Congressional Commissions: Overview, Structure, and Legislative Considerations

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

Congressional advisory commissions are formal groups established to provide independent
advice; make recommendations for changes in public policy; study or investigate a particular
problem, issue, or event; or perform a duty. While no legal definition exists for what constitutes a
“congressional commission,” in this report a congressional commission is defined as a multi-
member independent entity that (1) is established by Congress, (2) exists temporarily, (3) serves
in an advisory capacity, (4) is appointed in part or whole by Members of Congress, and (5)
reports to Congress. These five characteristics differentiate a congressional commission from a
presidential commission, an executive branch commission, or other bodies with “commission” in
their names. Over 80 congressional commissions have been established in the past 20 years.
Throughout American history, Congress has found commissions to be useful entities in the
legislative process. By establishing a commission, Congress can provide a highly visible forum
for important issues and assemble greater expertise than may be readily available within the
legislature. Complex policy issues can be examined over a longer time period and in greater depth
than may be practical for legislators. Finally, the non-partisan or bipartisan character of most
congressional commissions may make their findings and recommendations more politically
acceptable, both in Congress and among the public. Critics argue that many congressional
commissions are expensive, often formed to take difficult decisions out of the hands of Congress,
and are mostly ignored when they report their findings and recommendations.
The temporary status of congressional commissions and short time period they are often given to
complete their work product makes it important that legislators craft statutes creating
congressional commissions with care. A wide variety of options are available, and legislators can
tailor the composition, organization, and working arrangements of a commission, based on the
particular goals of Congress. As a result, individual congressional commissions often have an
organizational structure and powers quite different from one another.
This report provides an overview and analysis of congressional advisory commissions,
information on the general statutory structure of a congressional commission, and a catalog of ^st
congressional commissions created since the 101 Congress.

Introduc tion ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Defining “Congressional Commission”..........................................................................................2
Independent Establishment by Congress...................................................................................3
Temporary Existence.................................................................................................................3
Advisory Role...........................................................................................................................4
Inclusion of Members in the Appointment Process...................................................................4
Reporting Requirements............................................................................................................4
Cataloging Congressional Commissions.........................................................................................4
Methodology .................................................................................................................... ......... 4
Result s ....................................................................................................................................... 4
Types of Congressional Commissions.............................................................................................5
Policy Commissions..................................................................................................................6
Investigative Commissions.......................................................................................................6
Commemorative Commissions.................................................................................................6
Legislative Value of Congressional Commissions..........................................................................6
Obtaining Expertise...................................................................................................................7
Overcoming Issue Complexity..................................................................................................7
Overcoming Political Complexity.............................................................................................7
Consensus Building...................................................................................................................7
Reducing Partisanship...............................................................................................................8
Solving Collective Action Problems.........................................................................................8
Raising Visibility.......................................................................................................................8
Criticism of Commissions...............................................................................................................9
Abdicated Responsibility..........................................................................................................9
Reduced Democratic Accountability.........................................................................................9
Financial Inefficiency..............................................................................................................10
Legislative Options for Commission Structure.............................................................................10
Establishment and Mandate....................................................................................................10
Membership and Appointment.................................................................................................11
Compensation and Travel Expenses........................................................................................12
Commission Staffing...............................................................................................................14
Duties and Reporting...............................................................................................................14
Final Reports.....................................................................................................................14
Report Deadlines...............................................................................................................15
Linking Deadlines to Specific Events...............................................................................16
Commission Powers................................................................................................................17
Commission Funding..............................................................................................................18
Rules of Procedure..................................................................................................................18
Options for Procedural Rules............................................................................................19
Operational Considerations...............................................................................................20
Commission Termination........................................................................................................20
Key Considerations for Congress..................................................................................................20
General .................................................................................................................................... 21
Membership.............................................................................................................................21

St affi ng ....................................................................................................................... ............. 21
Duties ...................................................................................................................................... 21
Powers ..................................................................................................................................... 21
Funding ........................................................................................................................ ........... 21
Other.......................................................................................................................... .............. 21
Congressional Commissions, 101^st to 110^th Congress...................................................................22
Table 1. Number of Congressional Commissions Created by Congress.........................................5
Table 2. Number of Congressional Commissions Created, by Type...............................................5
Table 3. Appointment Authority to Congressional Commissions..................................................11
Table 4. Commission Member Compensation..............................................................................13
Table 5. Reporting Requirements of Congressional Commissions...............................................15
Table 6. Congressional Commission Final Report Deadlines.......................................................15
Table 7. Frequency of Final Report Deadline Linked to Specific Events.....................................16
Table 8. Congressional Commissions Created During the 110^th Congress...................................22
Table 9. Congressional Commissions Created During the 109^th Congress...................................22
Table 10. Congressional Commissions Created During the 108^th Congress.................................23
Table 11. Congressional Commissions Created During the 107^th Congress.................................24
Table 12. Congressional Commissions Created During the 106^th Congress.................................24
Table 13. Congressional Commissions Created During the 105^th Congress.................................25
Table 14. Congressional Commissions Created During the 104^th Congress.................................26
Table 15. Congressional Commissions Created During the 103^rd Congress.................................27
Table 16. Congressional Commissions Created During the 102^nd Congress.................................27
Table 17. Congressional Commissions Created During the 101^st Congress..................................28
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................29

Congressional commissions are formal groups established by Congress to provide independent
advice, make recommendations for changes in public policy, study or investigate a particular
problem or event, or perform a specific duty. Usually composed of policy experts chosen by
Members of Congress and/or officials in the executive branch, commissions may hold hearings,
conduct research, analyze data, investigate policy areas, or make field visits as they perform their
duties. Most commissions complete their work by delivering their findings, recommendations, or
advice in the form of a written report to Congress. Occasionally, legislation submitted by
commissions will be given “fast track” authority in Congress.
Although no legal definition exists for what constitutes a “congressional commission,” in this
report, a congressional commission is defined as a multi-member independent entity that (1) is
established by Congress, (2) exists temporarily, (3) serves in an advisory capacity, (4) is
appointed in part or whole by Members of Congress, and (5) reports to Congress. These five
characteristics effectively serve to differentiate a congressional commission from a presidential
commission, an executive branch commission, or other bodies with “commission” in their names.
Over 80 congressional commissions have been established in the past 20 years.
Throughout American history, Congress has found commissions to be useful tools in the
legislative process and legislators continue to use them today. By establishing a commission,
Congress can provide a highly visible forum for important issues and assemble greater expertise
than may be readily available within the legislature. Complex policy issues can be examined over
a longer time period and in greater depth than may be practical for legislators. Finally, the non-
partisan or bipartisan character of most congressional commissions may make their findings and
recommendations more politically acceptable, both in Congress and among the public.
Critics argue that many congressional commissions are established by legislators seeking “blame
avoidance,” and take difficult decisions out of the hands of Congress. Other observers have
suggested that commissions are undemocratic, with their members neither electorally accountable
to the public nor their meetings and decision-making processes public. Finally, some critics see
commissions as financially inefficient, arguing that the costs of establishing a commission
outweigh potential benefits, especially since their findings and recommendations may be ignored
by Congress.
Congressional commissions can be categorized as either policy commissions, investigatory
commissions, or commemorative commissions. Most congressional commissions are policy ¹
commissions, such as the United States Commission on North American Energy Freedom, that
study particular public policy problems and typically report their findings to Congress along with
recommendations for legislative or executive action. Far fewer commissions are investigative ²
commissions, such as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, that
are established to examine past events. A small number of commissions are commemorative
¹
^P^.^L.¹⁰⁹^-⁵⁸^,¹¹⁹^St^at¹⁰⁶⁴^,^A^u^gu^st^.^8,²⁰⁰⁵^.
²^P^.^L.¹⁰⁷^-³⁰^6,¹¹^{6 S}^t^at^{. 24}⁰⁸^,^Nove^m^b^er²⁷^,²⁰⁰²^.

commissions, such as the Abraham Lincoln Bicentennial Commission,³ that plan, coordinate, and
oversee celebrations of people or events, often in conjunction with milestone anniversaries.
The temporary status of congressional commissions and short time period they are often given to
complete their work product makes it important that legislators craft statutes creating
congressional commissions with care. Statutes establishing congressional policy commissions
generally include language that states the mandate of the commission, provides a membership
structure and appointment scheme, defines member compensation and other benefits, outlines the
commission’s duties and powers, authorizes funding, and sets a termination date for the
commission.
A variety of options are available for each of these organizational choices. Legislators can tailor
the composition, organization, and arrangements of a commission, based on particular goals. As a
result, individual commissions often have organizational structures and powers quite different
from one another.

In the past, confusion has arisen over whether particular entities are “congressional
commissions.” There are several reasons for this confusion. First, the term “Congressional
commission” is not defined by law; observers might disagree as to whether an individual entity
should be characterized as such. Second, many different entities within the federal government
have the word “commission” in their name, such as regulatory commissions, presidential advisory
commissions, and advisory commissions established in executive agencies. Conversely, many
congressional commissions do not have the word commission in their name; instead, they are
designated as boards, advisory panels, advisory committees, task forces, or by other terms.
In this report, a congressional commission is defined as a multi-member independent entity that
(1) is established by Congress, (2) exists temporarily, (3) serves in an advisory capacity, (4) is
appointed in part or whole by Members of Congress, and (5) reports to Congress. This definition
differentiates a congressional commission from a presidential commission, an executive branch
commission, or other bodies with “commission” in their names, while including most entities that
fulfill the role commonly perceived for commissions: studying policy problems and reporting ⁴
findings to Congress. Each of these characteristics is discussed below.
³
^P^.^L.¹⁰⁶^-¹⁷^3,¹¹^{4 S}^t^at^{. 14}^,^F^e^b^r^uar^y²⁵^,²⁰⁰⁰^.
⁴^A^lte^rⁿ^a^tiv^e^defⁱ^nitions^mⁱ^g^h^{t be}^e^qua^lly^a^ppe^a^ling^.^T^h^e^wⁱ^de^v^a^rⁱ^ety^o^f^boa^r^d^s^,^ta^s^k^f^o^r^c^e^s^{, pa}^ne^ls^{, a}^{nd c}^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^ons
^c^r^e^a^t^e^d^by^Cong^re^s^s^,^c^ouple^d^w^{ith the}^la^c^k^of^a^le^ga^{l de}^fⁱ^nition^f^o^{r “}^c^ong^re^s^sⁱ^ona^{l c}^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^on,”^re^s^u^ltsⁱⁿ^m^aⁿ^y^g^r^ay
^a^r^e^a^s^{. Conse}^que^ntly^{, som}^e^eⁿ^titie^{s c}^r^e^a^t^e^d^by^Cong^re^{ss tha}^t^do^not^m^e^e^t^a^{ll f}ⁱ^v^e^c^h^a^r^a^c^t^e^r^istic^s^mⁱ^g^h^{t be}^c^onsi^d^e^r^e^d^th
^coⁿ^g^ressi^oⁿ^a^l^co^mmⁱ^ssi^oⁿ^s^b^y^o^b^{servers u}^sⁱⁿ^{g a d}ⁱ^ff^eren^t^cri^t^e^ri^a.^F^o^{r exam}^p^l^e,ⁱⁿ^t^h^e¹¹⁰^Coⁿ^g^ress,^legislatioⁿ^w^a^s
^eⁿ^a^c^t^e^d^c^r^e^a^ting^a^Com^m^itte^e^{on L}^e^v^e^e^Saf^e^t^y^(P^.L^{. 110-}¹¹^4,^Se^c^.⁹⁰⁰^{3, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^{9, 20}^07).^T^h^e^c^o^m^m^itte^e^is^a
^te^m^por^a^r^y^a^d^vⁱ^s^o^r^y^body^c^r^ea^te^{d by}^s^t^a^t^utor^y^a^u^thor^ity^{, but its}^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^h^{ip is}^de^te^r^m^ine^d^by^e^x^e^c^u^tiv^e^br^aⁿ^c^h^aⁿ^d^s^t^a^t^e
^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s a}^{nd it re}^p^o^{rts t}^o^b^o^t^h^Co^ng^re^{ss a}^{nd the}^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of^the^A^r^m^y^{. W}^h^ile^{it is no}^{t inc}^l^ude^{d in}^thⁱ^s^re^{port, s}^o^m^e
^o^b^s^ervers^mⁱ^gh^t^coⁿ^sⁱ^d^{er i}^t^{a co}^ngressi^oⁿ^a^l^co^mmⁱ^s^si^oⁿ^.

