte^rna^tiona^l^Mig^r^a^tion,^G^e^org^e^to^wⁿ^Univ^e^r^sit^y^{, Oc}^tobe^{r 2}⁰⁰⁷^,^p.¹²^(he^r^e^a^f^te^{r c}^ite^{d a}^s^Wo^rksite
^Sol^utio^ns^t^o^Uⁿ^aut^hor^iz^e^d^Mⁱ^gr^at^ion^).
²⁸^T^h^e^MO^U^w^a^s^or^ig^ina^lly^sⁱ^gⁿ^e^d^by^ESA^a^{nd the}^I^m^mⁱ^g^r^a^{tion a}ⁿ^d^N^a^tur^a^liz^a^tion^Se^r^v^ic^e^of^the^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}
^Justic^e^.^{It is a}^v^a^ila^bleⁱⁿ^Iⁿ^terp^ret^e^{r Relea}^s^es^,^vo^l^.⁷⁵^,^no^.⁴⁷^(Decem^b^e^{r 1}⁴^,¹⁹⁹⁸^),^p^p^.¹⁷¹¹^-17²¹^.^DHS^an^d^DOL
^ha^v^e^be^g^{un dis}^c^us^sⁱ^ons^a^b^out^u^p^d^a^ting^the¹⁹⁹⁸^MO^U^.^E-^m^a^{il f}^r^o^m^I^C^{E to C}^R^S^{, O}^c^to^be^r²⁸^,²⁰^08.

that “knowingly hire[s] unauthorized workers to exploit their labor.” According to the paper,
“such employers may pay salaries in cash, failing to pay their share of social security taxes; and
they may seek unauthorized workers because they are less likely to complain about ill ²⁹
treatment.” Thus, with respect to unauthorized employment, enforcement of minimum wage,
overtime, and other statutory requirements may serve as a means of reducing the economic
incentives to hire unauthorized workers and thus result in decreased demand for these workers. In
a New York Times article about worker centers that assist immigrants, Mark Krikorian of CIS
explained this argument, as follows:
^[^T^he^w^o^r^k^e^r^c^eⁿ^t^e^r^s^]^he^l^p^p^e^op^l^e^s^tⁱ^f^fe^d^o^u^t^o^f^t^h^eⁱ^r^wa^ge^s^.^Th^at^can^s^e^r^v^e^a^pu^rpos^e^becau^s^e
^{it r}^a^{ises t}^h^{e p}^r^{ice o}^f^hⁱ^rⁱⁿ^g^il^leg^a^{l alien}^s^{, an}^d^t^h^e^m^o^r^e^{it co}^st^s^to^hⁱ^r^e^ille^g^a^{l alie}ⁿ^s^{, t}^h^e^m^o^r^e³⁰
^e^m^p^l^o^y^er^s^mⁱ^g^h^t^t^u^rⁿ^to^leg^a^l^w^o^r^k^er^s.
Others, such as former WHD Administrator Maria Echaveste, however, point out the limitations
of using labor law enforcement to address unauthorized employment. They argue that many
employers who hire unauthorized immigrants do not violate wage and hour laws. According to
Echaveste:
^I^kⁿ^o^w^fⁱ^r^s^t^h^an^d^t^h^at^m^aⁿ^y^e^m^p^l^o^y^er^s^w^h^o^co^m^p^l^y^wⁱ^t^h^o^t^h^e^r^lab^o^r^stan^d^a^r^d^{s still h}ⁱ^r^e^t^h^e
^uⁿ^docum^eⁿ^t^e^{d. Many}^busⁱⁿ^esses^pay^t^h^e^mⁱⁿⁱ^m^u^m^w^a^ge^aⁿ^d^ha^ve^b^a^r^e^l^y^t^o^l^e^r^a^b^l^e^w^o^rkⁱⁿ^g
^coⁿ^d^itioⁿ^s^b^ecau^{se th}^{ere are su}^ff^icien^t^uⁿ^d^o^c^u^m^eⁿ^ted^w^o^r^k^er^s^wⁱ^lliⁿ^g^to^{accept th}^os^{e ter}^m^s^.
^If^w^e^{care abou}^t^lo^w^-ⁱⁿ^co^m^e^work^ers^{in th}ⁱ^s^c^oun^tr^y^,^w^eⁿ^{eed to create pres}^s^u^{re to i}^m^prov^e³¹
^th^eir^ecoⁿ^o^mⁱ^{c co}ⁿ^d^itioⁿ^b^y^r^e^d^u^cin^g^th^e^su^p^p^l^y^o^f^uⁿ^a^u^th^o^rⁱ^zed^w^o^r^k^er^s.
To the extent that some employers of unauthorized aliens violate labor standards, WHD’s
compliance activities in low-wage industries may be particularly relevant to efforts to reduce
unauthorized employment. In FY2007, WHD devoted almost 40% of its enforcement resources to
investigations in the nine low-wage industries in Table 6. There is significant overlap between
these industries and those listed in Table 1 as having high concentrations of unauthorized
workers. For example, both tables include restaurants/food services, agriculture, hotels and
motels/accommodations, and garment/apparel manufacturing. This overlap suggests that WHD’s
enforcement activities may affect employers of unauthorized workers. In FY2007, as indicated in
Table 6, WHD collected $52.7 million in back wages for FLSA overtime and minimum wage
violations for 86,560 workers. Top industries in terms of the amount of back wages collected
were restaurants, health care, guard services, and janitorial services. In terms of the number of
employees receiving back wages, the leading industries were restaurants, health care, guard
services, agriculture, and janitorial services.

