Social Security: What Happens to Future Benefit Levels Under Various Reform Options

Report for Congress
Social Security: What Happens to Future
Benefit Levels Under Various Reform Options
August 20, 2001
David Koitz
Geoffrey Kollmann
and Dawn Nuschler
Domestic Social Policy Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Social Security: What Happens to Future Benefit Levels
Under Various Reform Options
Summary
Because Social Security is facing long-range financing difficulties, numerous
proposals have been made to solve the problem with reforms that typically bundle
together a variety of individual measures. Often it is difficult to identify when and
by how much these measures would alter future benefits. As an aid to those
exploring Social Security reform, this report unbundles various conceptual elements
of many of the reform plans, and presents them in a “generic” form, in order to
illustrate how certain changes would alter projected future retirement benefits.
The report first examines several benefit-constraint options. Among them are
raising the age at which full Social Security retirement benefits can be received,
changing the way initial benefits are computed, and constraining cost-of-living
adjustments (COLAs). It also illustrates the effects of creating new personal savings
accounts and presents their projected impact as a supplement to, or partial
replacement of, the existing system, or as a means to close the gap between the
benefit levels promised by the existing system and what can be paid under its
projected future income. Finally, because across-the-board cuts may be seen as too
severe for several types of recipients, other options that would ameliorate their
effects, including one that would raise revenue, are also illustrated.
The benefits resulting from the principal options are compared to those
computed under different baselines: benefits provided under current-law rules;
benefits affordable under the system’s current financing provisions; the purchasing
power of benefits of people retiring today; and benefits of recent retirees expressed
as a percentage of pre-retirement earnings. The analysis shows that although the
various benefit constraints would reduce benefits promised under current law, none
would cause the purchasing power of future retirees’ benefits to be lower than that
of someone retiring today. They would, however, reduce the role of Social Security
as an earnings replacement system. The analysis also shows that because of the way
the different options are phased in, the effects on different age cohorts would vary.
The role of personal accounts is examined under two financing alternatives.
One assumes the accounts would be funded by diverting to them part of the current
Social Security tax (a “carve-out” approach); the other assumes additional payments
from workers or from federal general revenues (an “add-on” approach). Two annual
rates of return are used to compute the value of the accounts, a “safe” rate of 6.4%,
reflecting the projected rate of return for long-term government bonds, and a
“market-based” rate on stocks of 10%. Given adequate time to grow, under either
scenario the value of the accounts would substantially offset or exceed the benefit
reductions that would occur under a number of the larger Social Security constraints
that might be used to restore the system’s solvency. However, because the eventual
worth of the personal accounts depends heavily on the power of compound growth,
they would have significantly smaller effects on workers retiring in the next three
decades (including most of the baby boom). They also would have a larger effect in
mitigating across-the-board benefit cuts on high-paid workers than on low-paid
workers.

Contents
Introduction and Overview of Findings.................................1
Overview of Findings..........................................2
Illustrative benefit reductions................................2
Illustrative personal accounts................................4
Other illustrative proposals..................................9
Different Baselines – Alternative Ways of Measuring Benefit Changes......11
“Benefits Prescribed by Current Law” Is Not a Constant Baseline.......11
Using Other Baselines Can Show How Well Policy Changes Achieve
Certain Other Retirement Goals.............................13
Description of Illustrative Options...................................19
Expenditure Constraint Measures................................19
Raise the age for full retirement benefits to 70 by 2029...........20
Raise the age for full retirement benefits to 66 by 2005 and
thereafter in tandem with increases in longevity.............20
Raise age for full retirement benefits to 70 by 2029 and
thereafter in tandem with increases in longevity.............20
Allow initial Social Security benefits to rise only with inflation....20
Allow initial Social Security benefits to rise by one-half of the real
growth implicit under current-law rules...................21
Reduce Social Security COLAs by 1 percentage point annually....21
Personal Account Measures.....................................21
Basic personal account illustrations...........................22
Combining personal accounts with measures that would reduce
Social Security benefits................................22
Other Selected Reform Measures................................23
Raising the Social Security taxable earnings base................23
Raising the level of Social Security widow’s and widower’s
benefits .............................................24
Raising Social Security benefits for young survivor and
disabled recipients...................................24
Results .........................................................26
Projected Effects of Expenditure Constraint Measures................26
Projected reductions from current law benefit levels.............26
A consideration with COLA constraints.......................29
The future purchasing power of Social Security benefits..........29
The decline in future replacement rates........................30
Projected Effects of Personal Account Measures....................33
Potential annuity payments from personal accounts..............33
Comparison of personal account annuities to the portion of Social
Security benefits that would not be payable given the
system’s projected financing gap.........................34
Effect of coupling a new personal account system with certain
Social Security benefit constraints........................35
Effect of financing considerations on the coupling of benefit
constraints and personal accounts........................44

accounts with Social Security benefit constraints............57
Projected Effects of Other Selected Reform Measures................61
Raising the Social Security taxable earnings base................61
Raising Social Security widow’s and widower’s benefits..........62
Raising Social Security benefits for young survivors and
disabled recipients...................................62
Cautionary Notes.................................................65
Appendix .......................................................66
Technical Comments on Report..................................66
Methods and basic assumptions used to prepare report............66
Assessment of public policy and market risks – traditional Social
Security versus market-based personal accounts.............68
Annuitization of personal accounts...........................70
How administrative costs might effect the assumed rates of
return on personal accounts.............................71
Effect of new personal accounts on other savings................74
List of Figures
Figure 1. Benefits “Promised” Versus Benefits “Payable” Under Current Law.14
Figure 2. Increase in Purchasing Power of Future Benefits Under Current Law17
Figure 3. Decline in Future Replacement Rates Under Current Law.........17
Figure 4. Effect of Add-on Versus Carve-out Approach to Funding
Personal Accounts............................................45
Figure 5. Effect of Rate-of-Return Assumption (Combined Benefit Under
Option) .....................................................46
Figure 6. Effect of Rate-of-Return Assumption (Separate Components Under
Option) .....................................................46
Figure 7. Combined Benefits Under Option Compared to Benefits
“Promised” and Benefits “Payable” Under Current Law..............47
Figure 8. Effect on Social Security’s Low-Wage “Tilt” Assuming a 6.4%
Rate of Return...............................................60
Figure 9. Effect on Social Security’s Low-Wage “Tilt” Assuming a 10%
Rate of Return...............................................60
List of Tables
Table 1. Illustrative Benefit Constraints that Could Help Restore Social
Security’s Solvency............................................2
Table 2. Alternative Views of the Value of Future
Social Security Benefits.........................................4
Table 3. Projected Impact of Coupling Personal Accounts Funded at 2% of Pay
With Social Security Benefit Constraints...........................6
Table 4. Projected Impact of Coupling Personal Accounts Funded at 2% of Pay
With Social Security Benefit Constraints on Low, Average, and
Maximum-Wage Earners........................................8
Table 5. Changes in Future Social Security Retirement Benefits Resulting
From Age-Related Provisions Enacted in 1983......................12

Current Law.................................................14
Table 7. Purchasing Power and Earnings Replacement Rates From Future
Social Security Benefits Projected Under Current Law...............16
Table 8. Years of Earnings Counted in Calculating Pre-Age 62
Survivor and Disability Benefit Cases Under Current Law............25
Table 9. Projected Changes in Social Security Benefits Resulting From
Various Benefit Constraint Options (Measured Against Benefit
Levels “Promised” Under Current Law)...........................27
Table 10. Effect of Paying 1 Percentage Point Lower Annual Social Security
COLAs As a Recipient Grows Older..............................29
Table 11. Projected Changes in Purchasing Power of Benefits Under Social
Security Benefit Constraint Options..............................31
Table 12. Projected Replacement Rates Under Social Security Benefit
Constraint Options............................................32
Table 13. Projected Indexed Annuities From Personal Accounts...........33
Table 14. Comparison of Payments From Personal Accounts to the Portion of
Social Security Benefits That Would Not be Payable Under Current Law.34
Table 15. Effect on Benefit Levels of Coupling Social Security Benefit
Constraints With Personal Accounts..............................36
Table 16. Separated Effects on Benefit Levels of Coupling Social Security
Benefit Constraints With Personal Accounts........................38
Table 17. Net Replacement Rates Resulting From Coupling Social Security
Benefit Constraints With Personal Accounts........................39
Table 18. Separated Effects on Replacement Rates From Coupling Social
Security Benefit Constraints With Personal Accounts ................40
Table 19. Projected Future Purchasing Power From Coupling Social Security
Benefit Constraints With Personal Accounts........................42
Table 20. Separated Effects on Future Purchasing Power of Benefits/Annuities
From Coupling Social Security Benefit Constraints With Personal
Accounts ...................................................43
Table 21. Effect on Benefit Levels of Coupling Social Security Benefit
Constraints With Personal Accounts Funded With “Carve out” of
Social Security Taxes..........................................49
Table 22. Separated Effects on Benefit Levels of Coupling Social Security
Benefit Constraints With Personal Accounts Funded With “Carve out”
of Social Security Taxes.......................................50
Table 23. Net Replacement Rates Resulting From Coupling Illustrative
Benefit Constraints With Personal Accounts Funded With “Carve out”
of Social Security Taxes.......................................52
Table 24. Separated Effects on Replacement Rates From Coupling
Illustrative Benefit Constraints With Personal Accounts Funded With
“Carve out” of Social Security Taxes.............................53
Table 25. Projected Future Purchasing Power From Coupling Illustrative
Benefit Constraints With Personal Accounts Funded With “Carve out” of
Social Security Taxes..........................................55
Table 26. Separated Changes in Future Purchasing Power of
Benefits/Annuities From Coupling Illustrative Benefit Constraints
With Personal Accounts Funded With “Carve out” of Social Security
Taxes ......................................................56

Social Security Benefits: Differences Between Low, Average, and
Maximum-Wage Earners.......................................58
Table 28. Change in Replacement Rates for Low, Average, and
Maximum-Wage Earners Retiring in 2070 Under Benefit Constraints
Coupled With Personal Accounts................................59
Table 29. Projected Impact of Raising Taxable Earnings Base on an
Affected Worker’s Social Security Benefits........................61
Table 30. Effect of Setting Widow’s and Widower’s Benefits to 75% of a
Couple’s Combined Pre-Death Benefits...........................62
Table 31. Effect of Illustrative Liberalization of Social Security Maximum
Family Benefits on a Young Survivor Family.......................63
Table 32. Range of Effects of Increasing the Number of Years
Disregarded in Computing Benefits for Workers Disabled Before
Age 47.....................................................64

Social Security Reform: What Happens
to Future Benefit Levels Under
Various Reform Options
Introduction and Overview of Findings
Social Security has projected long-range funding problems. According to the
latest estimates of the Social Security Board of Trustees, in 2016 the system’s taxes
will fall below its expenditures, and by 2038 its trust funds will be depleted. At that
point its incoming tax receipts would be sufficient to cover only 73% of its benefits
and even less in later years.¹ The question of how to deal with this gap has been a
major catalyst for the Social Security reform debate. Should we raise revenue and/or
cut benefits? Should we completely replace the system with something else? Or
should we blend elements of the current system with elements of a new one?
Numerous bills introduced by Members of Congress and recommendations
made by various commissions attempt to solve the problem with reforms that
typically bundle together a multitude of measures. Often, it is difficult to identify
when and by how much these measures would alter future benefits. As an aid to
those exploring Social Security reforms, this report unbundles various conceptual
elements of many of the reform plans, presenting them in a “generic” form, and,
using a benefit computation model developed by the Congressional Research
Service, examines how certain options would alter projected future retirement
benefits.
Among the options illustrated are proposals to raise the age at which recipients
can receive full Social Security retirement benefits, to alter the way initial benefits
are computed, to constrain annual cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs), and to raise
the maximum amount of earnings on which Social Security taxes are levied and
benefits are computed, i.e., the so-called taxable earnings base. Also included are
illustrations that show the effect of incorporating personal savings accounts into
Social Security – accounts that might be seen as a supplement or an alternative to the
existing system (or a portion thereof), or as a means to close the gap between the
benefit levels the current system promises and what can be paid under its projected²

future income.
¹ See “intermediate” projections of the 2001 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the
Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, March 19, 2001.
² Proposals for the Treasury to directly invest part of the Social Security trust funds in
equities, which could achieve gains similar to personal accounts, are not analyzed in this
report. For a further discussion, see: CRS Report RL30571, Social Security Reform: The
Issue of Individual Versus Collective Investment for Retirement, by David Koitz.

To simplify the presentation, most of the illustrations are based on the
commonly used example of a worker with a 43-year career who always earned
average wages and retired at age 65. Although additional career profiles could be
used, they would greatly expand the length and complexity of the paper, and they
would not affect the illustrations of the relative impact of the Social Security benefit
constraint options presented here because the benefit constraints are across-the-board
in nature. Other career work patterns could have an effect on the relative value of
personal accounts, however, and the report provides a number of additional
illustrations of these effects.
Overview of Findings
Illustrative benefit reductions. The report first shows the amount of
benefit reductions that would arise from several proposals that could help to bring
the system into long-range actuarial balance, i.e., to restore its solvency, by
constraining its growth (see Table 1). The proposal causing the smallest long-range
benefit reduction would eliminate only 13% of the system’s projected average 75-
year deficit. In contrast, the proposal causing the greatest reduction would produce
program savings sufficient to restore solvency, at least on average for the projection
period as a whole. The other proposals, for the most part, would produce program
savings somewhere in between, and, like the first one would need to be viewed as
measures that could contribute to a solution but not achieve solvency by themselves.
Table 1. Illustrative Benefit Constraints that Could Help Restore
Social Security’s Solvency
^{Benefit reductions from}^Benefit
^le^ve^{ls pr}^e^s^c^rⁱ^be^{d by}^r^e^duc^tion
^cu^rren^{t law}^*^{in 2070}
^Percen^{t of}^{implied by}
^{average 75-}^{making no}^{for new}^{for new}
^y^e^{ar deficit}^program^{retiree in}^{retiree in}
^{Benefit constraint measure}^eliminated^changes²⁰²⁰²⁰⁷⁰
^Rais^{e age for full retirem}^ent^62%^13.3%^19.2%^31.8%
^{benefits to 70}
^{Raise age for full retirem}^{ent benefits in}¹³^2.4^11.1^31.8
^{tandem with longevity}^gains
^{Raise age for full retirem}^{ent benefits to}
^{70 and then in tandem with longevity}⁷²^13.3^27.5^31.8
^gains
^{Allow initial benefits to rise only}¹⁰⁰^9.9^40.8^31.8
^{with inflation**}
^{Allow only}^{½ of the rise in “}^r^{eal” value}⁵¹^4.6^20.3^31.8
^{of initial benefits}
^{Reduce COLAs by}^{1% annually}⁷³^11.3^12.0^31.8
^Note:^{Long-range savings estim}^{ates were prepared by}^{the Office of the Actuary of the Social Security}
^Admⁱ^{nistration, May 2001. The reader is cautioned that one shoul}^dⁿ^o^t^a^d^d^t^o^g^e^{ther the financial}
^{effects of two or m}^o^{re of these proposals in order to determ}^{ine their com}^b^{ined effect}^{. Such a}
^{calculation would be inaccurate because of the interactions am}^{ong the proposals.}
^{* Illustrations are based on projected lifetim}^{e benef}^its^{for full-tim}^{e wage earners retiring at age 65}^who
^{always earned average wages. See Appe}^{ndix for discussion of other assum}^p^tions.
^{** Under current law, the purchasing power of future}^{Social Security benefits is projected to rise.}

Table 1 also illustrates the benefit reduction each proposal would cause for
workers retiring at age 65 in 2020 – the approximate middle of the baby boomers’
retirement years – and for similar workers retiring at age 65 in 2070. The latter case
represents the full effect of the proposals. The table also compares these reductions
to the amount of reduction implied by the lack of adequate long-range financing
under current law, i.e., to the benefits that would be “affordable” under current
projections of the system’s income. In other words, it compares the reductions to the
benefit levels “promised” under current law and to levels reflecting the implicit
benefit reductions that would occur if policymakers were to take no action to restore
the system’s solvency – in 2070, this is projected to result in a 32% reduction in
benefits.
Using the 2020 and 2070 retiree examples, Table 2 shows the projected
increase in the “real value” of benefits under the rules of current law, under the rules
of current law if benefits were reduced to fit within the program’s projected income,
and the amount of increase resulting from the various proposals. The results show
that even though these proposals reduce benefits promised under current law, none
causes the purchasing power of future retirees’ benefits to be lower than that of a³

2001 retiree.

However, Table 2 also shows that the various illustrated proposals would
reduce the role of Social Security in the future as an earnings replacement system.
For the steady average wage earner retiring at age 65 over the 1990-2000 period, first
year’s benefits expressed as a percent of final year’s earnings were an average of
42.4%. As Table 2 shows, under current law the increase in the age for full
retirement benefits from 65 to 67 (discussed at length later) will gradually reduce
these ratios to 36.6% for comparable future retirees, a decline of about 14%. The
illustrative proposals would cause these ratios to decline further, reaching levels
between 35.6% and 21.7%, a decline from the 1990-2000 level of between 16% and

49%.

The debate over reforming Social Security involves more than an examination
of whether and how its benefits should be constrained to restore solvency. If the
solution to Social Security’s long-range financing problem is to reduce its benefits
substantially, then the question arises of whether future retirement incomes will be
inadequate. In this context, tax increases and other income-producing measures
might be considered. They would not cause a reduction in benefits (although raising
the amount of earnings subject to Social Security taxation would, in turn, eventually
raise benefits, and this effect is discussed at length later in this report).

³ This occurs because, although it is often not understood, under current law rules the value
of future benefits is projected to rise significantly, both in terms of the level of monthly
benefits and in terms of their value over a person’s lifetime. There are two reasons lifetime
Social Security benefits will grow in the future. One is that increasing life expectancies
mean that retirees will collect benefits over a longer period of time. The other is, because
future Social Security benefits are linked to the growth in average wages, and wages tend to
rise faster than prices, the real value of monthly benefits promised in the future is projected
to rise.

There also has been growing interest in new approaches to securing future
retirement incomes that look beyond the traditional alternatives of cutting the
system’s benefits or raising its taxes or other income. Most of these involve creation
of new personal savings accounts modeled in one way or another after existing
individual retirement accounts (IRAs) or employer-sponsored 401(k) plans. This
report illustrates the effects of creating personal accounts and incorporating them as
part of a Social Security reform plan.
Table 2. Alternative Views of the Value of Future
Social Security Benefits
^{Real increase in}^{First year’s benefits}
^{value compared to}^{as % of final year’s}
^work^{er retiring in}^earnings
²⁰⁰¹
^{for 2020}^{for 2070}^{for 2020}^{for 2070}
^retiree^retiree^retiree^retiree
^{Benefits “promised” under current law}^27%^111%^38.9%^36.6%
^{Benefits “payable” under current law}²⁷⁷⁶^38.9^24.9
^{Benefit constraint measures:}
^{Reduce COLAs by 1% annually}¹²⁸⁶^37.8^35.6
^{Raise age for full retirem}^{ent benefits in}²³⁸⁸^38.0^32.6
^tandem^{with longevity gains}
^{Raise age for full retirem}^{ent benefits to 70}¹⁰⁷¹^33.8^29.6
^{Raise age for full retirem}^{ent benefits to 70}¹⁰⁵¹^33.8^26.6
^{and then in tandem}^{with longevity gains}
^{Allow only ½ of the rise in “real” value of}²¹⁶⁹^37.1^29.2
^{initial benefits}
^{Allow initial benefits to rise only with}¹⁴²⁵^35.1^21.7
^inflation
^Note:^{Illustrations}^are^{based on projected lifetim}^{e be}^{nefits for full-tim}^{e wage earners retiring at age}
^{65 who always earned average wages. See A}^{ppendix for discussion of other assum}^p^tions.
Illustrative personal accounts. The report shows that given adequate time
to grow, the annuities or periodic payments these accounts would yield could go a
long way to offsetting constraints on future Social Security benefits that may be
considered to restore the system’s solvency. The longer the new accounts are
assumed to accumulate, the greater their potential as an offset. In some cases, people
could be even better off than if future Social Security benefits were fully financed
(i.e., fully payable). The report illustrates the potential outcomes from steadily
contributing 2% of the pay of a full-time worker, who always earned an average
wage, into these accounts over their careers, and then combining the annuities
resulting therefrom with the lower benefits that would result from enacting various
Social Security constraint measures. Two annual rates of return are used to compute
the value of the accounts, a “safe” rate of 6.4%, reflecting the projected long-term

return on government bonds, and a “market-based” rate on stocks of 10%. Also, two
alternative funding approaches for the personal accounts are considered. One
assumes the money for the new accounts comes from additional contributions
workers would make or the government would make for them (perhaps using surplus
tax receipts). The other assumes that workers would be allowed to divert part of
their existing Social Security taxes to the accounts. The first is typically referred to
as an “add-on” approach; the second as a “carve-out” approach.
It is important to recognize that the loss of revenue caused by using existing
Social Security taxes to fund personal accounts would worsen the program’s long-
range problem. The revenue loss could be offset by tapping a new income source for
the system (e.g., general revenues). Absent that, however, benefits would have to be
reduced to compensate for the lower receipts, and this reduction would have to be
over and above what is needed to remedy the already existing long-range financing
imbalance. To illustrate this effect, the report assumes that under proposals to divert
Social Security taxes to personal accounts, a worker’s eventual Social Security
benefits would be reduced by an amount equal to the percentage of his or her lifetime⁴
Social Security taxes that were used this way (including the employer share). For
workers who divert taxes to these accounts steadily over their entire careers, the
additional benefit reduction would be 16.1%.
Table 3 illustrates the combined benefits when personal accounts funded from
these two approaches are coupled with three alternative benefit constraint measures.
For instance, Table 1 showed a potential 40.8% benefit reduction in 2070 under the
proposal to limit the growth of future initial benefit awards to the rate of inflation (a
measure with savings sufficient to restore the system’s long-range solvency). Table

3 shows that, for workers earning an average wage, including an annuitized “add-on”

personal account earning 6.4% would produce a combined benefit that would be
15.6% lower than under current law. Thus, it would replace more than 60% of their
lost Social Security benefit. If the account were assumed to earn 10% annually, it
would more than offset the lost Social Security benefit, yielding a combined benefit
that would be 21% higher than under current law. If the account were funded
through a “carve-out” approach and earned 6.4% annually, its annuity value would
offset nearly 40% of the lost Social Security benefit, resulting in a net reduction of
only 25%. If it earned 10% annually, it would more than offset the Social Security
benefit reduction, yielding a combined benefit that would be 11% higher than under
current law.