Congressional commissions are established by Congress, usually by statute.⁵ Not all advisory
commissions established by statute, however, are congressional commissions. Congress routinely
establishes advisory commissions in the executive branch by statute. Conversely, not all advisory
commissions serving the federal government are established by Congress. Commissions may be ⁶
established in the executive branch by the President, department heads, or individual agencies.
Congressional commissions are also independent of Congress in function. This characteristic
excludes commission-like entities established within Congress, such as congressional observer
groups, working groups, and ad hoc commissions and advisory groups created by individual
committees of Congress under their general authority to procure the “temporary services” of ⁷
consultants to “make studies and advise the committee,” pursuant to 2 U.S.C. 72a.
Congressional commissions are established to perform specific tasks, with statutory termination
dates linked to the completion of the tasks. This restriction excludes entities that typically serve
an ongoing administrative purpose, do not have statutory termination dates, and do not produce ⁸⁹
reports, such as the House Office Building Commission or Senate Commission on Fine Art.
Also excluded are entities that serve ongoing diplomatic or interparliamentary functions, such as ¹⁰
the U.S. Group to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, or the Canada-United States ¹¹
Interparliamentary Group. Finally, Congress has created a number of boards to oversee ¹²
government entities, such as the United States Holocaust Memorial Council and the John F. ¹³
Kennedy Center Board of Trustees. Although these entities could arguably be considered
congressional commissions, their lifespan, purpose, and function differs from temporary
congressional commissions.
⁵
^Aⁿ^e^x^am^ple^of^a^c^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^{on tha}^t^w^a^s^wⁱ^de^l^y^c^ons^ide^r^e^d^a^c^ong^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l c}^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on b}^u^t^{not e}^s^ta^bl^is^he^{d by}^C^ong^r^e^s^s
^w^a^s^the^I^r^a^{q St}^udy^G^r^{oup. C}^o^ng^r^e^s^s^a^ppr^opr^ia^te^{d m}^one^y^{to the}^U^.^{S. I}ⁿ^s^tⁱ^t^ute^of^P^{eace an}^dⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^al^l^y^arr^aⁿ^g^ed^f^o^{r t}^h^e
^s^e^le^c^{tion of}^the^c^h^aⁱ^r^m^eⁿ^{, bu}^{t d}ⁱ^d^{not f}^o^r^m^a^l^l^y^e^s^ta^blis^{h the}^g^r^ou^p^b^y^s^t^a^t^ute^or^r^e^s^o^l^u^tio^n.^Iⁿ^a^d^diti^on^{, s}^o^m^e^bodie^s
^c^r^e^a^t^e^d^by^c^h^am^be^r^r^e^s^o^{lution m}ⁱ^g^h^{t be}^c^o^ns^ide^r^e^d^c^o^ng^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l c}^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^ons^.
⁶^M^aⁿ^y^w^e^l^l^-^kn^o^wⁿ^ad^vi^so^r^y^co^mmⁱ^s^si^oⁿ^s^h^a^{ve b}^een^est^a^b^lⁱ^s^h^e^d^by^t^h^{e P}^r^esi^d^en^t^o^r^b^y^an^agen^c^y^.^F^o^{r exa}^m^p^l^e,^t^h^e
^{U.S. Com}^mⁱ^s^s^{ion o}ⁿ^Na^tio^na^{l Se}^c^u^rity^/21^st^C^e^nt^ur^y⁽^t^he^H^a^r^t^-^R^ud^m^a^{n c}^o^m^m^issⁱ^on)^aⁿ^{d the}^N^a^ti^on^a^l^C^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on on}
^S^o^ci^al^S^ecu^ri^t^y^Ref^o^r^m⁽^G^re^en^sp^an^Co^mmⁱ^ssi^oⁿ⁾^w^e^{re b}^o^t^h^est^a^b^lⁱ^s^h^e^d^b^y^execu^tⁱ^v^{e o}^r^d^e^{r o}^f^t^h^e^P^r^esi^d^en^t^.
⁷^For^e^x^a^m^ple^,^the^A^d^vⁱ^s^o^r^y^C^o^m^m^issⁱ^{on t}^o^St^udy^the^C^o^ns^um^e^r^Pr^ic^e^I^nde^x^w^a^s^es^ta^blis^he^{d by}^the^Se^na^te^C^o^m^m^itte^e
^oⁿ^Fin^aⁿ^{ce i}ⁿ^Juⁿ^e¹⁹⁹⁵^an^d^su^b^m^itted^{its rep}^o^r^{t t}^o^t^h^{e co}^mm^itteeⁱⁿ^Decem^b^e^r,^1996.^Se^e^U^.^S.^C^ongr^ess,^S^eⁿ^a^t^e
^Com^m^itte^e^{on Fina}^nc^e^,^Fina^{l Re}^p^o^{rt of}^the^A^d^vⁱ^sory^Com^mⁱ^ssi^{on t}^o^St^udy^the^Co^nsum^e^r^P^r^ic^e^In^de^x^,^c^o^m^m^itte^e^print,^th^nd
¹⁰⁴^Co^ng^.,²^s^e^s^s^{., S.}^P^r^t¹⁰^4-^{72 (}^W^a^s^hing^to^{n: G}^P^O^,¹⁹⁹⁶⁾^.
⁸^{2 U}^.^S^.^C^.²⁰^01;^P.L^.⁵⁹^-²^53;³⁴^S^t^a^t^{. 1}³⁶⁵^.
⁹^{2 U}^.^S^.^C^.²¹^01;^P.L^.¹^00-⁶⁹^6;¹⁰^{2 Sta}^t^.⁴⁶¹⁰
¹⁰^U^.^S.C^.¹⁹^28a^;^P.L^.⁸⁴^-⁶^89;⁷⁰^St^a^t^{. 52}^3.
¹¹^{22 U}^.^S.C^.²⁷⁶⁽^d)^;^P.L^.^86-^42,⁷³^Sta^t^{. 7}².
¹²^{36 U}^.^S.C^.²³⁰²^;^P.L^.^96-³⁸^8;⁹⁴^Sta^t^{. 1}⁵⁴⁷^.
¹³^{20 U}^.^S.C^.⁷^6h;^P.L^.⁸⁵^-⁸^74;⁷²^S^t^a^t^{. 1}⁶⁹⁸^.

Unlike regulatory commissions, congressional commissions are not typically granted
administrative authority, and they usually lack the power to implement their findings or
recommendations. Instead, advisory commissions typically produce reports that present their
findings and offer recommendations for either legislative or executive action.
Congressional commissions provide that Members of Congress, particularly the leadership, be
intimately involved in the appointment process, either through direct service on a commission, or
by appointing or recommending candidates for membership.
Congressional commissions are usually required to submit their reports to Congress, or to
Congress and the President. Other advisory commissions, such as Presidential or executive
branch commissions, typically submit their reports only to the President or agency head.

This report attempts to identify all congressional commissions established between the 101^st and ^th

110 Congress. A large number of bills creating congressional commissions are introduced in ^th

Congress each session. During the first session of the 110 Congress, bills were introduced that
would have created more than 30 congressional commissions. Similar numbers of bills have been
proposed in previous Congresses. Most of these bills proposing commissions are not enacted.
A database search was conducted using the Legislative Information System (LIS) for the 101^st ^th¹⁴
through 110 Congresses (1981-2008). Each piece of legislation returned was examined to
determine if (1) the legislation contained a commission; and (2) if the commission was an ad hoc
congressional commission. If the commission was judged to be an ad hoc congressional
commission, the name, public law number, Statutes-at-Large citation, and date of enactment were
recorded.
A total of 87 congressional commissions were identified through this search. Table 1 reports the
number of commissions identified by the search in each Congress.
¹⁴
^T^h^e^s^e^a^r^c^h^w^a^s^c^onduc^te^{d i}ⁿ^tw^o^ite^r^a^tions^.^Fir^s^t,^a^q^u^e^r^y^w^a^s^r^un^us^ing^the^s^ubje^c^t^te^r^m^“^F^e^d^e^r^a^l^A^d^vⁱ^s^o^r^y^B^odie^s^.”
^Se^c^ond,^a^q^u^e^r^y^w^a^s^{run f}^o^{r v}^a^rio^u^s^s^e^a^r^c^h^te^rm^s^,^inc^l^uding^c^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^on,^boa^rd^{, ta}^s^k^f^o^rc^e^,^a^{nd a}^d^vⁱ^s^o^ry^c^o^m^m^itte^e^.

Table 1. Number of Congressional Commissions Created by Congress
¹⁰¹^st^{to 1}¹⁰^th^Co^ngress
^Cong^ress^Number^Cong^ress^Number
¹⁰¹⁽¹⁹^89-¹⁹⁹⁰⁾¹²¹⁰⁶⁽¹⁹^99-²⁰⁰⁰⁾¹⁴
¹⁰²⁽¹⁹^91-¹⁹⁹²⁾¹⁰¹⁰⁷⁽²⁰^01-²⁰⁰²⁾⁷
¹⁰³⁽¹⁹^93-¹⁹⁹⁴⁾⁵¹⁰⁸⁽²⁰^03-²⁰⁰⁴⁾⁷
¹⁰⁴⁽¹⁹^95-¹⁹⁹⁶⁾⁵¹⁰⁹⁽²⁰^05-²⁰⁰⁶⁾⁷
¹⁰⁵⁽¹⁹^97-¹⁹⁹⁸⁾¹²¹¹⁰⁽²⁰^07-²⁰⁰⁸⁾^a⁸
^Source:^Database^que^{ry of Con}^{gressional Legislative Information System (LIS), 101}^st^{to 11}⁰^th^Con^gress.
^a.^Through^Decem^{ber 17, 20}⁰⁸
Two caveats accompany these results. As stated above, identifying congressional commissions
involves making judgment calls about particular characteristics. Second, tracking provisions of
law that create congressional commissions is an inherently inexact exercise. Although many such
bodies are created in easily identifiable freestanding statutes, others are contained within the ¹⁵
statutory language of lengthy omnibus legislation. Consequently, individual commissions may
have been missed by the search algorithm.

Congressional commissions can be generally placed into one of three categories. Most
congressional commissions are policy commissions, temporary bodies which study particular
policy problems and report their findings to Congress. Less common are investigative
commissions, which are similar in structure to policy commissions but tasked with reviewing
specific events. Commemorative commissions are entities established to commemorate a person
or event, often to mark an anniversary. Table 2 reports the total number and percentage of each ^st^th
type of commission identified in the LIS database search of the 101-110 Congresses.
Table 2. Number of Congressional Commissions Created, by Type
¹⁰¹^st^{to 1}¹⁰^th^Co^ngress
^{Percentage of All}
^{Commission Type}^{Total Number}^Commissions
^Pol^{icy 70}^80%
^{Investigative 6}^7%
^{Commemorative 11}^13%
^Source:^{CRS analysis of databas}^{e que}^{ry of Congres}^{sional Legislative Information System (LIS), 1}⁰¹^st^{to 11}⁰^th
^Congress
¹⁵
^For^e^x^a^m^ple^,^pr^ov^is^ions^f^o^r^t^h^e^e^s^ta^blis^hm^eⁿ^{t of}^{12 s}^e^pa^r^a^te^a^d^vⁱ^s^o^r^y^bodie^s^w^e^r^e^inc^l^ude^{d i}ⁿ^t^h^e^te^x^t^of^the^FY¹⁹⁹⁹
^Om^nibus^C^ons^o^lida^t^e^d^aⁿ^d^Em^e^r^g^e^ncy^Supple^m^eⁿ^ta^{l A}^ppr^opr^ia^ti^oⁿ^s^A^c^{t (}^P^.L^{. 1}^05-²⁷^7,1¹²^Sta^t^.²⁶⁸¹⁾^.

The vast majority of congressional commissions, 80%, were established to study, examine, or ^th^th
review a particular policy problem. During the 109 and 110 Congresses, policy commissions
were established to study a range of issues, including the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, motor fuel tax enforcement, surface transportation policy, and the threat to the United ¹⁶
States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) attacks.
Investigative commissions, established for the purpose of reviewing specific events, are much
less common than policy commissions. Only six such bodies have been established by Congress
during the past 20 years. Investigative commissions, however, such as the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 commission) often receive substantial
public attention. Investigative commissions are often granted broad powers, including the power
to subpoena witnesses. Most recently, the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan and the Congressional Oversight Panel for the Emergency Economic Stabilization ^th¹⁷
Act were established during the 110 Congress.
Since 1989, Congress has created 11 commemorative commissions. Four of the commissions ¹⁸
were created to commemorate individuals and coincided with a milestone anniversary of their
birth. Six commissions were related to the commemoration of historical events and coincided ¹⁹
with a milestone anniversary of the event. One commission—the Dwight D. Eisenhower
Memorial Commission—was created to oversee the development of a permanent national ²⁰
memorial.

