Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict

Report for Congress
Kashmiri Separatists:
Origins, Competing Ideologies, and
Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict
September 30, 2002
Kaia Leather
Foreign Affairs Analyst
Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies,
and Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict
Summary
The recent military standoff and threatened nuclear exchange between India and
Pakistan have lately focused congressional attention on the longstanding territorial
dispute over the former princely state of Kashmir. Although recent trips to the region
by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage have dampened the rhetoric of both nations’ leaders, state elections set for
October of 2002 on the Indian side of the Line of Control raise the specter of more
violence in the disputed area and a continued threat of war. And although Pakistani
President Pervez Musharraf has largely reduced infiltrations by Islamic militants into
Jammu and Kashmir state in India, recent reports indicate that this may be an
unsustainable long-term policy for any Pakistani leader, at least in the country’s
current political climate. Thus despite India’s insistence that the Kashmiri
insurgency is a domestic issue and adamant rejection of any international
intervention, the dispute has been seen by many State Department officials as “that
other conflict” whose nuclear character may make the dispute as dangerous to
regional stability as that of the most recent round of Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
This report focuses exclusively on the uprising in the Indian-controlled portion
of Kashmir, which has been disputed since both countries became independent in
1947. By many accounts the uprising began when anger over an allegedly rigged
election in 1987 became a militant insurgency by 1989. Since the end of the 1999
fighting in Kargil, which U.S. officials say came close to becoming a full scale war,
the uprising has become the central point of contention between the two countries.
India believes that Pakistan is using Islamic militant attacks to fight a proxy war over
Kashmir, while Pakistan accuses India of refusing to engage in meaningful
negotiation. Examining both the Indian and Pakistani strategies and perspectives in
Kashmir, this report outlines the various parties to the conflict, including descriptions
of the main militant groups active in Kashmir, and provides an analysis of three
possible settlements that policy makers have recently proposed for the region.
Many have argued that militant forces and political leaders in the Kashmir
insurgency have, in recent years, begun to fall into two competing groups. The first
group has a Kashmiri nationalist, or Kashmiriyat, vision of the former princely state,
and is largely struggling for complete independence from both India and Pakistan.
The second group, originating in the “jihadi” subculture in Pakistan and Afghanistan,
sees the Kashmir dispute as a religious conflict to free an oppressed Islamic
population from the rule of neo-colonial powers (mainly India, but also including
Pakistan). Some extremist members of this group see the conflict as the first battle
in a larger struggle to build a pan-Islamic state throughout South Asia and re-
establish a central Sunni leader, or Caliph. The report outlines the battle that has
emerged between the members of these groups and the effect that it has had on the
uprising as a whole.

Contents
In troduction ......................................................1
The U.S. Role in Kashmir and Congressional Interests.................3
Kashmiri Demography..........................................5
History of the Kashmir Dispute...................................5
Origin of the Uprising and Pakistani Influence...........................6
Separatists in Kashmir.............................................10
Religious and Political Influences................................10
The Struggle for Kashmiriyat...............................11
The Islamic Militant Struggle for a Caliphate...................12
Moderate Political Groups......................................13
All Parties Hurriyat Conference..............................14
Hurriyat Response to Elections in Jammu and Kashmir.......16
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)..................16
Armed Militant Groups........................................18
Hizb-ul Mujahideen (Freedom Fighters).......................18
Muttahida Jehad Council (United Jehad Council)................19
Lashkar-e-Taiba (The Army of the Pure)......................20
Jaish-e-Mohammad (Army of the Prophet).....................21
Harkat-ul Mujahideen (previously Harkat-ul Ansar)..............22
The Role of India.................................................23
Indian Security Forces and Human Rights Violations ................25
Broader Perspectives on the Insurgency...............................26
Indian Perspectives...........................................27
Pakistani Perspectives.........................................27
Indian and Pakistani Strategic Concerns...........................28
Perspectives of Kashmiri Non-combatants.........................29
Possibilities for Common Ground....................................30
Bifurcation, Trifurcation, and The Chenab River Agreement...........30
Reaffirm Article 370 and Kashmiri Autonomy......................32
The “Andorra” Model.........................................33
List of Figures
Figure 1. Kashmir ................................................2
Figure 2. Kashmiri Religious Demographic Map........................31

Table 1. Militant Groups in Kashmir.................................34
Table 2. Main Kashmiri Leaders.....................................35
Table 3. Members of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference.................39
Table 4. Members of the Muttahida Jehad Council......................39
This report was prepared under the general research supervision of Dick Nanto.

Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing
Ideologies, and Prospects for
Resolution of the Conflict
Introduction
In December 2001, India and Pakistan’s more than 50-year old dispute over the
former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir once again prompted significant
congressional and international fears that the conflict would lead to the first use of
nuclear weapons since World War II. Just as U.S.-led allied troops were battling
with al Qaeda and Taliban leaders in the war on terrorism, two Islamic militant
groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, reportedly staged a terrorist attack
on December 13, 2002 on India’s Parliament building in New Delhi, in which 14
were killed, including 5 assailants. India immediately accused Pakistan of
orchestrating this and other attacks by sending Islamic militants across the vast
Himalayan mountain region from training camps that reportedly dot the Pakistani-
controlled portion of Kashmir. The two countries amassed nearly a million troops
along their common border, but under significant U.S. pressure, Pakistani President
Pervez Musharraf promised to crack down on militant groups from Pakistan who
were active in the Kashmiri uprising. Although the rhetoric between the two nations
began to subside in the following months, a second terror attack near Srinagar on
May 14, 2002, which killed 32 people, including 10 children, prompted many to
question Pakistan’s insistence that it had stopped all cross-border infiltration of
Islamic militants into Indian-controlled Kashmir. India once again threatened to
cross into Pakistan to bomb alleged terrorist training camps – an action which many
have argued would have pushed Pakistan to respond with force leading to a full-scale
war.¹ Although visits to the region by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage
and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, appear to have calmed the rhetoric
between the two nations, ongoing fall 2002 elections raise the specter of fresh
violence in Kashmir as Islamic militants threaten candidates and enforce a boycott
of voting.
U.S. efforts to resolve the dispute between India and Pakistan are often
complicated by the actions of militant and political leaders who have been active in
an insurgency in the Indian-controlled state of Jammu and Kashmir since 1989.
Many have argued that a peaceful resolution of this dispute between Kashmiri,
Pakistani, and Indian leaders may be the key to calming relations between the two
nuclear armed nations and permanently ending their ongoing standoff, but neither
New Delhi nor Islamabad have been willing to consider compromise. Officials from
the U.S. embassy in New Delhi reportedly traveled to the state recently to urge

¹ “Kashmir at Brink of Wider Battle,” The Washington Post, pp. A1 (May 27, 2002).

moderate Kashmiri leaders, such as those from the All Parties Hurriyat Conference
(the Hurriyat), to participate in September and October 2002 elections, thus
supporting a key Indian goal in resolving the uprising.² Although India’s opposition
to international intervention in Kashmir will more than likely prevent direct U.S.
involvement in any negotiations with moderate leaders, the Bush Administration took
a leading role in facilitating this dialogue because of fears that another large-scale
attack by Islamic militants might once again drive India to threaten Pakistan
militarily. The complicated politics of the underlying uprising and the vast number
of interested parties to the Kashmir dispute, however, have often frustrated the efforts
of U.S. leaders in the region. The following is an outline of the movement for
independence that flared up in 1987 and the internal Kashmiri political struggle that
has characterized the insurgency, including descriptions of the groups involved and
analysis of some of the plans that have been recently suggested for peace. (For a
description of the overarching strategic struggle between India and Pakistan over
Kashmir, see CRS Report RL31481, Kashmir: Recent Developments and U.S.
Concerns.)

Figure 1. Kashmir
² “Hurriyat dilutes stand on poll participation. APHC Chief wants polls linked with Kashmir
resolution,” The Kashmir Times (August 27, 2002) <www.kashmirtimes.com>.

The U.S. Role in Kashmir and Congressional Interests
U.S. interests in Kashmir stem from three important concerns. First, after both
India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, the threat that any conflict
between the two nations may escalate to the point of a nuclear exchange has sparked
increasing concern among U.S. and international officials. Second, because Pakistan
has become central to the war on terrorism, many believe that the Kashmir dispute
has been used by Islamic extremists to create a standoff between India and Pakistan,
and thus distract Pakistan from its important role in tracking down al Qaeda forces.
Third, Members of Congress have expressed concern for human rights violations
allegedly committed by both Islamic militants and Indian security forces in Kashmir,
as well as for the integrity of the democratic process and the right of self-
determination.
Many analysts have claimed that the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament
building in New Delhi in December of 2001 was orchestrated by militants from the
Kashmir conflict. Given the reported ties between Jaish-e-Muhammad and al Qaeda
leaders, many believe that the attack was meant to create conflict between India and
Pakistan and thus draw Pakistani troops away from guarding the border with
Afghanistan just as top al Qaeda leaders were attempting to escape from the conflict
with U.S.-led troops at Tora Bora. Both the Kashmir insurgency and the standoff
between India and Pakistan, which has continued since both countries deployed more
than a million troops along their common border in January 2002, have thus gained
an unlikely importance within the war on terrorism. Similarly, there have been some
suggestions that al Qaeda leaders have used parts of Kashmir to hide from Pakistani
and U.S. forces, although others strongly dispute this assertion.
Kashmir is also perhaps the most important challenge to the U.S. interest to
promote stability throughout South Asia as a region. Although the spring 2002
military standoff appears to have cooled, militant attacks may continue to re-ignite
the conflict, especially during elections in September and October 2002 in both
Kashmir and Pakistan. Many U.S. and international policy makers have raised
concern that a continued standoff between the two countries may result in a nuclear
exchange if Pakistan allows militants to cross into Jammu and Kashmir and India
decides to retaliate. Given that more than a million South Asians lost their lives
during religious “communal” violence at the time of Partition and Independence,
some have argued that the concept of a nuclear exchange may not be outside of the
realm of possible action for Indian and Pakistani leaders engaged in a standoff over
Kashmir. While India has reportedly adopted a doctrine that it will not use a first
nuclear strike against any country, Pakistan has made no such declaration. Some
have argued, however, that India is more likely than Pakistan to take an action (such
as invading parts of Azad Kashmir) that might begin a chain of events leading to a
nuclear exchange. For all of these reasons, U.S. State and Defense Department
officials increasingly have been interested in helping to foster a peaceful resolution
to the Kashmir conflict.
There are, however, significant obstacles to any form of actual or perceived U.S.
intervention. Recent reported efforts by U.S. embassy officials to bring moderate
Kashmiri leaders from the All Parties Hurriyat Conference into elections in Jammu
and Kashmir have brought few tangible results. Similarly, although Pakistan has

recently followed through with some promises to U.S. officials that it will curb cross
border infiltration into India, many have argued that the government’s reported plan
to reorganize all Kashmiri militants within a single Kashmiri Liberation Army signals
that this is decidedly a temporary policy decision (see section “Separatists in
Kashmir” below).³ If this includes former members of foreign pan-Islamic groups,
they argue, this may be yet another excuse to continue the same activity under a
changed name. Similarly, if President Musharraf’s cooperation in the war on
terrorism and anti-extremist stance on Kashmir are not met with some sort of
concession from India, many have argued that Pakistanis may be more reluctant to
trust U.S. intervention and peaceful negotiation over Kashmir.
India, for its part, has repeatedly voiced staunch opposition to any form of U.S.
intervention in the conflict (see section “The Role of India” below). Many have
argued that, for this reason, there is little hope that Members of Congress could
suggest something similar to the Mitchell Plan (authored for the Northern Ireland
Israeli-Palestinian conflicts) and bring a lasting resolution to the Kashmir dispute.
Others, however, have recently argued that the increased friendliness between the
United States and India since President Clinton’s visit to the region in 1998 may
begin to erode this inflexibility. They believe that if the United States can build
stronger ties with formerly government-run sectors of the Indian economy (the
country’s energy, telecommunication, and transportation infrastructures), ruling
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leaders may become less inward-looking in finding
solutions to the problems of the region. Some observers see recent stronger military-
to-military ties between India and the United States, including a resumption of arms
sales and joint military exercises, as possibly making India more receptive to the
United States taking a role in the negotiation. Similarly, U.S. sympathy for countries
facing the challenge of terrorism may increase the likelihood that India will be
amicable to U.S. efforts in the region. The longstanding belief in the aftermath of
the Cold War, that any U.S. intervention in Kashmir would be skewed in Pakistan’s
favor, they argue, may begin to gradually subside in India, especially if the U.S. hunt
for al Qaeda terrorists in Pakistan and Afghanistan helps to end the activity of
extremist militants in Kashmir.

³ Mubashir Zaidi, “New Horizons: The government has decided in principle to merge all
militant outfits fighting in Kashmir into one grand ‘liberation army,’” The Herald, Lahore,
Pakistan (July 2002).

