The Impact of Mobilization on Student Reservists

Report for Congress
The Impact Of Mobilization On Student Reservists
October 8, 2002
Lawrence Kapp
Analyst in National Defense
Tiffany Petros
Research Associate
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division


Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

The Impact Of Mobilization On Student Reservists
Summary
The ongoing mobilization of reservists in support of Operations Enduring
Freedom and Noble Eagle (OEF/ONE), has been the largest reserve call-up since the
Persian Gulf War. Most of these reservists held civilian jobs prior to mobilization
and, as such, are entitled to certain legal protections under the Uniformed
Servicemembers Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA; 38 U.S.C.
4301-4333). However, a substantial number of reservists today are students at
institutions of higher education, either on a full-time or part-time basis. Their
academic status is not covered by USERRA, or any similar federal law (although it
is covered under the laws of some states).
Some of these students have reported that their academic status has been harmed
by mobilization and have advocated legal protections similar to those enjoyed by
employees. This report provides information on the types of problems encountered
by student reservists, the scope of those problems, the remedies available to student
reservists who experience difficulties related to mobilization, and an assessment of
the effectiveness of these remedies. It also provides several alternative options for
assisting student reservists which Congress may wish to consider. This report will
be updated as needed.



Contents
Background ......................................................1
How Many Student Reservists Are There?..............................1
How Many Student Reservists Have Been Mobilized for Operations
Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle?..............................3
Reported Problems of Student Reservists...............................3
What Type of Assistance is Available to Student Reservists Who Experience
Problems With Their Academic Status Due to Their Reserve Duties?.....4
What Are the Benefits and Drawbacks of the Current System? ..............5
What Are Some Alternatives For Dealing With This Issue?.................6
Do Nothing...................................................6
Require the Department of Defense to Study the Issue.................6
Increase Awareness of the Current System Run by SOC...............7
Transfer Responsibility for Student Reservists from SOC to ESGR ......7
Enact Federal Legal Protections for Student Reservists................8
Allow Students to Defer Mobilization While in School................8
Appendix A:
State Laws Protecting Student Reservists ..........................9
Arkansas .....................................................9
6-62-112: Students called into military service...................9
Louisiana ....................................................9
Revised Statutes 29: 38.2. Prohibition against academic penalties
against student members of the uniformed services of the
United States.........................................9
Revised Statutes 29:420. Academic Penalties Prohibited..........10
New Jersey..................................................11
18A:624.2. Options for student at public institution of higher
education unable to complete course due to military service...11
Texas ......................................................12
§ 54.006. Refund of tuition and fees..........................12
West Virginia................................................13
§15-1F-1a. Educational leave of absence for active duty..........13



The Impact Of Mobilization On Student
Reservists
Background
The ongoing mobilization of reservists in support of Operations Enduring
Freedom and Noble Eagle (OEF/ONE), has been the largest reserve call-up since the
Persian Gulf War. As of September 17, 2002, about 93,000 reservists had been
involuntarily called to active duty under federal authority.1
Most of these reservists held civilian jobs prior to mobilization and, as such, are
entitled to certain legal protections under the Uniformed Servicemembers
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA).2 For example, USERRA
generally guarantees that mobilized reservists will be allowed to return to their
civilian jobs, or similar jobs, after demobilization without adverse treatment.
However, a substantial number of reservists today are students at institutions of
higher education, either on a full-time or part-time basis. Their academic status is not
covered by USERRA, or any similar federal law (although it is covered under the
laws of some states).
Some of these students have reported that their academic status has been harmed
by mobilization and have advocated legal protections similar to those enjoyed by
employees. This report provides information on the types of problems encountered
by student reservists, the scope of those problems, the remedies available to student
reservists who experience difficulties related to mobilization, and an assessment of
the effectiveness of these remedies. It also provides several alternative options for
assisting student reservists that Congress may wish to consider.
How Many Student Reservists Are There?
The Department of Defense (DOD) does not track the academic status of
reservists, so a precise number is not available. However, DOD has made a rough


1This figure does not include those who volunteered for federal service in support of
OEF/ONE, nor does it include those members of the National Guard called up for state
active duty or for full time National Guard duty under Title 32 of the U.S. Code. For a
summary of these distinctions, see CRS Report RL30802, Reserve Component Personnel
Issues, by Lawrence Kapp.
238 U.S.C. 4301-4333.