Throughout American history, Congress has found commissions to be useful tools in the
legislative process. Commissions may be established, among other things, to cope with increases
in the scope and complexity of legislation, to forge consensus, to draft bills, to promote inter-
party communication, to address issues that do not fall neatly within the jurisdictional boundaries ²¹
of congressional committees, and to bring together recommendations. These goals can be
¹⁶
^P^.^L.¹⁰⁹^-¹⁶^3,¹¹^{9 S}^t^at^{. 34}³⁴^,^Jan.⁶^,²⁰⁰⁶^;^P^.^L.¹¹⁰^-⁵³^,¹²¹^S^t^at^{. 50}¹^,^A^u^g.^3,²⁰⁰⁷^;^P^.^L.¹⁰⁹^-⁵⁹^,¹¹⁹^S^t^at^{. 19}⁵⁹^,
^A^u^g^.^{10, 2}⁰⁰⁵^;^P.L^.¹⁰^9-¹⁶³^,¹¹⁹^Sta^t^.³⁴^34,^J^a^n.^6,²⁰^06.
¹⁷^P^.^L.¹¹⁰^-¹⁸^1,^Jan^.²⁸^,²⁰⁰⁸^;^P^.^L.¹¹⁰^-³⁴^3,^Oct^.^3,²⁰⁰⁸^.
¹⁸^T^h^e^indivⁱ^d^u^a^l^s^a^r^e^A^b^r^a^ham^Lⁱⁿ^c^{oln, J}^a^m^e^s^Ma^dis^{on, B}^eⁿ^j^a^m^{in Fr}^aⁿ^k^{lin, a}ⁿ^{d T}^hom^a^s^J^e^f^f^e^r^s^on.
¹⁹^T^h^{e even}^t^s^{are t}^h^{e en}^dⁱⁿ^g^o^f^t^h^{e t}^r^an^sat^l^aⁿ^tⁱ^c^sl^{ave t}^r^ad^e,^t^h^{e con}^s^t^r^u^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^{e Cap}ⁱ^t^o^l^,^t^h^e^S^eⁿ^{eca F}^a^l^l^s
^coⁿ^v^en^tⁱ^oⁿ^,^t^h^{e f}ⁱ^rst^su^ccess^f^u^l^ai^rp^l^aⁿ^e^f^lⁱ^g^h^t^,^t^h^{e e}ⁿ^d^o^f^t^h^{e Co}^l^d^W^a^r,^an^d^t^h^{e S}^u^p^r^em^{e Co}^u^r^t^d^eci^si^oⁿⁱⁿ^Br^ow^{n v}^.
^Boar^d^of^Ed^uc^ati^oⁿ^.
²⁰^P^.^L^.¹⁰^6-⁷⁹^,¹¹^{3 S}^t^a^t^.¹²^74,^O^c^{t. 25,}¹⁹⁹⁹^.
²¹^C^o^lt^{on C}^a^m^pbe^{ll, “}^C^r^e^a^ting^aⁿ^Aⁿ^g^e^{l: C}^ong^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l D}^e^le^g^a^{tion to A}^d^H^o^c^C^o^m^mⁱ^ss^ions^,”^C^ong^r^e^s^s^a^{nd the}
^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^c^y^{, v}^o^{l. 25,}ⁿ^o^.^{2 (}^A^utum^{n 1}⁹⁹⁸⁾^,^p.¹⁶^2.

grouped into six categories: expertise, issue and political complexity, consensus building, non-
partisanship, solving collective action problems, and visibility.
Congress may choose to establish a commission when legislators and their staffs do not currently ²²
have sufficient knowledge or expertise in a complex policy area. By assembling experts with
backgrounds in particular policy areas to focus on a specific mission, legislators can efficiently ²³
obtain insight into complex public policy problems.
Complex policy issues may cause time management challenges for Congress. Legislators often
keep busy schedules and may not have time to deal with intricate or technical policy problems, ²⁴
particularly if the issues require consistent attention over a period of time. A commission can
devote itself to a particular issue full-time, and can focus on an individual problem without ²⁵
distraction.
Complex policy issues may also create institutional problems because they do not fall neatly ²⁶
within the jurisdiction of any particular committee in Congress. By virtue of their ad hoc status,
commissions can circumvent such issues. Similarly, a commission may allow particular
legislation or policy solutions to bypass the traditional development process in Congress, ²⁷
potentially removing some of the impediments inherent in a decentralized legislature.
Legislators seeking policy changes may be confronted by an array of political interests, some in
favor of proposed changes and some against. When these interests clash, the resulting legislation ²⁸
may encounter gridlock in the highly structured political institution of the modern Congress. By
creating a commission, Congress can place policy debates in a more flexible environment, where ²⁹
congressional and public attention can be developed over time.
²²
^I^b^id^.,^p.¹⁷^{4. Se}^e^a^l^s^o^R^obe^r^t^L^.^C^h^a^r^tr^a^nd,^J^a^ne^B^o^r^t^nic^k^{, a}ⁿ^d^J^a^m^e^s^R^.^P^r^ic^e^,^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^a^t^or^a^s^U^s^e^r^of^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^tion
⁽^W^a^s^hing^{ton, D}^C^{: C}^ong^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^l^R^e^s^e^a^r^c^h^Se^r^v^ice^,¹⁹⁸⁷⁾^,^pp^{. 1}¹^-¹^5.
²³^C^o^lt^{on C}^a^m^pbe^{ll, D}ⁱ^s^c^ha^r^g^ing^C^ong^r^e^s^s^:^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt by}^C^o^m^m^issⁱ^{on (}^W^e^s^tpor^t^,^C^T^:^P^r^a^e^g^e^r^{, 200}²⁾^,^p.^51.
²⁴^Ibid^.,^pp.⁵⁵^-5^9.
²⁵^Mor^rⁱ^s^{P. F}ⁱ^orⁱⁿ^a^,^“^G^r^{oup C}^onc^eⁿ^tr^a^tio^{n a}ⁿ^{d t}^h^e^D^e^le^g^a^{tion of}^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^a^tiv^e^A^u^thor^ity^,”^{in R}^o^g^e^r^G^.^N^o^{ll, e}^d^.,
^Regu^l^a^t^o^ry^P^o^lⁱ^c^y^an^d^t^h^{e S}^o^ci^al^S^cⁱ^eⁿ^{ces (Berkel}^e^y:^Unⁱ^v^ersi^t^y^o^f^Calⁱ^f^o^rⁿⁱ^a^P^r^ess,¹⁹⁸⁵^),^p^.¹⁸⁴^.^S^{ee al}^so^Ja^m^e^{s E}^.
^K^a^tz^{, “}^S^cⁱ^eⁿ^c^e^,^T^e^c^hnol^og^y^,^a^{nd C}^ong^r^e^s^s^,^”^Sc^ie^nc^e^v^o^{l. 3}⁰^,^no.⁴⁽^M^a^y¹⁹⁹³⁾^,^pp^{. 4}¹^-⁴^4.
²⁶^G^e^or^g^e^T^.^Sulz^ne^r^,^“^T^he^Polic^y^P^r^oc^e^s^s^a^{nd t}^h^e^us^e^s^of^N^a^tiona^l^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nta^l^Stu^d^y^C^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^ons^,”^W^e^s^t^e^rⁿ
^Politic^a^l^Q^u^a^r^te^rly^,^v^o^{l. 24,}^no^{. 3}^{( Se}^p.¹⁹⁷¹⁾^{, p}^p^.⁴³^8-4⁴⁸^.
²⁷^Ke^nne^{th R}^.^Ma^y^e^{r, “}^C^losing^Mil^ita^ry^B^a^se^{s (Fina}^lly^{): Solv}^ing^Colle^c^tiv^e^Dile^m^m^a^s^T^h^roug^{h De}^le^g^a^tion,”
^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^a^tiv^e^Studie^s^Q^u^a^r^te^r^l^y^,^v^o^{l. 20}^{, n}^o^.^{3 (}^A^ug^{. 1}⁹⁹⁵⁾^,^pp.³^95-³^97.
²⁸^C^a^m^pbe^{ll, D}ⁱ^s^c^ha^r^g^ing^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,^p.¹²^.
²⁹^Ibid^{, p}^.¹³^{; N}^e^w^t^Gⁱ^ng^ric^h^{, “}^L^e^a^d^e^r^s^h^{ip T}^a^s^k^Forc^e^s^{: T}^h^e^‘T^hird^W^a^v^e^{’ Wa}^y^{to Conside}^r^L^e^gⁱ^sla^tion,”^R^o^{ll Ca}^ll,
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

Solutions to policy problems produced within the normal legislative process may also suffer ³⁰
politically from charges of partisanship. Similar charges may be made against investigations ³¹
conducted by Congress. The non-partisan or bipartisan character of most congressional
commissions may make their findings and recommendations less susceptible to such charges and
more politically acceptable to a diverse viewpoints. The bipartisan or nonpartisan arrangement
can give their recommendations strong credibility, both in Congress and among the public, even ³²
when dealing with divisive issues of public policy. Commissions can also give political factions
space to negotiate compromises in good faith, bypassing the short-term tactical political ³³
maneuvers that accompany public negotiations. Similarly, because commission members are not ³⁴
elected, they may be better suited to suggesting unpopular, but necessary, policy solutions.
A commission may allow legislators to solve collective action problems, situations in which all
legislators individually seek to protect the interests of their own district, despite widespread
agreement that the collective result of such interests is something none of them prefer. Legislators
can use a commission to jointly “tie their hands” in such circumstances, allowing general
consensus about a particular policy solution to avoid being impeded by individual concerns about ³⁵
the effect or implementation of the solution.
For example, in 1988 Congress established the Base Closure and Realignment Commission
(BRAC) as a politically and geographically neutral body to make independent decisions about ³⁶
closures of military bases. The list of bases slated for closure by the commission was required to
be either accepted or rejected as a whole by Congress, bypassing internal Congressional politics
over which individual bases would be closed, and protecting individual Members from political ³⁷
charges that they didn’t “save” their district’s base.
By establishing a commission, Congress can often provide a highly visible forum for important ³⁸
issues that might otherwise receive scant attention from the public. Commissions often are

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^No^v.¹⁶^,¹⁹⁹⁵^,^p^.⁵^.
³⁰^C^a^m^pbe^{ll, D}ⁱ^s^c^ha^r^g^ing^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,^p.¹⁰^.
³¹^Ibid^{., p. 9.}
³²^G^e^or^g^e^T^.^Sulz^ne^r^,^“^T^he^Polic^y^P^r^oc^e^s^s^a^{nd t}^h^e^us^e^s^of^N^a^tiona^l^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nta^l^Stu^d^y^C^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^ons^,”^pp.⁴^43-⁴⁴^5.
³³^Jo^hn^B.^Gⁱ^l^m^o^u^r^,^“S^u^m^mⁱ^t^s^an^d^S^t^al^emat^es:^Bi^p^a^rtⁱ^s^an^Ne^g^o^tia^tio^ns^{in the}^Postre^f^o^rm^Er^a^,^”^{in R}^o^g^e^r^H^.^D^a^vⁱ^ds^on,
^ed^{., T}^h^e^P^o^stref^o^rm^Coⁿ^g^{ress (N}^ew^Yo^rk^{: St. Martin}^’s^P^r^ess,¹⁹⁹³^{), p}^p^.²⁴⁷^-²⁴⁸^.
³⁴^D^a^nie^l^B^e^{ll, “}^G^ov^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^{t by}^C^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^on,”^P^u^blic^Iⁿ^te^r^e^s^t^{, n}^o^.³⁽^S^pr^ing¹⁹⁶⁶⁾^,^p.^7;^C^a^m^pbe^{ll, D}ⁱ^s^c^ha^r^g^ing
^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,^p.⁷⁰^.
³⁵^G^a^r^y^W^.^C^o^x^a^{nd Ma}^tthe^w^D^.^M^c^C^ubbi^ns^{, L}^e^gⁱ^s^l^a^tiv^e^L^e^vⁱ^a^t^ha^n:^P^a^r^t^y^G^ove^rⁿ^m^e^{nt in t}^h^e^H^o^us^e⁽^B^e^r^k^e^ley^:
^Uⁿ^iv^e^r^sⁱ^t^y^of^C^a^li^f^o^rⁿ^ia^P^r^e^s^s^,¹⁹⁹³⁾^,^p.⁸⁰^.
³⁶^Ma^y^e^r^,^C^l^os^ing^Mil^ita^r^y^B^a^se^s^,^{p. 39}^8-³⁹^9.
³⁷^Cha^r^le^{s E. C}^ook^{, “}^B^a^s^e^Closing^Furor:^Mi^nim^a^{l P}^o^litic^a^l^Im^pa^c^t^{for Me}^m^b^e^r^s,”^{Roll Ca}^ll,^Ma^{r. 1}⁸^,¹⁹⁹^3,^p.^1.
³⁸^D^a^vⁱ^{d S. B}^r^ow^{n, “}^T^he^P^u^blic^A^d^vⁱ^s^o^r^y^B^o^a^r^{d a}^s^aⁿ^Iⁿ^s^t^r^u^m^e^{nt of}^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt,”^P^u^blic^A^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^{tion R}^e^vⁱ^e^w^{, v}^o^l.
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

composed of notable public figures, allowing personal prestige to be transferred to policy ³⁹
solutions. Meetings and press releases from a commission may receive significantly more
attention in the media than corresponding information coming directly from members of
congressional committees. Upon completion of a commission’s work product, public attention
may be temporarily focused on a topic that otherwise would receive scant attention, thus ⁴⁰
increasing the probability of congressional action within the policy area.

