The Endangered Species Act and Claims of Property Rights "Takings"

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

The federal Endangered Species Act (ESA) has long been one of the major flash points in the
“property rights” debate. This report outlines the ESA provisions most relevant to the act’s
impacts on private property and surveys the major ESA-relevant principles of Fifth Amendment
takings law. The report then proceeds to the court decisions adjudicating whether government
measures based on the ESA effect a taking of property under the Fifth Amendment. The cases to
date address four kinds of ESA measures: (1) restrictions on land uses that might adversely affect
species listed as endangered or threatened; (2) reductions in water delivery or allowable water
diversion to preserve lake levels or instream flows needed by listed fish (currently the most active
area of ESA takings litigation); (3) restrictions on the defensive measures a property owner may
take to protect his/her property from listed animals; and (4) restrictions on commercial dealings in
members of listed species.
To date, only one of the 16 ESA-based takings cases disclosed by research, Tulare Lake Basin
Water Storage District v. United States, has found a taking, and that decision has been
undermined by a later decision of the same judge. But another credible taking challenge is
pending in Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States, now before the Federal Circuit.
Both these cases fall into the “reductions in water delivery or allowable water diversion” category
noted above.

Introduc tion ..................................................................................................................................... 1
I. ESA Features Pertinent to Private Property Use..........................................................................2
Listing and Critical Habitat Designation...................................................................................2
Section 9 Prohibitions; Section 10 Permits...............................................................................2
Section 7 and Federal Agencies................................................................................................4
Administrative Reforms, Etc.....................................................................................................4
II. ESA-Relevant Principles of Takings Law..................................................................................5
Preliminary Thresholds.............................................................................................................6
Takings Principles.....................................................................................................................6
III. Restrictions on Private Uses of Land That Might Adversely Affect Listed Species.................9
IV. Reductions in Irrigation Water to Preserve Instream Flows Needed by Listed Species..........14
V. Restrictions on Defensive Measures That a Property Owner May Use to Protect
Property from ESA-Listed Animals...........................................................................................17
VI. Restrictions on Commercial Dealings in Species....................................................................18
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................19

The federal Endangered Species Act (ESA),¹ along with its state counterparts, has long been a
major flash point in the “property rights” debate. In the ESA context, the debate has had at least
two parts. First, to what extent should, and to what extent does, the ESA restrict the use of
privately owned land? Second, given that restrictions on land uses and other property-related
activities are imposed under the ESA, to what extent does the Takings Clause of the Fifth ²
Amendment demand compensation of the property owner? This second question—the “takings”
implications of the ESA—is our subject here.
Much has been written about which, if any, impacts on property owners by wildlife protection ³
laws such as the ESA must be compensated as Fifth Amendment takings. In 1993, CRS provided
a comprehensive analytic review of how the takings issue had played out under the ESA and other ⁴
federal and state wildlife laws. This newer report simply reviews the takings court decisions
involving the ESA. These decisions illustrate the types of private property impacts that occur
under the ESA and how takings law regards them.
Note that this review is not a reliable indicator of the aggregate private property impacts of the
ESA program. Almost certainly, many landowners who are restricted in some way under the act
do not bother to sue. Of the filed suits, CRS has no systematic way of discovering those that were
resolved without published decision (as by settlement or voluntary dismissal). And finally, court
decisions under the Takings Clause do not exhaust the universe of decisions stemming from the ⁵
ESA’s private property impacts—other legal theories may be invoked.
Sections I and II of the report give basic background: the ESA features pertinent to its impact on
private property and ESA-relevant principles of takings law, respectively. Sections III through VI
are the heart of the report: reviews of ESA takings decisions grouped by type of property impact
involved. The decisions herein comprise all those of which CRS is aware, reported and

¹^{16 U}^.^S.C^.^§^§¹⁵³¹^-¹⁵⁴^4.
²^“^[^N^]^or^s^h^a^ll^pr^iv^a^t^e^pr^o^p^e^r^ty^be^ta^k^e^{n f}^o^r^public^us^e^,^w^ithou^{t jus}^t^c^o^m^p^eⁿ^s^a^tion.”
³^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,^Johⁿ^D.^E^c^h^e^verri^{a an}^{d Ju}^lⁱ^e^L^u^rm^an^,^“Pe^r^fe^c^tly^Astoun^din^g^{” P}^u^b^lic^Ri^g^h^{ts: W}ⁱ^l^d^life^Pro^t^e^c^tion^an^{d t}^h^e
^T^a^ki^ng^{s C}^l^au^se^{, 1}⁶^T^UL^ANE^E^NV^T^L^.^L.^J.³³¹⁽²⁰⁰³⁾^;^Re^b^{ecca E}^.^Harri^soⁿ^,^C^o^mm^en^t^,^W^h^eⁿ^Anim^als^Iⁿ^v^ade^an^d
^Occu^p^y^{: P}^h^ysi^c^a^l^T^a^ki^ng^{s an}^{d t}^h^{e E}ⁿ^da^ng^ered^Sp^eci^{es A}^c^t^{, 78}^W^AS^H^.^L.^R^EV^{. 867 (}²⁰⁰³⁾^;^G^l^eⁿⁿ^{P. Sug}^a^m^e^li,^The
^ESA^an^{d T}^a^kⁱ^ngs^of^Pr^iv^ate^Pr^o^p^e^r^t^y^{, in D}^o^na^{ld C.}^Ba^{ur a}ⁿ^{d W}^m^.^Robe^{rt Irv}ⁱⁿ^(e^ds^{.), T}^HE^E^ND^A^N^G^E^RE^D^S^PE^C^I^E^S^A^CT^:
^L^AW^,^P^OL^I^C^{Y A}^ND^P^ER^SP^EC^T^I^V^E^S⁽^A^m^e^rⁱ^c^aⁿ^B^a^r^A^s^s^’^{n, 200}²⁾⁽^u^p^d^a^t^e^f^o^r^t^hc^om^ing⁾^{; Monic}^a^L^.^Ma^s^o^{n, C}^o^m^m^eⁿ^t,
^De^nial^{of Pe}^rmission^to^“T^ak^e^”^aⁿ^En^da^nge^re^d^Spe^cⁱ^e^s^W^{ill Amo}^uⁿ^{t t}^o^a^“T^ak^ing^”^Un^de^{r the}^F^ifth^Ame^ndmeⁿ^{t i}ⁿ
^Lim^ite^{d Situ}^ati^ons^{, 21}^U^.^A^RK^.^L^IT^TL^E^R^OC^K^L.^R^EV^{. 519 (}¹⁹⁹⁹⁾^{; B}^l^aⁱ^ne^I^.^G^r^e^eⁿ^,^T^h^{e E}ⁿ^da^ng^ered^Sp^eci^{es A}^c^t^aⁿ^d
^{Fifth Ame}^ndmeⁿ^t^Takⁱ^ngs:^C^onsti^tutio^na^{l Limits}^of^Spe^cⁱ^e^s^Prote^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^{, 15}^Y^A^LE^J.^ON^R^EG^{. 329}⁽¹⁹⁹⁸⁾^{; R}^o^bⁱ^{n L}^.
^Riv^e^tt,^Wh^{y T}^h^{ere A}^r^{e S}^o^F^e^{w T}^a^kiⁿ^g^s^Ca^{ses Und}^e^{r t}^h^{e E}ⁿ^da^ng^ered^S^p^eci^{es A}^c^t^,^o^r^So^{me Ma}^j^o^{r O}^b^st^a^c^l^e^{s t}^o^T^a^kiⁿ^g^s
^Liab^ilitie^s^{, c}^o^ur^s^e^m^a^te^rⁱ^a^l^s^pr^e^p^a^r^e^d^f^o^r¹⁹⁹⁸^A^L^I^-^A^B^A^c^onf^e^r^eⁿ^ce^{on I}ⁿ^v^e^r^s^e^C^onde^mⁿ^a^{tion a}^{nd R}^e^la^te^d
^G^o^v^e^rn^m^e^{nt L}ⁱ^a^b^ility^.
⁴^{CRS Rep}^o^r^{t 9}³^-3⁴⁶^,^T^h^{e E}ⁿ^d^aⁿ^g^ered^S^p^eci^{es A}^c^t^an^d^P^rⁱ^v^a^t^{e P}^r^op^ert^y^{: A}^L^e^ga^l^P^rⁱ^m^er^{, by}^R^obe^r^t^Me^ltz^.
⁵^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,^Orf^f^v.^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^es,⁵⁴⁵^U.^S^.⁵⁹⁶⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾^(f^{armers co}^u^l^d^no^t^m^aⁱⁿ^t^aⁱⁿ^b^r^each^o^f^coⁿ^t^ract^suⁱ^t^agaiⁿ^s^t
^B^u^r^e^a^u^of^R^e^c^l^am^a^{tion ba}^s^e^d^on^ESA^-^r^e^quir^e^{d c}^u^t^b^a^c^k^s^{in w}^a^te^r^de^liv^e^r^e^d^by^B^u^r^e^a^u^{, s}ⁱ^nc^e^pe^r^tineⁿ^{t s}^t^a^t^ute^di^{d n}^o^t
^w^aⁱ^v^e^s^o^v^e^r^e^ig^{n im}^m^unit^y^f^o^r^s^u^c^h^s^u^its⁾^;^C^a^s^ita^s^M^unicⁱ^pa^{l W}^a^te^r^Dⁱ^s^t^rⁱ^c^t^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, 5}⁴³^F.^3d¹²⁷⁶⁽^F^e^d^{. C}ⁱ^r^.
²⁰⁰⁸⁾^(Uⁿ^ited^{States d}ⁱ^dⁿ^o^t^b^r^each^{its co}ⁿ^t^{ract w}^ith^w^a^{ter d}ⁱ^st^{rict w}^h^en^{it req}^uⁱ^red^dⁱ^strⁱ^{ct to}^b^u^ild^fⁱ^sh^p^a^ssag^e^facilit^y
^to^aid^ESA^-^listed^fⁱ^sh^{; w}^h^{ile Un}^it^ed^St^{ates’ req}^uⁱ^rem^eⁿ^t^th^{at w}^a^{ter b}^e^dⁱ^v^e^rted^t^o^fⁱ^sh^p^a^ssag^e^facility^dⁱ^d^b^r^each
^c^ontra^c^t^pr^ov^ision^gⁱ^vⁱ^ng^distric^t^a^{ll w}^a^te^{r a}^v^a^ila^ble^th^roug^h^pro^j^e^c^t^{, U.S.}^{is n}^o^{t lia}^ble^ow^ing^{to s}^o^v^e^re^ig^{n a}^c^t^s
^doc^trⁱⁿ^e⁾^.