Kashmiri Demography
Although some view the Kashmir dispute as a religious uprising, many have
argued that the beautifully mountainous Jammu and Kashmir state, which once
served as the favorite hot
^Indiaⁿ^-^c^oⁿ^t^r^o^{lled J}^a^m^m^u^a^{nd K}^a^shmⁱ^{r St}^a^t^eweather retreat of theBritish Raj and Indian
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^Area:^{56, 665 s}^q^u^a^{re m}ⁱ^l^e^s
^Relig^io^ns:^Mu^s^lⁱ^m^65%^{, H}ⁱⁿ^d^u^33%^{, Bu}^ddhⁱ^s^t^3%religiously diverse than
Pakistani leaders aver.
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^{Percent of J&K Population:}^54.1%estimates, approximately
^Relig^io^ns:^Mu^slim⁹⁸^%^{, A}^{ll o}^t^h^e^r^r^e^lig^ioⁿ^s²^%65% of the population of
Indian-controlled
^Jam^m^uKashmir is Muslim, 33%
^{Percent of J&K Population:}^43.6%is Hindu, and 3% is
^Relig^io^ns:^Hⁱ^nd^{u 5}⁶^%^,^O^t^he^r^r^e^lⁱ^gⁱ^o^{ns 4}⁴^%Buddhist.⁴ Similarly,
^L^a^dak^hwhile 54.1% of the
^{Percent of J&K Population:}^2.3%population lives in the
^Relig^io^ns:^Bu^ddhⁱ^s^t^50%^{, Mu}^s^lⁱ^m^49%^{, O}^t^h^e^{r 1%}majority-Islamic
^Sour^c^e^:^W^a^s^h^{ington Pos}^t⁽^J^uly^{28, 2002)}^{, r}^e^por^te^{d f}ⁱ^g^u^r^e^s^f^r^om²⁰⁰²Kashmir valley, 43.6%live in the majority-
^In^dⁱ^an^an^d^Kash^mⁱ^ri^go^vern^m^eⁿ^t^estⁱ^m^at^es.
Hindu region of Jammu,
and only 2.3% live in the
vast Buddhist-majority
area called Ladakh. Others, however, have pointed out that when one ignores the
Line of Control, which they argue has temporarily divided the region, the Islamic
population of the entire former princely state is roughly a 75% majority.⁵
History of the Kashmir Dispute
India and Pakistan have fought three wars since their independence from Britain,
including two over Kashmir, and have come to the brink of war over Jammu and
Kashmir state several times since both countries tested nuclear weapons in 1998.
The longstanding dispute over the Kashmir region began at the time of independence
from Britain in 1947, when the entire subcontinent was partitioned between the
newly emerging Indian and Pakistani states. During the negotiations leading to the
partition the indigenous rulers of the colony’s more than 500 principalities were
technically allowed the choice to accede to either country, though for practical
reasons most choices were dictated by a combination of geography and the religion
of the majority of the inhabitants. The Hindu Maharaja of majority-Muslim Kashmir,
however, put off this decision and refused to allow the accession until parts of his
principality were overrun by Pashtun tribal groups from Pakistan several months after

⁴ Rama Lakshmi, “Kashmir’s Hindus Show No Zeal for Insurrection,” The Washington Post
(July 28, 2002).
⁵ Kashmir Study Group, “Jammu and Kashmir: Distribution of Religions,”
[ ht t p: / / www.ka shmi r s t udygr oup.net / mapsexpl an/ r el i gi ons.ht ml ] .

independence and partition. The legality of his accession agreement with India has
been the subject of significant controversy ever since.
Determined to build India as a secular nation in which a state with an Islamic
majority could thrive, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru reportedly promised
Kashmir’s first chief minister, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, that the accession of the
princely state to India would not be complete until the people of Kashmir were
allowed to vote in a plebiscite to affirm the decision. Many have argued that Sheikh
Abdullah’s influence and Nehru’s message that Kashmir’s Islamic population would
be better off under a secular India than a struggling Pakistan could have turned this
vote in India’s favor. Following the 1948-49 war, India conditioned a plebiscite –
now mandated by a UN resolution – as contingent on Pakistan’s withdrawal from the
territory it had occupied. In 1953, in response to Sheikh Abdullah’s continuing
demands for promised autonomy and plebiscite, the Indian government removed him,
placed him under house arrest, and imposed rule from New Delhi. Because of
Nehru’s failure to follow through with a plebiscite and the Congress Party’s
continued interference in the autonomous state, all hopes that the dispute could come
to a peaceful resolution brokered by the United Nations were largely frustrated.
Many have argued that the early failures of India and later renunciation of
independence by the Abdullah family set the stage for a grass roots movement among
the Kashmiri people which turned into a violent uprising in December of 1989. More
than a decade later, the uprising now threatens to destabilize the entire South Asian
subcontinent.
Origin of the Uprising and Pakistani Influence
In 1972, after the 1971 war that caused the separation of Pakistan’s eastern wing
and the creation of Bangladesh, Pakistan was forced to agree in Simla (India) to
resolve the Kashmir dispute wholly through bilateral means (i.e., rejecting the
validity of the 1949 UN resolution calling for a plebiscite). In the view of many of
the leaders of the Kashmiri insurgency, the post-Simla elimination of international
pressure allowed a dramatic deterioration of the rights of the Islamic population of
Indian-held Kashmir. The decade after 1972 in India was characterized by Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi’s efforts to strengthen the political power of the central
government over the country’s state Parliaments. Further, armed regional
movements for autonomy and secession were treated by her administration with
harsh retribution and few concessions.
In Kashmir, Indira Gandhi brought Sheikh Abdullah back into power nearly 20
years after Jawaharlal Nehru had removed him from office in a dispute over the
abandoned promise of a plebiscite. At first, Abdullah signaled his willingness to
make significant concessions to the central government, and Indira Gandhi saw an
opportunity to lessen the importance of those still agitating for a plebiscite by
bringing Abdullah back into office. Abdullah’s signing of the 1974 “Kashmir
Accord,” which described Jammu and Kashmir state as a “constituent unit” of India,
was meant to bring a final blow to the argument that Kashmir was still a disputed
territory.

Although Sheikh Abdullah later revealed himself to be no puppet of Indira
Gandhi’s government, his efforts to solidify his power base within the state as well
as his willingness to compromise with India to secure his position generated for his
party some significant opponents in Kashmir. Thus, leaders like Mirwaiz
Mohammad Farooq (the father of Hurriyat leader, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq), who
would accept nothing less for Kashmir than a plebiscite, began to build a significant
opposition to Abdullah’s National Conference party. Similarly, many Islamic leaders
in Kashmir, including several moderate Sufi politicians, disagreed with Sheikh
Abdullah’s staunch secular stance and became active in the growing opposition.
After Sheikh Abdullah’s death in 1982, an argument between his two sons over who
would succeed their father as the chairman of the National Conference party led to
a power vacuum within the state and a dramatically increased role for the Indian
central government. After successive maneuvering by both brothers brought the state
under three different regimes in four years, the government called fresh elections for
1987. By many accounts, this was a time of tremendous hope for those who opposed
the National Conference party. Many of Sheikh Abdullah’s former foes joined their
parties as a Muslim United Front (MUF) to contest the 1987 Kashmiri elections.
Hurriyat leaders, however, claim that although this alliance had widespread support
in the Kashmir valley, the 1987 elections were widely rigged in favor of a puppet
government of the Indian center. Reportedly, thousands turned out in anger when it
was fraudulently announced that, in a coalition with the Congress Party, Farooq
Abdullah’s National Conference party had won the state election by an overwhelming
majority.
The years of political battle with India over autonomy and plebiscite, combined
with the belief that Rajiv Gandhi’s government had left the Kashmiri Muslim
population in 1987 electorally disenfranchised, some have argued, led to the
beginning of the armed uprising and the decision of many Kashmiris to turn to
Pakistan for help⁶. In India, the belief that anger over the election sparked the
uprising has been largely challenged by the notion that Pakistan in fact infiltrated the
region to create a militant insurgency. Pakistan, for its part, denies that it has had
anything to do with funding, training, or otherwise encouraging the militant activity
which began in the Kashmir valley in the later months of 1989. Thus the question
of who is responsible – native Kashmiris or the Pakistani military – for both the
original impetus for the uprising as well as the continued funding of militant groups
has become a central issue of contention between Indian and Pakistani leaders.
From 1987 onward, Kashmiri opposition leaders organized widespread
demonstrations and general strikes, which often led to riots, among the Kashmiri
Islamic population. Many have argued that militants from the Kashmir valley during
this time began to go to Pakistan to request training and funding to begin an armed
conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. These groups reportedly began to plan activities
which would coincide with other already organized Kashmiri militant groups such
as the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). In December 1989, reported
militants kidnaped Dr. Rubaiya Sayeed, the daughter of the Kashmiri Home Affairs
Minister, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed. The government responded to the militants’

⁶ Turkkaya Ataov, Kashmir and Neighbors: Tale, Terror, Truce, pp. 127-129 (Ashgate:
London, 2001).

demands, and Dr. Sayeed was released in exchange for the release of several
imprisoned militant leaders.⁷ This minor victory among militants, however, led to
a barrage of further kidnapings, assassinations, and violent attacks against the
National Conference-led government and minority religious groups in Kashmir. By
1990, the Indian government declared Governor’s rule over the region (the equivalent
of declaring an emergency), dissolved the Kashmiri Parliament, and began to rule the
state directly. During this time, the Indian government began to build a massive
security apparatus throughout Jammu and Kashmir state in order to battle the
militants. (For a discussion of human rights violations see section below, The Role
of India.)
Although the exact role of Pakistan in the onset of the insurgency is highly
contested, many analysts contend that the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
took on a significant role in directing the militancy after 1990. They argue that the
1988 death of Pakistani President, General Zia-al Haq (1977-1988) and the end of the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1989 left a significant number of mujahideen
soldiers idle in Pakistan. The Pakistani military is also said to have had deep
reservations about supporting groups like the JKLF because of their staunchly secular
background. In 1990, Pakistan is said to have begun to support Kashmiri leader Syed
Salaudin and the Hizb-ul Mujahideen as an alterative to the JKLF.
By 1993, however, Pakistan is said to have turned away from the Hizb-ul
Mujahideen because of fears that its leader Syed Salaudin would not support the
accession of Kashmir to Pakistan. It has been argued that the ISI began to back
Pakistani-based militant groups, often from the far-right leaning Islamic extremist
parties within Pakistan, in order to ensure that their allegiances were for Kashmiri
accession to Pakistan. Many of these groups also reportedly had ties to the Taliban
and funding from al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan.⁸
The next decade was characterized by widespread violence throughout Jammu
and Kashmir state. Militants began to target Kashmir’s upper caste Brahmin Hindus,
called “Pandits,” and other minority religious groups in Jammu and the Kashmir
valley in what many have called a campaign of ethnic cleansing. Pandit groups claim
that more than 400,000 Hindus have been forced from their homes since 1989.⁹
From the very onset, however, the Islamic leaders who remained allied with the
National Conference party were also targets of militant assassinations.
This violence against moderate Islamic leaders began to spread during elections
in 1996, when militant groups enforced a boycott of polls through assassination of
any moderate leader willing to run for office. Infighting caused by changing
allegiances and groups jockeying for power also led to significant numbers of
casualties among the Islamic population in Kashmir. Efforts by moderate leaders to

⁷ Robert Wirsing, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute, pp. 113-114 (St. Martin’s Press,
New York: 1994).
⁸ Rahul Bedi, “Kashmir Insurgency is Being Talibanized,” Jane’s.com (Oct. 5, 2001).
⁹ Virtual Homeland of Kashmiri Pandits,
[ h t t p : / / www.ka shmi r i -p andi t .or g/ sundr y/ ge noci d e.ht ml ] .

organize cease-fires have been answered invariably with assassinations and violence.
As tension began to mount between India and Pakistan over nuclear testing and the
Kargil conflict in 1999, the violence in Kashmir escalated. By the end of the 1990’s
a significant rift had occurred between groups who were interested in independence
for Kashmir or who were willing to negotiate with India and those who wanted the
state to accede to Pakistan at any cost.
The aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and
Washington dramatically affected the trajectory of the insurgency. The fall of the
Taliban and President Musharraf’s cooperation with the United States in the war on
terrorism began to conflict with the ISI’s support of the militant activity in Kashmir.
In December 2001, alleged Kashmiri terrorists clashed with security guards outside
the Parliament building in New Delhi, in an attack largely aimed at assassinating key
Indian government officials, including Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.¹⁰ Under
tremendous U.S. pressure and the threat of nuclear war with India, President
Musharraf promised to end militant activity originating in Pakistan. After a fresh
attack in Kashmir sparked a second tense military standoff in April of 2002,
Musharraf reportedly made efforts to block all Islamic militants from crossing the
border from Pakistani-controlled Azad Kashmir to Indian-controlled Jammu and
Kashmir state.
With elections planned in Pakistan for October 2002, some believe that
Pakistan’s promise to stop militant activity has left President Musharraf politically
vulnerable. His reported efforts to announce a cease fire of all militant activity in
April of 2002 are said to have been renounced by Hizb-ul Mujahideen leader Syed
Salaudin. Instead, the Pakistani press has reported that all groups with Pakistani
leadership, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad have been disbanded,
their leaders placed in custody, and their members left under the orders of the
Kashmiri Muslim-led Hizb-ul Mujahideen.¹¹
Many have argued, however, that the core of these groups have simply gone
underground and, among other activities, are carrying out terrorist attacks against
U.S. targets in Pakistan. Others, however, maintain that they are beginning to resume
their activity in Kashmir. Nonetheless, the Pakistani press has further reported that
Musharraf plans to create a Kashmiri Liberation Army jointly with the Hizb-ul
Mujahideen in order to shift control of the insurgency back to Kashmiri leaders and
away from pan-Islamic extremists who are sympathetic to the Taliban and al Qaeda.¹²

¹⁰ “Gunmen with Explosives Attack Indian Parliament,” The Washington Post (December

14, 2002).

