Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially in the hands of radical states and terrorists,
represent a major threat to U.S. national security interests. Multilateral regimes were established
to restrict trade in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missile technologies, and to
monitor their civil applications. Congress may consider the efficacy of these regimes in
considering the potential renewal of the Export Administration Act, as well as other proliferation-th
specific legislation in the 110 Congress. This report provides background and current status
information on the regimes.
The nuclear nonproliferation regime encompasses several treaties, extensive multilateral and
bilateral diplomatic agreements, multilateral organizations and domestic agencies, and the
domestic laws of participating countries. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, U.S. leadership has
been crucial in developing the regime. While there is almost universal international agreement
opposing the further spread of nuclear weapons, several challenges to the regime have arisen in
recent years: India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, North Korea withdrew from the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and tested a nuclear explosive device in 2006,
Libya gave up a clandestine nuclear weapons program in 2004, and Iran was found to be in non-
compliance with its treaty obligations in 2005. The discovery of the nuclear black market network
run by A.Q. Khan has spurred new thinking about how to strengthen the regime, including greater
restrictions on sensitive technology. However, the possible extension of civil nuclear cooperation
by the United States and other countries to India, a non-party to the NPT, has raised questions
about what benefits still exist for non-nuclear-weapons states that remain in the treaty regime.
The chemical and biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation regimes contain three elements:
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BWC), and the Australia Group. The informal Australia Group coordinates export controls on
CBW-related materials and technology. After 25 years of negotiations, the CWC entered into
force in April 1997. It prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of
chemical weapons, and mandates the destruction of existing chemical weapon arsenals. BWC
states parties have not yet been able to agree upon a verification protocol to be added to the
Convention. Since its 1972 inception, BWC State Parties have failed to agree on a verification
The missile nonproliferation regime is founded not on a treaty, but an informal agreement created
in 1987, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR’s goal is to limit the
spread of missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Thirty-four countries now adhere to the
guidelines, which have been modified over time to include missile systems designed for the
delivery of chemical and biological weapons. The regime, which has no enforcement
organization, is thought to have been instrumental in blocking several missile programs, but it has
been unable to stop North Korean missile development, production, and exports, or to win the full
cooperation of Russian and Chinese entities. This report is updated annually.
Introduc tion ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Status and Trends......................................................................................................................1
Counterproliferation, Intelligence, and Deterrence...................................................................4
Organization of the Report........................................................................................................5
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime............................................................................................9
Treaties and Agreements.........................................................................................................10
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 1970...................................10
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1987....................................11
Related Arms Control Agreements...................................................................................15
Implementing the Regime.......................................................................................................17
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)...........................................................17
The Zangger Committee...................................................................................................20
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)................................................................................20
U.S. Government Organization.........................................................................................21
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA)...........................................................................23
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA).......................................................23
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA).............................................................................24
Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA).......................................................................25
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945......................................................................................25
Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994...................................................................25
Nunn-Lugar/Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Legislation....................................26
Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992...................................................................26
Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act.................................................................................27
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act
of 2006...........................................................................................................................27 th
Issues for the 110 Congress...................................................................................................27
Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation Regime.............................................................28
Treaties and Agreements.........................................................................................................28
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)...........................................................................28
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention......................................................................29
Implementing the Regime.......................................................................................................29
U.S. Government Organizations.......................................................................................31
Export Administration Act of 1979...................................................................................31
Arms Export Control Act..................................................................................................31
Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991..........32
Biological Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989.............................................................................32
Additional CW/BW Nonproliferation Policy Provisions in Legislation...........................32 th
Issues for the 110 Congress...................................................................................................32
Chemical Weapons Convention........................................................................................34
Biological Weapons Convention.......................................................................................37
Domestic Controls and Legislation...................................................................................39
Missile Proliferation Control Regime...........................................................................................40
Implementing the Regime.......................................................................................................42
U.S. Government Organization.........................................................................................42
The Missile Technology Control Act of 1990...................................................................44
The Arms Export Control Act...........................................................................................44
The Export Administration Act of 1979............................................................................44
Additional Missile Nonproliferation Policy Provisions in Legislation.............................45 th
Issues for the 110 Congress...................................................................................................45
Table 1. Proliferation Control Regimes...........................................................................................3
Table 2. U.S. Legal Framework for Proliferation Control...............................................................7
Appendix A. Proliferation Control Regime Membership..............................................................48
Appendix B. Additional Legislation and Executive Orders..........................................................50
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................51
The United States has historically led the international community in establishing regimes
intended to limit the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missiles. The
regimes and their member countries use cooperative and coercive measures to achieve
nonproliferation and counterproliferation objectives. Multilateral agreements and organizations
are supplemented by strong bilateral cooperation among key allies, unilateral political and
economic actions, and recourse to military operations should they become necessary. Congress
supports the nonproliferation regimes primarily by providing statutory authority and funding for
U.S. participation, establishing policy, and mandating punitive actions to help enforce the
international standards set by the regimes.
The term “regime” often refers to the entire array of international agreements, multilateral
organizations, national laws, regulations, and policies to prevent the spread of dangerous weapons
and technologies. The nuclear nonproliferation regime is presently the most extensive, followed
by those dealing with chemical and biological weapons, and then by the missile regime. The
difficulty of producing nuclear weapons material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) and the
great awareness of nuclear weapons’ destructiveness together have been conducive to creating a
complex regime with widespread agreement on the priority of nuclear nonproliferation. Chemical
weapons are easier to make and rely on readily available precursors, and they are far less
destructive. Biological weapons also rely on dual-use technology, and as technology has spread,
efforts to build a more extensive control regime have intensified. Finally, there is no international
consensus on the danger of missile proliferation to support a nonproliferation treaty or a binding
regime with enforcement mechanisms.
A key aspect of all the regimes is their attempt to control exports of sensitive goods and
technologies through supplier agreements. These are the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the
Zangger Committee for nuclear technology, the Australia Group for chemical and biological
weapons technology, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. In the last decade, these export
control regimes have expanded their membership, expanded and refined their control lists, and
increased coordination among member states. At the same time, however, the non-binding nature
of some of the regimes and growing resistance to them by certain countries, including some
regime members, limits their effectiveness. A major dilemma is whether to include new members,
such as Russia and China, that are not U.S. allies and do not have reliable export controls, or to
limit membership to countries with excellent nonproliferation credentials. Regime members are
afforded special access to controlled technology by the other members, so this issue also affects
decisions on whether to include non-allies. Table 1 lists the proliferation control regimes, their
components and statutory authority. There are many arms control treaties and other activities that 2
address aspects of WMD and conventional weapons beyond the regimes covered in this report.
The nonproliferation regimes have prevented many risky transfers over the years. However,
several factors undermine their effectiveness. One is the difficulty of addressing underlying
1 This report was updated with the assistance of research associate Jill Marie Parillo.
2 For coverage of these subjects, see CRS Report RL30033, Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities: A Catalog
of Recent Events, Amy F. Woolf, coordinator.
motivations of countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Regional security
conditions as well as the desire to compensate for other countries’ superior conventional or
unconventional forces have been common motivations for WMD programs. Some countries may
want WMD to dominate their adversaries. Prestige is another reason why certain countries seek
WMD. Another factor working against the regimes is the steady diffusion of technology over
time—much of the most significant WMD technology is 50 years old, and growing access to
dual-use equipment makes it easier for countries or groups to build their own WMD factories
from commonly available civilian equipment.
There are at least two problems common to all of the nonproliferation regimes—the lack of
universal membership and gaps in verification. In the nuclear regime, India, Pakistan, North
Korea, and Israel are not members of the NPT. Apart from diplomatic questions about how to
treat their status as states with nuclear weapons not sanctioned by the NPT, those countries are
not bound by that treaty’s prohibition on sharing nuclear technology. They are also not members
of the export control groups. The international community seems to be at a loss for how to bring
these states into the nonproliferation regimes without tacitly agreeing to their acquisition of
nuclear weapons. A major objection to the proposed U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement with
India is the perception that it legitimizes India’s nuclear weapons program without extracting any
significant concessions. Like India, Pakistan is not bound by any NPT obligations, whether or not
Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan sold nuclear technology on the black market with or without
Pakistani government acquiescence. Revelations of centrifuge enrichment technology sales to
Libya, Iran, and North Korea in 2004 galvanized the international community to examine
strengthening implementation of national export controls and interdiction. Unfortunately, the
including North Korea’s withdrawal in 2003 and Iran’s noncompliance in 2005.
In the CBW area, some states suspected of having military programs are still outside the treaty.
Within the treaties, there are some members (e.g., Iran under the CWC and Russia under the
BWC) suspected of continuing programs. In the missile area, although the Hague Code of
Conduct has widespread membership, MTCR is still not adhered to by many states (e.g., China,
North Korea) that are responsible for proliferating missile technologies.
Continued diplomatic support for the treaties may face some hurdles. In the nuclear
nonproliferation regime, many non-weapons states link their continued cooperation with progress
in implementing Article VI of the treaty (steps toward eventual nuclear disarmament by the five
nuclear weapons states). In recent years, several developments have generated criticism: the
United States’ abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; conclusion of the Moscow
Treaty, which many criticize as having little real impact and no verification; the U.S. Senate’s
rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; failure to proceed on a fissile material
production cutoff treaty in Geneva; and perceived interest in new U.S. nuclear weapons.
Table 1. Proliferation Control Regimes
Treaties Suppliers Groups and Informal Agreements International Organization U.S. Legal Framework U.S. Government Agencies
Nonproliferation Treaty Zangger Committee, 1971 International Atomic AEA, 1954 State, Defense, Commerce, Energy (+
(NPT), 1970 Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, Energy Agency (IAEA) NNPA, 1978 national laboratories), Treasury NRC,
Convention on Physical Protection 1975 U.N. Conference on FAA, 1961 intelligence agencies
of Nuclear Material, 1987 G-8 Disarmament AECA, 1976
Treaty of Tlatelolco EAA, 1979
Treaty of Rarotonga NPPA, 1994
Treaty of Pelindaba Ex-Im Bank, 1945
Treaty of Bangkok Nunn-Lugar 1991
Treaty on a nuclear-weapons-free-Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
zone (NWFZ) in Central Asia proliferation (NP) Act, 1992
START Protocols Iran & Syria NP Act
Treaty of Moscow, 2002
Geneva Protocol, 1925 Australia Group, 1984 OPCW EAA, 1979 State, Defense, Commerce, Treasury,
iki/CRS-RL31559logical Chemical Weapons Convention U.N. Conference on AECA, 1976 intelligence agencies
g/w(CWC) 1993 Disarmament Biological Weapons Anti-
s.orBiological and Toxin Weapons Terrorism Act
leakConvention (BWC) Chem-Bio Weapons Control Warfare Elimination Act, 1991
://wikiNunn-Lugar Freedom Support Act
httpIran-Iraq Arms NP Act, 1992
Iran & Syria NP Act
Missile Technology Control FAA, 1961 State, Defense, Commerce, Treasury, NASA
Regime, 1987 AECA, 1976 intelligence agencies
International Code of EAA, 1979
Conduct, 2002 Missile Tech. Control Act,
Freedom Support Act
Iran-Iraq NP Act
Iran & Syria NP Act
Source: Congressional Research Service.
Notes: Legislation abbreviations: AEA—Atomic Energy Act; AECA—Arms Export Control Act; EAA—Export Administration Act; FAA—Foreign Assistance Act; NNPA—
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978; NPPA—Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act.
In addition to a formal framework of control agreements, close political relationships with key
allies and other countries are very important for U.S. efforts to counter the spread and the use of
WMD. Initiatives by allies, such as the G-8 Global Partnership to Combat the Spread of WMD,
demonstrate resolve to tackle specific proliferation problems. In May 2003, President Bush
launched the “Proliferation Security Initiative” (see description below). Many of these
relationships, nonetheless, are strongly influenced by other political, military, and economic
issues that sometimes take precedence over proliferation concerns. In practice, nonproliferation
competes with important policy objectives such as trade, regional issues, and domestic political
considerations, and uneven implementation of nonproliferation policy can result. In particular, it
appears that the Bush administration has elevated counterterrorism cooperation above
nonproliferation cooperation in a few cases.
A more difficult challenge exists when key U.S. allies and friends seek WMD and missiles of
their own or transfer WMD technology. In that circumstance, a breakthrough in establishing trust
and cooperation might ease some of the underlying security concerns that motivate countries to
acquire WMD or to transfer WMD technology. Perhaps the hardest challenge for nonproliferation
policies is to reduce the desire of countries for weapons of mass destruction. It is sometimes
possible to change regional security conditions through alliances, arms transfers, arms control, or
negotiations aimed at settling conflicts. However, eliminating underlying motivations takes time,
and the next best option may be to delay WMD development for as long as possible. Libya’s
decision in December 2003 to give up its nuclear, chemical weapons, and missile programs is a
good example of a state that apparently decided the costs of WMD programs exceeded their
Unilaterally, the United States uses sanctions to support its nonproliferation objectives. Various
laws authorize or require the President to impose unilateral sanctions on countries that acquire,
use, or help other countries to obtain WMD or missiles. Sanctions can affect U.S. aid,
cooperation, and impose restrictions on U.S. technology exports. The effectiveness of sanctions
often depends on persuading other countries to support or respect U.S. sanctions. Even without
multilateral support, sanctions can still highlight strong U.S. opposition to WMD proliferation.
However, strong sanctions are rarely imposed on U.S. friends or allies that acquire WMD.
U.S. armed forces have developed programs to help prevent the spread of WMD, to deter or
prevent their use, and to protect against their effects. Defense cooperation and arms transfers to
U.S. allies can ease concerns about security that can lead them to consider acquiring WMD, and
also signal potential adversaries that acquisition or use of WMD may evoke a strong military
response. U.S. conventional and nuclear military capabilities and the threat of retaliation help
deter WMD attacks against U.S. forces, territory, or allies. Counterproliferation capabilities have
been expanded in recent years to include more advanced “passive” and “active” defense
measures. Passive counterproliferation tools include protective gear such as gas masks and
detectors to warn of the presence of WMD. Active measures include missile defenses to protect
U.S. territory, forces, and allies; precision-guided penetrating munitions and special operation
forces to attack WMD installations; and intelligence gathering and processing capabilities.
Intelligence is crucial to U.S. nonproliferation efforts, particularly in helping shape policy
options. Intelligence agencies track foreign WMD programs, monitor treaty compliance, and
attempt to detect transfers of WMD goods and technology. The United States cooperates with
certain allies to prepare for possible counterproliferation actions. Although counterproliferation
has emerged as a main pillar of the Bush administration strategy to combat WMD, political and
technical hurdles (hidden underground bunkers, locations near civilians, etc.) tend to make
counterproliferation a last resort, after other options have failed.
One tool of counterproliferation that the Bush Administration has highlighted has been
interdiction of WMD-related equipment shipments at sea, on land, and by air. President Bush
announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) on May 31, 2003. PSI, described as an
activity rather than an organization, aims to better coordinate states’ efforts to interdict such illicit 3
shipments, based on existing legal authorities. As of November 2007, 86 countries have
committed to cooperating in PSI.