unreported, from the highest court to rule on the taking issue in the case.⁶ Of the 16 decisions ⁷
reviewed in this report, only one, Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States,
found a taking, and as discussed that decision has been undermined by a later decision of the
same judge that appears to have survived appeal. Three other cases have yet to be finally ⁸
resolved, and thus may or may not ultimately find a taking.

Under the ESA, the possibility of private property impacts begins when the Secretary of the
Interior, through the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), lists a species as endangered or ⁹
threatened. The Secretary of Commerce, through the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS,
popularly called NOAA Fisheries), administers the ESA for marine species.
Important here, listing is to be done “solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data ¹⁰
available” to the pertinent Secretary, without reference to economic costs or private property
impacts. In sharp contrast, such costs and impacts may be considered in devising agency
responses to the determination of endangered or threatened status. For example, at the time of a
listing, the Secretary is required, when “prudent and determinable,” to designate the “critical ¹¹
habitat” of the species—areas essential to its conservation. A critical habitat designation is to be ¹²
based both on scientific data and “economic impact and any other relevant impact,” presumably
allowing impacts on private property to be weighed. This distinction between listing and
subsequent agency responses such as critical habitat designation was made by Congress quite ¹³
deliberately.
Listing and critical habitat designation trigger the ESA provisions that may interfere with private
property use. Chief among these is Section 9, prohibiting certain acts in connection with ¹⁴
endangered animals and plants. Section 9’s prohibitions apply to both private and public land,
and apply regardless of whether critical habitat has been designated. For endangered animals,

⁶^Aⁿ^e^x^c^e^ption^is^Co^nc^e^r^ne^{d S}^h^ri^m^p^e^r^s^o^f^A^m^e^r^ic^a^,^Inc^.^v^.^Mos^b^a^c^he^{r, N}^o^{. CA}^C-90-³⁹^(S.D^{. T}^e^x^.^Ma^{r. 8,}¹⁹⁹⁰^),
^o^m^itted^b^ecau^{se CRS h}^a^{s b}^een^uⁿ^ab^{le to}^o^b^t^aiⁿ^{a co}^p^y^o^f^th^{e u}ⁿ^p^u^b^lish^e^d^d^ecisioⁿ^.^T^h^{is case rep}^o^r^ted^l^y^w^a^{s a ta}^kⁱⁿ^g
^ch^al^l^eⁿ^g^{e t}^o^an^agen^cy^req^uⁱ^re^m^eⁿ^t^un^d^e^r^t^h^{e E}^S^A^t^h^at^s^h^ri^m^p^t^r^aw^l^e^{rs u}^s^{e “t}^u^r^t^l^e^excl^u^d^e^{r d}^e^vi^ces^{” i}ⁿ^t^h^ei^{r n}^e^t^s^t^o
^mⁱⁿⁱ^mⁱ^{ze u}ⁿⁱⁿ^t^en^d^e^d^cat^ch^o^f^en^dan^g^ered^an^d^t^h^reat^en^ed^{sea t}^u^rt^l^e^s^.^T^h^{e case,}^ag^aiⁿ^rep^o^r^t^e^d^l^y^,^w^a^s^dⁱ^smⁱ^ssed^oⁿ^t^h^e
^g^r^oun^{d tha}^t^{it w}^a^{s f}^ile^{d in the}^w^r^ong^c^ourt.
⁷^Se^e^infr^a^a^t^pa^g^e¹⁵^.
⁸^Se^e^M^e^{ad v}^.^City^{of Co}^tati^{, i}ⁿ^fra^a^t^pa^g^e^9;^Ca^sit^a^{s Mu}^nicip^a^{l Wa}^t^e^{r Di}^s^t^rⁱ^c^t^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^State^s^,^infr^a^a^t^pa^g^e^{14; a}ⁿ^d
^K^l^am^at^{h I}^r^rⁱ^g^a^tio^{n D}ⁱ^s^t^rⁱ^c^t^v^.^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^St^ate^s^,ⁱⁿ^f^r^a^a^t^pa^g^e^15.
⁹^ESA^{§ 4;}¹⁶^U^.^S.C^.^§¹⁵³³^.
¹⁰^ESA^§⁴⁽^b⁾⁽¹^)(A^{); 1}⁶^U.S.C.^§¹⁵³³^(b⁾⁽¹^)(A^).
¹¹^ESA^§⁴⁽^a)(3^);¹⁶^U.S.C^.^§¹⁵³³⁽^a⁾⁽³^).
¹²^ESA^{§ 4(}^b)⁽²⁾^;¹⁶^U^.^S.C^.^§¹⁵³³⁽^b)⁽²⁾^.
¹³^Se^e^H^.^R^e^pt.^97-⁵^67,⁹⁷^th^C^ong^.,^2d^Se^s^s^.¹²⁽¹⁹⁸²⁾^{; H}^.^R^e^pt^{. 9}⁷^-⁸^35,⁹⁷^th^C^o^ng^.,^2d^Se^s^s^.¹⁹⁽¹⁹⁸²⁾^.
¹⁴^{16 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹⁵³⁸^.