Congressional commissions have been criticized by both political and scholarly observers. These
criticisms chiefly fall into three groups. First, critics often charge that commissions are an ⁴¹
“abdication of responsibility” on the part of legislators. Second, commissions are undemocratic,
replacing elected legislators with appointed decision-makers. Third, critics also argue that
commissions are financially inefficient; they are expensive and their findings often ignored by
Congress.
Critics of commissions argue that they are primarily created by legislators specifically for “blame ⁴²
avoidance.” In this view, Congress uses commissions to distance itself from risky decisions
when confronted with controversial issues. By creating a commission, legislators can take credit
for addressing a topic of controversy without having to take a substantive position on the topic. If
the commission’s work is ultimately popular, legislators can take credit for the work. If the
commission’s work product is unpopular, legislators can shift responsibility to the commission ⁴³
itself.
A second concern about commissions is that they are not democratic. This criticism takes three
forms. First, commissions may be unrepresentative of the general population; the members of ⁴⁴
most commissions are not elected and may not reflect the variety of popular opinion on an issue.
Second, commissions lack popular accountability. Unlike Members of Congress, commission

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^15,^no^{. 3}⁽^S^um^m^e^r¹⁹⁵⁵⁾^,^pp^{. 1}⁹⁷^-¹⁹^9.
³⁹^C^h^a^r^le^s^J^.^H^a^ns^e^r^{, G}^u^ide^to^D^e^cⁱ^sⁱ^{on: T}^h^e^R^o^y^a^{l C}^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on (}^T^otow^a^,^N^e^w^J^e^r^s^ey^{: B}^e^d^m^ins^t^e^r^P^r^e^s^s^,¹⁹⁶⁵⁾^,^pp^.
²²²^-²^25.
⁴⁰^G^e^or^g^e^T^.^Sulz^ne^r^,^“^T^he^Polic^y^P^r^oc^e^s^s^a^{nd t}^h^e^us^e^s^of^N^a^tiona^l^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nta^l^Stu^d^y^C^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^ons^,”^p.⁴⁴^4.
⁴¹^Se^{n. T}^r^eⁿ^{t L}^o^tt,^“^S^pe^cⁱ^a^l^C^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^ons^,”^R^e^m^a^r^k^s^{in the}^Se^na^te^.^C^ong^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l R}^e^c^o^r^d^,^da^ily^e^d^{ition, v}^o^l¹⁴^{8 (}^S^e^p^t.
^23,²⁰⁰²^{), p}^.^S⁹⁰⁵⁰^.^Se^e^a^l^s^o^D^a^vⁱ^{d Sc}^h^o^eⁿ^bro^d^,^Pow^e^{r W}^{ithout R}^e^s^pons^ib^ility^{: H}^o^w^Cong^re^s^s^A^bus^e^s^the^P^e^ople
^T^h^r^oug^{h D}^e^le^g^a^{tion (}^N^e^w^H^a^v^eⁿ^,^C^T^{: Y}^a^le^Uⁿ^iv^e^r^sⁱ^t^y^P^r^e^s^s^,¹⁹⁹³⁾^,^p.¹^{00; R}^.^W^.^A^pple^,^“^K^e^e^p^ing^H^o^t^Pota^toe^s^O^u^t
^of^the^K^itc^he^n,”^N^e^w^Y^o^r^k^Tⁱ^m^e^{s, Fe}^b.^2,¹⁹⁸⁹^{, D}²^0.
⁴²^{R. Ke}^{nt W}^e^a^v^e^r^{, “}^T^he^Politic^s^of^Bla^m^e^Av^oida^nc^e^,^”^Journa^l^of^Public^Polic^y^,^v^o^{l. 6,}ⁿ^o^.^{4 (Oc}^t^.-D^e^c^.¹⁹⁸^6),^pp^.
³⁷³^-³^74.^Se^e^a^l^s^o^D^o^ug^la^s^A^r^{nold, T}^h^e^L^o^gⁱ^c^of^C^ong^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l A}^c^tion⁽^N^e^w^H^a^v^e^{n: Y}^a^le^Uⁿ^iv^e^r^sⁱ^t^y^P^r^e^s^s^,¹⁹⁹⁰⁾^,^p.
¹⁰¹^.
⁴³^C^a^m^pbe^{ll, D}ⁱ^s^c^ha^r^g^ing^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,^pp^{. 6}⁸^-^{69; D}^oug^la^s^A^r^nold,^T^h^e^L^o^gⁱ^c^of^C^ong^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l A}^c^{tion, p.}¹⁰^1.
⁴⁴^R^.^K^e^{nt W}^e^a^v^e^r^{, “}^I^s^C^ong^r^e^s^s^A^bdic^a^ting^Pow^e^r^{to C}^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^ons^?^”^R^o^{ll C}^a^{ll, Fe}^b.^12,¹⁹⁸⁹^,^pp.^5,^25.

members are often insulated from the electoral pressures of popular opinion. Finally,
commissions may not operate in public; unlike Congress, their meetings, hearings, and ⁴⁵
investigations may be held in private.
A third criticism of commissions is that they have high costs and low returns. Congressional
commission costs vary widely, ranging from several hundred thousand dollars to over $10
million. Coupled with this objection is the problem of congressional response to the work of a
commission; in most cases, Congress is under no obligation to act, or even respond to the work of
a commission. If legislators disagree with the results or recommendations of a commission’s
work, they may simply ignore it. In addition, there is no guarantee that any commission will
produce a balanced product; commission members may have their own agendas, biases, and ⁴⁶
pressures. Or they may simply produce a mediocre work product. Finally, advisory boards
create economic and legislative inefficiency if they function as patronage devices, with Members ⁴⁷
of Congress using commission positions to pay off political debts.

Statutes establishing congressional policy commissions generally include language that states the
mandate of the commission, provides a membership structure and appointment scheme, defines
member compensation and other benefits, outlines the commission’s duties and powers,
authorizes funding, and sets a termination date for the commission.
A wide variety of options are available for each of these organizational choices. Legislators can
tailor the composition, organization, and working arrangements of a commission, based on the
particular goals of Congress. As a result, individual congressional commissions often have an
organizational structure and powers quite different from one another.
A commission’s establishment is generally prescribed in a brief introductory paragraph. The
proposed Commission on Catastrophic Disaster Risk and Insurance was established with a single
sentence:
^T^h^er^{e is estab}^lish^e^d^{a b}ⁱ^p^a^r^tisan^Co^m^mⁱ^ssioⁿ^oⁿ^Catas^t^r^o^p^h^ic^Dⁱ^s^a^s^t^e^r^Rⁱ^s^k^aⁿ^d^Iⁿ^s^u^r^aⁿ^c^e^.⁴⁸
In some instances, the establishment clause will identify the commission as “established in the
legislative branch.” This can often resolve confusion as to whether certain executive branch
personnel and ethics laws apply to employees of the commission. For commissions not
⁴⁵
^Na^ta^lie^Ha^nlon,^“^M^ilita^ry^Ba^se^Closure^s^{: A}^Study^of^G^ove^rnm^e^{nt by}^Com^mⁱ^ssion,”^Col^o^ra^do^L^a^{w Re}^vⁱ^e^w^{, v}^o^{l. 62}^,
^no.^{2 (}¹⁹⁹¹⁾^{, p}^p^.³³^1-³⁶⁴^.
⁴⁶^Ja^m^e^{s Q.}^Wⁱ^l^s^oⁿ^,^“A^Read^er’s^Guⁱ^d^{e t}^o^t^h^{e Cri}^m^{e Co}^mmi^ssi^on’^s^R^e^por^t,”^Pub^lic^Iⁿ^te^r^e^s^t^,^no.^{9 (}^F^a^{ll 1}⁹⁶⁷⁾^,^pp.⁶⁴^,
^82.
⁴⁷^D^a^vⁱ^{d S. B}^r^ow^{n, “}^T^he^P^u^blic^A^d^vⁱ^s^o^r^y^B^o^a^r^{d a}^s^aⁿ^Iⁿ^s^t^r^u^m^e^{nt of}^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt,”^p.¹⁹^9.
⁴⁸^Se^c^.^{3, H}^.^{R. 5}³⁷⁽¹¹⁰^th^Coⁿ^g^ress^).

specifically established in the legislative or executive branch, the manner in which the members ⁴⁹
of the commission are appointed may determine the commission’s legal status. A commission
with a majority of appointments made by the President may be treated as an executive branch
entity for certain purposes; if a majority of appointments are made by Members of Congress, it
may be treated as a legislative branch entity.
A bill creating a commission will sometimes provide congressional “findings” identifying the
conditions justifying the creation of the panel. The bill proposing the Commission on
Catastrophic Disaster Risk and Insurance includes seven specific findings related to hurricane
damage and the federal government’s role in catastrophe management. In other cases, legislation
creating a congressional commission may simply include a short “purpose” section describing the
justification for the creation of the commission, in lieu of “findings.”
Congressional commissions use a wide variety of membership schemes and appointment
structures. The statutory scheme may require that membership of a commission be made up in
whole or in part of specifically designated Members of Congress, typically Members in
congressional or committee leadership positions. In other cases, selected leaders, often with
balance between the parties, appoint commission members, who may or may not be Members of
Congress. A third common statutory scheme is to have selected leaders, again often with balance
between the parties, recommend members, who may or may not be Members of Congress, for
appointment to a commission. These leaders may act either in parallel or jointly, and the
recommendation may be made either to other congressional leaders, such as the Speaker of the
House and President pro tempore of the Senate, or to the President.
Table 3 presents commission appointment data from the 101^st to 110^th Congress. For each
appointing body, the table reports the percentage of commissions to which appointments are
made, the total number of appointments made, and the percentage of total appointments made.
Table 3. Appointment Authority to Congressional Commissions
¹⁰¹^st^{to 1}¹⁰^th^Co^ngress
^{Percentage of}^{Total Number of}^{Percentage of T}^otal
^{Appointing Bo}^dy^Commissions^Appointments^Appointees
^{Speaker 74%}¹⁷⁸^17.2%
^{President Pro Tempore}^17%⁴⁸^4.6%
^{Senate Majority Leader}^59%¹²⁹^12.4%
^{House Minority Leade}^r^53%⁸⁰^7.7%
^{Senate Minority Leader}^53%⁸⁰^7.7%
^{Committees 23%}¹⁸⁵^17.8%
⁴⁹
^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^o^f^L^e^g^a^{l Couns}^e^l^{, D}^e^pa^rt^m^e^{nt of}^J^u^s^tic^e^.^“^A^pplic^a^b^ility^of^{18 U}^.^S.C.^§²⁰^{8 to}^N^a^tio^na^{l G}^a^m^b^ling^Im^pa^c^t
^Study^C^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^on,”^Me^m^o^r^a^ndu^m^f^o^r^the^A^c^ting^G^e^ne^r^a^{l C}^ouns^e^l^{, G}^e^ne^r^a^{l Se}^r^v^ice^s^A^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^{tion, J}^a^nua^r^y^26,
¹⁹⁹^9.^Se^e^a^l^s^o^A^m^e^r^{on, I}ⁿ^c^.^v^.^U^.^{S. A}^r^m^y^C^o^r^p^of^Engⁱ^ne^e^r^s^,⁷⁸⁷^F.2^d⁸⁷⁵⁽³^{d C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁸⁶⁾^{; B}^o^w^s^he^r^v^.^Sy^na^r^,^{478 U}^.^S^.
⁷¹⁴⁽¹⁹⁸⁶⁾^.

^{Percentage of}^{Total Number of}^{Percentage of T}^otal
^{Appointing Bo}^dy^Commissions^Appointments^Appointees
^{Total, Legislat}^ive^Branch^100%⁷⁰⁰^67.5%
^{President 58%}²³³^22.5%
^Other^a^33%¹⁰⁴^10.0%
^Total,^{Other Sources}^79%³³⁷^32.5%
^Source:^{CRS analysis of databas}^{e que}^{ry of Congres}^{sional Legislative Information System (LIS), 1}⁰¹^st^{to 11}⁰^th
^Congress
^a.^{Includes age}^{ncy a}^{nd departme}^nt^{heads, Supreme}^Court^Membe^{rs, and state and local officials}
Some statutory provisions may have the effect of limiting the degree of autonomy a Member has
in appointing or making recommendations for commission membership. For example, statutory
language may require the appointing official to select members who are specifically qualified by
virtue of their education, knowledge, training, experience, expertise, distinguished service, or ⁵⁰
recognized eminence in a particular field or fields.
Statutes creating congressional commissions often include deadlines for leaders making
appointments. Such deadlines can range from several weeks to several months. For example, the ⁵¹
deadline for appointments to the Antitrust Modernization Commission was 60 days after the
enactment of the act. The deadline for appointment to the Commission on Wartime Contracting in
Iraq and Afghanistan was 120 days from the date of enactment. The deadline for appointment to
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States was December 15, 2002,

18 days after enactment of the act.