⁴ It should be observed that this approach might not overcome transitional financing issues.
While each worker’s eventual benefits would be reduced to reflect the earlier diversion of
taxes from the system, during the early years the reduction in the system’s aggregate benefit
payout may be insufficient to maintain the program’s solvency. Hence, either the other
benefit constraints would have to be phased in faster or an alternative income source would
have to be found for the system. In addition, this approach assumes that the benefit
reduction workers would incur because of the tax diversion would apply equally to
retirement, disability, and survivor benefits. If the benefit reductions were to apply only to
the retirement portion of the program, they would have to be larger than reflected in Table

3 and later tables in this report showing the effects of the “carve-out” approach.

Table 3. Projected Impact of Coupling Personal Accounts
Funded at 2% of Pay With Social Security Benefit Constraints
^{Percentage change in be}^{nefits from current law:}
^{for 2020 retirees who}^{for 2070 retirees who}
^{funded accounts using –}^{funded accounts using –}
^{Add on}^{Carve out}^A^{dd on}^{Carve out}
^Proposal^{Assuming accounts earn 6.4% annually*}
^{Create personal accounts and raise}^-5.0^-10.8⁺^6.0^-^7.0
^{age for full Social Security}
^retirem^{ent benefits to 70}
^{Create personal accounts and allow}^-1.6^-7.7^-15.6^-^25.1
^{initial Social Security benefits to}
^{rise only with inflation}
^{Create personal accounts and offset}^+2.1^-4.7^+6.3^-9.8
^{Social Security benefits by 75% of}
^{personal account annuity}
^{Assuming accounts earn 10% annually*}
^{Create personal accounts and raise}^-1.7^-7.5^+42.5⁺^29.5
^{age for full Social Security}
^retirem^{ent benefits to 70}
^{Create personal accounts and allow}^+1.6^-4.4^+21.0⁺^11.4
^{initial Social Security benefits to}
^{rise only with inflation}
^{Create personal accounts and offset}^+2.9^-3.9^+15.4^-^0.7
^{Social Security benefits by 75% of}
^{personal account annuity}
^Note:^{Illustrations are based on projected benefits}^{for full-tim}^{e wage earners retiring}^at^age⁶⁵^who
^{always earned average wages. See Appe}^{ndix for discussion of other assum}^p^tions.
^{* The alternative 6.4% and 10% rates of return}^repr^{esent “}^nom^{inal” rates; on an after-inflation, or what}
^econom^{ists refer to as a “real” basis, th}^{ey would be 3.0% and 6.5% respectively.}
Under these scenarios, the annuities from personal accounts funded from either
an “add-on” or a “carve-out” approach, coupled with a benefit constraint sufficient
to achieve long-range actuarial balance (e.g., allowing initial benefits to rise only
with inflation), eventually produce a combined benefit that would be higher than
what would be affordable if policymakers did not address the system’s projected
funding shortfall. This occurs under either a 6.4% or 10% annual rate-of-return for
the accounts. For example, with personal accounts earning 6.4% annually, the 15.6%
and 25.1% net reductions for the 2070 retiree under the “add-on” and “carve-out”
approaches, respectively, are still smaller than the projected 32% benefit reduction
that would occur in that year if Social Security benefits were adjusted to fit within
the system’s income projected under current law.
As Table 3 shows, the “carve-out” approach produces a smaller combined
benefit than the add on approach in each case because it requires workers to give up

a portion of their Social Security benefit in addition to the loss of benefits resulting
from the constraint measure incorporated in the proposal. Nonetheless, the
magnitude of the differential between the two approaches is not great. For example,
for workers earning an average wage, if a personal account growing at 6.4% annually
were joined with raising the age for full Social Security retirement benefits to 70,
under the “add on” approach the combined benefits would be 6% higher than current
law, and under the “carve out” approach they would be 7% lower, a difference of
13%. In 2070, the differences in the level of the combined benefits between the add
on and carve out approaches under the three proposals range from 9.5% to 16.1%.
Table 3 also illustrates the importance of the rate of return on the account.
Even with an account to which only 2% of pay is contributed, the difference in
benefits from compounding growth at different rates over a 43-year period can be
quite large. At a 6.4% growth rate, an “add on” personal account coupled with the
proposal to allow initial benefits to rise only with inflation would produce a net
benefit reduction for the 2070 retiree of 15.6% (compared to current law). On the
other hand, if the account grew at a 10% annual rate, the combined benefit would be
21% higher than current law. The spread between the two outcomes would be equal
to 37% of current law benefits.
Another important factor, not reflected in Table 3, is the effect that personal
accounts could have on the “tilt” of the Social Security system that now favors
workers with lower career earnings. The Social Security benefit formula is designed
to replace a higher proportion of earnings for low-wage workers. Everything else
held equal, a personal account funded with a constant percentage of pay would
produce an account that would be strictly proportional to the level of a worker’s
earnings. Thus, a personal account intended to substitute for a portion of Social
Security or make up for across-the-board reductions needed to bring the system into
long-range actuarial balance would lessen the tilt currently favoring low-paid
workers. This is not to say that a personal account to which 2% of pay is contributed
would in and of itself discriminate among workers. Rather, it would be the natural
result of shifting more of the combined benefit to a purely proportional system.
Tables 1 through 3 reflect benefit outcomes only for the “average earner” case. To
illustrate the potential reduction in the tilt, Table 4 shows the effects on replacement
rates for “low,” “average,” and “maximum” earners⁵ retiring in 2070 when a benefit
constraint sufficient to achieve long-range actuarial balance is coupled with personal
accounts.
As Table 4 shows, if the personal account were to grow at a 6.4% annual rate,
at all three wage levels it would make up for only part of the reduction in Social
Security benefits. The reduction in earnings replacement would be greatest for the
low-wage earner – 22.3% relative to current law, compared to a reduction of 5.0%
for the high-wage earner. On the other hand, if the personal account were to grow
at a 10% annual rate, it would more than make up for the benefit reduction at all
three wage levels. However, the magnitude of the gain would be largest for the high-

⁵ A “maximum-wage earner” is defined here to be someone who always earned the
maximum level of earnings each year subject to the Social Security tax; a “low-wage earner”
is defined as someone who always earned 45% of the average wage.

wage earner. The net increase for the high-wage earner would be 50.2% relative to
current law compared to a net increase of 4.7% for the low-wage earner.
Table 4. Projected Impact of Coupling Personal Accounts
Funded at 2% of Pay With Social Security Benefit Constraints
on Low, Average, and Maximum-Wage Earners
^{Replacement rates for 2070 retirees (in percent)}
^Maximum
^{Low earner}^{Average earner}^earner
^{Current law}
^49.3^36.6^24.1
^Proposal^{Assuming accounts* earn 6.4% annually}
^{Create personal accounts and}
^{allow initial Social Security}^38.3^30.8^22.9
^{benefits to rise only with inflation}
^Relative^decrease^{in replacem}^ent^-22.3%^-15.8%^-5.0%
^rate
^{Assuming accounts* earn 10% annually}
^{Create personal accounts and}
^{allow initial Social Security}^51.6^44.2^36.2
^{benefits to rise only with inflation}
^Relative^increase^{in replacem}^ent^4.7%^20.8%^50.2%
^rate
^Note:^{Illustrations are for full-tim}^{e low, average,}^and^m^a^xim^u^m^{wage earners who retire at age 65.}
^{See the Appendix for further description of these exam}^{ples and a discussion of other assum}^p^tions.
^{* Assum}^e^{s “}^a^{dd on” approach is taken to fund the accounts.}
The reader should keep in mind that the projected personal account balances
shown in this report are illustrations only. Actual outcomes would vary. The report
makes no assertion that a career in which a worker has 43 years of continuous steady
earnings is typical or that a 6.4% or 10% rate of return in each year of a 43-year
investment period is a typical or likely investment scenario. For example, many
workers earn relatively low wages early in their careers and receive higher wages as
their careers progress. Under the Social Security benefit computation rules, a worker
who earns low wages early in his or her career and higher wages later on could have
the same average lifetime earnings, and therefore the same Social Security benefit,
as a worker who always earns average wages. However, with personal accounts, the
timing of highs and lows with regard to earnings and investment returns can
significantly affect asset accumulations. Specifically, because of the power of
compound growth, contributions made early in a career have a disproportionate
effect on the eventual value of the account. Everything else held equal, a pattern in
which “average wage” workers start out with relatively lower wages early in their
careers would result in account balances at retirement that would be less than those
shown for workers who always earned the average wage. This effect could be offset
if the workers’ accounts earned a relatively higher rate of return toward the end of

their careers. However, a relatively lower return late in their careers, or periods of
unemployment, could further reduce the value of the account. The point is that the
reader should recognize that the eventual value of a personal account is sensitive to
fluctuations in contribution levels and rates of return during the worker’s career. As
a result, actual outcomes will vary from the illustrations shown here which feature
workers who always earn average wages (or a set proportion thereof) and always
receive the same rate of return on their personal accounts.
Other illustrative proposals. Other proposals illustrated in the report target
a particular segment of the population or are designed to mitigate the effect of other
constraint proposals on a particular group. One – raising the taxable earnings base
– is a revenue measure that also alters benefits. The Social Security tax is levied on
earnings only up to a certain level or base amount each year. In 2001, this figure is
$80,400. While raising the base is often seen as a means to bring in more receipts
to help close the long-range funding gap, the proposal also would increase the
amount of earnings credited to the affected workers’ earnings records and thus
potentially increase their eventual Social Security benefits. The workers involved
are relatively high paid (only about 6% of workers today have earnings at or above
the base). Consequently, while they may receive higher benefits, the return on the
additional taxes they paid can be relatively modest because the system’s benefit
formula is designed to replace a smaller proportion of earnings for high-paid
workers. For example, the report shows that increasing the base by $50,000 in 2002
(from an estimated $84,900 to $134,900) would raise the benefits of a high paid
worker retiring in 2030 by 24%, but the value of each additional tax dollar paid
would render only $0.42 in benefits. For the 2070 retiree, the benefit increase would
be 30%, but for each additional tax dollar paid there would be only $0.29 in benefits
earned.
Another proposal would attempt to enhance Social Security benefits for aged
widows and widowers, either to address their relatively high incidence of poverty
today or to offset the impact of other general constraints that might be considered to
restore the system’s long-range solvency. When one member of a couple receiving
Social Security benefits dies, the surviving spouse is sometimes left with just the
higher of their two individual “pre-death” benefits, which can be as little as one-half
of what the couple was formerly receiving. The proposal illustrated here would base
Social Security widow’s and widower’s benefits on 75% of the combined level of
benefits payable to the couple before one of them died. Doing so would raise the
basic widow’s or widower’s benefit by a range of 12.5% to 50% depending on
whether one or both members of the couple had work records of their own and the
level of benefits payable on those records.
Two other proposals are directed at instances where a younger worker dies or
becomes disabled. In these cases the earnings replacement value of personal
accounts is curtailed by the shorter period over which contributions and investment
returns are accumulated. This is more likely to be an issue where personal accounts
are coupled with across-the-board benefit constraints. For example, an annuity from
an account that accumulates for only 8 years would be worth only 6% of an annuity
from an account that accumulates over a full 43-year career. One proposal illustrated
here to mitigate this effect would raise the maximum Social Security benefits payable
to a worker’s family. Under current law, spouses’, children’s, or other potential

dependents’ benefits are often reduced because of an overall limit on the benefits
payable on a single earnings record. This limit ranges from 150% to 188% of the
worker’s basic benefit and varies with the size of that benefit. Under the proposal,
these maximum percentages would be increased gradually over time as the general
constraint on benefits becomes larger. For example, a 1/3% per year hike in the
family maximum limit could raise the benefits payable to a family by 10% in 2030
and 26% by 2070.
The other proposal would increase the number of years of earnings that can be
dropped in calculating Social Security benefits for workers who become disabled
before age 47. Disregarding low earnings can raise a recipient’s average career
earnings for benefit calculation purposes. Under current law, when death occurs at
a relatively early age, as few as 2 years may be used in calculating survivors benefits.
The same applies when disability occurs before age 25. However, between the ages
of 25 and 46, more years of earnings are counted in disability cases than for
survivors. The proposal illustrated here would allow workers who become disabled
at these ages to have the same number of years disregarded as in early death cases.
Its effect would vary significantly depending on each worker’s earnings record.
Obviously it would have no effect on workers disabled after age 46. As a general
rule, it’s greatest effect would be on younger low-paid workers, and it’s smallest
effect would be on high-paid workers disabled at age 46. For example, a worker who
became disabled at age 30, and who earned an amount equal to one-half of the
minimum wage in the 4 preceding years, would receive 76% higher benefits under
the proposal, whereas a worker disabled at age 46 who always earned the maximum
taxable wage would receive an increase of only 0.08%.
The following sections of this report go into these illustrations in greater detail.

Different Baselines – Alternative Ways of Measuring
Benefit Changes
The effects of the proposals examined in this report are illustrated by comparing
the benefits they are projected to provide to four different baselines:

1. Benefits prescribed by the rules of current law;

2. Benefits that would be payable if they were adjusted to fit within the
system’s projected income under the financing provisions of current law;
3. The purchasing power of benefits paid to today’s retirees (i.e., the
purchasing power of future retirees’ benefits compared to those of workers
retiring in 2001); and
4. Benefits expressed as a percentage of pre-retirement earnings for recent
retirees (i.e., the average “replacement rate” for workers retiring in 1990-

2000).

“Benefits Prescribed by Current Law” Is Not a Constant
Baseline
The most common approach policymakers use to evaluate proposed reforms of
Social Security is to determine the extent to which they would alter the level of
benefits prescribed by current law. However, these rules are changing. From the
program’s inception in 1935 until 2000, the age at which full retirement benefits⁶
were payable was 65. However, as a result of legislation passed in 1983,⁷ over a 22-
year period the age for full retirement benefits is gradually rising to 67, beginning
with those becoming eligible (i.e., attaining age 62) in 2000. For example, the age
for full retirement benefits for people becoming eligible in 2001, the second year of
the transition, is 65 and 4 months. Thus, those affected today are persons who
choose to retire well before attaining this age, i.e., those now ages 62 and 63.
Compared to what they would have received under the pre-1983 law, their benefits
reflect 2 or 4 more months of reduction for “early retirement.”
Other changes enacted in 1983 are now increasing the so-called delayed
retirement credit, or DRC. This credit raises the benefit levels of people who delay
filing for Social Security benefits until after they reach their age for full retirement
benefits. The higher credit is currently being phased in and will reach its full level

⁶ The term “full retirement benefits” is a misnomer, because it does not represent the highest
benefit a worker can receive. Under the law, a worker’s basic benefit, or “primary insurance
amount” (PIA), is determined by a benefit formula that is specifically applicable to the
worker’s age cohort (the formula changes annually for each new cohort). This basic benefit
is what is being referred to by the term “full retirement benefits.” For retirees, the amount
of benefits payable will be lower or higher than their PIA if they choose to receive benefits
before or after their cohort’s full-benefit age.
⁷ The Social Security Amendments of 1983, P.L. 98-21.

for those becoming eligible in 2008 and thereafter.⁸ Table 5 illustrates how much
lower or higher these benefits will be compared to those under the pre-1983 law.
Table 5. Changes in Future Social Security Retirement Benefits
Resulting From Age-Related Provisions Enacted in 1983
^{Percent of full benefits payable under current law}
^{Age at which}^{Percent of full}
^work^{er elects}^benefits^Work^e^r^Work^e^r^Work^e^r
^{to receive}^{payable under}^becoming^becoming^becoming
^benefits^{pre-1983 law}^{eligible in 2001}^{eligible in 2010}^{eligible in 2022}
^{Age 62}⁸⁰^{78 1/3}⁷⁵⁷⁰
^{Age 65}¹⁰⁰^{97 7/9}^{93 1/3}^{86 2/3}
^{Age 66}¹⁰³^{104 2/3}¹⁰⁰^{93 1/3}
^{Age 67}¹⁰⁶^{111 2/3}¹⁰⁸¹⁰⁰
^{Age 68}¹⁰⁹^{118 2/3}¹¹⁶¹⁰⁸
^{Age 69}¹¹²^{125 2/3}¹²⁴¹¹⁶
^{Age 70}¹¹⁵^{132 2/3}¹³²¹²⁴
^Note:^Am^{ounts in excess of 100% are the result of delayed retirem}^{ent credits.}
As shown in Table 5, when the 1983 law is fully phased-in (i.e., when the age
for full retirement benefits reaches age 67 for workers who become eligible in 2022
or later), the benefits for anyone who retires before age 68 and 3 months⁹ will be
lower than under pre-1983 law. Because few people wait to file for benefits until
after age 68 (4% of those filing for benefits in 1999), the basic effect of the 1983
changes is to cut benefits for a large majority of future retirees. As a result, it is not
always clear what a proposed alteration of current law means. For people who
become eligible for retirement benefits over the next 21 years, current law is a
moving target. If comparisons to current law are intended to show by how much
benefits resulting from reform proposals will differ from those paid to today’s
retirees, they are misleading because under current law benefits promised to future
retirees already differ from those paid to today’s retirees.
Comparisons to current law benefits are nonetheless important in a legislative
sense. They allow policymakers to examine by how much a proposed change will
alter previously established policy or what is perceived to be the “status quo.” It
shows the degree of change on average and potential “winners and losers.” More

⁸ Under the old law, the maximum DRC was 3% per year and was applicable to retirements
delayed beyond age 65, up to age 70. Thus, the maximum cumulative DRC was 15% (5
years x 3% per year). Under current law, the DRC will eventually reach a maximum of 8%
per year, and when the age for full retirement benefits reaches 67, the maximum cumulative
DRC will be 24% (3 years x 8% per year).
⁹ The point at which benefits are the same (110% of the PIA) under both the pre-and post

1983 law.

than nine out of ten workers have a stake in Social Security and 45 million people
currently receive benefits. Thus, the obvious first question for lawmakers is “how
are we changing the rules that exist today and what does it mean in dollars and
cents?” In effect, current-law policy generates certain expectations, and those
expectations are a baseline, even if not constant or fixed, from one retirement cohort
to the next. It also is important that the system’s income and costs as projected under
current law determine the extent to which Social Security is under-or over-financed.
Therefore, for those who believe that the fundamental goal of Social Security reform
is to restore the program’s solvency, current law is the most appropriate baseline
against which all reform proposals should be measured. From this perspective, the
fact that benefits paid at any given age are changing as a result of the 1983 law is
seen as irrelevant.
Using Other Baselines Can Show How Well Policy Changes
Achieve Certain Other Retirement Goals
Not only does the “benefits prescribed by current law” baseline change over
time, it also does not reflect that current-law benefits are projected to be
unsustainable. Under the Social Security trustees’ intermediate or “best guess”
projections, Social Security’s trust funds would be depleted in 2038 and incoming
receipts could pay for only 73% of the program’s expenditures (declining to 68% by
2070).¹⁰ Table 6 shows the level of Social Security benefits prescribed under the
rules of current law, the benefits that would be affordable given the system’s
projected financing limitations, and the difference, i.e., the amount that would not be
payable if the projections materialized (all calculations are for full-time workers
retiring at age 65 who always earned average wages).
Table 6 illustrates that comparing a proposal’s projected benefits to those
resulting from the rules of current law can be misleading since the full amount of
benefits promised under current law would not be payable under the trustees’
projections. For example, a proposal that is shown to result in benefits that are 10%
or 20% lower than under current law may at first glance appear politically
unattractive, but may appear less so if compared to the 27% reduction in benefits that
would have to occur in 2038 if policymakers were to take no action (see Figure 1).

¹⁰ Some observers point out that under the trustees’ projections Social Security tax receipts
fall below the system’s expenditures in 2016 and remain lower thereafter. Although the trust
funds are projected to have a balance of $5 trillion in federal securities credited to them at
that point (and will continue to have a balance until 2038), these observers pose the question
of where the Government will get the money to redeem the securities. They argue that the
system’s problems may occur earlier than 2038. The assumption here that benefits would
be paid in full up to 2038 is based on the premise that the Treasury would not lose its
authority to pay benefits in full prior to this date. It is not intended to dispute the possibility
that financial strains on the Government and/or the Social Security system could emerge
earlier.

Table 6. Social Security Benefits “Promised” vs. Benefits
“Payable” Under Current Law
^{Initial Social Security Monthly Benefits (in constant 2001 dollars)}
^Assuming^Assuming
^benefits^{benefits are}
^{“promised”}^{constrained by}
^{Year of}^{under current}^{amount of}
^{retirement at}^{law are paid in}^projected^{Difference in}^{Difference in}
^{age 65}^full^deficit^dollars^percent
²⁰¹⁰^$¹^,171^$¹^,171⁰⁰^%
²⁰²⁰^$¹^,273^$¹^,273⁰⁰^%
²⁰³⁰^$¹^,317^$¹^,317⁰⁰^%
²⁰⁴⁰^$¹^,450^$¹^,059^-$392^-27%
²⁰⁵⁰^$¹^,597^$¹^,164^-$433^-27%
²⁰⁶⁰^$¹^,759^$¹^,237^-$522^-30%
²⁰⁷⁰^$¹^,936^$¹^,319^-$617^-32%
^Note:^Illustratⁱ^oⁿ^s^a^r^e^b^eⁿ^e^{fits projected for full-tim}^{e wage earners retiring at age 65 who always}
^{earned average wages. See Appendix for discussion of other assum}^p^tions.