prohibited acts include (a) the “taking” of an animal, (b) possessing, selling or transporting an
animal obtained by an unlawful “take,” (c) transporting an animal interstate in the course of
commercial activity, and (d) selling an animal interstate, or importing/exporting same. For
endangered plants, the list is narrower—we do not describe it here since there appear to be no
Fifth Amendment takings decisions involving listed plants.
The term “take” is a key ESA concept, not to be confused with Fifth Amendment takings. It is
expansively defined by the statute to include almost any act adversely affecting a species ¹⁵
member—including “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, ... capture, or collect” a listed animal.
Central to the ESA’s impact on private land owners, the FWS defines “harm” to include indirect ¹⁶
harm to listed species members through certain significant habitat modifications. This agency ¹⁷
definition has been upheld by the Supreme Court as a reasonable interpretation of the statute.
By general rule, the FWS has extended almost all of the endangered species prohibitions just ¹⁸
discussed to threatened animals and plants. “Special rules,” withdrawing particular threatened
species from aspects of the general regime, have been promulgated for those species with atypical ¹⁹
management needs. The NMFS, on the other hand, adopts Section 9’s endangered species
prohibitions for threatened species only on a case-by-case basis. “Experimental populations” of ²⁰
listed species generally are treated as threatened species.
To minimize its constraints on economic growth, the ESA in Section 10 allows a much-used
exemption from section 9’s taking prohibitions. The exemption authorizes the appropriate ²¹
Secretary to permit any taking incidental to, and not the purpose of, otherwise lawful activity—
allowing some projects to proceed even if they harm individuals of a listed species. Such
“incidental taking permits” (ITPs) may be issued to non-federal entities after the landowner
submits a habitat conservation plan (HCP) including proposed mitigation measures and the
considered but rejected alternatives to the proposed action. The purpose of the HCP is to ensure
that the proposed action does not appreciably reduce the survival and recovery prospects of the
species.
In an enforcement action for violating the ESA, the statute allows an affirmative defense for
offenses committed in the good faith belief that the defendant was acting to protect persons from ²²
bodily harm. The ESA makes no mention, however, of a similar defense for acts to protect
property. The absence of a property-protection defense in the ESA itself has been largely offset—
as to threatened species and experimental populations, but not endangered species—by ²³
administrative regulation.

¹⁵^ESA^{§ 3(}¹⁹⁾^;¹⁶^U^.^S.C^.^§¹⁵³²⁽¹⁹⁾^.
¹⁶^{50 C}^.^F.R^.^§¹⁷^.3.
¹⁷^Ba^bbitt^v^.^Sw^e^e^t^H^o^m^e^Cha^p^te^{r of}^Com^m^unitie^s^f^o^{r a}^G^r^e^a^t^O^r^egon,⁵¹^{5 U}^.^S.⁶⁸^{7 (1}⁹⁹^5).
¹⁸^{50 C}^.^F.R^.^§¹⁷^.3^{1 (}^w^ildlif^e⁾^{, § 1}⁷^.7^{1 (}^p^la^nts⁾^.
¹⁹^{50 C}^.^F.R^.^§^§¹⁷^.^40-^17.⁴⁸⁽^w^ildli^f^e⁾^;^{50 C}^.^F.R^.^§^§¹⁷^.^73-^17.⁷⁸⁽^p^l^a^nts⁾^.
²⁰^ESA^{§ 1}⁰⁽^j⁾⁽²⁾⁽^C⁾^;¹⁶^U^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 1}⁵³⁹⁽^j⁾⁽²⁾⁽^C⁾^.^Se^e^s^p^e^cⁱ^a^l^r^u^le^s^f^o^r^e^x^pe^rⁱ^m^e^nta^l^pop^ula^tⁱ^ons^a^t⁵⁰^C^.^F.R^.^§§¹⁷^.8^4-
^17.^86.
²¹^ESA^§¹⁰^(a)(1^)(B);¹⁶^U.S.C.^§¹⁵³⁹⁽^a)(1^)(B)^.
²²^ESA^§¹¹^(a)(3^),¹⁶^U.S.C.^§¹⁵⁴⁰^(a)(3^{) (civ}^{il en}^f^o^rcem^eⁿ^{t a}^c^tions⁾^;^ESA^{§ 1}¹⁽^b⁾⁽³⁾^,¹⁶^U^.^S.C^.^§¹⁵⁴⁰⁽^b)⁽³⁾
^(crimⁱⁿ^a^{l en}^f^o^rce^m^en^{t actio}ⁿ^s^).
²³^Se^e^infr^a^no^t^e^{s 32}^-33^and^acco^mp^an^yⁱⁿ^g^t^e^xt^.

Another ESA provision with obvious property rights implications is Section 7.²⁴ This section
comes into play only when a project has a federal nexus—as when a non-federal project requires
a federal permit or is being federally funded, or the federal agency itself is carrying out the
project. Section 7’s mandate is that each federal agency consult with the FWS or NMFS,
depending on the listed species involved, to ensure that its actions are “not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species, or result in the destruction ²⁵
or adverse modification of” designated critical habitat. (Note the focus on the species, in
contrast with section 9’s focus on individual members of the species.)
Once consulted, FWS or NMFS must, if listed species might be affected, prepare a biological ²⁶
opinion to determine the actual impact of the proposed action. If “jeopardy” of species or
“destruction or adverse modification” of critical habitat (see preceding quote) is found, the FWS
or NMFS must suggest “reasonable and prudent alternatives” to the proposed activity that would
not violate the section 7 mandate. If the agency agrees to these or other reasonable and prudent
alternatives consistent with the section 7 mandate and approved by FWS or NMFS—and if,
further, any incidental takes satisfy that mandate, and other conditions are met—then the FWS or
NMFS issues an incidental take statement and the activity may go forward consistent with its ²⁷
terms. The incidental take analysis under section 7 is the same as for section 10 ITPs, and
compliance with the mitigating measures in the biological opinion confers the same exemption
from section 9 prohibitions as an ITP does on non-federal entities.
A federal action may be exempted from the section 7 mandate, despite the possibility of
extinction, by an Endangered Species Committee of high-ranking federal officials (popularly ²⁸
called the God Squad). The Committee must find, among other things, that there are no
reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action, and that the action’s benefits clearly
outweigh the benefits of alternatives that would conserve the species or its critical habitat. The
Endangered Species Committee exemption process is generally considered burdensome and is
rarely used.
Several administrative reforms were adopted in the Clinton Administration, under claimed
authority in the ESA, to enhance the program’s flexibility in dealing with property owners. Joint
FWS and NMFS policies streamlined permit procedures for small landowners, and other
initiatives encouraged landowners to increase protection for listed species on their land. Under
“safe harbor agreements,” landowners who increase species habitat can return to baseline ²⁹
conditions without penalty. And “no surprises agreements” assure a landowner that if he/she

²⁴^{16 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹⁵³⁶^.
²⁵^ESA^§⁷⁽^a)(2^);¹⁶^U.S^.^C.^§¹⁵³⁶⁽^a)(2^).
²⁶^ESA^§⁷⁽^b⁾⁽³^)(A^{); 1}⁶^U.S.C.^§¹⁵³⁶^(b⁾⁽³^)(A^).
²⁷^ESA^§⁷⁽^b⁾⁽⁴^);¹⁶^U.S.C^.^§¹⁵³⁶⁽^b⁾⁽⁴^).
²⁸^ESA^{§ 7(}^e⁾^;^{16 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹⁵³⁶⁽^e⁾^.
²⁹^FW^{S a}^{nd N}^M^FS^pu^blis^he^{d a}^joⁱⁿ^{t Fina}^l^Sa^f^e^H^a^r^bor^P^o^lic^y^a^t^{64 F}^e^{d. R}^e^g^.³²^,7^{17 (}^J^une^17,¹⁹⁹⁹⁾^.^I^m^plem^eⁿ^ting
^r^e^g^u^la^tions^a^r^e^a^t⁵⁰^C^.^F.R^.^§§¹⁷^.22(^c⁾^,¹⁷^.3²⁽^c⁾^.

implements an HCP, there will be no further costs or land use restrictions to benefit species ³⁰
covered by the HCP (with minor exceptions).
Federal managers also attempted, where consistent with the facts, to tilt toward threatened rather
than endangered designations, to allow use of the more flexible ESA provisions governing ³¹
threatened species. Use of threatened status has allowed the FWS, through “special rules,” to
authorize takes of members of specified species causing depredations of private property ³²
(livestock, domestic animals, crops). Usually, such takes of problem animals must be carried out
by government officials, rather than the aggrieved property owner. FWS regulations governing
private property depredations by members of experimental populations more often allow takes by ³³
both government agents and private landowners.
Despite these impact-softening mechanisms in the ESA and in administrative reforms, the act at
times may frustrate the economic desires of owners of land or other property. This fact has long
been a rallying cry for the ESA’s detractors, who argue that restrictions under the act routinely
“take” property in the constitutional sense. This brings us to Section II.

