Training the Military to Manage Contractors During Expeditionary Operations: Overview and Options for Congress








Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress



The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for performing a wide range of expeditionary
missions, including domestic emergency operations and military operations outside of the
continental United States. DOD increasingly relies on contractors during expeditionary operations
to perform a wide range of services. For example, more contractors are working for DOD in Iraq
and Afghanistan than are U.S. military personnel. As a result, military personnel in the field are
increasingly interacting with and responsible for managing contractors. Yet many observers argue
that the military is not sufficiently prepared to manage contractors during expeditionary missions.
The National Defense Authorization Act of FY2008 (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181) required DOD, and
especially the Army, to train military personnel who are outside the acquisition workforce but are
expected to have acquisition responsibility , and to incorporate contractors and contract
operations into mission exercises.
DOD, including the Army, are taking a number of steps to comply with Congressional legislation
to better prepare the operational force—including servicemen and women conducting military
operations on the battlefield—to work with contractors. These steps include developing doctrine
for integrating contract support into expeditionary operations, introducing courses on contract
support into the curriculum for non-acquisition personnel, and incorporating contract operations
into mission readiness exercises. This report examines these steps being taken by DOD and
options for Congress to monitor DOD’s efforts to comply with P.L. 110-181. Options include
requiring military departments to report on acquisition education courses available for operational
personnel. This report will be updated as events warrant.






Backgr ound ..................................................................................................................................... 1
DOD’s Experience With Contractors in Iraq...................................................................................2
Calls for More Robust Training.......................................................................................................4
Legislation in the 110th Congress....................................................................................................4
DOD Efforts to Train the Operational Force to Work Effectively With Contractors During
Expeditionary Operations.............................................................................................................5
DOD Efforts to Improve Contractor Coordination and Management.......................................5
Educational Courses for Military Personnel.......................................................................5
Incorporation of Contractors and Contract Operations in Relevant Mission-
readiness and Other Exercises.........................................................................................6
Army Efforts to Improve Contractor Coordination and Management......................................6
Educational Courses for Army Personnel...........................................................................7
Incorporation of Contractors and Contract Operations in Relevant Mission-
readiness and Other Exercises.........................................................................................7
Options for Congress.......................................................................................................................8
Take No Action.........................................................................................................................8
Require Performance Evaluations to Include Contractor Management....................................8
Require Military Departments to Report on Acquisition Education Courses Available
for Operational Personnel......................................................................................................8
Require Military Departments to Report on Non-Acquisition Workforce Contracting
Education and Training Goals, and Progress in Meeting Those Goals..................................8
Figure 1. Contractors as Percentage of DOD Workforce in Area of Operations.............................1
Figure 2. Iraq DOD Contractor Personnel by Type of Service Provided (as of July 2008)...........2
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................9
Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................... 9






The Department of Defense (DOD) has a long history of relying on contractors to support troops 1
during wartime and expeditionary operations. Generally, from the Revolutionary War through
the Vietnam War, contractors provided traditional logistical support such as medical care,
transportation, and engineering to U.S. armed forces. Since the end of the Cold War there has
been a significant increase in contractors supporting U.S. troops – in terms of the number and
percentage of contractors, and the type of work being performed (Figure 1). According to DOD,
post-Cold War budget reductions resulted in significant cuts to military logistical and support
personnel, requiring DOD to hire contractors to “fill the gap.”
Figure 1. Contractors as Percentage of DOD Workforce in Area of Operations
Source: U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq, August 2008, p. 13,
based on data from: William W. Epley, “Civilian support of Field Armies,” Army Logistician, vol. 22
(November/December 1990), pp. 30-35; Steven J. Zamparelli, “Contractors on the Battlefield: What Have We
Signed Up For?”Air Force Journal of Logistics, vol. 23, no. 3 (Fall 1990), pp.10-19. Iraq data based on figures
discussed above. Operation Desert Storm (first Gulf War) not included because Saudi Arabia provided significant
logistical and other support.

1 This report will generally use the term ‘Expeditionary Operations’, conforming with the Commission on Army
Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations. See Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary
Contracting. October 31, 2007. p. 1. Expeditionary operations include both domestic and foreign operations. This
report will use the term ‘contingency when ‘contingency is used by the document being discussed.