Figure 1. Benefits “Promised” Versus Benefits
“Payable” Under Current Law
^$2,500^Iⁿⁱ^tⁱ^a^l^m^ont^hl^{y be}^ne^fⁱ^t⁽^c^ons^t^a^nt^{2001 dol}^l^a^r^s⁾^F^o^r^av^er^ag^e-^w^a^g^e^earⁿ^e^r^r^e^tⁱ^rⁱⁿ^g^at^ag^{e 6}⁵
^$2,000
Benefits "promised"
undercurrentlaw
^$1,500
^$1,000
Benefits "affordable"
under current law
^$500
^$0
²⁰¹⁰²⁰²⁰²⁰³⁰²⁰⁴⁰²⁰⁵⁰²⁰⁶⁰²⁰⁷⁰
^Y^e^a^r^o^f^re^tⁱ^re^m^eⁿ^t

The debate over reforming Social Security involves more than an examination
of whether and how its benefits should be constrained to restore solvency. If the
solution to the system’s long-range financing problem is to reduce its benefits
substantially, then the question arises of whether future retirement incomes would
be inadequate. Thus, bringing the system’s income and outgo into balance is only
part of the issue. To give different perspectives on the broad effect of making a
change to Social Security, and to address the issue of how adequate retirement
benefits would be, this report uses two alternative baselines. One examines the
question of adequacy by comparing the purchasing power of Social Security benefits
of future retirees, under both current law and proposed benefit constraints, to the
purchasing power of benefits for workers retiring today. The second baseline
examines the role of Social Security in providing retirement income by comparing
the proportion of pre-retirement earnings replaced by Social Security for future
retirees under the illustrative benefit constraints to those provided to recent retirees
(defined as those retiring at age 65 in the past decade or so).
Under current law, a recipient’s basic monthly Social Security benefit is
calculated by multiplying a three-step formula against most of the recipient’s career
earnings record. A new benefit formula is created each year for each new cohort of
eligible recipients, a formula that reflects the annual increase in average wages
occurring 2 years earlier. The earnings histories used to compute each person’s
average earnings, to which the formula is applied, also are indexed for wage growth
from the year they were earned until the year the worker reached age 60 (earnings
at age 60 and later are included in the calculation at their nominal value). Since
wages are projected to grow faster than prices (under the trustees’ intermediate
forecast, wages would grow at a rate of 4.3% annually and prices at a rate of 3.3%),
initial Social Security benefits for future retirees, one cohort to the next, are assumed
to grow faster than inflation.
Thus, under current rules, Social Security benefits are projected to grow in “real
terms,” meaning that future retirees’ benefits would have greater purchasing power
than that of today’s retirees. Conversely, because of the change in the age for full
retirement benefits, the earnings replacement that these benefits would afford future
retirees is projected to be noticeably lower than that afforded recent retirees of the
same age. Table 7 illustrates these two phenomena.

Table 7. Purchasing Power and Earnings Replacement Rates
From Future Social Security Benefits Projected
Under Current Law
^{Projected Change in Purchasing Power of}^{Current Law Social Security Benefits}
^{For full-time steady}^{Increase in real value of}
^{average-wage earner}^{Initial benefits in}^{future benefits from 2001}
^{retiring at age 65 in:}^{“constant” 2001 dollars}^{level (in percent)}
²⁰⁰¹^$1,051^–-
²⁰¹⁰^1,171^11.3%
²⁰²⁰^1,273^21.0
²⁰³⁰^1,317^25.2
²⁰⁴⁰^1,450^37.8
²⁰⁵⁰^1,597^51.8
²⁰⁶⁰^1,759^67.2
²⁰⁷⁰^1,936^84.1
^{Projected Change in Social Secu}^{rity’s Replacement of Earnings}
^{Change in earnings}
^{For full-time steady}^{Earnings replacement rate}^{replacement rate from}
^{average-wage earner}^{(first year’s benefits as % of}^{average for 1990-2000}
^{retiring at age 65 in:}^{final year’s earnings)}^{retirees (in percent)}
^{1990-2000 average}^42.4%^–-
²⁰¹⁰^39.4^-7.1%
²⁰²⁰^38.9^-8.3
²⁰³⁰^36.6^-^13.7
²⁰⁴⁰^36.6^-^13.7
²⁰⁵⁰^36.6^-^13.7
²⁰⁶⁰^36.6^-^13.7
²⁰⁷⁰^36.6^-^13.7
^Source:^{CRS, based on interm}^{ediate assum}^p^{tions of}^{the 2001 Social Security trustees’ report.}
Table 7 shows that, in one sense, current law rules (assuming they were
affordable) would result in substantial increases in the real value of future benefits
– 25.2% for the 2030 retiree and 84.1% for the 2070 retiree (for “average wage
earners” retiring at age 65 – see Figure 2). In another sense, Social Security’s future
role as a source of retirement income would decline somewhat. While on average
Social Security replaced approximately 42.4% of final year’s earnings for steady
average wage earners retiring at age 65 in 1990-2000, it eventually would drop to a
level of 36.6% for workers retiring at age 65 in 2025 and thereafter – a decline of
nearly 14% (see Figure 3).

Figure 2. Increase in Purchasing Power of Future
Benefits Under Current Law
^Chaⁿ^g^eⁱⁿ^r^e^a^l^va^l^u^e^of^fut^u^r^e^beⁿ^e^fi^t^s^f^r^om²^{001 l}^e^ve^l
^90%
^F^o^r^av^er^ag^e-^w^a^g^e^ea^rⁿ^er^r^e^tⁱ^rⁱⁿ^g^at^ag^{e 6}⁵
^80%
^70%
^60%
^50%
^40%
^30%
^20%
^10%
^0%
²⁰¹⁰²⁰²⁰²⁰³⁰²⁰⁴⁰²⁰⁵⁰²⁰⁶⁰²⁰⁷⁰
^Y^e^a^r^of^r^e^tⁱ^re^m^e^nt
Figure 3. Decline in Future Replacement Rates
Under Current Law

^Chaⁿ^g^e^from^a^v^e^r^a^g^e^{for 1990-2000 re}^tⁱ^re^e^s
^0%
²⁰¹⁰²⁰²⁰²⁰³⁰²⁰⁴⁰²⁰⁵⁰²⁰⁶⁰
^-^10%^Y^e^ar^of^r^e^tⁱ^r^e^m^e^nt
^-^20%
^-^30%
^-^40%
^F^o^r^av^er^ag^e-^w^a^g^e^earⁿ^e^r^r^e^tⁱ^rⁱⁿ^g^at^ag^{e 6}⁵
^-^50%

These two baselines represent different approaches to assessing the adequacy
of future Social Security benefits, under both current law and proposed reforms. One
baseline suggests that future benefits could be less than those promised under current
law and still provide a meaningful basic floor of retirement income. The other
suggests that Social Security’s role in replacing pre-retirement earnings is already
scheduled to decline and would decline further if its financing problems were
addressed through additional benefit reductions. Where to peg Social Security’s
future role within these two baselines is a value judgement for policymakers, but it
is as much a part of the overall issue of Social Security reform as is bringing the
system’s finances into long-range balance.

Description of Illustrative Options
Expenditure Constraint Measures
The illustrative proposals examined first are ones that are designed to deal with
Social Security’s long-range funding gap by constraining future expenditures.
According to the trustees’ latest projections, on average over the next 75 years Social¹¹
Security’s expenditures will exceed its income by 14%. A surplus of
approximately 3% in the first 25 years is overwhelmed by deficits of 33% in the
second 25 years and 40% in the last 25 years. In the final year of the projection
period, 2075, the deficit is 45%. The proposals illustrated here could help close that
gap. Not all of them would remedy the problem by themselves, but all would have
a large effect. According to estimates prepared by the Office of the Actuary of the
Social Security Administration, the proposal that would result in the smallest benefit
reductions would eliminate 13% of the problem on average, and the proposal that
would result in the largest reductions would eliminate the entire problem and then
some (see the “actuarial effect” section of Table 9 on pages 27 and 28. The types
of proposals selected are intended to represent the broad range of ideas manifested
in bills introduced in recent Congresses and proposals made by other panels and
commissions. They are not necessarily identical to any specific bill or
recommendation.
The illustrations are intended to show general effects on benefit levels. The first
set of proposals beginning with Table 9 illustrates the general effects of certain
broad-based benefit constraints measures, and for this reason the analysis focuses on
a hypothetical full-time worker who always earned average wages. It should be
noted that all the constraint measures shown would produce roughly proportional
benefit reductions. For example, raising the age for full retirement benefits to 70 by
2029 produces a long-range reduction in current law retirement benefits of 19% at
ages 62, 65, and 70, and on low, average, and high wage earners alike. Policymakers
could decide to follow a more targeted approach, perhaps to mitigate the effect of a
constraint on certain types of recipients, (e.g., low-wage earners, early retirees,
survivors, the disabled), or to offset the distributional or wealth effects of other
measures, such as creating personal accounts and combining them with a general¹²
benefit constraint. No judgement is made as to whether these effects should be
mitigated or accentuated for any segment of the recipient population. Other
illustrative measures designed to target specific segments of the recipient population
are examined later in the report.

¹¹ The trustees’ intermediate forecast assumes Social Security’s average expenditures over
the 2001-2075 projection period would equal 15.44% of the nation’s taxable payroll, while
its income would equal 13.58%. The difference of 1.86% of taxable payroll is equal to 14%
of the system’s average projected income (1.86/13.58 = 14%).
¹² For instance, a change in the Social Security benefit formula could affect low- and high-
paid workers differently. Some reformers have proposed changing the replacement factors
or the “bend points” in the benefit formula. Such changes would affect the tilt in formula,
usually by providing less earnings replacement for high-paid workers.

Raise the age for full retirement benefits to 70 by 2029. As described
earlier, under current law the age for full Social Security retirement benefits is
scheduled to rise to 67 in two gradual steps. The first step began in 2000, affecting
workers attaining age 62 in that year (62 is the earliest age at which retirement
benefits can be received, i.e., the first year of eligibility). For workers reaching age
62 before 2000, the age for full retirement benefits remains at 65. The age for full
retirement benefits currently is rising by 2 months per year until it reaches 66 for
newly eligible workers in 2005. It then stays at 66 until 2017 when it again rises by
2 months per year until reaching 67 for newly eligible workers in 2022. It then
remains at 67 for subsequent new retirees. Under the option examined here, the age
for full retirement benefits would rise at the rate of 2 months every year until it
reaches age 70 for those becoming eligible in 2029 and later. The proposal would
take effect in 2006 (and would only apply those attaining age 62 in that year and
thereafter).
Raise the age for full retirement benefits to 66 by 2005 and
thereafter in tandem with increases in longevity. Under this option, the age
for full retirement benefits would rise to 66 in 2005 as under current law. Thereafter,
it would rise by 1 month every 2 years. This rate of increase would approximately
match the projected rise in longevity under the trustees’ intermediate projections.
Under this scenario, the age for full retirement benefits would be 67 in 2030, 67 and
10 months in 2050, and 68 and 11 months in 2075. At that point the age increase
would come close to matching about half of the overall increase in longevity since
the program’s inception in 1940. The proposal would take effect in 2007 (applying
only to those attaining age 62 in that year and thereafter). This measure would
replace the current law increase in the age for full retirement benefits from 66 to 67
scheduled to be phased in from 2017 to 2022.
Raise age for full retirement benefits to 70 by 2029 and thereafter
in tandem with increases in longevity. Under this option, the age for full
retirement benefits would rise by 2 months every year until it reaches age 70 for
those becoming eligible in 2029. Thereafter, it would rise by 1 month every 2 years.
This rate of increase would approximately match the projected rise in longevity
under the trustees’ intermediate projections from that point on, and by 2075 would
come close to matching the overall increase in longevity since the program’s
inception in 1940. The age for full retirement benefits would be 70 and 10 months
in 2050 and 71 and 11 months in 2075. The proposal would take effect in 2006
(applying only to those attaining age 62 in that year and thereafter).
Allow initial Social Security benefits to rise only with inflation. As
discussed earlier, under current law Social Security benefits are projected to grow
in “real terms,” meaning that future recipients’ benefits would have greater
purchasing power than that of today’s recipients. This is based on the trustees’
projection that wages (from which benefits are determined) would grow faster than
prices. Under this option, the annual adjustment made in calculating benefits would
be set so that the initial benefits would rise only at the rate of inflation. Hence, the
real value of initial benefits would be held constant over time, meaning that they
would buy the same amount of goods and services for future recipients as they buy
for today’s recipients. To phase in the change without causing reductions to the real
value of benefits by coupling it with the already scheduled hikes in the age for full

retirement benefits, the proposal would not take effect until 2006 (i.e., it would begin
with those attaining age 62 or otherwise becoming eligible in that year), and the
second phase of the current law hike in the age for full retirement benefits (raising
it from 66 to 67 beginning in 2017) would be repealed.
Allow initial Social Security benefits to rise by one-half of the real
growth implicit under current-law rules. This option would be similar in
concept to the previous one, but the limitation on the growth of initial benefits would
not be as large. Under this option, the annual adjustment made in calculating
benefits would be set so that initial benefits would rise by one-half of the real growth
resulting under current law. Hence, the real value of benefits still would be allowed
to grow, meaning that the benefits would buy more goods and services from one
cohort to the next, but not by as much as under current law. To phase in the change
without causing reductions to the real value of benefits by raising the age for full
retirement benefits, the proposal would not take effect until 2006 (i.e., it would begin
with those attaining age 62 or otherwise becoming eligible in that year), and the
second phase of the current law increase in the age for full retirement benefits
(raising it from 66 to 67) would be repealed.
Reduce Social Security COLAs by 1 percentage point annually.
Under current law, once initial Social Security benefits are determined under the
formula, they are adjusted annually thereafter for inflation through cost-of-living
adjustments – or COLAs. COLAs take effect beginning with the year after a worker
reaches age 62 or otherwise becomes eligible for disability or survivor benefits.
Even a worker who delays retirement beyond age 62 receives an adjustment in the
level of his or her initial benefits to reflect COLAs that took effect in the intervening
years. The amount of the COLA is based on the rise in the Bureau of Labor
Statistics’ Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers
(CPI-W) from the third quarter of 1 year to the third quarter of the next year. It
becomes effective for the following December’s benefits (and is payable in January
of the next year). Under this proposal, the COLA would be reduced each year by 1
percentage point. For example, if the CPI-W rises by 3.3% during the measuring
period, the following December’s benefit increase would be 2.3%. This proposal
would take effect beginning with the COLA for December 2006 (payable in January

2007).

Personal Account Measures
Many of the recent Social Security reform bills, as well as reform plans
proposed by others, have included measures to create personal Social Security
savings accounts patterned after IRAs or 401(k) pension plans. They envision
annual contributions to the accounts being made by the individual or the government
(on behalf of the individual) that would be invested in stocks and bonds to
accumulate assets for retirement, death, or disability. The value of each individual’s
account would vary depending on the amounts contributed and the rate of return of
the investments. There is no uniform or “consensus” approach among proponents
regarding how to structure these accounts, but their basic themes are that the
accounts could serve as supplements to Social Security, as a way to create an entirely
new system to replace income lost due to retirement, death, and disability, or as a

means to offset all or part of the benefit reductions that might be used to bring the
system into long-range financial balance.
This report illustrates potential annuitized payments that personal accounts
might produce. The analysis here first reflects the outcomes from a number of
alternative contribution rates and investment returns, with the results expressed as
“indexed” periodic annuity payments.¹³ It attempts to make the numbers relevant to
the Social Security reform debate by comparing them to the size of projected
retirement benefits prescribed under current law, which illustrates the extent to which
these annuities could supplement or replace a portion of the system’s benefits. It
then examines the outcomes of combining personal accounts with a number of Social
Security constraint measures. Although the report uses a generalized approach to
personal accounts that is designed to show a reasonable range of outcomes, the
reader is advised that there are many caveats to making such projections. The
Appendix provides a more detailed discussion on some of the major ones. Broader
economic issues that may be related to the creation of personal accounts are not
analyzed in this report.
Basic personal account illustrations. To illustrate an array of examples,
the analysis first determines the account balance that might be accumulated by
workers who always earned an average wage under contribution rates of 1%, 2%,
or 3% of their pay. No assumption is made as to how the accounts would be funded.
For example, workers could pay additional sums over and above their Social Security
taxes, they could divert a portion of their existing Social Security taxes to them, or
the government could fund them with general revenues. The illustrations show how
much an “indexed” periodic payment or annuity from a personal account would be
relative to the size of projected Social Security benefits computed under current law
rules. The outcomes are shown under alternative annual growth rates (rates of
return) of 6.4% and 10% (or 3% and 6.5%, respectively, after adjustment for
inflation). Hence, the analysis shows six possible outcomes – three different annual
contribution rates combined with two different rates of return for each. The lower
rate – 6.4% – is the trustees’ assumed long-range rate of return for the investments
held by the Social Security trust funds under current law (basically the rate earned
by longer-term U.S. government bonds), and serves as a proxy for the rate of return
a relatively “safe” investment strategy would earn. The higher rate – 10% –
represents the approximate average investment return achieved by the Standard and¹⁴
Poor’s 500 index from 1926 to 1999, minus 1.3 percentage points. Contributions
to the account are assumed to begin in 2002 (or at age 22 if occurring later) and
continue through age 64. (For a detailed description of the assumptions and
methodology used, see Methods and Basic Assumptions Used to Prepare Report in
the Appendix.)
Combining personal accounts with measures that would reduce
Social Security benefits. Under this set of options personal accounts would be

¹³ An “indexed” periodic payment or annuity assumes that the payment would be increased
automatically each year by the rate of inflation. Thus, the payment it would provide initially
would be smaller than that provided by a traditional non-indexed annuity, but, unlike the
non-indexed annuity, it would not lose value over time. Portraying the annuity from the
personal account in this way makes them analogous to Social Security benefits.
¹⁴ Ibbotson Associates, Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation: 2000 Yearbook.

created for each Social Security taxpayer beginning in 2002 in conjunction with
enactment of one of the three alternative options to help reduce Social Security’s
long-range deficit discussed earlier.¹⁵ Under one option, Social Security benefits
would be reduced at the time of retirement, or alternatively funded,¹⁶ by 75% of the
annuity value of the personal account. Under the other two options, the personal
accounts would have no direct effect on Social Security benefits. However, it is
assumed that the creation of the accounts would be accompanied by enactment of
Social Security benefit constraints. One would raise the age for full Social Security
retirement benefits to 70 by 2029. The other would allow initial Social Security
benefits to rise only with inflation. To simplify the illustrations, annual contributions
are assumed to equal 2% of pay throughout the worker’s career. The analysis then
shows two possible outcomes for each of the three “joined” options based on the two
rate of return assumptions for the personal accounts.
Other Selected Reform Measures
Additional proposals are included in this report to show a few types of targeted
measures, i.e., measures designed to affect a particular segment of the population or
mitigate the effect of constraint proposals on a particular group.
Raising the Social Security taxable earnings base. This option would
affect only high-paid workers. The taxable earnings base is the maximum level of
earnings subject to Social Security taxation each year. In 2001, the base is $80,400.
In any year in which there is a COLA, the base rises in proportion to the growth in¹⁷
average earnings in the economy since the previous COLA. This income-
producing option is illustrated because, unlike a payroll tax rate increase or general
revenue infusion to the system, raising the base also may raise the eventual benefits¹⁸
of affected workers. Since a recipient’s career “taxable” earnings are used to

¹⁵ Implicit in this scenario is the assumption that personal accounts would be mandatory.
Some proposals for personal accounts would make them voluntary. Making participation
optional would not alter the illustrations for personal workers, but it could have different
effects on the system overall depending on which workers choose to participate (i.e.,
recognizing the possibility of “adverse selection” that could exist under a voluntary system).
For example, if a disproportionate number of higher-paid workers were to opt for voluntary
personal accounts and a portion of their existing Social Security taxes were diverted to fund
them, program receipts available to pay for current benefits and administrative expenses
would decline disproportionately. Since the system is designed to favor low earners, to the
extent a higher percentage of higher-wage earners opted to divert some of their taxes to
personal accounts, a greater burden for financing the system would fall on the lower-wage
earners who remain fully vested in it.
¹⁶ “Alternatively funded” means that the annuity would be reduced instead of the Social
Security benefit, and a corresponding amount would be transferred to the Social Security
trust funds. Either way, the combined payments would be the same.
¹⁷ This linkage is prescribed under current law.
¹⁸ Raising the system’s income through higher payroll tax rates, or infusions of general
revenues, would not directly alter future benefits. However, additional revenue would lower
the amount by which benefits would have to be reduced to restore the system’s solvency, and
in this respect, they could have an effect on benefits. The reductions that otherwise would
(continued...)

compute Social Security benefits, raising the amount that is taxable will result in a
higher “average” earnings level for computing benefits and, thus, raise the worker’s
eventual benefits.¹⁹ Under two variations illustrated here, the taxable earnings base,
estimated under current law to be $84,900 in 2002, would be increased by (1)
$15,000 (setting it at $99,900 in 2002) or (2) $50,000 (setting it at $134,900 in

2002), after which it would rise again by the rate of average earnings in the economy.