Most statutorily created congressional commissions do not compensate their members, except to
reimburse members for expenses directly related to their service, such as travel costs.
For example, Section 201(i) of the statute establishing the United States Commission on ⁵²
International Religious Freedom reads
⁽ⁱ^{) F}^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^.^—^M^e^m^ber^s^of^t^h^e^C^o^m^mⁱ^ssⁱ^{on sh}^al^l^{be al}^l^o^w^e^{d t}^r^av^el^ex^peⁿ^s^e^s^{, i}ⁿ^c^l^u^dⁱⁿ^g^per
^di^e^mⁱⁿ^lⁱ^{eu of su}^bsⁱ^s^t^eⁿ^{ce, a}^t^rat^e^s^aut^h^ori^zed^f^o^{r e}^m^pl^o^y^ee^{s un}^{der su}^bch^a^pt^{er I o}^f^c^h^apt^e^r
⁵⁷^o^f^{title 5}^,^Unⁱ^t^ed^States^Co^d^e^,^w^h^{ile a}^w^a^y^f^r^o^m^t^h^eir^h^o^m^e^{s o}^r^reg^u^l^{ar p}^l^aces^o^f^b^u^sⁱⁿ^es^s
ⁱⁿ^th^{e p}^e^r^f^o^r^m^aⁿ^{ce o}^f^ser^v^ice^s^f^o^r^th^{e Co}^m^mⁱ^ss^ioⁿ^.
Among congressional commissions that compensate their members, the level of compensation is
almost always specified statutorily, and is typically set in accordance with one of the federal pay
⁵⁰
^F^o^{r exam}^p^l^e,^P^.^L^.¹⁰⁹^-⁵⁸^p^r^escri^b^{es t}^h^atⁿ^o^mⁱⁿ^{ees f}^o^{r t}^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es Co}^mmⁱ^ssi^oⁿ^oⁿ^N^o^rt^{h Ameri}^can^Eⁿ^erg^y
^Fr^e^e^dom^m^u^s^t^be^“^k^now^le^dg^e^a^b^l^e^{on e}ⁿ^e^r^g^y^is^s^u^e^s^{, inc}^l^udi^ng^oil^a^{nd g}^a^s^e^x^plor^a^tio^{n a}ⁿ^d^pr^o^duc^ti^oⁿ^{, c}^r^u^d^e^oil
^r^e^fⁱ^ning^{, oil a}ⁿ^{d g}^a^s^pi^pe^line^s^{, e}^l^e^c^tr^ic^ity^pr^oduc^tio^{n a}ⁿ^{d tr}^aⁿ^s^m^is^sⁱ^{on, c}^o^a^l^,^unc^oⁿ^v^e^ntio^na^{l hy}^dr^oc^a^r^bon^r^e^s^our^c^e^s^,
^f^u^el^cel^l^s^,^m^o^t^o^{r veh}ⁱ^cl^{e p}^o^w^{er syst}^e^m^s,ⁿ^u^c^l^{ear en}^erg^y^,^reⁿ^e^w^a^b^l^{e en}^erg^y^,^bⁱ^o^f^u^e^l^s^,^en^erg^y^e^f^fⁱ^ci^en^c^y^,^an^d^en^erg^y
^c^ons^e^r^v^a^tion.”
⁵¹^P^.^L.¹⁰⁷^-²⁷^3,¹¹^{6 S}^t^at^{. 17}⁵⁸^,⁽²⁰⁰²⁾^.
⁵²^P^.^L^.¹⁰^5-²⁹²^;¹¹²^Sta^t^.²⁷⁸⁷^{, 2}⁷^{98 (}^10/²⁷^/1⁹⁹⁸⁾^.

scales, prorated to the number of days of service. The most common level of compensation is the
daily equivalent of Level IV of the Executive Schedule (EX), which has a basic annual rate of pay ⁵³⁵⁴
of $149,000 in 2008. For example, the statute establishing the Antitrust Modernization
Commission states
^{(a) P}^a^y^.^—
^{(1) N}^oⁿ^g^o^v^e^rnm^e^nt^e^m^pl^o^y^e^e^s^.^—^E^ach^m^e^m^b^{er of}^t^h^e^C^o^m^mⁱ^ssⁱ^oⁿ^w^{ho i}^sⁿ^o^t
^o^t^h^e^r^w^{ise e}^m^p^l^o^y^ed^b^y^{a g}^o^v^e^rn^m^eⁿ^t^s^h^{all b}^e^en^titled^to^receiv^e^th^{e d}^a^il^y^eq^uⁱ^v^a^leⁿ^t^o^f
^th^{e a}ⁿ^nu^{al rate of}^ba^sⁱ^{c pa}^y^pay^a^ble^f^o^{r lev}^e^{l IV o}^f^t^h^{e E}^x^ecu^tⁱ^v^e^Sch^e^d^u^le^uⁿ^d^er
^s^ection^{5315 of}^t^{itle 5 U}ⁿ^ited^States^C^{ode, as}ⁱⁿ^eff^ect^f^r^o^m^ti^m^e^{to ti}^m^e^,^f^o^{r each da}^y
⁽ⁱⁿ^c^lu^dⁱⁿ^g^tr^av^{el ti}^m^e⁾^d^u^rⁱⁿ^g^w^h^ic^h^su^c^h^m^e^m^b^er^{is en}^g^a^g^e^dⁱⁿ^th^{e actu}^a^l^p^e^r^f^o^r^m^aⁿ^c^e
^of^du^tⁱ^e^s^o^f^t^h^e^C^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^on^.
^{(2) Gov}^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^e^m^p^l^o^y^ees^.^—^A^m^e^m^b^{er of}^t^h^{e C}^o^m^mⁱ^s^s^ion^w^h^{o is}^aⁿ^of^fⁱ^{cer or}
^e^m^p^l^o^y^{ee o}^f^{a g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^s^h^a^{ll ser}^v^e^wⁱ^t^h^o^u^{t ad}^d^itioⁿ^a^{l p}^a^y⁽^o^r^b^eⁿ^e^fⁱ^t^sⁱⁿ^t^h^{e n}^a^t^u^r^e
^of^co^m^p^ens^a^tion⁾^f^o^{r s}^e^r^v^{ice a}^s^a^m^e^m^b^{er of}^t^h^{e C}^o^mm^is^sⁱ^oⁿ^.
^(b)^Trav^{el Ex}^pen^s^e^s^.—Me^m^b^e^r^s^of^th^{e C}^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^s^h^a^{ll receiv}^e^trav^el^e^x^p^eⁿ^s^es^,ⁱⁿ^c^l^u^dⁱⁿ^g
^p^e^{r d}ⁱ^emⁱⁿ^lie^u^o^f^su^b^s^isteⁿ^c^{e, in}^acco^rd^an^ce^w^ith^s^u^b^c^h^a^p^t^{er I o}^f^ch^ap^{ter 5}⁷^o^f^{title 5}^,⁵⁵
^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^e^s^C^ode.
As shown in Table 4, approximately two-thirds of commissions created in the past 20 years have
not paid members beyond reimbursement. The remaining commissions have paid members at the
daily equivalent of level IV of the Executive schedule.
Table 4. Commission Member Compensation
¹⁰¹^st^{to 1}¹⁰^th^Co^ngress
^{Total Number of}^{Percentage of All}
^Comp^{ensation Level}^Commissions^Commissions
^Reimburseme^{nt only}⁶⁰^69%
^{Daily equivalent of Level IV}^{26 30%}
^{of the E}^xecu^{tive Schedule}
^{Daily equivalent of Level I of}^{1 1%}
^{the E}^{xecutive Sc}^hedule
^Source:^{CRS analysis of databas}^e^que^{ry of Congres}^{sional Legislative Information System (LIS), 1}⁰¹^st^{to 11}⁰^th
^Congress
⁵³
^htt^p^://w^ww^.op^m^.g^ov^/oc^a^/^08ta^b^le^s/pdf^/e^x^.^pdf^.
⁵⁴^A^lthoug^{h L}^e^v^e^{l I}^V^of^the^Ex^e^c^u^tⁱ^v^e^Sc^he^dule^is^t^h^e^m^o^s^t^c^o^m^m^{on c}^o^m^p^eⁿ^s^a^{tion le}^v^e^{l, c}^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on m}^e^m^b^e^r^s^c^ould
^be^c^o^m^p^eⁿ^s^a^te^{d a}^t^othe^r^le^v^e^ls^of^the^Ex^e^c^u^tiv^e^Sc^he^dule^or^a^t^pa^r^tⁱ^c^ula^r^le^v^e^ls^of^the^G^e^ne^r^a^{l Sc}^he^dule^.^Me^m^b^e^r^s^of
^c^ong^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l c}^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^ons^tha^t^f^a^{ll un}^de^r^the^Fe^de^r^a^{l A}^d^vⁱ^s^o^r^y^C^o^m^m^itte^e^A^c^{t (}^P^.L^{. 9}²^-⁴⁶³⁾^,^h^o^w^e^v^e^r^,^a^r^e^pr^ohi^bite^d
^f^r^o^m^recei^viⁿ^g^co^m^p^en^satⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^e^x^{cess o}^f^t^h^{e rat}^e^sp^eci^fⁱ^ed^f^o^{r E}^x^e^c^u^tⁱ^v^{e S}^c^h^e^d^u^l^{e L}^e^vel^IV^.
⁵⁵^P^.^L^.¹⁰^7-²⁷³^,¹¹⁶^Sta^t^.¹⁷⁶⁸^,¹⁸^{58, J}^a^nua^r^y^{2, 20}⁰²^.

Congressional commissions created to study a policy problem or conduct an investigation are
usually authorized to hire a staff. Many of these commissions are specifically authorized to
appoint a staff director and other personnel as necessary. The size of the staff is not generally
specified, allowing the commission flexibility in judging its own staffing requirements. Typically,
maximum pay rates will be specified, but the commission will be granted authority to set actual
pay rates within those guidelines.
Most of these congressional commissions are also authorized to hire consultants and procure
intermittent services. Many commissions are statutorily authorized to request that federal
agencies detail personnel to assist the commission. Some commissions are also authorized to
accept voluntary services.
Statutes creating congressional commissions often direct the General Services Administration (or
another agency) to offer administrative support to the commission:
^Up^oⁿ^th^{e r}^e^q^u^{est o}^f^th^e^Co^m^m^issioⁿ^{, th}^e^A^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^to^r^o^f^Gen^e^r^a^{l Ser}^v^ice^s^sh^al^{l p}^r^o^vⁱ^d^e^t^o
^th^{e C}^o^m^mⁱ^s^s^ion^,^on^{a rei}^m^bu^r^s^{able bas}ⁱ^s^,^th^{e ad}^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rati^v^e^s^u^{pport s}^e^rv^icesⁿ^eces^s^a^r^y^f^o^r
^th^{e Co}^m^mⁱ^ss^ioⁿ^to^car^r^y^o^u^{t it}^s^r^e^sp^oⁿ^sib^ilities^uⁿ^d^er^thⁱ^s^A^c^t.^Th^e^s^e^a^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^r^a^tⁱ^v^e^s^e^r^vⁱ^c^e^s
^ma^yⁱⁿ^c^l^ud^e^hu^ma^{n r}^e^s^o^ur^c^e^ma^na^ge^me^nt^,^b^u^d^g^e^t^,^l^e^a^sⁱⁿ^g^,^accouⁿ^tⁱⁿ^g^,^an^d^pay^r^oll^s^e^r^v^ic^es^.
Congressional commissions are usually statutorily directed to carry out specific tasks. These can
include studying a problem, fact-finding, assessing conditions, conducting an investigation,
reviewing policy proposals, crafting recommendations, and making feasibility determinations.
For example, the proposed Commission on Catastrophic Disaster Risk and Insurance is directed
^to^{assess t}^h^{e co}ⁿ^d^itioⁿ^o^f^t^h^{e p}^r^o^p^e^r^t^y^an^d^cas^u^a^lt^yⁱⁿ^s^u^r^aⁿ^{ce an}^d^r^eⁱⁿ^s^u^r^aⁿ^ce^m^a^r^k^{ets i}ⁿ^t^h^e
^af^t^e^r^m^a^t^{h of H}^u^rri^c^aⁿ^{es K}^a^t^rⁱⁿ^{a, Ri}^t^a^{, a}ⁿ^{d Wi}^l^m^{a i}ⁿ^{2005, an}^{d t}^h^{e 4}^m^a^j^o^{r h}^u^rri^caⁿ^e^s^t^h^at
^s^t^ru^c^k^t^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^e^sⁱⁿ^2004;^an^{d t}^h^{e on}^g^oⁱⁿ^g^e^x^pos^u^r^{e of}^t^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^e^s^t^o
^wⁱⁿ^d^s^t^or^m^s^{, eart}^h^qu^a^k^es^,^v^o^l^canⁱ^c^er^u^p^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^t^s^uⁿ^a^mⁱ^s^,^a^{nd f}^l^oods^;^aⁿ^{d reco}^m^m^eⁿ^d^aⁿ^d
^report^{... an}^yⁿ^ece^s^s^a^r^y^le^gⁱ^s^l^at^iv^{e an}^{d reg}^u^lator^y^ch^aⁿ^g^e^s^t^h^{at w}^{ill i}^m^p^r^o^v^{e th}^{e d}^o^m^e^st^{ic an}^d
ⁱⁿ^tern^a^tion^a^l^fⁱⁿ^aⁿ^c^ial^h^ealt^h^an^{d com}^p^eti^tiv^eⁿ^es^s^of^s^u^ch^m^a^rk^ets^;^an^{d as}^s^u^{re con}^s^u^m^e^r^s^o^f⁵⁶
^av^ailab^ilit^y^o^f^ad^eq^u^a^{te i}ⁿ^s^u^r^aⁿ^{ce co}^v^e^r^a^g^e^w^h^eⁿ^anⁱⁿ^s^u^r^e^d^ev^en^{t o}^ccu^r^s^.
One of the primary functions of most congressional commissions is to produce a final report for ⁵⁷
Congress outlining their activities, findings, and legislative recommendations. Most
commissions are required to produce an interim, annual, or final report for transmittal to
Congress, and sometimes to the President or executive department or agency heads, usually
⁵⁶^th
^Se^c^.^{5, H}^.^{R. 5}³⁷⁽¹¹⁰^Coⁿ^g^ress^).
⁵⁷^Som^e^c^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^ons^{, s}^u^c^h^a^s^t^h^e^Motor^F^u^e^l^T^a^x^Enf^o^r^c^em^eⁿ^{t A}^d^vⁱ^s^o^r^y^C^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^{on (}^P^.L^{. 1}^09-⁵⁹^;¹¹^{9 Sta}^t^{. 2}⁹⁴¹⁾
^a^r^e^{not r}^e^q^u^ir^e^d^{to s}^ubm^{it a}^fⁱ^na^{l r}^e^por^t,^bu^{t ins}^t^e^a^d^m^a^k^e^a^nnua^{l r}^e^por^ts^t^o^C^ong^r^e^s^s^durⁱⁿ^g^the^s^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^lif^e^s^pa^{n of}
^t^h^{e co}^mmⁱ^ssi^oⁿ^.