The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution ends with 12 deceptively simple words: “[N]or
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Long a constitutional
sleeper, this “Takings Clause” has been thrust into the limelight in recent decades by increased
government land use controls (such as under the ESA) combined with a more conservative
judiciary interested in greater protections for property owners. The Clause seeks to strike a
balance between these two interests—more broadly, between society’s needs, as effected by
government, and the burdens that satisfying those needs may impose on individual property
owners.
Here we scan the law developed by the courts for deciding which government actions work a
Fifth Amendment taking of private property, requiring the owner to be compensated. We include
only the principles most relevant to the ESA.

³⁰^{50 C}^.^F.R^.^§^§¹⁷^.²²⁽^b)⁽⁵⁾^,¹⁷^.³²⁽^b)⁽⁵⁾⁽^F^W^S⁾^;⁵⁰^C^.^F^.^R^.^{§ 2}^22.³⁰⁷⁽^g⁾⁽^N^MFS)^.
³¹^ESA^s^e^c^{tion 4(}^d)^{, g}^o^v^e^rⁿⁱⁿ^g^thr^e^a^t^eⁿ^e^d^s^p^e^cⁱ^e^s^{, c}^ontaⁱ^nsⁿ^o^de^ta^il^e^d^lis^{t of}^pr^ohi^bite^d^a^c^t^s^,^a^s^doe^s^s^e^c^{tion 9}^f^o^r
^en^d^aⁿ^g^ered^sp^eci^es.^Rat^h^er,ⁱ^t^requⁱ^r^{es o}ⁿ^l^y^t^h^at^regu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^oⁿ^t^h^re^at^en^ed^sp^eci^{es “p}^ro^vi^d^e^f^o^{r t}^h^{e c}^oⁿ^s^ervatⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^su^ch
^sp^eci^es.^”¹⁶^U.^S^.^C^.^{§ 15}³³⁽^d⁾^.
³²^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,⁵⁰^C^.^F.R^.^§^17.⁴⁰⁽^b)⁽¹⁾⁽ⁱ⁾⁽^C⁾⁽^g^ov^e^r^nm^eⁿ^{t a}^g^eⁿ^ts^m^a^y^r^e^m^ove^g^r^iz^z^l^y^be^a^r^s^c^a^u^sⁱ^ng^de^pr^e^d^a^tio^ns^to
^l^a^wf^u^l^l^y^p^r^esen^t^lⁱ^v^est^o^ck,^cro^p^s^,^o^r^b^eehⁱ^v^es);⁵⁰^C.^F^.^R.^§¹⁷^.⁴⁰⁽^d)(2⁾⁽ⁱ^)(B)(⁴⁾^(go^v^ern^m^en^t^agen^t^s^ma^y^t^a^ke
^Minne^s^o^ta^g^r^ay^w^o^lv^e^s^c^a^u^sⁱ^ng^de^pr^e^d^a^tions^of^la^w^f^ull^y^pr^e^s^eⁿ^{t d}^o^m^e^s^tic^aⁿⁱ^m^a^l^s⁾^{. FW}^{S r}^e^g^u^la^tio^ns^c^ontaⁱ^{n a}^v^e^r^y
^br^oa^{d a}^u^th^or^ity^f^o^r^ta^k^e^s^o^f^the^U^t^a^h^pr^aⁱ^rⁱ^e^dogⁱⁿ^tha^t^s^t^a^t^e^,^thr^o^u^g^h^sta^t^e^pe^rm^{its a}^ppa^re^ntly^issua^b^le^to^priv^a^t^e
^pa^r^tie^s^.⁵⁰^C^.^F^.^R^.^{§ 1}⁷^.⁴⁰⁽^g⁾⁽²⁾^.
³³^For^e^x^a^m^ple^,^r^e^g^a^r^d^ing^the^e^x^pe^rⁱ^m^e^nta^l^popula^tⁱ^oⁿ^of^r^e^{d w}^o^lv^e^s^{in N}^o^r^t^{h C}^a^r^o^lina^aⁿ^{d T}^e^nne^s^s^e^e^,^s^e^e^{50 C}^.^F^.^R^.
^§§^17.⁸⁴^(c^)(4)(iii)^(priv^a^te^la^nd^o^w^ne^r^m^a^y^ta^ke^re^{d w}^o^lv^e^sⁱⁿ^the^a^c^t^of^k^illing^liv^e^s^toc^k^{or pe}^{ts), 1}⁷^.8^4(c^)(4)(iv⁾
⁽^p^rⁱ^v^a^te^la^ndow^ne^r^m^a^y^ha^r^a^ss^r^e^{d w}^o^lv^e^s^f^{ound o}ⁿ^ow^ne^r^’^s^la^nd)^,^a^nd^17.⁸⁴⁽^c⁾⁽⁵⁾⁽^g^ov^e^r^nm^eⁿ^{t a}^g^ents^m^a^y^tak^e^r^e^d
^w^o^lv^e^s^c^a^u^sⁱ^ng^de^pr^e^d^a^tio^ns^of^la^w^f^ull^y^pr^e^s^eⁿ^{t dom}^e^s^tic^aⁿ^im^a^l^s^or^ot^he^r^pe^r^s^oⁿ^a^l^pr^o^p^e^r^ty⁾^.

Before a court can even get to a plaintiff’s taking claim, some initial hurdles, both procedural and
substantive, must be surmounted. Procedurally, a taking claim against the United States (the
likely defendant if suing because of the ESA) must be filed in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, if ³⁴
plaintiff seeks more than $10,000. It must also, under that court’s statute of limitations, be filed ³⁵
within six years of the date of the alleged taking.
Most daunting of all the procedural hurdles, the taking claim must be ripe—that is, the dispute
must have reached a sufficient maturity to be suitable for judicial resolution. In cases against the
United States, this means chiefly that the property owner must have obtained a “final decision”
from the government agency in question as to the nature and extent of the restrictions on the ³⁶
property. “Final decision” is a much-litigated term of art. To get a final decision, it may be
necessary for the property owner, after his/her initial development proposal is rejected, to reapply
with scaled-down or reconfigured proposals. In the ESA context, the final decision requirement
has been held to mean that the taking claim is not ripe until an ITP has been applied for and,
usually, denied. Denial of the ITP is not necessary for ripeness where further negotiations with the
federal agency are not needed to indicate what degree of development the government will allow
on the parcel, where further negotiations would otherwise be pointless (“futility exception”), or
where plaintiff is claiming that an agency’s delay in granting or denying the ITP is
“extraordinary.” But as yet, no court has been willing to excuse a plaintiff’s failure to even apply
for an ITP.
An agency’s determination simply that the property owner’s proposal requires an ITP application
cannot itself be a taking. The reason is clear: that determination leaves open the possibility that ³⁷
the permit, if applied for, will be granted.
Most important of the substantive threshold hurdles is the Takings Clause demand that the thing
alleged to have been taken is “property” as used in the Clause. Almost all common interests in
land—fee simple absolutes, leases, easements, etc.—are indisputably property, as are water
rights, making this threshold an easily surmounted one in ESA takings cases. However, takings
law is cognizant of only direct impacts on the property. For example, the denial of an ITP for a
residential subdivision may, in proper circumstances, take the tract for which the permit is sought.
However, a taking claim will not be entertained as to the nearby commercially zoned parcel
whose value is greatly reduced because no residential subdivision, hence no potential customers,
will come to the ITP-denied lot.
As recently reviewed by the Supreme Court, there are three types of takings claims, each ³⁸
evaluated under a different Supreme Court-created test. Each type might arise in the ESA
context.