The number of DOD contractors in Iraq is significant. According to DOD, as of July 1, 2008,
there were 200,000 DOD contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, compared to 180,000 uniformed 2
military personnel. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that from 2003 through 3
2007, DOD obligated $54 billion for contractors working in Iraq. These contractors not only
provide traditional logistical support—such as delivering food and providing weapons
maintenance—but also provide critical front-line combat support that puts them directly on the
battlefield. Such front-line support includes interrogating prisoners, working as translators for
combat units, providing security for convoys traveling through the battle space, and providing
security for forward operating bases (Figure 2). Projecting into the future, a senior DOD official
said that civilian contractors may make up 50% of all DOD personnel deployed in future overseas 4
operations. Unless a policy decision is made to expand the military, many analysts argue that the
large-scale use of contractors will remain a fixture of the military’s force structure for the 5
foreseeable future.
Figure 2. Iraq DOD Contractor Personnel by Type of Service Provided
(as of July 2008)
Source: Department of Defense
This raises questions about DOD’s capacity to manage contractors in the field during such
operations. DOD has an established acquisition workforce, consisting of military and civilian

2 According to DOD, there were 162,000 contractors in Iraq, of which 39% (63,000) were local nationals. Most of the
local Iraqi contractors (47,000) were engaged in base support.
3 See Contractors Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq, Op. Cit., p. 3.
4 Based on discussions with and a presentation given by the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program
Support).
5 Based on discussions with contractors, government officials, and industry experts. According to one publication, “Not
since the 17th century has there been such a reliance on private military actors to accomplish tasks directly affecting the
success of military engagements ... this trend has arguably reached the point of no return.” See also: Fred Schreier and
Marina Caparini. Privatizing Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies.
Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, March 2005, p. 1.





personnel who are responsible for acquiring goods and services for the military.6 However, while
a number of contracting officers and other acquisition officials are in Iraq, most of DOD’s
acquisition workforce is generally not deployed or embedded with the military during
expeditionary operations. As the number of contractors in the area of operations has increased, the
operational force—the service men and women in the field—increasingly rely on, interact with, 7
and are responsible for managing contractors. Yet, a number of military commanders and service
members have indicated they did not get adequate information regarding the extent of contractor
support in Iraq and did not receive enough pre-deployment training to prepare them to manage or 8
work with contractors. One DOD official has pointed out that the military does not have an 9
adequate infrastructure to effectively execute and manage contractors in Iraq. And last year, an
Army commission produced the Gansler Report, which found that Contacting Officer
Representatives (CORs) responsible for managing contractors are generally drawn from combat 10
units and receive “little, if any, training” on how to work with contractors. This finding confirms
what many analysts have argued: that deployed military personnel are not sufficiently trained or
prepared to manage contractors in an area of operations.
Given the critical role contractors are playing in supporting military operations and the billions of
dollars DOD spends on contractors, the ability of the operational force to manage and oversee
contractors has become increasingly important. Poor contract management can lead to troops not 11
receiving needed support and the wasteful spending of billions of dollars. A lack of effective
contractor management can even undermine the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. military.
For example, according to an Army investigative report, a lack of good contractor surveillance at
Abu Ghraib prison contributed to fostering a permissive environment in which prisoner abuses 12
took place. Many observers believe that the fallout from Abu Ghraib and other incidents, such
as the shooting of Iraqi civilians by private security contractors hired by the United States
government, have hurt the credibility of the U.S. military and undermined efforts in Iraq.

6 There are a number of positions in the acquisition workforce, including contracting officers, program managers, and
auditors. For more information on the acquisition workforce see http://www.dau.mil/workforce/index.asp. Last visited
October 23, 2008.
7 The operational force, including servicemen and women conducting military operations on the battlefield, consist of
those forces thatconduct full spectrum operations around the world.” The institutional force, including acquisition
personnel, supports the operational force. “Institutional organizations provide the infrastructure necessary to raise,
train, equip, deploy and ensure the readiness of military forces. See Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary
Contracting, Op. Cit. p. 1.
8 U.S. Government Accountability Office. DOD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance on Contractors and
Continue to Improve Management and Oversight. GAO-08-572T. Highlights page. March 11, 2008; Also based on
discussions with military personnel deployed in Iraq.
9 Kathryn T.H. Syzmanski, Command Counsel U.S. Army Materiel Command in Atlanta on August 9, 2004. American
Bar Association Section of Public Contract Law, Contractors on the Battlefield: Exploration of Unique Liability and
Human Relations Issues, Volume II.
10 Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations. Urgent Reform Required:
Army Expeditionary Contracting. October 31, 2007. p. 43.
11 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Stabilizing And Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address Inadequate
Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments. GAO-08-568T. March 11, 2008. p. 4,6; See also Urgent Reform
Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, Op. Cit., p. 2.
12 Department of Defense. Investigation of Intelligence Activities At Abu Ghraib. August 23, 2004. p. 52. The report
found “Proper oversight did not occur at Abu Ghraib due to a lack of training and inadequate contract management ...
[T]his lack of monitoring was a contributing factor to the problems that were experienced with the performance of the
contractors at Abu Ghraib”.See http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/
oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA429125. Last visited October 16, 2008.






