Reconstruction Assistance in Afghanistan: Goals, Priorities, and Issues for Congress

CRS Report for Congress
Reconstruction Assistance in Afghanistan:
Goals, Priorities, and Issues for Congress
February 26, 2003
Rhoda Margesson
Foreign Affairs Analyst
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Johanna Bockman
Research Associate
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Reconstruction Assistance in Afghanistan:
Goals, Priorities, and Issues for Congress
Summary
Afghanistan has taken the first step toward reconstruction. According to many
observers, the most serious challenge facing Afghans and Afghanistan today remains
the lack of security. Most experts agree on the need for substantial, long-term
reconstruction with international support, but questions are raised about the funds
required, the priorities, and the coordination necessary for this process. This report
examines U.S. foreign aid to Afghanistan in the context of the international effort and
explores the major issues for Congress.
As a result of decades of violent conflict, Afghanistan is in great need of
substantial reconstruction, from roads and schools to a broad range of development
projects encompassing the whole country. Decades of civil war and proxy regional
wars have created four intertwining and competing economies in Afghanistan
revolving around war, drugs, agriculture, and humanitarian aid that drive conflicting
incentives for Afghans and their neighbors. Effective reconstruction assistance could
reconfigure these economies and provide incentives for viable economic growth.
The international recovery and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan is immense
and complicated, with the Afghan government, numerous U.N. agencies, bilateral
donors, many international organizations, and countless non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) working to help Afghanistan. The international community
and the Afghan government have sought to establish coordinating institutions and a
common set of goals in order to utilize donor funds most effectively. Officially,
international assistance is coordinated through the United Nations Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), though there are other coordinating institutions
tied to the Afghan government.
Donor countries have committed $1.7 billion and, from that, disbursed $1.5
billion. Key areas of concern include whether the funding levels to Afghanistan are
adequate and how much is being used for reconstruction. Some have argued that the
majority of FY2002 funds–as much as 70% –went towards humanitarian aid.
The next major donor conference for Afghanistan will take place in March 2003.
Some of the major reconstruction programs are government capacity building,
women’s programs, employment generation, road construction, agricultural
rehabilitation, urban reconstruction, energy, education, health, communications, and
media. There is concern about creating enough momentum behind reconstruction
initiatives in the short term and sustaining international focus on Afghanistan in the
long term, particularly in light of a possible war in Iraq. This report will be updated
as events warrant.

Contents
In troduction ......................................................1
Background: Past Forms of Assistance to Afghanistan.................1
Current Forms of Assistance.....................................3
Humanitarian Assistance....................................3
Military Assistance........................................4
Reconstruction Goals...........................................6
Institutional Mechanisms............................................6
U.S. Institutions...............................................6
International Institutions........................................7
Pre-existing Institutions.....................................8
New Coordinating Institutions................................9
Donor Conference and Trust Funds...........................10
Coordination Challenges...................................11
Funding ........................................................12
International and U.S. Funding Levels............................12
Pledge Fulfillment Problems................................12
Questions about Funding Levels.............................13
Making Reconstruction a Funding Priority.....................14
Congressional Action..........................................14
FY2001 Appropriations....................................14
FY2002 Appropriations....................................15
FY2002 Supplemental Appropriations........................15
FY2003 Appropriations....................................15
Other Legislation.........................................16
Reconstruction Assistance..........................................16
Reconstruction Priorities.......................................17
Reconstruction Programs.......................................18
Government Capacity Building..............................18
Women’s Programs.......................................20
Employment Generation...................................21
Road Construction........................................22
Agricultural Rehabilitation.................................22
Urban Reconstruction.....................................24
Energy .................................................24
Education ...............................................24
Health ..................................................25
Communications and Media................................25
Issues for Congress...............................................25
Reconstruction Goals..........................................25
Reconstruction Priorities.......................................26
Funding ....................................................27
Donor Conferences and Trust Funds..............................28
Military Role in Humanitarian Assistance..........................28
Afghanistan and Possible Iraq War...............................28

List of Tables
Table 1. Lead Countries by Sector....................................18
Appendix - Afghanistan Assistance Donor Funds Committed and
Disbursed by Country as of February 10, 2003......................30

Reconstruction Assistance in Afghanistan:
Goals, Priorities, and Issues for Congress
Introduction
Afghanistan has begun the slow process of reconstruction. According to many
observers, the most serious challenge facing Afghans and Afghanistan today remains
the lack of security. While the Taliban regime fell and the new government has
celebrated its first anniversary, Afghanistan is still in a peacebuilding process, an
essential part of which is reconstruction. Most observers agree on the need for
substantial, long-term reconstruction and the need for international support, but
questions are raised about the funds required, the priorities, and the coordination
necessary for this process. This report examines U.S. foreign aid to Afghanistan in
the context of the international effort and explores the major issues for Congress.
Background: Past Forms of Assistance to Afghanistan
The United States, other countries, and international relief organizations have
long been active in providing assistance to the Afghan people.¹ During the 1980s,
the United States along with other countries had funded, through Pakistan, the
mujahedin forces fighting against the Soviet Union, as well as providing
humanitarian aid to the large refugee camps in Pakistan. After the Soviet Union left
Afghanistan and dissolved, the United States sharply reduced its programs. From
FY1994, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) did not
have a mission in Afghanistan, but continued to provide aid mainly through U.N.
agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). During the violent civil war
that lasted throughout the 1990s, the United Nations continued to seek a peace
agreement, which would allow for sustained reconstruction. However, with the
failure of several peace agreements, the international donor community focused
primarily on humanitarian aid because the conditions were not stable for long-term
development and donors did not want to provide assistance to the Taliban, which
came to power in 1996. Between 1996 and 2001, the United States alone provided
half a billion dollars in emergency aid to Afghanistan.²

¹ For further information on Afghanistan, please refer to CRS Report RL30588,
Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report
RL31389, Afghanistan: Challenges and Options for Reconstructing a Stable and Moderate
State by Richard Cronin.
² USAID, “U.S. Agency for International Development: Afghanistan Recovery and
Reconstruction Strategy,” document provided during briefing given by Andrew S. Natsios,
October 18, 2002, p. 4.

The assistance situation changed dramatically once the Taliban was removed
from power, allowing for the implementation of humanitarian assistance and the
development of reconstruction plans. These plans quickly took shape with the Bonn
Accord on December 5, 2001, which led to the formation on December 22, 2001 of
an interim government led by Hamid Karzai. The central government was further
strengthened in June 2002 through the loya jirga, which was attended by 1,550
delegates. It chose a new government to run Afghanistan for the next two years
during which time a new constitution is to be drafted and elections are to be held. At
the loya jirga, Karzai was chosen to lead the new government named the Islamic
Transitional Government of Afghanistan (ITGA). The Afghan government has been
working with the international donor community on reconstruction programs and
plans, since a major donor conference in January 2002 in Tokyo and subsequent
ongoing meetings with international donors.
As a result of decades of violent conflict, Afghanistan is in great need of
substantial reconstruction, from roads and schools to a broad range of development
projects encompassing the whole country. According to USAID, the decades of civil
war and proxy regional war have created four intertwining and competing economies
in Afghanistan.³ These economies create conflicting incentives for Afghans and their
neighbors and have a determining influence on the future of Afghanistan.
^!There is the war economy, an economy of arms trafficking, looting,
kidnaping, black market activity, and the brokering of violence.
Different factions, funded by neighboring countries, control border
crossings, generate revenue from trade and illicit smuggling, support
militias through arms purchases, and thus fuel violence. Some
contend that this economy creates incentives for the continuation of
conflict;
^!Connected with the first is the drug economy.⁴ Poppy trade provides
substantial income for some Afghans, but also has led to
skyrocketing addiction rates in the region and created incentives
leading away from other forms of agriculture critical to the sustained
livelihood of the country;
^!As a result of decades of conflict, deep poverty, and on-going
drought, many Afghans rely on the benevolence of the international
community, which has created a humanitarian aid economy. While
humanitarian aid is essential in the short-term, the influx of money
and people can create distortions in local markets and provide few
incentives for local production. As a result, development aid
agencies will be critical to assisting Afghans with local production;

³ For further discussion of these economies, see USAID, “U.S. Agency for International
Development: Afghanistan Recovery and Reconstruction Strategy,” October 18, 2002.
⁴ For more information, please refer to CRS Report RL31710, Afghanistan: Prospects for
Opium Eradication by Rensselaer Lee.

^!Agriculture has always been a mainstay of the Afghan economy,
and, before the civil war, Afghanistan had been self-sustaining in
agricultural production. In addition, Afghanistan also has other
economic sectors, though much weakened by war. The most vibrant
sector is transportation, which has long traversed Afghanistan and
connected Central Asia with the Middle East and South Asia, but
Afghanistan also has coal mines, oil and natural gas reserves, and a
carpet weaving industry.
Effective reconstruction assistance could reconfigure these economies, reduce
the war and drug economies, and provide incentives for viable economic growth.
Current Forms of Assistance
Before reconstruction recently got underway, the United States and the
international community provided other forms of assistance: humanitarian, military,
and security. During the height of the anti-Taliban war and with the preparations for
both winters (2002 and 2003), the focus of assistance was on the continuation of the
war and on humanitarian aid and quick-impact projects. Humanitarian, military, and
security assistance continue.
Humanitarian Assistance. The United Nations and other organizations
have provided Afghans humanitarian assistance since at least 1979, when the Soviet⁵
Union invaded Afghanistan. As a result of this long-term involvement, the United
Nations and other organizations had a basic institutional network in the region to
provide and expand humanitarian assistance.
Since the fall of the Taliban regime and the establishment of a new government,
this institutional network has been utilized. The Afghan government and the
international donor community have sought to focus on reconstruction, but
humanitarian relief assistance continues to be greatly needed. The overwhelming
majority of assistance (outside of military aid) to date has been spent on humanitarian
needs. The United States has been the largest contributor of humanitarian assistance⁶
to Afghans.
Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) have been the focus of much
humanitarian assistance. These groups have been returning to their homes in
unexpectedly high numbers. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
reports that since March 1, 2002, more than two million Afghan refugees have
repatriated mainly from Pakistan but also from other neighboring countries. This is
more than double the number expected by UNHCR. As of August 2002, another

230,000 IDPs returned to their homes with the assistance of the International

⁵ Between 1997 and 1999, Afghans in Afghanistan and in surrounding refugee camps
received approximately $300 million in total aid each year. Haneef Atmar and Jonathan
Goodhand. 2002. “Aid, Conflict and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: What Lessons Can be
Learned?” International Alert.
⁶ Specific funding amounts are provided in a later section.