within a specified period of time. A commission may also be authorized to issue other
recommendations it considers appropriate.
Table 5. Reporting Requirements of Congressional Commissions
¹⁰¹^st^{to 1}¹⁰^th^Co^ngress
^Recipient^{Total Number}^{Percentage of T}^otal
^{Congress and t}^he^{50 57%}
^President
^{Congress only}²³^27%
^{Congress and a}ⁿ^ex^ecutive^{14 16%}
^agency
^Source:^{CRS analysis of databas}^{e que}^{ry of Congres}^{sional Legislative Information System (LIS), 1}⁰¹^st^{to 11}⁰^th
^Congress
As seen in Table 5, the majority of commissions created in the past 20 years have submitted their
work product to both Congress and the President. About one-quarter of commissions have
submitted their work to Congress only. The remainder have submitted their work to both
Congress and an executive branch agency.
Since the recommendations contained in a commission report are only advisory, no changes in
public policy occur on the authority of a congressional commission. The implementation of such
recommendations is dependent upon future congressional or executive branch action.
Most commissions are given statutory deadlines for the submission of their final report. The
deadline for the submission of final reports varies from commission to commission. Some ⁵⁸
commissions, such as the National Commission on the Cost of Higher Education, have been
given less than six months to submit their final report for Congress. Other commissions, such as ⁵⁹
the Antitrust Modernization Commission, have been given three or more years to complete their
work product. Table 6 summarizes the deadlines for submission of final reports.
Table 6. Congressional Commission Final Report Deadlines
¹⁰¹^st^{to 1}¹⁰^th^Co^ngress
^{Statutory Report Deadline}^{Number of}^Commissions
^{Six months or less}¹¹
^{Between six mont}^{hs a}^{nd one yea}^r⁶
^{One year}¹⁷
^{Between one yea}^{r and}^{18 mo}^nth^s¹³
^{Between 1}⁸^mont^{hs and two yea}^rs⁶
⁵⁸
^P^.^L^.¹⁰^5-¹⁸^;¹¹^{1 S}^t^a^t^{. 2}⁰⁷⁽^J^uⁿ^e^12,¹⁹⁹⁷⁾^.
⁵⁹^P^.^L.¹⁰⁷^-²⁷^3;¹¹^{6 S}^t^at^.¹⁸⁵⁶⁽^N^ov.²^,²⁰⁰²⁾^.

^{Statutory Report Deadline}^{Number of}^Commissions
^{Two years}¹⁴
^{Between two and t}^{hree yea}^rs⁶
^{Three years}^{or more}⁸
^{No specified deadline}³
^{No final report}³
^Source:^{CRS analysis of databas}^{e que}^{ry of Congres}^{sional Legislative Information System (LIS), 1}⁰¹^st^{to 11}⁰^th
^Congress
As shown in Table 6, congressional commissions have been given a wide range of deadlines for
the completion of the final reports to Congress. For the 87 identified commissions, final report
deadlines ranged from 120 days to 4.5 years. Over seventy-five percent of the commissions had a
final report deadline of two years or less.
The overall length of time for commissions to complete their final report also varies based on
when the specified time limit begins. For the 87 commissions identified by the database search,
four different events were used as the start point related to the report deadline: the enactment of
the legislation, the appointment of the commission members, the date of the first meeting of the
commission, or a specific calendar date. Therefore, a commission with a six month deadline from
the first meeting of the commission will have more total time than a commission with a six month
deadline linked to the enactment of the legislation. Table 7 reports the frequency of use of each of
these four events as starting points for report deadlines.
Table 7. Frequency of Final Report Deadline Linked to Specific Events
¹⁰¹^st^{to 1}¹⁰^th^Co^ngress
^{Number of}^Commissions^Wi^{th Report}
^Event^{Deadline Fi}^{xed to Event}
^Enactme^{nt of legislation}¹¹
^Appointment^{of commissioners}¹²
^{First meeting of commission}³²
^{Specific calendar date}²⁴
^{Unspecified 4}
^{No final report}⁴
^Source:^{CRS analysis of databas}^{e que}^{ry of Congres}^{sional Legislative Information System (LIS), 1}⁰¹^st^{to 11}⁰^th
^Congress
As shown in Table 7, most commissions identified by the search linked the deadline for the
submission of the final report to either the first meeting of the commission or a specific calendar
date.
The length of time granted to a congressional commission for the completion of its work product
is arguably one of the most important decisions facing legislators as they design a new
commission. If the commission is given a short amount of time, the quality of its work product

may suffer or the commission may not be able to fulfill its statutory mandate. Policymakers
should also consider the amount of time necessary for “standing up” a new commission; the
selection of commissioners, recruitment of staff, arrangement of office space, and other logistical
matters may take six months or more from the date of enactment of commission legislation.
On the other hand, if the commission is given a long amount of time to complete its work
product, it may undermine one of the primary legislative advantages of a commission, the timely
production of expert advice on a current policy matter. If legislators seek to create a commission
to address a pressing policy problem, a short deadline may be appropriate. In addition, the cost of
a commission will increase with a longer deadline.
Legislators should also carefully select which event triggers the start of the deadline clock.
Selecting a specific calendar date will ensure delivery of a final report at a predictable time, but
may leave the commission less time to complete its work product than anticipated if there is a
delay in member selection or staff hiring. Linking the deadline to a flexible date, such as the first
meeting, will often give the commission a more predictable amount of time to complete its work,
but may delay the actual calendar date of submission of the final report.
Most congressional commissions are directed to hold public meetings to discuss commission
matters, usually at the call of the chair or the majority of the commission. In addition, most of
these congressional commissions are statutorily empowered to hold fact-finding hearings and take
testimony from witnesses.
Commissions are occasionally empowered to subpoena witnesses. For example, the proposed ⁶⁰
Hurricane Katrina Disaster Inquiry Commission is authorized to issue subpoenas by agreement ⁶¹
of the chair and vice chair, or by the affirmative vote of eight commission members. Additional
statutory language provides for the enforcement of the subpoenas in federal court.
Some commissions are empowered to secure information from federal agencies. For example, the
proposed Hurricane Katrina Disaster Inquiry Commission would be authorized to
^s^ecu^{re directl}^y^f^r^o^m^aⁿ^y^e^x^ec^utiv^{e depart}^m^eⁿ^t^{, bu}^rea^u^{, ag}^eⁿ^c^y^{, board, com}^mⁱ^s^s^ion^,^o^f^fice,
ⁱⁿ^d^e^p^eⁿ^d^en^{t es}^tab^lis^h^m^eⁿ^{t, o}^rⁱⁿ^str^u^m^eⁿ^t^a^lit^y^o^f^th^e^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^{, in}^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^,^su^g^g^estⁱ^oⁿ^s,
^es^ti^m^a^tes^,^aⁿ^{d s}^t^at^is^tic^s^{... [e]ach}^depart^m^eⁿ^t^{, bu}^reau^{, a}^g^eⁿ^c^y^{, board, com}^mⁱ^s^s^ion^,^o^f^fice,
ⁱⁿ^d^e^p^eⁿ^d^en^t^estab^lⁱ^s^h^m^eⁿ^{t, o}^rⁱⁿ^str^u^m^eⁿ^t^a^lit^y^s^h^all,^to^th^e^ex^t^eⁿ^t^a^u^t^h^o^r^ized^b^y^la^w^,^f^u^rⁿⁱ^s^h⁶²
^s^u^c^h^inf^o^r^m^a^tion^{... u}^pon^reques^t^m^a^{de b}^y^t^h^{e ch}^air^m^aⁿ^.
In addition, Congress occasionally directs specific executive branch agencies to assist a
commission in the completion of its work.
Commissions may also be given the following powers: the authority to contract with public
agencies and private firms, the authority to use the mails in the same manner as departments and
agencies of the United States, and the authority to accept gifts and donations.
⁶⁰^th
^H.^R^.²⁶^{5 (}¹¹⁰^C^ong^r^e^s^s⁾^.
⁶¹^Se^c^.⁶⁽^a⁾⁽²⁾^,^H^.^R^.²⁶^{5 (}¹¹⁰^th^C^o^ngr^ess)^.
⁶²^Se^c^.⁶⁽^c⁾^{, H}^.^R^.²⁶⁵⁽¹¹⁰^th^C^ong^r^e^s^s⁾^.

Congressional commission costs vary widely, ranging from several hundred thousand dollars to
over $10 million. Overall expenses for any individual commission are dependent on a variety of
factors, the most important of which are the number of paid staff and duration of the commission.
Many commissions have few or no full-time staff; others employ large numbers, such as the ⁶³
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, which had a full-time paid
staff of 80. Additionally, some commissions provide compensation to members; others only
reimburse members for travel expenses. Many commissions finish their work and terminate
within a year of creation; in other cases, work may not be completed for several years.
Secondary factors that can affect commission costs include the number of commissioners, how
often the commission meets or holds hearings, and the number and size of publications the
commission produces. Although congressional commissions are primarily funded through
congressional appropriations, many commissions are statutorily authorized to accept donations of
money and volunteer labor, which may offset costs.
Most statutes authorizing the creation of congressional commissions do not specify how the
commission should conduct its business. Instead, the statutory language is typically either silent
on internal commission procedure or specifically empowers the commission to determine its own
rules of procedure. For example, the statute authorizing the National Gambling Impact Study
Commission provides that
^T^h^e^Co^mmi^ssi^oⁿ^m^a^{y e}^s^t^a^b^lⁱ^s^{h b}^y^ma^j^o^rⁱ^t^y^vo^t^e^aⁿ^{y o}^t^he^r^r^u^l^e^{s fo}^r^t^h^e^c^o^nd^uc^t^o^f^t^h^e
^Co^m^mⁱ^s^s^ioⁿ^’^{s b}^u^siⁿ^e^s^s^{, i}^f^s^u^c^h^r^u^le^{s ar}^{e n}^o^{t in}^coⁿ^sⁱ^s^ten^t^wⁱ^t^h^th^is^A^c^{t o}^r^o^t^h^e^r^ap^p^licab^le⁶⁴
^la^w^.
Certain rules of internal procedure, however, are found in the language of most statutes that
establish commissions. For instance, many commission statutes provide that votes taken by the
commission will be by simple majority, or that a quorum will consist of a particular number of ⁶⁵
commissioners. Similarly, commissions that are given subpoena authority are usually statutorily ⁶⁶
directed as to who on the commission has the authority to issue the subpoenas. Many
commissions provide that rules regarding staff hires will be determined by the commission. For
instance, the statute authorizing the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government
Secrecy states that
⁶³
^P^.^L.¹⁰⁷^-³⁰^6;¹¹^{6 S}^t^at^.²⁴⁰⁸^.
⁶⁴^P^.^L.¹⁰⁴^-¹⁶^9;¹¹^{0 S}^t^at^.¹⁴⁸²⁽^O^ct^.³^,¹⁹⁹⁶⁾^.
⁶⁵^F^o^{r exam}^p^l^e,^t^h^{e st}^at^u^t^{e creat}ⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{e Bro}^wⁿ^vs.^Bo^ard^o^f^E^d^u^catⁱ^oⁿ⁵⁰^th^Aⁿⁿⁱ^versar^y^Co^mme^m^o^ratⁱ^{ve Co}^mmi^ssi^oⁿ
^(P.L^{. 10}^7-4¹^;¹¹^{5 Sta}^t^.²⁰⁶⁾^provⁱ^d^e^s^tha^t^“^a^m^a^jority^o^f^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^”^w^{ill f}^o^r^m^a^quorum^{, w}^h^ile^the^s^t^a^t^ute^c^r^e^a^ting^the
^C^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on on t}^h^e^N^a^tio^na^{l Mil}ⁱ^t^a^r^y^Mus^e^um⁽^P^.L^{. 1}^06-^65;¹¹³^S^t^a^t^{. 8}⁸⁰⁾^pr^ov^ide^s^t^h^a^t^a^s^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^c^num^be^r^of
^c^o^m^mⁱ^ssione^{rs (six}^{) w}^{ill f}^o^r^m^a^q^uor^um^.
⁶⁶^For^e^x^a^m^ple^,^s^e^e^P^.^L^.¹⁰^7-³⁰⁶^,^w^h^ic^{h c}^r^e^a^t^e^d^the^N^a^tiona^{l C}^o^m^m^issⁱ^{on o}ⁿ^T^e^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^t^A^tta^c^k^s^U^{pon the}^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^.