A number of experts believe that the military needs to improve the operational force’s
management of and coordination with contractors in the area of operations. These experts have
argued that increased training and education is necessary for non-acquisition personnel
throughout the military. The Gansler Report stated that the Army needs to train operational
commanders on the important role contracting plays, as well as on their responsibilities in the
process. The report called for including courses in the curricula on contractors in expeditionary
operations at command schools (e.g., the War College and Sergeant Majors Academy) and other 13
officer educational programs.
Echoing the Gansler Report, an official at the U.S. Army Materiel Command wrote that
“Contractor logistics support must be integrated into doctrine and taught at every level of 14
professional schooling in each component.” The calls for more robust training are not new. For
example, in 2003, GAO testified before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on
Readiness, stating “[T]he lack of contract training for commanders, senior personnel, and some
contracting officers’ representatives can adversely affect the effectiveness of the use of
contractors in deployed locations. Without training, many commanders, senior military personnel,
and contracting officers’ representatives are not aware of their roles and responsibilities in dealing 15
with contractors.”

In early 2008, Congress amended the law (10 U.S.C. 2333, as amended) and mandated training
for non-acquisition military personnel filling positions with contracting responsibilities during 16
expeditionary operations. The statute was aimed to ensure that the military is prepared to deal 17
with contracting responsibilities during contingency and other operations. The amendment also
(1) mandated the incorporation of contractors and contract operations into mission readiness
exercises; (2) directed the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army to evaluate all
recommendations in the Gansler Report and submit a report to the congressional defense
committees describing their plans for implementing applicable report recommendations; and (3)
and required the GAO to submit to Congress a report analyzing the extent to which DOD is 18
complying with this amended section (2333) of title X. In addition, Congress appropriated

13 Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, Op Cit., p. 7.
14 Contractors on the Battlefield Volume II, Op. Cit.
15 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed
Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans, GAO-03-695, June 2003. p. 36.
16 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Section 849 (P.L. 110-181).
17 Ibid.
18 DOD and the Army have already submitted their reports. For the DOD report, see http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/
cc/docs/section849.pdf. For the Army report, see https://www.alt.army.mil/portal/page/portal/oasaalt/documents/
Army%20Sect849%20Report%20to%20Congress%205-28-08.pdf. Last visited, October 16, 2008. GAO submitted its
report on November 20, 2008. See U.S. Government Accountability Office. Contract Management: DOD Developed
Draft Guidance for Operational Contract Support but Has Not Met All Legislative Requirements. GAO-09-114R,
November 20, 2008.





$2,500,000 for the Joint Contingency Contract Support Office and $2,000,000 for Military Non-19
Contracting Officer Training to implement this program.



According to Title X of the United States Code, military services are generally responsible for
training military forces. As such, some argue that it is the charge of the military services to
implement training aimed at improving contractor coordination and management. Others argue
that the use of contractors during expeditionary operations cuts across military branches and to be
successful, training initiatives should be spearheaded by DOD and then propagated throughout
the individual services. According to senior military officials, while there is not yet a unified
strategy among the various DOD departments on how to train and educate non-acquisition
personnel to work with and manage contractors, a number of initiatives are underway. Some of
these initiatives are described below.
In July 2008, DOD developed an Operational Contract Support Concept of Operations, intended
to be a road map for integrating contract support and management during expeditionary
operations. The concept calls for training officers in developing and executing key contracting
documents such as statements of work, with the objective that “DOD as a whole must have the
ability to ensure CORs are properly trained and certified.” In addition, according to the Joint
Staff, a “Joint Logistics” doctrine has been published that addresses contractor support integration 20
and management. DOD is also developing classroom and on-line training for non-acquisition
personnel and incorporating contracting scenarios into military exercises.
DOD has developed an eight-hour course on Contingency Contract Management Training that is
intended to pave the way for the military services to introduce such a course at the Staff Colleges. 21
DOD also developed a similar eight-hour course geared to the Senior Staff Colleges. These
courses are intended to prepare military leaders who lack extensive contracting experience to plan
for contract support, integrate contractors into force plans, and manage contractors in the area of
operation. DOD expects these courses to be offered in 2009. According to senior DOD officials,
the long term plan is to offer similar courses throughout the military’s educational system,
including courses for noncommissioned officers.