Congress has been actively engaged in nonproliferation legislation for close to sixty years. In
addition to laws affecting diplomacy, treaty implementation and military options, legislation
effecting restrictions on foreign aid, sanctions, and export controls help establish nonproliferation
policy and congressional oversight of executive branch nonproliferation policies.
Congress enacted strict controls on nuclear energy and cooperation in the first Atomic Energy Act
of 1946. By the 1950s, however, it became clear that the U.S. nuclear weapons program needed
materials from abroad and that pure denial of materials and technology had neither stopped the
Soviet Union nor the UK from acquiring nuclear weapons. The 1954 revision of the Atomic
Energy Act reflected a shift in strategy from that of prevention through denial to one of influence
through cooperation. However, as allies planned to sell sensitive enrichment and reprocessing
equipment to states outside of the NPT in the 1970s (e.g., Pakistan, South Korea, and Brazil),
Congress reacted by passing several laws to slow down nuclear commerce and implement
sanctions against those states clandestinely pursuing nuclear weapons. Controls on exports of
chemical and biological agents with military applications and missiles have been regulated under
the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1968, and their dual-use technologies have been
regulated under the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979 and its predecessors, but these
controls were implemented relatively later in the 1980s. Table 2 lists the major U.S. laws enacted
to limit the transfer of WMD and WMD technology. Over time, most laws have been amended to
address the range of WMD threats, but there are a few laws that address only one kind of weapon
of mass destruction; some laws have focused on a proliferation threat from a particular country.
Nunn-Lugar-related legislation and the Freedom Support Act address the range of WMD, but
focus on Russia and the NIS. In addition, legislation related to Iran and Syria span the range of
WMD proliferation. See Appendix B for relevant text from nonproliferation-related legislation.
The following sections will describe the nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile
nonproliferation regimes. Each section will include (a) a background section with a brief history
of the regime; (b) a section setting out the treaties and agreements that authorize or affect the
3 See CRS Report RS21881, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), by Sharon Squassoni.
regime; (c) a brief description of how the regime is implemented; (d) U.S. laws authorizing or th
affecting the regime; and (e) issues for 110 Congress. More detailed information on regime
membership, specific provisions in law and relevant executive orders are contained in appendices.
Table 2. U.S. Legal Framework for Proliferation Control
Title Public Law Application Nuclear Chemical Biological Missiles Country Notes
Export-Import Bank Act P.L. 79-173 financing cutoff for X X X X Various P.L. 107-189 added enforcement
of 1945 P.L. 107-189 nuclear safeguards of AECA, EAA, IEEPA as
reauth violations and justification for denying financing,
nuclear tests after extending purview of law to
1977 CW/BW/missile areas
Atomic Energy Act 1954 P.L. 83-703 exports; cutoff in X Various P.L. 95-342 added Sec 129
nuclear cooperation Sec 129
Foreign Assistance Act P.L. 87-195 aid cutoff X X X X Various NPPA repealed relevant sections
1961 Sec 307e Sec 498 Russia in FAA and placed them in
Sec 620 E A(b) Cuba AECA. Reference to FAA is
(e) deemed now to refer to
Sec 620 sections 101 or 102 in AECA.
iki/CRS-RL31559Arms Export Control Act P.L. 90-629 exports, aid cutoff; X X X X Various * NPPA 94
g/w1968 sanctions Sec 3f Sec 81** Sec 81 Sec 72, **P.L. 102-182 added in 1991
s.orSec 101, 73, 74
://wikiNuclear Nonproliferation Act 1978 P.L. 95-242 sanctions X Various See Atomic Energy Act
Export Administration P.L. 96-72 export controls X X X X Various Sec 11C added in 1991 by P.L.
Act 1979 Sec 5, 6 Sec 6(m), Sec 6(m), Sec 5, 102-182.
11C 11C 6(l),
Biological Anti-Terrorism P.L. 101-298 treaty: X N.A. Implements BWC
Act 1989 BWC
Missile Technology P.L. 101-510, Title sanctions X Various Added Chapter VII to AECA,
Control Act 1990 XVII Sections 6 (L) and 11B to EAA
Chemical and Biological P.L. 102-182, Title sanctions X X Various
Weapons Control and III
Warfare Elimination Act
Title Public Law Application Nuclear Chemical Biological Missiles Country Notes
Nunn-Lugar 1991 P.L. 102-228 assistance programs X X X X Russia Amendment to CFE Treaty;
Cooperative Threat P.L. 103-160 Title XI
Reduction Act 1993 X X X X
Iran-Iraq Arms P.L. 102-484 sanctions X X X X Iran, Iraq
Nonproliferation Act Title XVI
Freedom Support Act P.L. 102-511 assistance programs X X X X NIS
Nuclear Proliferation P.L. 103-236, Title sanctions X Various Consolidated np legislation into
Prevention Act 1994 VIII AECA, moving it from FAA
Chemical Weapons P.L. 105-277 treaty: X N.A.
Implementation Act 1998
North Korea Threat P.L. 106-113 assistance; X North
iki/CRS-RL31559Reduction Act of 1999 (consolidated nuclear cooperation Korea
s.orIran and Syria P.L. 109-122 third-party sanctions X X X X Iran, Syria Covers transfers to and from
leakNonproliferation Act states
://wikiSyria Accountability and P.L. 108-175 Export controls, X X X X Syria
httpLebanese Sovereignty sanctions
Restoration Act of 2003
Foreign Operations, P.L. 109-102 Financing, X Russia
Export Financing, and assistance cutoff
Appropriations Act, 2006
Iran & Libya Sanctions P.L. 109-267 third-party sanctions X X X X Iran, Libya Renewed by H.R. 6198, Iran
Act (amended by H.R. Freedom Support Act until
5877) 2011, signed by President on
Sept. 30, 2006
The nuclear nonproliferation regime encompasses several treaties, extensive multilateral and
bilateral diplomatic agreements, multilateral organizations and domestic agencies, and the
domestic laws of participating countries. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, U.S. leadership has
been crucial in developing the regime. While there is almost universal international agreement
opposing the further spread of nuclear weapons, several challenges have arisen in recent years:
India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998; North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and tested a nuclear device in 2006; Libya gave up a
clandestine nuclear weapons program in 2004, and Iran was found to be in non-compliance with
its treaty obligations in 2005. The discovery of the nuclear black market network run by A.Q.
Khan has spurred new thinking about how to strengthen the regime, including enhanced export
controls and greater restrictions on sensitive technology. However, the possible extension of civil
nuclear cooperation by the United States and other countries to India, a non-party to the NPT, has
raised questions about what benefits still exist for non-nuclear weapons states that remain within
the treaty regime.
In 2004, there were five declared nuclear weapons states (United States, Russia, Great Britain,
France, China), three de facto nuclear weapons states (India, Israel, Pakistan), and one country—
North Korea—that has probably secretly produced enough plutonium for at least half a dozen
nuclear bombs. This is considerably less than predicted 40 years ago, when President Kennedy
warned of the possibility that, by the 1970s, the United States could “face a world in which
fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these weapons.”
The nonproliferation regime has not stopped all proliferation, but it has helped restrain nuclear
ambitions and solidified an international norm of behavior strongly condemning proliferation.
Many countries that could make nuclear weapons have not, but some have at one time or another
taken significant steps towards acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. Argentina, Brazil, South
Africa, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Taiwan, Sweden, and South Korea all have had nuclear weapons
development programs. Both Japan and Germany had nuclear weapons programs during the
Second World War, but did not succeed in making nuclear weapons before their programs were
halted at the end of the war. Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, and South Africa
abandoned their nuclear weapons programs and joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states.
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, as former Soviet republics with inherited nuclear weapons on
their soil, also opted to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states. Despite its membership as a
non-nuclear weapons state in the NPT, Libya gave up a clandestine nuclear weapons program in 4
Only a few countries maintain an interest in developing nuclear weapons, but it is difficult to
predict how many countries or terrorist groups may in the future want a nuclear weapons
capability. Some of the major challenges in preventing nuclear proliferation will include the
4 See CRS Report RS21823, Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction, by Sharon Squassoni.
• controlling access to sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies, such as uranium
enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing, via multilateral ownership or some other
• strengthening physical protection of all source and special nuclear materials
globally, with continued emphasis on controlling nuclear materials smuggling
from the former Soviet Union and other countries with weak controls;
• strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguards system;
• strengthening national export control laws and regulations, per U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1540;
• negotiating with North Korea to verify and dismantle its nuclear weapons
• restraining nuclear proliferation in India and Pakistan;
• restraining nuclear programs in the Middle East, including those of Israel and
• preventing U.S. technology from aiding the development of WMD and delivery
systems in foreign countries;
• strengthening international verification and enforcement of nonproliferation
The NPT, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Treaties/npt.html, is the centerpiece of
nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Other relevant treaties include regional nuclear-weapon-free
zones and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. In addition to these
multilateral treaties, the United States has also entered into bilateral agreements and initiatives,
such as the G-8 Global Partnership to Combat WMD. Finally, actions the United States takes in
related areas of arms control may have an impact on the nonproliferation regime.
It took just three months after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 for the first
proposals to emerge from governments to control the “destructive uses” of nuclear energy. It took 5
twenty-five years, however, for the NPT to emerge as the blueprint for nuclear nonproliferation.
In 1968, the treaty demarcated nuclear-weapon states from non-nuclear-weapon states by defining
nuclear-weapon states as those states that have manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or
other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967. This definition implied that there would
only ever be five “legitimate” nuclear-weapon states—the United States, Russia, Great Britain,
France, and China. All other states would join as non-nuclear weapon-states, agreeing not to
5 Previous proposals included a 1945 proposal by the United States, Britain, and Canada proposed to establish a U.N.
Atomic Energy Commission to eliminate “the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes,” a 1957 “package” of
measures (from Canada, UK, France, and United States) to the U.N. Disarmament Commission that included a
commitment not to transfer nuclear weapons, a 1964 program proposed by the United States for nonproliferation. See
Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of the Negotiations, 1990 edition, U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, p. 89.
acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As of 6
January 2008, there are 190 parties to the NPT, including all five nuclear weapons states. North
Korea withdrew from the treaty officially in April 2003. India, Israel and Pakistan have never
been members of the treaty.
The pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons is verified through the application of “nuclear
safeguards” measures. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), founded in 1957,
devised a system of nuclear material accountancy coupled with periodic and special inspections
to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful uses to military uses. Each non-
nuclear-weapon-state party to the NPT must negotiate an agreement with the IAEA to submit all 7
nuclear material in its possession to regular inspections. After learning several lessons from
Iraq’s and North Korea’s clandestine nuclear programs, the IAEA launched a major effort to
strengthen its safeguards system (see below) in 1992.
The incentive for non-nuclear-weapon states to submit to inspections is a promise by advanced
nuclear countries to promote “the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific 8
and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” The nuclear-weapon
states also agree to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation 9
of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament....”
In 1995, NPT members voted to make the treaty permanent. The members also agreed on a
stronger review process to oversee compliance with the treaty. However, many members of the
NPT are dissatisfied and the future of the treaty is not guaranteed. (see discussion of
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Conventions/cppnm.html, sets international standards for nuclear trade and
commerce. The treaty had 130 parties in September 2007. The Convention outlines security
requirements for the protection of nuclear materials against terrorism and provides for the
prosecution and punishment of offenders of international nuclear trade laws. Parties to the treaty
agree to report to the IAEA on the disposition of nuclear materials being transported and agree to
provide appropriate security during such transport.
For several years, the United States has been trying to strengthen this treaty to address the issue of
nuclear terrorism by extending controls to domestic facility security, not just transportation. In
July 2005, states parties convened to amend the convention. They extended the Convention’s
scope to cover not only nuclear material in international transport, but also nuclear material in
domestic use, storage, and transport, as well as the protection of nuclear material and facilities
from sabotage. The new rules will come into effect once they have been ratified by two-thirds of
the States Parties of the Convention, which could take several years. As of November 2007, only
6 This number excludes the DPRK.
7 These agreements are called “full-scope safeguards.” Other states have partial safeguards agreements, including India,
Pakistan and Israel, which can either apply to material or facilities. All of the five nuclear weapons states have
voluntary safeguards agreements, which cover a portion of facilities and materials.
8 NPT, Article IV-2.
9 NPT, Article VI.
13 states had deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, or approval of the
amendment with the depositary. On September 4, 2007, President Bush submitted the amendment
to the Senate for its consent.
In the last 35 years, some states have concluded treaties to declare their regions to be “nuclear
weapons-free.” These regions now include Latin America, Central and Southeast Asia, the South
Pacific, and Africa.
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Treaties//tlatelolco.html. This treaty establishes a
nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in Latin America. Protocol I of the treaty obligates non-Latin
American countries that have territories in the zone (U.S., U.K., Netherlands, France) to accept
the provisions of the treaty with respect to those territories. Protocol II contains a negative
security pledge by the nuclear weapons states (China, France, Russia, U.K., U.S.) “not to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty....” In 1994, treaty
holdouts Argentina, Brazil, and Chile signed on, and in 1995 Cuba signed the treaty (which
entered into force in 2002).
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2006/central_asia.html. Signed on September 8, 2006,
this treaty creates a NWFZ in the five Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan ratified the treaty in 2007. It will enter
into force after all five countries have ratified. The treaty, which is the first nuclear weapon-free
zone located entirely in the northern hemisphere, prohibits the development, manufacture,
stockpiling, acquisition, or possession of any nuclear explosive device within the zone. The treaty
requires signatories to accept enhanced IAEA safeguards on nuclear material and activities,
addresses the impact of production and testing of Soviet nuclear weapons on the environment,
and implements measures to meet international standards for nuclear facility security.
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf331.shtml. Thirteen nations of the
South Pacific have established a NWFZ for their region which prohibits the possession of nuclear
weapons by its members and bans the manufacture or permanent emplacement of nuclear
weapons within the zone by signatories outside of the Pacific region. The treaty does not inhibit
transit through the zone by nuclear-armed or powered military ships or aircraft. In 1996, the
United States, France, and Britain signed the protocols to the treaty, which are nearly identical to
those of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Before signing the treaty protocols, France conducted its last
nuclear tests at its test site in French Polynesia. The United States is the only nuclear-weapon
state that has not ratified the protocol.
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Treaties//pelindaba.html. In April 1996, the Treaty
of Pelindaba, establishing Africa as a NWFZ, was opened for signature. The Treaty now has 53 th
signatures and 21 ratifications. It will enter into force after the 28 ratification. The African
NWFZ closely follows the models of the South Pacific and Latin American zones, and thus was
able to attract the support of the United States and other weapons states after certain criteria were
satisfied. This nuclear-weapon-free zone is not yet in force and the United States and Russia have
not ratified (but have signed) the relevant protocol.