²⁹^W^o^r^k^s^ite^Sol^utio^ns^t^o^Uⁿ^aut^hor^iz^e^d^Mⁱ^gr^ati^oⁿ^{, p.}^vⁱ^-v^ii.
³⁰^A^t^the^s^a^m^e^ti^m^e^{, K}^r^ik^oria^{n e}^x^pre^s^s^e^{d opp}^os^iti^{on t}^o^w^o^rk^e^r^c^eⁿ^te^rs^a^s^“^l^obbie^s^f^o^{r ille}^g^a^{l a}^lie^ns^.”^St^e^v^eⁿ
^G^r^ee^nhous^e^,^“^I^m^m^ig^r^a^{nt W}^o^r^k^e^r^{s Fin}^d^S^u^p^por^tⁱⁿ^a^G^r^ow^ing^N^e^t^w^or^k^of^A^s^sⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^C^e^nte^r^s^,^”^{New Yo}^rk^Times^{, A}^p^ril
^23,²⁰⁰⁶^{, s}^e^c^.^1,^p.²²^.
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Table 6. Cases and Back Wage Collections in Low-Wage Industries: FY2007
^{Number of}^{Back Wages}^{Number of}^Employees
^Industry^Cases^Collected^{Receiving Back Wages}
^{Restaurants 4,46}⁹^$17,4^32,8⁰⁵^27,6⁶¹
^{Agriculture 1,66}⁷^$3,18^6,85⁴^8,67¹
^{Health Care}^1,43¹^$9,89^9,41⁷^17,4⁸⁸
^{Hotels & Motels}⁸⁸⁰^$2,12^5,79⁷^4,24⁶
^Gua^{rd Services}⁷²⁹^$7,54^5,70⁴^11,5⁸⁴
^{Day Care}⁷¹¹^$1,18^1,53⁹^3,19¹
^Garme^{nt Ma}^nufa^cturing⁶⁷⁶^$2,89^1,47⁵^3,44⁹
^{Janitorial Services}⁴⁶⁴^$6,97^2,36²^8,42⁰
^{Temporary Help}³⁵⁵^$1,48^6,72⁸^1,85⁰
^{Total 11,3}⁸²^$52,7^22,⁶⁸¹^86,5⁶⁰
^Source:^Depart^{ment of}^{Labor, E}^{mployment Training Administrati}^{on, Wage and Hour Division.}
Table 7 provides data on low-wage industry cases and back wage collections for FLSA overtime
and minimum wage violations for FY2003-FY2007. As shown in Table 7, the number of cases in
low-wage industries decreased each year from FY2003 to FY2006 and then increased from
FY2006 to FY2007. Despite this general reduction in cases, however, back wage collections
increased throughout the period. With respect to the number of employees receiving back wages,
this number increased until 2005 and then began to decrease. In addition, when considered in the
larger context of the potential number of employers in these low-wage industries that may be
violating FLSA requirements with respect to unauthorized workers, or workers generally, the
numbers in Table 6 and Table 7, as in the ICE data tables, can seem quite small.
Table 7. Cases and Back Wage Collections in Low-Wage Industries: FY2003-FY2007
^{Number of}^{Back Wages}^{Number of}^Employees
^{Fiscal Year}^Cases^Collected^{Receiving Back Wages}
²⁰⁰^{3 12,9}⁶²^$39,5^95,3⁸²^80,7⁷²
²⁰⁰^{4 12,6}²⁵^$43,1^41,9¹¹^84,8⁹⁷
²⁰⁰^{5 12,4}⁶⁸^$45,7^83,7⁴³^96,5¹¹
²⁰⁰^{6 11,1}⁷²^$50,5^66,6⁶¹^86,7⁸⁰
²⁰⁰^{7 11,3}⁸²^$52,7^22,6⁸¹^86,5⁶⁰
^Source:^Depart^{ment of}^{Labor, E}^{mployment Training Administrati}^{on, Wage and Hour Division.}

In light of the current economic difficulties and the advent of President-elect Obama’s new
Administration, the future of worksite enforcement is unclear. These economic and political
changes could result in scaled-back worksite enforcement programs at DHS and DOL, if, for
example, less funding were made available for such activities. On the other hand, especially if
unemployment rates were to rise significantly, policymakers could opt to bolster worksite

enforcement efforts at one or both agencies with the goal of protecting the jobs and working
conditions of U.S. workers. Of course, it could be that these countervailing pressures—or other
considerations or priorities—result in maintenance of the status quo and that worksite
enforcement continues to look much like it does today. Another possibility would be a shift of
emphasis from DHS worksite enforcement with its explicit focus on unauthorized employment to
DOL enforcement with its immigration status-neutral focus on labor law violations. While some
may see such a shift as a viable means of achieving key policy and political goals, it likely would
be highly controversial.
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