Organization for Migration (IOM).⁷ Returnees require continuing humanitarian aid,
but they also need transitional assistance for resettlement, such as housing supplies,
seeds and agricultural resources, jobs, and other services. With the return rate higher
than expected, UNHCR and other aid agencies remain very concerned that they
cannot provide returnees with the same level of resources as previously and that
returnees are also returning to a lack of adequate resources.
At the same time, there are many other refugees and IDPs who have still not
returned to their homes and require humanitarian assistance. The difficulties of
winter are affecting large proportions of the Afghan population, not only returning
refugees and IDPs. In response, aid agencies have prepositioned food, clothing, and
other items, particularly in areas typically isolated during the winter. Furthermore,
the region has been affected by a severe drought since 1999. While some areas have
improved, the drought continues, which means that some areas cannot return to
previous levels of agricultural production and continue also to rely on humanitarian
assistance.
Military Assistance. The international military involvement in Afghanistan,
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), began on October 7, 2001. Twenty-seven
nations have deployed more than 14,000 troops in support of OEF.⁸ Of these twenty
seven, 14 NATO members, NATO Partners, and other countries have been involved
through special operations forces, the provision of planes and ships, and operations
involving surveillance and interception. OEF continues with 9,000 U.S. troops and
about 2,500 non-Afghan, non-American troops. These troops in Afghanistan
continue to search for Taliban and al Qaeda fighters and weapons caches in southern
and eastern Afghanistan.⁹ According to the Department of Defense (DOD), the cost¹⁰
of the war in Afghanistan has been $12.595 billion for the United States in FY2002.
According to the Afghan government, the United Nations, and international
NGOs, the lack of security remains the most serious challenge.¹¹ Former
commanders maintain control over their own areas and continue fighting with their
rivals, which further makes difficult the extension of the national government, the
provision of humanitarian assistance, and the initiation and implementation of
reconstruction. With the continued fighting and insecurity, the process of
demobilization and integration of combatants has been slow, but on January 10,

2003, the United Nations and the Afghan government announced a plan for 250,000

⁷ USAID, Afghanistan – Complex Emergency Situation Report, Dec. 18, 2002, p. 1.
⁸ “Operation Enduring Freedom: One Year of Accomplishments,”
[ ht t p: / / www.whi t e house.gov/ i nf ocus/ def e nse/ endur i ngf r e edom.ht ml ] .
⁹ James Dao, “U.S. Shifts Emphasis in Afghanistan to Security and Road Building,” The
New York Times, Nov. 12, 2002.
¹⁰ DOD Report to Congress, Defense Emergency Response Fund, FY2002, September
Execution Report, Briefing to Congressional staff, Dec. 19, 2002.
¹¹ Care International, “Policy Brief,” Jan. 2003; U.N. Security Council, “The situation in
Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: report of the Secretary-
General (A/57/487-S/2002/1173),” Oct. 21, 2002.

militiamen to hand over their weapons in exchange for cash, vocational training, and
employment assistance.¹²
The main programs to improve the security situation have been the insertion of
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the creation of an Afghan
National Army (ANA) and police force.¹³ ISAF is a U.N.-mandated, multinational
force deployed in and around Kabul as a peacekeeping force since December 20,
2001. Twenty-three countries, mostly NATO allies, have contributed troops or
personnel to the 4,500-strong force. The mission of the ISAF is to (1) assist the
interim Afghan government in building a national security infrastructure, (2) assist
in the country’s reconstruction, and (3) assist Afghanistan in training its future
security forces. At the end of June 2002, the United Kingdom handed over to Turkey
the command of ISAF. Germany and the Netherlands took over command of ISAF
on February 10, 2003. U.S. troops provide some assistance to the ISAF (i.e.,
logistical, intelligence, and quick reaction force support), but they do not engage in
peacekeeping.
President Karzai, U.N. officials, and others have asked that ISAF be expanded,
so that peacekeeping could take place outside of Kabul, but there has been a lack of
international consensus on this issue.¹⁴ In response to security concerns, the
Pentagon has initiated a shift from an emphasis on military action to one on
reconstruction and security. While U.S. military action continues under OEF, by
February 2003 the U.S. military planned to put 75% of its effort towards
reconstructing security services and supporting civil reconstruction through
“provincial reconstruction teams,” which would join civilian and military efforts in
regional areas outside Kabul.¹⁵ The United States will also be centrally involved in
the training of the ANA. According to government officials, the United States will
keep some troops in Afghanistan for several years.¹⁶

¹² “Afghans, UN embark on mammoth disarmament plan,” Reuters, Jan. 10, 2003,
[http://www.reliefweb.int]. Before this announcement, smaller disarmament programs had
been implemented, such as more than 6,000 small arms and 30 tanks collected in Kunduz
since Nov. 10, 2002. USAID, Afghanistan – Complex Emergency Situation Report, Dec. 18,

2002.

¹³ The creation of the army and police force are discussed later in the report.
¹⁴ “Pentagon Plans a Redirection in Afghanistan,” The Washington Post, Nov. 20, 2002.
According to Joseph J. Collins, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability
operations, “I think the physical expansion of ISAF is a dead letter because nobody wants
to do it.” James Dao, “U.S. Shifts Emphasis in Afghanistan to Security and Road Building,”
The New York Times, Nov. 12, 2002.
¹⁵ U.S. Dept. of State, “Fact sheet details U.S. support for rebuilding Afghanistan,” Jan. 9,

2003.

¹⁶ “U.S. Shifts Emphasis in Afghanistan to Security and Road Building,” The New York
Times, Nov. 12, 2002.

Reconstruction Goals
The international recovery and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan is immense
and complicated, with the Afghan government, numerous U.N. agencies, bilateral
donors, many international organizations, and countless NGOs working to help
Afghanistan. The international community and the Afghan government have sought
to establish a common set of goals in order to utilize donor funds most effectively.
In agreement with many in the international donor community during its six-month
tenure, the first transitional government identified intended outcomes of the
reconstruction process: political stability and security, access to basic services, an
adequate standard of living for its people, economic growth, and, in the long term,
independence from foreign aid.¹⁷
However, these goals are broad and abstract because Afghanistan not only
experienced 23 years of war but also was one of the less developed countries even
before the war. Particularly in the case of Afghanistan, humanitarian assistance,
reconstruction, and development are not easily separable. Humanitarian assistance
can overlap with the goals of reconstruction, such as by repairing water systems to
provide clean water or by providing basic building materials to repair housing.
Reconstruction and development further blend in the case of Afghanistan. These
efforts run on parallel and sometimes overlapping tracks.
Institutional Mechanisms
To understand the reconstruction process in Afghanistan, it is useful to be
familiar with the different institutions involved in the process and their own
particular institutional mechanisms for conducting and coordinating post-conflict
reconstruction. Many of these mechanisms were put into place during earlier
reconstruction attempts in Afghanistan or were a result of lessons learned from other
post-conflict countries. Building on these initiatives, the international community
sees Afghanistan as a test case for new forms of donor coordination. As a result, not
only is Afghanistan the beneficiary of past practices, but also the international
community, including the United States, has invested itself in the success of Afghan
reconstruction.
U.S. Institutions
Before 2001, U.S. aid to Afghanistan mainly flowed through U.N. agencies and
NGOs, but the U.S. role increased dramatically since Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) began.¹⁸ U.S. government funding has come from three main agencies –

¹⁷ The World Bank reported these goals in its “Afghanistan: Preliminary Needs Assessment
for Recovery and Reconstruction,” II. The Development Framework,
[http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ SAR/ sa.nsf/Attachments/df/$File/n-df.pdf].
¹⁸ USAID established a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) office in Pakistan in
June 2001 in response to the humanitarian emergency in Afghanistan from the regional
drought that had become a serious threat by 1999. Other than this office, the United States

USAID, the State Department, and Department of Defense (DOD) – and follows
several routes to Afghanistan. First, the United States provides bilateral aid to
Afghanistan. These bilateral funds are either distributed to NGOs, which provide
services in Afghanistan, or directly to the Afghan government. At USAID, funds are
distributed through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the Office of
Transition Initiatives (OTI), the Office of Food for Peace (FFP), Economic Growth
Agriculture and Trade (EGAT) Bureau, and the Asia Near East (ANE) Bureau.¹⁹ At
the State Department, funds are distributed through the Bureau for Population,
Refugees, and Migration (PRM), Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL), and Humanitarian Demining Programs (HDP). DOD
provides funding through its Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid
(OHDACA) program, which includes three segments: the Humanitarian Mine Action
Program, the Humanitarian Assistance Program, and Foreign Disaster Relief
Assistance.²⁰ Military and security assistance are also provided through the DOD.
Other funds are distributed through U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
Second, Afghanistan also receives U.S. aid through multilateral institutions.
The most important avenue is through the United Nations and its affiliated agencies,
such as U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), U.N. Development
Program (UNDP), the World Food Program (WFP), and World Health Organization
(WHO), and through international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Some U.S. funding for Afghanistan comes
from U.S. dues and additional voluntary donations to the United Nations through the
State Department’s International Organizations account or, in the case of UNHCR,
through the State Department’s Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account
and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) Fund. Funds for the
World Bank and other international financial institutions are allocated through the
Treasury Department within the foreign operations appropriation bill.
International Institutions
For countries emerging from conflict, the international donor community has
established a series of institutional mechanisms for developing and coordinating
reconstruction. Though adapted to specific situations, these institutional mechanisms
are generally the same. In general, the international donor community is considered
to be made up of international organizations and donor countries. This section
provides an overview of the institutional map of the international donor community
working with Afghanistan.