¹¹ Mubashir Zaidi, “New Horizons: The government has decided in principle to merge all
militant outfits fighting in Kashmir into one grand ‘liberation army,’” The Herald (July

2002).

¹² Ibid.

Separatists in Kashmir
Like many nationalist movements throughout the world, from Sri Lanka’s Tamil
insurgency to the Palestinian uprising and Iraq’s Kurdish opposition, the Kashmiri
independence movement has been characterized, from its very inception, by crippling
internal conflicts of ideology and personal rivalries. Unlike similar movements,
however, in Kashmir no single politician has gained the dominance achieved by
Tamil Tiger militant Vellupillai Prabhakaran or Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat.
Some suggest that the larger regional battle over Kashmir has created a unique
situation in which two competing ideologies have been allowed to thrive among
Islamic insurgents living on different sides of the Line of Control. Increasingly,
many observers have argued that the dispute has become not only a “proxy” war
between India and Pakistan visited on the Kashmiri people, but also an internal
conflict between moderate Kashmiri separatists and “foreign” extremist militants
who have infiltrated from Pakistan’s “jihadi” subculture. Recent attacks by militant
extremists have not only led to the deaths of Indian security forces and Hindu
civilians, but also moderate Muslim separatists who, ironically, were leaders of the
original uprising. Although some see the Kashmir conflict as a religious dispute
between Hindu India and Islamic Pakistan, the insurgency itself has become part of
a larger debate over the emerging political character of Islam throughout the entire
South Asian subcontinent.
Religious and Political Influences
Aside from the concerns
Kashmiri Separatist Organizationsof Pakistani political and
¹³ the
^M^a^{in Arm}^e^{d M}^ilit^aⁿ^t^s^G^r^o^upsmilitary leaders,
^Hi^zb^-u^l^M^u^jahⁱ^d^een^:^pr^o-^P^a^kⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^/I^s^l^a^m^ic^vⁱ^sⁱ^{on of}^K^a^s^h^mⁱ^rgroups struggling for a
^Lash^k^a^r-e-Tai^b^a:^A^l^he^Ha^dith/w^aⁿ^{ts P}^a^n-Isla^mⁱ^c^sta^t^eplebiscite in Kashmir
^J^aⁱ^s^h-^e^-^M^uham^m^a^d:^De^oba^ndi/w^aⁿ^{ts P}^a^n-Isla^mⁱ^c^sta^t^ehave been characterized
^Ha^rk^a^t-u^l-M^u^ja^hⁱ^d^een^:^D^e^oba^{ndi/ w}^a^nts^P^a^n-^I^s^la^mⁱ^c^s^t^a^t^e
^J^&^K^Lib^era^tioⁿ^Froⁿ^{t (n}^o^t^th^{e Ya}^sim^M^a^lik^fa^ctioⁿ⁾^:by two main ideological
^Ka^sh^miriya^tstrains of thought. The
^Po^lit^ica^l^Um^brella^G^r^o^upsfirst group, althoughdecidedly Islamic, has a
^Al^l^P^a^rti^e^{s Hu}^rri^y^a^{t Con}^f^eren^ce:^s^o^m^e^Ka^sh^miriya^t^;
^s^o^m^e^pr^o-^P^a^kⁱ^s^t^aⁿnationalist vision of
^M^u^t^t^a^hi^{da J}^e^{had C}^o^uncⁱ^l^:^s^upports^pro-P^a^kⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^m^ilita^ntsKashmir and views the
^M^a^{in Kas}^h^mⁱ^{ri Parties}struggle as a means to
^J^&^K^P^e^op^l^e^{’s Con}^f^eren^ce:^Ka^sh^miriya^t“liberate” the entire state
^J^&^K^Lib^era^tioⁿ^Froⁿ^{t (Ya}^s^im^M^a^lik^):^Ka^sh^miriya^tfrom India, and in some
^J^a^m^a^a^t-e-Isla^m^{i (K}^a^s^h^m^ir):^so^m^e^p^r^o^-^P^a^kistan^{; so}^m^e^lesscases also Pakistan. The
^h^a^rd^-lin^e
^J^a^m^a^a^t-e-Isla^m^{i (Pa}^k^istaⁿ⁾^:^pr^o-^P^a^kⁱ^s^t^aⁿsecond group takes a
more extremist view of
Islam and sees Kashmir
as the land of a struggling Muslim majority, trapped within a neo-colonial secular
state that prevents them from living under (Taliban style) Islamic law. Although a

¹³ For a description of the views of the Pakistani government and those of many Pakistani
citizens, see the section below entitled “Perspectives of the Insurgency and Possibilities for
Common Ground.”

significant grey area exists between the two camps in which certain leaders often
display allegiance to both sides, many would argue that the movement has become
marred by an underlying ideological polarization. The characterization of the
uprising as being driven purely by a popular desire to allow all Kashmiris (from both
the Pakistani and Indian sides of the Line of Control) to decide their own fate has
become increasingly untenable.
The Struggle for Kashmiriyat. Many have argued that the 1987 uprising
in Kashmir began with a “Kashmiriyat” or nationalist vision of the state as a region
with a strong ethnic identity that unites Kashmiris across international and religious
lines (this argument is put forth largely by moderate Muslims). Kashmiri nationalists
today see the United Nations-established Line of Control as a boundary akin to the
Berlin Wall, in that it has led to a division of Kashmiri families from one another for
more than fifty years.¹⁴ Those who make this argument insist that they should not be
called “separatists” because they do not accept that Jammu and Kashmir state has
ever become a permanent part of India through accession from Maharaja Hari Singh.
Kashmiri nationalists further argue that the Islamic majority of the state lived in
subjugation throughout the colonial period under the rule of Hindu maharajas. They
argue that the limited autonomy granted to the state in the Indian constitution has
never safeguarded the state from a continued “occupation” and dominance from the
majority-Hindu Indian government. They argue, therefore, that their struggle is to
bring the diverse Islamic population of Kashmir some assurance that their “national”
rights will not continue to be violated and, further, that they have no intention to
establish an Islamic theocracy in Kashmir. Many from the religious minority
communities in Jammu and Kashmir (mainly Hindu Pandits and Buddhists),
however, view the Kashmiri nationalists’ secular claims with suspicion and have
expressed deep-seated fears that the fulfillment of the Kashmiriyat vision would
result in widespread discrimination, or even ethnic cleansing, against non-Muslims.
Kashmiri nationalists also argue that during Indian Prime Minister Nehru’s time,
prior to 1953, there was a widespread belief among Kashmiri citizens, led by Sheikh
Abdullah, that a United Nations-sponsored plebiscite would result in a vote for
Kashmir to remain in India. Once Nehru denied Kashmiris this vote and subsequent
Indian Prime Ministers began to intervene heavily in Kashmiri politics, the argument
follows that Kashmiri Muslims began to believe that they would never have complete
popular control over their own state government and that the divided sections of
Kashmir would never be reunited. The election in 1987, which they say was rigged,
is said to have been the last straw, and due to the Abdullah family’s abandonment of
the call for a plebiscite, the argument goes, Kashmiris turned to violence and rejected
the notion that they should accept the Line of Control as a national border.

¹⁴ Interview with Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai, Executive Director, Kashmiri-American Council
(June 14, 2002). Many international observers have recommended that any permanent
border separating Kashmir should be “soft” or porous so as to prevent this separation.
Others argue that if militants continue to be trained in Pakistan, such a porous border would
be extremely dangerous to India.

The Islamic Militant Struggle for a Caliphate. The uprising in Kashmir
increasingly has become dominated by a second group of mainly militant leaders
acting under a pan-Islamic ideology. Many assert that these groups represent a far-
right political version of the Sunni Islamic faith that has been nurtured widely in
South Asia only since the Zia ul-Haq regime (1977-1988) in Pakistan. Although
there is little agreement from one faction to another, many of these groups reject the
central tenets of Western-style democracy and seek to set up a Taliban-style
theocracy which would stretch throughout South Asia. Many have argued that these
militants see the “jihad” (struggle) for Kashmir as a first step to liberating the entire
South Asian Islamic population from the secular dominance of India. Barring that,
however, they would prefer that the entirety of Kashmir become part of Pakistan and
are violently opposed to the concept of Kashmir separating from both countries
entirely.
Many of the jihadi militants active in Kashmir (especially those with the closest
reported links to al Qaeda) trace their religious origins to a conservative Islamic
revivalist movement that began during the colonial period in India. After quashing
the Indian Sepoy uprising against colonial rule in 1857, the British began to heavily
discriminate against the Islamic elite who had once held positions of power within
the bureaucracy of the Mughal empire. Islamic leaders responded to the sudden
change in their position through two important South Asian movements. The first,
led by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan at the Aligarh Muslim University, sought to return the
Islamic elite to positions in the government through the attainment of an advanced
English-medium, Western-style education, while simultaneously cultivating Urdu
literature and a modernist notion of Islamic culture. The second movement, however,
which began in the Dar-ul Uloom (House of Knowledge) school in Deoband, India
in 1866, violently rejected the secular influences embraced by British modernists and
sought to create a conservative Sunni revival throughout South Asia. The
“Deobandi” movement sought to “purify” the practice of Islam in British India,
ridding it of the mystical beliefs of the Sufi Islamic tradition, which the revivalists
believed to be the product of corrupting colonial and Hindu influences. The
movement focused on adherence to Taqlid, (tradition or “acceptance of the old
interpretations”), while rejecting the notion of Ijtehad, or “reinterpretation of religion
according to (the) times.”¹⁵
Many have argued that Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, drew
ideological inspiration from the moderate Islamic work of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan,
and it was not until the country became a front-line state in the war against the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan that the conservatism of the Deobandi movement began to
find a widespread following in Pakistan. During the regime of General Zia ul-Haq,
thousands of religious schools (or madrassas) became the central source of primary

¹⁵ Pakistan Link, “The Flowering of the Deobandi Movement,”
[http://www.pakistanlink.com/sah/04202001.html]. It should be noted that the Dar-ul
Uloom school still graduates many students every year in Deoband, India (approximately
90 miles north-east of Delhi), although many have argued that the practice of Deobandi
Islam in India has never been as extremist as it has become in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

education for all but an elite minority in Pakistan.¹⁶ Many of these schools claimed
to have adopted the teaching of the Deobandi Dar-ul Uloom school, as well as Saudi
Arabian Wahhabi and Ahle Haddith traditions. The madrassas became the
underlying source for “mujahideen” soldiers fighting in Afghanistan; and when the
Soviets and Americans left the region, many have argued that the Pakistani ISI began
to rely on madrassa-educated militants to take part in the Kashmiri uprising.
Many have argued that the practice of Deobandi Islam that is being imported
into Kashmir has an extremist character that was never even practiced in the Dar-ul
Uloom school in India, and has been modified significantly by more puritanical
Pakistani, Saudi Arabian, and Afghani Pashtun (Taliban) influences. Similarly, when
the Afghan leader Mullah Mohammad Omar declared himself to be the true Islamic
Caliph and began the Taliban movement, his followers are said to have enforced an
Islamic “conservatism” (ironically unseen throughout the entire history of the Islamic
world), while simultaneously claiming an adherence to the Deobandi school. Some
argue, however, that much has been gained by militants from the original teachings
of Deoband. In this vein, some maintain that Osama bin Ladin and members of al
Qaeda prefer the militant activism of the original Deoband school to the non-
confrontational rejection of the West they see in present day Saudi Wahhabism.
Thus, the second strain of ideological thinking behind the groups in Kashmir
contains a strong anti-colonial origin. These groups often see both India and Pakistan
as semi-autonomous secular states created by the colonial Western world to prevent
Muslims from practicing true Islam. They also believe that Pakistan is controlled by
secular elite backed by the United States in much the same way that the Indian
princely states were once dominated by Britain during the colonial period. If
Muslims are to be free of this neo-colonial order, they claim, it is necessary to set up
a pan-Islamic state which adheres to the teachings of a supreme Sunni Islamic leader,
or Caliph (in this case Omar or bin Ladin would claim this position). They see
Kashmir as the most egregious example of this oppression, but their vision of a Pan-
Islamic revival reportedly covers all of South and Southeast Asia. Ironically, then,
many have argued that despite Pakistan’s alleged use of these groups in Kashmir,
they may be as ideologically opposed to Pakistan’s state structure as they are
antagonistic to India.
Moderate Political Groups
The clash of these extremist and moderate camps has led many of the Kashmiri
uprising’s original leaders to renounce the use of violence and agitate for a plebiscite
through purely political means. These moderate leaders have come under substantial
pressure from extremist groups based in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir to continue to
agitate unflinchingly for the accession of the state to Pakistan. Often these leaders
support the Kashmiriyat vision of the region, but believe that continued pressure
from Pakistan is needed to focus international attention on the uprising and force
India to negotiate a settlement. Recently, however, many of these leaders have begun
to renounce publically the participation of “foreign” Pakistani based groups, and