estimate of the student population within the Selected Reserve3 based on GI Bill
utilization rates. According to Dr. John Winkler, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Reserve Affairs (Manpower and Personnel), “An estimated 30 percent
of National Guard members and Reservists are students enrolled in institutions of
higher learning.”4 The methodology used to arrive at this number, however, probably
overstates the number of reservists who are students at the time of mobilization.5 An
alternative methodology indicates that about 10-15% of reservists are students at any
given point in time.6 Additionally, a recent survey by the General Accounting Office
of 1,608 reservists from selected high operational tempo units found that 22% of
them were students on a full-time or part-time basis.7


3The Selected Reserve, a sub-element of the Ready Reserve, contains those units and
individuals most essential to wartime missions. Selected Reservists generally perform one
weekend of training each month, for which they receive a monthly paycheck, and two weeks
of training a year, for which they receive a separate paycheck. Another sub-element of the
Ready Reserve is the Individual Ready Reserve, which is a manpower pool of pre-trained
individuals who have already served in the Active Component or the Selected Reserve, but
who are not required to train regularly as are those in the Selected Reserve. Although
members of the Individual Ready Reserve have been mobilized during each call up since
Desert Storm, the numbers have been low in comparison to the numbers of Selected
Reservists activated.
4Dr. John Winkler, “Protecting Recalled Students,” The Officer, December, 2001, 38.
5 The methodology used to arrive at this figure deserves discussion. According to the Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD/RA), there were 188,960
members of the Selected Reserve who drew benefits from the reserve version of the GI Bill
at some point during fiscal year 2000. During that same fiscal year, the total membership
of the Selected Reserve was 873,207. Thus, based on these two figures, OASD/RA
calculated that 21.6% of Selected Reservists were drawing reserve GI Bill educational
benefits. In addition, an indeterminate number of Selected Reservists were attending school
using active duty GI Bill benefits or state military educational benefits, or were self-
financing their education. Thus, OASD/RA believes that a student population estimate of
30% is reasonable when these other factors are taken into consideration. It should be
pointed out, however, that this estimate is fundamentally based on the number of students
who drew reserve GI bill benefits at some point during an entire year. As some students
drop out, graduate, or only enroll for one semester, this methodology has the practical effect
of maximizing the population designated as “student.” A methodology which looked only
at those drawing GI bill benefits during a given month would produce a lower proportion
of student reservists.
6This methodology looks at only those members of the Selected Reserve drawing active or
reserve GI Bill benefits during a given month – specifically, January of 2000. According
to the Defense Manpower Data Center, that number was 60,114. With a total Selected
Reserve membership of 873,207 people, this indicates that 6.9% of Selected Reservists were
drawing GI Bill educational benefits during that month. The number of reservists using
state military educational benefits or self-financing their education is unknown, but an
estimate of 3-8% does not appear to be unreasonable.
7However, it should be pointed out that this survey was not administered to a random sample
of reservists, so its findings cannot be considered representative of the Reserve Components
generally.

How Many Student Reservists Have Been Mobilized
for Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle?
Another issue related to student reservists involves the degree to which they are
affected by mobilization. While the proportion of students in the Selected Reserve
may be 10, 15, 22 or 30%, as the previous paragraph indicates, that ratio may not
correspond to the population of mobilized reservists. In fact, data from the Bosnia
and Kosovo missions appear to indicate that student reservists were mobilized at a
rate lower than their overall representation in the Selected Reserve. Specifically, of
the reservists mobilized for Bosnia, only about 5.5% were receiving reserve or active
GI Bill benefits within the three months prior to mobilization. Of the reservists
mobilized for Kosovo, only about 3% were receiving reserve or active GI Bill
benefits within the three months prior to mobilization. Again, these figures do not
include those who were self-financing their education or those who were receiving
state military educational benefits. However, the gap between these figures and the
figures cited in the previous paragraph is considerable. This gap may be due, in part,
to the self-selection8 that often accompanies smaller-scale mobilizations like Bosnia
and Kosovo, and to the heavy utilization in these operations of military units which
typically have older and better educated populations.9 Alternatively, the gap may be
caused not by a decrease in the proportion of students in the mobilized population,
but by a decrease in the population of students using GI Bill benefits in the mobilized
population. This, too, could be caused by the utilization of units which have older
populations who may have used up all of their GI Bill entitlements.
The reserve call-ups which occurred in the wake of the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks were substantially larger than those of Bosnia and Kosovo, and so
these factors may have been reduced or eliminated. However, it may still be the case
that student reservists are underrepresented in the OEF/ONE mobilization in relation
to their overall representation in the Selected Reserve. Nonetheless, if one assumes
that just 10% of those mobilized for OEF/ONE were students just prior to their
activation, then there are about 9,300 reservists whose academic status could have
been affected by the mobilization.10
Reported Problems of Student Reservists
Mobilized student reservists have reported a number of problems associated
with their academic status. Perhaps the most commonly reported problem relates to
the treatment of classes they are taking at the time of mobilization. For example,
some students have complained of difficulty withdrawing from courses without