³⁴²⁸^U^.^S^.^C.^§§¹³⁴⁶^(a),¹⁴⁹¹^.^On^t^h^{e rare o}^ccasi^oⁿ^t^h^at^an^E^S^A^t^a^kiⁿ^g^cl^ai^m^s^eek^s^$10,⁰⁰⁰^or^le^s^s^,^t^h^e^c^l^aⁱ^m^m^a^y^be
^f^ile^{d e}^ithe^r^{in t}^h^e^Co^urt^of^Fe^de^ra^{l Cla}ⁱ^m^s^{or in distr}ⁱ^c^t^c^our^t.
³⁵^{28 U}^.^S.C^.^§²⁵⁰¹^.
³⁶^W^illia^m^s^{on Cou}ⁿ^ty^Re^gⁱ^ona^l^P^l^aⁿⁿⁱ^ng^Com^m^{’n v}^.^Ha^m^{ilton Ba}^nk^{, 47}^{3 U.}^S.¹⁷^{2 (1}⁹⁸^5).
³⁷^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^Rⁱ^v^e^r^s^ide^B^a^y^vⁱ^e^w^H^o^m^e^s^,^Iⁿ^c^{., 4}⁷⁴^U^.^S.¹²^1,¹²^{6 (}¹⁹⁸⁵⁾^.

A regulatory taking claim asserts that a government action has taken property merely by
restricting its use. The idea of the regulatory taking concept is that even in the absence of an
obvious government taking of property—as by appropriation of title or physical occupation—use
restrictions may be sufficiently severe to amount to the same thing. Regulatory takings claims
break down into two subcategories, depending on whether the regulation is alleged to have
caused a total elimination of the land’s use or value, called a total taking claim, or a less-than-
total elimination, called a partial regulatory taking claim.
The first category, total elimination of use or value, is held to be a per se taking, with at least one
big exception. If the government restriction was implicit in “background principles” of property ³⁹
or nuisance law existing when the property was acquired, there is no taking. The rationale for
this exception is that the government has not taken away any right the property owner ever had.
There is limited case-law support for the argument that the states’ historic ownership of wildlife
and responsibility for wildlife protection as a trust obligation to the public constitute a
background principle that forecloses takings claim based on such protections. However, this
defense has yet to be addressed in an ESA-based takings decision.
Claims in the second category, less-than-total losses, are far more common, and are evaluated
quite differently. Instead of a per se test, courts use a fact-intensive, case-by-case approach
applying the “Penn Central balancing test.” Under this approach, the government action is
assessed for its economic impact, the degree of interference with investment-backed expectations, ⁴⁰
and its “character.” These vague factors have been explicated only minimally by the Supreme
Court, leading many commentators to complain that the test is muddled and easily manipulated.
Still, it is at least clear that the impact on the property owner must be severe, with the result that
the large majority of regulatory takings claims tested under Penn Central are rejected. This
government-friendly pattern has been replicated in the ESA-takings cases raising Penn Central
claims, even though takings courts have not accorded the species-preservation goal of the ESA ⁴¹
any special status (at least explicitly) in the takings calculus.
With either total or partial regulatory takings claims, the court must define the “parcel as a whole”
(aka “relevant parcel”) as to which the impact of the government action will be measured. The
relevant parcel notion is needed because takings law looks at the economic impact and
interference with expectations factors in a relative, rather than absolute, sense. As to economic
impact, for example, what counts in the takings analysis is not that the plaintiff’s land lost X
dollars in value due to a government restriction, but rather that the loss constituted a high
percentage of the pre-restriction value of the parcel as a whole.
The relevant parcel generally is defined to include the entire contiguous lot in the same
ownership, with noncontiguous lots held by the same owner thrown in if part of an integrated
development. Importantly, the relevant parcel cannot be limited to the portion of the property

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
³⁸^Lⁱ^ng^le^v^.^C^h^e^v^r^{on U}^.^S.A^.^Iⁿ^c^.^,⁵^{44 U}^.^S.⁵²^{8 (}²⁰⁰⁵⁾^.
³⁹^L^u^c^a^s^v^.^South^C^a^r^o^li^na^C^o^a^s^ta^l^C^ounc^il^{, 5}⁰⁵^U^.^S.¹⁰⁰³⁽¹⁹⁹²⁾^.
⁴⁰^P^e^{nn C}^e^ntr^a^{l T}^r^aⁿ^s^p^{. C}^o^{. v}^.^N^e^w^Y^o^r^k^C^ity^{, 438 U}^.^S.¹⁰^4,¹²^{4 (}¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^.
⁴¹^A^c^co^rdⁱⁿ^{g t}^o^t^h^e^S^u^p^r^em^{e Co}^u^r^t^,^Coⁿ^g^{ress i}ⁿ^t^h^{e E}^S^A^el^evat^ed^t^h^{e go}^vern^m^eⁿ^t^{’s i}ⁿ^t^e^restⁱⁿ^sp^eci^es^p^r^eservatⁱ^oⁿ^t^o
^the^“^h^ig^he^{st of}^pri^o^ritie^s.”^T^V^A^v^.^Hill,⁴³^{7 U.S}^.¹⁵³^,¹⁷⁴⁽¹⁹⁷^8).^W^e^re^{this v}^a^unte^d^sta^t^{us t}^o^eⁿ^te^{r t}^h^e^ta^kⁱ^ng^{s a}ⁿ^a^l^y^s^is
^a^s^s^o^m^e^thing^to^be^ba^la^nc^e^d^a^g^aⁱ^ns^{t the}^bur^de^{n im}^pos^e^d^on^the^pr^o^p^e^r^ty^o^w^ne^r^,^{it w}^ould^pr^e^s^um^a^b^ly^{do s}^o^t^h^r^o^ug^{h t}^h^e
^“ch^aract^{er o}^f^t^h^{e go}^vern^m^eⁿ^t^actⁱ^oⁿ^”^f^act^o^rⁱⁿ^t^h^e^Peⁿⁿ^Ce^ntr^a^l^te^s^t^.

subject to the challenged use restriction, at least not solely on that basis. Thus, a regulation that
severely reduces use or value on only a portion of a tract is unlikely to be a taking. For this
reason, it is almost certain that the relevant parcel factor has held down the number of ESA-based
takings claims; many property owners restricted on a portion of their land still have economic use
of the remainder. Beyond the regulated/nonregulated rule, however, the Supreme Court has left
unresolved many issues that arise in defining the relevant parcel.
Also for both total and partial takings claims, the Supreme Court recently rejected the absolute
version of the “notice rule,” under which lower courts once held that restrictions imposed under ⁴²
laws existing when the property was acquired cannot be a taking. The pre-acquisition existence
of the law in question carries some weight in the takings analysis, but does not bar the taking ⁴³
claim outright. This easing of the notice rule is highly significant for the ESA, which was
enacted so long ago (1973) that most landowners today, by virtue of having bought since
enactment, might be barred from claiming takings under the former, absolute rule.
Finally, regulatory takings claims are treated differently depending on whether the restriction
giving rise to the alleged taking was initially deemed to be permanent (of indefinite duration) or
temporary. If an initially permanent government restriction is ultimately withdrawn or judicially
invalidated, the analysis of whether it worked a taking while on the books is unaffected. The
termination of the restriction nominally changes the permanent taking claim to a temporary one,
but its only real effect is to limit the amount of compensation. A few ESA cases present this
scenario: land use restrictions were lifted once listed birds were found no longer present in an
area. By contrast, the very same land use restriction may not cause a taking if initially designated
as temporary (such as a development moratorium), because of the likelihood that the restriction ⁴⁴
will be lifted after a defined period.
A physical taking claim asserts that the government has taken property by causing, or authorizing,
a physical invasion. Such claims come in two types: permanent physical occupations and
temporary physical invasions. Permanent physical occupations are almost invariably held to be ⁴⁵
takings, because they infringe upon one of the most essential attributes of property ownership:
the right to exclude others. Thus in assessing physical occupation claims the courts will not
inquire into the extent of the occupation, the magnitude of the economic impact, or the
importance of the underlying public purpose—key ingredients of a regulatory takings analysis.
Indeed, even the parcel as a whole rule does not apply, so that an occupation of only a minuscule
portion of a tract is a taking. Not surprisingly, takings plaintiffs always try to bring a physical
occupation claim, among others, if the facts permit.
Temporary physical invasions, the lesser degree of interference, are regarded quite differently.
They are tested under the Penn Central balancing test and generally are held nontakings.
Physical takings claims are common in ESA cases—the property owner pointing to the listed
animals whose physical presence on his/her land must be tolerated, or the consumption of
livestock by listed predators because the livestock owner was barred by the ESA from taking
stronger measures (e.g., shooting) against the marauding animals, or the temporary presence on