¹⁶ “Pakistani Loyalty To Radical Islam Tests Crackdown,” The Washington Post (January

20, 2002).

although under the threat of deadly militant reprisals, have shown a cautious
willingness to compromise with India. Many have pointed to the alleged militant
assassination on May 21, 2002 of separatist political leader, Abdul Gani Lone, as an
example of the threat faced by such Kashmiri moderates.¹⁷
Although consistently rejecting most of the moderates’ demands, the Indian
government has shown a significant interest in convincing these leaders to participate
in elections in Jammu and Kashmir. In many cases, India also provides these
moderate separatists with personal security guards in order to safeguard them from
militant attacks. The ruling Kashmiri National Conference party, however, has often
shown resistance to India’s efforts to negotiate with these leaders and has recently
arrested some of them under Indian anti-terrorism laws. Some in India, especially
supporters of the BJP government, have seen these arrests as justifiable because they
suspect that the moderate leaders continue to support militant activities in secret.
Others, however, have accused the National Conference of holding these moderates
in custody because they may pose a potential electoral threat. Ultimately, however,
many U.S. analysts see these moderate leaders as the key to negotiating a viable
settlement between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.
All Parties Hurriyat Conference. The All Parties Hurriyat (Freedom)
Conference (or the “Hurriyat”) was formed in 1993 by moderate (and some hard line)
separatist leaders as an umbrella organization of political, religious, cultural and
labor parties agitating peacefully for a referendum in Kashmir (see Table 4 for a list
of parties that are members of the Hurriyat). Hurriyat leaders make the argument that
their struggle for independence is not a “separatist” movement because they do not
accept that India has ever attained legal control over the part of Kashmir that it¹⁸
occupies, but some acknowledge their willingness to negotiate only for increased
autonomy if necessary. Through general strikes and international lobbying, the
Hurriyat has sought to bring attention to charges that the Indian security forces have
committed numerous human rights violations during their attempts to end militant¹⁹
activity in Kashmir.
Currently chaired by moderate leader Abdul Gani Bhat, the Hurriyat is often
prone to internal conflicts as leaders of parties who are willing to negotiate with India
compete for power with those who take a more hard-line stance or support
involvement in the uprising from Pakistan. Syed Ali Shah Geelani is often said to
be the most important member of this hard-line faction. Despite the inconsistencies,
many have argued that the Hurriyat is dominated by leaders who support the
Kashmiriyat vision of the region and see the uprising as a struggle for popular
sovereignty for the Islamic majority in Kashmir, rather than a holy war to create a
multi-regional theocracy. Others have argued that many of the Hurriyat parties are
heavily linked behind the scenes to militant activity and that the Hurriyat was simply
formed to lend legitimacy to the ISI’s activity in Kashmir. Some, however, explain

¹⁷ “Hurriyat Leader Lone Assassinated in Srinagar,” The Hindu (May 22, 2002).
¹⁸ Interview with Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai, Executive Director, Kashmiri-American Council
(June 14, 2002).
¹⁹ See “The Role of India” below.

that many of the Hurriyat leaders do not wish to end their support for the activity of
militants in Kashmir because they believe that without Pakistani support there will
be no impetus for India to negotiate. They argue that the fickle actions of the
Hurriyat reveal an underlying fear that they will lose this Pakistani backing if they
support anything less than full accession to Pakistan.
In April of 2002, two moderate Hurriyat leaders from Indian-held Kashmir
traveled to Sharjah, in the United Arab Emirates, (approximately 10 miles north of
Dubai) to meet with leaders of the insurgency from Pakistani-held Kashmir. Hurriyat
leaders Abdul Gani Lone and Mirwaiz Umar Farooq met with the leader of the
Pakistani-based Kashmir Committee, Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, who is also a
former Prime Minister of Azad (“Free”) Kashmir, the Pakistani-controlled part of
Kashmir.²⁰ Although representing Pakistani leaders, Sardar Khan reportedly has
taken a far less militant stance towards the Kashmir problem than many of his
col l eagues.²¹
During the meeting, Lone reportedly requested that Pakistani-based militants
stop their activity in Indian-held Kashmir and allow the Hurriyat to negotiate with
India independently. Lone reportedly expressed concern that Pakistani-based militant
activity would cause the entire uprising to be deemed “terrorism” by the United
States in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. Others have also speculated
that Lone may have been interested in participating in upcoming elections in Jammu
and Kashmir and was asking that he be allowed to survive a boycott by militants.
Reportedly, the director of Pakistan’s ISI, Lt. Gen. Ehsan Ul-Haq, denounced Lone
during the meeting, and warned him to stop supporting participation in the
elections.²² Lone, however, shrugged off Pakistani objections and continued his
activity after returning to Kashmir from the meeting and a trip to the United States.
Some have concluded that the Dubai meeting was favorable to the Indian national
government’s efforts to split the Hurriyat in order to bring more moderate members
into Jammu and Kashmir state elections.²³
Many observers believe that Abdul Gani Lone’s actions earned him an almost
immediate death sentence. On May 21, 2002, Lone was assassinated by alleged
militants while he was giving a speech in Indian-controlled Kashmir. While some
in India have blamed Lone’s killing on the ISI, others in Pakistan have pointed to
corrupt National Conference leaders or members of the far-right Hindu nationalist
party, Shiv Sena, who had verbally and physically attacked Lone in the recent past.
Nonetheless, many have noted that the incident highlights the threat to moderate
Islamic leaders in Kashmir who are seeking democratic solutions to the crisis.²⁴

²⁰ “Kashmiri Leaders Hold Talks in Dubai,” BBC Monitoring – South Asia (April 18, 2002).
²¹ “Interview with Sardar Muhammed Abdul Qayyum Khan,” rediff.com (June 24, 2002).
²² Selig Harrison, “As Kashmir Boils, Keep Heat on Pakistan,” Los Angeles Times (August

7, 2002).

²³ “Hurriyat ‘split’ may change J&K political scenario,” The Hindu (May 7, 2002).
²⁴ Selig Harrison, “As Kashmir Boils, Keep Heat on Pakistan,” Los Angeles Times (August
7, 2002). Harrison suggests that Mirwaiz Omar Farooq, who others have recognized to be
(continued...)

Abdul Gani Lone’s son, Sajjad Lone, has reportedly replaced his father as the leader
of the People’s Conference party and a member of the Hurriyat.
Hurriyat Response to Elections in Jammu and Kashmir. Indian and
international efforts to bring the Hurriyat into elections in Jammu and Kashmir have
historically resulted in an impasse. In the past, the Hurriyat has publically boycotted
Kashmiri elections, claiming that they are an illegal and meaningless exercise
because of its position that Kashmir is not part of India. Combined with the activity
of militants, this boycott of elections led to widespread violence throughout Jammu
and Kashmir, and the minuscule voter turnout (many have argued out of fear of
militant reprisals) has challenged the legitimacy of the National Conference party’s
rule.
In anticipation of elections in September and October of 2002, however, and
acting under international pressure, some Hurriyat leaders suggested that they would
not press for an outright boycott, while still refusing to run for seats in the state
Parliament. Hurriyat leaders further suggested that they would participate in
elections if U.N. international peacekeeping forces²⁵ or election observers were sent
to Kashmir to guard against election rigging and human rights abuses by Indian
security forces. India, however, remained unflinching in its rejection of any effort to
make the question of Kashmir into more than a domestic conflict, and thus rejected
these Hurriyat demands outright.
Many members of the Hurriyat also requested passports to travel to Pakistan to
hold negotiations with Azad Kashmiris and Pakistani leaders to end militant
incursions. India had, in the past, denied individual passport requests because of
accusations that some Hurriyat members have sympathies with terrorists. The
Hurriyat refused to follow through with such negotiations if some members are
excluded from the trip to Pakistan.
In anticipation of elections, India also formed a Kashmir Committee of
prominent leaders to negotiate with the Hurriyat over their participation in elections.
The Hurriyat reportedly responded favorably to the negotiations, while repeating its
position that no Hurriyat leader would participate in elections without international
monitors.
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). Many analysts have
asserted that the JKLF is no longer a militant group and has engaged only in political
mobilization in Kashmir since half of the group declared a cease fire in 1994 and

²⁴ (...continued)
perhaps the most important remaining moderate separatist leader in Kashmir, may also be
in danger.
²⁵ There is currently a tiny cadre of U.N. observers, called the United Nations Military
Observer Group for India and Pakistan, active in Kashmir, which was set up in 1949 to
monitor the cease fire declared between the two countries after their first war. This group
deliberately takes a very low profile, and Pakistan has accused the U.N. of bowing to Indian
pressure by not allowing the U.N. a greater presence in the region. See Susan Price, “The
world’s eyes and ears on Kashmir,” BBC News (June 27, 2002).

most of the other half were killed by Indian security forces in 1996. Led by
prominent political leader, Yasim Malik, the remaining political group has become
a prominent voice in the moderate Kashmiri umbrella group, the All Parties Hurriyat
Conference. Others, however, would argue that despite Yasim Malik’s renunciation
of violence, he has continued his ties to militant groups. On March 25, 2002, Malik
was arrested by Indian Security Forces under the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance
(POTO – also often referred to as an act or POTA) on charges that two other people
who had been arrested, carrying the equivalent of $100,000 in cash, had meant the
money for him.²⁶ The accusation is that the money was coming from Pakistan and
was intended for militant activity. Malik maintains that the connection has been
fabricated. He has also charged the Indian security police with human rights abuses
because he was allegedly denied medical care for kidney stones and heart failure
while in custody. On July 20, 2002, a judge released Malik on bail to receive
medical treatment while his trial under POTO is pending. Within minutes, however,
Indian security police reportedly rearrested him, stating that his previous action had
also violated a different anti-terrorism ordinance, the Public Safety Act.²⁷ Using this
ordinance, the Indian police can hold Malik for up to two years without trial. Some
have suggested that the arrest of Malik is related to a political rivalry between the
Kashmiri ruling National Conference party and Hurriyat leaders.
Historically, the JKLF has played an integral part in Kashmiri militant activity.
The group was founded in Britain in 1977 – agitating for a plebiscite nearly ten years
before the uprising is recognized to have formally begun in Kashmir. Throughout the
1970s and early 1980s, the JKLF and their associated predecessors carried out many
militant attacks including the hijacking of an Indian airlines passenger plane and the
kidnaping and killing of Ravindra Mahtre, a senior Indian diplomat in Britain.²⁸
Unlike many of the militant groups struggling for a pan-Islamic state in Kashmir, the
JKLF has represented a Kashmiri nationalist (Kashmiriyat) vision, and views the
Islamic population of the state as a democratically disenfranchised ethnic minority
who are struggling to create a nation separate from both India and Pakistan. Many
suggest that after 1987, the ISI encouraged the formation of the Hizb-ul Mujahideen
in order to counter the popularity of the JKLF and its more secular Kashmiriyat goals.
Some have claimed that the JKLF’s early fall from prominence among Kashmiri
militants bolsters the Indian argument that the 1987 Kashmiri uprising was started
by Pakistan. After serving a prison sentence in India from 1990 to 1994 for his part
in the militancy, Yasim Malik broke from the militant sections of the group,
renounced violence, and re-constituted the JKLF as a political organization.

²⁶ “JKLF chairman Yasin Malik arrested, booked under POTO,” rediff.com (March 25,

2002).

²⁷ “Yasin Malik re-arrested under PSA after release on bail by POTA court,” The Kashmir
Times (July 20, 2002).
²⁸ “Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, Institute for
Conflict Management, India (2001), [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/
j andk/terrorist_outfits/j ammu_&_kashmir_liberation_front.htm] .