Raising the level of Social Security widow’s and widower’s
benefits. Under current law, a surviving spouse is entitled to the higher of his or
her own Social Security benefit (from his or her own earnings record) or to a
widow’s or widower’s benefit that is 100% of the deceased spouse’s benefit. This
proposal would provide widow’s and widower’s benefits equal to 75% of the
combined benefits paid to the couple before one of them died (or would have been
paid had they filed for benefits). Because a spouse is eligible for one-half of the
other spouse’s basic benefit, while they are both alive the couple’s combined benefits
(before any reduction for early retirement) is at least 150% of the higher-earning
spouse’s basic benefit. Hence, when one member of a couple dies, a surviving
spouse without a work record receives a benefit that is 33% lower than the couple’s
former combined benefit (the combined pre-death level drops from 150% to 100%
of the deceased recipient’s former benefit). If the surviving spouse receives a benefit
based on his or her own work record, that benefit is subtracted from the widow’s or
widower’s benefit, and only the difference, if any, is paid as a survivor benefit.
Hence, in these circumstances, when one member of a couple dies, the surviving
spouse is left with the higher of the two individual “pre-death” benefits, which can
be as little as one-half of what the couple formerly received. Enhancement of Social
Security widows’ and widowers’ benefits is proposed frequently as a means of
reducing the high poverty rates that prevail among aged widows and widowers. The
range by which this proposal would increase the basic widow’s or widower’s benefit
would be between 12.5% and 50%, depending on the level of benefits payable on
each worker’s record.
Raising Social Security benefits for young survivor and disabled
recipients. Two proposals are directed at instances where a younger worker dies
or becomes disabled. In these cases the earnings replacement value of personal
accounts is curtailed by the shorter period over which contributions and investment
returns are accumulated. This is more likely to be an issue where personal accounts
are coupled with benefit constraints, i.e., a change in the benefit formula that would
result in across-the-board reductions in initial benefits. In contrast, proposals to raise
the age for full retirement benefits might not affect young disabled and survivor
cases (by design, their benefits currently are computed as if they already attained that
age). Similarly, benefits under proposals to offset Social Security benefits by the
amount of the annuity from a personal account might not be much different from the

¹⁸ (...continued)
have to take place are illustrated by Table 6, which projects the difference between the
benefit levels prescribed by current law and those that would be affordable under the
trustees’ intermediate projections.
¹⁹ It is assumed that the additional earnings taxed would accrue to the worker’s Social
Security earnings record. Some proposals advocated in the past would have taxed the
additional earnings without crediting them to the worker’s record.

level of benefits promised under current law, since the idea is to achieve those levels
through the combination of Social Security benefits and annuity payments.
Under two measures illustrated here, it is assumed that proposals to create
personal accounts and curtail the growth of initial Social Security benefits would be
accompanied by additional measures allowing the system to retain a greater portion
of its pre-reform “social insurance” function. One would accomplish this by raising
the maximum Social Security benefits payable to a worker’s family. Under current
law, spouse’s, children’s, or other potential dependents’ benefits are often reduced
because of an overall limit on the benefits payable on a single earnings record. This
limit, referred to as the “family maximum,” now ranges from 150% to 188% of the
worker’s basic benefit and varies with the size of that benefit. Under the proposal,
these family maximum percentages would be increased gradually over time as the
constraint on basic benefits becomes larger.
The other proposal would increase the number of years of earnings disregarded
in calculating Social Security benefits for workers who become disabled before age
47. Disregarding years of low earnings can raise a recipient’s average career
earnings for benefit calculation purposes. Under current law, the highest 35
earnings’ years are used for workers age 62 or older. The number of years counted
drops for younger disability or survivor cases. In early death cases, it drops by the
number of years the worker died before age 62, with a minimum of 2 years used in
the calculation for survivors of workers who die at or before age 29. The same rule
applies in disability cases where the disability occurs after age 46 but before age 62.
However, in cases where the disability occurs at ages 25 through 46, the number of
“drop out” years is scaled back. In such cases more earnings years are counted in
computing disability benefits than in survivor benefits (see Table 8). The proposal
illustrated in this report would allow workers who become disabled at ages 25
through 46 to have the same number of years disregarded as in early death cases.
Table 8. Years of Earnings Counted in Calculating Pre-Age 62
Survivor and Disability Benefit Cases Under Current Law
^{Age at time of death}^{Years counted for}^{Years counted for}
^{or disability}^{survivor benefits}^{disability benefits}
⁶¹³⁴³⁴
⁴⁷²⁰²⁰
⁴⁶¹⁹²⁰
⁴¹¹⁴¹⁶
³⁶⁹¹²
³¹⁴⁸
²⁹²⁶
²⁷²⁴
²⁶²⁴
²⁵²³
^{24 and younger}²²

Results
Projected Effects of Expenditure Constraint Measures
Projected reductions from current law benefit levels. Table 9
illustrates the benefit reductions from current law levels resulting from the constraint
measures described in the previous section. The effect of the measures is shown for
workers with a career of steady average earnings retiring at age 65 from 2010 to
2070. The top section of the table shows the reduction in benefits in the first year of
retirement; the middle section shows the reduction in benefits over a lifetime; and
the bottom section shows by how much each proposal would reduce the system’s
long-range deficit.
The proposals causing the smallest initial reductions are: (1) reducing the
COLA by 1 percentage point annually and (2) raising the age for full retirement
benefits to reflect increases in longevity. The COLA proposal reduces the first
year’s benefit by only 3%. However, the reduction compounds year after year,
resulting in reductions over a lifetime of 11% to 12%. Raising the age for full
retirement benefits in tandem with increases in longevity would produce a small
benefit increase for the 2030 retiree because the age for full retirement benefits then
would be slightly lower than under current law (66 and 11 months instead of 67).
However, the age for full retirement benefits would continue to rise for later retirees,
resulting in an 11% first-year and lifetime benefit reduction for the 2070 retiree. The
proposal causing the largest reductions for the 2070 retiree is the one that allows
initial benefits to rise only with inflation. It would result in first-year and lifetime
benefit reductions of 41%.
When observing the benefit levels in the following tables, the reader should
keep in mind that only one of the options – allowing future benefits to rise only with
inflation – is projected to achieve enough aggregate savings on its own to restore the
system’s long-range solvency, i.e., on average over the next 75 years. Because the
various options are shown next to each other in each table, the reader might
instinctively compare one option’s effects to another as if they were comparable on
an actuarial basis. If viewed this way, a proposal that shows higher residual benefits
would appear preferable to another showing lower ones. To evaluate the options in
this way would be misleading because the option incorporating the smaller cut would
not get as close to or achieve actuarial balance as the ones incorporating larger cuts.
Other benefit cuts or tax increases would have to accompany the options with the
smaller effects if the system’s solvency is to be restored. The tables are designed
primarily to show how much each option on its own would change benefits. The
third section of Table 9 is designed to give the reader some sense of how far each
option goes in restoring actuarial balance.

Table 9. Projected Changes in Social Security Benefits Resulting From Various Benefit
Constraint Options (Measured Against Benefit Levels “Promised” Under Current Law)
^{Raise age for}^{Raise age for}^{Allow initial}^{Allow initial}
^{full retirement}^{full retirement}^{benefits to rise}^{benefits to rise}^{Reduce COLAs}
^{Raise age for}^{benefits to 66 by}^{benefits to 70 by}^{only with}^{by ½ of real}^{by 1 percentage}
^{Year of}^{full retirement}^{2005 and then}^{2029 and then}^inflation^{wage growth}^{point annually}
^{retirement at}^{benefits to 70 by}^{by increases in}^{by increases in}^{beginning in}^{beginning in}^{beginning in}
^{age 65}²⁰²⁹^longevity^longevity²⁰⁰⁶²⁰⁰⁶²⁰⁰⁶
^{Change in first year’s benefits}^{from current law levels (in percent)}
²⁰¹⁰^-2.4%^-0.6%^-2.4%^-2.1%^-1.1%^-2.9%
²⁰²⁰^-13.3^-^2.4^-^13.3^-^9.9^-^4.6^-^2.9
²⁰³⁰^-17.3^0.7^-^17.3^-^12.9^-3.3^-2.9
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL31086}²⁰⁴⁰^-19.2^-^2.6^-^21.0^-^20.9^-^7.9^-^2.9
^g/w²⁰⁵⁰^-19.2^-^5.8^-^23.1^-^28.2^-^12.2^-^2.9
^s^.or
^le^ak²⁰⁶⁰^-19.2^-^8.7^-^25.3^-^34.8^-^16.3^-^2.9
^://wiki²⁰⁷⁰^-19.2^-^11.1^-^27.5^-^40.8^-^20.3^-^2.9
^h^ttp
^{Change in lifetime benefits fr}^{om current law levels (in percent)}
²⁰¹⁰^-2.4%^-0.6%^-2.4%^-2.1%^-1.1%^-11.2%
²⁰²⁰^-13.3^-^2.4^-^13.3^-^9.9^-4.6^-11.3
²⁰³⁰^-17.3^0.7^-^17.3^-^12.9^-3.3^-11.5
²⁰⁴⁰^-19.2^-^2.6^-^21.0^-^20.9^-7.9^-11.6
²⁰⁵⁰^-19.2^-^5.8^-^23.1^-^28.2^-^12.2^-^11.8
²⁰⁶⁰^-19.2^-^8.7^-^25.3^-^34.8^-^16.3^-^11.9
²⁰⁷⁰^-19.2^-^11.1^-^27.5^-^40.8^-^20.3^-^12.0

^{Raise age for}^{Raise age for}^{Allow initial}^{Allow initial}
^{full retirement}^{full retirement}^{benefits to rise}^{benefits to rise}^{Reduce COLAs}
^{Raise age for}^{benefits to 66 by}^{benefits to 70 by}^{only with}^{by ½ of real}^{by 1 percentage}
^{Year of}^{full retirement}^{2005 and then}^{2029 and then}^inflation^{wage growth}^{point annually}
^{retirement at}^{benefits to 70 by}^{by increases in}^{by increases in}^{beginning in}^{beginning in}^{beginning in}
^{age 65}²⁰²⁹^longevity^longevity²⁰⁰⁶²⁰⁰⁶²⁰⁰⁶
^{Actuarial effect of proposals on So}^{cial Security’s long-range deficit}²⁰
^{Percent of}
^{average 75-year}
^{deficit rem}^a^ining^38%^87%^28%^0%^49%^27%
^{Percent of deficit}^th
^rem^a^{ining in 75}
^year⁶³⁸³⁴⁸⁰³⁹⁶¹
^Note:^Illustra^{tions are for full-tim}^{e workers who always earned averag}^{e wages. Com}^p^{arisons are based on constant dollar am}^{ounts. S}^{ee the}
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL31086}^{Appendix for discussion of other assum}^p^tions.

^g/w
^s^.or
^le^ak
^://wiki
^h^ttp²⁰
FOOTNOTE TABLE: The system’s projected average 75-year deficit, expressed as a percent of taxable payroll, is 1.86%. In the^th
75 year, it is 6.05%. Similarly expressed in percent of taxable payroll, the reduction in these deficit figures resulting from each
proposal is as follows:
Raise full benefitRaise full benefitAllow initialAllow initialReduce COLAs by
age to 66 by 2005age to 70 by 2029benefits to risebenefits to rise by1 percentage point
Raise full benefitand then byand then byonly with inflation½ of real wageannually
age to 70 by 2029increases inincreases inbeginning in 2006growth beginningbeginning in 2006
longevitylongevity in 2006
Average 75-year reduction (as % of taxable payroll)

1.15% 0.24% 1.34% 2.06% 0.94% 1.35%

Reduction in 75^th year (as % of taxable payroll)

2.21% 1.00% 3.17% 7.13% 3.67% 2.34%

A consideration with COLA constraints. With the exception of the
proposal to constrain COLAs, Table 9 shows that under each proposal the reduction
in benefits during the first year of retirement and over a lifetime are proportionately
the same (compare the figures for each proposal in the top and middle segments of
the table). For instance, the effect of raising the age for full retirement benefits to 70
for someone retiring in 2070 in the first year is 19%, as is the loss in lifetime
benefits. With the COLA constraint, however, there would be differences. The
relatively small initial (first year) reduction of 3% is somewhat misleading, as is
evidenced by the projected lifetime reduction of 12% in 2070.²¹ The effect of the
COLA constraint grows each year after a person joins the benefit rolls. In effect, it
compounds over a recipient’s lifetime, and the benefit reduction relative to current
law grows larger the longer a person remains on the benefit rolls. Although the
recipient would continue to get benefit increases under the proposal, and the nominal
value of the benefits would go up, the purchasing power (or real value) of the
benefits would decline. Table 10 shows that, for a worker retiring at age 65, the
value of the benefits would be 11.8% lower by age 75 and 23.8% by age 90.
Table 10. Effect of Paying 1 Percentage Point Lower Annual
Social Security COLAs As a Recipient Grows Older
^{Benefits with annual}^Percentage
^{Benefits under}^{COLA minus 1}^{reduction from}
^{Monthly benefit at:}^{current law}^{percentage point}^{current law levels}
^{Age 65}^$1,551^$1,507^{- 2.8%}
^{Age 70}^1,825^1,689^{- 7.5}
^{Age 75}^2,147^1,892^-11.9
^{Age 80}^2,525^2,119^-16.1
^{Age 85}^2,970^2,374^-20.1
^{Age 90}^3,493^2,660^-23.8
^Note:^{Illustrations are for a}^full-tim^e^worker^{retiring at age 65 in 2010 who always earned average}
^{wages. Benefits shown in nom}^{inal dollars. S}^{ee the Appendix for discussion of other assum}^p^tions.
The future purchasing power of Social Security benefits. While
Tables 9 and 10 show that these proposals would provide Social Security benefits
that generally would be lower than those provided under current law, they would still
provide benefits that have more purchasing power than those of today’s retirees.
Under current law Social Security benefits are projected to rise significantly in real
terms. For example, in comparison to the purchasing power of the benefits of
workers retiring today at age 65, a similar worker retiring in 2070 would receive a
benefit that would be 84% higher in terms of the goods and services it could buy

²¹ One might ask why the COLA option produces a reduction in initial benefits, since the
widespread perception is that the COLA is meant to adjust benefits for inflation after
recipients join the benefit rolls. COLA adjustments, however, start to apply to benefits the
year after a person becomes eligible (at age 62), regardless of whether they choose to receive
benefits. The illustrations in the table are for someone retiring at age 65, three years after
he or she became eligible for benefits. Hence, the initial benefits shown under the proposal
reflect 3 years’ worth of COLAs that have been reduced by 1 percentage point annually.

(assuming there was sufficient financing to pay benefits promised under current law).
Thus, under all the proposals illustrated here, the purchasing power of future retirees’
benefits would still be higher than that of the benefits for comparable new retirees
in 2001. Using the same hypothetical retirees as in Table 9, Table 11 illustrates
these increases. Note that the bottom section of the table shows that increases in the
purchasing power of lifetime benefits are larger than those shown for initial benefits.
This occurs because, as a consequence of increasing longevity, future retirees will
collect benefits for a longer time than will 2001 retirees.
As the table shows, the proposal resulting in the smallest reduction in benefits
from current law levels – increasing the age for full retirement benefits to reflect
increases in longevity – produces an initial benefit that has 64% more purchasing
power for someone retiring in 2070 than for someone retiring in 2001. The proposal
resulting in the largest benefit reduction from current law levels – allowing initial
benefits to rise only with inflation – still produces an increase in purchasing power
of 9%. In terms of lifetime benefits, in 2070 benefits under these proposals have
88% and 25% more purchasing power, respectively, than for someone retiring in

2001.

The decline in future replacement rates. At first glance, it may appear
that providing greater purchasing power to future retirees represents an expansion
of the Social Security program. It can be construed that way because future
recipients would be able to buy more goods and services with their Social Security
benefits than people retiring in 2001. However, Social Security has always been
described as a form of insurance against the loss of earnings due to retirement,
disability or death. Because earnings have almost always tended to grow faster than
prices, it is a natural product of Social Security’s design that the value of Social
Security benefits, expressed in constant dollars, rises over time. Under all the
options (and as is slated to occur to a degree under current law as the age for full
retirement benefits increases), the income provided by Social Security as a percent
of retirees’ pre-retirement earnings (the replacement rate) would decline. This would
reduce Social Security’s role in providing retirement income. These effects are
illustrated in Table 12, which compares future replacement rates projected under
current law and the various options to the average of those for workers retiring at age

65 in 1990-2000.

As Table 12 shows, under current law Social Security replacement rates for a
worker retiring at age 65 who always earned an average wage would decline from
the approximate 42.4% level of the past decade to 36.6% for comparable workers
retiring in 2025 and later – a decline of 14%. Setting aside the COLA constraint
option (because its initial effect is not representative of its relative effect over a
lifetime), the option resulting in the smallest reduction in initial benefits from current
law levels – raising the age for full retirement benefits to reflect increases in
longevity – also results in the smallest drop in replacement rates. Under this option,
the replacement rate for the average-wage earner retiring in 2070 would drop to
32.6% – a decline of 23% from the 1990-2000 level. Under the option resulting in
the largest benefit reduction from current law levels – allowing initial benefits to rise
only with inflation – the replacement rate for the average-wage earner retiring in

2070 would drop to 21.7% – a decline of 49%.

CRS-31
Table 11. Projected Changes in Purchasing Power of Benefits Under Social Security Benefit Constraint Options
^{Raise age for full}^{Raise age for full}^{Allow initial benefits}^{Allow initial benefits}
^{retirement benefits}^{retirement benefits}^{to rise only with}^{to rise by ½ of real}^{Reduce COLAs by 1}
^{Raise age for full}^{to 66 2005 and then}^{to 70 by 2029 and}^{inflation beginning}^{wage growth}^{percentage point}
^{retirement benefits}^{by increases in}^{then by increases in}^{in 2006}^{beginning in 2006}^{annually beginning}
^{to 70 by 2029}^longevity^longevity^{in 2006}
^{Increase in “real value” of first year’s}^{benefits from that payable in 2001}
²⁰¹⁰^8.6%^10.7%^8.7%^9.0%^10.0%^8.1%
²⁰²⁰^4.9^18.1⁵^.0^9.0^15.4^17.5
²⁰³⁰^3.5^26.0³^.5^9.0^21.1^21.6
²⁰⁴⁰^11.3^34.3⁹^.0^9.0^27.0^33.9
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL31086}²⁰⁵⁰^22.6^43.1^16.7⁹^.0^33.3^47.5
^g/w²⁰⁶⁰^35.0^52.7^24.9⁹^.0^39.9^62.4
^s^.or
^le^ak²⁰⁷⁰^48.7^63.7^33.6⁹^.0^46.8^78.8
^://wiki^{Increase in “real value” of projected lifet}^{ime benefits from that payable in 2001}
^h^ttp²⁰¹⁰^11.3%^13.3%^11.3%^11.6%^12.7%^1.3%
²⁰²⁰^9.7^23.4⁹^.7^14.0^20.6^12.2
²⁰³⁰^10.6^34.6^10.6^16.5^29.4^18.4
²⁰⁴⁰^21.4^46.4^18.8^18.8^38.5^32.8
²⁰⁵⁰^36.1^58.8^29.6^21.0^48.0^48.7
²⁰⁶⁰^52.5^72.5^41.1^23.1^58.0^66.3
²⁰⁷⁰^70.7^88.0^53.3^25.2^68.5^85.9
^{Illustrations are for full-tim}^{e workers who always earned}^averag^{e wages. For an explanation of why the outcom}^e^{s differ using}^{first year’s}^benefits^and^{projected lifetim}^{e benefits,}
^p^tions.

Table 12. Projected Replacement Rates Under Social Security
Benefit Constraint Options
^Raise^Raise
^{age for}^{age for}^Allow^Reduce
^full^full^Allow^initial^COLAs
^Raise^retireme^retireme^initial^benefits^{by 1}
^{age for}^nt^nt^benefits^{to rise}^percenta
^{Year of}^full^benefits^benefits^{to rise}^{by ½ of}^{ge point}
^retireme^retireme^{to 66 by}^{to 70 by}^only^real^annually
^{nt at age}^Current^nt²⁰⁰⁵²⁰²⁹^with^wage^beginnin
⁶⁵^law^benefits^{and then}^{and then}^inflation^growth^{g in 2006}
^{to 70 by}^by^by^beginnin^beginnin
²⁰²⁹^increase^increase^{g in}^{g in}
^{s in}^{s in}²⁰⁰⁶²⁰⁰⁶
^longevit^longevit
^y^y
^1990-^42.4%*
²⁰⁰⁰
²⁰¹⁰^39.4%^38.5%^39.2%^38.5%^38.6%^39.0%^38.3%
²⁰²⁰^38.9^33.8^38.0^33.8^35.1^37.1^37.8
²⁰³⁰^36.6^30.3^36.8^30.3^31.9^35.4^35.6
²⁰⁴⁰^36.6^29.6^35.7^28.9^28.9^33.7^35.6
²⁰⁵⁰^36.6^29.6^34.5^28.1^26.3^32.1^35.6
²⁰⁶⁰^36.6^29.6^33.4^27.3^23.9^30.6^35.6
²⁰⁷⁰^36.6^29.6^32.6^26.6^21.7^29.2^35.6
^Change
^from
^1990-^-14%^-30%^-23%^-37%^-49%^-31%^-16%
²⁰⁰⁰
^{period to}
²⁰⁷⁰
^Note:^{Illustrations are for full-tim}^{e workers who alwa}^{ys earned average wages.}^See^the^Appendix^for
^{discussion of other assum}^p^tions.
^{*Average replacem}^{ent rate for the period.}

Projected Effects of Personal Account Measures
Potential annuity payments from personal accounts. Table 13
illustrates six variations in the projected annuity values of personal accounts, were
the accounts to begin in 2002, for workers retiring at age 65 who always earned an
average wage. The alternative contributions are 1, 2, and 3% of a worker’s earnings
and the alternative rates of return on the account balances are 6.4% and 10%.
Table 13 presents the results as a percent of projected Social Security benefits
promised under current law. For example, a worker retiring in 2030, who always
earned an average wage and steadily contributed 2% of pay earning a rate of return
of 6.4%, would have accumulated account assets of $33,176 (in 2001 dollars) by age
65. The indexed annuity payable from the account during the first year of retirement
would be $2,363. This amount would be equal to about 15% of the Social Security
benefits the retiree would receive under current law. If the account were to grow by

10% a year, the first year annuity would be $4,072, and would be equal to about 26%

of the retiree’s Social Security benefits. In effect, if intended to be an “add on” to
Social Security, the table shows that, depending upon the amount of contributions,
the rate of return, and the time over which the account grows, for workers always
earning the average wage the account could pay an annuity that could supplement
the Social Security benefit by anywhere from 1.7% to 95.8%. If intended to be an
alternative to Social Security, the account could replace the benefits by equivalent
amounts.
Table 13. Projected Indexed Annuities From Personal Accounts
^{First Year’s Payments From Personal}^{Account Compared to First Year’s}
^{Social Security Benefits Under Current Law (in percent)}
^{Career Contribution Level:}
^{Year of}
^retire-^{1% of pay}^{2% of pay}^{3% of pay}^{1% of pay}^{2% of pay}^{3% of pay}
^{ment at}
^{age 65}^{6.4% annual investment retur}ⁿ^{10% annual investment return}
²⁰¹⁰^1.7%^3.3%^5.0%^1.9%^3.9%^5.8%
²⁰²⁰^4.1⁸^.3^12.4⁵^.8^11.6^17.3
²⁰³⁰^7.5^15.0^22.4^12.9^25.8^38.6
²⁰⁴⁰^11.1^22.2^33.3^24.1^48.2^72.2
²⁰⁵⁰^13.1^26.1^39.1^31.9^63.9^95.8
^2060*^12.8^25.7^38.5^31.4^62.8^94.2
^2070*^12.6^25.2^37.9^30.9^61.8^92.6
^Note:^{Illustrations are for full-tim}^{e workers who al}^{ways earned avera}^g^{e wages. See the Appendix}
^{for discussion of other assum}^p^tions.
^*^{One m}ⁱ^{ght ask why the value of the personal account}^{as a percentage of current-law Social}^Security
^benefits^declines^{after 2050. This}^results^from^projected^{increases in longevity. Because the values}
^{are expressed as an annuity, the m}^{onthly benefit pa}^yable^from^{the principal declines as the period over}
^{which the annuity m}^u^{st be paid increases.}

It is important to note that the values shown in Table 13, and the following
tables that show the effects of personal accounts, would be different for workers who
have earnings patterns different from that of a full-time worker who always earned
an average wage. For example, if a worker always earned the projected federal
minimum wage, the ranges shown in Table 13 would be from 0.9% to 57.6%. For
a worker who always earned the Social Security maximum taxable wage, the range
would be from 2.6% to 140.6%. In each case, the lower end of the ranges would be
lower still if there were periods of unemployment in the worker’s career.
Comparison of personal account annuities to the portion of Social
Security benefits that would not be payable given the system’s
projected financing gap. Because the trustees project that the Social Security
benefits prescribed by current law would not be fully payable beginning in 2038,
comparisons to benefits promised under current law can be misleading. Table 14
shows the benefit amounts prescribed under the rules of current law, the amounts that
would be affordable given the system’s projected financing limitations, and the
difference, i.e., the amounts that would not be payable if the projections materialized
(again, all calculations are for the steady average-wage earner retiring at age 65).
It then compares the benefit shortfall to how much could be paid as an indexed
annuity from a personal account funded at 2% of pay, growing at the alternative
annual rates of return of 6.4% and 10%.
Table 14. Comparison of Payments From Personal Accounts to
the Portion of Social Security Benefits That Would Not be
Payable Under Current Law
^{Personal account}
^{monthly annuity,}
^{Initial Social Security monthly benefit}^{assuming 2% of pay}
^{(in constant 2001 dollars)}^{contribution and:}
^Difference
^Benefits^between
^Benefits^{payable given}^{“promised”}
^{Year of}^{“promised”}^projected^and^6.4%^10%
^retirement^{under current}^income^{“payable”}^annual^annual
^{at age 65}^law^shortfall*^benefits^return^return
²⁰¹⁰^$¹^,171^$¹^,171^$⁰^$³⁹^$⁴⁵
²⁰²⁰^$¹^,273^$¹^,273^$⁰^$¹⁰⁶^$¹⁴⁷
²⁰³⁰^$¹^,317^$¹^,317^$⁰^$¹⁹⁷^$³³⁹
²⁰⁴⁰^$¹^,450^$¹^,059^$³⁹²^$³²²^$⁶⁹⁸
²⁰⁵⁰^$¹^,597^$¹^,164^$⁴³³^$⁴¹⁷^$¹^,020
²⁰⁶⁰^$¹^,759^$¹^,237^$⁵²²^$⁴⁵¹^$¹^,103
²⁰⁷⁰^$¹^,936^$¹^,319^$⁶¹⁷^$⁴⁸⁹^$¹^,196
^Note:^{Illustrations}^{are for full-tim}^{e workers who alwa}^{ys earned average wages. See the}^Appendix^for
^{discussion of other assum}^p^tions.
^{* Does not include benefit reductions that m}ⁱ^ght^{be necessary if the personal accounts we}^re^funded
^from^{a “}^{carve out” of Social Security payroll taxes.}

The figures in Table 14 show that a personal account funded at 2% of pay with
a 6.4% annual rate of return would offset much of the benefit shortfall for workers
retiring in 2040 and later, and would significantly exceed the shortfall for all retirees
if the annual return were 10% (compare the amounts in the two “personal account
monthly annuity” columns on the right to the middle column labeled “difference
between ‘promised’ and ‘payable’ benefits”). Although not reflected in the table, a
personal account funded at 1% of pay would provide only a partial offset to the
benefit shortfall if its annual return were 6.4%, but would more than offset the
shortfall for 2050 and 2060 retirees if it achieved a 10% return. An account funded
at 3% of pay would more than offset the benefit shortfall for all retirees under either
a 6.4% or 10% annual return scenario, by as much as threefold if the return were

10%.