⁴²^P^a^l^azzo^l^o^v.^Rho^d^e^Isl^aⁿ^d^,⁵³³^U.^S^.⁶⁰^{6 (20}⁰¹⁾^.
⁴³^T^a^hoe^-^S^ie^r^r^a^P^r^e^s^e^r^v^a^{tion C}^o^uⁿ^c^{il, I}ⁿ^c^.^v^.^T^a^hoe^R^e^gⁱ^ona^l^P^l^aⁿⁿⁱⁿ^g^A^g^eⁿ^cy^{, 535 U}^.^S.³^{02 (}²⁰⁰²⁾^.
⁴⁴^Id.
⁴⁵^L^o^r^e^{tto v}^.^T^e^le^pr^om^pte^r^Ma^nha^tt^aⁿ^C^A^T^V^C^o^r^p^.,⁴⁵^{8 U}^.^S^.⁴¹⁹⁽¹⁹⁸²⁾^.

the owner’s property of federal investigators. As the decisions described herein show, no physical
taking claim based on these physical acts has been successful. Ironically, in the one ESA/takings
case where the plaintiff prevailed, Tulare Lake (Section IV), a physical taking was found in the
absence of any physical invasion, based on the appropriation perceived by the court of a water
right.
The exaction taking claim asserts a taking on the basis of an exaction demanded by a land
regulatory agency as a condition of approving a development proposal. In order not to be a
taking, the exaction condition must meet two criteria. First, there must be an “essential nexus”
between the condition and an underlying purpose of the permit or other approval to which the ⁴⁶
condition is attached. Second, the burden imposed on the property owner by the exaction must
be no greater than “roughly proportional” to the impact of the proposed development on the ⁴⁷
community. Moreover, the burden of proving rough proportionality is on the government. This
two-prong test places greater burden on the government defendant than the test for regulatory
takings and is referred to as “heightened scrutiny.”
The Supreme Court has clarified that not any condition attached to a development permit can
ground an exaction taking claim. Rather, the Court particularly has in mind conditions requiring
that the permit applicant dedicate land to a specific purpose—as by recorded easement. Lower
courts have split on whether an exaction taking claim can be based, in addition, on a monetary
exaction—when government requires a payment as a condition for development approval.
At least potentially, the conditions that landowners opt for in their submitted HCPs could be
subject to exaction taking challenge. Such conditions have at times included dedications of
acreage on the ITP applicant’s land, or commitment by the applicant to purchase mitigation
credits. If the ITP applicant realistically had no choice but to adopt one of these options to meet
the statutory criteria for ITP issuance, and the condition lacks an essential nexus or rough
proportionality, an exaction taking claim becomes possible. We have no information on how often
this happens in practice, but can note that even after three decades of ESA implementation, there
appear to be no court decisions adjudicating exaction takings challenges to HCP conditions.

Mitigation condition on development approval: Mead v. City of Cotati, 2008 WL 4963048
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2008)
Plaintiff, owner of 1.6 acres of vacant land in the city, applied to the city for approval to build
four duplexes on 0.9 acres. The city approved, subject to compliance with the city’s affordable
housing plan and, pertinent here, mitigation of the proposed development’s impact on the
California tiger salamander, an endangered species. Plaintiff’s consultant concluded that under
interim mitigation guidelines developed by the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the state
under the ESA, plaintiff would be required to devote one acre of land to habitat conservation for

⁴⁶^N^o^lla^{n v}^.^C^a^lif^orⁿⁱ^a^C^o^a^s^ta^{l C}^o^m^m^’^{n, 48}^{3 U}^.^S^.⁸²⁵⁽¹⁹⁸⁷⁾^.
⁴⁷^D^o^la^{n v}^.^C^ity^of^Tⁱ^g^a^r^d^{, 512 U}^.^S^.³⁷^{4 (}¹⁹⁹⁴⁾^.

each acre of a nearby salamander breeding site that was adversely affected by the development.
Plaintiff claims the imposition of the two conditions effects a taking.
Held, neither claim is ripe. FWS’s motion to dismiss is granted. Plaintiff does not seek
compensation, the usual takings remedy, but rather a declaration that each of the two conditions is
an unconstitutional taking and an injunction prohibiting FWS and the city from enforcing them.
This claim is not ripe because a taking is not unconstitutional unless it is uncompensated, and
plaintiff has not sought compensation. The city’s motion to dismiss is also granted. Plaintiff has
satisfied the ripeness requirement that to assert a taking claim in federal court, plaintiff first must
obtain a final decision from the government agency. But plaintiff has not satisfied the second
ripeness requirement for takings claims in federal court—that he was either denied compensation
in state court or that seeking compensation there would have been futile. Plaintiff cannot avoid
this ripeness requirement by seeking an injunctive, rather than compensation, remedy.
^C^o^mmen^t^:^Ev^en^h^a^d^th^{e p}^l^ain^t^if^f^so^u^g^h^t^m^oⁿ^e^tar^y^co^m^p^eⁿ^satioⁿ^an^d^satis^fⁱ^ed^{all r}ⁱ^p^eⁿ^e^ss
^requⁱ^r^e^m^ent^s^{, t}^h^{e t}^a^kⁱ^ng^cl^ai^{m ag}^aiⁿ^s^t^t^h^{e F}^W^S^,ⁱ^f^f^o^r^m^o^{re t}^h^an^$10,000,^cou^l^{d n}^o^t^h^a^v^e
^proceede^dⁱⁿ^f^e^{deral dis}^t^{rict co}^u^r^{t. Un}^{der 28}^U.S^.^C^.^s^ectioⁿ^s^{1346 an}^{d 1}⁴⁹¹^{, tak}ⁱ^ng^s^clai^m^s
^ag^ai^ns^t^t^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^e^s^f^o^{r m}^o^{re t}^h^aⁿ^{$10,000 m}^u^s^t^{be f}ⁱ^l^e^{d i}ⁿ^t^h^e^U^.^S^.^C^o^u^r^t^o^f^F^e^dera^l
^Claⁱ^ms.
Restrictions on timber harvesting for personal use: Morris v. United States, 392 F.3d 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2004)
The plaintiffs own a half-acre lot, on which they seek to cut down old-growth redwood trees for
lumber to build on another lot they own. They allege that owing to state and county land-use
restrictions, harvesting timber is the lot’s only economic use. In 2001, the NMFS told plaintiffs
the harvest would violate the ESA by harming listed salmon in the river bordering the lot. The
NMFS later said they could apply for an ITP, requiring them to prepare a HCP. However,
plaintiffs’ research led them to believe that the cost of applying for an ITP and preparing a HCP
would be greater than the modest value of their trees and property. Hence, they did neither and
instead filed a taking claim.
Held, claim is not ripe. Plaintiffs challenge the cost of the administrative process, rather than any
use restrictions that may result from it. But there has been no final agency decision that has
sufficiently fixed the cost of the application, and the agency has discretion to assist plaintiffs with
their application (indeed, a NMFS handbook instructs field offices to assist ITP applicants).
Because the court has no way to predict what influence the wielding of that discretion will have
on plaintiffs’ costs, this case cannot be ripe. Therefore, the court will not reach plaintiffs’ “novel
theory” that a taking can result from the cost of complying with a valid regulatory process, where
the government has never actually restricted the use of the property.
^C^o^mmen^t^:^T^hⁱ^s^deci^sⁱ^onⁱ^s^bu^t^on^e^m^aⁿⁱ^f^e^s^t^atⁱ^oⁿ^of^t^h^{e l}^ong^s^t^an^di^ng^j^u^di^ci^alⁱⁿ^sⁱ^s^t^eⁿ^{ce t}^h^at
^to^rⁱ^p^eⁿ^{a tak}ⁱⁿ^g^clai^m^b^a^sed^oⁿ^{a f}^e^d^e^r^a^{l p}^e^r^m^{it r}^e^q^u^ir^e^m^eⁿ^{t, th}^{e lan}^d^o^wⁿ^e^r^m^u^{st at least}
^b^e^gi^{n t}^h^e^p^e^r^mⁱ^t^a^p^p^lⁱ^c^a^tⁱ^o^{n a}ⁿ^d^ne^go^tⁱ^a^tⁱ^o^{n p}^r^o^c^e^ss.^V^a^rⁱ^o^u^s^t^a^kⁱⁿ^g^s^-^l^a^w^ri^peⁿ^e^ss^doct^rⁱⁿ^es
^m^a^yⁱⁿ^{deed ex}^c^u^s^e^t^h^{e plai}ⁿ^tⁱ^ff’^s^f^a^il^u^r^{e to pu}^rs^u^e^t^h^{e proces}^s^{all t}^h^e^w^a^y^{to a}^f^o^r^m^{al per}^m^it
^denⁱ^al—t^h^e^g^eⁿ^e^ral^mⁱⁿⁱ^m^u^m^prerequⁱ^s^{ite f}^o^{r a ripe tak}ⁱ^ng^cl^ai^m^—^b^u^{t to de}^m^oⁿ^s^{trate t}^h^eir
^ap^p^licab^ilit^y^th^{e p}^r^o^cess^m^u^st^{at least b}^e^en^g^a^g^e^d^.