^T^h^{e C}^h^air^m^aⁿ^{, in}^accordan^{ce w}ⁱ^t^h^ru^le^s^ag^{reed u}^pon^b^y^th^e^C^o^m^mⁱ^ss^ion^,^m^a^y^appoin^t^an^d
^fⁱ^x^t^h^{e co}^m^p^eⁿ^s^a^tion^o^f^a^s^t^a^f^f^{director an}^d^s^u^c^h^ot^h^e^{r pers}^onⁿ^e^l^as^m^a^y^beⁿ^eces^s^a^r^y^to⁶⁷
^en^ab^{le th}^e^Co^m^mⁱ^s^s^ioⁿ^to^car^r^y^o^u^{t it}^{s f}^uⁿ^c^tioⁿ^s^.
Absent statutory guidance (either in general statutes or in individual statutes authorizing
commissions), commissions vary widely in how they adopt their procedures. In general, three
models exist: formal written rules, informal rules, and norms. Any individual commission may
make use of all three of these models for different types of decision making.
(1) Formal Written Rules: Some commissions choose to formalize their procedures for
meetings and hearings. For example, the United States - China Economic and Security Review ⁶⁸
Commission established written rules of procedure for the conduct of both meetings of the
commission and for hearings held by the commission. The rules include procedures for: selection
of chairpersons, proxy use, budgeting, expenditures of money, hiring and firing of staff, ⁶⁹
commissioner ethics, and periodic revision of the rules. Changes to the rules require a majority ⁷⁰
vote of the commission as well as review by outside counsel. The commission’s written rules
for hearings include procedures for: the hearing structure, the selection of panelists, generation of ⁷¹
questions, opening statements, and post-hearing recommendations to Congress.
(2) Informal Rules: Some commissions adopt set processes for establishing rules piecemeal
as the need arises. For example, the National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue ⁷²⁷³
Commission did not establish formal written rules of procedure. However, the members of the
commission did take occasional votes to clarify particular procedures that the commission would
use for meetings. For example, at the first meetings of the commission, members voted by simple ⁷⁴
majority as to whether future votes of commission members could be conducted by proxy.
Although the result of this vote was used as precedent for the remainder of the commission’s
existence, neither the result of the vote, the rule, or the rules governing the vote itself were ⁷⁵
formalized in a written fashion.
(3) Norms: Many advisory commissions choose not to create formal rules for commission
meetings or hearings. Instead, these commissions rely on a collegial relationship between
commission members and staff, and conduct the meetings in a procedurally flexible manner. In
some cases, deference to the wishes of the chairman is followed for procedural matters. For
instance, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China does not operate within a system of
⁶⁷
^P^.^L^.¹⁰^3-²³⁶^;¹⁰⁸^Sta^t²⁵^{5 (}^A^pr^.^30,¹⁹⁹⁴⁾^.
⁶⁸^P^.^L^.¹⁰^3-⁶⁹⁸^;¹¹⁴^Sta^t^.¹⁶^54A^-³^{34 (}^O^c^t^.³⁰^{, 2}⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
⁶⁹^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^-^C^hina^Ec^on^om^ic^and^Se^c^u^r^ity^R^e^vⁱ^ew^C^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^on,^C^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on R}^u^le^s^,^a^d^opte^d^J^une^6,²⁰^03.
⁷⁰^Ibid^{., r}^u^le¹⁹^.
⁷¹^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^-China^Ec^on^om^ic^a^nd^Se^c^u^rity^Re^vⁱ^e^w^Co^m^mⁱ^ssion,^P^r^oc^e^dure^s^aⁿ^{d Re}^sp^onsi^b^ilitie^s^of^He^a^r^ing
^Co^ch^ai^rs.
⁷²^P^.^L^.¹⁰^9-⁵⁹^;¹¹^{9 S}^t^a^t^{. 1}⁴⁷⁰⁽^A^ug^{. 10}^{, 2}⁰⁰⁵⁾^.
⁷³^In^t^e^rvi^e^w^wⁱ^t^h^S^u^san^Biⁿ^d^e^r,^f^o^r^m^{er E}^x^ecu^tⁱ^v^{e Di}^re^ct^o^r^,^Natⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^S^u^rf^ace^T^r^an^sp^o^r^t^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^P^o^lⁱ^c^y^an^d^Reven^u^e
^C^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on, J}^u^ly^{10, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
⁷⁴^Ibid^.
⁷⁵^Ibid^.

formal rules of procedure.⁷⁶ Commission members make collective agreements about operational
issues such as the recording of minutes or voting procedure, but these agreements are created and ⁷⁷
enforced by collective norms, not formal action or votes. Similarly, the National Surface ⁷⁸
Transportation Infrastructure Finance Commission relied on member collegiality and deference ⁷⁹
to the chair and co-chair of the commission for procedural decisions.
The choice to adopt written rules or rely on informal norms to guide commission procedure may
be based on a variety of factors, such as the size of the commission, frequency of meetings,
commission member preferences regarding formality, the level of collegiality among members,
and the amount of procedural guidance provided by the commission’s authorizing statute.
Regardless of how procedural issues are handled, procedures for decision-making regarding the
following operational issues may be important for the commission to consider at the outset of its
existence:
• eligibility to vote and proxy rules
• staff hiring, compensation, and work assignments
• hearings, meetings, and field visits
• non-staff expenditures and contracting
• reports to Congress
• budgeting
• agenda setting
• modification of existing rules
Congressional commissions are usually statutorily mandated to terminate. Termination dates for
most commissions are linked to either a fixed period of time after the establishment of the
commission, the selection of members, or the date of submission of the commission’s final report.
Alternatively, some commissions are given fixed calendar termination dates.

The following are key considerations for Congress in forming a commission:
⁷⁶
^Iⁿ^te^r^v^ie^w^w^{ith D}^oug^la^s^G^r^{ob, St}^a^f^f^Dⁱ^r^e^c^t^or^{, J}^u^ly^10,²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁷⁷^Ibid^.
⁷⁸^P^.^L^.¹⁰^9-⁵⁹^;¹¹^{9 S}^t^a^t^{. 1}⁹⁶²⁽^A^ug^{. 10}^{, 2}⁰⁰⁵⁾^.
⁷⁹^Inte^rv^ie^w^w^{ith Ja}^c^k^W^e^{lls, sta}^f^f^dire^c^t^{or, J}^u^ly^{10, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.

• What is the purpose of the proposed commission?
• How long will the commission have to complete its mission?
• How will the members of the commission be appointed?
• Will commission members be compensated?
• Will the commission have an executive director?
• Who will have the authority to hire staff?
• Can the commission procure temporary and intermittent labor?
• Can staff be detailed to the commission?
• Will the commission produce a final report or interim reports?
• Who will receive the work product of the commission?
• Will the commission have the power to hold hearings?
• Can the commission enter into contracts for services?
• Will the commission have subpoena power?
• Can the commission accept gifts?
• How much funding will the commission receive?
• Will funding be available on an annual basis or until expended?
• Who will provide administrative support to the commission?
• What procedural rules should be statutory? What will be left to the commission?
• Where will the commission and its staff be located?
⁸⁰
^T^h^e^s^e^c^ons^ide^r^a^tions^a^r^e^ba^s^e^{d, i}ⁿ^pa^r^t^,^oⁿ^C^a^m^pbe^{ll, D}ⁱ^s^c^ha^r^g^ing^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,^p.^{7, T}^a^ble^1.3.

The tables that follow provide information on the 87 congressional commissions identified by the ^st^th
database search of the 101 through 110 Congresses. For each commission, the following
information is provided: the name of the commission; the type of commission; and the public law
creating the commission and date of enactment.
Table 8. Congressional Commissions Created During the 110^th Congress
^{Commission Type}^Authority
^{Commission on the Abolition of the}^{Commemorative P.L.}^110-1⁸³
^{Transatlantic Slave Trade}^{Feb. 5, 20}⁰⁸

^{Commission on the Prevention o}^f^{Weapons of}^Pol^{icy P.L.}^110-5³
^{Mass Destr}^{uction Proliferation and Terrorism}^{Aug. 3, 20}⁰⁷

^{Commission on Wartime Contracting in Ira}^q^{Investigative P.L.}^110-1⁸¹
^{and Afgha}^nistan^{Jan. 28,}²⁰⁰⁸

^{Congressional Commission on the Strategic}^Pol^{icy P.L.}^110-1⁸¹
^{Posture of the U}^{nited States}^{Jan. 28,}²⁰⁰⁸

^{National Commission on Childre}^{n and}^Pol^{icy P.L.}^110-1⁶¹
^Disasters^{Dec. 26, 20}⁰⁷

^{Genetic No}^{ndiscrimination Study Commission}^Pol^{icy P.L.}^110-2³³
^{Oct. 3, 20}⁰⁸
^{Congressional Oversight Panel (E}^mergency^Pol^{icy/Investigative P.L.}^110-3⁴³
^{Economic Stabilizati}^{on Act)}^{Oct. 3, 20}⁰⁸

^{Commission to Study the Potential Creation}^Pol^{icy P.L.}^110-2²⁹
^{of a National Muse}^{um of t}^{he Am}^{erican Latino}^{May 8, 2}⁰⁰⁸
^Source:^Database^que^{ry of t}^{he c}^{ongressional Legislative Information System (LIS)}
Table 9. Congressional Commissions Created During the 109^th Congress
^{Commission Type}^Authority
^{Commission on the Impleme}^{ntation of the}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 109-1}^63;1^{19 Stat. 3}⁴³
^{New Strategic Posture of t}^{he Uni}^{ted States}^{Jan 6,}²⁰⁰⁶

^{Commission to Assess the Threa}^{t to the}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 109-1}^{63; 1}¹⁹^{Stat. 34}³⁴
^{United States from Electromagne}^{tic Pulse}^{Jan 6,}²⁰⁰⁶

^{(EMP) Attack}

^{Commission Type}^Authority
^Human^{Space Flight Inde}^pende^nt^{Investigation}^{Investigative}^{P.L. 109-1}^{55; 1}¹⁹^{Stat. 29}⁴¹
^Commission^{Dec. 30, 20}⁰⁵

^{Motor Fuel Tax E}^nforceme^{nt Ad}^visory^Pol^icy^{P.L. 109-5}⁹¹^{19 Stat. 1}⁹⁵⁹
^Commission^{Aug. 10, 2}⁰⁰⁵

^{National Surface Tran}^{sportation I}^nfrastr^uct^ure^Pol^icy^{P.L. 109-5}^9;11^{9 Stat. 19}⁶²
^{Financing Commission}^{Aug. 10, 2}⁰⁰⁵

^{National Surface Tran}^sportation^Pol^{icy and}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 109-5}^9;11^{9 Stat. 14}⁷⁰
^{Revenue Commission}^{Aug. 10, 2}⁰⁰⁵

^{United States Commission on North American}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 109-5}^8;11^{9 Stat. 10}⁶⁴
^Energ^{y Freedom}^{Aug. 8, 20}⁰⁵

^Source:^Database^que^{ry of t}^{he c}^{ongressional Legislative Information System (LIS)}
Table 10. Congressional Commissions Created During the 108^th Congress
^{Commission Type}^Authority
^{Commission on the Abra}^{ham Lin}^{coln Study}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 108-1}^99;1^{18 Stat. 4}³⁵
^{Abroad Fellowship Program}^{Jan. 23,}²⁰⁰³

^{Commission on the National Gu}^{ard and}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 108-3}^75;1^{18 Stat. 1}⁸⁸⁰
^Reserve^{Oct. 28, 2}⁰⁰⁴

^{Commission on Review the Over}^{seas Military}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 108-1}^32;1^{17 Stat. 1}³⁸²
^{Facility Structure of the U}^{nited States}^{Nov. 22, 2}⁰⁰³

^{Helping to En}^han^{ce the}^Livelihoo^{d of People}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 108-1}^99;1^{18 Stat. 1}⁰¹
^{Around the}^{Globe Commission}^{Jan. 23,}²⁰⁰³

^{National Commission on Small C}^{ommunity Air}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 108-1}^76;1^{17 Stat. 2}⁵⁴⁹
^Service^{Oct. 18, 2}⁰⁰³

^{National Prison Rape Reduction Commission}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 108-7}^{9 ;11}^{7 Stat. 9}⁸⁰
^{Sept. 4, 20}⁰³
^{Veterans’ Disability Benefits Commission}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 108-1}^36;1^{17 Stat. 1}⁶⁷⁶
^{Nov. 24, 2}⁰⁰³
^Source:^Database^que^{ry of t}^{he c}^{ongressional Legislative Information System (LIS)}

Table 11. Congressional Commissions Created During the 107^th Congress
^{Commission Type}^Authority
^{Antitrust Modernization}^Commission^Pol^icy^{P.L. 107-2}^73;1^{16 Stat. 1}⁸⁵⁶
^{Nov. 2, 20}⁰²
^{Benjamin Franklin Tercen}^tenar^y^{Commemorative}^{P.L. 107-2}^02;1^{16 Stat. 7}³⁹
^Commission^{July 2}^{4, 20}⁰²

^{Brown v. Board of Education 5}⁰^th^{Commemorative}^{P.L. 107-4}^1;11^{5 Stat. 22}⁶
^Anniversar^{y Commission}^{Sept. 18, 2}⁰⁰¹

^{Guam War}^{Claims Review Commission}^{Investigative}^{P.L. 107-3}^33;1^{16 Stat. 2}⁸⁷³
^{Dec. 12, 20}⁰²
^{National Commission for the Review of the}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 107-3}^06;1^{16 Stat. 2}⁴³⁷
^{Research a}^{nd Development Prog}^{rams of the}^{Nov. 27, 2}⁰⁰²
^{United States Intelligence Community}

^{National Commission on Terrori}^{st Attacks}^{Investigative}^{P.L. 107-3}^{06; 1}¹⁶^{Stat. 24}⁰⁸
^{Upon the U}^{nited States}^{Nov. 27, 2}⁰⁰²