Effect of coupling a new personal account system with certain
Social Security benefit constraints. While Table 14 gives some perspective
on the extent to which a personal account funded at 2% of pay might offset the
projected benefit shortfalls for a worker always earning the average wage, few if any
policymakers would envision a scenario of allowing Social Security benefits to drop
abruptly when the trust fund balances are depleted. Benefit constraints likely would
be phased in gradually, allowing future retirees time to adjust their retirement plans.
Table 15 illustrates how three relatively large benefit constraints would mesh with
the potential annuities from personal accounts. The first would couple the creation
of personal accounts with raising the age for full Social Security retirement benefits
to 70. The second would couple personal accounts with allowing initial Social
Security benefits to rise only with inflation. The third would offset Social Security
benefits by 75% of the personal account’s annuity value (or alternatively, use the
personal account to fund part of the Social Security benefit). To simplify the
presentation, Table 15 shows the net effect of each proposal, i.e., the combined
effect of reducing Social Security benefits and providing annuities from new
personal accounts.

Table 15. Effect on Benefit Levels of Coupling Social Security
Benefit Constraints With Personal Accounts
^{Percentage Change in Benefi}^{ts from Current Law Levels}
^{Create personal}
^{Create personal}^{accounts and allow}^{Create personal}
^{accounts and raise age}^{initial Social Security}^{accounts and offset}
^{for full Social Security}^{benefits to rise only}^{Social Security benefits}
^{retirement benefits to}^{with inflation}^{by 75% of personal}
^{70 by 2029}^{beginning in 2006}^{account annuity}
^{Year of}
^retire-^{Assuming personal accounts funded at 2% of pay* earn annual return of:}
^{ment at}
^{age 65}^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%
²⁰¹⁰^1%^1.4%^1.3%^1.8%^0.8%^1.0%
²⁰²⁰^-5.0^-1.7^{-1.6 1.6}²^.1^2.9
²⁰³⁰^-2.4^8.4²^.0^{12.8 3.7}⁶^.4
²⁰⁴⁰^3.0^28.9¹^.3^27.2⁵^.6^12.0
²⁰⁵⁰^6.9^44.6^-2.1^35.7⁶^.5^16.0
²⁰⁶⁰^6.4^43.5^-^9.2^28.0⁶^.4^15.7
²⁰⁷⁰^6.0^42.5^-^{15.6 21.0}⁶^.3^15.4
^Note:^{Illustrations are for workers who always}^e^a^rⁿ^e^d^a^v^e^r^{age wages. See the Appendix for}
^{discussion of other assum}^p^tions.
^{* Assum}^e^{s “}^a^{dd on” approach is taken to fund the accounts.}
Under the first approach shown in Table 15 – coupling personal accounts with
raising the age for full retirement benefits to 70 – if the personal accounts were to
grow at a 6.4% annual rate, the annuities payable from them would slightly exceed
the reduction in Social Security benefits for most cohorts, with the exception of those
retiring in the 2020-2030 period. (These “earlier” cohorts would be fully affected
by the increase in the age for full retirement benefits, but the personal accounts
would not have a full career over which to grow). If the personal accounts were to
grow at a 10% rate, by 2040 the annuities would substantially exceed the benefit
reduction. Table 16, which separates the effects of the Social Security benefit
constraints from those of the personal accounts, shows that with an account growing
at a 6.4% rate, a 19% reduction in Social Security benefits for a new retiree in 2070
is more than offset by an account annuity whose value is equal to 25% of the current
law Social Security benefit. At a 10% annual growth rate, the account annuity would
be more than three times as large as the Social Security benefit reduction.
As with the first approach, under the second approach – coupling personal
accounts with allowing initial benefits to rise only with inflation – the Social
Security benefit reduction would be partially offset if the accounts were to grow at
a 6.4% rate and more than offset if they were to grow at a 10% rate. Table 16 shows
that with the accounts growing at a 6.4% rate, a 41% reduction in Social Security
benefits for a new retiree in 2070 is partially offset by a personal account annuity

equal to 25% of the current law Social Security benefit. At a 10% annual growth
rate, the account annuity substantially exceeds the Social Security benefit reduction.
Under the third approach – offsetting Social Security benefits by 75% of the
annuity payable from a personal account – by definition the combined benefit would
be higher by an amount equal to 25% of the personal account annuity.²² Also, the
personal accounts will be one-third higher than the reduction in Social Security²³
benefit, regardless of the rate of return on the personal account. Table 15 shows
that if the personal account grew at a 6.4% rate, by 2070 the combined benefit would
be 6.3% higher than the Social Security benefit payable under current law. If the
account were to grow at a 10% rate, by 2070 the combined benefits would exceed
current-law Social Security benefits by 15%. Table 16 shows that with the accounts
growing at a 6.4% rate, a 19% reduction in Social Security benefits for a new retiree
in 2070 is more than offset by a personal account annuity equal to 25% of the current
law Social Security benefit. At a 10% annual growth rate, a 46% reduction in Social
Security benefits is more than offset by an account annuity equal to 62% of the
current-law Social Security benefit.

²² If the personal account annuity were $1.00 and the Social Security benefit were $2.00,
after the 75% offset was applied, the Social Security benefit would be $1.25, resulting in a
combined benefit of $2.25.
²³ The reduction in Social Security benefits equals 75% of the personal account, so the
personal account (100%) exceeds the reduction (75%) by 33.3%.

CRS-38
Table 16. Separated Effects on Benefit Levels of Coupling Social Security Benefit Constraints With Personal
Accounts
^{Change in Benefits from Current Law Levels (in percent)}
^{Create personal accounts and raise age for}^{Create personal accounts and allow initial}
^{full Social Security retirement benefits to}^{benefits to rise only with inflation beginning}^{Create personal accounts and offset benefits by 75% of}
^{70 by 2029}^{in 2006}^{personal account annuity}
^{Increase in retirement}^{Increase in retirement}^{Reduction in Social}^{Increase in retirement}
^{income from account}^{income from account}^{Security benefits with}^{income from account}
^{funded at 2% of pay* with}^{funded at 2% of pay*}^{account funded at 2% of}^{funded at 2% of pay*}
^{Reduction in}^{annual return of:}^{with annual return of:}^{pay* with annual return}^{with annual return of:}
^Social^{Reduction in}^of:
^Security^{Social Security}^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL31086}^benefits^benefits
^g/w²⁰¹⁰^-2.4%³^.3%^3.9%^-2.1%^3.3%^3.9%^-2.5%^-2.9%^3.3%^3.9%
^s^.or
^le^ak²⁰²⁰^-13.3^8.3^11.6^-9.9^8.3^11.6^-6.2^-8.7^8.3^11.6
^://wiki²⁰³⁰^-17.3^15.0^25.8^-^12.9^15.⁰^25.8^-^11.2^-^19.3^15.0^25.8
^h^ttp²⁰⁴⁰^-19.2^22.2^48.2^-^20.9^22.²^48.2^-^16.7^-^36.1^22.2^48.2
²⁰⁵⁰^-19.2^26.1^63.9^-^28.2^26.¹^63.9^-^19.6^-^47.9^26.1^63.9
²⁰⁶⁰^-19.2^25.7^62.8^-^34.8^25.⁷^62.8^-^19.2^-^47.1^25.7^62.8
²⁰⁷⁰^-19.2^25.2^61.8^-^40.8^25.²^61.8^-^18.9^-^46.3^25.2^61.8
^{Illustrations are for workers who always earned average wa}^{ges. See the Appendix for discussion of other assum}^p^tions.
^e^{s “}^a^{dd on” approach is taken to fund the accounts.}

Tables 17 and 18 show a similar pattern for replacement rates for a steady
average-wage earner under the three options. By the time the personal accounts are
fully phased-in, only one option – coupling personal accounts with allowing initial
benefits to rise only with inflation – does not produce a replacement rate that is
higher than the benefits promised under current law, and this result occurs only when
the account is assumed to grow at a 6.4% rate. However, if compared to the benefit
levels payable under the system’s projected revenue stream (i.e., if no action were
taken to close the long-range funding gap), leading to a “current law” replacement
rate of only 24.9% in 2070, then all the options eventually would produce a higher
replacement rate than current law (compare the 24.9% rate to the rates shown for the
options on the bottom line of Table 17).
Table 17. Net Replacement Rates Resulting From Coupling
Social Security Benefit Constraints With Personal Accounts
^{Combined Replacement Rate from Reducing}^{Social Security Benefits and Creating}
^Personal^{Accounts Funded at 2% of Pay*}
^{(First year’s benefits/payments}^{as % of final year’s earnings)}
^{Create personal}
^{Create personal}^{accounts and allow}^{Create personal}
^{accounts and raise}^{initial Social}^{accounts and offset}
^{age for full Social}^{Security benefits to}^{Social Security}
^{Security retirement}^{rise only with}^{benefits by 75% of}
^{benefits to 70 by}^{inflation beginning}^{personal account}
^{2029, assuming}^{in 2006, assuming}^{annuity, assuming}
^{accounts earn}^{accounts earn}^{accounts earn}
^{Year of}^{annual return of:}^{annual return of:}^{annual return of:}
^retirement^Current
^{at age 65}^law^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%
²⁰¹⁰^39.4^39.7^39.9^39.8^40.0^39.7^39.7
²⁰²⁰^38.9^36.9^38.2^38.2^39.5^39.6^39.9
²⁰³⁰^36.6^35.6^39.6^37.2^41.2^37.9^39.9
²⁰⁴⁰^36.6^37.6^47.1^37.0^46.4^38.5^40.9
²⁰⁵⁰^36.6^39.0^52.8^35.7^49.5^38.9^42.3
²⁰⁶⁰^36.6^38.8^52.4^33.2^46.7^38.8^42.2
²⁰⁷⁰^36.6^38.7^52.0^30.8^44.2^38.8^42.1
^Note:^{Illustrations are for workers who always earned average wages. Se}^e^t^h^e^A^p^p^e^{ndix for}
^{discussion of other assum}^p^tions.
^{* Assum}^e^{s “}^a^{dd on” approach is taken to fund the accounts.}

CRS-40
Benefit Constraints With Personal
Accounts
^{Separate Components of Replacement Rate from Reducing Social S}^{ecurity Benefits and Creating Personal Accounts Funded at 2% of P}^{ay* (First year’s}
^{benefits/annuities as % of final year’s earnings)}
^{Create personal accounts and raise age}^{Create personal accounts and allow}
^{for full Social Security retirement}^{initial Social Security benefits to rise}^{Create personal accounts and offset Social Security}
^{benefits to 70 by 2029}^{only with inflation beginning in 2006}^{benefits by 75% of personal account annuity}
^{From Social Security,}^{From personal account}
^{From account earning}^{From account earning}^{with an account earning}^{earning annual return}
^From^{annual return of:}^From^{annual return of:}^{annual return of:}^of:
^Current^Social^Social
^law^Security^Security^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL31086}²⁰¹⁰^39.4^38.5¹^.3^1.5^38.5¹^.3^1.5^38.4^38.3¹^.3^1.5
^g/w
^s^.or²⁰²⁰^38.9^33.8³^.2^4.5^35.0³^.2^4.5^36.5^35.6³^.2^4.5
^le^ak
²⁰³⁰^36.6^30.3⁵^.4^9.4^31.8⁵^.4^9.4^32.5^29.6⁵^.4^9.4
^://wiki
^h^ttp²⁰⁴⁰^36.6^29.6⁸^.1^17.6^28.9⁸^.1^17.6^30.5^23.4⁸^.1^17.6
²⁰⁵⁰^36.6^29.6⁹^.5^23.3^26.2⁹^.5^23.3^29.5^19.1⁹^.5^23.3
²⁰⁶⁰^36.6^29.6⁹^.4^22.9^23.8⁹^.4^22.9^29.6^19.4⁹^.4^22.9
²⁰⁷⁰^36.6^29.6⁹^.2^22.5^21.6⁹^.2^22.5^29.7^19.7⁹^.2^22.5
^{Illustrations are for workers who always earned average wa}^{ges. See the Appendix for discussion of other assum}^p^tions.
^e^{s “}^a^{dd on” approach is taken to fund the accounts.}

Under all three options, the purchasing power of future Social Security benefits
is projected to be higher than that of the benefits for a comparable worker retiring in
2001. Tables 19 and 20 show that adding an annuity from a new personal account
would be a significant supplement to these higher levels.
In these tables, under the option creating the largest reduction in Social Security
benefits – allowing initial benefits to rise only with inflation beginning in 2006 –
future Social Security benefits would still be 9% higher than that of a retiree in 2001.
However, supplementing the Social Security benefit with a personal account funded
at 2% of pay and growing at a 6.4% rate of return would raise the future purchasing
power of the initial benefit over that of the 2001 retiree by 27.7% for the 2030 retiree
and 55.5% for the 2070 retiree. If the account were to grow at a 10% rate, the
account would raise the initial benefit’s purchasing power by 41.2% for the 2030
retiree and 122.7% for the 2070 retiree.
Under the proposal to raise the age for full retirement benefits to 70, a personal
account funded at 2% of pay and growing at a 6.4% rate of return would raise the
future purchasing power of the initial benefit over that of the 2001 retiree by 22.2%
for the 2030 retiree and 95.1% for the 2070 retiree. If the account were to grow at
a 10% rate, the account would raise the future purchasing power by 35.8% for the
2030 retiree and 162.4% for the 2070 retiree. Under the proposal to offset Social
Security benefits by 75% of the account’s annuity value, the account would raise the
initial benefit’s purchasing power by 29.9% for the 2030 retiree and 95.7% for the
2070 retiree. If the account were to grow at a 10% rate, the account would raise the
initial benefit’s purchasing power by 33.2% for the 2030 retiree and 112.5% for the

2070 retiree.

Table 19. Projected Future Purchasing Power From Coupling
Social Security Benefit Constraints With Personal Accounts
^{Projected Changes in Purchasing Power}^{of Combined Benefits From 2001 Levels}
^{Create personal}
^{Create personal}^{accounts and allow}^{Create personal}
^{accounts and raise}^{initial Social}^{accounts and offset}
^{age for full Social}^{Security benefits to}^{Social Security}
^{Security retirement}^{rise only with}^{benefits by 75% of}
^{benefits to 70 by}^{inflation beginning}^{personal account}
²⁰²⁹^{in 2006}^annuity
^{Year of}^{Accounts are funded at 2% of pay* and have annual return of:}
^retire-
^{ment at}^Current^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%
^{age 65}^law
²⁰¹⁰^11.3%^12.3%^12.9%^12.7%^13.3%^12.2%^12.3%
²⁰²⁰^21.0^15.0^18.9^19.0^23.0^23.5^24.5
²⁰³⁰^25.2^22.2^35.8^27.7^41.2^29.9^33.2
²⁰⁴⁰^37.9^42.0^77.7^39.6^75.4^45.5^54.5
²⁰⁵⁰^51.8^62.2^119.6^48.6^106.0^61.7^76.1
²⁰⁶⁰^67.2^77.9^140.0^51.9^113.9^77.9^93.4
²⁰⁷⁰^84.1^95.1^162.4^55.5^122.7^95.7^112.5
^Note:^{Illustrations are for full-tim}^{e workers}^{who al}^{ways earned average wages. See the Appendix}
^{for discussion of other assum}^p^tions.
^{* Assum}^e^{s “}^a^{dd on” approach is taken to fund the accounts.}

CRS-43
Table 20. Separated Effects on Future Purchasing Power of Benefits/Annuities From Coupling Social Security
Benefit Constraints With Personal Accounts
^{Projected Changes in Purchasing Po}^{wer of Benefits From 2001 Levels}
^{Create personal accounts and raise}^{Create personal accounts and allow}
^{age for full Social Security}^{initial benefits to rise only with}^{Create personal accounts and offset benefits for 75%}
^{retirement benefits to 70 by 2029}^{inflation beginning in 2006}^{of personal account annuity}
^{Income from}^{Social Security benefits}^{Income from account}
^{account funded at}^{Income from account}
^{2% of pay* with}^{funded at 2% of pay*}^{Assuming account funded at 2% of pay* with annual}
^Social^{annual return of:}^Social^{with annual return of:}^{return of:}
^Current^Security^Security
^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL31086}^law^benefits^benefits
^g/w²⁰¹⁰^11.3%^8.7%^3.7%^4.3%^9.0%^3.^7%^4.3%^8.4%^8.0%^3.7%^4.3%
^s^.or
^le^ak²⁰²⁰^21.0⁴^.9^10.0^14.0⁹^.0^10.0^14.0^13.5^10.5^10.0^14.0
^://wiki²⁰³⁰^25.2³^.5^18.7^32.3⁹^.0^18.7^32.3^11.1¹^.0^18.7^32.3
^h^ttp²⁰⁴⁰^37.9^11.3^30.6^66.4⁹^.0^30.6^66.4^14.9^-^11.9^30.6^66.4
²⁰⁵⁰^51.8^22.6^39.6^97.0⁹^.0^39.6^97.0^22.1^-^20.9^39.6^97.0
²⁰⁶⁰^67.2^35.0^42.9^104.9⁹^.0^42.⁹^104.9^35.0^-^11.5^42.9^104.9
²⁰⁷⁰^84.1^48.7^46.5^113.7⁹^.0^46.⁵^113.7^49.2^-^1.2^46.5^113.7
^{Illustrations are for a full-tim}^{e worker who always earned av}^{erage wages. See the Appendix for discussion of other assum}^p^tio^ns.
^e^{s “}^a^{dd on” approach is taken to fund the accounts.}

Effect of financing considerations on the coupling of benefit
constraints and personal accounts. Although this report makes no explicit
assumption about how personal accounts would be funded, Tables 14 through 20
reflect reform plans in which personal accounts would implicitly be funded in a way
that does not alter the system’s current financing, i.e., through an “add on” approach.
These illustrations assume that the Social Security trust funds would continue to be
credited with Social Security taxes as scheduled under current law and that a separate
source of funding would be created for the personal accounts. For example, wage
earners might be required to make additional payroll tax contributions to fund the
accounts, or surplus federal tax receipts (assuming they exist) might be apportioned
to each wage earner’s account.
Alternatively, if these accounts were funded under the “carve out” method, i.e.,
using a portion of existing Social Security taxes that would otherwise be credited to
the Social Security trust funds, the system’s long-range actuarial deficit would be
increased. If it were assumed that other funding sources would be established to
make up for the diverted taxes (such as general fund infusions into the system), then
the retirement income reflected in the previous tables would be the same as shown.
However, if it were assumed that future Social Security benefits would have to be
further reduced to make up for the larger deficit, the retirement income reflected in
the previous tables would be too high. Larger benefit reductions would be required
to avoid an increase in the system’s actuarial deficit. Currently, the system’s long-
range deficit is projected to be 1.86% of taxable payroll for the next 75 years as a
whole. A diversion of 2 percentage points of the Social Security tax to personal
accounts potentially would increase the imbalance to something on the order of

3.86% of taxable payroll, more than doubling the average 75-year deficit.

Although there is no generic approach to offsetting this potential revenue loss,
a number of proposals would reduce a worker’s Social Security benefits by an
amount equal to the percentage of lifetime Social Security taxes that are diverted.
For example, the reduction in benefits for workers who throughout their career
diverted 2 percentage points of the 12.4% Social Security tax (employee/employer
shares combined) would be 16.1% of their future Social Security benefits (2/12.4 =²⁴

16.1%).