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc548.pdf. A group of 10
Southeast Asian nations declared a NWFZ for their region in December 1995 and the treaty
entered into force in 1997. The United States and other weapons states declined to sign the
protocols to the zone because the treaty contained controversial definitions of its members’
sovereignty over territorial seas. The United States maintains that the language of the treaty is
inconsistent with the Law of the Sea and could inflame territorial disputes as well as interfere
with rights of passage. Modifications of the language are under consideration. In 1999, China
announced it would sign the protocol but has deferred its signature.
The United States has concluded arrangements with several states on a bilateral basis and on a
multilateral basis in an effort to address specific programs. In 1994, the United States signed the
Agreed Framework with North Korea (which was terminated in 2003). In 2002, the United States
initiated a “10 plus 10 over 10” effort within the G-8 to provide additional funding for nuclear
nonproliferation assistance to Russia and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union
(NIS), called the G-8 Global Partnership to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. As noted
earlier, the United States also created the Proliferation Security Initiative in 2003. The
establishment of these joint activities suggest a trend away from internationally negotiated
approaches to proliferation controls and towards ad hoc cooperation amongst “like-minded
In October 1994, the United States signed an agreement with North Korea to freeze its plutonium
production facilities (reactors and reprocessing plant) in exchange for assistance, and, eventually, 10
two 1000-megawatt, light water nuclear reactors. North Korea received shipments of heavy fuel
oil to compensate for energy that theoretically might have been generated from the reactors it
agreed to shut down. The deal required North Korean compliance with its full-scope safeguards
10 North Korea joined the NPT in 1985, but delayed inspections until 1992. In February 1993, North Korea denied
access by IAEA inspectors to two sites which IAEA (and U.S. intelligence) believed held evidence of clandestine
nuclear work. On March 12, 1993, North Korea notified the United Nations Security Council that it was withdrawing
from the NPT, which permits withdrawal after three months notice. It subsequently suspended its withdrawal, but
claimed to have “unique status” under the NPT, and continued to block inspections. See CRS Report RL33590, North
Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by Larry A. Niksch, and CRS Report RS21391, North
Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Latest Developments, by Sharon Squassoni.
agreement before completion of the new reactors. Such compliance hinged on several issues,
including resolution of how much undeclared plutonium North Korea might have separated prior
to 1994. Experts generally agree that the amount is at least sufficient for 1-2 bombs (about 12 kg).
An international consortium called the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
(KEDO) was established in March 1995 to coordinate the reactor construction project. KEDO
negotiated several agreements with North Korea on the legal, financial and territorial aspects of
the project. South Korea was to build the reactors and pay for about 60-70% of the deal. Japan
and other countries were to pay for the rest. The United States payed for oil shipments and payed
for storage of the spent nuclear fuel rods that were removed from North Korea’s test reactor in
In October 2002, North Korea’s reported admission of a secret uranium enrichment program set
in motion a series of events that are similar to the 1994 crisis from which the Agreed Framework
emerged. In December 2002, the United States cut off its shipment of heavy fuel oil and
pronounced that the Agreed Framework would be terminated. North Korea announced it would
restart its plutonium facilities, breaking seals and expelling IAEA inspectors at the end of
December 2002. In January 2003, North Korea announced it would withdraw from the NPT,
which became effective in April 2003.
The Bush Administration has said it favors a diplomatic solution and conducts negotiations
through the Six-Party talks with North Korea (including the United States, North Korea, Russia,
China, Japan, and South Korea). In September 2005, the Six Parties issued a joint statement in
which North Korea agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons and nuclear programs. On October 9,
2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test, with a yield of under 1 kiloton. The United Nations
Security Council passed Resolution 1718 on October 14, 2006, condemning the test. On February
13, 2007, North Korea reached an agreement with other members of the Six-Party Talks to begin
the initial phase (60 days) of implementing the Joint Statement from September 2005 on
denuclearization. Key components of the agreement include halting production at the Yongbyon
nuclear complex and delivery of heavy fuel oil to North Korea. In July 2007, International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors verified the shutdown of the Yongbyon facilities. On
October 3, 2007, the Six Parties adopted a Joint Statement in which North Korea agreed to
disable the Yongbyon facilities and provide a declaration of all its nuclear programs. The October
2007 statement said the United States would lead disablement activities and provide the initial
funding for those activities. As of January 2008, disablement work at the Yongbyon facilities
continues, and the five parties are waiting for North Korea to submit a declaration of its nuclear
programs before moving on to the dismantlement phase.
At a summit held in June 2002 in Kananaskis, Canada, G-8 members agreed to a Global
Partnership to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and
technology. The G-8 members agreed to raise $20 billion over 10 years in nonproliferation
assistance to Russia, of which the United States committed to providing $10B. Projects relating to
disarmament, nonproliferation, counterterrorism and nuclear safety will focus initially on Russia, 11
but the initiative will be open to other states as well. Since 2002, 13 other countries have joined
11 See Fact Sheet on G-8 Summit, Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, June 27, 2002, Office
of the Press Secretary, The White House. http://usinfo.state.gov.
as donors. At the June 2004 Sea Island summit, the Global Partnership states agreed to consider
expanding the application of cooperative threat reduction assistance to states outside the former
Soviet Union. This would mirror U.S. efforts to expand its own cooperative threat reduction 12
assistance to states outside of Russia and the former Soviet Union, for example, Albania. Many
experts agree that pledges are about $2 billion short of the $20 billion goal, and there remains a
gap between pledges and actual funds spent.
At the July 2006 summit, the United States and Russia launched another initiative—the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. As of December 2007, 64 states have agreed to the
statement of principles and are Global Initiative partner nations. Although it does not receive
funding of its own, the initiative appears to exceed the G-8 Global Partnership in its scope. It is
meant to be a framework for countries to exchange information and best practices in a range of
terrorism prevention activities. According to a White House fact sheet issued at the time, the 13
Initiative has the following goals:
• Improve security of nuclear material and radioactive substances and nuclear
• Detect and prevent illicit trafficking in such materials, especially by terrorists;
• Develop responses to nuclear terrorist attacks;
• Cooperate in developing technical means to combat nuclear terrorism;
• Take all possible measures to deny safe haven to terrorists seeking to acquire or
use nuclear materials; and
• Strengthen national legal frameworks to ensure the effective prosecution of
President Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in May 2003 to improve
multilateral cooperation in interdicting shipments of weapons of mass destruction-related
materials at sea, on land, and in the air. Administration officials have stressed that PSI is an
activity, not an organization. The purpose is to strengthen the enforcement of already-existing
export controls associated with nonproliferation treaties. States agreed to a set of interdiction 14
principles in Paris in September 2003 and 86 nations now support PSI. PSI participants
conducted 32 joint interdiction training exercises as of October 2007.
Article VI of the NPT calls for an end to the arms race and progress toward disarmament. For
many non-nuclear-weapon states, Article VI embodies the quid pro quo of the NPT—while non-
12 See CRS Report RL32359, Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Survey of Options, by Sharon Squassoni.
14 See CRS Report RS21881, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), by Sharon Squassoni.
nuclear-weapon states give up their right to develop nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon states
agree to eventually disarm. In the 1990s, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was seen as 15
the next step toward nuclear disarmament. By the mid-1990s, all nuclear weapons states were
observing a moratorium on testing, which the treaty would have made permanent. The parties
completed negotiations and signed the CTBT in 1996; President Clinton submitted the treaty to 16
the Senate in September 1997 and in 1999, the Senate voted against the treaty. The treaty
remains on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee calendar.
Unilateral and bilateral reductions of nuclear weapons have also been important within the
context of the nuclear nonproliferation regime as demonstrations of good faith by the nuclear
weapons states towards the eventual goal of disarmament. In January 2002, the Bush
Administration released the results of its “Nuclear Posture Review,” announcing that U.S. nuclear
planning would no longer address the “Russian threat,” but would need to meet a range of threats
from unspecified countries. The redirection would be accompanied by a large, unilateral
reduction in deployed nuclear weapons. However, the new policy also included development of a
controversial missile defense capability, improving the nuclear weapons “infrastructure” to allow
resumption of testing, and possible development of new weapons more rapidly. Although the
Administration statement did not indicate that such activities were contemplated or necessary, the 17
suggestion that they might be in the future caused dismay in nonproliferation circles. In May
2002, Presidents Bush and Putin signed what has become known as the Treaty of Moscow, which
will reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons to between 1700 and 2200 by 18
2012. This treaty has been viewed alternately by some observers as a step toward nuclear
disarmament and by others as a step back from nuclear disarmament, since its reductions are not
permanent and apply only to deployed forces rather than the stockpile of weapons as a whole.
For many countries, the ABM Treaty was an important symbol of a commitment by the United
States and USSR to ratchet down the nuclear arms race, and its June 2002 abrogation represents
to some a setback in disarmament. On the other hand, some observers have argued that U.S.
withdrawal from the treaty will have little impact on other states’ nuclear force postures, 19
including that of China.
On May 18, 2006, the United States tabled a draft Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) at the
CD in Geneva. The proposed U.S. treaty would
• enter into force with the signatures of the five nuclear weapons states;
• ban new production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for use in nuclear
weapons for 15 years;
• be extended only by consensus of the parties;
15 In the early 1990s, a test ban and a treaty halting the production of nuclear material (known as fissile material
production cutoff treaty), were viewed as the next steps. No progress has been made to date on negotiating a production
cutoff treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.
16 See CRS Report RL33548, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments, by
17 See CRS Report RS21133, The Nuclear Posture Review: Overview and Emerging Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
18 See CRS Report RL31448, Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, by Amy F. Woolf.
19 See CRS Report RL30699, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends, by Paul K.
• allow high-enriched uranium enrichment for naval fuel;
• contain no verification mechanism.
The lack of a verification mechanism in the U.S. draft is controversial as it contradicts the
“Shannon Mandate,” of 1995 in which the Conference on Disarmament agreed to “negotiate a
non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” Following
a Bush administration internal review in 2004, U.S. policy has been that effective and 20
international verification of a FMCT is “not achievable.” This was a break from previous policy.
The review reportedly found that a verification regime would be too intrusive and too expensive.
Disagreement remains about this approach and negotiations have not yet begun.
Nevertheless, some perceive a ban on producing fissile material for weapons as much more
relevant today than it was a decade ago, a view supported by the Bush Administration’s May 18, 21
2006, proposal. Concern about terrorist access to large stockpiles of fissile material has only
grown since the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs began in the early 1990s and
particularly since September 11, 2001. Revelations about Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan’s nuclear
black market sales of uranium enrichment technology in 2004 have spurred efforts not only to
shut down networks, but restrict even “legitimate” technology transfer. Recent proposals to
strengthen the nonproliferation regime, including those of Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), have focused on tighter controls on sensitive
nuclear fuel cycle technologies, renewed disarmament effort, and creative approaches toward 22
states outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—India, Pakistan, and Israel. An
FMCT could play a pivotal role in implementing that agenda, by helping to gain broad support
for new multilateral arrangements to restrict enrichment and reprocessing, helping to strengthen
consensus among NPT parties, and by achieving a concrete step towards disarmament.
Although the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is perhaps the most visible aspect of the
nuclear nonproliferation regime, the success of nonproliferation efforts relies on the sturdy
functioning of national export control laws and implementation, the Zangger Committee and
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group multilateral coordination of export controls, and effective inspections
conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Equally important is the quid pro
quo of technical assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy that the IAEA provides.
The IAEA, a U.N.-affiliated international organization, was established in 1957 to “accelerate and
enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity,” and to ensure “that 23
assistance provided by it...is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.” With the
20 “U.S. Proposals to the Conference on Disarmament,” Jackie Sanders Remarks to the Conference on Disarmament,
July 29, 2004. http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/2004/34929.htm.
21 See CRS Report RS22474, Banning Fissile Material Production for Nuclear Weapons: Prospects for a Treaty
(FMCT), by Sharon Squassoni.
22 Mohamed ElBaradei, “Rethinking Nuclear Safeguards,” Washington Post, June 14, 2006.
23 The IAEA Statute is found at http://www.iaea.org/About/statute.html.
entry into force of the NPT in 1970, it performs the dual missions of verifying NPT obligations
and providing assistance in peaceful nuclear technology to developing nations. By Decenber 24
2007, the Agency had 144 member states and an annual budget of about $419 million. The
IAEA safeguards system monitors nuclear materials and technology to deter and detect diversions
from peaceful to military uses.
The administrative structure of the Agency resembles that of the United Nations. The General
Conference includes all members and meets annually. The Board of Governors has 35 members,
nine of which are permanent advanced nuclear nations, with the remaining Board members
serving one-year terms as representatives of regional nuclear interests. The Secretariat is the
administrative arm of the Agency. It is headed by the Director General, who is the chief policy-
making official. The current Director General, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, is an Egyptian diplomat
who previously served as head of the IAEA’s legal department. Dr. ElBaradei and the IAEA won
the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005.
In over 25 years of inspections, five states have been declared in violation of their safeguards
agreements: Iraq, North Korea, Romania, Libya, and Iran. Following revelations in 1991 of Iraq’s
clandestine activities, the IAEA developed a strengthened safeguards program (formerly called
“93+2”) to improve its ability to detect unreported nuclear activities in non-weapons states. The
• provision of intelligence information to the IAEA by member states about
suspect nuclear activities;
• access for inspectors to any location on a timely basis;
• new safeguards technology;
• measures to promote complete transparency and reporting of all nuclear
• sufficient financial resources to carry out the IAEA’s expanded responsibilities.
State parties to the NPT have been required to ratify new “model protocol” agreements to their
existing nuclear safeguards agreements with the IAEA (INFCIRC/540). President Bush submitted
the U.S. model protocol agreement to the Senate for its consent to ratification in 2002 and the
Senate ratified it in 2004. Implementing the legislation, however, has not yet passed the Senate. A
continuing issue will be adequate funding for the IAEA safeguards. The annual safeguards budget
is insufficient to carry out the IAEA’s new responsibilities; the Agency spent $137M on
safeguards from its regular budget, and relied on extrabudgetary (voluntary) contributions of
$10.8M to fully fund its work. Thus, the IAEA’s ability to carry out its growing responsibilities
and efforts to upgrade its safeguards system continue to be limited by members’ reluctance to
increase the IAEA budget.
Since September 11, 2001, the IAEA has been promoting efforts to help prevent terrorists from
acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear or radiological devices. These
have focused primarily on upgrading its assistance in physical security, in locating orphaned
radioactive sources, and in promoting enhancement of the Convention on the Protection of
Physical Security. The IAEA established a Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of
24 See http://www.iaea.org/About/index.html.
Radioactive Sources in 2001 and an action Plan on Combating Nuclear Terrorism in 2002. In 25
2005, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a four-year Nuclear Security Plan 2006-2009. The
Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) is a voluntary funding mechanism to support activities to prevent,
detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. Implementation of the Nuclear Security Plan is 26
dependent on contributions to the NSF. As of August 2007, 96 states participate in the IAEA’s
Illicit Trafficking Database, which facilitates the exchange of information related to the illicit
trafficking of nuclear or radiological material.