8 In other words, volunteers replace those who would have a difficult time deploying. These
volunteers may be disproportionately non-students.
9 For example, aviation and civil affairs units.
10This figure is based solely on the number of reservists who had been involuntarily
activated for federal service in support of OEF/ONE as of September 17, 2002. For a
summary of these distinctions, see CRS Report RL30802, Reserve Component Personnel
Issues, by Lawrence Kapp.

penalty, stating that faculty or administrators told them their grades would suffer if
they did not complete their courses, or that they would be allowed to withdraw, but
would forfeit the tuition they had paid for the courses. Other students have objected
to a lack of guarantees regarding readmission to school, reinstitution of scholarships,
or renewal of on-campus housing privileges when they return to school after their
tour of duty. Loss of student health benefits while mobilized and concerns about
prompt reinstitution of this benefit after demobilization have also been reported.11
There are no solid data on the frequency of such problems, but there is some
evidence that mobilization related difficulties are fairly uncommon. Steve Kime, the
director of the Servicemembers’ Opportunity College (SOC), which has voluntarily
agreed to respond to such complaints on behalf of mobilized reservists, stated that
during the reserve mobilizations for the Gulf War, Bosnia, and Kosovo, his office
received only a handful of complaints – about two dozen total – from affected
reservists. This low rate of complaints through official channels seem to indicate that
problems related to the academic status of mobilized student reservists are not
widespread. Alternatively, however, it may simply indicate that student reservists are
not well informed about avenues of assistance for problems they encounter. Lacking
such information, they may attempt to deal with the problems on their own and
accept any negative outcomes as part of the “price” of mobilization.12 Reports from
officials in states which have laws protecting the academic status of reservists also
indicate a very small number of complaints.13
What Type of Assistance is Available to Student
Reservists Who Experience Problems With Their
Academic Status Due to Their Reserve Duties?
At the federal level, the principal avenue reservists have for assistance with
academic problems related to mobilization is provided through the Servicemembers’
Opportunity Colleges (SOC),14 a DOD funded educational consortium. Reservists


11Reservists mobilized for contingency operations such as OEF/ONE are immediately
eligible for military health benefits nearly identical to those offered to active duty personnel.
However, many reservists prefer to maintain their private health insurance while deployed,
especially if they have dependents who are accustomed to using a certain health plan.
12The author is aware of several cases such as this which occurred in connection with
activations for the Bosnia mission.
13Based on interviews conducted by Tiffany Petros with state officials in Louisiana, New
Jersey, and West Virginia. It may be, however, that the low number of complaints in these
states is due to the laws they have protecting student reservists.
14“SOC was created in 1972 to provide educational opportunities to servicemembers, who,
because they frequently moved from place to place, had trouble completing college degrees.
Today SOC is a consortium of more than 1550 colleges and universities that provide
educational opportunities for servicemembers and their families. SOC is cosponsored by
the American Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU) and the American
Association of Community Colleges (AACC), in cooperation with 13 other educational
(continued...)