Like Tables 15 through 20, Tables 21 through 26 illustrate retirement income
under proposals that couple personal accounts with benefit reductions, but they
incorporate further reductions in benefits to reflect the assumption that workers
would give up a portion of their remaining Social Security benefits based on the
percentage of lifetime Social Security taxes diverted to fund their accounts.
Table 15 showed that, under the first approach (coupling personal accounts
funded from the add on method with raising the age for full retirement benefits to

²⁴ The 16.1% reduction would apply to workers who divert 2% of their Social Security
payroll taxes each year for a full 43-year career. The reduction would be smaller for workers
with less than a full career under a system of personal accounts. Also, as mentioned in
footnote 4on page 5, this approach assumes that the 16.1% reduction would apply equally
to retirement, disability, and survivor benefits. If the benefit reductions were to apply only
to the retirement portion of the program, they would have to be larger than 16.1%.

70), the annuities payable from accounts of full-time workers who always earned an
average wage and contributed 2% of pay that grew at an annual rate of 6.4% would
slightly exceed the reduction in Social Security benefits for most cohorts. At 10%
annual growth, however, the annuities would substantially exceed benefit reductions
for those retiring in 2040 and beyond. For example, retirement income for a worker
retiring in 2070 would be 42.5% higher than Social Security benefits under current
law. By comparison, if it is assumed that benefits would be further reduced in
proportion to the amount of Social Security taxes diverted to fund the account, as
shown in Table 21, the annuities payable from accounts that grew at an annual rate
of 6.4% would not be sufficient to offset Social Security benefit reductions for any
cohort. For example, under this “carve out” approach the Social Security benefit for
a worker retiring in 2070 would be reduced by about 32% from current law levels.
The annuity payable from an account would offset only about 80% of that reduction,
so the net retirement income from the two sources would be 7% lower than under
current law (see Figure 4). At the higher growth rate of 10%, the annuity would
more than offset the Social Security benefit reductions for workers retiring in 2040
and later. As shown in Table 22, for a new retiree in 2070 the annuity would equal
62% of current-law Social Security benefits, almost twice the amount needed to
offset the 32% benefit reduction that would occur under the proposal, yielding a 30%
net increase in retirement income (see Figures 5 and 6).

Figure 4. Effect of Add-on Versus Carve-out
Approach to Funding Personal Accounts
^C^o^m^bⁱⁿ^ed^b^eⁿ^e^fⁱ^t^s^co^mp^a^r^ed^t^o^cu^r^r^en^t^law
³⁰^%
^C^r^ea^{te p}^e^r^s^oⁿ^a^l^a^c^co^uⁿ^ts^aⁿ^d
²⁰^%^raⁱ^s^e^a^g^e^f^o^{r f}^u^l^l^re^tⁱ^re^m^eⁿ^t^b^eⁿ^e^fⁱ^ts^to⁷⁰
¹⁰^% Add- o n
+6%
^0%
-7%
^-1^0% Ca rv e -o ut
^-2^0%
^F^o^r^av^er^ag^e-^w^a^g^e^earⁿ^e^r^r^e^tⁱ^rⁱⁿ^g^at^a^g^{e 6}⁵ⁱⁿ²⁰⁷⁰^;
^as^s^u^m^e^s^acc^o^uⁿ^t^ea^rⁿ^e^d⁶^.⁴^%^anⁿ^u^al^l^y
^-3^0%

Figure 5. Effect of Rate-of-Return Assumption
(Combined Benefit Under Option)
^C^o^m^bⁱⁿ^ed^b^eⁿ^e^fⁱ^t^s^co^mp^ar^e^d^t^o^c^u^r^r^en^t^la^w
⁸⁰^%
^Cr^e^a^t^e^p^e^r^s^on^al^ac^c^o^uⁿ^t^s^an^d
⁶⁰^%^raⁱ^s^e^a^g^e^f^o^{r f}^u^l^l^re^tⁱ^re^m^eⁿ^t
^b^eⁿ^e^fⁱ^ts^to⁷⁰
⁴⁰^%With 10% return
²⁰^%
+30%
^0%
-7%
^-2⁰^%With 6.4%
return
^-4⁰^%
^-6⁰^%^F^o^r^a^v^e^r^ag^e-^w^a^g^e^ea^rⁿ^e^r^r^e^tⁱ^rⁱⁿ^g^at^ag^{e 6}⁵ⁱⁿ²⁰⁷⁰^;
^as^s^u^m^e^s^a^cco^uⁿ^t^f^uⁿ^d^ed^wⁱ^t^h^a^"^c^ar^v^e^o^u^t^"
^-8⁰^%
Figure 6. Effect of Rate-of-Return Assumption
(Separate Components Under Option)

^80%Change from current law
With 10% returnCreate personal accounts
^60%and raise age for full
retirement benefits to 70
^40% Wi th

6.4% return+62%

^20%
+25%
^0%^C^u^r^r^eⁿ^{t la}^w
Personal account
^-^20% annuity-32%
^-^40%Social Security
benefit
^-^60%^F^o^{r a}^v^e^r^a^g^e^-^w^a^g^e^e^a^rne^r^re^tⁱ^ri^ng^a^t^a^g^e⁶⁵ⁱⁿ²^070;^a^s^s^u^m^e^s
^-^80%^a^cco^uⁿ^t^f^uⁿ^d^ed^wⁱ^t^h^a^"^car^v^e^o^u^t^"

Similarly, Table 15 showed that under the second approach – coupling personal
accounts funded from the add on method with allowing initial benefits to rise only
with inflation beginning in 2006 – the annuities payable from accounts that grew at
an annual rate of 6.4% would only partially offset the benefit reductions for earlier
cohorts, while at the higher growth rate of 10%, they would more than offset the
benefit reductions for all cohorts. By comparison, as shown in Table 21, personal
accounts that grew at an annual rate of 6.4% would not be sufficient to offset the
larger benefit reductions. However, if the accounts grew at a rate of 10%, the
annuities would exceed the benefit reductions for new retirees in 2030 and later
although the net positive effect on retirement income would be somewhat lower. For
example, under the add on approach shown in Table 15, a worker retiring in 2070
would receive a net increase of 21% over current law. If Social Security benefits are
reduced further to reflect a diversion of taxes to fund the accounts, as shown in
Table 21, the same worker would receive a net increase of 11%. When compared
to the portion of Social Security benefits affordable under current law if no changes
are made to the system, retirement income under the second approach would be
higher under both an add on and a carve out approach assuming the personal
accounts earned either a 6.4% or a 10% rate of return (see Figure 7).

Figure 7. Combined Benefits Under Option
Compared to Benefits “Promised” and
Benefits “Payable” Under Current Law
^C^o^m^bⁱⁿ^e^d^b^eⁿ^e^fⁱ^t^s^co^m^p^ar^e^d^t^o^cu^r^r^eⁿ^t^l^a^w
⁵⁰^%
^C^r^e^a^t^e^pe^r^s^on^al^ac^c^o^uⁿ^t^s^aⁿ^d^al^l^o^wⁱⁿⁱ^tⁱ^a^l
⁴⁰^%^S^o^cⁱ^a^{l S}^ecu^rⁱ^t^y^beⁿ^e^f^its^to^rⁱ^s^e^oⁿ^l^y^wⁱ^thⁱⁿ^f^la^tⁱ^oⁿ
³⁰^%
^A^d^d-^on^Ca^r^v^e^-^o^u^t
²⁰^%¹⁰^%^re^t^u^rn
¹⁰^%^10%^re^t^u^rn
^0%^6.^4%^re^t^u^rn
^6.4%^re^t^u^rn
^-1⁰^% "p romised"
^-2⁰^%
"payable"
^-3⁰^%
^-4⁰^%
^-5⁰^%
^F^o^r^av^er^ag^e-^w^a^g^e^earⁿ^e^r^r^e^tⁱ^rⁱⁿ^g^at^ag^{e 6}⁵ⁱⁿ²⁰⁷⁰

Under the third approach shown in Table 15 – offsetting Social Security
benefits for 75% of the annuity payable from a personal account funded from the add
on method – accounts that earned either a 6.4% or 10% annual return would be
sufficient to make up for the reduction in Social Security benefits. Under the
proposal, the net increase varies from about 1% to about 16% depending on the
cohort and the investment return. By comparison, personal accounts funded under
the carve out method under both investment return assumptions would not be
sufficient to offset the larger benefit reductions shown in Table 21 for any cohort.
With a 10% annual return, the proposal would result in only a small negative net
effect for all cohorts, especially new retirees in 2050 and later for whom the net
negative effect would be less than 1%. As shown in Table 22, assuming a 6.4%
annual return, Social Security benefits would be reduced by about 35% for a new
retiree in 2070 and the annuity would be equal to about 25% of current law benefits
resulting in a 10% net reduction in retirement income. Assuming a 10% annual
return, the reduction in Social Security benefits (-62.4%) would be roughly equal to
the value of the annuity relative to current law benefits (+61.8%) for a net (rounded)
reduction of -0.7%.

CRS-49
Benefit Constraints With Personal Accounts Funded
With “Carve out” of Social Security Taxes
^{Change in Benefits from Current Law Levels (in percent)}
^{Create personal accounts and allow initial}
^{Create personal accounts and raise age for}^{Social Security benefits to rise only with}^{Create personal accounts and offset Social}
^{full Social Security retirement benefits to 70}^{inflation beginning in 2006}^{Security benefits by 75% of personal account}
^{by 2029}^annuity
^{Assuming personal accounts funded at 2% of pay earn annual return of:}
^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%
²⁰¹⁰^-2.0%^-1.5%^-1.7%^-1.2%^{- 2.2%}^-2.0%
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL31086}²⁰²⁰^-10.8^-^7.5^-7.7^-4.4^-4.7^-3.9
^g/w
^s^.or²⁰³⁰^-11.0^-^0.2^-7.2^3.7^-6.8^-4.1
^le^ak
²⁰⁴⁰^-8.5^17.4^-^10.0^15.9^-^8.7^-^2.2
^://wiki
^h^ttp²⁰⁵⁰^-6.2^31.6^-13.7^24.1^-^9.6^-^0.2
²⁰⁶⁰^-6.6^30.5^-^19.7^17.4^-^9.7^-^0.4
²⁰⁷⁰^-7.0^29.5^-25.1^11.4^-^9.8^-^0.7
^{Illustrations are for full-tim}^{e workers who always earned aver}^{age wages. See the Appendix for discussion of other assum}^p^tion^s.

CRS-50
Table 22. Separated Effects on Benefit Levels of Coupling Social Security Benefit Constraints With Personal
Accounts Funded With “Carve out” of Social Security Taxes
^{Change in Benefits from Current Law Levels (in percent)}
^{Create personal accounts and raise age for}^{Create personal accounts and allow initial}
^{full Social Security retirement benefits to}^{benefits to rise only with inflation beginning}^{Create personal accounts and offset benefits by 75%}
^{70 by 2029}^{in 2006}^{of personal account annuity}
^{Increase in retirement}^{Increase in retirement}^{Reduction in Social}^{Security benefits}^{Increase in retirement}^{income from account}
^{income from account}^{income from account}
^{Reduction in}^{funded at 2% of pay}^{with annual return of:}^{Reduction in}^{funded at 2% of pay with}^{annual return of:}^{Assuming account funded at 2% of pay with annual}^{return of:}
^{Social Security}^{Social Security}
^benefits^benefits^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL31086}
^g/w²⁰¹⁰^-5.3%³^.3%^3.9%^-5.0%^3.3%^3.9%^-5.5%^-^5.9%^3.3%^3.9%
^s^.or²⁰²⁰^-19.1^8.3^11.6^-16.0^8.3^11.6^-13.0^-15.4^8.3^11.6
^le^ak
^://wiki²⁰³⁰^-26.0^15.0^25.8^-22.1^15.⁰^25.8^-21.7^-29.8^15.0^25.8
^h^ttp²⁰⁴⁰^-30.7^22.2^48.2^-32.2^22.²^48.2^-30.9^-50.4^22.2^48.2
²⁰⁵⁰^-32.3^26.1^63.9^-39.8^26.¹^63.9^-35.7^-64.0^26.1^63.9
²⁰⁶⁰^-32.3^25.7^62.8^-45.3^25.⁷^62.8^-35.4^-63.2^25.7^62.8
²⁰⁷⁰^-32.3^25.2^61.8^-50.3^25.²^61.8^-35.1^-62.4^25.2^61.8
^{Illustrations are for full-tim}^{e workers who always earned aver}^{age wages. See the Appendix for discussion of other assum}^p^tion^s.

Tables 17 and 18 show that, once personal accounts funded from the “add-on”
method are fully phased in (around 2045), under each of the options the combined
benefits would result in higher net replacement rates than under current law, with the
exception of the second approach – coupling personal accounts with allowing
benefits to grow only by inflation – when the accounts are assumed to grow by 6.4%
annually. As shown in Table 18, current-law Social Security benefits would provide
a replacement rate of 36.6% for a new retiree in 2070. Under the proposal, Social
Security benefits would provide a replacement rate of 21.6% and an annuity payable
from an account that earns 6.4% annually would replace 9.2% of the worker’s final
earnings, yielding a net replacement rate of 30.8%. If the account earns an annual
return of 10%, the annuity would replace 22.5% of the worker’s final earnings
resulting in a net replacement rate of 44.2% (about 20% higher than under current
law). Tables 23 and 24 illustrate the effects on replacement rates when each option
is combined with personal accounts funded from the carve out method. Table 23
shows that, if the accounts were to grow at an annual rate of 6.4%, all of the options
would result in lower net replacement rates compared to current law. The second
approach – coupling personal accounts with allowing benefits to increase only by
inflation – would result in a net replacement rate of 27.3% for a worker retiring in
2070. If the accounts were to grow at an annual rate of 10%, all of the proposals
would result in a net replacement rate approximately equal to or higher than that
provided under current law. For example, the first approach – coupling personal
accounts with raising the age for full retirement benefits to 70 – would provide a net
replacement rate of 47.3% for workers retiring in 2070 (compared to 36.6% under
current law).

Table 23. Net Replacement Rates Resulting From Coupling
Illustrative Benefit Constraints With Personal Accounts Funded
With “Carve out” of Social Security Taxes
^{Combined Replacement Rate from Reducing Social Security}
^{Benefits and Creating Personal Accounts Funded at 2% of Pay}
^{(First year’s benefits/annuities}^{as % of final year’s earnings)}
^{Create personal}^{Create personal}^{Create personal}
^{accounts and}^{accounts and allow}^{accounts and offset}
^{raise age for full}^{initial Social}^{Social Security}
^{Social Security}^{Security benefits to}^{benefits by 75% of}
^retirement^{rise only with}^{personal account}
^{benefits to 70 by}^{inflation beginning}^annuity
²⁰²⁹^{in 2006}
^{Year of}^{Assuming accounts earn annual return of:}
^retirement^Current
^{at age 65}^law^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%
²⁰¹⁰^39.4^38.7^38.9^38.7^38.9^38.5^38.5
²⁰²⁰^38.9^34.7^36.0^35.9^37.1^37.0^37.3
²⁰³⁰^36.6^32.5^36.5^33.9^37.8^34.0^35.0
²⁰⁴⁰^36.6^33.5^42.9^32.9^42.3^33.3^35.7
²⁰⁵⁰^36.6^34.3^48.1^31.5^45.3^33.0^36.4
²⁰⁶⁰^36.6^34.2^47.7^29.3^42.9^33.0^36.3
²⁰⁷⁰^36.6^34.0^47.3^27.3^40.7^32.9^36.3
^Note:^{Illustrations a}^r^{e for full-tim}^{e workers who al}^{ways earned average wages. See the Appendix}
^{for discussion of other assum}^p^tions.

CRS-53
Table 24. Separated Effects on Replacement Rates From Coupling Illustrative Benefit Constraints With Personal
Accounts Funded With “Carve out” of Social Security Taxes
^{Separate Components of Replacement Rate from Reducing Social}^{Security Benefits and Creating Personal Accounts Funded at 2% of}
^Pay
^{(First year’s benefits/annuities}^{as % of final year’s earnings)}
^{Create personal accounts and raise}^{Create personal accounts and allow}
^{age for full Social Security retirement}^{initial Social Security benefits to rise}^{Create personal accounts and offset Social Security}
^{benefits to 70 by 2029}^{only with inflation beginning in 2006}^{benefits by 75% of personal account annuity}
^{From Social Security}
^{From account}
^{From account with}^{From account with}
^From^{annual return of:}^From^{annual return of:}^{Assuming annual return of:}
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL31086}^{Current law}^Social^Security^Social^Security^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%
^g/w
^s^.or²⁰¹⁰^39.4^37.3¹^.3^1.5^37.4¹^.3^1.5^37.3^37.1¹^.3^1.5
^le^ak
²⁰²⁰^38.9^31.5³^.2^4.5^32.7³^.2^4.5^33.9^33.0³^.2^4.5
^://wiki
^h^ttp²⁰³⁰^36.6^27.1⁵^.4^9.4^28.4⁵^.4^9.4^28.7^25.7⁵^.4^9.4
²⁰⁴⁰^36.6^25.3⁸^.1^{17.6 24.7}⁸^.1^17.6^25.3^18.2⁸^.1^17.6
²⁰⁵⁰^36.6^24.8⁹^.5^{23.3 22.0}⁹^.5^23.3^23.6^13.2⁹^.5^23.3
²⁰⁶⁰^36.6^24.8⁹^.4^{22.9 20.0}⁹^.4^22.9^23.7^13.5⁹^.4^22.9
²⁰⁷⁰^36.6^24.8⁹^.2^{22.5 18.1}⁹^.2^22.5^23.8^13.8⁹^.2^22.5
^{Illustrations are for full-tim}^{e workers who always earned aver}^{age wages. See the Appendix for discussion of other assum}^p^tion^s.

As shown in Tables 19 and 20, all three benefit constraint options combined
with personal accounts funded from the add on method would result in an increase
in purchasing power over that for a 2001 retiree (assuming either a 6.4% or 10% rate
of return). Furthermore, in most instances, all three would provide a greater increase
in purchasing power than benefits prescribed under current law. For example,
assuming a 10% annual return, the first approach – coupling personal accounts with
raising the full benefit age to 70 – would yield a net increase in purchasing power of
about 162.4% for a new retiree in 2070. Because current law would provide the
same worker with an 84% increase in purchasing power over that for a 2001 retiree,
the purchasing power of the benefit under the proposal would be 93% greater than
that of the benefit prescribed by current law. Assuming a 6.4% annual return, the
second approach – coupling personal accounts with allowing benefits to increase
only by inflation – would provide a worker retiring in 2070 with a 55.5% net
increase in purchasing power over that for a 2001 retiree (however, it would be 34%
less than under current law).
When benefits are reduced further to take into account a diversion of Social
Security taxes to fund the personal accounts, a different pattern emerges. As shown
in Tables 25 and 26, when the rate of return on the accounts is assumed to be 6.4%,
all three proposals would provide greater purchasing power than that for a 2001
retiree (although less than that provided under current law). Assuming a 10% annual
return, two of the options — coupling personal accounts with raising the full benefit
age to 70 and allowing initial benefits to grow only by inflation — would provide
even greater purchasing power than current law once the personal account system
has had time to mature. For example, retirement income under these two options
would provide a worker retiring in 2070 with a net increase in purchasing power of

138.4% and 105.1%, respectively, over that for a 2001 retiree (compared to 84.1%

under current law). Once personal accounts are fully phased in, retirement income
under the third option (offsetting Social Security benefits by 75% of the annuity from
an account that earns a 10% return) would provide about the same increase in
purchasing power as Social Security prescribed by current law.

CRS-55
er From Coupling Illustrative Benefit Constraints With Personal Accounts
Funded With “Carve out” of Social Security Taxes
^{Projected Net Change in Purchasing}^{Power of Benefits From 2001 Levels}
^{Create personal accounts and raise}^{Create personal accounts and allow}^{Create personal accounts and offset}
^{age for full Social Security}^{initial Social Security benefits to rise}^{Social Security benefits by 75% of}
^{retirement benefits to 70 by 2029}^{only with inflation beginning in 2006}^{personal account annuity}
^{Assuming account funded at 2% of pay with annual return of:}
^{Current law}^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%
²⁰¹⁰^11.3%^9.1%^9.7%^9.4%^10.0%^8.9%^9.0%
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL31086}²⁰²⁰^21.0^7.9^11.9^11.7^15.6^15.3^16.3
^g/w²⁰³⁰^25.2^11.4^24.9^16.3^29.8^16.7^20.1
^s^.or
^le^ak²⁰⁴⁰^37.9^26.1^61.9^24.1^59.8^25.9^34.8
^://wiki²⁰⁵⁰^51.8^42.5^99.8^31.0^88.4^37.2^51.6
^h^ttp²⁰⁶⁰^67.2^56.1^118.2^34.3^96.4^50.9^66.5
²⁰⁷⁰^84.1^71.2^138.4^37.9^105.1^66.0^82.8
^{Illustrations are for full-tim}^{e workers who always earned aver}^{age wages. See the Appendix for discussion of other assum}^p^tion^s.

CRS-56
er of Benefits/Annuities From Coupling Illustrative Benefit
Constraints With Personal Accounts Funded With “Carve out” of Social Security Taxes
^{Projected Change in Purchasing Po}^{wer of Benefits From 2001 Levels}
^{Create personal accounts and raise}^{Create personal accounts and allow}
^{age for full Social Security retirement}^{initial benefits to rise only with}^{Create personal accounts and offset benefits for 75%}
^{benefits to 70 by 2029}^{inflation beginning in 2006}^{of personal account annuity}
^{From Social Security}
^{From account funded}^{From account funded at}^benefits^{From account}
^{at 2% of pay with}^{2% of pay with annual}
^From^{annual return of:}^From^{return of:}^{Assuming account funded at 2% of pay with annual}
^Social^Social^{return of:}
^Current^Security^Security^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL31086}^law^benefits^benefits
^g/w²⁰¹⁰^11.3%^5.4%^3.7%^4.3%^5.7%^3.^7%^4.3%^5.2%^4.8%^3.7%^4.3%
^s^.or
^le^ak²⁰²⁰^21.0^-2.1^10.0^14.0¹^.7^10.0^14.0^5.3^2.3^10.0^14.0
^://wiki²⁰³⁰^25.2^-7.3^18.7^32.3^-^2.4^18.7^32.3^-^2.0^-12.1^18.7^32.3
^h^ttp
²⁰⁴⁰^37.9^-4.5^30.6^66.4^-^6.5^30.6^66.4^-^4.7^-31.6^30.6^66.4
²⁰⁵⁰^51.8^2.8^39.6^97.0^-^8.6^39.6^97.0^-^2.4^-45.4^39.6^97.0
²⁰⁶⁰^67.2^13.3^42.9^104.9^-8.6^42.⁹^104.9^8.1^-38.5^42.9^104.9
²⁰⁷⁰^84.1^24.7^46.5^113.7^-8.6^46.5^113.7^19.6^-30.9^46.5^113.7
^{Illustrations are for full-tim}^{e workers who always earned aver}^{age wages. See the Appendix for discussion of other assum}^p^tion^s.