relied on the United Nations and others to provide assistance.
¹⁹ In June 2002, the DART office was replaced by the USAID Office for Foreign Disaster
Assistance (OFDA), which continues to monitor the humanitarian situation and coordinate
the response with the broader humanitarian community.
²⁰ See the DOD’s budget justification for FY2003:
[http://www.dtic.mil/comptroller/fy2003budget/budget_j ustification]

Pre-existing Institutions. Many institutions were in place before September
11, 2001. The United Nations and the World Bank demonstrate the largest
institutional presence in conflict and post-conflict areas, though many NGOs and
other international actors have long played an essential assistance role in
Afghanistan. In Afghanistan in 1988, the Geneva Peace Accords were signed, which
led to the Soviet withdrawal. With the peace accord in place, the United Nations
established an active presence in Afghanistan. The United Nations commonly
maintains separate offices for (1) political and peace processes (Pillar I) and (2)
humanitarian and reconstruction operations (Pillar II). Since 1988 in Afghanistan,
these offices had received a series of different names, but most recently the Pillar I
office was run by the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA) and
the Pillar II office was run by the United Nations Office for Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).
With each attempt at a sustainable peace, the United Nations sought to
implement reconstruction. As the U.N.’s development agency, UNDP in 1993
conducted a major study for the immediate rehabilitation and long-term
reconstruction of Afghanistan in response to peace accords in that year. As a result,
UNDP and others had systematically examined the humanitarian and reconstruction
needs of a post-war Afghanistan, but the peace process did not hold and fighting
began again.
In 1997, there was hope again for a peace accord.²¹ In Afghanistan, UNDP
developed its Strategic Framework, a new coordinating structure aimed to bring
coherence to multilateral, bilateral, and non-government efforts. The UNDP planned
to reorient international development according to this new structure, and thus
Afghanistan played an important role in these new ideas and programs. As part of
this framework, the United Nations organized the International Forum on Assistance
to Afghanistan in Turkmenistan, which led to the Afghanistan Support Group (ASG).
Made up of the 15 largest donor countries and the EU, ASG met (until recently)²²
twice per year and focused on coordination of humanitarian relief efforts. Since
September 11, 2001, this formal coordinating structure for humanitarian and
reconstruction efforts has been utilized.
The World Bank has also had a continuing role. For countries in conflict, the
World Bank generally puts them in “Watching Brief” status, during which the World
Bank monitors the country’s economy and provides analytical support to
international relief agencies at work within its borders, thus supporting preparation
efforts for reconstruction. In 1997, Afghanistan entered Watching Brief status,
which, beyond monitoring, also provided funds for training of Afghan women’s non-
governmental organizations based in Pakistan and for training of Afghan teachers in
refugee camps also in Pakistan.

²¹ As part of the peace process, the “Six Plus Two” contact group, which included the United
States, Russia, and six neighboring countries, had its first meetings. This and other contact
groups formed the basis of the current peace accords in Afghanistan.
²² A year later, the Afghanistan Programming Body (APB) also was formed, which
developed policy and consensus within the assistance community. At that time, Japan
chaired both the ASG and APB.

New Coordinating Institutions. In November 2001, with the possibility of
the fall of the Taliban and a potential opening for sustainable reconstruction work,
the international donor community quickly began new initiatives. The donor
countries formed the Steering Group for Assistance in the Reconstruction of
Afghanistan in Washington, DC, chaired by the European Union, Japan, Saudi
Arabia, and the United States. The Steering Group began an assessment of
Afghanistan’s needs. To coordinate donor activities on a more operational level, the
Steering Group in January 2002 formed the Implementation Group, which met
quarterly in 2002 in Kabul, providing further support to the Afghan government.
The World Bank with other multilateral organizations organized several
conferences where Afghans, NGOs, and donors discussed reconstruction. The World
Bank also prepared a Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) that outlines a range of
tasks, while the UNDP organized an Immediate Transitional Assistance Program
(ITAP). The ITAP sets out immediate tasks and quick-impact programs. In March
2002, the United Nations formed United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
(UNAMA) bringing together the political (Pillar I) and humanitarian/reconstruction
(Pillar II) efforts. Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Representative for the Secretary-General
to Afghanistan, organized the Bonn Accord signed on December 5, 2001 and now
directs UNAMA.²³
Currently, the international donor community has put great emphasis on
“ownership” – meaning leadership and control – of reconstruction efforts by the
country itself. The Afghan government has taken on an increasingly central role in
reconstruction planning and the management of aid funds. In February 2002, the
Afghan government established the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority
(AACA) that interacts with donor coordination groups to regulate aid traffic and
seeks to ensure that the aid provided supports some government programs and is not
fragmented or subject to donor competition. AACA monitors aid flows through a
database – funded and provided by UNDP – that tracks donors, their pledges, and²⁴
programs. The database is considered to be about 70% accurate. The Afghan
government has also developed its own priorities in its National Development
Framework (NDF), which is going through further revision to become the National
Development Budget (NDB) by March 2003.
Consultative Groups are institutional mechanisms associated with the World
Bank that provide more control to countries receiving assistance than the “Watching
Brief” status because country representatives are members of consultative groups.
On December 18, 2002, the ASG dissolved itself and turned over its responsibilities
to the new Consultative Group based in Kabul and led by Afghan finance minister,

²³ This accord was signed in Bonn, Germany on December 5, 2001 and the interim
government began, led by Hamid Karzai, on December 22, 2001. The Emergency Loya
Jirga in June 2002 was another step in this process towards elections in 2004. The peace
process mainly involved the four groups involved in previous peace talks and did not include
the Taliban. “United Nations Talks on Afghanistan,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan, December 6, 2001,
[ ht t p: / / www.mof a .go.j p/ r e gi on/ mi ddl e_e/ af ghani s t a n/ unt al k0112.ht ml ] .
²⁴ For further information, see the AACA website: [http://www.afghanaca.org].

Ashraf Ghani.²⁵ This Consultative Group will differ from the usual model in that
consultative Groups primarily focus on economic development, but the Afghan group
will also maintain an emphasis on humanitarian needs because of continuing serious
humanitarian concerns.²⁶
Donor Conference and Trust Funds. In addition to providing their own
assistance to Afghanistan, international organizations and international financial
institutions have administered donor conferences, trust funds, and humanitarian and
reconstruction programs. With the Bonn accord and interim government in place, the
UNDP organized a donor conference, in which the interim government presented its
reconstruction plans and country representatives and international NGOs made
pledges in order to show international support for those plans. These pledges
represent amounts that countries were willing to earmark for Afghanistan. At the first
major donor conference, which took place in January 21-22, 2002 in Tokyo, the
ITAP was presented and funds pledged. Sixty-one countries and twenty-one
international organizations pledged $1.8 billion for 2002. The U.S. government alone
pledged $297 million, just under 25% of total pledges. The cumulative total was
$4.5 billion, with some states making pledges over multiple years and commitments
of different time frames. The next major donor conference is scheduled for March
2003, during which the Afghan government will present its National Development
Budget (NDB) and donors direct their pledges toward specific priorities in the
NDB.²⁷
The international community has placed great emphasis on paying the Afghan
government’s current expenditures, most importantly the salaries of government
employees, in order to build up government capacity and sustain momentum.
Towards this end, several trust funds have been established. Trust funds allow for
rapid distribution of monies because they remove the administrative requirements of
multiple funds. Donor countries decide to contribute to these trust funds and urge
others to make contributions. UNDP created the Afghan Interim Authority Fund
(AIAF) for donor contributions to the first six months of governmental operations
and other related activities, mobilizing $65.8 million for immediate operating costs.
AIAF paid the salaries of over 100,000 civil servants in the first two months of the
government, repairs of ministry and state buildings, the operation of the Emergency
Loya Jirga Commission, the provision of basic equipment and vehicles for
ministries, and the preparation work of experts for the establishment of a Civil²⁸
Service Commission.