Armed Militant Groups
By all accounts there have been dozens of militant groups operating in Kashmir
at any given time throughout the insurgency’s 14-year history. Often groups have
changed their names or claimed responsibility for a particularly violent action under
an assumed name in order to prevent international scrutiny or a loss of funding
channels from abroad. New groups have also emerged as militant leaders have split
or merged their efforts or new, more ideologically extremist religious leaders have
come into prominence. The following are descriptions of the largest and most active
groups operating in Kashmir as of August 2002. Although reports have recently
stated that many of these groups have been banned and dissolved by Pakistan, others
have argued that they remain active under new names, and are planning to resume
militant attacks during the 2002 Kashmiri elections. (A more complete list of
militants active throughout the past decade is offered in Table 1 at the end of this
report.)
Hizb-ul Mujahideen (Freedom Fighters). The largest group operating in
Kashmir, Hizb-ul Mujahideen, was founded as the militant wing of the Kashmiri
political separatist group Jamaat-e-Islami (Kashmir).²⁹ Some have argued that the
militant group’s current leader, Syed Salaudin (formerly Mohamed Yusef Shah),
began the militant struggle after losing the allegedly rigged election in Indian-³⁰
controlled Kashmir in 1987. Others assert, however, that Hizb-ul Mujahideen was
founded at the behest of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) as a religious
alternative to the secular and Kashmiri nationalist, Jammu and Kashmir Liberation
Front (JKLF).
After 1993, the ISI is said to have turned away from Hizb-ul Mujahideen, in
favor of groups led by non-Kashmiris who supported the accession of Kashmir to
Pakistan and could be relied upon not to negotiate with India. In 1998, Jamaat-e-
Islami (Kashmir) reportedly relinquished its ties to Hizb-ul Mujahideen, thus
prompting the remaining members to work more closely with foreign (Pakistani and
Middle Eastern “guest militant”) groups organized in Pakistan. The group is
currently made up of both Kashmiri and foreign militants.

²⁹ This group is not part of the Jamaat-e-Islami parties in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Jamaat-e-
Islami was formed as a single party in 1941 by Deobandi leader, Maulana Abul Ala
Maudoodi, but split into several different groups during successive South Asian partitions.
The extremist elements of Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan (led by Qazi Hussain Ahmed) often
differ considerably over Kashmiri issues with the leader of Jamaat-e-Islami of Kashmir,
Ghulam Mohammad Bhat. There have been, however, more extremist elements of the
Kashmiri party who are seen to have ties to the Pakistani party. See “Kashmir separatists’
dramatic about-face,” CNN (July 1, 2002). Similarly, while the Jamaat-e-Islami party of
Kashmir is said to have started the Hizb-ul Mujahideen, some have argued that when the
Kashmiri party later publically renounced violence, the militant group became much more
closely influenced by the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan. Jamaat-e-Islami of Kashmir has been
officially banned by India, and its members are often subject to harassment by counter-
insurgent militias.
³⁰ Interview with Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai, Executive Director, Kashmiri-American Council
(June 14, 2002).

Pakistani press reports have indicated that the ISI recently changed course and
again strengthened its ties to Hizb-ul Mujahideen, and placed militants from
dissolved groups under Salaudin’s control. Some have claimed that President
Musharraf plans to use Hizb-ul Mujahideen to lead a “Kashmiri Liberation Army”
in order to re-establish the domestic Kashmiri character of the militancy, and dampen
allegations that the “freedom movement” has turned into “terrorism.”³¹
In many ways, the Kashmiri militants of Hizb-ul Mujahideen stand in stark
contrast to the majority of other separatists in Kashmir. Although many Kashmiri
political separatists maintain that they would like to be independent of both India and
Pakistan, Hizb-ul Mujahideen’s stated goal is the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan.
Similarly, while many political separatists in Kashmir maintain a vision of a secular
and multi-religious Kashmiriyat (or Kashmiri nationalist) cohesion within a nation
“liberated” from India, Hizb-ul Mujahideen’s vision leans more toward a nationalism
based exclusively on Islam. Hizb-ul Mujahideen has also shared responsibility with
other purely “guest militant” groups for many attacks against moderate political
separatists and Kashmiri journalists.
As a group made up mainly of Kashmiris, however, Hizb-ul Mujahideen has
shown a willingness to negotiate with India, which sets it apart from the foreign
militant groups operating in the region. In May 2002, Hizb-ul Mujahideen offered
once again to initiate negotiations with India over Kashmir, provided that India allow
Pakistan into the discussions. Similarly, Hizb-ul Mujahideen’s religious vision of
Kashmir is, in many ways, different from that of foreign militant groups like Lashkar-
e-Taiba who see Kashmir as single element of the struggle for a pan-Islamic state.
Some have observed that these contradictions lead to inconsistencies among Hizb-ul
Mujahideen and Muttahida Jehad Council leaders, as they negotiate for support in
Pakistan. Ultimately, however, many agree that any effort by India to bring Kashmiri
separatists into the political realm will most likely require a means to overcome
significant barriers and negotiate successfully with Syed Salaudin.
Muttahida Jehad Council (United Jehad Council). The Muttahida Jehad
Council is a political umbrella organization started in 1990 in Muzaffarabad (in the
Pakistani part of Kashmir) to represent Kashmiri-led militant groups. The
organization is reportedly led by Hizb-ul Mujahideen leader Syed Salaudin, although
the militant leader was temporarily forced out in 2000 when he briefly declared and³²
then rescinded a cease-fire in Kashmir. Groups with “foreign” leadership such as
Lashkar-e-Taiba and Al Badr are reportedly allowed only “observer” status. The
group has become a key player in the political activity of militant separatist leaders
who are based mainly in Pakistani “Azad” Kashmir. (A list of jihadi groups who are
members of the organization appears as Table 5 to this report.)

³¹ Mubashir Zaidi, “New Horizons: The government has decided in principle to merge all
militant outfits fighting in Kashmir into one grand ‘liberation army,’” The Herald (July

2002).

³² South Asia Terrorism Portal, Institute for Conflict Management, India (2001),
[ h t t p : / / www.sat p.or g/ sat por gt p/ count r i es/ i ndi a/ st at es/ j andk/ t e r r or i st_outfit s / j a mmu _ & _
kashmir_ liberation_front.htm].

Lashkar-e-Taiba (The Army of the Pure). Lashkar-e-Taiba was founded
in 1993 in Pakistan as the militant wing of the Markaz Dawa Al Irshad (the Center
for Preaching). Lashkar’s leader, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, is a professor from the
University of Engineering and Technology in Lahore.³³ Built in 1987, with reported
contributions from Osama bin Ladin, the Markaz sprawls across 190 acres in
Muridke (approximately 28 miles from Lahore) in Pakistani Punjab.³⁴ Some have
argued that Pakistan’s ISI began to support Alhe Hadith, Deobandi and Wahabi
Islamic groups including Lashkar-e-Taiba as intermediaries in Kashmir after 1993.
Many have argued, however, that Lashkar’s actions after September 11 show that the
group has moved beyond Pakistani control. After it was alleged that the group was
responsible for the attacks on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, Lashkar-e-
Taiba was banned by Pakistan and placed on the U.S. Department of State’s list of
organizations who sponsor terror. While some Pakistani press reports have stated
that the group has been dissolved, others say the ban has not been kept in good faith
because Lashkar has simply changed its name, to Jamaat al-Dawa, and continued its
activity.³⁵
Lashkar militants reportedly receive training on the Muridke campus through
basic 21 day (Daura Aam) or intensive three month (Daura Khas) courses. The more
intensive course offers training in guerrilla warfare, the use of arms and ammunition,
survival, and (reportedly) aircraft hijacking. Lashkar has historically recruited far
more militants than it actually sends into Indian-controlled Kashmir. Lashkar
militants are known for brutal treatment of civilians across Jammu and Kashmir state,
as they are reportedly taught to behead or disembowel their captives. Ramzi Yousef,
one of those held responsible for the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center,
reportedly trained in a Lashkar camp in Pakistan.³⁶
Many argue that Lashkar’s senior leadership is made up mainly of militants
from Pakistan and the Middle East who are “guests” in Kashmir and have little
appreciation for the specific interests of local Islamic Kashmiris. An Ahle Hadith
organization of Wahabi orientation, the Markaz reportedly teaches contempt for
Western-style democracy and the Sufi form of Islam that is indigenous to much of
Kashmir. Similarly, the secular Kashmiriyat nationalism espoused by moderate
Kashmiri political leaders is seen by Lashkar as corrupting and evil. Lashkar and
Markaz leaders reportedly envision Kashmir as a single element of a struggle to
create a pan-Islamic state under a Caliphate. In a pamphlet entitled “Why We Are

³³ As of July 31, 2002, there were reports that Lashkar leader, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed
(who claims to have resigned from the group shortly after it was banned), may be “missing.”
His family claims that he was re-arrested in May, nearly two months after a review board
of the Lahore High Court failed to extend his three month detention (since January 2002)
under Pakistan’s Maintenance of Public Order law. While Pakistani authorities had initially
confirmed his re-arrest, they now deny that he is in their custody. “Kashmir Militant Leader
‘Missing,’” BBC News (July 31, 2002).
³⁴ “Lashkar-e-Taiba: A Backgrounder,” SAPRA INDIA (Dec. 27, 2000)
[http://www.subcontinent.com/ sapra/terrorism/terrorism20001227a.html].
³⁵ Khaled Ahmed, “The Power of the Ahle Hadith,” The Friday Times (July 12-18, 2002).
³⁶ “Lashkar-e-Taiba: A Backgrounder,” SAPRA INDIA (Dec. 27, 2000)
[http://www.subcontinent.com/ sapra/terrorism/terrorism20001227a.html].

Waging Jihad,” Lashkar reportedly states that its agenda is to restore Islamic rule
over the entire Indian subcontinent.³⁷ Lashkar has also staged attacks against the Red
Fort in Delhi (in 2000) and against hard-line Hindu nationalist leaders in India.³⁸
Many in India assert that the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan would allow groups
like Lashkar an important strategic position from which to launch attacks throughout
the rest of India. Lashkar states, however, that its goal in Kashmir is the accession
of the state to Pakistan.
Jaish-e-Mohammad (Army of the Prophet). Since its inception in
January 2000, Jaish-e-Mohammad has rapidly emerged into prominence in the
insurgency. The group was founded by the militant Islamic cleric Maulana Masood
Azhar after Indian authorities allowed his release in exchange for 155 hostages taken
in the hijacking of an Indian Airlines passenger plane in 1999. Jaish-e-Mohammad
was also banned by Pakistan and placed on the U.S. State Department’s list of
organizations that sponsor terrorism after the group was charged with the December
2001 attack on the Parliament building in Delhi. Jaish has also claimed
responsibility for the attack in October 2001 on the Kashmiri Parliament, which
killed 38 people. Jaish’s elusive military commander, Gazi Baba, is reported to be
widely feared throughout Jammu and Kashmir for his leadership in Jaish and former
activity with Harkat-ul Mujahideen.³⁹ Recent reports have stated that Jaish, like
Lashkar, has been dissolved and its members placed under Syed Salaudin’s control;
others, however, have argued that although Azhar is in Pakistani custody, the group
has simply gone underground to continue its activity.
Jaish-e-Mohammad’s Sunni Islamic ideology has been adapted from the
Deobandi Dar-ul Uloom school and militant movement that began during the
colonial period in India. Jaish militants state that their goal is not simply to liberate
Kashmir from India, but also to release the entire South Asian subcontinent from the
states (i.e. India and Pakistan) that were originally set up under colonial dominance.
The group’s adherence to staunch Deobandi principles reportedly has brought it
strong ties to the Taliban and al Qaeda. Jaish is reportedly linked to the Jamiat-e-
Ulemai-Islam network of madrassas (Islamic schools) in Pakistan, and that Maulana
Masood Azhar has direct connections with three madrassas – Jamia Abu Yousuf,
Madipore Karachi, and Jamiat-ul-Uloomi Islamiyah in Binori town of Karachi.⁴⁰
Jaish founder Maulana Masood Azhar is a former leader of Harkat-ul
Mujahideen and was imprisoned by India between 1994 and 1999 for his
involvement in the group’s activity in Kashmir. After his release, some have alleged
that Azhar met with Osama bin Ladin in Afghanistan and received generous funding

³⁷ “Who Are the Militants?” BBC News, (Jan. 2, 2002)
[http://news.bbc.co.uk/ hi/english/world/south_asia /newsid_1719000/1719612.stm].
³⁸ Ibid.
³⁹ Nazir Masoodi, “Jaish’s Gazi Baba leaves no footprints in Valley,” India Express,
Kashmir Live (Dec. 19, 2002).
⁴⁰ Muzamil Jaleel, “Jaish Mohamad,” India Express, Kashmir Live (2001),
[ ht t p: / / www.expr essi ndi a.com/ ka shmi r / ka shmi r l i ve/ j a i s h.ht ml ] .

for the creation of Jaish-e-Mohammad.⁴¹ After Azhar held several large rallies
throughout Pakistan, some three-quarters of Harkat-ul Mujahideen’s militants
reportedly joined the new organization.⁴² Omar Saeed Sheikh (who was released
with Azhar in the 1999 hijacking and has been sentenced to death in Pakistan for the
murder of Wall Street Journal reporter, Daniel Pearl) reportedly provided broad
assistance to Azhar in his work to build Jaish-e-Mohammad. Some have alleged that
Pearl’s kidnaping and murder were organized and carried out entirely by Jaish
militants. Others have argued that there was a falling out between Maulana Masood
Azhar and Omar Saeed Sheikh long before the kidnaping because a power rivalry had
begun to form between them.
Harkat-ul Mujahideen (previously Harkat-ul Ansar). In 1997, Harkat-ul
Ansar became the first militant group operating in Kashmir to be placed on the U.S.
Department of State’s list of organizations who sponsor terrorism. The group then
changed its name to Harkat-ul Mujahideen, in order to avoid international scrutiny.
In 1995 Al Faran, a group that was widely believed to have been made up of Harkat-
ul Ansar militants, claimed responsibility for the kidnaping of six Western tourists
in Kashmir. When the group was unsuccessful in their demand to have Maulana
Masood Azhar and other militants from Harkat-ul Ansar released from prison in
India, they beheaded one of the five tourists, a Norwegian national. While one
American tourist eventually escaped, the other four tourists (including Donald
Hutchings, a U.S. citizen from Spokane, Washington) are missing and presumed⁴³
dead. The leader of this and other kidnaping incidents carried out in the mid-1990’s
by Al Faran was widely believed to have been then Harkar-ul Ansar member, Omar
Saeed Sheikh. Sheikh was first captured in Kashmir by Indian security forces in a
raid which successfully freed four Western hostages taken in a separate incident. He
was later released from prison along with Maulana Masood Azhar in the 1999 Indian
Airlines hijacking.
Harkat-ul Ansar was first formed as a result of the war in Afghanistan from the
merger of two militant groups, Harkat-ul Jihad al-Islami and Harkat-ul Mujahideen.
The latter of Ansar’s two predecessors, the original Harkat-ul Mujahideen, reportedly
had been involved in militant activities in the Kashmir valley since 1992 and was the
first group with a pan-Islamic ideology to take part in the insurgency.⁴⁴ Harkat
militants reportedly worked closely with the ISI in both Afghanistan and Kashmir,
at least prior to the ban on the group’s activities. Throughout the group’s evolution
it has reportedly sent militants to jihadi conflicts around the world, including Bosnia,
Chechnya, Tajikistan, Burma, and the Philippines.