In response to revelations in 2004 about Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan’s clandestine nuclear sales
to Libya, Iran, and North Korea, the IAEA’s Director General has proposed seven steps to
enhance the nuclear nonproliferation regime. These include a five-year moratorium on
construction of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities; conversion of nuclear
reactors using highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium; making the Additional
Protocol the verification norm of the NPT; revisiting U.N. Security Council actions in response to
a state’s withdrawal from the NPT; universal implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution
and resolution of regional security tensions that give rise to proliferation, including a Middle East 27
The case of Iran’s noncompliance with its safeguards obligations continues to present challenges
for the IAEA and the nonproliferation regime. In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors
found that Iran’s breaches of its obligations constituted noncompliance. After Iran resumed
enrichment-related activities and suspended interim application of its Additional Protocol in
January, the Board referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council. In March, the U.N. Security
Council issued a presidential statement that called upon Iran to reinstate its suspension of
enrichment and reprocessing, reconsider construction of its heavy water reactor, ratify and
implement the Additional Protocol and implement transparency measures.
On June 6, 2006, the permanent five members of the Security Council plus Germany (P-5 plus 1)
offered Iran a new negotiating proposal, which included incentives such as affirmation of Iran’s
inalienable right to peaceful nuclear energy, assistance in building state-of-the-art light water
reactors for Iran, a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement between EURATOM and Iran, fuel
supply guarantees, dismissing U.N. Security Council consideration of Iran’s NPT noncompliance,
WTO membership, and an end to certain US sanctions to allow Iran to purchase agriculture
appliances and Boeing aircraft parts. In return, Iran would suspend enrichment- and reprocessing-
related activities, resume implementation of the Additional Protocol and fully cooperate with the
IAEA. Iran’s moratorium could be reviewed once several conditions had been met, including
resolving all outstanding issues and restoring international confidence in the peaceful nature of
Iran’s nuclear program. The proposal also outlined several measures targeted at Iran’s nuclear
program should Iran not agree to cooperate: a ban on nuclear-related exports, freeze of assets,
travel/visa bans, suspension of technical cooperation with the IAEA, a ban on investment in
related entities, and on Iranians studying abroad in nuclear and missile-related areas. Broader
measures could include an arms embargo, no support for WTO membership, and a general freeze
on assets of Iranian financial institutions.
25 See GC(50)/RES/11.
26 See GOV/2007/43-GC(51)/15.
27 IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, “Seven Steps to Raise World Security,” Financial Times, February 2,
Iranian officials insisted on deferring a response until August 2006, which prompted the Security
Council to pass Resolution 1696 under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The
resolution called upon Iran to take the steps required by the Board of Governors (fully suspend
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, stop construction of the IR-40 heavy water-
moderated reactor, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol and implement transparency
measures), endorsed the P-5 plus 1 proposal, and stated the Council’s intention, should Iran fail to
comply with previous demands, to adopt sanctions under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter.
Unfortunately, the August 31 deadline passed with little progress reported by the IAEA in
resolving outstanding issues. Key members of the U.N. Security Council, such as China and
Russia, reportedly have been opposed to sanctions. Since then, the UNSC has adopted two
resolutions, 1737 and 1747, which imposed limited sanctions on Iran.
In 1971, a group of seven NPT nuclear supplier nations formed the Nuclear Exporters Committee,
known as the Zangger Committee, to assist in restricting nuclear trade as called for in Article III 28
of the NPT. In 1974, the Zangger Committee compiled a list of nuclear export items that could
be potentially useful for military applications of nuclear technology. The nuclear suppliers agreed
that the transfer of items on the list would “trigger” a requirement for IAEA safeguards to assure
that the items were not used to make nuclear explosives. The Zangger list included reactors,
reactor components, and certain nuclear materials such as heavy water. In recent years, the list of
controlled items has been expanded and updated. Membership is voluntary and implies no formal
commitments for enforcement of the guidelines. As of January 2008, the Zangger Committee had 29
36 members and continued to meet twice each year to exchange information and upgrade its list
of controlled commodities.
Shaken by the 1974 test of a nuclear explosive device by India, the major nuclear suppliers in 30
1975 established a set of unpublished nuclear export guidelines. In 1978, the group, known as
the London Club, added new members and announced a common policy regarding nuclear
exports. While the NPT’s Zangger list initially included only nuclear materials and components
used directly in weapons development, the London Club adopted more restrictive export control
guidelines that included some dual-use items, with civil and military applications. The NSG
guidelines called for suppliers to exercise restraint regarding transfers of enrichment and
reprocessing technology, and required the provision of physical security for transferred nuclear
facilities and materials, acceptance of safeguards on replicated facilities (based on a design
transferred from a London Club member-state), and prohibitions against retransfer of nuclear
exports to third parties.
Although NSG guidelines were in place, members took no further actions until 1991. Concerned
about Iraq’s successful procurement of dual-use items and apparently inconsistent enforcement of
nuclear export controls in several supplier countries, the NSG convened in March 1991 for the
first time since 1978 to update its list of controlled commodities. The expanded group agreed on
28 See http://www.zanggercommittee.org/Zangger/default.htm for Zangger website.
29 See Appendix A for list of Zangger Committee members.
30 See http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org for NSG website.
new guidelines in January 1992 for transfers of a wider range of nuclear-related, dual-use
equipment, material and technology and jointly adopted the longstanding U.S. policy of requiring
full-scope safeguards for all nuclear exports. (Nations purchasing nuclear technology must open 31
all nuclear facilities to inspection, not just the facility in which an imported item is used.) The 32
NSG has expanded to 45 members.
Some developing nations have objected to the NSG because it further divides the technologically
advanced nuclear “haves” from the “have nots” and creates additional obstacles to their access to
nuclear technology. A few countries have turned to suppliers outside of the NSG to avoid the
requirement for full-scope safeguards on nuclear exports. The emergence of new nuclear
suppliers that do not subscribe to NSG guidelines undermines the efforts of NSG members to
control the spread of nuclear weapons.
The strengthening of NSG export policy after the Gulf War responded to numerous examples of
illegal, covert, and suspicious nuclear trade involving Western firms and countries such as India,
Iraq, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, and others. These transfers
underscored the limitations of voluntary export controls, but they also motivated U.S. officials to
push for further tightening of NSG restrictions on world nuclear exports. However, as a voluntary
association, the NSG has no formal administrative structure, no legal authority to influence the
nuclear trade policies of its members, and no formal enforcement mechanism.
In 2005, the United States approached the NSG to create an exception for India to the NSG’s
requirement for full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply. Such an exception would
be necessary for the United States to implement its proposed civil nuclear cooperation initiative 33
with India. Key NSG members, such as the United States, Russia, and France, support a
country-specific exception, while other members question whether such an approach might be
damaging to the nonproliferation regime. NSG members may take up the issue in 2008 if and
when India and the IAEA formulate a safeguards agreement, as required by the Henry J. Hyde
United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-401). India and
the agency have been conducting discussions on such an agreement.
The Departments of State, Energy, Defense, Commerce and the intelligence community are all
involved in the formulation and implementation of nonproliferation policy.
• The National Security Council coordinates nonproliferation policy.
• The State Department, in consultation with the Energy Department, negotiates
U.S. agreements for nuclear cooperation, represents U.S. nonproliferation
interests with other states and international organizations such as the IAEA, and 34
administers some nonproliferation assistance programs.
31 The new guidelines appeared as an International Atomic Energy Agency document, INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 1 and
Part 2, July 1992.
32 See Appendix A for NSG membership. China, Lithuania, Estonia, and Malta joined the NSG at the May 2004
33 See CRS Report RL33016, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress, by Paul K. Kerr.
34 An October 2007 GAO Report raises important questions about US efforts to combat proliferation networks. See
U.S. General Accounting Office, “U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Networks Need Better Data on Proliferation Risks
• The Department of Defense is responsible for counterproliferation strategy and
policy, and also administers Cooperative Threat Reduction programs.
• The Department of Energy provides expertise in nuclear weapons to support
nonproliferation policy and diplomacy, largely through its national laboratories.
DOE also administers nonproliferation programs to control fissile material in the
former Soviet Union and elsewhere.
• The Nuclear Regulatory Commission licenses nuclear exports subject to
concurrence by the Department of State.
• The Department of Commerce oversees licensing of dual-use exports as
mandated by Section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act, which requires
controls on “all export items, other than those licensed by the NRC, which could
be, if used for purposes other than those for which the export is intended, of
significance for nuclear explosive purposes.”
• The Department of the Treasury oversees U.S. embargoes through its Office of
Foreign Assets Control, and enforces export control through the U.S. Customs
• The Director of National Intelligence has a National Counterproliferation Center
(NCPC) that coordinates intelligence on proliferation issues within the
• Several interagency working groups coordinate the various responsibilities for
Since September 11, 2001, significant U.S. government interest has focused on
counterproliferation programs—that is, military measures against weapons of mass destruction.
Although the Department of Defense has had programs in place for several years, efforts in this
area have been renewed. Counterproliferation includes active and passive defenses to protect U.S.
and allied troops, although protection against nuclear weapons is far more difficult than
protecting against chemical weapons. The December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons
of Mass Destruction described counterproliferation as including interdiction, deterrence, defense 35
and mitigation. Preemption is explicitly described as an option under defense and mitigation
The main legislative pillars of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy are the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, and the Arms Export Control Act
and Program Results,” October 31, 2007. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0821.pdf.
35 “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” December 11, 2002. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/
36 This section drawn from CRS Report RL31502, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation Sanctions:
Selected Current Law, by Dianne E. Rennack.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 established legal authority for the commercial and military
development of nuclear energy. It gave primary authority for the development and oversight of
the U.S. government’s nuclear programs to a civilian agency: the Atomic Energy Commission
(now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission). In 1974, these duties were divided between the NRC
and the Department of Energy. A major purpose of the act was to establish controls on the export
of nuclear materials, goods, information, and technology. Under the AEA, the State Department
must negotiate an agreement for nuclear cooperation as a precondition for exports of sensitive
U.S. nuclear technology to any foreign country. Each agreement must meet several standards
outlined in the AEA. Moreover, the act contains penalties and restrictions for countries that do not
uphold the terms of nuclear agreements with the United States. Congress reviews all such
agreements before they can enter into force.
Congress and the Carter Administration viewed U.S. leadership and control over the international
nuclear fuel cycle as an effective means of restraining the spread of uranium enrichment and
plutonium reprocessing facilities throughout the world. Enrichment and reprocessing technologies
are key technologies for states aspiring to develop nuclear weapons. While reaffirming the U.S.
commitment to be a reliable supplier of nuclear technology and fuels, the act established an
important new requirement for nations importing U.S. nuclear technology and materials: they
must accept full-scope safeguards on their entire nuclear program. This standard was adopted by
NSG members in 1992. The act also established a requirement of prior U.S. approval for
retransfers or reprocessing of material or equipment as well as to material produced using U.S.-
exported technology. These measures gave the United States much more control over the foreign
uses of U.S.-origin nuclear material.
Title III of the NNPA includes such varied measures as requiring the Department of Energy to
obtain NRC licenses to distribute source and special material and establishment of criteria for
terminating nuclear exports from the United States (which affects bilateral nuclear cooperation
agreements) to include detonation of a nuclear device, termination/abrogation or violation of
IAEA safeguards, or engaging in activities involving nuclear material which have significance in
the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices (covering a wide array of activities). Additional
prohibited acts included violating a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States;
assisting a non-nuclear-weapon state in activities involving nuclear material that could potentially
help in the manufacture or acquisition of a nuclear explosive device; or enriching any U.S. source
or special material without the permission of the United States. The NNPA requires (in Section
601) the President to report annually to Congress on the Government’s efforts to prevent nuclear
37 P.L. 83-703, 42 U.S.C. 2011.
38 P.L. 95-242, 22 U.S.C. 3201.
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended, authorizes U.S. government military sales,
loans, leases, financing, and licensing of commercial arms sales to other countries. The AECA
coordinates such actions with other foreign policy considerations, including nonproliferation, and
determines eligibility of recipients for military exports, sales, leases, loans, and financing.
• Section 3(f) (22 U.S.C. 2753(f)) prohibits U.S. military sales or leases to any
country that the President determines is in material breach of binding
commitments to the United States under international treaties or agreements
regarding nonproliferation of nuclear explosive devices and unsafeguarded
special nuclear material.
• Section 40 (22 U.S.C. 2780) prohibits exports or assistance in exporting
(financial or otherwise) munitions to countries that provide support for terrorism.
Included in the definition of acts of international terrorism are: “all activities that
the Secretary [of State] determines willfully aid or abet the international
proliferation of nuclear explosive devices to individuals or groups or willfully aid
or abet an individual or groups in acquiring unsafeguarded special nuclear
material.” The President can rescind a determination or waive sanctions if
essential to the national security interests of the United States.
• Section 101 (22 U.S.C. 2799aa) (formerly section 669 of the Foreign Assistance
Act) prohibits foreign economic or military assistance to countries that deliver or
receive nuclear enrichment equipment, materials, or technology unless the
supplier agrees to place such under safeguards and the recipient has full-scope
safeguards. The President, who makes the determination, can waive sanctions if
they will have a serious adverse effect on vital U.S. interests, given assurances
that the recipient will not acquire, develop, or assist others in acquiring or
developing nuclear weapons.
• Section 102 (22 U.S.C. 2799aa-1) (formerly section 670 of the Foreign
Assistance Act) prohibits foreign economic or military assistance to countries
that deliver or receive nuclear reprocessing equipment, material, or technology to
or from another country; or any non-nuclear-weapon state which illegally exports
from the United States items that would contribute to nuclear proliferation. The
President, who makes the determination, can waive the sanction if he finds that
ending assistance would adversely affect U.S. nonproliferation objectives or
jeopardize the common defense and security. The section further prohibits
assistance (except humanitarian or food assistance), defense sales, export licenses
for U.S. Munitions List items, other export licenses subject to foreign policy
controls, and various credits and loans to any country that the President has
determined transfers a nuclear explosive device, design information, or
component to a non-nuclear weapons state, or is a non-nuclear weapons state and
receives a nuclear device, design information, or component, or detonates a
nuclear explosive device.
39 P.L. 90-629, 22 U.S.C. 2751. Title 22 of the U.S. Code, Chapter 39, addresses Arms Export Control. Subchapter VII
addresses control of missiles and missile exports or technology; subchapter VIII addresses chemical weapons and
biological weapons, and subchapter X addresses nuclear nonproliferation controls.
Much of the language on nuclear nonproliferation controls that had been incorporated into the
Foreign Assistance Act earlier (including the 1977 Glenn-Symington amendments on enrichment
and reprocessing and the 1985 Pressler amendment related to Pakistan) were incorporated into the
AECA in 1994 by the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (see discussion below).
The Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72) authorizes the executive branch to regulate
private sector exports of particular goods and technology to other countries. Although the act
expired in 1989, export controls have been implemented under executive orders and the 40
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The EAA coordinates such actions
with other foreign policy considerations, including nonproliferation, and determines eligibility of
recipients for exports. Section 5 (50 U.S.C. app. 2404) authorizes the President to curtail or
prohibit the export of any goods or services for national security reasons: to comply with other
laws regarding a potential recipient country’s political status or political stability, to cooperate
with international agreements or understandings, or to protect militarily critical technologies.
Section 6 (50 U.S.C. app. 2405) authorizes the President to curtail or prohibit the export of goods
or services for foreign policy reasons. Within Section 6, for example, Section 6(j) establishes the
State Department’s list of countries found to be supporting acts of international terrorism, a list on
which many other restrictions and prohibitions in law are based.
The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 (P.L. 79-173) establishes the Export-Import Bank of the
United States and authorizes the Bank to finance and facilitate exports and imports and the
exchange of commodities and services between the United States and foreign countries. Key
nuclear-nonproliferation-related provisions were added in 1978. These include Section 2(b)(1)(B)
(12 U.S.C. 635(b)(1)(B)) and Section 2(b)(4) (12 U.S.C. 635(b)(4)), which together allow the
Bank to deny credit generally if that credit does not help advance U.S. nuclear proliferation
policy, and specifically, if a person or country has a) violated, abrogated or terminated a nuclear
safeguards agreements; b) violated a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States; or c)
aided or abetted a non-nuclear-weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or to acquire
unsafeguarded special nuclear material. There is a provision for presidential waiver. (See
Appendix B for details.)
The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 was amended in 200241 to allow denial of Ex-Im Bank
financing for violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the Arms Export Control Act, the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act or the Export Administration Act of 1979,
extending its purview from strictly nuclear to CW, BW, and missile-related concerns.
In 1994 Congress approved the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, (NPPA, Title VIII, of the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, P.L. 103-236) which primarily
strengthened penalties against persons who aid or abet the acquisition of nuclear weapons or
40 See CRS Report RL31832, The Export Administration Act: Evolution, Provisions, and Debate, by Ian F. Fergusson.
41 See The Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2002, P.L. 107-189.
unsafeguarded nuclear weapons materials, or countries (non-nuclear-weapon states) that obtain or
explode nuclear devices. Sanctions include cutoff of U.S. assistance, prohibition on involvement
with U.S. government procurement, stringent licensing requirements for technology exports, and
opposition to loans or credits from international financial institutions. These sanctions were
imposed on India and Pakistan following their nuclear tests in May 1998, but were gradually th
relaxed. Legislation passed in the 106 Congress extended the President’s authority to relax
sanctions on India and Pakistan for a year, and the Senate passed a bill suspending sanctions on
the two countries for five years. The FY2000 Department of Defense Appropriations bill (P.L.
106-79) extended the authority to suspend sanctions. Following the September 11 terrorist
attacks, President Bush lifted all remaining sanctions on India and Pakistan in response to support
of U.S. operations in Afghanistan.
The NPPA defined for the first time in U.S. law the term “nuclear explosive device.” It defined
“terrorism” as used in the AECA, to include activities that assist groups or individuals to acquire
any nuclear explosive device. It included a sense of Congress that identified 24 measures to
strengthen IAEA safeguards, some of which have been implemented. Relevant sections include
Section 821 (22 U.S.C. 3201 note), which requires U.S. government procurement sanctions;
Section 823 (22 U.S.C. 3201 note), which requires U.S. executive directors of international
financial institutions to vote against finance that might promote nuclear proliferation; and Section
824 (22 U.S.C. 3201 note), which takes aim at financial institutions and persons involved with
financial institutions from assisting nuclear proliferation through the provision of financing. (See
Appendix B for specific details.)
In late 1991, Congress passed the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act (which became known as
the Nunn-Lugar Amendment), establishing programs to assist with the safe and secure storage
and dismantlement of nuclear weapons in Russia and the Newly Independent States (NIS). These
programs initially focused on the “loose nukes” problem, but have broadened their focus to
address a variety of proliferation risks associated with weak political control over nuclear
materials, equipment, and expertise, as well as CW, BW, and missiles. This effort has expanded to
include the CTR program in DOD and nonproliferation programs in DOE and the State 42
Department. In the FY2004 defense authorization act, there was a provision to allow $50
million of unobligated funds to be spent on cooperative threat reduction outside the former Soviet
Union. So far, the Bush administration has spent $38.5 million of CTR funds in Albania to
dispose of CW-related items.
Section 1602 of the Defense Authorization for FY1993 (Title XVI, P.L. 102-484, as amended)
extended existing sanctions on Iraq to Iran. The law states that it is the policy of the United States
to oppose any transfer to Iran or Iraq that could contribute to either country’s ability to acquire
nuclear, chemical, biological, or advanced conventional weapons. Section 1604 requires the
President to impose sanctions against any person whom he has determined to be engaged in such th
transfers. Section 1605 similarly addresses activities of foreign governments. The 104 Congress
42 See CRS Report 97-1027, Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs: Issues for Congress, by Amy F.
amended the law (by passage of section 1408(a), P.L. 104-106, National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1996) to make it apply to transfers contributing to the development of
weapons of mass destruction as well as advanced conventional weapons.
The law (P.L. 106-178) imposes penalties on countries whose companies help Iran’s efforts to
acquire weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems. In 2005, P.L. 109-112, Iran
Nonproliferation Amendments Act, added Syria to the law and added sanctions for transfers to
and from those countries. In 2006, both Houses introduced legislation to add North Korea to the
law as well (H.R. 5805, S. 3667) and on September 30, 2006, the House passed the Senate’s bill
This law (P.L. 109-102) withheld 60 percent of funds set aside for assistance to the Russian
government until the President certifies that assistance to Iran has ceased. Assistance constitutes
technical training, expertise, technology, or equipment needed to build a nuclear reactor, develop
research facilities or programs, or ballistic missile technologies.
Since September 11, 2001, much of Congress’s attention in the area of the nonproliferation of
weapons of mass destruction has focused on how to mitigate the threat U.S. citizens face right
now—improving domestic preparedness against WMD terrorism and improving intelligence
capabilities to detect evidence of proliferation-related activities. Above all, however, most sources
agree that the U.S. government should continue to address nuclear proliferation at the source—
securing nuclear materials in Russia and the NIS and halting information flows from WMD-
knowledgeable scientists to countries of proliferation concern.
Other key nuclear nonproliferation issues for Congress include:
• implementing DOD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction programs to improving
controls on nuclear materials, equipment, and expertise in Russia and the NIS
and expanding these efforts to countries outside the NIS;
• monitoring efforts to end Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program;
• monitoring Iran’s nuclear program, including Russian and Chinese nuclear
exports and assistance;
• opposing the nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan and preventing those
countries from exporting WMD technology;
• strengthening the IAEA safeguards system to enforce the NPT and maintaining
• maintaining and expanding adherence to NSG nuclear export control standards;
• curbing dangerous Chinese and Russian nuclear exports;
• banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
Closer to home, Congress will be asked to consider how to dispose of tons of excess plutonium
from dismantled Russian and U.S. warheads without increasing proliferation risks; and how U.S.
arms control and defense cooperation (particularly missile defense cooperation) might affect
proliferation risks. In particular, Congress may exert oversight over key nonproliferation
programs, such as Proliferation Security Initiative, Global Threat Reduction Initiative, and Global
Nuclear Energy Partnership.
Prohibitions against the use of chemical weapons date back to the International Peace
Conferences that met at the Hague in 1899 and 1907; these pre-World War I prohibitions were
reaffirmed in the 1919 Versailles Treaty and further expanded in the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
Although public horror at the nature of these weapons rivals that accorded to nuclear weapons, it
has been much more difficult to constrain their proliferation and use. They do not require as
extensive an infrastructure as do nuclear weapons and the technologies are much more widely 44
disseminated, making it difficult to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate activities. In
addition, there has been a weaker consensus on the need to control these weapons, in part because
they are viewed as less destructive than nuclear weapons. The regimes that have grown up around
these weapons, while not as extensive as the nuclear nonproliferation regime, include treaties,
supplier agreements, and domestic laws.
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BWC) are the two primary treaties related to CBW proliferation. The United States is a State
Party to both the BWC and the CWC.
Culminating 25 years of negotiations, the Chemical Weapons Convention opened for signature in 45
January 1993. The CWC entered into force on April 29, 1997, and there are 183 state parties, 46
including the United States.
For states party to the treaty, the CWC prohibits the development, production, stockpiling,
transfer, and use of chemical weapons. The Convention mandates the destruction of chemical
weapon arsenals within 10 years of its coming into force. The CWC also restricts the international
43 Prepared by Steven R. Bowman, Specialist in National Defense, and Jill Parillo, Research Associate, Foreign Affairs,
Defense, and Trade Division.
44 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, “Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat: The Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention since 2001,” Disarmament Forum, 2006.
transfer of chemicals deemed useful in the production of chemical weapons, so-called
“precursors.” Most precursor chemicals are dual-use, with legitimate peaceful applications. The
CWC establishes extensive lists or “schedules” of precursors whose production, use, and transfer
must be reported to the CWC’s Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).
The schedules are designated I - III, in order of their potential usefulness in chemical warfare.
Schedule I chemicals may be exported only to states parties (i.e., nations that have ratified the
CWC). In accordance with treaty provisions, as of April 2000, the export of Schedule II
chemicals to non-states parties became prohibited, and the extension of these export restrictions
to Schedule III chemicals is under consideration.
The Biological Weapons Convention, http://www.opbw.org/, was concluded in 1972, with U.S. 47
ratification and entry in force in 1975. The BWC has 155 states parties; 16 signatory states have 48
not yet acceded to the treaty. The Convention bans the development, production, and stockpiling
of biological agents or toxins “of types and in quantities that have no justification for peaceful
purposes.” The development, manufacture, and possession of BW weapons or delivery systems is
also prohibited. States parties also agree not to transfer biological agents or toxins for any but
The United Kingdom first tabled a draft treaty in 1968 that contained verification provisions.
Assuming the Soviet Union would reject such a proposal, the United States, with U.K. agreement,
privately negotiated a treaty text with the Soviets that did not include a verification mechanism.
On the same day in 1969, both the United States and the Soviet Union tabled identical draft
treaties. In 1969, the United States declared a unilateral end to its offensive BW program and
suggested separating the BW issue from the chemical-biological arms control negotiations in
Geneva. Negotiations on this proposal took only three years to conclude.
The CBW nonproliferation regime relies on the Australia Group and the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), http://www.opcw.org/, which was created by the
CWC. There is no independent international organization to administer the Biological Weapons
Convention. Currently, BWC member states report all defensive biological activities to the United
Nations’ Department of Disarmament Affairs. This information is reported to all BWC member
states, with the State Department as the international point of contact within the U.S. government.
In 1984, United Nations investigators officially confirmed that chemical weapons had been used
in the Iran-Iraq War. In response, the United States and several other countries began to
implement export controls on chemicals that could be used to manufacture chemical weapons. In
48 http://www.opbw.org/ or http://www.unog.ch/bwc.
1985, Australia proposed that concerned countries meet in order to coordinate their export
controls and share information to enhance their effectiveness. The first meeting took place in June
The Australia Group, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html, has established a list of
chemicals and equipment that are subject to control. In 1990, in response to growing concerns
over the proliferation of covert biological weapons programs, certain biological agents and
research/production equipment were added to the control list. Australia Group guidelines do not
call for prohibiting the export of control list items, but rather establishing monitoring and
licensing procedures, with export denial only if there is reason to suspect potential contribution to
a CBW program. The Group’s list does not curtail legitimate trade.
As noted, the Australia Group does not have an independent administrative organization. National
governments administer their own export control programs. As an informal effort, it is not based
on international treaty, is not affiliated with any international organization, and has no
independent administrative structure. It operates entirely upon consensus of its 41 members (see
Appendix A), and its decisions are not binding. Countries are admitted to membership only upon
the full consensus of current members, and must have demonstrated compliance with the CWC
and BWC, and have an effective export control regime.
The Australia Group has agreed to add controls on the transfer of information and knowledge that
could aid BW proliferation. These included “catch-all” constraints covering items that are not on
control lists, adding eight toxins to the control list, adopting controls on technology associated
with dual-use biological equipment, and agreeing to control intangible technology transfer (i.e. by
phone, fax, or internet) that could be used to advance CBW programs.
The OPCW is headquartered in The Hague. It has four components:
• Conference of States Parties—Comprises all nations who have ratified the
Convention; meets annually; has the responsibility to ensure compliance and levy
sanctions; selects the Executive Council;
• Executive Council—Comprises 41 states parties on a two-year rotation49; directs
the routine administration of the OPCW;
• Technical Secretariat—Comprises a permanent international work force;
administers and monitors treaty compliance (inspections, data collection and
• Scientific Advisory Board—Comprised of independent experts to advise the
OPCW on relevant scientific and technical issues.
49 By virtue of the treaty-prescribed method of selecting rotational members, the United States will always have a seat
on the Executive Council.
In the United States, the following offices, among others, participate in administering the CBW
export control program, with State serving as the international point of contact:
• Department of Commerce—Under Secretary of Commerce, Bureau of Industry
• Department of State—Under Secretary for Arms Control and International
Security—Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation administers the
CWC and export controls;
• Department of Defense—Deputy Under-Secretary for Technology Security
Policy and Counterproliferation;
• The Department of the Treasury oversees U.S. embargoes through its Office of
Foreign Assets Control;
• The Department of Homeland Security enforces export control through the U.S.
U.S. laws pertaining to chemical and biological weapons proliferation include statutes and
executive orders, the most important of which are the Export Administration Act and the Arms
Export Control Act. These statutes operate on the principle that licenses are required for the
export of certain goods, and that it is government policy to deny such licenses if there is a danger
that the items will contribute to CBW proliferation. In addition, bills to implement the Chemical rdth
Weapons Convention were introduced in the 103 Congress (S. 2221/H.R. 4849) and the 104 th
Congress (S. 1732), though none was reported from committee. In the 105 Congress,
implementing legislation was incorporated into the FY1999 Omnibus Appropriations Act, and
signed into law October 20, 1998 (P.L. 105-277).
(P.L. 96-72, Section 6(m) and 11C, 50 U.S.C. App. 2405m and 2410c). This act requires a license
for the export of dual-use goods or technology that “would directly and substantially” assist CBW
proliferation. Under the act, the Secretary of Commerce maintains a list of such goods. Exports to
countries which have entered into an agreement for the control of restricted goods (i.e., Australia
Group members) are exempted from licensing requirements. The EAA requires the President to
impose procurement and import sanctions on foreign persons who contribute to CBW
proliferation through exports.