²⁵ Walter Gibbs, “Donor Group Gives Karzai Control of Aid,” The New York Times,
December 19, 2002. The Implementation Group was also supposed to have dissolved itself
by December 2002.
²⁶ “Building upon Existing Structures: A Government Led Consultative Group in
Afghanistan,” Oct. 13, 2002, [http://www.afghanaca.org]. For more on consultative groups,
see [http://www.areu.org.pk/a_to_z/terms/cg.html].
²⁷ There have been other donor conferences, such as one on December 17-18, 2002 where
UNDP’s Transitional Assistance Program for Afghanistan (TAPA) for 2003 was presented
and $1.2 billion pledged, but it is not clear that these pledges represented new funds.
²⁸ UNDP, “Afghanistan Fact Sheet,” [http://www.undp.org/afghanistan/FactSheet-final.doc]

On July 22, 2002, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)
succeeded the AIAF. ARTF provides funds for the government’s budget, investment
activities and programs including quick-impact recovery projects, funding to support
the participation of Afghan experts residing abroad, and training programs for
Afghans. Contributions from donors to date have totaled some $95 million, and over
$200 million more is expected.²⁹ In addition, the Law and Order Trust Fund for
Afghanistan (LOTFA) is beginning to cover the basic needs of the police in the
Kabul region. UNDP manages this fund in cooperation with the Afghan government
and the UNAMA. Activities to be covered through LOTFA include the rehabilitation
of police facilities, payment of salaries, training and capacity-building, and
procurement of non-lethal equipment. The idea is that sufficient resources will be
provided to this fund to allow funding activities to be expanded to other provinces
soon.³⁰
Coordination Challenges. From decades of experience in Afghanistan, the
international community has developed coordinating mechanisms and institutions,
which have helped to move the reconstruction process forward. Coordination is an
important goal and, as has been demonstrated in previous conflicts, coordinated
activities generally lead to fewer unintended consequences, quicker learning
processes, and more effective results.³¹ The institutional networks have altered over
time with UNAMA taking on the main coordinating role in March 2002.
Some observers argue that the Afghan government, international organizations,
NGOs, donor countries, and others are following their own priorities and programs,³²
and are not coordinated enough. Some have suggested that complete coordination
may be both unnecessary and ineffective, especially when different organizations do³³
not share common goals or strategies. For example, the United Nations, the United
States, and others have supported regime change in Afghanistan, which has led to a
specific strategy to bolster the regime change with reconstruction. For those in
Afghanistan and the region who do not support this goal of regime change or for
those who have been marginalized by regime change (such as former supporters of

²⁹ See Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund Contributions,
[ h t t p : / / www.wor l dba nk.or g/ a r t f ] .
³⁰ U.N. Security Council, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for
international peace and security: report of the Secretary-General (A/57/487-S/2002/1173),”
Oct. 21, 2002, section 16.
³¹ “In the past, international action has often been part of the problem rather than the
solution. It has been half-hearted, uncoordinated, often one-sided and has frequently created
the wrong kinds of incentives. Continued support by the international community for a UN-
led peacebuilding process is essential.” Haneef Atmar and Jonathan Goodhand. 2002. “Aid,
Conflict and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: What Lessons Can be Learned?” International
Alert, p. 7.
³² Sue Lautze et al. “Qaht-E-Pool ‘A Cash Famine’ Food Insecurity in Afghanistan, 1999-
2002,” May 2002; Nicholas Stockton, Strategic Coordination in Afghanistan. “Strategic
Coordination in Afghanistan,” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, August 2002.
³³ Nicholas Stockton, Strategic Coordination in Afghanistan. “Strategic Coordination in
Afghanistan,” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, August 2002.

the Taliban regime), supposedly neutral, non-partisan humanitarian assistance could
appear partisan. Coordination is a complicated matter, but some would argue that
there should be coordination only among like-minded organizations, such as among
humanitarian groups, separate from the coordination of political groups, and separate
from the coordination of military oriented groups.³⁴
Funding
International and U.S. Funding Levels
Areas of concern include whether the funding levels to Afghanistan are adequate
and whether funding is being used for reconstruction. The Afghan government’s
donor assistance database, which keeps track of aid flows, provides a picture of
international funding levels. (For a list of the funds committed and disbursed by
country, see the appendix of this report.) It should be recognized that these numbers
are self-reported by countries, may include double counting (such as country pledges
that flow through U.N. organizations), and may cover non-monetary items (such as
food aid or donation of used goods). In addition, some new projects have not yet
been included, such as a road project proposed by Iran.
Donor countries have committed $1.7 billion and, from that, disbursed $1.5
billion. The top donor countries (in descending order by funds committed) are as
follows: the United States, European Commission, Japan, Germany, United
Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, the Netherlands, Italy, France, and China.³⁵
Pledge Fulfillment Problems. With donor countries committing $1.7
billion and disbursing $1.5 billion, the numbers approach the $1.8 billion pledged at
the donor conference in Tokyo in January 2002. Throughout the year, however, the
Afghan government expressed disappointment and even exasperation for delays in
the delivery of funds that slowed reconstruction and, therefore, undermined popular
support of the government. According to the Afghan government, as of October 11,³⁶
2002, about 67% of the pledges had been disbursed. Some of these delays could
be explained by the donor countries’ need to obtain Congressional or Parliamentary
support and appropriations for funds, which takes time. Yet, efforts have been
needed to make certain countries deliver their pledges. In addition, some countries
have changed their pledges. For example, for the Kabul-Kandahar-Herat road project,
Saudi Arabia has changed its $50 million pledge to a $30 million low-interest loan.³⁷

³⁴ Nicholas Stockton, “Strategic Coordination in Afghanistan,” Afghanistan Research and
Evaluation Unit, August 2002, pp. 45-46.
³⁵ This information comes from the AACA donor database. While the database states that
the European Commission committed $376 million and disbursed $242 million, it is difficult
to ascertain whether this money is different from the totals given by each individual EU
country.
³⁶ Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority, “Transitional Government: Preliminary
Analysis of Aid Flows to Afghanistan,” Oct. 11, 2002.
³⁷ “Saudis Alter Promise to Help Afghans,” The Washington Post, Dec. 22, 2002.

In response to Afghan government requests, the U.S. Defense Department and State
Department have assigned senior officials to raise money from other countries for
reconstruction, particularly for the training, equipping, and housing of the Afghan
national army. Two of these senior officials went to the Persian Gulf to fund-raise
and obtained several new pledges.³⁸
Questions about Funding Levels. Despite the seemingly large pledges,
many observers have argued that even the pledged amounts are not adequate.
According to the preliminary needs assessment presented in January 2002 by the
UNDP, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Afghanistan³⁹
would need $15 billion over the next 10 years. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell
stated that Afghanistan would need $8 billion over the next five years.⁴⁰ The Afghan
government, however, seeks much more money and resources for reconstruction,
arguing that 23 years of war necessitates increased funds. The Afghan government⁴¹
seeks $22 billion over the next decade and $45 billion over twenty years. Donor
countries at the Tokyo conference pledged around $4.5 billion, about one third of the
UNDP-WB-ADB $15 billion estimate, though the $1.8 billion pledge for the first
year met the estimated levels. The U.N. Secretary-General has criticized these
pledging levels: “the [Afghan] Government, regrettably, remains very much under-
resourced. The total needs of a country recovering from over two decades of conflict,
destruction and drought outstrip even the $1.8 billion generously pledged at the donor
conference held in Tokyo on 21 and 22 January 2002.”⁴² In sum, the long-term funds
pledged have not reached the amount deemed necessary by the UNDP, World Bank,
and ADB.
Observers also have found that, in comparison with other countries, Afghanistan
has received smaller pledges and less funding. The pledges calculated as per capita
annual allocations are far smaller in Afghanistan than in many other post-conflict
situations – $42 for Afghanistan, versus $195 for East Timor, $288 for Kosovo and
$326 for Bosnia.⁴³ As part of this funding, the numbers of peacekeepers have also
been comparatively low. The number of people per peacekeeper has been in Kosovo

48 people, in Bosnia 58 people, in Sierra Leone 304 people, and in Afghanistan 5,380⁴⁴

people.

³⁸ “U.S. Shifts Emphasis in Afghanistan to Security and Road Building,” New York Times,
Nov. 12, 2002.
³⁹ “Donors receive estimates of Afghanistan’s reconstruction ahead of Tokyo conference,”
UNDP Press Release, Jan. 15, 2002, [http://www.undp.org].
⁴⁰ “Afghanistan: EU Puzzled by Kabul’s Call for $45 Billion in Aid,” RFE/RL, Jan. 14,

2002.

⁴¹ “Diplomats’ Calculators Work Overtime on Afghan Aid,” Reuters, Jan. 18, 2002.
⁴² U.N. Security Council, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for
international peace and security: report of the Secretary-General (A/57/487-S/2002/1173),”
Oct. 21, 2002, section 55.
⁴³ Arthur C. Helton and Jennifer Seymour Whitaker, “Nation-Busting from Afghanistan to
Iraq,” International Herald Tribune, Nov. 15, 2002.
⁴⁴ Care International, “Policy Brief,” Jan. 2003, p. 4.

Making Reconstruction a Funding Priority. The Afghan government has
particularly complained that donors have not provided adequate funding for
reconstruction. The overwhelming majority of U.S. funding dedicated to
Afghanistan has gone to DOD’s spending for the war against the Taliban and al⁴⁵
Qaeda and DOD’s continued activities. For FY2002, the amount is $12.595 billion.
That total is about 24 times greater than the $531 million that the U.S. government⁴⁶
spent in FY2002 on humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.
The Pentagon has indicated that some troops are now aiding in road construction
and other reconstruction projects as well as performing their normal duties. The
$6.1 billion that DOD received for Afghanistan and the global war on terrorism in
H.J. Res 2, P.L. 108-7, the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, covers
DOD’s continuing costs of deploying forces in Afghanistan and heightening security
in the United States in the first quarter of FY2003.
In non-military assistance, most funding – some say 70% of FY2002 funds –
went towards humanitarian aid–usually considered urgent food, shelter, and medical
care.⁴⁷ The majority of this assistance was food aid, which is essential for
humanitarian crises but, according to experts, is problematic in the longer term for
reconstruction. According to this view, food aid in a non-emergency situation
undercuts market prices for food and decreases the incentive for agricultural
production.⁴⁸
In addition, the Afghan government argues for a different process of funding.
Since humanitarian aid generally moves through the United Nations and non-
governmental organizations, the Afghan government does not have access to these
funds or control over how they are distributed. Moreover, it cannot use these funds
to increase capacity building in the government and therefore cannot demonstrate
government effectiveness to the Afghan population.
Congressional Action
FY2001 Appropriations.The United States has long been the major donor
and contributor to the Afghan people. According to USAID, during FY2001 the U.S.
government provided $184.3 million in humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan.