Restrictions on commercial timber harvesting: Seiber v. United States, 364 F.3d 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2004)
Plaintiffs owned a 200-acre tract, almost all timberlands. In 1994, Oregon designated 40 acres of
the tract as spotted owl nesting habitat. By state law, this designation barred timber harvesting on
the 40 acres, unless plaintiffs obtained an ITP under the federal ESA (the United States had
designated the spotted owl a threatened species). The FWS found plaintiffs’ ITP application
inadequate, but said it was willing to work with them. The plaintiffs rejected this offer, and in
2000 the application was denied. The denial letter indicated, however, that several approvable
alternatives (including selective harvesting) were available to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs simply applied
for reconsideration of the denial, which was denied. In 2001, Oregon informed the plaintiffs that
it no longer opposed timbering because the owls had moved away, and in 2002, the FWS found
that an ITP was no longer needed for the same reason. The plaintiffs seek compensation for a
temporary taking, from 2000 to 2002.
Held, claim is ripe, but no taking. For purposes of this decision, the court assumes that the
federal ESA barred logging during the period of the alleged taking, without which there can be no
federal taking. The taking claim was ripe, even though the FWS identified approvable alternatives
that the plaintiffs declined to pursue. The FWS did not say it lacked enough information to grant
or deny the permit; rather, it formally denied the permit and did not allow further reconsideration.
On the merits, there was no physical taking by the presence of the owls. Nor was there a
regulatory taking: the government action did not deprive the relevant parcel (whether defined as
the 200-acre parcel, or solely the trees on the 200-acre parcel) of all economic value, and indeed,
plaintiffs made no showing of any economic injury caused by the temporary taking. Further, there
was no regulatory taking by the alternative test: failure to substantially advance a legitimate
government interest.
^C^o^mmen^t^:^T^h^{is case p}^u^{ts i}ⁿ^hⁱ^g^h^r^e^lie^f^t^h^{e u}^b^iq^u^ito^u^s^ta^kⁱⁿ^g^s^-^la^w^is^s^u^{e o}^f^h^o^w^to^d^e^fⁱⁿ^e^th^e
^“r^e^l^e^v^aⁿ^t^p^a^r^c^e^l^”^—^t^h^a^tⁱ^s^,^t^h^e^p^r^e^cⁱ^s^e^p^r^o^p^e^r^t^yⁱⁿ^t^e^r^e^s^t^t^h^a^t^t^h^e^c^o^u^r^t^w^ill^lo^o^k^atⁱⁿ^as^sessⁱⁿ^g
^th^{e i}^m^{pact o}^f^t^h^e^g^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^’^s^ac^tion^oⁿ^t^h^{e plai}ⁿ^tⁱ^f^f^.^{It does}^s^oⁱⁿ^t^w^o^w^a^y^s^.^Firs^t,^it
^requⁱ^r^es^t^h^at^t^h^{e 40 acres}^{be eval}^u^a^t^e^{d t}^o^g^e^t^h^er^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e re}^m^aⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^{160 acres}^on^t^h^{e parcel}^.
^T^hⁱ^s^w^a^s^no^nc^oⁿ^t^r^o^ve^r^sⁱ^a^l^—^s^q^ua^r^e^l^yⁱⁿ^lⁱ^ne^wi^t^h^preceden^{t. Secon}^d^{, th}^{e cou}^r^{t rais}^{ed, bu}^{t did}
ⁿ^o^t^res^o^l^v^{e, t}^h^{e i}^s^s^u^e^w^h^et^h^e^{r t}^h^{e t}ⁱ^m^b^{er on}^t^h^{e 200 acres}^cou^l^{d be}^reg^a^{rded s}^e^p^a^r^a^t^e^l^y^,^p^rⁱ^o^r
^to^h^a^r^v^estiⁿ^g^{, f}^r^o^m^t^h^{e la}ⁿ^d^oⁿ^w^h^ich^it^g^r^e^w^.
Restrictions on commercial timber harvesting: Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d

1339 (Fed. Cir. 2002)

The FWS determined that allowing Boise Cascade to log its 65-acre old-growth tract in Oregon
might harm spotted owls that would otherwise nest there. Subsequently, in October, 1998, a
district court permanently enjoined the logging until Boise obtained an ITP. While Boise’s ITP
application was pending, however, an owl living on the tract was found dead and surveys found
no other owls in the area, so the FWS said an ITP was no longer required. Accordingly, the
district court, in August, 1999, lifted the injunction. Boise seeks compensation for the temporary
taking of its merchantable timber, which it was prevented from logging during the court
injunction.
Held, no taking. The FWS never denied Boise’s ITP; the company was enjoined only from
logging without a permit. The mere imposition of a permit requirement by a regulatory agency
does not, by itself, effect a regulatory taking. Nor is there a per se physical taking by the owls; the
government is only regulating the use of the tract due to the incidental location of the owls there.