can contact SOC and request assistance in dealing with their academic institution.15
SOC director Kime states that his office has substantial leverage within the higher
education community due to the military’s ongoing relationship with many colleges
and universities. This, he argues, allows SOC to contact school administrators
directly and to effectively mediate academic problems related to mobilization. Mr.
Kime states that SOC has been able to resolve all mobilization related cases brought
to its attention since the organization assumed this role during the Persian Gulf
War.16 Additionally, SOC played a key role in getting major higher education
associations like the American Council on Education and the American Association
of State Colleges and Universities, to encourage their members to adopt policies to
protect the academic status of mobilized students.
At the state level, reservists may also have legal recourse depending on the laws
of the state in which they are attending school. States which have laws protecting the
academic status of reservists include Arkansas, Louisiana, New Jersey, Texas, and
West Virginia. (The scope of these laws varies considerably; see Appendix A for a
listing of these statutes). Other states may have laws or regulations which protect the
academic status of reservists as well.
What Are the Benefits and Drawbacks of the
Current System?
The major benefit of the current system is that it appears to be working: in those
cases where SOC is made aware of problems, it claims to have resolved them in a
manner favorable to the reservist. This system also has the benefit of being relatively
inexpensive: SOC has a small staff, and student mobilization issues take up only a
small part of its time. The current system also avoids the adversarial relationship
which could develop between the military and academic institutions if student
reservists were given specified legal rights which the federal government could
enforce against colleges and universities.
The drawbacks of the current system are, first of all, that it has not been well
publicized. Student reservists experiencing academic problems due to mobilization
may be unaware of – and thus unable to take advantage of – the mediating services
provided by SOC. Additionally, the existence of laws protecting student reservists
in some states, but not others, creates a situation where some student reservists have


14(...continued)
associations, the Military Services, the National Guard, and the Coast Guard. SOC is
funded by the Department of Defense (DOD) through a contract with AASCU. The contract
is managed for DOD by the Defense Activity for Non-Traditional Education Support
(DANTES).” For online information, see the Servicemembers’Opportunity Colleges web
site, [http://www.soc.aascu.org/socgen/WhatIs.html], July 3, 2002.
15Affected reservists can contact SOC by calling 1-800-368-5622, via email at
socamail@aascu.org or by writing to Servicemembers Opportunity Colleges, 1307 New
York Avenue, NW, Fifth Floor, Washington, D.C. 20005-4701.
16Author’s conversation with Mr. Steve Kime.

more rights than others. This disparity could generate feelings of inequity during a
mobilization and dissatisfaction with the lack of federal legal protections. Also, the
lack of uniform rules defining the rights and responsibilities for student reservists vis-
a-vis academic institutions might have a negative impact on the attitudes of students
towards reserve service, as it complicates the individual reservist’s ability to plan for
the future. Even if academic institutions generally accommodate student reservists
in practice, the possibility that they might not may cause students to attach an
unjustifiably high “cost” to reserve service and therefore discourage participation.
Perhaps most fundamentally, however, the current system can be criticized for
being wholly contingent upon the cooperation of academic institutions. Should a
school refuse to cooperate with SOC – especially one that is not part of the SOC
consortium – there is no legal recourse for the affected reservist. This point is
perhaps less relevant at present, when the current operations against terrorism enjoy
widespread support among the American public and within academia. However, if
this conflict, or a future conflict, were to become unpopular within the academic
community (as was the case in Vietnam), the current level of cooperation might
decrease markedly.
What Are Some Alternatives For
Dealing With This Issue?
Congress has a number of options for dealing with the impact of mobilization
on student reservists. The choice among these alternatives will likely hinge on
Congress’s assessment of (a) the prevalence of mobilization related problems among
student reservists, (b) the impact such problems could have on the recruiting and
retention of reservists who are in college or have plans to attend college, and (c) the
effectiveness of the current system in resolving such problems.
Do Nothing
One option for Congress is simply to take no action, thereby maintaining the
status quo. This response would be most appropriate if Congress believed that there
were a relatively small number of mobilization related problems for student
reservists, that these problems had little impact on reserve recruiting and retention,
and/or that the current system was doing an acceptable job handling the problems that
do occur.
Require the Department of Defense to Study the Issue
Another option Congress might consider is directing the Department of Defense
to conduct a study on how mobilization impacts student reservists and the
implications of this for reserve recruiting and retention. Based on the findings of the
study, DOD could then make recommendations to Congress on the most appropriate
policy response. Such a study would have the additional benefit of strengthening the
factual basis for any policy decision Congress decides to make. As mentioned
earlier, there is a lack of solid data on key issues concerning student reservists – for
example, how many student reservists there are, how frequently they are mobilized,