⁴⁵ DOD Report to Congress, Defense Emergency Response Fund, FY2002, September
Execution Report, Briefing to Congressional staff, Dec. 19, 2002.
⁴⁶ Others have stated that it is 30 times more. “Nation-Busting from Afghanistan to Iraq,”
International Herald Tribune, Nov. 15, 2002.
⁴⁷ In October 2002, Afghanistan’s foreign minister, Abdullah Abdullah, said that some 70
percent of the $4.5 billion pledged at the donors conference in January 2002 in Tokyo was
designated for humanitarian organizations. Jim Abrams, “Afghan Official Presses U.S. on
Aid,” AP Online, Oct. 21, 2002.
⁴⁸ Sue Lautze et al. “Qaht-E-Pool ‘A Cash Famine’ Food Insecurity in Afghanistan, 1999-

2002,” May 2002, p. 39.

FY2002 Appropriations. On October 4, 2001, President Bush announced an
initial U.S. commitment of $320 million in humanitarian assistance to Afghans both
inside and outside Afghanistan’s borders. Multiple U.S. agencies are providing some
form of humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, which cover a wide variety of
aid, services, and projects. Overall, the United States provided over $530 million in
FY2002 Afghan humanitarian assistance directly through government agencies or as
a result of grants to international organizations and NGOs, a total above the original
commitment of $320 million.
At the first major donor conference held in Tokyo in January 2002, donor
countries and other organizations pledged a total of $1.8 billion for 2002. The
cumulative total pledged at Tokyo was 4.5 billion with some states making pledges
over multiple years and commitment of different time frames. The U.S. government
pledged $297 million, funds which were drawn from existing sources - either from
the $40 billion Emergency Terrorism Response supplemental (P.L. 107-38) that was
passed shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks⁴⁹ or from regular FY2002
appropriations, P.L. 107-115, passed on January 10, 2002.
FY2002 Supplemental Appropriations. Both the House and the Senate
proposed higher aid levels for Afghanistan reconstruction and security funding than
the President’s FY2002 $250 million Emergency Supplemental request. The FY2002
Supplemental (P.L. 107-206, H.R. 4775) did not set a specific amount for
Afghanistan, but it appears that amounts for economic, humanitarian, and security
aid intended by Congress totaled $304 million. Because of an executive-legislative
dispute over “contingent emergency” funds in the Supplemental Appropriation,
including some money for Afghanistan, not all of the amount intended by Congress
was available. In September 2002, the Administration allocated $258 million for
Afghanistan, slightly above the requested level, but below the amount assumed by
Congress. This assistance is in addition to the $297 million in FY2002 funding
previously allocated.
FY2003 Appropriations. No figures were provided in the Administration’s
request for Afghanistan for FY2003, although the Administration told Congress that
its request included about $140 million, $98 million of which would come from
Foreign Operations appropriations accounts. On September 12, 2002, the
Administration pledged an additional $80 million for road reconstruction through
USAID.
The Senate version of the FY2003 foreign aid appropriations (S. 2779, S.Rept.
107-219) recommended a slightly higher level, $157 million for Afghanistan, and the
House version (H.R. 5410) recommended almost double the request, $295.5 million.
Recent indications by the Pentagon of a likely shift in strategy in Afghanistan, where
troops will assist with initial reconstruction projects, raise the possibility of
additional funds being made available through the Department of Defense. However,

⁴⁹ Shortly after September 11, 2001, the Congress approved the Emergency Terrorism
Response supplemental (P.L. 107-38), which from its $40 billion total allocated $1.5 billion
to foreign operations.

both House (H.R. 5410) and Senate (S. 2779) Foreign Operations bills, as reported
in 2002, expired with the end of the 107^th Congress.
On January 23, 2003, the Senate adopted a revised FY2003 Foreign Operations
measure as part of H.J.Res. 2, a continuing appropriation bill to which the Senate had
added full text of the 11 funding measures that had not been enacted for that fiscal
year. The new bill was similar, but modified in several ways what the Senate
Appropriation Committee had reported last year in S. 2779. H.J.Res. 2
recommended $220 million for Afghanistan, more than double what the
Administration had assumed in its request and $63 million higher than the Senate bill
in the 107^th Congress. The Senate measure further included several provisions
emphasizing the needs of Afghan women and children by earmarking as much as $75
million of the total for these groups. The House bill from the 107^th Congress (H.R.
5410) had recommended $295.5 million for Afghanistan, nearly triple the
Administration’s request. In H.J.Res. 2, P.L. 108-7, the FY2003 Consolidated
Appropriations Resolution, $295.5 million was appropriated for humanitarian and
reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan.
Other Legislation. There have been several authorizing bills. The Afghan
Women and Children Relief Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-081) is legislation signed into law
on December 12, 2001 to authorize the provision of educational and health care
assistance to the women and children of Afghanistan. No specific amount was⁵⁰
authorized.
The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327, S. 2712), passed
by Congress on November 15, 2002 and signed by the President on December 4,
2002, authorizes an additional $3.3 billion for Afghanistan over four years. Included
is $2 billion for humanitarian, reconstruction, and enterprise fund assistance through
FY2006 and $300 million in drawdown from U.S. military stocks of defense articles
and equipment for Afghanistan and other countries and organizations participating
in restoring Afghan security. The legislation also includes a Sense of Congress that
calls for an expanded ISAF with an authorization of an additional $1 billion over two
years.
Reconstruction Assistance
The Afghan government and the international community are seeking to move
more quickly to reconstruction. As already stated, reconstruction must cope with the
destruction of 23 years of war and with the distortions in the Afghan economy, in
which the war and drugs compete to the detriment of agriculture and other economic
activities. The Afghan government faces a daunting task. Reconstruction is seen as
the single most important factor in sustaining peace.⁵¹ According to many observers,

⁵⁰ The State Department July 2002 report U.S. Support for Afghan Women, Children, and
Refugees was mandated by this legislation.
⁵¹ See “Afghan War Faltering, Military Leader Says; Myers Cites Al Qaeda’s Ability to
Adapt,” The Washington Post, Nov. 8, 2002.

successful reconstruction will stop disillusionment with the new system in
Afghanistan and will keep Afghanistan from again becoming a haven for terrorists.
It is important to remember that, while Afghans signed the Bonn Accord in
December 2001, Afghanistan is still in a crucial peace-building stage. Some point out
that the collapse of law and order in the 1990s was a key factor behind the Taliban’s
military successes in subsequent years.⁵²
Quick-impact programs (with a time frame of four to six months) initiated the
post-emergency transition toward reconstruction and constituted the initial part of
more long-term programs in education, health, poppy eradication, and other areas.
These projects also provide an important basis for further reconstruction.⁵³
Numerous small-scale and some large longer-term, mostly road, projects are
underway.
There are several issues of concern for the international community, the Afghan
government, and observers beyond the funding challenges discussed above. First, the
lack of security has threatened the progress of reconstruction. Second, not much
obvious progress has been made on reconstruction because there have been many
small programs and few large programs. According to some observers, Afghans have
become frustrated with what they perceive as little evidence of reconstruction. There
are many possible explanations for the perceived lack of progress: lack of security,
lack of human and physical capacity to implement substantial reconstruction,
inadequate funding levels, and funding predominately going towards the continuing
humanitarian crisis and towards the administrative costs of the international donor
community, rather than towards reconstruction projects. Both security and progress
on reconstruction are necessary in order to maintain international donor interest in
Afghan reconstruction, encourage private investment in Afghanistan, and maintain
Afghans’ hope in improvement in their country and their own lives.
Reconstruction Priorities
The goals of the reconstruction process are broad and abstract. These goals
cover recovery, reconstruction, and development. The international community and
the Afghan government have sought to establish priorities. The international
community initially divided up the reconstruction effort so that each donor country
was the lead for specific project areas. Table 1 shows the distribution of the
reconstruction effort.

⁵² See U.N. Security Council report, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for
international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General (A/57/487-S/2002/1173),”
Oct. 21, 2002, section 52, [http://www.reliefweb.int].
⁵³ The State Department and USAID have funded quick-impact projects. In December 2002,
USAID funded its 200^th quick-impact project in Afghanistan. “Fact Sheet: USAID on
Rebuilding Afghanistan,” Jan. 9, 2003, U.S. Dept. of State, International Information
Programs.

Table 1. Lead Countries by Sector
Reconstruction SectorsLead Countries
Communications
-RadioUnited States
-T elevision J apan
Legal and Judicial SystemItaly
NarcoticsUnited Kingdom
Roads
-Main NorthernEU, World Bank
-Main SouthernJapan, Saudi Arabia, U.S.
Security
-ArmyU.S.
-Demobilization J apan
-ISAFU.K. (to June 2002); Turkey (to Feb.
2003); Germany and the Netherlands
(from Feb. 2003)
-PoliceGermany
TradeGermany
In 2002, the Afghan government has established its national priorities in the
National Development Framework (NDF) and other documents. These priorities are
as follows:
1. National Solidarity Program and Emergency Public Works Program
2. Education Infrastructure Program
3. Urban Infrastructure Program
4. Water Resource Investment Program
5. National Governance Infrastructure Program: government building
construction, transparency, and capacity building.

6. Transport Project: roads, bridges, and airports.⁵⁴

At the same time, the TAPA put together by UNDP and the Afghan government
incorporated these priorities and added other programs. The TAPA is broader than
the NDF, including funds for refugee and IDP returns, culture and media, mine
action, and narcotics control. Below there is a discussion of most cited priority
areas.
Reconstruction Programs
Government Capacity Building. A representative national government that
is considered legitimate by the majority of the population and that can effectively
provide services is considered an essential element of reconstruction in Afghanistan.

⁵⁴ Interim Administration of Afghanistan, “Executive summary and national priority
projects,” Oct. 12, 2002, [http://www.reliefweb.int].