Section 81 of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2798) provides the State Department the authority to maintain
licensing of the export of chemical and biological agents and munitions. It also provides criminal
50 This section drawn from CRS Report RL31502, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation Sanctions:
Selected Current Law, by Dianne E. Rennack.
penalties for violation and specifies sanctions against foreign persons who contribute to CW or
BW proliferation through exports, and against countries which use chemical or biological
weapons or make substantial preparations to do so.
This act mandates U.S. sanctions, and encourages international sanctions, against countries that
use chemical or biological weapons in violation of international law. Section 307 (22 U.S.C.
5605) requires the President to terminate foreign assistance (except humanitarian, food, and
agricultural assistance) arms sales and licenses, credits, guarantees, and certain exports to a
government of a foreign country that he has determined has used or made substantial preparation
to use chemical or biological weapons. Within three months, the President must determine and
certify to Congress that the government: is no longer using chemical or biological weapons in
violation of international law, is no longer using such weapons against its own people, has
provided credible assurances that such behavior will not resume, and is willing to cooperate with
U.N. or other international observers to verify that biological and chemical weapons are not still
in use. Without this three-month determination, sanctions are required affecting multilateral
development bank loans, U.S. bank loans or credits, exports, imports, diplomatic relations, and
aviation access to and from the United States. The President may lift the sanctions after a year,
and may waive the imposition of these sanctions.
This act (P.L. 101-298) implements the Biological Weapons Convention, providing criminal
penalties for its violation. It does not amend either the Export Administration Act or the Arms
Export Control Act.
Congress has expressed views on CW/BW nonproliferation policy and U.S. government
organization to implement those policies in several other laws. CBW-related provisions have been
included in the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992, the Freedom Support Act, and the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Act. These and other provisions are listed in Appendix B.
Effective export controls are critical tools in all international efforts to stem the proliferation of
chemical and biological weapons. The General Accountability Office (GAO) continues to find
shortcomings in the implementation of U.S. exports. In reviewing the Department of Commerce’s
administration of export controls on dual-use items (i.e. items that can be used for both legitimate
51 Title III, P.L. 102-182, 22 U.S.C. 5601-5606.
and proscribed activities), the GAO noted in June 2006 that the Department’s Bureau of Industry
and Security (BIS).
has not comprehensively analyzed available data to determine what dual-use items have
actually been exported. Further, contrary to government management standards, BIS has not
established performance measures that would provide an objective basis for assessing how 52
well the system is protecting U.S. interests.
In addition, GAO determined that BIS’s watchlist of ineligible exporters and export control
violators was incomplete and not regularly reviewed for accuracy. GAO also expressed concern
that a large number of its previous recommendations for improving controls on sensitive items
have not been implemented, thereby increasing the likelihood of improperly exporting dual-use or 53
There are three significant current issues concerning the Australia Group: (1) expansion of
membership; (2) possible transhipment of restricted commodities through AG members; and (3)
the AG’s relationship to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
The question of membership expansion has been a perennial one, as countries seek AG
membership to avoid the export controls imposed on non-members. The AG has remained
relatively small because of its inclusion only of countries seriously dedicated to CBW non-
proliferation and capable of maintaining an effective export control regime. Some have argued
that extending membership to countries such as Russia could provide greater leverage in
encouraging export control improvements. To date, however, AG members have not been
persuaded that the advantages of such action outweigh the potential for dilution of the regime’s
effectiveness and new obstacles to consensus-building.
The transhipment issue arises because AG members are exempted from the export licensing
requirements for restricted goods and technology. Member states assume that exports to AG
members will be controlled by the receiving nation’s export control regime once in that country
and therefore are not subject to unauthorized reshipment. Critics of this exemption maintain that,
in practice, monitoring unlicenced shipments is almost impossible, and that countries such as Iran
and Iraq have been able to elude export controls through multiple transhipments. This controversy
reflects the perpetual tension between nonproliferation controls and the desire for unfettered
commerce with major trading partners.
One apparent weakness in the system is related to information exchange. A 2002 GAO report
stated that, in particular, the United States failed to report 27 export license denials to AG 54
members between 1996 and 2002. In 2006, GAO reported that the State Department had not 55
acted upon corrective recommendations.
52 Improvements to Commerce’s Dual-Use System Needed, GAO-06-638, June 2006, p. 1.
53 Ibid, p. 31.
54 Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export Control Regimes, GAO-03-43. p. 1.
55 Improvements to Commerce’s Dual-Use System Needed. GAO-06-638. p. 31.
The question of the Australia Group’s relationship to the Chemical Weapons Convention revolves
around the Convention’s Article XI which declares that states parties will not:
maintain among themselves any restrictions, including those in any international agreements,
incompatible with the obligations undertaken under this Convention, which would restrict or
impede trade and the development and promotion of scientific and technological
The Australia Group maintains that its export control regime is compatible with the objectives of
the Convention, and therefore not prohibited. All AG members have agreed, however, to review
their export controls to ensure they are consistent with the Convention. A number of developing
countries, led by Iran (a CWC state party), maintain that the AG controls should be dropped—
particularly for CWC states parties. They view the controls as a tool of economic oppression on
the part of developed countries, even though no country has been able to provide an example
where AG controls have resulted in a denial of exports for legitimate purposes. This issue
continues to be pressed within the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
Some provisions of the CWC’s implementing legislation (P.L. 105-277) have raised concerns
from CWC supporters. These include
• Section 213—sets procedures for U.S. firms to seek compensation from the U.S.
government, should they suffer the loss of proprietary information through the
actions of OPCW employees. Critics, however, maintain that, as worded, this
section does not place a high enough burden of proof on the claimants, and
consequently could lead to excessive and unfounded claims against the
government. To date, no U.S. firm has sought compensation under this provision.
• Section 237—grants the President the right to deny a request for inspection if it
“may cause a threat to U.S. national security interests.” The CWC contains no
provision permitting denial of an inspection, and critics note that doing so could
place the United States in non-compliance. They maintain that even if never
exercised, this section’s existence will encourage other nations to enact similar
exemptions, thereby weakening the CWC verification regime.
• Section 253—exempts discrete organic chemicals not on the CWC control lists
and incidental chemical by-products or waste-streams from reporting and
inspection requirements. This is intended to ease potential burdens, particularly
on paper manufacturers, but critics believe the exemption is too broadly worded
and would rule out an effective non-intrusive sampling technique for inspectors.
In early 2002, the Bush Administration led a successful effort to have Jose Bustani removed as
the Director-General of the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat. Citing “disdain for the OPCW
Executive Committee” and inappropriate administrative and budgetary policies among other
charges, the State Department made a concerted and sustained effort to gain support after Bustani
refused to voluntarily resign. On April 21, 2002 the Conference of OPCW State Parties voted 48-
7, with 43 abstentions to support the U.S. position and on July 25, 2002, Ambassador Rogelio
Pfirter was confirmed as the OPCW’s new Director-General. DG Pfirter’s term was set to expire
in July 2006, but in November 2005, state parties approved another four-year term.
Though the United States attributed the OPCW’s fiscal difficulties to DG Bustani’s
mismanagement, others have pointed to the U.S. and Russia’s repeated delinquency in annual
dues payments and inspection cost reimbursements as having contributed significantly to the
OPCW’s budget shortfalls. In 2002, the United States refused to support a budget increase to
address a backlog of inspections, and was successful in having its pro-rated portion of the annual
dues reduced from 25% to 22%. With a fairly small budget at the Department of State for
international organizations, the United States regularly pays its OPCW annual dues late in the 56
fiscal year or early in the year after they are due. These actions have raised questions among
CWC supporters concerning the U.S. commitment to the OPCW. However, the United States
approved an overall OPCW budget increase of 6.7% for 2004, for a total budget to $86.5 million.
The total OPCW 2005 budget was 75.8 million Euros ($97.7 million), of which the United States
assessment was 16.7 million Euros ($21.5). The budget stabilized in 2006, at $75.6 million Euros
($95.2 million) and was only cut slightly (1.5%) for 2007. The budget for 2008 is also just over
In July 2007, the OPCW confirmed that Albania had become the first country to have destroyed
its declared CWs. Five other states—India, Libya, Russia, South Korea, and the United States—
have declared possession of CWs. All have stated that they will destroy their weapons by the
Convention’s April 29, 2012, deadline.
In April 2006, the United States submitted its formal request to the OPCW Chairman and
Director-General to extend the U.S.’s final chemical weapons destruction deadline from April 57
2007 to April 29,2012, the latest possible date allowed under the CWC. However, Ambassador
Eric Javits, U.S. Permanent Representative to the OPCW, added that “we do not expect to be able
to meet that deadline” because Washington had encountered “delays and difficulties” in 58
destroying its stockpile. These delays have generally resulted from the need to meet state and
federal environmental requirements and from both local and congressional concerns over the
means of destruction.
Reinforcing Javits’ statement, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld notified Congress in
April 2006 that destruction of the U.S. stockpile by the April 2012 deadline “was in doubt based
on the current schedules, but that the Department of Defense would continue requesting resources
needed to complete destruction as close to the 2012 deadline as practicable.”
The United States destroyed 50% of its stockpile as of December 10, 2007.59 Washington projects
that its five operating destruction facilities will have destroyed 90% of the total U.S. stockpile by 60
2017. Two other facilities under construction will destroy the remaining chemical agents
56 Dr. Paul Walker, Weapons of Mass Destruction Program Director, Global Green USA, Interviewed by CRS Research
Associate, Jill M. Parillo, February 8, 2007, Washington, DC.
57 Ambassador Eric Javits, U.S. Permanent Representative to the OPCW, Statement Concerning Request to Extend the
United States’ Destruction Deadline Under the Chemical Weapons Convention, April 20, 2006. Available at
59 “Army Destroys Half of Chemical Stockpile,” APG News, January17, 2008. Available at
60 The United States has destroyed all of its chemical weapons munitions. As of June 2007, its remaining stockpile
consisted of GB (also known as sarin) and VX nerve agents, as well as mustard, a blister agent. See Chemical
Demilitarization: Additional Management Actions Needed to Meet Key Performance Goals of DOD’s Chemical
Demilitarization Program, GAO-08-134, December 2007, pp. 12-13.
stockpiles located at Pueblo, CO, and Lexington, KY. A 2007 estimate from the Department of
Defense’s Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) program states that these 61
stockpiles will be destroyed by 2020 and 2023, respectively. But Sec. 8119 of the 2008 Defense
Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-116) requires the Defense Department to “complete work on the
destruction” of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile” by the 2012 deadline “and in no
circumstances later than December 31, 2017.” In response, ACWA has “initiated an assessment of
potential opportunities for accelerating the destruction of the Colorado and Kentucky chemical 62
Although the CWC, unlike the BWC, has a strong verification mechanism, which currently
employs over 180 inspectors, verification is a fundamental challenge to the success of the CWC.
This verification mechanism allows for the CWC to meet evolving challenges to the
implementation of the CWC, yet to successfully do so, the OPCW must intensify its oversight
capacity. This would call for greater financial support from key Member States in order to
increase the inspectorate and enable the OPCW to do more inspections in a shorter amount of
time. The fact that many toxic chemicals could be used for either military or peaceful purposes
and new synthetic compounds are continually developed with toxic properties, adds to challenges 63
in CWC verification. Under the verification system, facilities developing chemicals never
before used in warfare are given less scrutiny than facilities that once developed warfare agents, 64
leaving newly developed toxins with future warfare potential insufficiently monitored.
This facility issue could also become an issue in respect to biochemicals. The international
community may run into a definitional problem in respect to these chemicals, and they could be
detrimental to the purposes of the convention. Synthetic biology is a new powerful technology 65
which attempts to assemble new microbial genomes from a set of standardized genetic parts.
These components could be natural genes applied for new purposes or natural genes redesigned to
function more efficiently, or artificial genes that have been designed and synthesized from 66
scratch. Biochemicals developed in synthetic biology produced from natural genes would not be
within the scope of CWC verification criteria and may instead fall under the biological weapons
regime. Since the biological weapons regime lacks a verification mechanism the development of
biochemicals for warfare may be left unmonitored by the international community. Dr. Malcolm
Dando, co-director of Bradford University’s project on Biological and Toxin Weapons
61 See ACWA Cost and Schedule Information. Available at http://www.pmacwa.army.mil/ip/dl/
62 ACWA Quarterly Brief, December 2007. Available at http://www.pmacwa.army.mil/ip/dl/
Additionally, Sec. 922 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181) requires that the
Secretary of Defense submit a report to Congress which includes the “anticipated schedule at the time of such report for
the completion of destruction of chemical agents, munitions, and materiel at each chemical weapons demilitarization
facility in the United States” and a “description of the options and alternatives for accelerating the completion of
chemical weapons destruction at each such facility, particularly in time to meet the destruction deadline of April 29,
2012, currently provided by the Chemical Weapons Convention, and by December 31, 2017.” ACWA’s December
brief states that “Defense Department officials will meet with Congress by next summer to discuss the acceleration
options and come to an agreement on the path forward.”
63 Jonathan B. Tucker, “Verifying the Chemical Weapons Ban: Missing Elements,” Arms Control Today,
January/February 2007. Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_01-02/Tucker.asp?print.
64 Ibid, Tucker.
65 Jonathan B. Tucker and Zilinskas, Raymond A., “The Promise and Perils of Synthetic Biology,” The New Atlantis,
Spring 2006, pg. 25-45.
66 Ibid, Tucker and Zilinskas.
Convention, has pointed out that the entire threat spectrum from biochemicals must be addressed.
He wrote that
[T]here is an overlap between the scope of the CWC and the BTWC in relation to mid-spectrum
agents such as chemical incapacitants. In short, we have to deal with the control of a biochemical
threat spectrum ranging from classical lethal chemical agents, industrial chemicals, bioregulators
and toxins (covered by the CWC) through bioregulators, toxins, classical biological agents and 67
genetically modified biological agents (covered by the BTWC).
For most of the 1990s, BWC state parties sought ways to address the BWC’s lack of compliance
verification and enforcement provisions. The most extensive effort to draft an adaptation protocol
regarding these issues all but collapsed at the last BWC Review Conference in November 2001.
After ten years of negotiation, the United States declared the adaptation protocol draft
unacceptable, and rejected it as a basis for further negotiation. In rejecting the draft protocol, the
Bush Administration stated that
The draft Protocol will not improve our ability to verify BWC compliance. It will not
enhance our confidence in compliance and will do little to deter those countries seeking to
develop biological weapons. In our assessment, the draft Protocol would put national 68
security and confidential business information at risk
At the same time, the United States introduced a number of proposals which it suggested that
nations undertake on a unilateral basis to enhance biological weapons non-proliferation. These
• enact strict national criminal legislation against prohibited BW activities with
strong extradition requirements;
• establish an effective United Nations procedure for investigating suspicious
outbreaks or allegations of biological weapons use;
• establish procedures for addressing BWC compliance concerns;
• commit to improving international disease control and to enhance mechanisms
for sending expert response teams to cope with outbreaks;
• establish sound national oversight mechanisms for the security and genetic
engineering of pathogenic organisms;
• devise a solid framework for bioscientists in the form of a code of ethical conduct
that would have universal recognition; and
• promote responsible conduct in the study, use, modification, and shipment of
67 Malcolm Dando, “Scientific and Technological Change and the Future of the CWC: The Problem of Non-Lethal
Weapons,” Disarmament Forum, No. 4, 2002. p. 37.