⁴¹ Rahul Bedi, “Kashmir Insurgency Is Being Talibanized,” Jane’s.com (Oct. 5, 2001).
⁴² U.S. Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2000,” at Appendix B:
“Background Information on Terrorist Groups” (released April 30, 2001).
⁴³ “One Year Later, Kashmir Kidnapings Remain a Mystery,” The Associated Press (July
2, 1996). “No closure in seven-year-old Kashmir kidnaping saga,” Agence France Presse
(July 4, 2002).
⁴⁴ “U.S. Blacklist Doesn’t Quite Whitewash Valley,” Kashmir Live, India Express Group
(Sept. 24, 2001).

Harkat-ul Mujahideen has a Deobandi ideology and sees Kashmir as a single
building block in the creation of a pan-Islamic state. Harkat reportedly draws its
membership from Tabligi Jamaat, an organization which was set up to distribute
Islamic charitable contributions in Pakistan. Some have asserted that, at least prior
to the international scrutiny of Pakistan, high ranking members of the ISI and
Pakistani government were members of Tabligi Jamaat and were aware of its
involvement with Harkat.⁴⁵ Since Maulana Masood Azhar’s creation of the more
ideologically extremist Deobandi group, Jaish-e-Muhammad, in 2000, however,
Harkat’s activities have been severely limited due to the defection of nearly three-
fourths of its members. Recent Pakistani reports suggest that Harkat has also been
dissolved and placed under Syed Salaudin’s control.
The Role of India
Throughout the history of the insurgency, successive Indian governments have
dealt with the leaders of the Kashmiri uprising in much the same way as they have
with separatist movements from other regions of India since Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi’s administration. During the Sikh uprising in Punjab in 1984, for example,
India adopted a strategy of non-negotiation and repression of separatist leaders,
followed by efforts to bring remaining Sikh leaders into the political process. This
approach resulted both in an internationally recognized massacre of hundreds of Sikh
leaders in the Golden Temple in Amritsar and in a decision of the more moderate
leaders of the largely Sikh Alkali Dal party eventually to participate in democratic
elections in Punjab. Although this approach eventually led to the end of the uprising,
it also precipitated the assassination of Indira Gandhi by her long-trusted Sikh
bodyguard. The events of the massacre and the ensuing violence after Indira
Gandhi’s death also created lasting resentment among even moderate members of the
Sikh community, many of whom have gained political asylum in the United States
and European countries because of continued “harassment” by Indian police.
Nonetheless, the Punjabi example illustrates the thinking behind the often
contradictory Indian policy toward Kashmir.
The Indian effort to end the uprising in Kashmir has focused on a three-part
strategy. First, India has sent a massive security force to Kashmir in order put down
the militant activity in the region with full force. Second, India has attempted,
through offers of senior positions within the state government, to entice moderate
Kashmiri political leaders to participate in the state’s elections and add democratic
legitimacy to the Jammu and Kashmir state government. And finally, India has
made every attempt possible to prevent the conflict from becoming the subject of
calls for international intervention. Many have argued that this is the best available
strategy for India to avoid losing Kashmir to Pakistan or complete independence.
India has argued that, were it not for Pakistan’s funding of the “terrorist proxy war”
in Kashmir, the strategy could have been successful long ago.

⁴⁵ B. Rahman, “Harkat-ul Mujahideen - an update,” Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai,
India (March 20, 1999).

India’s staunch aversion to international intervention in Kashmir has been an
extremely important sticking point for U.S. policy makers who are anxious to find
a viable solution to the conflict. Indian political leaders reportedly were angered by
U.S. Secretary of State Powell’s suggestion, during a visit to the region in July 2002,
that international observers be allowed to monitor the September and October 2002
el ect i ons.⁴⁶
India’s rejection of even this limited type of mediation stems from several
ideological and political concerns. First, many Indian analysts have argued that direct
intervention from the United States or other Western countries between India and
Pakistan would be very similar to the British colonial control over the region that
precipitated the creation of Pakistan. Indian intellectuals often argue that the dispute
is an internal “conflict between brothers,” and that India and Pakistan should be able
to reconcile their differences without the interference of a “neo-colonial” power.
Pakistanis consider this argument to be a patronizing dismissal of their legitimate
claim to Muslim-majority Kashmir, which was recognized by the United Nations as
a disputed territory. Second, despite a generally improved relationship between India
and the United States since President Clinton’s visit to the region in 1998, Indian
policy makers are often still suspicious of U.S. involvement in South Asia given the
close cooperation between Pakistan and the United States during the Cold War. They
have indicated an underlying belief that the United States would not be favorable to
their interests. Third, India has argued that the Kashmir dispute is a domestic issue,
and that Pakistani and international interference in its handling of the insurgency is
a violation of its national sovereignty. And finally, India has had much to gain from
stressing the significance of the Simla Agreement of 1972, in which Pakistan agreed
to forgo the United Nations’ mediation of past treaties in favor of a hope of future
bilateral negotiations between the two countries over Kashmir. The Simla
Agreement has allowed India to postpone negotiation over Kashmir indefinitely,
while warding off Pakistani pressure by insisting that the uprising is purely domestic
and that elections held in 1996 in Jammu and Kashmir state have superceded the
need for a plebiscite.
Despite these arguments, however, many have noted that India has had an
increased trust in U.S. diplomatic efforts in the region during times of crisis since the
Bush Administration took an unstinted stance against terrorism after the September
11 attacks. Others have also argued that, given the threat of nuclear war between
India and Pakistan, the Kashmir dispute is by its very nature an international concern.
In late August and early September of 2002, a group of Indian academics and
policy makers, sanctioned by the Indian government, initiated a dialogue with the All
Parties Hurriyat Conference in an effort to discuss negotiations over Kashmir. The
Hurriyat stated that it would only be willing to discuss the issue of talks and would
reject participation in October elections outright. Many, however, have suggested
that Secretary of State Powell’s recent trip to the region may have been the impetuous
for India’s backing of these talks.

⁴⁶ “Government Surrendered Sovereignty to U.S.,” The Hindu (July 31, 2002).

Indian Security Forces and Human Rights Violations
In January 1990, the government of India imposed direct rule over Jammu and
Kashmir and began a massive occupation of the state through military and security
forces. Although “governor’s rule” and close control over the state from the Indian
government relaxed when the National Conference party came to power through
boycotted elections in the state in 1996, the security forces have remained deployed
throughout Jammu and Kashmir in increasing numbers. Indian paramilitary forces,
including the Border Security Force, Central Reserve Police Force, and the elite
Rashtriya (National) Rifles, have been engaged in a widespread battle to search out
and arrest militant separatists, as well as, to prevent them from crossing the
mountain range from training camps in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir.⁴⁷ Although
much of the violence began in the Kashmir valley, the conflict between militant
groups and Indian paramilitary forces has more recently extended throughout the
region. Further combined with state and local law enforcement, the Indo-Tibetan
Border Police, and over 500,000 Indian military troops who have been deployed
along the border since the January 2002 standoff, India’s paramilitary forces have
established a strong presence in Indian-controlled Kashmir.
Since 1990, international organizations have documented widespread allegations
of human rights violations committed by these paramilitary and security forces.
According to Human Rights Watch, these include extrajudicial killings and summary
execution of detainees, denial of medical treatment to Kashmiri prisoners, torture of
those under interrogation, and excessive use of force in capturing militants.⁴⁸ Human
Rights Watch has also reported the use of gang rape by security forces as a means to
intimidate members of the civilian population.⁴⁹ Security forces have also been
accused of harassing, threatening, or killing doctors, attorneys, human rights activists
and journalists who provide advice or care to wounded or captured militants or who
monitor events in Kashmir. Kashmiri civilians reportedly are subject to intimidation,
harassment, and torture during village searches for militants or information about
separatist activities. Reportedly, civilians are often killed as security forces shoot
indiscriminately in all directions if attacked by militants. The elite Rashtriya Rifles
are believed to be among the most well known for committing human rights
violations in Jammu and Kashmir.
Security forces have also trained and organized counter-insurgent militia
organizations throughout Kashmir that have been accused of committing numerous
human rights violations against the (mainly Islamic) civilian population. These
militias are made up of captured or surrendered former militants who have often been
tortured in prison or detention until they agree to join the counter-insurgent effort.

⁴⁷ Robert G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute, pp. 144-145 (St. Martin’s
Press, New York: 1994).
⁴⁸ Human Rights Watch, Behind the Kashmir Conflict: Abuses by Indian Security Forces
and Militant Groups Continue (July 1999); Amnesty International Report 2002: India, AI
Index: POL/10/001/2002 (covers January to December 2001); U.S. Department of State,
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2001: India (March 4, 2002).
⁴⁹ Human Rights Watch, Behind the Kashmir Conflict: Abuses by Indian Security Forces
and Militant Groups Continue, at “Rape and Torture in Doda” (July 1999).

The counter-insurgents are armed and trained by the Indian army and other security
forces, and are often used to harass members of the Jamaat-i-Islami party of Kashmir
and carry out assassinations against separatist militants and political activists. Since
1995, the Indian military has reportedly used these militias, called “renegades” by
local Kashmiris, to carry out repressive actions for which they would like to have no
official accountability.⁵⁰
Throughout the Kashmiri uprising the Indian government has used special anti-
terrorist legislation to detain and imprison separatist Kashmiri political leaders,
activists, and journalists. Most recently, under the new Prevention of Terrorism
Ordinance (POTO), several Kashmiri separatist political leaders and journalists have
been arrested or detained allegedly for such activity as downloading information
about the Indian army from the internet or other similar charges.⁵¹ Some Kashmiris
have alleged that these arrests are an attempt to prevent Hurriyat leaders from
engaging in political activity and negotiation prior to the fall 2002 elections. Release
of these leaders has been a key demand of the Hurriyat in all recent attempts at
organizing negotiations. Human rights activists have expressed grave concern over
the implications of POTO and its predecessor, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
Act (or TADA), which was allowed to lapse in 1995 because of widespread public
criticism throughout India.⁵²
Indian policy makers argue that they have responded to these criticisms by
arresting and trying several members of the security forces in Kashmir and sending
them to prison for “isolated” human rights violations. They also argue that they have
been especially vigilant in the arrest and trial of those accused of gang rape.⁵³
Kashmiris have argued that the government has done little to protect them from
security forces and that these human rights violations are not isolated incidents, but
a systematically organized method to intimidate the civilian population.
Broader Perspectives on the Insurgency
Recently many analysts have argued that India and Pakistan have both used the
issue of the Kashmir conflict symbolically to rehash the dramatic political battle that
led to the partition of British India and the creation of the two countries, accompanied
by the deaths of nearly three million South Asians in fighting and “ethnic cleansing”
during a vast exchange of populations. Indians, they argue, see their own ability to
provide democratic rights to the Islamic population of Kashmir as a confirmation that
they were indeed capable of creating a secular government; and, thus, that
Muhammad Ali Jinnah had no reason to seek a separate Muslim homeland.

⁵⁰ Ibid., at “Abuses Involving Countermilitant Militias.”
⁵¹ Kashmir Times, “The Truth About Iftikhar Gillani’s Arrest,” (August 15, 2002),
[ h t t p : / / www.ka s h mi r t i me s .c om] .
⁵² Amnesty International, The Prevention of Terrorism Bill of 2000: Past Abuses Revisited?
AI Index: ASA 20/22/00 (June 2000); Amnesty International,”India: Briefing on the
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance”
⁵³ Personal interview with Sunil Lal, Counsellor, Embassy of India (July 2002).