Effect on Social Security’s low-wage “tilt” of coupling personal
accounts with Social Security benefit constraints. Table 27 shows the
percentage of Social Security benefits that personal accounts would represent for
low, average, and high-paid workers. It illustrates that personal accounts would
represent a larger percentage of Social Security benefits for high-wage earners than
low-wage earners. This occurs because the current Social Security benefit formula²⁵
is “tilted” in favor of low-wage earners. Although Social Security benefits are not
based on a worker’s taxes, a comparison of taxes paid to benefits received shows that
lower-wage earners receive a higher return on their taxes than higher-wage earners.
Similarly, when benefits in the first year of retirement are compared to a worker’s
final earnings, lower-wage earners have a larger percentage of their earnings
replaced by benefits. This so-called “tilt” in the program is deliberate and has
existed since its inception. It is one of the social insurance features of the program,
reflecting the view that Social Security should provide a means through which low-
wage workers can sustain at least a “minimal” standard of living in retirement
without resorting to welfare. This report does not debate the merits of the “tilt” but
merely shows that a personal account funded with a constant percentage of pay
would produce, everything else held equal, an account that would be strictly
proportional to the level of a worker’s earnings. Thus, a personal account intended
to substitute for a portion of Social Security or make up for across-the-board
reductions needed to bring the system into long-range actuarial balance would lessen
the tilt currently favoring low-paid workers. This is not to say that a personal
account to which 2% of pay is contributed would in and of itself discriminate among
workers with different levels of earnings. Rather, the lessening of the tilt would be
the natural result of shifting more of the combined benefit to a purely proportional
system.

²⁵ Benefits are computed by applying a three-step formula to a worker’s “average indexed
monthly earnings” (AIME) calculated using as many as 35 years’ worth of earnings. For
workers who reach age 62 in 2001, monthly benefits are the sum of 90% of the first $561 of
AIME, 32% of earnings over $561 through $3,381, and 15% of the amount above $3,381.
Both the earnings used to compute the worker’s AIME and the so-called “bend points” in
the benefit formula (“$561" and “$3,381") are indexed to reflect growth in average wages
in the economy. For retirees, each year’s earnings are indexed from the year they were
earned to the year the worker reaches age 60. Earnings at age 60 and beyond are included
in the averaging calculation at their nominal value.

Table 27. Projected Value of Personal Accounts As Percent of
Current Law Social Security Benefits: Differences Between
Low, Average, and Maximum-Wage Earners
^{Percent of Social Security Benefits Re}^{placed by Personal Account Annuities}
^{Relative lifetime earnings level}
^Low-wage^{Average-wage Maximum-wage}
^{Year of retirement}
^{at age 65}^{Accounts funded at 2% of pay with annual return of 6.4%}
²⁰¹⁰^2.5%^3.3%^5.2%
²⁰²⁰^6.2⁸^.3^12.6
²⁰³⁰^11.1^15.0^22.6
²⁰⁴⁰^16.5^22.2^33.7
²⁰⁵⁰^19.4^26.1^39.6
²⁰⁶⁰^19.1^25.7^39.0
²⁰⁷⁰^18.7^25.2^38.3
^{Accounts funded at 2% of pay with annual return of 10%}
²⁰¹⁰^2.9%^3.9%^6.0%
²⁰²⁰^8.6^11.6^17.6
²⁰³⁰^19.1^25.8^39.0
²⁰⁴⁰^35.8^48.2^73.1
²⁰⁵⁰^47.4^63.9^97.0
²⁰⁶⁰^46.6^62.8^95.3
²⁰⁷⁰^45.9^61.8^93.8
^Note:^Il^l^u^{strations are for full-tim}^{e workers retiring at age 65 who steadily contributed to personal}
^{accounts beginning in 2002 or later. See the Appendix for discussion of other assum}^p^tions.
A key point here is that an across-the-board cut in Social Security benefits when
coupled with building personal accounts would affect workers with low earnings or
truncated work histories more adversely, because the accumulations in their personal
accounts would not make up or adjust for as much of a cut as it would for average
and high-wage earners. For example, if a proposal were designed to achieve a 25%
general reduction in benefits by 2070, Table 27 shows that, under the 6.4% rate-of-
return scenario, the reduction would basically match the value of the personal
account for the average wage earner, meaning that these workers would receive a
combined benefit approximately equal to benefits promised under current law. The
low-wage earner, however, would receive a combined benefit that would be 6.3%
lower than under current law, and the worker who always earned the maximum
taxable wage would receive a combined benefit that would be 18% higher.
Table 28 shows that if personal accounts earning 6.4% annually were combined
with allowing initial benefits to grow only at the rate of inflation, by 2070 the
reduction in total payments from current law levels would be 22.1% for low-wage
earners, compared to 15.6% for average-wage earners, and 4.8% for maximum-wage
earners. If, instead, the personal accounts earned 10% annually, the combined
benefits would exceed those afforded by current law rules for wage earners at all

three levels, but again the “tilt” would be lessened. The combined payments would
be 5.0% higher than under current law for low-wage earners, and 21.0% and 50.6%
higher, respectively, for average and maximum wage-earners (see Figures 8 and 9).
Table 28. Change in Replacement Rates for Low, Average, and
Maximum-Wage Earners Retiring in 2070 Under Benefit
Constraints Coupled With Personal Accounts
^{Relative lifetime earnings level}
^Low-wage^Average-wage^Maximum-wage
^{Accounts funded at 2% of pay* earning annual return of:}
^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%^6.4%^10%
^{Raise age for full Social Security retirement benefits to 70}^:
^Replacem^{ent rate}^48.9%^62.2%^38.7%^52.0%^28.6%^42.0%
^{Relative change from}^-0.5%⁺^26.6%^+6.0%⁺^42.5%^+19.1%^+74.7%
^{current law}
^{Allow initial Social Security benef}^{its to rise only with inflation}^:
^Replacem^{ent rate}^38.3%^51.6%^30.8%^44.2%^22.9%^36.2%
^{Relative change from}^-22.1%^+5.0%^-^15.6%^+21.0%^-4.8%⁺^50.6%
^{current law}
^{Offset Social Security benefits by 75%}^{of personal account annuity:}
^Replacem^{ent rate}^51.4%^54.8%^38.8%^42.1%^26.4%^29.7%
^{Relative change from}^+4.7%⁺^11.5%^+6.3%⁺^15.5%^+9.6%⁺^23.5%
^{current law}
^Note:^{Illustrations are for full-tim}^e^workers^retiring^at^age⁶⁵^who^{steadily contributed 2% of pay to}
^{personal accounts. See the Appendix for discussion of other assum}^p^tions.
^{* Assum}^e^{s “}^a^{dd on” approach is taken to fund the accounts.}

Figure 8. Effect on Social Security’s Low-Wage “Tilt”
Assuming a 6.4% Rate of Return
⁶⁰^%^R^e^p^l^ace^m^eⁿ^t^r^a^t^e
⁵⁵^%^C^r^e^a^t^e^pe^r^s^oⁿ^a^l^a^c^c^o^un^t^s^an^d
^a^llo^wⁱⁿ^it^ia^l^S^o^cⁱ^a^l^S^e^cu^r^ity
⁵⁰^%^b^eⁿ^e^fⁱ^ts^to^rⁱ^s^e^oⁿ^l^y^wⁱ^thⁱⁿ^f^l^a^t^ioⁿ
⁴⁵^%^Cu^r^r^eⁿ^t^l^a^w
⁴⁰^%
³⁵^%
³⁰^%^P^r^op^os^a^l
²⁵^%
²⁰^%^F^o^r^w^o^r^k^e^r^r^e^tⁱ^rⁱ^ng^a^t^a^g^e⁶⁵ⁱⁿ²⁰⁷^0;
¹⁵^%^as^s^u^m^e^s^a^cco^uⁿ^tⁱ^s^f^uⁿ^d^ed^wⁱ^t^h^aⁿ
¹⁰^%^"^a^d^d^oⁿ^"^an^d^ea^rⁿ^s⁶^.⁴^%^anⁿ^u^al^l^y
^5%
^0%^L^o^w^e^a^rⁿ^e^r^M^a^xⁱ^{mum e}^a^rⁿ^e^r
Figure 9. Effect on Social Security’s Low-Wage “Tilt”
Assuming a 10% Rate of Return

60%Replacement rate^C^r^e^a^t^e^pe^r^s^on^al^a^c^c^oun^t^s^and^al^l^o^w

55%ⁱⁿⁱ^tia^l^S^o^cⁱ^a^l^S^e^c^u^r^ity^b^eⁿ^e^fits^t^o^rⁱ^s^e

50%^oⁿ^l^y^wⁱ^thⁱⁿ^fl^a^t^ioⁿ

45%Proposal

40%

35%

30%Current law

25%

20%^F^o^r^w^o^r^k^e^r^r^e^tⁱ^rⁱ^ng^a^t^a^g^e⁶⁵ⁱⁿ²⁰⁷^0;

15%^a^s^s^u^m^e^s^ac^co^uⁿ^tⁱ^s^f^uⁿ^d^ed^wⁱ^t^h^an

10%^"^a^d^d^on"^aⁿ^d^e^a^rⁿ^s^10%^a^nnu^a^l^l^y

0%^Lo^w^e^a^rⁿ^e^r^M^a^xⁱ^m^u^m^ea^rⁿ^er

Projected Effects of Other Selected Reform Measures
Raising the Social Security taxable earnings base. Under the two
variations of this option illustrated here, the taxable earnings base would be
increased by (1) $15,000 and (2) $50,000, respectively, effective in 2002, after which
it would rise again by the rate of average earnings in the economy. Table 29 shows
the increase in benefits for workers retiring in 2030 and 2070 who had earnings at
or above the proposed new levels of the base throughout their careers. If the base
were increased by $15,000 in 2002 (setting it at $99,900 instead of an estimated
$84,900), and indexed thereafter to reflect average wage growth, benefits for a
maximum earner retiring in 2030 would be 7.3% higher than those prescribed under
current law. For the comparable worker retiring in 2070, benefits would be 9.1%
higher. If the base increased by $50,000 in 2002, (setting it at $134,900 instead of
$84,900), and indexed thereafter to reflect average wage growth, benefits for a
maximum earner retiring in 2030 would be 24.1% higher than those prescribed under
current law. For the comparable worker retiring in 2070, benefits would be 30.1%
higher.
It should be understood, however, that while these workers would have higher
benefits than under current law, the value of their lifetime benefits relative to the
taxes they paid would have fallen. Table 29 shows that the value of the additional
benefits received would be a small proportion of the value of the additional taxes
paid. This is the result of the low replacement of the earnings on which the higher
taxes would be paid – all of the additional earnings credited to the worker’s record
would be converted into benefits in the lowest bracket (15%) of the Social Security
benefit formula.
Table 29. Projected Impact of Raising Taxable Earnings Base
on an Affected Worker’s Social Security Benefits
^{Value* of}
^{Change in}^additional
^replace-^{Change in}^{Change in}^{benefits as}
^{Year of}^{ment rate}^purchasing^benefits^{percent of}
^retirement^Replace-^from^{power from}^from^additional
^{at age 65}^{ment rate}^{current law}^{2001 level}^{current law}^{taxes paid}
^{Raise Base by $15,000 in 2002}
²⁰³⁰^+22.0%^-8.8%⁺^47.1%^+7.3%⁺^41.8%
²⁰⁷⁰^+22.3%^-7.2%⁺^119.8%^+9.1%⁺^28.8%
^{Raise Base by $50,000 in 2002}
²⁰³⁰^+18.9%^-21.7%^+70.2%^+24.1%^+41.8%
²⁰⁷⁰^+19.7%^-18.0%^{+161.9% +30.1%}^+28.8%
^Note:^{Illustrations are for full}^-tⁱ^m^e^w^o^rk^e^r^{s who always earned m}^a^xim^u^m^{taxable wages. See the}
^{Appendix for discussion of other assum}^p^tions.
^{* Discounted at 6.399%, the effective}^rate^of^re^{turn on long-term}^{U.S. governm}^e^{nt bonds projected}
^{under the interm}^{ediate assum}^p^{tions of the 2001 Social Security trustees’ report.}

Raising Social Security widow’s and widower’s benefits. Table 30
shows the effect of basing Social Security widow’s and widower’s benefits on 75%
of combined pre-death Social Security retirement or disability benefits payable to the
couple. The illustrations show the results for both one and two-earner couples. In
the case of a one-earner couple, the deceased worker is assumed to have received a
monthly benefit under current law of $1,000 before his or her death; the spouse
therefore would have received a spousal benefit of $500 a month before the death of
his or her partner (for a combined monthly benefit of $1,500). In case of a two-
earner couple, three illustrations are provided. As Table 30 shows, the range of the
increase in benefits provided under this option would be between 12.5% and 50%.
Table 30. Effect of Setting Widow’s and Widower’s Benefits to
75% of a Couple’s Combined Pre-Death Benefits
^{Comparison of surviving spouse’s benefi}^{t under current law and proposal, assuming:}
^{Couple had}^{Monthly benefits}
^{combined benefits}^{of one-earner}^{Monthly benefits of two-earner couple, each}
^{of $1,500 a month}^{couple before}^{member having benefits on his or her own}
^{before one of them}^{death of primary}^{record before death of primary recipient or}
^{died –}^{recipient –}^{other member –}
^{Benefit levels of}¹^st^{spouse – $1,000}¹^st^{spouse –}¹^st^{spouse –}¹^st^{spouse –}
^{each m}^e^m^b^{er of}^$1,000^$1,000^$1,000
^{couple before death}^nd^nd^nd^nd
^{of one spouse (read}²^{spouse – $500}²^{spouse –}²^{spouse –}²^{spouse –}
^across):^{(paid as}^{$500 or less*}^$750^$1,000
^{dependent’s}
^benefit)
^{Survivor benefit}
^{under current law:}^$1,000^$1,000^$1,000^$1,000
^{Survivor benefit}
^{under proposal:}^$1,125^$1,125^$1,313^$1,500
^{* If less than $500, under current law the benefit the spouse}^e^a^rⁿ^s^from^{his or her own work record}
^{would be supplem}^{ented to bring it up to $500 (the supplem}^{ental portion b}^e^{ing paid as a dependent}
^{spouse’s benefit). Assum}^e^{s that both m}^e^m^b^{ers re}^{tired at the age for full retirem}^{ent benefits.}
Raising Social Security benefits for young survivors and disabled
recipients. An ancillary issue with the creation of personal accounts is their effect
on surviving family and disability benefits. By definition, these types of benefits are
paid to younger workers and their dependents. If a worker dies or becomes disabled
at a young age, there would not be enough time for a personal account to accumulate
much value. As mentioned earlier, this is more likely to be an issue where the
creation of the personal account is coupled with a general constraint on benefits. The
annuity from a personal account that grows for only 8 years would be worth only 6%
of an account that grows for 43 years; one that grows over 18 years would be worth
only 18%; and one that grows over 28 years would be worth only 39%. To
ameliorate this phenomenon, policymakers could augment the Social Security
benefits of these recipients. Examples of ways to address this issue and their
projected effects are described below.

Raising the Social Security maximum family benefit. Table 31 shows
the effect of raising the “family maximum” levels, which under current law range
from 150% to 188% of the principal recipient’s basic benefit. Under the proposal,
these family maximum percentages would be increased gradually by 1/3% per year
as the effect of the general benefit constraint becomes larger. If personal accounts
were included as part of the proposal, presumably the personal account annuities
would offset part of the benefit reductions as well.
The table shows the amount by which family maximum benefits would increase
over current law levels. By 2070, the family maximum would be 26% higher than
under current law. This would substantially offset the general benefit constraints that
would be required if the program’s expenditures were curtailed to stay within its
projected income.
Table 31. Effect of Illustrative Liberalization of Social Security
Maximum Family Benefits on a Young Survivor Family
^{Maximum Family Monthly Benefit in 2001 Dollars}
^(Work^{er always earned average wage}^{and has 2 or more eligible survivors)}
^{If family maximum}
^{Year of work}^er’s^{Family maximum}^{rises at 1/3% per}^Increase
^{death at age 42}^{under current law}^{year after 2001}^{(in percent)}
²⁰¹⁰^$2,340^$2,411^3.0%
²⁰²⁰^2,576^2,744^6.5
²⁰³⁰^2,836^3,126^10.1
²⁰⁴⁰^3,123^3,555^13.8
²⁰⁵⁰^3,439^4,047^17.7
²⁰⁶⁰^3,787^4,607^21.7
²⁰⁷⁰^4,170^5,245^25.8
^Note:^{Illustrations are for full-tim}^{e workers who al}^{ways earned average wages. See th}^e^Appendix
^{for discussion of other assum}^p^tions.
Increasing the number of years that can be disregarded in
computing benefits for persons disabled before age 47. Table 32 shows
the effect of increasing the number of years of earnings that can be disregarded in
calculating benefits for workers who become disabled before age 47. This option
would allow workers who become disabled at ages 25 through 46 to have the same
number of years disregarded as in early death cases as displayed in Table 8. Table
32 illustrates the range of its effects. Obviously, this option would do nothing for
workers disabled after age 46. Among those gaining additional “drop-out” years,
this option would have the largest impact on a very young worker with low earnings,
because the proportional effect of fewer years in the denominator would be larger
and the increase in average earnings would be replaced by the highest bracket (90%)
in the benefit formula. This option would have the least impact on high-paid workers
who become disabled at age 46, because the proportional effect of decreasing the

number of years in the denominator determining average earnings would be the
smallest, and because any increase in average earnings would be replaced by the
lowest bracket (15%) in the benefit formula. Table 32 portrays the effect on workers
at these two extremes.
Table 32. Range of Effects of Increasing the Number of Years
Disregarded in Computing Benefits for Workers Disabled Before
Age 47
^{Large Effect: Work}^{er Disabled at Age 30}^{Who in the Previous 4 Years Earned An}
^{Amount Equal to One Half the Minimum Wage}
^{(in 2001 dollars)}
^{Current law benefits}^Benef^{its under proposal}^Difference
^$226^$398^76%
^{Small Effect: Work}^{er Disabled at Age 46 Who Always Earned the}
^{Maximum Taxable Wage}
^{(in 2001 dollars)}
^{Current law benefits}^Benef^{its under proposal}^Difference
^$1,972^$1,974^0.08%
^Note:^{Illustrations are for workers}^who^becom^e^disabledⁱⁿ^2006.^{See the Appendix for discussion}
^{of other assum}^p^tions.

Cautionary Notes
The purpose of this report is to illustrate the potential impact of various Social
Security reform measures on future benefit levels. Although the measures examined
are ones commonly proposed to help restore the system’s solvency, only one is
estimated to do so. Each of the others would require, to varying degrees, additional
benefit reductions, tax increases, or new sources of income to bring the system into
long-range financial balance. Therefore, the reader is cautioned not to compare the
measures based only on the size of the benefit reductions they would produce.
Also, in providing illustrations incorporating personal accounts in a Social
Security reform plan, two alternative funding approaches are used. One assumes the
accounts would be funded with a portion of existing Social Security taxes (a “carve
out” approach), and the other assumes they would be funded by other means (an “add
on” approach). The report makes no judgement as to which would be preferable.
However, it is important to note that, while the add on approach would have no direct
impact on the system’s financing, by definition the carve out approach would worsen
it. In recognition of this, the report assumes that additional benefit constraints would
be necessary to avoid or mitigate this effect. Thus, in viewing the illustrations
depicting the effects of personal accounts, readers should be aware that the outcomes
will differ depending on which approach is used to fund the accounts.
The report makes no assumption regarding whether participation in personal
accounts would be mandatory or voluntary. Whether they are mandatory or
voluntary makes no difference in the portrayal of the effect on recipients of coupling
personal accounts with benefit constraints. However, whether they are mandatory
or voluntary could have an impact on the system’s financing, particularly under a
carve out approach. A system of voluntary accounts could lead to what is known as
“adverse selection.” For example, if the workers choosing to participate in voluntary
personal accounts funded from a carve out approach tended to be mostly high-paid
workers, the loss of the Social Security taxes they otherwise would have paid would
outweigh the reductions in Social Security benefits they would incur. (This occurs
because of the tilt in the benefit formula that replaces a lower proportion of earnings
for high-paid workers discussed earlier.) Thus, a greater burden for financing Social
Security would fall on the workers who choose not to participate in personal
accounts. No adjustment for this effect is included in the report’s “carve out”
illustrations.
For purposes of showing personal account accumulations, the analysis assumes
a 43-year career, based on a person starting work at age 22 and always earning the
average wage until retirement at age 65. This stylized scenario is often used in
analyzing Social Security benefits (for example, in the portrayal of replacement
rates). However, such a scenario should not be construed to necessarily represent a
“typical” worker, because of variabilities in unemployment, the ages of entry and
exit from the work force, career earnings patterns, etc. These variations are
particularly important in calculating the value of personal accounts accumulations.
Additional cautions regarding assumptions made in preparing the report are
discussed at length in the Appendix.