19 Congressional Record May 19th, 2008 pg. S. 4325.
20 According to Joint Staff J4,the publication is entitled Joint Publication 4-10 Operational Contract Support, dated
October 17, 2008.
21 Interviews with DOD officials and a review of documents. Staff colleges train intermediate level officers. Senior
staff colleges generally train Lieutenant Colonels and those of higher rank.





DOD is also planning to develop an on-line course targeting non-acquisition personnel that is
designed along the lines of the classroom courses. The on-line training is intended to focus on
pre-deployment training needs such as how to plan for, work with, and get the most out of
contractors during military operations.
Some observers believe that incorporating contractors and contract operations in military
exercises can help educate and prepare military planners and operational commanders to better
manage contractors. DOD established the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO)
to provide the joint force commander with the necessary assistance to plan, support, and oversee 22
contingency contracting activities during the initial phases of a contingency operation. JCASO
is intended to provide initial program management and contracting teams and will be responsible
for coordinating and monitoring all contractors in a joint area of operations where JCASO is
operating.
In May 2008, DOD tested the JCASO concept by incorporating it into a U.S. European Command 23
(USEUCOM) military exercise which took place in Germany over a span of nine days.
According to DOD, the exercise validated the JCASO concept and structure, providing the joint
force commander with “much-needed visibility regarding contracts and contractors”. A post-
exercise assessment found that military planners and commanders need to become better 24
informed as to the role of JCASO and the capabilities it provides. DOD intends to have JCASO
participate in other war games and exercises to ensure that contracting is integrated into mission
planning and execution.
Recognizing that acquisition and program management during expeditionary operations is a
critical element in achieving operational success, the Army established the commission that 25
issued the Gansler Report. In addition to DOD efforts, the Army has been developing and
implementing a number of initiatives to improve how it works with and manages contractors on
the battlefield and during expeditionary operations. Incorporating ideas from the Gansler Report,
the Army is developing doctrine and taking a three-pronged approach to improve how the
operations force works with contractors. The new approach would (1) familiarize the operational
force with the importance of contracting support to mission execution, (2) educate and train
selected individuals to better plan and coordinate the management of contractor support, and (3)
collectively train units at the brigade level and above.

22 See U.S. Department of Defense. Defense Logistics Agency. “New organization to Help Combatant Commanders
Manage Acquisition”. Press Release. October 24, 2008. JCASO was established pursuant to section 854 of the John
Warner National Defense Authorization Act of FY2007, (P.L. 109-364), which requires adeployable cadre of
experts” to translate policy objectives and mission needs into contract requirements.
23 The military exercise was named AUSTERE CHALLENGE.
24 Department of Defense. Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO)Assessment Report AUSTERE
CHALLENGE 2008, Draft Report, May 2008.
25 See Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, Op Cit., pp. 79-80, 82.





According to Army officials, some educational classes and seminars are intended to familiarize
the force with the importance of contracted support, while other classes and seminars are intended
to provide concrete knowledge and skill sets. Officials stated that most efforts are focused on
logisticians, who will be provided seminars or discussions on contracting throughout their
careers, including at the Staff Sergeant, Captain, and Second Lieutenant levels. A number of
educational opportunities will also be offered to non-logisticians. For example, all Majors will be
required to attend a two hour class on contract support through the intermediate leader education
courses. All attendees of the Army War College will be required to participate in a seminar on
contractor support and operations logistics. Selected generals are to take a three hour Senior
Leader Course on operational contract support. The army has also developed informational
pamphlets and handbooks to help military personnel better understand the contracting process, to 26
know their contracting responsibilities, and to work more effectively with contractors.
In addition, the Army, with Air Force support, is developing a one to two week course on
operational contract support that is intended to outline the contracting process (focusing on
tactical unit commanders and staff roles and responsibilities in the acquisition process), teach
relevant contracting skills (including how to create a complete requirements package), and teach
how to integrate contractor personnel into military operations. The course is expected to be taught
at the Army Logistics Management College’s Huntsville, Alabama, campus at Ft. Levenworth,
Kansas, to selected officer and NCO multi-functional logisticians, and is to be made available to
all Army personnel.
According to officials, the Army has incorporated operations contract support into most mission-27
readiness exercises over the last two years. In addition, the Army is working with the joint
community to include contract support into other operations. For example, from August 11 - 22,