Pakistanis, in turn, rely on their belief that Islamic Kashmiris and other Muslim
minorities suffer under Indian rule as a means to justify the necessity of their own
state. They argue that, in this sense, the national identities of both countries will be
forever antagonistic to one another. Without this underlying rationale for national
cohesion (and without the impetus to retain one another as defined national enemies),
it is said, both India and Pakistan might divide into several separate countries or be
overrun by communal or sectarian violence, due to the threat from successive
regional movements. Many have countered, however, that this argument glosses over
the political complexity of both countries, not to mention the actual concerns of
Pakistanis for Muslims in Kashmir and other parts of India. They argue that in both
India and Pakistan there are several perspectives on Kashmir as well as many
domestic political interests to maintain the conflict.
Indian Perspectives
Many in India express absolute opposition to giving up Kashmir to Pakistan.
Many have noted, however, that two very different political perspectives characterize
the motivation behind this position. The first is held mainly by much of the
opposition Congress Party and those who support the political ideals of former Prime
Minister (and Kashmiri Pandit) Jawaharlal Nehru, who sought to build modern India
as a secular democracy in which no political party could be founded on religion and
no group would be discriminated against because of religious practice. For those
who see India in this manner, the loss of Kashmir and its Islamic population is
viewed as a threat to the founding framework of India as a religiously free and fair
society.
The second perspective is held by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the
far-right Shiv Sena Party, and several Hindu nationalist groups, such as the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP). Those who hold
the principles of “Hindutva” often speak of India as a holy land and see the Partition
of India as a visceral violation of this sacred ground by successive foreign invaders
(both the Mughal and British Empires). The loss of Kashmir would be seen as yet
another blow to an already victimized indigenous population. They have also
expressed particular concern for the Hindu Pandit population of Jammu and Kashmir,
who, they argue, have been the victims of “ethnic cleansing” throughout the
separatist movement.
Many analysts have argued that hard-line leaders of the BJP have capitalized on
national anger over the militant violence in Kashmir and threats of retaliation against
Pakistan as a means to drum up popular electoral support for their party and Hindu-
nationalist agenda. Many Indian intellectuals have also warned that if the country
were to lose Kashmir, Hindu nationalists would probably initiate widespread mob
violence against the more than 100 million Muslims living in other parts of India.
Pakistani Perspectives
Pakistanis often state that they have concern for Kashmir “in the blood.” Many
have argued, however, that the reasons for this concern are as diverse as they are in
India. The first group, made up of the majority of the Pakistani population, have

expressed concern foremost for the safety of the Muslim majority in Kashmir living
under Indian security forces and counter-insurgent militias. They also sympathize
with India’s remaining Islamic minority, living under a Hindu-nationalist-led
government, especially given recent communal violence that has killed more than one
thousand Muslims in the Indian state of Gujarat since March 2002. They speak about
the necessity of a plebiscite in Kashmir in order to ensure the self determination of
the Kashmiri people. Some analysts have argued that while the majority of
Pakistanis speak of the activity of the “mujahideen” in Kashmir as a struggle for
freedom, they believe that sectarian and anti-Western attacks in their own country are
intolerable acts of terrorism. The Pakistani media, which are often controlled
ideologically by the military, they argue, prevents the majority of the population from
knowing that the violence in both Kashmir and Pakistan is carried out largely by the
same groups acting under different names. Generally Pakistanis strongly oppose an
independent Kashmir, and note that the 1949 U.N. resolution allows only a plebiscite
vote for Pakistan or India, not a third option. In other words, many Pakistanis see a
zero-sum issue with India in which the only acceptable outcome is to overturn the
state’s accession to India.
Some take the view that the Pakistani military has been motivated in its fight
over Kashmir by an underlying fear that if India is allowed to take over all of
Kashmir, it will be the first step to retaking the rest of Pakistan. They see India as
a dominating regional power, which attempts to impose its will over all of the other
countries in the region, and that backing down from this historic battle would
ultimately marginalize Pakistan as a nation. Many in the Pakistani military have also
shown impassioned sympathy for the Kashmiri cause – some support those, such as
Syed Salaudin, who wage war for Kashmiri nationalism, and others back those who
would like to build a pan-Islamic state. Some analysts have suggested that the
military has been willing to use the extremist militant groups operating out of
Pakistan in the past to fight a proxy war in Kashmir, although it may not agree with
all of the militants’ underlying political goals. The military, however, has often
shown its violent opposition to any leader who argues for Kashmiri independence
from both Pakistan and India.
Many have argued, finally, that there is a growing population in Pakistan who
see the struggle for Kashmir as a religious battle. They see India as a Hindu nation
that forces its Muslim minority to live under a political system that is against Islam.
Others, however, have pointed to the lack of support in previous parliamentary
elections for the Jamaat-i-Islami party and other right-leaning Islamic parties in
Pakistan as an indication that few of the country’s population view the conflict in
Kashmir from this perspective.
Indian and Pakistani Strategic Concerns
In addition to the ideological concerns on both sides of the dispute, there are
also significant strategic issues at stake for both countries, simply because of the
central geography of Kashmir. If, for example, India were to attain Azad Kashmir,
Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad, would be even more geographically vulnerable to an
Indian attack. On the other hand, if Jammu and Kashmir were to fall into Pakistan’s
hands, New Delhi would be more accessible to Pakistan. India has also expressed
strategic concerns that, if Pakistan had complete control of Kashmir, there would be

increased Sino-Pakistani geographic encirclement of India. Moreover, many in India
have argued that if Kashmir were turned over to Pakistan, the region would become
a haven for pan-Islamic extremists, in the same manner in which Azad Kashmir has
been dotted with militant training camps throughout the past decade.
Perspectives of Kashmiri Non-combatants
It is often difficult to gauge the level of popular support held by Kashmiri
civilians for the insurgency. A wide variety of political options have been advocated
by citizens of Kashmir, including control by either India or Pakistan, complete
separatism, partition of Kashmir along the Chenab river (with the Kashmir valley
ostensibly going to Pakistan), or a limited combination of regional autonomy from
both countries and an unrestricted border between Azad Kashmir and Jammu and
Kashmir state. A recent opinion poll conducted in Indian-controlled Kashmir by the
independent British research company Market & Opinion Research International
(MORI) has suggested that there is widespread dissatisfaction with the uprising. In
a survey of 850 Kashmiris interviewed statewide, 61% stated that they “would be
better off as part of India,” while only 6% said they “would fare better as part of
Pakistan.”⁵⁴ Similarly, 86% reportedly stated that elections would bring peace to the
region. Many have argued, however, that the poll did not take an adequate survey of
public opinion in Kashmir because it did not include an answer for those who
supported complete independence or much greater autonomy. They argue that the
remaining 33%, who were listed in the “don’t know” category, may have shown
strong support for independence. They also argue that those who supported India’s
control of Kashmir did not have the chance to state their interest in some degree of
autonomy. They note that the poll found that 91% supported greater interaction
between the Indian and Pakistani controlled sides of the region. They also point out
that while a significant sample was taken in Jammu and Kashmir state, the poll did
not include the opinions of those living in Azad Kashmir.
Many also point out that Kashmir’s religious minorities – mainly Sikhs, Hindus,
and Buddhists – are often left out of discussions about the state’s future. Prominent
members of these communities have been the targets of widespread human rights
abuses by militant groups throughout the history of the insurgency. This “ethnic
cleansing” led to a large scale exodus of the region’s Hindu Pandit community
beginning in 1990. Some analysts suggest that Jammu and Kashmir should be
recognized as a culturally diverse region, and that minority groups should be brought
into any negotiations concerning the insurgency. Several Hurriyat leaders have
agreed with this assessment of Kashmir and have argued that an independent
Kashmir should recognize separate electorates for these minority groups to ensure
that their views are heard in a Kashmiri Parliament. Others, however, have said that
the Jammu and Ladakh areas of Jammu and Kashmir state should be separated from
the Kashmir valley in order to protect these areas from militancy and allow the
creation of a separate homeland for Kashmiri Hindu Pandits.

⁵⁴ “What the Pollsters Found in Kashmir – Bold Questioners, Armed With Sharp Pencils,
Faced Risks, Got Looks, Learned,” The Wall Street Journal (Aug. 14, 2002).

Possibilities for Common Ground
Many foreign observers of the Kashmir conflict have expressed constant
frustration with the entrenched positions of both sides. While Pakistan continues to
push militarily for a plebiscite, India refuses to discuss the matter with Pakistan and
rejects any form of international intervention. Similarly, while India continually
rejects a plebiscite, Hurriyat leaders refuse to participate in Jammu & Kashmir
elections. Successive U.S. efforts to decrease tension between the two nuclear
powers and renew negotiations have been met with provocative militant attacks in
Kashmir and India, which almost always serve to re-escalate the conflict. Many
observers have labeled the Kashmir dispute an “unending conflict” because there
seems to be no resolution that all sides are willing even to consider for negotiation.
Some have argued, however, that there are several similar options for settling the
issue that have been advocated at different times by different parties on both sides of
the dispute. Some observers suggest that these proposals could provide a road map
for future negotiations and a possible lasting settlement.
Bifurcation, Trifurcation, and The Chenab River Agreement
Recently, Hindu nationalists in India have suggested that much of the Jammu
and Ladakh areas of Jammu and Kashmir should become states (or given “Union
Territory” status, in the case of Ladakh) separate from the Kashmir valley (see map
below). In this scenario, much of the so-called “Muslim belt” that is part of Jammu
and Ladakh, such as Doda, Poonch, and Rajouri districts, would also be given to the
new Kashmir region. Their belief is that this “trifurcation” will contain the violence
within the Kashmir valley and protect the region’s minority populations from
militants. The “whisper campaign” surrounding trifurcation actually began as a
movement in Jammu for “bifurcation,” or the separation of Jammu’s Hindus from the
rest of Kashmir.⁵⁵ Some believe that this would simply provide an excuse to allow
security forces to commit human rights violations indiscriminately against the
remaining population of the Kashmir valley without causing harm to Hindu civilians.
Others have countered that although this plan leaves India with less of an argument
against the loss of Kashmir, at least it would prevent the loss of Jammu and Ladakh
if a plebiscite were to be held.
Some members of the Hurriyat who support the accession of Kashmir to
Pakistan (such as Syed Shah Geelani) reportedly have voiced their agreement with
the idea of trifurcation. They argue that at least the RSS and Shiv Sena leaders who
support this position are tacitly agreeing that the issue of Kashmir is not forever
closed. A similar idea was first proposed in 1950 by Sir Owen Dixon, the U.N.
representative for India and Pakistan. This plan suggested using the Chenab river,
which flows just north of the city of Jammu, as a national boundary between India
and Pakistan, thus dividing the state along religious lines (see map below). President
Musharraf reportedly has expressed a favorable interest recently in discussing this

⁵⁵ “In Pursuit of Trifurcation,” Frontline (April 14, 2001).

plan with the Indian government.⁵⁶ This might allay some of India’s concerns for the
religious minorities in Kashmir, while answering Pakistan’s interest to free the
Islamic majority (most of whom live in the Kashmir valley) from Indian control.
Figure 2. Kashmiri Religious
Demographic Map
Not surprisingly, the notion of another partition within the South Asian
subcontinent provokes anger from many who see the loss of Kashmir as a threat to
India’s cohesion as a secular nation. The ruling Kashmiri National Conference party
has also expressed deep dismay with the trifurcation proposal, saying that it would
amount simply to handing the Kashmir valley to Pakistan.⁵⁷ Hurriyat leaders who
argue that the division of the Indian- and Pakistani-controlled portions of Kashmir
was a repeat of the “Berlin Wall” also find the further division of Jammu and
Kashmir difficult to swallow. They point out that there are still significant Islamic
minority populations in Jammu and Ladakh, and that they would be subject to further
Indian oppression without protection from the majority in the Kashmir valley. Those
who believe that there are Kashmiriyat cultural ties beyond religion that join the
population of the region also view this division with concern. They argue above all

⁵⁶ “Musharraf for ‘framework’ to resolve Kashmir dispute,” The Hindu (June 30, 2001).
⁵⁷ “Farooq Warns of ‘U.S. plan’ on Kashmir,” The Hindu (July 17, 2002).