what proportion experience academic problems as a result of mobilization, which
problems are most frequently experienced, and whether or not such problems affected
their views about reserve service. A thorough study could therefore provide a more
substantive underpinning for debating policy alternatives than currently exists.
Increase Awareness of the Current System Run by SOC
This option might be useful if the Congress believes that the current system run
by SOC is generally effective in assisting student reservists, but that student
reservists need to be better informed about the services it provides. For example,
Congress could direct DOD to ensure that all reservists are aware of SOCs mediating
services through the various communications channels at DOD’s disposal, or it could
direct DOD to hire an outside public relations firm for this purpose. Additionally,
Congress could require that the military services brief reservists about SOC’s
mediating services on a regular basis or upon mobilization. Increased publicity,
however, would likely increase the demand for SOC’s services, and SOC might have
difficulty handling an increase in requests for mediation at its current staffing levels.
Transfer Responsibility for Student Reservists from SOC to
ESGR
Congress could direct DOD to transfer responsibility for student reservists from
SOC to the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve
(ESGR). ESGR is a DOD chartered organization which “was established in 1972 to
promote cooperation and understanding between Reserve component members and
their civilian employers and to assist in the resolution of conflicts arising from an17
employee’s military commitment.” It has 30 years of experience in helping resolve
conflicts which arise between employers and reservists due to military duty, and it
has developed a large network of volunteers in each state and territory to support this
mission. Transferring responsibility for academic related issues to ESGR would
provide student reservists with a larger, more experienced, and better known
organization for addressing their mobilization related problems. However, it should
be pointed out that ESGR does not have the same type of relationship with the
academic community that SOC has, and this could make it more difficult for ESGR18
to effectively mediate complaints from student reservists. This option would


17“What is the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve?”
Factsheet, available at [http://www.esgr.org/].
18For more information on this option, see the GAO Report entitled “Reserve Forces: DOD
Actions Needed To Better Manage Relations Between Reservists And Their Employers,”
June, 2002, pp. 16-17 and 24-27. In this report, GAO made a formal recommendation to
DOD that “the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Reserve Affairs, add students as a target population to the mission and responsibilities
of ESGR, study in depth the problems related to deployments that student Reservists have
experienced, and determine what actions the ESGR might take to help students and their
educational institutions.” The DOD response was as follows: “Concur. During strategic
planning ESGR identified students and educational institutions as a target customer group.
However, without additional resources ESGR can only provide limited information and
(continued...)

probably be most appropriate if Congress felt that the current system run by SOC was
acceptable in principal, but that it needed to be managed by a larger, more visible
organization.
Enact Federal Legal Protections for Student Reservists
Another option for Congress is to pass legislation, roughly analogous to
USERRA, which defines the respective rights and duties of student reservists and
academic institutions. For example, among other things, such a law might require
academic institutions to readmit student reservists after they have been demobilized,
but also require that the student apply for readmission within a specified period of
time. This type of law could eliminate many of the negative impacts which
mobilization can have on student reservists and thereby reduce potential
dissatisfaction with reserve service among students. Additionally, by clearly defining
rights and duties for student reservists and academic institutions, such a law could
also help to minimize misunderstandings between the respective parties. On the
other hand, depending on how the law was written, it could prove burdensome to
academic institutions, especially in the case of small schools with large number of
student reservists. It might also create an adversarial relationship between members
of the academic institution and reservists which could hinder resolving situations not
specifically addressed in the law. This option would probably be most appropriate
if Congress determined that the academic problems encountered by student reservists
were fairly common, were causing significant recruiting and retention problems, or
were not being resolved effectively by the current system. Such legislation could be
modeled on currently existing state laws (see Appendix A).
Allow Students to Defer Mobilization While in School
Yet another option would be to place the burden of protecting the academic
careers of student reservists on the military, rather than on academic institutions.
Under such a policy, reservists who are enrolled in courses could be exempted from
mobilization until the end of the semester, or the end of the academic year. However,
such a policy would likely cause serious readiness and morale problems in reserve
units. For example, would a reserve unit be capable of performing its assigned
mission upon mobilization if 10% of its members claimed exemption under such an
academic deferment policy? How would the unit function if the exempted personnel
included key leaders, such as the commanding officer? During a mobilization, would
reservists who could not claim academic deferment feel they were being treated
unfairly? A further problem with such a policy is that it would create a “moral
hazard”: the ability to temporarily avoid service might tempt some reservists to enroll
in school if a mobilization appeared imminent. Such actions, even if undertaken by
only a few reservists, could also cause morale and readiness problems.


18(...continued)
mediation for Guard and Reserve students.”

Appendix A:
State Laws Protecting Student Reservists
Arkansas

6-62-112: Students called into military service.