68 Statement by the United States to the Ad Hoc Group of Biological Weapons Convention States Parties, Geneva,
Switzerland, July 25, 2001.
In the wake of the U.S. statement, the Review Conference was unable to reach consensus on a
final conference declaration. Many in the arms control community criticized the U.S. position as 69
“self-imposed isolation from the mainstream of BWC diplomacy.” In light of continued U.S.
opposition, the chairman of the November 2001 Review Conference, presented a minimal
program at a resumed session of the Review Conference in 2002. The program emphasized only
annual meetings to discuss strengthening national laws and ways to respond to BW attacks. The
United States, which did not attend the resumed 2002 session, endorsed this work program.
Expert-level meetings have focused on, among other things, maintaining security of pathogens,
enhancing capabilities to respond to outbreaks, broadening mechanisms for surveillance,
improving the ability to combat infectious disease, and creating codes of conduct for scientists.
The last BWC Review Conference was held from November 20 to December 8, 2006. State
parties came to consensus over a Final Document, which extended the series of annual meetings
started in the previous intersessional period and provided a mandate for the next BWC Review
Conference. The intersessional meetings will take place from 2007 to 2010 for two weeks each th
year. The mandate for the next (7) BWC Review Conference, as stated in the 2006 Final
Document, is that the next Review Conference will be held in 2011 and will review:
• the operation of the Convention, taking into account, new scientific and
technological developments relevant to the Convention,
• the progress made by States Parties on the implementation of the obligations
under the Convention,
• progress of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations agreed
upon at the Sixth Review Conference.
At the 2006 Review Conference, BWC State Parties also decided to expand the Geneva-based
Secretariat’s role and add Arabic as an official language to the BWC.
Some observers expressed disappointment that little was accomplished at this last Review
Conference. Alan Pearson, Director of the DC-based Center for Arms Control and Non-
Proliferation’s Biological and Chemical Weapons Control Program, said that although experts had
high hopes of success, “because it appeared that the United States and many other nations had
come to agree in principle on a wide range of proactive measures to strengthen the Convention,”
however continued tension between developing and developed nations destroyed any chance of
major success towards strengthening the Convention: For example, consensus was not found on
topics such as, an “action plan” to improve national implementation of treaty obligations, an
effort to enhance transparency of “dual-use” biodefense activities, and annual review of treaty 70
implementation. “As biotechnology increases its global spread in the future, it will only become
more important to find ways to achieve balance and reduce this tension...otherwise, efforts to
prevent the misuse of the life sciences and biotechnology will continue to break upon the rocks of 71
economic competition,” said Pearson.
69 Nicholas Sims, “Route-Map to OPBW: Using the Fifth Review Conference,” Chemical and Biological Weapons
Convention Bulletin, No. 56, June 2002, p. 2.
70 Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference Ends in Modest Success,” BWC Observer: Center for Arms
Control and Nonproliferation, December 8, 2006. Available at http://www.bwc06.org/ngo-activities/
Although tension over a verification mechanism is not fully alleviated, common ground to
improve the BWC exists. At the April 2006 Preparatory Committee for the Sixth Review
Conference, in contrast to the U.S. position, the Group of Non-Aligned States, the European
Union, and a new grouping of Latin American states, all reasserted that a verification mechanism 72
remained their long-term goal. However, all State Parties do share a common interest in
improving capabilities to respond to disease outbreak (natural or intentional) and to prevent non-73
state actors from obtaining bioweapons. States with advanced technology and systems of
reporting and surveying disease can share information with states less advanced in these areas.
Keeping bioscience work transparent and keeping a good system of reporting can help states
distinguish between basic research and weapons-intended research—this is another area where
information sharing could take place. Establishment of a shared information/technology link
between the World Health Organization (WHO) and the BWC has also been discussed among
BWC participants as a way to strengthen implementation. However, the level of cooperation
several Member States legally approved for the WHO is different from what they approved for
BWC. For this reason, in several cases a direct link between the two regimes would not be
feasible without a change in law.
The 6th BWC Review Conference, held in December 2006, could not reach consensus on a
comprehensive set of guidelines for national implementation of the Convention owing to
differences between the United States and the non-aligned nations group over technology transfer
control issues. The assumption of the United States’ opposition also precluded consideration of
enhanced verification or enforcement provisions for the Convention. The Conference did th
establish a new program of work for annual meetings, which are to take place before the 7
Review Conference in 2011, for discussion and information exchanges on a variety of issues,
including domestic enforcement of BWC provisions, pathogen security, and oversight of
potentially dual-use research. The United States required, however, that these sessions be
prohibited from reaching binding decisions, reserving that for the next Review Conference. The
first meeting under the new program of work was held December 10-14 in Geneva.
As with the CWC, many developing nations, again headed by Iran, are seeking removal of
Australia Group controls and increased biotechnical cooperation in exchange for accepting any
enhancements to the BWC.
The 109th Congress considered measures to improve domestic preparedness against bioterrorism,
including reauthorizing funding to enhance state and local public health infrastructure and the 74
possible creation of the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA).
BARDA, under the aegis of the Department of Health and Human Services, would help
coordinate federal efforts to develop antidotes and vaccines against biological weapons and th
infectious diseases. The 109 Congress also oversaw development of a National Biodefense
Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC). The NBACC program was initiated to identify
72 Richard Lennan, “Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat: The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention since 2001,”
Disarmament Forum, Three: 2006. Available at http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2509.pdf.
73 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (para 2) mandates states to adopt and enforce laws that prohibit
non-state actors from manufacturing or acquiring bioweapons.
74 For more information on biological terrorism countermeasures, see CRS Report RS21507, Project BioShield:
Purposes and Authorities, by Frank Gottron.
potential biological threats by assessing vulnerabilities and potential consequences, while also
developing a national capability to conduct forensic analysis of evidence from bio-crimes and
terrorism. Given the difficulty of differentiating between offensive and defensive BW research,
some observers have suggested that initiatives such as NBACC could raise questions among
BWC member states about U.S. activities, particularly in the absence of formal verification or th
additional confidence-building measures. Congressional oversight in the 110 Congress could be
key in maintaining transparency in biodefense. The overlapping responsibilities of Health and
Human Services, Homeland Security, and other federal agencies, and the expansion of laboratory th
capacity for high biosafety pathogens are policy issues that may be of interest to the 110 75
In the early 1980s, the United States and its allies became concerned over the rapid spread of
missiles as the advanced industrial nations’ monopoly on missile technology gave way to a
diffusion of missiles and missile technology throughout much of the world. In April 1987, the
United States, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom created the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to limit the proliferation of missiles capable of 77
delivering nuclear weapons. Thirty-four countries are now partners in the MTCR. In addition,
China, Israel, Romania, and the Slovak Republic have agreed to observe MTCR guidelines but
without becoming MTCR partners. Israel additionally has completed a memorandum of
understanding with the United States affirming its commitment to abide by MTCR guidelines.
The Regime is based on the premise that foreign acquisition and development of missiles can be
delayed and made more difficult and expensive if major producers agree to control exports of
missiles and the equipment and technology used in missile production. The MTCR is similar in
this regard to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement.
It differs from the nuclear, chemical, and biological non-proliferation regimes in that the MTCR
is not supported by a treaty and has no international organization to verify or enforce compliance.
Rather, the MTCR is a set of common export control guidelines adopted and administered
independently by each of the partner nations.
The specific missile equipment and technology subject to the guidelines is described in an annex
to the MTCR Guidelines and divided into two categories. Each of the member countries is to
exercise particular restraint in considering transfers of items in Category I which include
complete rocket systems and unmanned air vehicle (UAV) systems capable of delivering a 500-
kilogram (1,100-pound) payload to a range of 300 kilometers (186 miles) or more, and complete
subsystems of such missiles and vehicles. There is a strong presumption by the MTCR to deny
transfers of these systems and components. The guidelines further state the transfer of Category I
production facilities will not be authorized. Export restraints are to be applied to Category II
items, which consist of other components, equipment, material, and technology that would be
usable in the production of missiles and UAVs. Category II also includes, at item number 19,
complete rocket systems and UAVs with a 300-km range but not capable of delivering a 500-kg
75 CRS Report RL32891, The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress, by
Dana A. Shea.
76 Prepared by Steven A. Hildreth, Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
77 See Appendix A for a list of current partners.
payload to that range (as covered by Category I), and in item number 20, individual rocket stages
and rocket engines and production equipment usable for systems with a range of 300 km with less
than a 500-kg payload.
In January 1993, MTCR partners revised the guidelines to limit the risks of proliferation of
missile delivery systems for all weapons of mass destruction: chemical and biological weapons as
well as nuclear weapons. The guidelines now call for particular restraint and the presumption to
deny transfers of any missiles (whether or not they are included in the annex) and of any items in
the annex if the government judges that they are intended to be used for the delivery of weapons 78
of mass destruction. This addition is commonly referred to as a “catch-all” clause.
The MTCR has undergone a transformation from a small group of Western industrial countries to
a more inclusive group of countries. Argentina, with its Condor II missile program, was originally
one of the primary targets of the Regime, but that country terminated development of Condor II
and is now a full partner in the MTCR. South Africa and Brazil had active missile programs but
are now partners. Whereas the Soviet Union was the primary source for missiles to the Third
World in the 1970s and 1980s, Russia has become a partner in the MTCR, although the United
States has sanctioned Russian organizations for improper exports to Iran. China has been, and still
is, another significant supplier of missiles and missile technology to developing countries but has
committed to observing the MTCR guidelines and pledged not to transfer surface-to-surface
missiles that meet the MTCR thresholds. In spite of these commitments, Russian and Chinese
organizations and individuals continue to supply components and technical assistance for missile
North Korea has become the primary supplier of missiles and missile technology to developing
countries. Iran, Syria, India, and Pakistan are the other countries of major concern regarding the
development and acquisition of missiles. Missile programs in China, Egypt, and South Korea
have also caused concern in Washington. Cruise missiles have always been included with ballistic
missiles and space-launch vehicles in the MTCR but are now receiving greater attention as
advanced propulsion and guidance technology is becoming more widely available.
The United States long ago stated its support for expanding membership of the MTCR “to include
additional countries that subscribe to international non-proliferation standards, enforce effective 79
export controls, and abandon offensive ballistic missile programs.” The United States will not
support space launch programs in non-MTCR countries but will consider exports of MTCR items
for use in space-launch programs by MTCR countries on a case-by-case basis. The United States
and other MTCR countries are promoting regional efforts to reduce the demand for missiles and
persuade countries to forgo the acquisition of missiles.
78 According to the guidelines, the government judgment on the likely use of the missile items will be made, “on the
basis of all available, persuasive information, evaluated according to factors including:
A. Concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
B. The capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programs of the recipient state;
C. The significance of the transfer in terms of the potential development of delivery systems (other than manned
aircraft) for weapons of mass destruction;
D. The assessment of the end-use of the transfers, including the relevant assurances of the recipient states...; and
E. The applicability of relevant multilateral agreements.”
79 U.S. Department of State, Reprint of White House Press Release, Non-Proliferation and Export Control Policy,
September 27, 1993.
Some nations have not joined the MTCR, affirming their sovereign right to acquire, develop,
deploy, and export missiles. It has been particularly difficult to control dual-use technologies
which may be used for civilian space launch vehicles, civil aviation, general industry, and tactical
weapons. MTCR member states have been working since about 1999 on a complementary effort
which has become known as the International Code of Conduct (ICOC) Against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation. On November 25, 2002, the ICOC entered into force and the United States was an
initial subscribing member. The Code includes broad principles, general commitments and
modest confidence-building measures. The United States sees the ICOC as “an important addition
to the wide range of tools available to countries to impede and roll back this proliferation 80
threat.” The code attempts to fill the gap of demand-side incentives by offering “cooperation”
with respect to civilian space-launch vehicle technology in exchange for significant
nonproliferation commitments. However, such cooperation is to be worked out between states
and is not specified in the draft document, making incentives for cooperation appear a bit elusive.
Although the MTCR has no international organization, partner countries hold monthly meetings
in Paris among embassy representatives (called “points of contact” meetings), hold technical
experts’ meetings (including information exchanges) and convene a plenary once each year. In
this manner, partners revise the guidelines and the equipment annex and admit new partners. At
the Madrid 2005 Plenary, partners emphasized that the threat of proliferation of WMD delivery
systems constitutes a threat to international peace and security and stressed the need to reduce the
risks associated with terrorism in this regard.
The Office of Defense Trade Controls of the State Department administers the regulations
governing the export of items on the Munitions List—those items that are subject to controls
under the AECA and the ITAR. The Bureau of Industry and Security in the U.S. Department of
Commerce administers the regulations governing the export of items on the Commerce Control
List—those items that are primarily for civilian use but have applications for the development,
testing, or production of missiles.
The Missile Technology Export Control Committee is an interagency group, chaired by a State
Department official, that reviews controversial missile export license cases. The Missile Trade
Analysis Group, another interagency group chaired by a State Department representative, reviews
intelligence reports on diversions of missile technology from legitimate recipients to others.
Officials in the State Department’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation and
regional bureaus also undertake diplomatic initiatives to dissuade additional nations from
developing missiles, to persuade other countries to adopt export controls on missile technology,
and to reduce the perceived need for missiles.
80 John R. Bolton, Remarks at the Launching Conference for the ICOC, The Hague, The Netherlands, November 25,
2002. See http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/15488.htm.
Department of Defense officials have established a counter-proliferation policy that addresses
export controls, security relationships with friendly and hostile countries, defensive and offensive
military operational concepts, and equipment. Many organizations within the Department
implement the various aspects of the counter-proliferation policy, but the Assistant Secretary for
International Security Policy has the primary responsibility for counter-proliferation policy
The Department of the Treasury also oversees U.S. embargoes through its Office of Foreign
Assets Control, and helps enforce export controls through the U.S. Customs Service.
The United States has maintained stringent controls on missiles and missile technology under the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (22
C.F.R. Part 121, hereafter the ITAR).
In the early 1980s, the United States also unilaterally adopted tighter export controls on dual-use
equipment and technology that could benefit foreign missile programs. Dual-use controls have
been placed in the Export Administration Regulations (15 C.F.R. 730-799) pursuant to the
authority of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.) and the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). Successive
administrations have updated regulations to reflect changes adopted by the MTCR, changes in
U.S. law, and the changing international political environment. The Export Administration Act of
1979 has expired several times, but the President has invoked his authority to continue in effect
the system of controls that had been maintained under the act.