For many decades, Afghanistan has been a failed state. Critical to the strength and
sustainability of the government, Afghanistan established and continues to develop
many national institutions, such as the Loya Jirga, effective ministries, a Central
Bank, and a national army.
The international community has placed great emphasis on paying the Afghan
government’s current expenditures, most importantly the salaries of government
employees. Towards this end, UNDP created the Afghan Interim Authority Fund
(AIAF) and the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTR), as well as the Law
and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). To develop and strengthen
government institutions, the international community has entered into partnerships
with ministries and organizations in the Afghan government in order to do capacity
building and thus transfer needed skills and knowledge. The Bonn Agreement also
mandates the establishment of a number of commissions to create new institutions
in the government and implement major reforms of existing institutions. These
commissions include a Human Rights Commission, a Judicial Commission, a
Constitutional Drafting Commission, a Defense Commission, and numerous other
commissions.⁵⁵ The United States is giving $5 million to help facilitate the work of
these commissions.⁵⁶ U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) and
international donors have sought to strengthen the Human Rights Commission so that
it can implement an effective human rights program, which would include
investigating past and present abuses, educating the public about human rights, and
training Afghans in the principles of international human rights law.⁵⁷
As the lead country in army training, the United States has worked with other
countries to provide training and assistance in the formation of the ANA. The plans
are for an army of 70,000 soldiers, and as of January 9, 2003, the U.S. and other
forces had trained and equipped four battalions with 1,600 soldiers.⁵⁸ The U.S.
government is also providing additional money for military infrastructure, including
$16 million for barracks, dining facilities, and training areas.⁵⁹
On October 7, 2002, the Central Bank of Afghanistan introduced its new
currency, the Afghani, in the hopes of stabilizing prices and exchange rates. The new

⁵⁵ U.N. Security Council, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international
peace and security: report of the Secretary-General (A/57/487-S/2002/1173),” Oct. 21, 2002,
section 19.
⁵⁶ U.S. Dept. of State, “Fact sheet details U.S. support for rebuilding Afghanistan,” Jan. 9,

2003.

⁵⁷ U.S. State Department, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Catalogs 2002 Humanitarian Successes in
Afghanistan,” January 16, 2003.
⁵⁸ U.S. Dept. of State, “Fact sheet details U.S. support for rebuilding Afghanistan,” Jan. 9,
2003. As of October 2002, 38 countries had offered assistance in the training or equipping
of the ANA. [http://www.defendamerica.mil/specials/oct2002/sp101502a.html]
⁵⁹ U.S. Dept. of State, “Fact sheet details U.S. support for rebuilding Afghanistan,” Jan. 9,

2003.

notes were printed in Germany.⁶⁰ The United States has been the primary donor in
the currency conversion process, providing technical expertise, equipment,
transportation for delivery of currency, monitors to ensure the destruction of old
notes, and other activities. The Central Bank has had to extend the currency
exchange period and continues to exchange and destroy old notes. The United States
is providing $3.3 million to cover the costs of this extended exchange period.⁶¹
However, the value of the Afghani has been unstable. At least as of late November,
the value of the Afghani had plunged and caused consumer prices to rise sharply.⁶²
Women’s Programs. U.S.-funded projects emphasize women’s participation
in general, and some also benefit women’s programs specifically, such as refugee
care and resettlement, health, and job training.⁶³ Overall, the situation for women in
Afghanistan has seen improvement since the fall of the Taliban, but a great deal
needs to be done to change the basic standard of living and means of livelihood for
the average Afghan woman. This involves a wide range of issues, from education,
family care, and health to participation in the political process.⁶⁴
With regard to reconstruction in FY2002, USAID announced two grants totaling
$64,000 to support the refurbishing of the Ministry of Women’s affairs building and
to provide the then Afghan Women’s Affairs Minister, Sima Samar, with basic office
equipment, a vehicle, phone and other start-up capital. Coordinated through its
implementing partner, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the
project has two goals: to rehabilitate the building complex and to provide technical
advisors to help establish operations and programs.
In the FY2002 Emergency Supplemental (P.L. 107-206, H.R. 4775), $2.5
million was appropriated from ESF funds to support the construction of women’s
resource centers.⁶⁵ The plan is to establish one center in each of Kabul’s districts

⁶⁰ “Afghanistan redenomiates currency,” BBC News, September 4, 2002,
[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2236075.stm].
⁶¹ U.S. Dept. of State, “Fact sheet details U.S. support for rebuilding Afghanistan,” Jan. 9,

2003.

⁶² “A Year after Taliban, Daily Life in Kabul is Struggle for Most,” The Washington Post,
Nov. 20, 2002.
⁶³ The Department of State report, “U.S. Support for Afghan Women, Children,” and
Refugees provides useful information related to women’s programs including a matrix with
specific details on projects and sources of funding. See [http://www.state.gov].
⁶⁴ The Afghan Women and Children Relief Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-081) is legislation signed
into law on December 12, 2001 to authorize the provision of educational and health care
assistance to the women and children of Afghanistan. No specific amount was authorized.
The State Department July 2002 report “U.S. Support for Afghan Women, Children, and
Refugees” was mandated by this legislation.
⁶⁵ Other specific grants include a USAID-IOM grant of $13,000 that supports the
rehabilitation of the training center of a local NGO, Ariana, which provides a range of
educational and vocational courses to women, and funding for the Afghan Women’s
Network which provides training for job skills and participation in the political process. See
USAID information at [http://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/empoweringwomen.html].

with a long-term goal of building one in each of Afghanistan’s 32 provinces. These
centers are to provide a range of training and other initiatives focused on women,
including health and education.⁶⁶ The FY2002 Emergency Supplemental also
allocated $1.6 million to the State Department in support of the U.S.-Afghan
Women’s Council, which focuses on programing and implementation of projects at
the women’s centers mentioned above. Established in January 2002, the Council
draws on leaders from business, government, and the media in both the United States
and Afghanistan who work together to facilitate public-private partnerships between
the two countries, to develop resources, and to provide opportunities for the
participation of women in the rebuilding of Afghanistan.
In The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327), $15 million
is authorized “to be appropriated to the President to be made available to the Afghan
Minister of Women’s Affairs.” No specific figures for women’s programs in
Afghanistan were provided in the Administration’s budget request for FY2003. The
Senate measure (revised FY2003 Foreign Operations measure as part of H.J.Res. 2)
included several provisions emphasizing the needs of Afghan women and children
by earmarking as much as $75 million of the total for these groups.⁶⁷ In H.J.Res. 2,
P.L. 108-7, the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, $5 million was
earmarked from the Economic Support Fund for the Afghan Ministry of Women’s
Affairs, including support for the establishment of women’s centers in Afghanistan.
Employment Generation. As many as 4 million refugees have not returned
to Afghanistan. While lack of security partly explains this, Afghanistan also lacks
employment opportunities. Many Afghans have migrated to Iran because of the
economic opportunities there. Some refugees in Pakistan near the Afghan border⁶⁸
refuse to return because they have employment and jobs are scarce in Afghanistan.
According to Andrew Natsios, head of USAID, the largest employers in
Afghanistan are the Afghan government and the U.N. Mine Action Center.⁶⁹ Beyond
these employers, the rehabilitation of the agricultural sector could provide many
Afghans with some form of livelihood. A rehabilitated agricultural sector could offer
not only much needed food and cash, but also employment for demobilized fighters,
returning refugees, and many others. This in turn could diminish the attractiveness
of returning to war or drug production and strengthen the basis for peace-building.

⁶⁶ These activities are expected to be coordinated with the respective government ministries
when overlap in programming occurs.
⁶⁷ The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327), legislation passed by
Congress on November 15, 2002 and signed by the President on December 4, authorizes $15
million “to be appropriated to the President to be made available to the Afghan Ministry of
Women’s Affairs.” Although the appropriations process is not yet complete, it is likely that
monies will be administered through USAID, and in turn, through NGOs working in
Afghanistan.
⁶⁸ UNHCR, “UNHCR Afghanistan Humanitarian Update No. 67,” Jan. 3, 2003,
[ ht t p: / / www.r e l i e f we b.i nt ] .
⁶⁹ “Reconstruction and Rebuilding Efforts in Afghanistan,”Remarks by Andrew S. Natsios,
USAID Administrator, Dec. 23, 2002, [http://www.usaid.gov].

International organizations and NGOs have been providing both food-for-work
and cash-for-work programs to reconstruct Afghanistan and to provide resources to
Afghans. Many are now calling for a focus only on cash-for-work programs because
these programs do not undermine local agricultural prices. The Afghan government
and others are calling for a mass cash-for-work program to combat both the high
levels of unemployment and the “cash famine.”⁷⁰
Road Construction. Road and bridge construction, as well road clearing,
particularly during the winter snows, have been another major employment area for
Afghans. Such infrastructural work is also important for the Afghan economy and
the extension of the Afghan government across the nation. Afghanistan lies at the
intersection of historic trade routes connecting Central Asia, the Middle East,
Pakistan, India, and China. Transportation has long been an important revenue
creator for Afghanistan. After years of civil war, major roads are now a focus of
reconstruction work.
The United States, Saudi Arabia, and Japan have funded the reconstruction of
the major Kabul-Kandahar-Herat road, which was originally built by the United
States and the Soviet Union in the 1960s. While Japan and Saudi Arabia are
providing $50 million each, the United States has provided $80 million, making it
the United States’ largest single aid project in Afghanistan since the anti-Taliban war.
Reconstruction of this road began on November 10, 2002 and is expected to be⁷¹
completed in three years. The Russians helped rebuild the Salang Tunnel,
connecting Kabul with Northern Afghanistan and on to Central Asia, while the
United States is providing $1.6 million to keep it open during the winter. Recently,
Iran announced it will fund and oversee the reconstruction of a 62-mile road from⁷²
Herat to the Iranian border. The European Commission, the Swedish government,
and Pakistan have begun emergency rehabilitation of the Kabul-Jalalabad-Torkham⁷³
road in Eastern Afghanistan, and full construction will start next year. Other road
construction, as well as bridge construction, is taking part in different areas of the
country.
Agricultural Rehabilitation. Rehabilitation of the agricultural sector is one
key element in the reorientation of the Afghan economy away from the war and drug
economies. In the past, Afghanistan has demonstrated the ability to be not only
agriculturally self-sufficient, but also an agricultural exporter. As of 1978,
Afghanistan was largely self-sufficient in food and was a significant exporter of

⁷⁰ Interim Administration of Afghanistan, “Executive summary and national priority
projects,” Oct. 12, 2002, [http://www.reliefweb.int]. Sue Lautze, et al. “Qaht-E-Pool ‘A
Cash Famine’: Food Insecurity in Afghanistan, 1999-2002,” May 2002.
⁷¹ “Afghans Rebuild a Broken Lifeline,” The Washington Post, Nov. 11, 2002. However,
Saudi Arabia has changed its $50 million pledge to a $30 million low-interest loan. “Saudis
Alter Promise to Help Afghans,” The Washington Post, Dec. 22, 2002.
⁷² “Iran agrees to fund reconstruction projects in Afghanistan,” Agence France-Presse, Jan.