(a) When any person is activated for full-time military service during a time of
national crisis and therefore is required to cease attending a state-supported
postsecondary educational institution without completing and receiving a grade
in one (1) or more courses, the following assistance shall be required with
regard to courses not completed:
(1) Such student shall receive a complete refund of tuition and such
general fees as are assessed against all students at the institution.
(A) Proportionate refunds of room, board, and other fees which
were paid to the institution shall be provided to the student,
based on the date of withdrawal.
(B) If an institution contracts for services covered by fees which
have been paid by and refunded to the student, the contractor
shall provide a like refund to the institution.
(2) If the institution has a policy of repurchasing textbooks, students shall
be offered the maximum price, based on condition, for the textbooks
associated with such courses.
b) When a student is required to cease attendance because of such military activation
without completing and receiving a grade in one (1) or more courses, the
institution shall provide a reasonable opportunity for completion of the courses
after deactivation.
(c) A student activated during the course of a semester shall be entitled, within a
period of two (2) years following deactivation, to free tuition for one (1)
semester at the institution where attendance had been interrupted unless federal
aid is made available for the same purpose.
Louisiana
Revised Statutes 29: 38.2. Prohibition against academic penalties
against student members of the uniformed services of the United
States.
1. A.(1) No student member of the uniformed services of the United States shall have
his postsecondary education, including but not limited to colleges and universities,
unnecessarily disrupted because of his military service, in accordance with the Board
of Regents’ “Policy on Reservist and National Guard Mobilization/Activation for
Louisiana Public Postsecondary Education Institutions”, (Section II, 8.2). No student



member of the uniformed services of the United States shall have his postsecondary
education, including but not limited to postsecondary proprietary schools, vocational,
technical, or trade schools, or nonpublic colleges and universities licensed to do
business within the state of Louisiana as provided by law, unnecessarily disrupted
because of his service in the uniformed services.
(2)(a) Policies shall be developed jointly by the Board of Regents and the
management boards of public postsecondary education to address
academic matters of members of the uniformed services resulting from
mobilization or activation to ensure that the pursuit of education is
disrupted to the minimum extent possible and that no undue penalties are
assessed due to a military call to service. The policies shall address the
awarding of academic credits, grades, time frames for resumption of
academic work, academic status upon reenrollment, scholarships, student
grants and loans, student fees, assessments and tuition, and related matters
relative to the disruption of academic pursuits due to the mobilization or
activation of student members of the uniformed services of the United
States.
(b) Proprietary schools and nonpublic colleges and universities
licensed to do business in the state of Louisiana by the Board of
Regents shall also adopt policies consistent to the maximum
extent possible with the policies set forth in Subsection A of this
Section.
B. The enforcement of this Section shall be reserved for the proper authority and the
appropriate jurisdiction of the Board of Regents and the management boards of
public postsecondary education or the successor of such boards, and the boards
of trustees of the private colleges and universities in this state which award a
baccalaureate or higher degree and which maintain and operate educational
programs for which credits are given.
C. As used in this Section, “uniformed services of the United States” shall have the
same meaning as defined in R.S. 29:403(11).
Added by Acts 1988, No. 187,§ 1, eff. July 1, 1988; Acts 1991, No. 113,§ 1, eff. June

30, 1991; Acts 2001, 2nd Ex. Sess., No. 9,§ 1, eff. Oct. 16, 2001.


Revised Statutes 29:420. Academic Penalties Prohibited.
A.(1) No student member of any uniformed service of the United States shall have
his postsecondary education, including but not limited to colleges and
universities, unnecessarily disrupted because of his service in the uniformed
services, in accordance with the Board of Regents’ “Policy on Reservist and
National Guard Mobilization/Activation for Louisiana Public Postsecondary
Education Institutions”, (Section II, 8.2). No student member of the uniformed
services of the United States shall have his postsecondary education, including
but not limited to postsecondary proprietary schools, vocational or technical or
trade schools, or nonpublic colleges and universities licensed to do business