Members of Congress became interested in missile proliferation in the mid-1980s because of
evidence of Third World missile development and acquisition programs and because the
developing threat was an additional consideration in funding research into ballistic missile
defenses. Libya had purchased Soviet Scud missiles and Iran and Iraq were firing missiles at each
other. Congress had little or no involvement in shaping the MTCR, since it was neither a treaty
nor an executive agreement. Soon after the Regime was announced in April 1987, it became
apparent that companies and individuals from a number of MTCR member countries (such as
West Germany, Italy, Britain, and France) were transferring goods and technical assistance to
missile development teams in Argentina, Brazil, Iraq, Egypt, and elsewhere. In 1987, the United
States also learned that China had transferred intermediate range missiles to Saudi Arabia. Many
Members of Congress thought the MTCR needed enforcement mechanisms, additional members,
and stricter compliance.
Several bills were introduced in the 101st Congress with the intention of strengthening the U.S.
position on missile nonproliferation. Several bills that included sanctions against nations,
companies, and individuals who violate the MTCR guidelines gained widespread bipartisan
congressional support. Bush Administration officials maintained that the President already had
sufficient authority to reprimand or sanction foreign governments, companies, and individuals for
inappropriate missile transfers and objected to the imposition of mandatory statutory sanctions.
President George H.W. Bush pocket-vetoed the Export Administration Act of 1990, which
81 This section drawn from CRS Report RL31502, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation Sanctions:
Selected Current Law, by Dianne E. Rennack.
included a missile nonproliferation provision, as well as the Chemical and Biological Weapons
Control Act. However, he signed the defense authorization bill that contained a nearly identical
section on missile nonproliferation policy.
The act became law in the 101st Congress (H.R. 4739, Title XVII of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, P.L. 101-510). It added Chapter 7 to the Arms Export
Control Act, sections 6(l) and 11B to the Export Administration Act of 1979, and established an
annual reporting requirement. Chapter 7 of the AECA has been amended several times.
(22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) Chapter 7 of the AECA requires the President to impose sanctions on
U.S. and foreign individuals who improperly conduct trade in controlled missile technology. If a
person inappropriately transfers MTCR Category II goods or technology, he/she will be denied,
for two years, any U.S. Government contracts relating to missile equipment or technology, and
U.S. export licenses for missile equipment and technology. The AECA requires sanctions for at
least two years if a person inappropriately transfers Category I items; these include denial of all
U.S. Government contracts and export licenses for any item on the U.S. Munitions List. If the
President determines that a foreign person has substantially contributed to the design,
development, or production of missiles by a non-MTCR country, he shall prohibit for at least two
years U.S. imports of items produced by that person. The act includes presidential waivers,
exclusions, determination requirements, and definitions that allow the Administration to take no
action in certain circumstances.
These sanctions may be waived by the President, and they generally do not apply to transfers of
missile goods or technology to an MTCR adherent or from an MTCR adherent. The United States
has imposed missile sanctions against entities in several countries including China, Pakistan,
South Africa, North Korea, Iran, Russia, India, Syria, and Egypt.
(Sections 6 (l) and 11B, 50 U.S.C. app. 2405 and app. 2410b). Similarly, the EAA requires
controls on U.S. missile-related exports and sanctions against U.S. and foreign persons who
improperly transfer dual-use goods or technology listed in the MTCR annex. If a person
improperly transfers Category II goods or technology, he will be denied export licenses for two
years for missile equipment and technology controlled under the EAA. If a person improperly
exports Category I goods or technology, he will be denied export licenses for at least two years
for all items controlled under the EAA. If a foreign person exports goods or technology that
substantially contribute to the design, development, or production of missiles in a non-MTCR
country, he will be denied license to import his products into the United States for at least two
years. Actions that trigger sanctions under the provisions of either the AECA or the EAA, require
commensurate sanctions under the other act.
Over the years, Congress has called for additional sanctions, expressed views on nonproliferation
policies related to missiles or advanced conventional weapons, and expressed views on the
organization of the U.S. Government to implement those policies in several other laws. There are
provisions related to missile proliferation in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Iran and
Syria Nonproliferation Act of 2006, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992, the
Freedom Support Act, and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act. These and other laws are listed
in Appendix B.
A perennial problem is whether the MTCR and the associated U.S. sanctions are effective enough
to warrant the economic and political costs to the United States, and whether additional or
alternative feasible measures would increase effectiveness.
Many analysts consider the MTCR a successful vehicle of quiet diplomacy. The MTCR has been
credited with slowing missile development in Brazil and India, and blocking a collaborative
program of Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq to build the Condor missile. This missile would have been
a significant improvement over the Scud-based missiles used by Iraq in the Gulf War. Russia and
China have probably stopped exporting entire missiles that fall under the parameters of the
MTCR, but continue to transfer components and technology. Most European countries and Asian
allies have tightened their export control laws and some have prosecuted individuals who have
smuggled missile technology as well as nuclear and chemical production technology. Accurate
long-range missiles are expensive and difficult to develop and produce. Because most countries
cannot produce and integrate all of the sophisticated components required, the MTCR and
complementary export controls will probably continue to impede development of the most
The major current challenge, however, is that much of the international commerce in missiles and
missile technology occurs between nations that do not adhere to MTCR guidelines. China and
North Korea are not members, although China promised to observe the guidelines after the
United States had twice imposed economic sanctions on Chinese companies for transferring
missile items to Pakistan, on the condition that the United States would lift those sanctions. North
Korea’s missile development, production, deployment, and export of missiles has apparently not
been hindered by the MTCR. In particular, North Korean exports of missile production
technology to Iran, Pakistan, Syria, and Egypt seriously undercut the international standards and
goals of the Regime. In the view of some analysts, the activities of North Korea demonstrate the
failure of the MTCR and the necessity of the other measures.
Some difficulties associated with the nuclear, chemical, and biological nonproliferation regimes
may be even more acute with respect to missile technology. The notion of a suppliers’ regime
dividing the world into “haves” and have-nots” is even more exacerbated in the case of missiles,
since there is no treaty and no quid pro quo for the have-nots. The International Code of Conduct
is an attempt to address this “carrot” side of the carrot-stick equation, but the lack of specificity
on incentives is viewed by some as too limited and by others as too potentially expansive. Also,
there is a common perception that technology is shared among MTCR members, although the
guidelines call for the strong presumption of denial of Category I-class missiles and technology to
anyone. The U.S. decision in 2002 to elaborate what constitutes “rare occasions” (wherein 82
Category I presumption of denials could be overruled) lends credence to this view.
Further, while many of the materials associated with nuclear weapons can be identified and
controlled, the materials and components used in missiles are commonly used in a wide range of
commercial manufacturing processes. Ballistic missiles can be nearly indistinguishable from
civilian space launch vehicles, and some missile production equipment, technology, and materials
are difficult to distinguish from civilian items. This is particularly acute in the case of UAVs.
As developing nations become increasingly capable of producing missiles indigenously, the
effectiveness of supplier controls is gradually being eroded. A growing list of nations now
produce ballistic missiles and are increasingly less dependent on imported materials. Some
analysts see attempts to control missile technology exports as futile and argue for the fewest
export restrictions possible, emphasizing the importance to the U.S. economy of exports. Others
say the U.S. Government should not allow the export of any goods that are likely to harm U.S.
national security, despite the potential effect on some American business interests.
In addition to the promotion of exports, other foreign policy and national security goals may also
compete with missile nonproliferation for government attention and action. For instance, U.S.
leaders hope to encourage Russia and China to become stable and responsible actors in their
regions and in the international community, to pursue economic and political reforms, and to
respect internationally recognized human rights. The United States seeks the cooperation of those
two countries and many others in efforts to block nuclear proliferation, terrorism, drug
trafficking, and organized crime. Although missile nonproliferation will remain an issue of utmost
importance, other goals may occasionally be given greater emphasis. However, when political
leaders suspend missile nonproliferation policies in favor of other goals, the credibility of the
U.S. missile policy and that of the MTCR are damaged. It can become more difficult to persuade
other countries to comply with a set of standards when the United States appears to enforce the
standards on a selective basis. The priority to be given to missile nonproliferation has
occasionally been a point of contention between Congress and the administration.
Congress has established economic sanctions that must be imposed on companies that trade in
missile technology contrary to the MTCR guidelines. The imposition, lifting, and waiving of
these sanctions frequently cause controversy. Some analysts suggest these negative actions should
be coupled with positive incentives to induce countries to refrain from proliferation. Positive
incentives could include trade credits, development assistance, military assistance, technology
transfers, access to space launch and satellite capabilities, or security guaranties. But other
analysts contend the security benefits derived from adhering to the MTCR should be sufficient
and that the United States should not try to buy compliance.
According to many foreign policy specialists, the underlying political and security problems that
drive proliferation must be resolved before meaningful curbs can be applied to the spread of
weapons of mass destruction and missiles. The United States and its partners in the MTCR have
helped countries, particularly neighbors in regions of ongoing conflict, to adopt confidence-
82 Testimony given by Vann Van Diepen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Proliferation Controls in a hearing
before Senate Government Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal
Services, June 11, 2002.
building measures such as those that have contributed to security and cooperation in Europe.
They also try to help correct regional imbalances of military forces and to facilitate peace
negotiations and arms control talks.
Security alliances and military assistance can play a role in restraining missile development. The
U.S. security umbrella over Western Europe and parts of Asia and the transfer of large quantities
of advanced conventional weapons helped to dissuade a number of U.S. allies from developing
weapons of mass destruction and helped deter aggression. Some analysts contend that the security
of some allies was enhanced by the deterrent power of U.S. nuclear-armed missiles previously
deployed in their territory or, possibly in the case of Israel, by indigenous weapons. The U.S.
Government has also decided that it is appropriate to sell missiles (U.S. Army Tactical Missile
Systems) with a potential range of 250 km to Turkey, Greece, South Korea, Britain, France, and
Germany, though it forbids sales of missiles with a range of 300 km. However, the superiority of
U.S. military technology may actually persuade some adversary countries to develop weapons of
mass destruction and missiles as their best means of deterring U.S. intervention.
Some analysts see missile defense systems as a proper alternative to export controls, though most
see them as supplementing other military, political, and economic measures (including export
controls and sanctions). The United States will probably deploy theater and national missile
defense systems and has provided defensive missiles to some allies in Europe, East Asia, and the
Middle East. As the United States seeks to increase defense cooperation in the area of missile
defenses, issues could arise about the applicability of MTCR guidelines. One particular case
where questions have arisen is the proposed transfer of Arrow missile defense systems from Israel 83
to India, which requires U.S. approval. Air defense missiles and anti-theater ballistic missiles
probably enhance the security of U.S. allies, but none are expected to be 100 percent effective. In
some cases, such as Taiwan, deployments might increase tensions. The Administration and
Congress will have to weigh carefully defense policy objectives against nonproliferation policy
objectives in this area.
83 In a hearing on Multilateral Nonproliferation Regimes of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, July 29,
2002, Vann Van Diepen, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Proliferation Controls, stated that the Arrow
interceptor is a MTCR Category-1 class missile and that Israel would have to go through the necessary procedures to
decide it could overcome a strong presumption of denial to make such a sale.
NSG (45) MTCR (34) Australia Group (41)
Argentinaa Argentina Argentina
Australiaa Australia Australia
Austriaa Austria Austria
Belgiuma Belgium Belgium
Bulgariaa Bulgaria Bulgaria
Canadaa Canada Canada
Czech Republica Czech Republic Czech Republic
Denmarka Denmark Denmark
Finlanda Finland Finland
Francea France France
Germanya Germany Germany
Greecea Greece Greece
Hungarya Hungary Hungary
Irelanda Ireland Ireland
Italya Italy Italy
Japana Japan Japan
Luxembourga Luxembourg Luxembourg
Netherlandsa Netherlands Netherlands
New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand
Norwaya Norway Norway
Polanda Poland Poland
Portugala Portugal Portugal
NSG (45) MTCR (34) Australia Group (41)
Russian Federationa Russian Federation
South Africaa South Africa
South Koreaa South Korea South Korea
Spaina Spain Spain
Swedena Sweden Sweden
Switzerlanda Switzerland Switzerland
Turkeya Turkey Turkey
Ukrainea Ukraine Ukraine
United Kingdoma United Kingdom United Kingdom
United Statesa United States United States
a. Zangger member.
Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, Title VII, Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, P.L. 104-293, 50 U.S.C. 2301 note.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Title XVI, Arms Control Matters,
Nonproliferation Provisions, P.L. 103-160.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Title XV, Arms Control Matters,
Nonproliferation Provisions, P.L. 103-337; 22 U.S.C. 2751 note.
Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act of 1992, Title XV, National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1993, P.L. 102-484; 22 U.S.C. 5859a begins at section 1505 of Act.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Title V, Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical Weapons Restrictions, P.L. 104-132, 18 U.S.C. 831 note, and 2331, 42 U.S.C. 262
note, 50 U.S.C. 1522 note.
Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1994, Title VIII, Part A, Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, P.L. 103-236, 22 U.S.C. 2551 note.
Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, Title XIV, National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, P.L. 104-201, 50 U.S.C. 2301 note.
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Title XI and XIII: Verification of Arms
Control and Nonproliferation Agreements, Assistance - P.L. 107-228 (Sec. 1101) 22 USC
Executive Order 13382 (June 28, 2005, 70 FR 38567) Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters.
Executive Order 13222 (August 17, 2001, 66 FR 44025, August 22, 2001) Continuation of Export
Control Regulations, upon the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979.
Continued on August 15, 2002 by notice published in Federal Register on August 16, 2002.
Executive Order 13128 (June 25, 1999, 99FR 16634) Implementation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act.
Executive Order 13049 (June 11, 1997, 62 FR 32471) Organization for the Prohibition of
Executive Order 13030 (December 12, 1996, 61 FR 66187) Administration of Foreign Assistance
and Arms Exports.
Executive Order 12938 (November 14, 1994, 59 F.R. 59-9, 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) Declares the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery as an unusual and
extraordinary threat and declares a national emergency to deal with that threat.
Amended by EO 13094 (July 28, 1998, 63 FR40803 and by EO 13128 (June 25, 1999, 64 FR
Executive Order 12946 (January 20, 1995, 60 F.R. 4829, 22 U.S.C. 2551 note) Establishes the
President’s Advisory Board on Arms Proliferation Policy.
Executive Order 12851 (June 11, 1993, 58 F.R. 33181, 22 U.S.C. 2797 note) Delegates
President’s authority under the Export Administration Act, Arms Control Export Act, and the
Chemical and Biological Weapons Control, Warfare Elimination Act, National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1993, and Foreign Relations Authorizations Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993,
to the Secretaries of State, Commerce, Defense, and Treasury, and Director of ACDA.
Executive Order 11850 (April 8, 1975, 40 F.R. 16187, 50 U.S.C. 1511 note) Renunciation of
certain uses in war of chemical herbicides and riot control agents.
Mary Beth Nikitin, Coordinator Steve Bowman
Analyst in Nonproliferation
Paul K. Kerr Steven A. Hildreth
Analyst in Nonproliferation Specialist in Missile Defense
email@example.com, 7-8693 firstname.lastname@example.org, 7-7635