Appendix
Technical Comments on Report
Methods and basic assumptions used to prepare report. Over the
years the Congressional Research Service has developed a computer model that does
case simulations of personal workers’ Social Security benefits. Computations of
benefits are based on current law, and the underlying economic and demographic
projections used are those contained in the intermediate or “best guess” assumptions
of the latest report of the Social Security Board of Trustees. The computations can
be expressed in current and constant dollars or as a percentage of pre-retirement
earnings that Social Security benefits replace.
The model can be modified to reflect the features of various reform plans so the
effect on present and future recipients’ benefits and taxes can be evaluated, including
the value and effect of personal accounts. It also can be modified to show the effect
of differences in personal characteristics (e.g., in their relative earnings levels), in
underlying economic and demographic assumptions, or to reflect alternative
assumptions about how much of future Social Security benefits can be paid generally
given the system’s projected financing problems. However, it is a case simulation
model and does not do cohort analyses or stochastic modeling.
A crucial measure in comparing the value of benefits over a lifetime is the
computation of present values. The model does so by constructing streams of benefit
payments that accrue at a specified rate of interest and include cost of living
adjustments for benefits. These streams are adjusted by the probability that a
particular worker will survive to each year. These probabilities are based on the
mortality assumptions contained in cohort life tables on which the intermediate
demographic projections are based. We use cohort, rather than period, life tables
because they reflect expected improvements in mortality.
Under the intermediate assumptions of the 2001 Social Security trustees’ report,
average wages in the economy and prices (as measured by the CPI) are assumed to
grow ultimately at an annual rate of 4.3% and 3.3% respectively.²⁶ For lifetime
benefit computations (expressed as the present value of benefits at age 65), the
probability of survival in each year after retirement is based on the trustees’
projections of mortality for a recipient’s age cohort and the annual interest rate used
for discounting is 6.399%.²⁷ The trustees project mortality rates separately for men

²⁶ For illustrations involving minimum, low, and maximum-wage earners, the level of
earnings year-to-year is assumed to grow at the rate of average wages in the economy.
²⁷ “Discounting” is used in present value analysis to reflect the value of money over time.
For example, to compute the value of lifetime Social Security benefits, the calculation
involves determining the amount of money that would have to be invested at a given rate of
interest at the time of retirement so that the principle and accumulated interest would be just
sufficient to fund a recipient’s benefit given his or her probability of survival in each
subsequent year. The discount rate used in this analysis, 6.399%, is the same as that
employed in the trustees’ report intermediate projections for long-term federal securities.
The reader should recognize that an alternative discount rate could significantly alter the
(continued...)

and women. The illustrations shown in this report are based on “unisex” mortality
assumptions that reflect a blending of the trustees’ separate assumptions for men and
women. This methodology was chosen largely because the proposals illustrated here
envision an annuity system that mandates the use of unisex assumptions in
computing annuities (in recognition that gender-based projections of life expectancy
are not permitted in determining the amount of annuities payable under 401(k) plans,
etc.). Also, because men and women with the same circumstances (i.e., earnings
history, age, and time of retirement) receive the same level of benefits for as long as
they live, Social Security implicitly annuitizes on a unisex basis.
To provide illustrations of the effect of the various options and the asset
accumulations in personal accounts, the analysis assumes a 43-year work career,
based on a person starting work at age 22 and always earning the average wage until
retirement at age 65. This stylized scenario is often used in analyzing Social
Security benefits (for example, in the portrayal of replacement rates). However, such
a scenario should not be construed to necessarily represent a “typical” worker,
because of variabilities in unemployment, the ages of entry and exit from the work
force, career earnings, etc. These variations are particularly important in calculating
the value of personal account accumulations.
Another variable with a very large impact on personal account values is the
investment rate of return. For illustrative purposes, the analysis uses two average
rate-of-growth (or rate-of-return) scenarios, 6.399% (rounded to 6.4% in the
discussion) and 10% annually. The lower rate-of-return scenario — 6.399% —
represents the same long-range rate projected for the federal securities held by the
Social Security trust funds under the trustees’ current intermediate assumptions.
These securities consist largely of nonmarketable special issue federal notes and
bonds, which earn rates of interest equal to that of all federal securities sold and
traded in the financial markets with maturities of more than 4 years. The higher rate-
of-return scenario — 10% — represents a return equal to the approximate 11.3%
average annual rate of growth of the S&P 500 market index (including dividends)
over the 74-year period 1926 to 1999, minus 1.3 percentage points per year to reflect²⁸
administrative costs and related management fees. The use here of these two
scenarios is not intended to suggest that either one represents the most likely future
range of returns for individuals or age segments (cohorts) of society generally. The
intent is only to show the potential asset accumulations and annuity outcomes from

²⁷ (...continued)
figures shown in the tables.
²⁸ This adjustment is a crude proxy for these fees (e.g., for the costs of buying and selling
securities, marketing, and account maintenance). “Index fund” investments might have costs
of a mere fraction of a percent, whereas actively traded, personally-directed accounts might
have considerable transaction charges. Perhaps most important, experience in other
countries suggests that the extent to which administrative charges cut into the potential rates
of return is heavily dependent on the competition that might exist among investment
companies vying for new accounts. A number of commentators have pointed out that
marketing expenses have been very costly in some countries that have redesigned their
Social Security systems to include personal investment components (e.g., Great Britain and
Chile).

a reasonably wide range of possible investment returns, given the past performance
of market “averages.”
As mentioned in the body of the report, these two rates of return are expressed
in nominal terms throughout the report. Economists tend to favor expressing rates
of return in so-called “real” terms, i.e., adjusting them for inflation. It is difficult to
know the true magnitude (or worth) of an investment return if expressed in nominal
terms, because part of the rate might merely reflect inflation and therefore provide
no increase in the real value of the asset. For example, if a nominal rate earned on
an asset is 5%, it would provide no increase in the asset’s real value if the inflation
rate is 5%, whereas it would if inflation were 2% or 3%. To determine a real
investment return, nominal rates are reduced by the underlying inflation assumption,
which under the trustees’ intermediate forecast is 3.3% annually. Hence, the “real”
rate-of-return scenarios modeled for this report are 3% annually when referring to
a nominal rate of 6.4% (106.399/103.3 = 1.03) and 6.5% annually when referring to
a nominal rate of 10% (110/103.3 = 1.065).
Assessment of public policy and market risks – traditional Social
Security versus market-based personal accounts. There has been
considerable attention drawn to the question of whether reforming Social Security
by creating personal savings accounts would subject people’s retirement income to
greater risk than modifying the program in traditional ways, i.e., increasing taxes or
constraining benefit growth. The financial markets, particularly the equities market,
are volatile, and if people were to be unlucky or unwise in their investment choices,
their retirement incomes could suffer. If workers invest in index equity or bond
funds that reflect broad market performance, as is prescribed in a number of bills
introduced in the past few Congresses, the risk of investing in poor-performing
individual stocks would be mitigated. Nonetheless, there still would be substantial
variation in the value of personal accounts due to fluctuations in the broad market
over time. Even over many years, the markets can produce varied results for
investors, and consequently produce varying results for different cohorts of retirees.
While one generation might benefit from a market rising by 10% per year over their
contribution years, another might only experience an increase of 5% annually. The
timing of when they work (or invest) and retire (or draw down their assets) can be
a critical factor.
The assumed rates of return used in this analysis do not try to simulate the
future ebb and flow of the nation’s financial markets. They reflect steady growth of
assets year-over-year. In the real world the markets can be expected to behave very
differently; they will go up and down and the pattern of investment growth can be
erratic even over 10- or 20-year periods. As a result, the actual growth of a worker’s
personal account could differ markedly from what is shown in this report.
However, to presume that the traditional Social Security system provides a
“guaranteed” government-afforded benefit that is more reliable than a market-based,
personal retirement account system, may overstate the certainty of the traditional
system’s ability to pay the level of benefits it currently promises. Certainly, over a
short-run period, i.e., of 5 or 10 years – few would challenge the notion that the
financial markets could fluctuate significantly more than the economic variables
affecting Social Security benefits. Thus, annuities payable from such accounts could

be far more unpredictable in the short run than one’s projected Social Security
benefits. And it is also true that under current benefit rules individuals with the same
wage history and retiring at the same age (at the same time) are treated the same by
Social Security. Under a system of personal accounts, these individuals may receive
different benefits. However, they may not be worse off than under the traditional
Social Security system. They might all receive higher personal account annuities
than what they would receive from the traditional system. They could be lower as
well, but the fact that these different people could receive different benefits under a
system of personal accounts does not make it riskier than the traditional system. The
traditional system is not a stable benchmark. Its promised benefits also could be
altered.
Social Security benefits are not contractual (unlike personal savings accounts)
and can be reduced by a change in the law, as was done a number of times since
1977, and may have to be done again given the trustees’ current projections of a
large looming deficit.²⁹ Conversely, a buildup of larger than projected trust fund
reserves might ultimately lead to pressure on future Congresses to authorize larger
benefits, only to have to pull them back again because of unexpected adverse
economic or demographic circumstances. This happened in the early 1970s. Social
Security benefits were increased very significantly from 1967 through 1972, then had
to be greatly revised (scaled back) twice in the following 11 years. Benefit levels for
new retirees swung about 25% in relative value in the late 1970s and early 1980s.³⁰
If Congress chooses to address the system’s currently projected financing problems
with across-the-board benefit cuts, the total reductions could be as large as 27% from
the levels projected to prevail in 2038 under the current benefit computation rules.
Such is the volatility inherent in a largely pay-as-you-go system.
In the context of assessing the risks inherent in most of the personal account
proposals that have been put forth thus far, it should be observed that few rest all or
even most of their future benefits on equity investments. In addition few, if any,
envision truly unregulated investments. Most would employ 401(k)-type
arrangements providing workers with investment choices similar to the index fund
options of the federal employees’ Thrift Savings Plan (TSP). Hence, the probability
that poor market choices or timing will decimate a worker’s future retirement income
is considerably less likely than under a hypothetical Social Security system modeled
after a fully self-directed, market-based, defined contribution system.

²⁹ In the past, when making changes to benefits, Congress generally has not reduced them
for current recipients. The reductions typically have been prospective in nature.
³⁰ As a result of changes in the benefit computation rules enacted in 1977 to shore up the
Social Security system (P.L. 95-216), the relative level of “initial” benefits for full career
average-wage earners dropped by 25% from 1981 to 1985 (the replacement rate — the ratio
of the initial benefits to final earnings — dropped from 54.4% for an age-65 retiree in 1981
to 40.9% for a similar retiree in 1985). This followed a rise of nearly 60% over the
preceding 11-year period. As a result of amendments enacted in 1983 (P.L. 98-21), the
relative benefit levels for similarly-situated future retirees are scheduled to drop by another
12 or 13% by 2022 (the effect of phasing up the age for receipt of “full” benefits from 65 to

67).

Also, while the equity markets are much more volatile than the economy
generally, e.g., changes in gross domestic product, average wages, etc. are typically
less volatile — the traditional Social Security system is strongly influenced by the
performance of the economy and its expansion-recession phases. Social Security’s
revenues are contingent on the number of people working and paying taxes as well
as the rate of growth of their wages. The initial benefits it provides are derived from
the wage histories of its covered workers and are adjusted thereafter to rise with
inflation. In addition, other non-economic factors such as early retirement trends,
shifts in immigration, and fluctuations in the incidence of disability can greatly vary
the system’s payout.
In summary, the fluctuations in the financial markets, and the commensurate
effect this may have on the assets and annuities resulting from personal savings
accounts, might well be greater than the broader economic fluctuations affecting the
financial flows of the traditional Social Security system, but other demographic and
political factors can affect the “non-contractual” benefits of the traditional system.
In this context, this report makes no determination of the relative risks for the
incomes of future retirees under the various proposals it analyzes. Many variables
can effect the reliability of each of them, making a valid assessment that one is
riskier than another very difficult. It is enough to say that each method of financing
involves some element of risk. It is left to congressional policymakers to make value
judgements as to which risks and what levels of risk are acceptable.
Annuitization of personal accounts. The illustrations in this report
employ the principles of annuitization to express the value of the projected personal
account assets in terms of the monthly inflation-indexed benefits they would produce
over a worker’s retirement years. However, they are not intended to represent
“purchased” annuities. Simulating the process of annuitizing, i.e., spreading or
paying out personal account accumulations over the period of a person’s retirement
— on a scale that encompasses every potential retiree in society — is complex and
highly speculative. Today’s annuity market is relatively small and expensive.
Annuitizing on a large societal basis could result in either large or small charges by
the annuity providers, depending on the potential costs of administration (which
possibly could be minimized through tight regulation and limiting marketing
practices), but more importantly on the risk the providers envision of³¹
underestimating annuitants’ longevity.
On the other hand, the current rules pertaining to drawing down Individual
Retirement Accounts (IRAs) used by many retirees who wish to avoid annuitizing,
and the costs thereof, might serve as a proxy. Retirees might also avoid these costs
by employing a personalized method of drawing down their accounts, involving

³¹ For a lengthy discussion of annuitization issues, see Social Security Privatization and the
Annuities Market. CBO. February 1998. CBO points out that the costs of annuity policies
offered by insurance companies today are 15% to 25% higher than “average mortality would
suggest,” but it cautions that the current market is small. It states that “a variety of policy
options might be considered to avoid the high costs of annuities in a privatized system.
Those policy options would monitor the regulation of withdrawals from personal retirement
accounts, the timing of annuity purchases, the regulation of annuities markets, and the
generosity of government minimum benefit guarantees.”

either an accelerated or delayed liquidation of the assets. Although there would be
other factors affecting a retiree’s choice to annuitize, if the public were to perceive
annuitization as expensive, more people could be expected to draw down their
retirement assets on their own. If annuities were viewed as having modest costs,
then more people could be expected to purchase them.
If the creation of personal accounts and their eventual annuitization were to be
mandatory, both the large size of the population involved and the fact that
annuitization would be mandatory could greatly lessen the potential costs from those
incurred in today’s annuity policies – particularly if annuitization were administered
through a single insurer or under rules precluding insurers as a group from
discriminating on the basis of probable life expectancies. However, there are many
unknowns, notable among them being how “inflation-adjusted” annuities would be
priced.
How administrative costs might effect the assumed rates of return
on personal accounts. There are widely varying views about how much
administrative expenses would reduce the returns on investments that workers would
realize under proposals to create personal accounts. Some suggest that
administrative costs would be a minor offset, while other suggest they would be so
large that they would defeat the purposes of establishing the accounts. These general
assertions, however, tend to oversimplify the debate. There are many types of
personal account proposals with a wide range of designs that could greatly vary how
much administrative expenses would erode their potential returns.
Many of the Social Security reform plans that have been proposed envision the
creation of a process similar to the federal employees’ Thrift Savings Plan (TSP),
under which the Treasury Department would serve as the collective receiver of
contributions for subsequent investment in individually-selected broad-based equity
or bond funds (perhaps administered by one or more non-governmental financial
institutions). Some 2.5 million federal employees participated in the TSP in March³²
2001 The Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board, which oversees and is
responsible for the TSP, reports very modest administrative expenses for operation
of the TSP.³³ However, no institution has had experience handling the volume of
records and transactions that would arise from payroll contributions from a
participant population of 155 million or more. As a result, many administrative
issues (and potential costs) would likely arise with a personal account system that are
not observed or well understood at this point. Notable among them is whether a high
volume of small dollar transactions that an investment company may be required to

³² Thrift Savings Plan Highlights, May 2001.
³³ The Board reports that record keeping and oversight costs were approximately 0.06% of
fund assets in 1999. Although data on the transaction charges and management fees of
Barclay’s Equity Index Fund — the stock fund used by the TSP — were not published,
financial statements for two prominent equity index mutual funds — the Vanguard Group’s
S&P 500 Index Fund and T. Rowe Price’s Equity Index 500 Fund — show administrative
expenses for 2000 equal to 0.18% and 0.35% of the funds’ holdings respectively (these
figures also include the record keeping costs of the funds). The Vanguard Group’s figure
was representative of the relative administrative costs incurred by its fund over the preceding

10 years.

handle would raise the relative magnitude of administrative costs compared, say, to
the experience of large mutual fund companies today. They often incur
administrative expenses of a fraction of a percent of their assets.³⁴ However, they
routinely require minimum initial deposits of $1,000 or $2,500 and minimum³⁵
subsequent deposits of $100 or more. These “conditions” can greatly hold down
transaction activity. A high volume of small dollar deposits and account balances,
as could be expected to arise from regular payroll deductions, might significantly
raise the percent of fund assets that administrative costs consume — these are
sometimes referred to as “expense ratios.”
The effect on employers might be significant as well, particularly in dealing
with investment education of their employees, misreporting of contributions,
misreporting of account numbers, failure to withhold, under- and over-withholding,
switching of investment companies/funds, changing employers, fraud avoidance, and
oversight.
On the other hand, a number of factors might be expected to lessen such
problems and the costs they would generate. First, professional management by
experienced and regulated investment companies, as frequently used in 401(k)
arrangements, could minimize excessive trading and the transaction charges that
might be expected from a self-directed, continuously traded, equity account. Second,
to the extent that workers were required, or elect, to make use of a uniform
withholding and depositing process managed by the Treasury Department — that
subsequently channels their deposits into limited-switching “index” funds — fewer
investment options would be provided, participant trading would be constrained, and
transaction volume and expenses would be minimized.³⁶ This has been the reported

³⁴ The Vanguard Group also has cited a 1997 industry average for equity-index mutual funds
of 0.33% of assets, as determined by Lipper Analytical Services (see Vanguard’s Index Trust
Prospectus, April 20, 1998). In direct consultation we had with Lipper Analytical Services,
data Lipper provided for funds whose fiscal years ended in the May 1997 - September 1998
period showed a “median expense ratio” of S&P 500 index funds of 0.60% for retail
investors and .35% for institutional investors. Also of note is the experience of the TIAA-
CREF Equity Index Fund. It reports an expense ratio for 2000 of .26% of assets.
³⁵ The Fidelity Magellan Fund — the largest equity mutual fund in America with assets on
March 31, 2000 of approximately $109 billion — reported administrative expenses over the
preceding 12 months equal to .75% of the average assets of the fund. Although currently
closed to new investors, it required a $2,500 minimum initial deposit ($500 on a retirement
account), and minimum $100 deposits through its so-called “automatic” account builder
system.
³⁶ In regard to turnover rates for large index funds, the Vanguard Group of mutual funds
notes in its annual report for 2000 (The “Vanguard U.S. Stock Index Funds – Large-
Capitalization Portfolios, Annual Report, December 31, 2000") – “Generally, a passively
managed fund sells securities only to respond to redemption requests or to adjust the number
of shares held to reflect a change in the fund’s target index. Turnover rates for large-cap
stock index funds tend to be very low because large-cap indexes, such as the S&P 500,
typically do not change much from year to year. Turnover rates for mid-cap and small-cap
stock index funds tend to be higher (although still relatively low, compared to actively
managed stock funds), because the indexes they track are more likely to change as a result
of mergers, acquisitions, business failures, or growth of companies than a larger-cap
(continued...)

experience of the federal TSP with respect to its equity index fund (i.e., the so-called
“C” fund). Similarly, to the extent the federal TSP is used as a model, charges that
typically are levied on mutual fund accounts with low balances, e.g., annual
“maintenance” fees or the like, would not occur.³⁷ Third, while unforeseen
administrative issues (and accompanying costs) could arise because of the large
magnitude of accounts and transaction activity a personal account system would
create, there also would likely be significant economies of scale.³⁸
In summary, there is no definitive basis to assess the relative magnitude of the
costs of administering personal accounts. The high-yield scenario illustrated in this
report — reflecting a 10% annual growth rate — incorporates an arbitrary adjustment
for trading and other administrative fees (the average annual 11.3% return of the
S&P 500 Index over the 1926 to 1999 period was reduced by 1.3 percentage points).
Expressed differently, the annual rate of return on personal account assets was
assumed to be 12% lower than the Index’s average annual growth rate (1.3/11.3 =
12%). The adjustment may appear to be large relative to expense ratios incurred by
equity-index funds today, but given the “administrative” uncertainties, its use here
provides a conservative approach to projecting the outcomes from a higher risk,
higher-yielding investment scenario. No explicit adjustment was made to the low-
yielding scenario — reflecting a 6.399% annual growth rate. The modest return it
portrays could be viewed as already incorporating the potentially lower
administrative costs of investing through a conservative, minimally traded, high-
grade, bond index strategy.³⁹

³⁶ (...continued)
index.” The report continues “As of June 30, 2000, the average turnover rate for passively
managed domestic equity index funds investing in common stocks was approximately 21%;
for all domestic stock funds, the average turnover rate was approximately 90%, according
to Morningstar, Inc.” The report shows a turnover rate of 6% for the Vanguard 500 Index
Fund in 1999.
³⁷ For instance, the Fidelity Magellan Fund imposes a $12 annual “maintenance” fee on
accounts with balances under $2,500. It also requires a “load” on new deposits of 3%, but
the load may be lower on accounts with balances in excess of $250,000. Similarly, the
Vanguard Group of index funds imposes a $10 annual maintenance fee on accounts with
balances under $10,000. These types of requirements do not exist in the federal TSP.
³⁸ A study done for the Department of Labor showed significantly lower mutual fund
expense ratios for “institutional” and large pension plan investors compared to individual
“retail” investors. Institutional and large investors in index equity funds were shown to have
average expenses ratios in 1996 of 0.35% and 0.13% respectively, compared to retail
investors who had a ratio of 0.59%. Economic Systems Inc. Study of 401(k) Plan Fees and
Expenses, submitted to the Department of Labor, Pension and Welfare Benefits Division.
April 13, 1998. Also see statement of Joel M. Dickson, Senior Investment Analyst,
Vanguard Group, before the Subcommittee on Finance and Hazardous Materials of the
House Committee on Commerce, July 24 1998. (Hearing on Enhancing Retirement Through
Individual Investment Choices. Washington, GPO, 1998.) He discusses various means to
simplify administration of personal accounts and achieve economies of scale.
³⁹ The trustees’ long-range investment yield used in this report represents an assumption
about the return on outstanding “federal” securities. A broader-based bond investment
strategy would include corporate bonds and possibly those of other nations with higher
yields. Hence, a more generalized bond-investment scenario would be expected to yield a
(continued...)

Effect of new personal accounts on other savings. If new personal
savings accounts were mandated or promoted as part of a Social Security reform
plan, people might be expected to make different decisions about their “other”
savings. For instance, they might save less in existing 401(k) accounts or IRAs. No
adjustment for these possible effects is made in this report.
This does not represent a conclusion that the effect on other savings of creating
a new personal account system is likely to be negligible or unlikely to occur. It
merely reflects uncertainty about what the effect would be. The effect on other
savings poses a significant question about whether and to what extent a Social
Security reform plan would effectively increase a worker’s eventual retirement assets
and, as well, whether society as a whole would save more. While some reduction in
other savings might be expected from introducing a new form of personal account
system as part of Social Security, it would be highly speculative to generalize or
suggest what the reduction in other savings might be. Much depends on the
incentive effects of other tax preferences and workers’ propensity to save and
consume. To the extent the favorable income tax treatment afforded under current
tax law to other forms of savings (IRAs, 401(k)s, employer-sponsored private
pensions, and the like) is continued, the incentives to participate in these other
arrangements would continue. Similarly, to the extent such accounts are funded
from governmental funds (e.g., out of surplus federal tax receipts or the like) and
require no new contributions from participants, the dis-savings effects of creating
new accounts should be lessened. Nonetheless, regardless of how these new
accounts were to be funded or treated under the income tax code, to the extent
persons feel that they have a larger nest egg than they might otherwise have, they
may be inclined to borrow or spend more of their discretionary income. And by so
doing, they would alter their net savings, and as a group, the overall level of savings
achieved in the economy.⁴⁰

³⁹ (...continued)
higher return than assumed in this report.
⁴⁰ For a further discussion, see CRS Report RL30708, Social Security, Savings, and the
Economy, by Brian Cashell.