within the state of Louisiana as provided by law, unnecessarily disrupted
because of his service in the uniformed services.
(2)(a) Policies shall be developed jointly by the Board of Regents and the
management boards of public postsecondary education to address
academic matters of members of the uniformed services resulting from
mobilization or activation to ensure that the pursuit of education is
disrupted to the minimum extent possible and that no undue penalties are
assessed due to a military call to service. The policies shall address the
awarding of academic credits, grades, time frames for resumption of
academic work, academic status upon reenrollment, scholarships, student
grants and loans, student fees, assessments and tuition, and related matters
relative to the disruption of academic pursuits due to the mobilization or
activation of student members of the uniformed services.
(b) Proprietary schools and nonpublic colleges and universities licensed to
do business in the state of Louisiana by the Board of Regents shall also
adopt policies consistent to the maximum extent possible with the policies
set forth in Subsection A of this Section.
B. The enforcement of this Section shall be reserved for the proper authority and the
appropriate jurisdiction of the Board of Regents and the management boards of
public postsecondary education or the successor of such boards, and the boards
of trustees of the private colleges and universities in this state which award a
baccalaureate or higher degree and which maintain and operate educational
programs for which credits are given.
C. As used in this Section, “uniformed services of the United States” shall have the
same meaning as defined in R.S. 29:403(11).
Acts 1991, 1st E.S., No. 6,§ 1, eff. April 17, 1991; Acts 1995, No. 716,§ 1, eff. June

21, 1995; Acts 2001, 2nd Ex. Sess., No. 9,§ 1, eff. Oct. 16, 2001.


New Jersey
18A:624.2. Options for student at public institution of higher
education unable to complete course due to military service.
1. a. A student at a New Jersey public institution of higher education who is unable
to complete a course because the student is called to partial or full mobilization for
State or federal active duty as a member of the National Guard or a Reserve
component of the Armed Forces of the United States shall be entitled to the options
set forth in this section with respect to the student’s grade for the course.
b. A student who has completed at least eight weeks of attendance in a course may
choose to:



(1) receive a letter grade; or
(2) receive a grade of pass or fail; or
(3) receive a grade of incomplete; or
(4) withdraw from the course.
c. A student who has completed less than eight weeks of attendance in a course may
choose to:
(1) receive a grade of incomplete; or
(2) withdraw from the course.
d. A letter grade or a grade of pass shall only be awarded if, in the opinion of the
faculty member teaching the course, the student has completed sufficient work, and
there is sufficient evidence of progress toward meeting the requirements of the
course, to justify the grade.
e. A grade of incomplete shall remain valid for a period of one year after the student
returns to the New Jersey public institution of higher education.
f. A student who chooses to accept a grade of pass or fail may, within one year after
returning to the New Jersey public institution of higher education, receive a letter
grade for the course by completing the work required for the course, in which case
the letter grade shall replace the pass or fail grade as the student’s grade for the course.
g. A student who chooses to withdraw from a course shall receive a full refund of
tuition and fees attributable to that course.
h. A student who has paid amounts for room, board or fees shall, except as provided
in subsection g. of this section, receive a refund of that portion of those amounts
attributable to the time period during which the student did not use the services for
which payment was made.
i. Any refund payable to a student who is a financial aid recipient shall be subject to
the applicable State and federal regulations regarding refunds.
L.1997,c.377,s.1.
Texas
§ 54.006. Refund of tuition and fees.
(f) Beginning with the summer semester of 1990, if a student withdraws from an
institution of higher education because the student is called to active military service,
the institution, at the student’s option, shall:
(1) refund the tuition and fees paid by the student for the semester in which the
student withdraws;



(2) grant a student, who is eligible under the institution’s guidelines, an incomplete
grade in all courses by designating “withdrawn-military” on the student’s transcript;
or
(3) as determined by the instructor, assign an appropriate final grade or credit to a
student who has satisfactorily completed a substantial amount of coursework and
who has demonstrated sufficient mastery of the course material.
West Virginia
§15-1F-1a. Educational leave of absence for active duty.
Whenever any member of the national guard or other reserve component of the
armed forces of the United States is called or ordered to active duty, other than active
duty for training, including, in the case of members of the national guard, active state
duty, the educational institution in which the member is enrolled shall grant the
member a military leave of absence from their education. Persons on military leave
of absence from their educational institution shall be entitled, upon release from
military duty, to be restored to the educational status they had attained prior to their
being ordered to military duty without loss of academic credits earned, scholarships
or grants awarded or tuition and other fees paid prior to the commencement of the
military duty. It shall be the duty of the educational institution to refund tuition or
fees paid or to credit the tuition and fees to the next semester or term after the
termination of the educational military leave of absence at the option of the student.
The provisions of this section shall not supercede federal laws, rules and regulations
at the time of the military leave of absence.