13, 2003.

⁷³ European Commission, “Afghanistan, one year after the Bonn Agreement,” Jan. 15, 2003,
[ h t t p : / / www.r e l i e f we b.i nt ] .

agricultural products, especially high-quality fruit, silk, cotton, and other products.
Wheat is grown in every region. Fruit trees (such as apricots, almonds, and walnuts)
and grapevines were almost universally found as recently as 2001. Different regions
produce a variety of crops: corn, barley, rice, cotton, beans, onions, potatoes,
sugarcane, and vegetables. In 1997-1998, Afghanistan was 70 percent self-sufficient
in cereals. Beginning in 1998, however, a severe drought hit Afghanistan. The
drought has now lessened in a few regions, and agricultural production has increased
there, but the consequences of the successive years of drought persist and, in many
regions, the drought itself continues. The drought and decades of war have made
self-sufficiency and export production a longer-term goal requiring substantial
resources for crop substitution and the rehabilitation of agricultural production.
One significant and complicated issue is the drug economy. The British
government is the lead in this area and focuses on eradication of poppy and on the
training of eradication officers. The U.S. government has emphasized providing
incentives for alternative forms of agricultural production, such as cotton and grape
farming. However, aggressive poppy eradication programs could exacerbate political
tensions (by terminating essential cash income for large segments of the population,
including powerful vested interests) and precipitate new armed internal conflicts.⁷⁴
Therefore, drug eradication programs raises significant security concerns as well.
To facilitate agricultural production, it is generally accepted that Afghan farming
needs substantial infrastructural reconstruction. In addition to road construction and
poppy eradication programs, the agricultural sector would benefit from:
^!Water Access. Lack of water is the most serious obstacle to
agricultural production. The irrigation systems need to be
reconstructed by drilling wells, rebuilding local irrigation systems,
canals, and reservoirs, and promoting water conservation.
^!De-mining. Land mines remain a huge problem throughout
Afghanistan. Afghanistan is believed to have one of the worst mine
and unexploded ordnance problems in the world, with 5-7 million
still littered about the country. Some say it will take 12 more years
and another $500 million to remove most of the mines.⁷⁵ With over
80% of the Afghan population relying on agriculture for its
livelihood, this is a substantial obstacle not only to refugee and IDP
returns, but to the basic recovery and reconstruction plans as well.
^!Farming Resources. Afghan farmers need the means to farm:
seeds, new trees to replace those killed by drought, fertilizer, and
livestock. USAID has recently funded the implementation of Famine
Early Warning System (FEWS) in Afghanistan, which has long been
used in other regions, monitoring drought and famine conditions.

⁷⁴ For more information on opium eradication programs and issues of concern, please refer
to CRS Report RL31710, Afghanistan: Prospects for Opium Eradication by Rensselaer Lee.
⁷⁵ “Afghanistan Politics: Fragile peace must be made to stick,” The Economist, Jan. 14,

2003.

^!Debt Relief. In order to survive the twin devastations of war and
drought, farmers and others accumulated substantial debt.⁷⁶ With
opium as a significant cash crop distorting the rest of the agricultural
economy, farmers need credit and loans to buy seeds, trees, and
other items to survive and work outside the drug economy.
Urban Reconstruction. The overwhelming majority of refugees and IDPs are
returning to Kabul and other major cities because much of the humanitarian and
reconstruction resources are there. This urbanization trend has resulted in an acute
housing shortage and the need to invest in basic services, including water, sanitation,
and power. Adding to this problem, the international aid community in Afghanistan
has enabled an artificial economy to flourish by increasing housing rents, reducing
availability, and thus making the current situation even more difficult.
Energy. As of spring 2002, seventy percent of Afghanistan’s power was
hydroelectric, but the long-term drought has meant that hydroelectric plants have
been running at less than full capacity. In addition, years of war significantly
damaged the power network. To provide energy to the country, the Afghan
government has recently signed agreements with its neighbors to connect its power⁷⁷
grids with those of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. USAID, ECHO, and IOM have
also provided money for a coal mining and distribution program. Furthermore,
Turkmenistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan have signed an agreement to build a $3.2
billion natural gas pipeline through Afghanistan.
Education. An initial effort in the area of primary education has been the Back-
to-School Campaign run by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). In March
2002, the Afghan schools officially opened. UNICEF’s goal was to help 1.78 million
children return to school, but, according to UNICEF, up to three times that number
may have returned.⁷⁸ This Campaign has provided Afghan schools with essential
materials, including textbooks, blackboards, pencils, notebooks, teaching aids, tents
for use as makeshift classrooms, and other teaching and learning materials. USAID
provided 10.6 million textbooks at a cost of $7.75 million, as well as support for the
airlift of these textbooks to Afghanistan at a cost of $742,000. The State Department
also contributed $2 million to the Back-to-School Campaign.
While there have been many successes in primary education, other areas have
received less attention and funds. For the further expansion of the primary school
system, more teachers are needed. In response to this, the World Bank has been

⁷⁶ Sue Lautze et al. “Qaht-E-Pool ‘A Cash Famine’ Food Insecurity in Afghanistan, 1999-

2002,” May 2002.

⁷⁷ “Afghanistan: Bright Future for Mazar as grip power returns,” [http://www.irinnews.org],
Aug. 28, 2002; “Crumbling Afghan energy plants struggle to bring power to the people,”
Agence France-Presse, April 4, 2002, [http://www.reliefweb.int]. Turkmenistan is
overseeing the construction of a new powerline to the Afghan border, which will continue
to Herat. This power line is supposed to be operational by late 2003. “Turkmenistan
economy: Decimation of imports boosts surplus,” Economist Intelligence Unit, Jan. 7, 2003.
⁷⁸ UNICEF, “‘Back to school’ for 1.5 million Afghan children,”
[http://www.unicef.org/ noteworthy/ af ghanistan/bts/index.html ].

funding tertiary education, especially the teaching of teachers. In addition, secondary
education is in need of further funding.
Health. Inoculations and basic medical care have helped improve living
standards in Afghanistan. For example, nearly six million children have been
immunized against polio through a program conducted by the Afghan Ministry of
Public Health, WHO, and UNICEF. Over four million children have been immunized
against measles. More directly related to reconstruction is building the health care
capacity in rural areas and the rehabilitation of hospitals and clinics. Many hospitals
and hundreds of clinics have been rehabilitated, especially in Kabul. With these areas
receiving funding from many sources, USAID has turned to rural health care,
including the training of midwives and planned construction and rehabilitation of up
to 600 primary health care facilities.
Communications and Media. A key component of the coordination of
reconstruction and the everyday function of the Afghan government is
communication. Afghanistan relies on cell phone service – which works best in
major cities and is provided through a partnership of the Afghan government and a
New Jersey-based company – and satellite phones. Telecommunications is a sector
attracting private foreign investment.⁷⁹ Considering radio an important way to
connect the country, the United States has taken the lead the radio sector and
provided technical and financial support to Radio Afghanistan. As the lead in the
television sector, Japan has helped rebuild a television station and supplied technical
support and equipment for satellite broadcasting of the Emergency Loya Jirga
throughout Afghanistan.
Issues for Congress
Reconstruction Goals
What should be the goals of reconstruction in Afghanistan where humanitarian
assistance, reconstruction, and development initiatives overlap? Not only did
Afghanistan experience a decades long war, it also was a developing country before
the war. Therefore, reconstruction and development blend in the case of
Afghanistan. There are several issues that Congress could consider. For the United
States, is the goal merely “aid-induced pacification” (giving funds to Afghanistan in
order to pacify the population and reduce possible security threats from
Afghanistan)?⁸⁰ Or is the goal some form of development, providing incentives for
livelihoods outside the drug and war economies? How much development should
the United States fund under the aegis of reconstruction, leaving other areas to formal
development agencies like UNDP?

⁷⁹ Regan Morris, “Telecommunications drawing investors in Afghanistan,” Associated
Press Newswires, Aug. 19, 2002.
⁸⁰ Nicholas Stockton, “Strategic Coordination in Afghanistan,” Afghanistan Research and
Evaluation Unit, Aug. 2002.