^{National Museu}^{m of Africa}^{n Ame}^rican^Pol^icy^{P.L. 107-1}^{06; 1}¹⁵^{Stat. 10}⁰⁹
^{History and Cultur}^{e Plan for Acti}^on^{Dec. 28, 20}⁰¹
^{Presidential Commissi}^on
^Source:^Database^que^{ry of t}^{he c}^{ongressional Legislative Information System (LIS)}
Table 12. Congressional Commissions Created During the 106^th Congress
^{Commission Type}^Authority
^Abraham^{Lincoln Bicenten}^{nial Commission}^{Commemorative}^{P.L. 106-1}^73;1^{14 Stat. 1}⁴
^{Feb. 25, 2}⁰⁰⁰
^{Commission on Affordable Housing and}^st^Pol^icy^{P.L. 106-7}^4;11^{3 Stat. 11}⁰⁶
^{Health Care Facility Needs in the}²¹^{Oct. 20, 1}⁹⁹⁹
^Century

^{Commission on Indian and Nativ}^{e Alaskan}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 106-3}^10;1^{14 Stat. 1}²¹⁶
^{Health Care}^{Oct. 17, 2}⁰⁰⁰

^{Commission on Ocean Policy}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 106-2}^56;1^{14 Stat. 6}⁴⁵
^{Oct. 7, 20}⁰⁰
^{Commission on the National Mili}^tary^Pol^icy^{P.L. 106-6}^5;11^{3 Stat. 88}⁰
^Muse^um^{Oct. 5, 19}⁹⁹

^{Commission on Victory in the Cold War}^{Commemorative}^{P.L. 106-6}^5;11^{3 Stat. 76}⁵
^{Oct. 5, 19}⁹⁹

^{Commission Type}^Authority
^{Commission to Assess United States}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 106-6}^5;11^{3 Stat. 81}³
^{National Security Space Ma}^nage^{ment and}^{Oct. 5, 19}⁹⁹
^Organization

^{Dwight D. Eisenhower Me}^morial^{Commemorative}^{P.L. 106-7}^9;11^{3 Stat. 12}⁷⁴
^Commission^{Oct. 25, 1}⁹⁹⁹

^{James Madison Commemoration}^{Commemorative}^{P.L. 106-5}^50;1^{14 Stat. 2}⁷⁴⁵
^Commission^{Dec. 19, 20}⁰⁰

^{Judicial Review Commiss}^{ion on Foreign}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 106-1}^20;1^{13 Stat. 1}⁶³³
^{Asset Control}^{Dec. 3, 199}⁹

^{Lands Title Report Commission}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 106-5}^68;1^{14 Stat. 2}⁹²³
^{Dec. 27, 20}⁰⁰
^{Millennial Housing Commission}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 106-7}^4;11^{3 Stat. 10}⁷⁰
^{Oct. 20, 1}⁹⁹⁹
^{National Commission for the Review of the}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 106-1}^20;1^{13 Stat. 1}⁶²⁰
^{National Reconnaissance O}^ffice^{Dec. 3, 199}⁹

^{National Commission to Ensure}^Consumer^Pol^icy^{P.L. 106-1}^81;1^{14 Stat. 1}⁰⁵
^{Information and C}^{hoice in the Ai}^rline^{Apr. 15,}²⁰⁰⁰
^Industr^y
^Source:^Database^que^{ry of t}^{he c}^{ongressional Legislative Information System (LIS)}
Table 13. Congressional Commissions Created During the 105^th Congress
^{Commission Type}^Authority
^{Commission on the Advanceme}ⁿ^t^of^Pol^icy^{P.L. 105-2}^55;1^{12 Stat. 1}⁸⁸⁹
^{Women and Minorities in Scienc}^e,^{Oct. 14, 1}⁹⁹⁸
^Engineeri^{ng, and Tech}^{nology Development}

^{Commission on Military Training and}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 105-8}^5;11^{1 Stat. 17}⁵⁰
^{Gender-Related Issue}^s^{Nov. 18, 1}⁹⁹⁷

^{National Bipartisan Commission on the}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 105-3}^3;11^{1 Stat. 34}⁷
^{Future of}^Medicare^{Oct. 5, 19}⁹⁷

^{National Commission on the Cost of Higher}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 105-1}^8;11^{1 Stat. 20}⁷
^Education^{June 12, 19}⁹⁷

^{National Commission on Terrori}^sm^Pol^icy^{P.L. 105-2}^77;1^{12 Stat. 2}⁶⁸¹
^{Oct. 21, 1}⁹⁹⁸

^{Commission Type}^Authority
^{National Health Mu}^{seum Commi}^ssion^Pol^icy^{P.L. 105-7}^8;11^{1 Stat. 15}²⁵
^{Nov. 13, 1}⁹⁹⁷
^{Presidential Advisory Commiss}^io^{n on}^{Investigative}^{P.L. 105-1}^86;1^{12 Stat. 6}¹¹
^{Holocaust Assets in th}^{e United States}^{June 23, 19}⁹⁸

^{Twenty-First Centu}^{ry Workforc}^e^Pol^icy^{P.L. 105-2}^20;1^{12 Stat. 1}⁰⁸⁷
^Commission^{Oct. 7, 19}⁹⁸

^{Trade Deficit Review Commiss}^ioⁿ^Pol^icy^{P.L. 105-2}^77;1^{12 Stat. 2}⁶⁸¹
^{Oct. 21, 1}⁹⁹⁸
^{United States Commission on Int}^ernational^Pol^icy^{P.L. 105-2}^92;1^{12 Stat. 2}⁷⁹⁷
^Relig^{ious Freedom}^{Oct. 27, 1}⁹⁹⁸

^{Web-Based Education Commission}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 105-2}^44;1^{12 Stat. 1}⁸²²
^{Oct. 7, 19}⁹⁸
^{Women’s Progress Commemora}^tion^{Commemorative}^{P.L. 105-3}^41;1^{12 Stat. 3}¹⁹⁶
^Commission^{Oct. 31, 1}⁹⁹⁸

^Source:^Database^que^{ry of t}^{he c}^{ongressional Legislative Information System (LIS)}
Table 14. Congressional Commissions Created During the 104^th Congress
^{Commission Type}^Authority
^{Commission on Maintaining Unit}^{ed States}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 104-2}^01;1^{10 Stat. 2}⁸⁴³
^{Nuclear Wea}^{pons E}^x^p^ertise^{Sept. 23, 1}⁹⁹⁶

^{Commission on Service members}^{and Veterans}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 104-2}^75;1^{10 Stat. 3}³⁴⁶
^{Transition Assistance}^{Oct. 9, 19}⁹⁶

^{Commission on the Advanceme}ⁿ^t^{of Federal}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 104-1}^32;1^{10 Stat. 1}³⁰⁵
^{Law En}^forceme^nt^{Apr. 24,}¹⁹⁹⁶

^{Commission to Assess the Orga}ⁿ^izati^{on of the}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 104-2}^93;1^{10 Stat. 2}⁷¹¹
^{Federal Governme}^{nt to Combat}^the^{Oct. 11, 1}⁹⁹⁶
^{Proliferation of Weapons of Mass}^Destruction

^{National Gambling Im}^{pact Study}^Commission^Pol^icy^{P.L. 104-1}^69;1^{10 Stat. 1}⁴⁸²
^{Oct. 3, 19}⁹⁶
^Source:^Database^que^{ry of t}^{he c}^{ongressional Legislative Information System (LIS)}

Table 15. Congressional Commissions Created During the 103^rd Congress
^{Commission Type}^Authority
^{Commission on Leave}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 103-3;1}^{07 Stat. 2}³
^{Feb. 5, 19}⁹³
^{Commission on Protecting and Reducing}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 103-2}^36;1^{08 Stat. 5}²⁵
^Governme^{nt Secrec}^y^{Apr. 30,}¹⁹⁹⁴

^{Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 103-3}^59;1^{08 Stat. 3}⁴⁵⁶
^{United States Intelligence Community}^{Oct. 14, 1}⁹⁹⁴

^Na^{tional Bankrupt}^{cy Review Commission}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 103-3}^94;1^{08 Stat. 4}¹⁴⁷
^{Oct. 22, 1}⁹⁹⁴
^{National Commission on Crime Control and}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 103-3}^22;1^{08 Stat. 2}⁰⁸⁹
^Prevention^{Sept. 13, 1}⁹⁹⁴

^Source:^Database^que^{ry of t}^{he c}^{ongressional Legislative Information System (LIS)}
Table 16. Congressional Commissions Created During the 102^nd Congress
^{Commission Type}^Authority
^{Commission on the Bicenten}^{nial of the}^{Commemorative}^{P.L. 102-3}^92;1^{06 Stat. 1}⁷²⁶
^{United States Capitol}^{Oct. 6, 19}⁹²

^{Commission on Broadcasting to the People’s}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 102-1}^38;1^{05 Stat. 7}⁰⁵
^{Republic of China}^{Oct. 28, 1}⁹⁹¹

^{Commission on Child and Family}^Welfare^Pol^icy^{P.L. 102-5}^21;1^{06 Stat. 3}⁴⁰⁶
^{Oct. 25, 1}⁹⁹²
^{Congressional Commission on the Evaluation}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 102-5}^58;1^{06 Stat. 4}¹⁹⁸
^{of Defense I}^ndust^{ry Base Policy}^{Oct. 28, 1}⁹⁹²

^{National Education Commission on Time and}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 102-6}^2;10^{5 Stat. 30}⁶
^Learning^{June 27, 19}⁹¹

^{National Commission on Reduci}^{ng Capital}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 102-2}^45;1^{06 Stat. 2}¹
^{Gains for}^{Emerging Tec}^hnology^{Feb. 14, 1}⁹⁹²

^{National Commission on Rehabili}^tation^Pol^icy^{P.L. 102-5}^69;1^{06 Stat. 4}³⁴⁴
^Services^{Oct. 29, 1}⁹⁹²

^{National Commission on the Fut}^{ure Role of}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 102-1}^72;1^{05 Stat. 1}¹⁵⁰
^{United States Nuclear Wea}^pons^{Nov. 26, 1}⁹⁹¹

^{Commission Type}^Authority
^{National Commission to Promot}^{e a Strong}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 102-5}^81;1^{06 Stat. 4}⁸⁹¹
^{Competitive Airline Industry}^{Oct. 31, 1}⁹⁹²

^{Thomas Jeffer}^{son Commemoration}^{Commemorative}^{P.L. 102-3}^43;1^{06 Stat. 9}¹⁵
^Commission^{Oct. 17, 1}⁹⁹²

^Source:^Database^que^{ry of t}^{he c}^{ongressional Legislative Information System (LIS)}
Table 17. Congressional Commissions Created During the 101^st Congress
^{Commission Type}^Authority
^{Civil War S}^{ites Advisory Commi}^ssion^Pol^icy^{P.L. 101-6}^28;1^{04 Stat. 4}⁵⁰⁴
^{Nov. 28, 1}⁹⁹⁰
^{National Commission on Manufa}^ctured^Pol^icy^{P.L. 101-6}^25;1^{04 Stat. 4}⁴¹³
^Housing^{Nov. 28, 1}⁹⁹⁰

^{Commission on Legal Immigratio}^{n Reform}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 101-6}^49;1^{04 Stat. 5}⁰⁰¹
^{Nov. 29, 1}⁹⁹⁰
^{Commission on Manageme}^{nt of t}^{he Agenc}^{y for}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 101-5}^13;1^{04 Stat. 2}⁰²²
^Inter^{national Development Progr}^ams^{Nov. 5, 19}⁹⁰

^{Commission on State and Private Forests}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 101-6}^24;1^{04 Stat. 3}⁵⁴⁸
^{Nov. 28, 1}⁹⁹⁰
^{Defense Base Closure a}^{nd Realignment}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 101-5}^10;1^{04 Stat. 1}⁸⁰⁸
^Commission^{Nov. 5, 19}⁹⁰

^{Joint Federal-State Commissi}^{on o}ⁿ^{Policies and}^Pol^{icy P.L.}^101-³^79;1^{04 Stat. 4}⁷⁸
^{Programs Affecting Alaska}^Natives^{Oct. 18, 1}⁹⁹⁰

^{National Commission on American Indian,}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 101-2}^35;1^{03 Stat. 2}⁰⁵²
^{Alaska Native, and Native Hawaiian Housing}^{Dec. 15, 19}⁸⁹

^{National Commission on Defense and National}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 101-5}^11;1^{04 Stat. 1}⁸⁹⁹
^Security^{Nov. 5, 19}⁹⁰

^{National Commission on Financial Institution}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 101-6}^47;1^{04 Stat. 4}⁸⁸⁹
^{Reform, Recovery, and Enforc}^em^ent^{Nov. 29, 1}⁹⁹⁰

^{National Commission on Judicial}^Impeac^hment^Pol^icy^{P.L. 101-6}^50;1^{04 Stat. 5}¹²⁴
^{Dec. 1, 199}⁰

^{Commission Type}^Authority
^{National Commission on Severel}^{y Distressed}^Pol^icy^{P.L. 101-2}^35;1^{03 Stat. 2}⁰⁴⁸
^{Public Housing}^{Dec. 15, 19}⁸⁹

^Source:^Database^que^{ry of t}^{he c}^{ongressional Legislative Information System (LIS)}
^Matth^e^w^Er^{ic Glas}^s^m^an
^Aⁿ^al^y^s^t^on^t^h^e^C^ong^res^s
^m^g^l^a^ssm^aⁿ^@^c^rs^.l^oc.g^ov^{, 7-}³⁴⁶⁷