2008, the U.S. Southern Command sponsored PANAMAX 2008, a military exercise focused on 28


ensuring the defense of the Panama Canal. The exercise included a Joint Contracting Command
element provided by the Army, augmented by Air Force and Navy personnel. As a result of the
contracting component of the exercise, the After Action Review of the effort included discussions
on contracting. For example, noting the importance of contracting to mission success and the
“little to no emphasis on contracting functions ... during the execution phase of the exercise,” the
After Action Review recommended “joint training agencies develop acquisition training programs 29
that target operational commanders as the training audience.” The report also recommended the
establishment of policies and procedures for managing contractors.

26 For example, the Army developed Contracting Basics for Leaders and The Deployed COR, pocket-sized pamphlet
that explains key contracting concepts, definitions, and processes. The Army also published a handbook Deployed
COR: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, and has a draft handbook Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Customer
Handbook.
27 Mission-readiness exercises, also known as mission rehearsal exercises, focus on a specific mission prior to
deployment.
28 The exercise involved more than 30 ships, a dozen aircraft, and 7,000 personnel from 20 nations.
29 Executive Summary to Joint Contracting Command South After Action Review (AAR) for PANAMAX 08, September
22, 2008.






The National Defense Authorization Act of FY2008 (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181) required DOD, and
especially the Army, to train military personnel who are outside the acquisition workforce but are
expected to have acquisition responsibility , and to incorporate contractors and contract
operations into mission exercises. As outlined above, DOD has initiated a number of steps to
comply with P.L. 110-181, including developing doctrine, developing a concept of operations,
planning and introducing educational courses into the curricula of non-acquisition military
personnel, and incorporating contractor support scenarios into mission-ready and other exercises.
Congress may wish to consider requiring officer and/or enlisted performance evaluations to
include commentary and/or grade evaluation of contractor management. On the one hand,
including a contractor management narrative as part of a performance evaluation could help
ensure attention is given to this issue. However, it should be recognized that contract support is
not relevant for all military personnel, and elements of contract support could also fall under other
evaluation factors, such as personnel, management. Alternatively, Congress could consider
requiring performance evaluations for military personnel whose mission involves or substantially
relies on contractor support. Another option would be to amend the performance evaluation
guidelines to stipulate specifically that contractor management be part of the discussion of
personnel management or other related factors.
Such a requirement would be similar to section 527 of the FY2009 Duncan Hunter National
Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-417) which requires the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to submit to Congress a report outlining the joint education courses available throughout the
DOD. Such a report could help Congress execute its oversight function.
Such a report could help accomplish two goals: it can (1) help Congress chart the military’s
progress in preparing the operational force to work with contractors during expeditionary
operations and (2) help DOD maintain focus on this issue. DOD has stated as far back as 2004
that it would explore creating training courses on contracting for mid- and senior-level service





schools.30 However, some analysts would argue that DOD failed to follow through adequately on
creating additional training on contract support until Congress mandated training for appropriate 31
non-acquisition military personnel. As described in this report, DOD has recently taken a
number of concrete steps to improve how the operational force works with contractors and has
incorporated contractors and contract operations into mission-readiness and other exercises.
Analysts argue that only sustained congressional attention can help ensure that the desired results
will be achieved.
Moshe Schwartz
Analyst in Defense Acquisition
mschwartz@crs.loc.gov, 7-1463

Research assistance and support for this report was provided by Mari-Jana MJ” Oboroceanu, Knowledge
Services Group, CRS.

30 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Military Operations: DODs Extensive Use of Logistics Support Contracts
Requires Strengthened Oversight. GAO-04-854. July 2004. Page 62.
31 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Section 849 (P.L. 110-181).