In addition to the Administration, some in Congress have talked about developing
a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan. So far the calls for a Marshall Plan seems to mean
only a sustained, long-term commitment to reconstruction, which in the case of
Afghanistan, includes nation building. The Marshall Plan for Europe was
substantially different from what is evident in Afghanistan. First, the European
Marshall Plan would have been $103 billion in today’s money spread out over four
years, which is much more than the amount currently provided by the United States,
even including the military assistance. Second, the European Marshall Plan was also
a regional strategy for Western Europe, as opposed to a national strategy. Third,
Afghanistan is much less developed than Western Europe was at the time, which
means that reconstruction will entail much more development.
Senator Biden proposed a kind of Marshall Plan for Central and South Asia,
providing a regional approach to Afghan reconstruction and drawing in its
neighbors.⁸¹ Afghanistan’s neighbors and other countries have repeatedly supported
the decades-long civil war. Pakistan, Iran, Russia, the Central Asian countries, India,
and the United States sought to influence the war’s outcome. From experiences in
other similar situations in Rwanda, Somalia, and Kosovo, scholars have argued that
peace processes are most threatened in countries with intervening neighbors. As a
result, these scholars have argued for reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan to be
coordinated with relevant officials in neighboring countries, so that conflicting
programs do not provide opposing incentives and negative consequences. The
Congress took steps in this direction with the Afghanistan and Central Asian
Republics Sustainable Food Production Trust Fund Act of 2001 (H.R. 3566), but the
last action on this bill was in January 2002 when it was referred to the House
Subcommittee on International Monetary Policy and Trade. Furthermore, on
December 22, 2002, Afghanistan and its six neighbors signed the Kabul Declaration
on Good Neighborly Relations, a non-aggression pact.⁸²
Reconstruction Priorities
Security is a top priority in Afghanistan. Plans for the U.S. military to be a part
of provincial reconstruction teams stands in contrast to the sense of Congress put
forth in the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act, which calls for the expansion of
ISAF. With the provincial reconstruction teams now being put together, how does
Congress view ISAF?
Demobilization of local militia could be further encouraged through employment
generation programs. These programs could also provide incentives for economic
activities beyond the drug and war economies. Employment generation is also a

⁸¹ “Biden Proposes Long-Term Humanitarian Relief for Afghanistan and Surrounding
Region,” Press Release, Oct. 3, 2001, [http://biden.senate.gov]; “Biden to propose
reconstruction if Afghanistan attacked,” CNN.Com, Oct. 3, 2001, [http://www.cnn.com].
⁸² This agreement was signed by Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan,
and Turkmenistan.

priority area for the Afghan government.⁸³ The Afghan government and others are
calling for a mass cash-for-work program to combat both the high levels of
unemployment and the “cash famine.”⁸⁴ This mass program might resemble the U.S.
Civilian Conservation Corps, established in the 1930s to cope with unemployment
from the Great Depression. It employed about three million young men to work full-
time for cash on a variety of projects.⁸⁵
The contribution of food aid by the United States and other countries is also an
issue for Congress. On the one hand, food aid can undermine market prices and
provide disincentives for agricultural production and thus some parts of
reconstruction. Other forms of assistance, such as cash-for-work programs, could
help Afghanistan reduce its dependence on international assistance. On the other
hand, food aid and humanitarian assistance are considered essential in some parts of
Afghanistan. The form of assistance is a significant issue for Congress.
Funding
In March 2003, the next major donor conference for Afghanistan will take place.
The pledges at the first donor conference in Tokyo in January 2002 nearly met the
first year needs assessment conducted by the World Bank, UNDP, and ADB.
However, these pledges were primarily used for humanitarian assistance.
Furthermore, reconstruction is just now slowly beginning, and there is concern about
maintaining donor interest in Afghan reconstruction. Therefore, the pledges at the
March conference are particularly important.
In regard to U.S. funding, the Administration’s request for FY2004 for
Afghanistan totals $531 million, not including disaster assistance.⁸⁶ Some members
of Congress believe the amounts should be greater with fewer constraints. The
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327) authorizes $3.3 billion
over four years. In addition, if a Marshall Plan were to be planned for Afghanistan,
then much more money is likely to be necessary. In any case, the amount of the U.S.
contribution, and the framework under which it will be provided, remain key
questions for Congress.
In addition to concerns about the necessary U.S. aid levels, Congress and others
have been concerned about burden sharing. The donor conferences have often not
produced the necessary amounts of funds in a timely manner. Late in 2002, the

⁸³ Interim Administration of Afghanistan, “Executive summary and national priority
projects,” Oct. 12, 2002, [http://www.reliefweb.int].
⁸⁴ Interim Administration of Afghanistan, “Executive summary and national priority
projects,” Oct. 12, 2002, [http://www.reliefweb.int]. Sue Lautze, et al. “Qaht-E-Pool ‘A
Cash Famine’: Food Insecurity in Afghanistan, 1999-2002,” May 2002.
⁸⁵ For further information on the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), see the U.S. Forest
Service’s history of the CCC: [http://fs.jorge.com/archives/ccc/US.htm].
⁸⁶ This figure includes $150 million for the Economic Support Fund (ESF); $150 million for
Foreign Military Financing; $150 for Development Assistance; $20 million for
Peacekeeping; $21 million for Child Survival; and $40 for Antinarcotics.

United States had to play a role in fundraising. What level of funding should the
United States and other countries provide? Should other countries be encouraged to
contribute more? How can interest in Afghanistan from the donor community be
sustained?
Donor Conferences and Trust Funds
Many inside and outside the Afghan government have criticized donors for not
following through on their pledges. However, donor conferences in general exhibit
problems, such as slow disbursement of funds, weak mechanisms for pledging and
mobilizing assistance, inadequate devices for tracking aid flows, inappropriate forms
of aid conditionality, poor articulation between relief and development efforts, and
weak coordination within the donor community.⁸⁷ Donors over-pledge, pledge
already allocated funds, and slowly or never fulfill their pledges. In the case of
Afghanistan, the international community has sought to avoid some of these
problems, such as through the creation of the AACA aid database, which has made
pledging, tracking, and monitoring more transparent. Whether donor conferences
and trust funds are the best way to fund reconstruction has been questioned by some
observers who also ask if the United States should give more money to the trust
funds. If not, then other potential methods must be examined.
Military Role in Humanitarian Assistance
As of this fall, the Pentagon announced that it was transforming its strategy from
military to security and reconstruction goals. DOD has been providing humanitarian
assistance to Afghanistan since OEF began, and it seems that this role in a
reconstruction framework will increase. In general, militaries worldwide are
increasingly providing such assistance because humanitarian agencies increasingly
work in war-torn areas. However, many NGOs have argued that the provision of
humanitarian assistance by militaries comes at a high cost. Military provision of this
assistance associates humanitarian agencies and actors, as well as refugees and other
victims, with military objectives and activities, even with particular sides in the war.
It is argued that this association may put these agencies and actors in danger. On the
other hand, security remains a key factor in the distribution of aid itself and often
requires a military presence for it to be effective. It would be useful to examine the
costs and benefits of the increased humanitarian programs conducted by DOD in
Afghanistan and elsewhere to understand better the impact of the military on non-
military assistance programs.
Afghanistan and Possible Iraq War
There is a consensus that Afghanistan requires long-term international attention
in order to receive adequate donor funds, have successful reconstruction, and avoid
another civil war. Some argue that Afghanistan’s situation is precarious. However,
discussions and attention have turned to Iraq with the possibility of war there. While

⁸⁷ Stewart Patrick, “The Check is in the Mail: Improving the Delivery and Coordination of
Post-Conflict Assistance,” Center on International Cooperation, New York University, Dec.

1998, p. 2.

a war in Iraq is projected to cost many billions of dollars, President Bush has stated
that the United States will continue to fund and organize reconstruction in
Afghanistan. How will the Congress seek to reconcile these two costly programs
with the rest of the foreign aid budget and the general budget? Some, including the
international community, have raised doubts about the U.S. commitment to
Afghanistan as the United States focuses on Iraq and visa versa. Can the United
States manage maintain a central focus on Afghanistan at the same time that it takes
on Iraq?

Appendix - Afghanistan Assistance
Donor Funds Committed and Disbursed by Country
as of February 10, 2003
CountryFunds CommittedFunds Disbursed
Andorra 50,000 50,000
Australia 22,464,310 19,040,510
Austria 2,580,000 1,700,000
Belgium 13,498,758 8,428,774
Brunei Darussalam435,493435,493
Canada 19,890,601 17,014,883
Chile 30,000 30,000
China 35,062,700 5,062,700
Czech Republic141,873141,873
Denmark 23,437,186 23,437,186
Fi nland 16,494,636 14,482,136
France 43,200,399 31,165,899
Germany 126,847,715 90,002,975
Greece 1,021,550 1,021,550
Iceland 170,800 170,800
India 21,500,000 21,500,000
Indonesia 40,000 40,000
Ireland 9,948,463 9,831,463
It aly 58,215,594 44,176,723
J apan 235,675,626 174,059,932
Kuwait 2,346,445 2,346,445
Latvia 18,022 18,022
Li echtenstein 62,112 62,112
Lithuania 12,500 12,500
Lux embourg 5,465,009 5,365,009

CountryFunds CommittedFunds Disbursed
Malays ia 1,066,255 66,255
Malta 29,152 29,152
Monaco 91,827 91,827
Morocco 117,608 117,608
Netherlands 66,817,221 60,565,555
New Zealand680,952680,952
Norway 20,179,888 19,439,865
Poland 180,046 180,046
Russian Federation4,000,0004,000,000
Saudi Arabia72,495,47972,495,479
Singapore 1,535,583 1,535,583
Slovakia 131,658 131,658
Spain 6,041,584 6,041,584
Sweden 29,836,135 29,520,345
Switz erland 7,302,092 6,702,092
Thailand 678,000 678,000
Turkey 1,143,551 1,143,551
United Kingdom126,179,021116,358,370
USA 725,550,378 714,675,300
Venez u ela 1,000,000 1,000,000
Total 1,703,666,222 1,505,050,207
^Source:^A^A^C^A^don^{or as}^sⁱ^s^t^an^{ce databas}^e^{, Feb. 10, 2003, [h}^{ttp://aacadad.u}ⁿ^dp.org^]^.