that such a change could lead to widespread communal violence and forced migration
throughout the region.
Reaffirm Article 370 and Kashmiri Autonomy
Many in India have noted that the special autonomy granted to the state of
Jammu and Kashmir in the Indian constitution, which never has actually been
honored, could provide the Kashmiris with more concessions than those granted to
any other state in the country. The hotly contested accession agreement signed by
Maharaja Hari Singh in October 1947 provided India with jurisdiction over only three
areas of governance – defense, external affairs, and communications. The Indian
constitution thus provided Kashmir with an autonomous status in line with the
accession agreement so that all other areas of governance would be decided by the
Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly. It is for this reason that, unlike other
states in India, Kashmir has a separate constitution, flag, penal code, and criminal
procedure code from the rest of the country.⁵⁸ Members of the Hurriyat, however,
have argued that the Indian constitution allowed a compliant Kashmiri constituent
assembly to erode this autonomy.⁵⁹ Under a special provision of Article 370, any act
passed by the Indian Parliament could be applied to Kashmir at the request of the
state’s constituent assembly. Thus, over the years, believing the promise of a
plebiscite and trusting in the ruling Congress Party, the Sheikh Abdullah government
made many such requests. Thus although Sheikh Abdullah was able to use the
autonomy to institute considerable land reform in Kashmir, Hurriyat leaders argue
that his actions rendered the autonomy virtually meaningless.
Many, however, have expressed hope that such an article, already codified in the
Indian constitution, could be revived through a negotiation between Hurriyat leaders
and the Indian government and provide some means of finding a compromise to the
dispute. Before his death, Abdul Gani Lone reportedly expressed an interest in
negotiating with India to gain a package of further concessions for Jammu and
Kashmir, which would reverse some of the longstanding erosion of Kashmiri
autonomy.⁶⁰ Although perhaps falling short of independence, this autonomy could
reduce significantly the Indian presence in Kashmir, especially if it gained enough
popular support and won over some militants – a questionable proposition.
Analysts maintain that Lone’s death, has put a significant damper on the
viability of this form of settlement for Kashmir. Other moderate Hurriyat leaders
have been much more reluctant to negotiate with India because it is widely believed
that he was killed for his views. Similarly, some Hurriyat leaders and Kashmiris in
Pakistan view this type of solution with contempt because it does not safeguard
independence or provide accession to Pakistan. The plan would also fall far short of
meeting Pakistan’s interests for the region and might create problems for the
government of Azad Kashmir. Although many have argued that, were the plan to

⁵⁸ “Motive Behind Kashmir Autonomy Resolution,” The Hindu (July 11, 2000).
⁵⁹ Lawrence Lifschultz, “Death in Kashmir, Perils of ‘Self-Determination’” Economic and
Political Weekly, Mumbai (Bombay), India (August 3, 2002).
⁶⁰ Ibid.

gain widespread support in Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan would have little to bolster
an argument against such a solution. In India, leaders of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS) have spoken vehemently against the central government making such
concessions to Kashmir. They have stated that granting such autonomy to only one
state is similar to allowing the independence of the state, which they regard as a
treasonous solution.⁶¹
The “Andorra” Model
In 1998, a Kashmiri American businessman organized a group of policymakers
and academics to suggest possible resolutions to the Kashmir conflict. Among other
plans, the Kashmir Study Group proposed that the region could be governed in the
same manner as Andorra, a small state that was claimed by both France and Spain
until 1993. The arrangement gave Andorra partial sovereignty, a separate
constitution, and free access across borders for both France and Spain. The plan
allowed both countries to continue to have partial sway over the region while
providing it with partial independence. When applied to Kashmir, the group only
included the Kashmir valley, where most of the Islamic population of the region
lives. This plan would allow Kashmiris free access to visit their relatives across the
mountains into Azad Kashmir. Similarly, the independent region would have a
separate constitution, citizenship, and legal system. The Kashmiri legislature would
govern over every aspect of normal sovereign jurisdiction except defense and foreign
affairs. The new state would be a free trade zone, thus opening the region’s beloved
tourist areas to both India and Pakistan. The entire region would thus become a
demilitarized zone, and the present Line of Control would be made into a “soft”
national border. Many analysts also suggest that this solution would have the added
benefit of providing a natural buffer zone between India and Pakistan, thus restricting
their ability to orchestrate standoffs against one another and answering to both
countries’ strategic concerns.
Some, however, have questioned the ability of such a soft border to protect India
if large groups of militants, from organizations like Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-
e-Taiba, began to use the region to launch attacks against the rest of India. They
argue that the plan would only be feasible if Pakistan could follow through on its
promise to crack down on these banned militant groups. Similarly, although
recognizing that the borders between India and Kashmir would be open, some have
also questioned the plan’s proposal to partition Jammu and Kashmir state along
religious lines. The plan would also include converting the Line of Control into a
national border – an idea that Pakistan vehemently opposes. Ultimately, however,
many have argued that no proposal could possibly be negotiated as long as India
continues to reject international calls to reopen the issue.

⁶¹ “Editorial: Autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir,” Frontline, Volume 17, Issue 14 (July 8 -

21, 2000).

Table 1. Militant Groups in Kashmir
Hizb-ul Mujahideen
Al Omar Mujahideen
Lashkar-e-Taiba
J a ish-e-Muhamma d
Harkat-ul-Muj ahideen
Harkat-ul-Ansar
H a r k a t -u l -J e h a d -e -Is l a mi
Al Badr
Jamiat-ul Mujahideen
Lashka r-e-J a bbar
H a r k a t -u l -J e h a d -i -Is l a mi
Al Barq
T ehrik-ul-Muj ahideen
Al Jehad
Jammu & Kashmir National Liberation Army
People’s League
Muslim Janbaz Force
Kashmir Jehad Force
Al Jehad Force
Mahaz-e-Azadi
Islami Jamaat-e-Tulba
Jammu & Kashmir Students Liberation Front
Ikhwan-ul-Muj a hideen
Islamic Students League
T a h r i k -e -H u r r i a t -e -K a s h m i r
T e h r i k -e -J e h a d -e -Is l a mi
Muslim Mujahideen
Al Mujahid Force
Tehrik-e-Jehad
Islami Inquilabi Mahaz
Al Hadith
Al Faran
T e h r i k -e -J a mma t -Is l a mi
Pasban-e-Ahle Hadis
Al Fateh
H i z b -e -Is l a mi

CRS-35
Table 2. Main Kashmiri Leaders
HistoryPolitical GroupsStated Vision for KashmirStatus (August 2002)
h AbdullahSheikh Abdullah was the first leader offounded the NationalWas determined to gain aDied in 1982
Jammu and Kashmir, then lost power in aConference Partyplebiscite or secure
falling out with Nehru. Nehru reportedlyautonomy for Kashmir. In
promised Abdullah that there would be apractice, however, some of
plebiscite in Kashmir to confirm accessionAbdullah’s actions led to
of the state to India. Abdullah returned tothe erosion of Article 370
power in 1972. and Kashmiri autonomy.
The son of Sheikh Abdullah, FarooqNational ConferenceWidely seen to have anCurrently the Chief Minister of
Abdullah became the leader of thePartyallegiance with India,Jammu and Kashmir State.
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL31587}National Conference party in 1986. although he has sought toFarooq Abdullah recently held
^g/wFarooq Abdullah returned to power inincrease Kashmir’s Articlea ceremony to pass National
^s^.or1996 elections in Kashmir. Many370 autonomy.Conference leadership to his
^le^akKashmiri separatists see Farooq Abdullahson, Omar Abdullah.
as a traitor because of his allegiance to
^://wikiIndia since he formed a coalition with
^h^ttpRajiv Gandhi’s Congress Party. He has
also been accused of running a corrupt
government.
MohammadKashmiri opposition leader who led theAwami Actionplebiscite, independence,assassinated on May 21, 1990
movement for a plebiscite during timesCommitteeand staunchly againstreportedly by the Hizb-ul
when Sheikh Abdullah made compromisesterrorismMujahideen

with Indira Gandhi.

CRS-36
HistoryPolitical GroupsStated Vision for KashmirStatus (August 2002)
aizSon of Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq,All Parties Hurriyatrestoration of autonomy oractive political leader in Jammu
ar FarooqMirwaiz Umar Farooq has been widelyConference; plebiscite and independenceand Kashmir state
seen as an important Kashmiri
independence leader. Umar Farooq
accompanied Abdul Gani Lone to the
March meeting in Dubai in which Lone
reportedly indicated his willingness to
participate in elections.
A moderate Hurriyat leader and activist forAll Parties Hurriyatplebiscite and independenceassassinated on May 21, 2002
a plebiscite or independence, Abdul GaniConference; People’s
Lone was one of the original leaders whoConference
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL31587}contested the 1987 elections in Kashmir.
^g/wLone was reportedly willing to negotiate
^s^.orwith India for a cease fire, opposed
^le^akmilitant activity, and considering
contesting elections in October 2002. In
^://wikiApril of 2002, Lone reportedly met with
^h^ttpPakistani leaders to ask for an end to
militant attacks and was chastised by a
member of the Pakistani military. He was
assassinated shortly after his return from
Dubai.
jad LoneSajjad Lone is the son of Abdul GaniAll Parties Hurriyatplebiscite and independenceReplaced his father as head of
Lone. He has reportedly taken his father’sConference; People’sthe People’s Conference and as
place as the chairman of the People’sConferencea Hurriyat leader.

Conference.

CRS-37
HistoryPolitical GroupsStated Vision for KashmirStatus (August 2002)
Chairman of the Hurriyat, Abdul GaniAll Parties Hurriyatplebiscite; recentlyactive political leader
Bhat also formed the J&K MuslimConference; Muslimindicated willingness to
Conference which lost rigged elections inConferenceparticipate in elections if
1987. Often viewed as a soft-spoken butthey were to mean the
hard-line leader, this former Persianbeginning of negotiations
professor is seen to be staunchly pro-with India
Pakistan. Sajjad Lone reportedly lashed
out in anger at Abdul Gani Bhat after
Abdul Gani Lone’s death.
sim MalikOutspoken leader of the secular-leaningAll Parties Hurriyatplebiscite and independenceCurrently imprisoned under
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front,Conference; Jammucharges of violating POTO;
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL31587}Yasim Malik renounced all violence, andand Kashmirextremely ill.
^g/wsevered ties to the remaining militantLiberation Front
^s^.orfaction of his group. He has become a(Malik-led faction)
^le^akprominent member of the Hurriyat and has
previously traveled to the United States to
^://wikimeet with U.S. policy makers.
^h^ttp
MohammadThe Jamaat-i-Islami (Kashmir) leader isAll Parties Hurriyatplebiscite; believed to beactive political leader in Jammu
treportedly very moderate. The Jamaat-i-Conference; Jamaat-i-pro-Pakistanand Kashmir state
Islami of Kashmir has reportedly severedIslami (Kashmir)
all ties to militancy under Bhat’s
leadership. Bhat has reportedly fought
openly with hard-line leader Syed Ali Shah
Geelani over this decision.
ed Ali ShahHard-line leader of the All Parties HurriyatAll Parties Hurriyataccession to Pakistan;active political leader in Jammu
Conference. Syed Ali Shah Geelani isConference; Jamaat-i-plebisciteand Kashmir state; has been
widely seen as having an allegiance toIslami (Kashmir)denied an Indian passport to
Pakistan, and refuses to renouncetravel to Pakistan

militancy.

CRS-38
HistoryPolitical GroupsStated Vision for KashmirStatus (August 2002)
ed Salaudin;Hard-line leader of the Hizb-ulHizb-ul-Mujahideen;accession to Pakistan andactive militant and political
a Pir SahibMujahideen militant group, Syed SalaudinMuttahida Jihadplebisciteleader in Azad Kashmir

erlywas one of the original Kashmiri leaders toCouncil
mad Yousuflose rigged elections in 1987. Although he
has attempted to call a cease-fire in the
past, Salaudin reportedly has opposed both
Hurriyat and President Musharraf’s efforts
to end militancy and negotiate with India
recently. Some Pakistani press reports
have indicated that Salaudin may have
regained a favored position with Pakistani
ISI leaders.
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL31587}
^g/w
^s^.or
^le^ak
^://wiki
^h^ttp

Table 3. Members of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference
Awami Action Committee
Jamaat-e-Islami (Kashmir)
Jammu and Kashmir People’s Conference
Muslim Conference
Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front
People’s League
Ittihad-ul Muslimeen
All Jammu & Kashmir Employees’ Confederation
Employees and Workers Confederation
Anjaman-e-Tablig-ul Islam
Liberation Council
Jamiat-e-Ahle Hadith
Kashmir Bazme Tawheed
J ami at-e-Hamdania
Kashmir Bar Association
Political Conference
Tehreek-e-Huriati Kashmiri
Jamiate Ulama-E-Islam
Anjamani Auqafi Jama Masjid
Muslim Khawateen Markaz
Jammu and Kashmir Human Rights Committee
Jammu and Kashmir People’s Basic Rights (Protection) Committee
Employees & Workers Confederation (Arsawi Group)
Students Islamic League
Islamic Study Circle
Auquaf Jama Masjid
Table 4. Members of the Muttahida Jehad Council
Hizb-ul Mujahideen
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (not affiliated with Yasim Malik)
Harkat-ul-Ansar
Tehrik-e-Jehad
T ehrik-ul-Muj ahideen
J amait-ul-M uj ahideen
Al Jehad
Al Umar Mujahideen
Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front
Muslim Janbaz Force
Hizbullah
Al Fatah
Hizb-ul Momineen
*Al-Badr
*Lashkar-e -T aiba
^*^T^h^e^s^e^g^r^ou^ps^report^e^dl^y^h^a^v^e^on^l^y^obs^erv^e^{r s}^t^at^u^s^.