The state has no control over where the owls choose to nest. Finally, no physical taking was
caused by the requirement that Boise allow government officials to enter its land to conduct owl
surveys. The visits were brief, nonexclusive, and approved by the district court.
^C^o^mmen^t^:^T^h^{e cou}^r^t’s^refu^s^a^l^{to reg}^a^{rd th}^{e pres}^eⁿ^{ce of t}^h^e^s^{potted o}^w^ls^on^t^h^{e plai}ⁿ^tⁱ^f^f^’^s
^lan^d^as^{a phy}^sⁱ^{cal ta}^kⁱⁿ^gⁱ^sⁱⁿ^accord^wⁱ^t^h^al^m^o^s^t^ev^er^y^p^r^{ior decis}ⁱ^on^addres^sⁱⁿ^g^s^u^c^h
^ch^alleⁿ^g^e^{s to}^w^ild^li^f^e^p^r^o^t^ectioⁿ^s^{. Rat}^h^er^{, th}^{e lo}^g^gⁱⁿ^g^r^e^strⁱ^cti^oⁿ^w^a^{s d}^e^e^m^ed^to^b^e^a^t^m^o^st^a
^reg^u^l^at^or^y^t^a^ki^ng^.^A^sⁿ^o^t^e^{d, t}^a^kⁱ^ngs^pl^ai^ntⁱ^f^fs^pref^{er to cas}^{t t}^h^{eir clai}^m^s^a^s^phy^sⁱ^{cal, rath}^er
^th^an^re^g^u^l^ator^y^,^ta^kⁱⁿ^g^s^,^sⁱⁿ^{ce th}^{e f}^o^r^m^{er are tes}^t^{ed un}^{der a m}^o^{re plain}^tif^f-f^r^ieⁿ^d^l^y^s^t^an^d^a^r^d^.
Restrictions on land clearing and construction of home for personal use: Taylor v. United
States, No. 99-131 L (Fed. Cl. June 20, 2001) (unpublished)
The plaintiff planned to build a house on his residential-zoned lot. After he bought the lot, a pair
of nesting bald eagles moved onto the adjacent parcel, within 90 feet of the planned house. The
FWS informed the plaintiff that land clearing and construction on his property likely would
render the area unusable by the eagles, and that a resulting abandonment of the nest would be a
“take” pursuant to the ESA. The agency further told him that he could apply for an ITP, which
would allow the house construction to proceed. However, when the plaintiff applied, the FWS
insisted he agree to all the required mitigation before it would process the application. Plaintiff
declined, believing the demanded mitigation to be overly restrictive.
Held, claim is ripe, but no “total taking.” In an unpublished prior decision, the court held that
despite the absence of a formal denial of the permit application, the FWS’s insistent position
ripened the taking claim. In the decision here, the court holds that there is no total taking because
the ESA development restrictions do not deprive plaintiff’s property of all economic value. The
parties must present additional evidence, however, before the court can determine whether a
partial regulatory taking occurred based on the takings test for less-than-complete loss of property
value. Therefore, the parties’ motions for summary judgment are denied.
^C^o^mmen^t^:^Ulti^m^a^tel^y^{, a}ⁿ^I^T^P^w^a^{s iss}^u^ed^to^Mr^{. T}^a^y^l^o^r^,^m^eanⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{at at}^m^o^st^h^e^h^a^d^a
^te^m^porary^ta^kⁱ^ng^clai^m^.^T^h^{e c}^a^s^e^s^e^{ttled in}^A^p^{ril, 2002.}
Restrictions on filling in wetlands for commercial home construction: Good v. United States,

189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999)

In 1973, plaintiff bought a 40-acre, mostly wetlands tract in the Florida Keys, and in 1980 began
efforts to secure the federal, state, and local permits needed to construct a residential subdivision
there. Though the Corps of Engineers issued wetlands permits twice, construction did not begin
because of state and local permitting and ESA problems. Both of the Corps permits expired.
Plaintiff’s final application to the Corps, at issue here, was denied in 1994 on the ground that the
proposed project would endanger the continued existence of the Lower Keys marsh rabbit and the
silver rice rat, listed as endangered in 1990 and 1991 respectively.
Held, no taking. The plaintiff claims that the effect of the Corps’ action was to completely bar
economic use of his property—effecting a per se total taking. Even with a total taking claim,
however, a property owner must show that his reasonable investment-backed expectations were
frustrated. The plaintiff could not have had reasonable expectations when he bought the property
in 1973 that he would obtain approval to fill the wetland. By that year, the Corps had begun to
deny dredge-and-fill permits solely on environmental grounds. And plaintiff acknowledged in the
sales contract the difficulty of obtaining the necessary permits. Finally, plaintiff waited seven

years after purchasing the property before applying for permits, during which wetlands protection
and endangered species laws became increasingly stringent. While these developments do not bar
the taking claim, they reduce plaintiff’s ability to claim surprise when the permit application was
denied.
^C^o^mmen^t^:^Th^e^Go^o^d^d^ecisⁱ^on^tak^e^s^{a broad v}ⁱ^e^w^of^th^e^“n^oti^{ce ru}^le”—th^e^c^a^s^e^l^a^w^d^o^c^t^rⁱⁿ^e
^th^{at n}^o^regu^lator^y^takⁱ^ng^occurs^w^h^en^t^h^{e g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^res^t^ri^cts^{a pro}^p^erty^us^{e un}^{der a law}
^exⁱ^s^tⁱ^ng^w^h^eⁿ^t^h^{e propert}^y^w^a^s^acquⁱ^{red, or}^ev^en^{, as}ⁱⁿ^G^ood’^s^cas^{e, u}ⁿ^d^{er a l}^a^w^w^h^os^e
^adoptⁱ^oⁿ^a^fter^t^h^{e propert}^y^w^a^s^acquⁱ^{red cou}^l^{d h}^a^v^e^been^fores^een^{. Mr. G}^{ood b}^o^ught^hi^s
^w^e^t^l^aⁿ^d^s^bef^o^{re t}^h^{e ESA}^w^a^s^eⁿ^act^{ed i}ⁿⁱ^t^s^m^odern^f^o^r^m^{, an}^d^17-^{18 y}^ears^bef^o^re^t^h^e^s^p^e^cⁱ^e^s
^th^at^tr^ig^g^e^r^e^d^th^e^p^e^r^m^it^d^eⁿⁱ^a^l^w^e^r^e^li^sted^{. Ho}^w^e^v^e^r^,^a^s^m^eⁿ^t^ioⁿ^e^dⁱⁿ^Sectioⁿ^I^I^{, t}^h^eⁿ^o^tice
^ru^{le is}ⁿ^o^long^{er vie}^w^{ed as}^an^abs^o^lu^{te bar to a tak}ⁱ^ng^clai^m^.
^Th^e^G^ood^h^o^ldin^g^th^a^t^{a prope}^rt^y^buy^er’s^inv^e^s^t^m^eⁿ^t^-^b^ack^ed^ex^pectations^{are relev}^aⁿ^t
^ev^en^t^o^t^o^t^a^l^-^t^a^kⁱ^ng^cl^ai^m^s^w^a^{s con}^t^rav^eⁿ^e^{d l}^a^t^e^{r b}^y^aⁿ^opposⁱ^t^e^h^o^l^dⁱⁿ^g^o^f^aⁿ^ot^h^e^{r F}^e^deral
^Cir^c^u^{it p}^aⁿ^e^{l, h}^o^ldⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{at ex}^p^ectatioⁿ^s^ar^{e ir}^r^e^lev^aⁿ^t^to^{a to}^tal-^ta^kⁱⁿ^g^clai^m^.^{Palm Beach}
^Is^l^e^s^Ass^o^cs^{. v. U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^{d St}^at^es^{, 208 F}^.^3d¹³⁷^{4, 13}^{79 n}^.^{3 (F}^{ed. C}ⁱ^r.),^and^{on petition for}
^r^e^hearⁱⁿ^g^{, 231 F}^.^{3d 135}^{4 (F}^{ed. C}ⁱ^{r. 2000). S}ⁱⁿ^{ce t}^h^{e deci}^sⁱ^on^sⁱⁿ^{Palm Beach Is}^les^{, th}^e
^Co^ur^t^o^f^Fe^d^e^r^a^l^Cl^aⁱ^ms^aⁿ^d^F^e^d^e^r^a^l^Ci^r^c^ui^t^ge^ne^r^a^l^l^y^ha^ve^f^o^l^l^o^w^e^d^t^h^e^{Palm Beach Is}^le^s
^approach^.^{See C}^a^{ne T}^e^nnes^s^{ee, Inc. v.}^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^{d St}^at^es^,^{62 F}^e^d.^C^l^{. 703, 7}^11-⁷¹⁶⁽²⁰^04).
Deletion of area from timber sale contract: Janicki Logging Co. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl.

338 (1996), affirmed without published opinion, 124 F.3d 226 (Fed. Cir. 1997)

Plaintiff entered into a contract with the U.S. Forest Service allowing plaintiff to remove timber
from areas within a national forest. Subsequently, the Forest Service deleted an area from the
contract, citing the discovery of a northern spotted owl nest there. Plaintiffs claim a taking of its
contract right.
Held, no taking. The Forest Service did not abrogate or repudiate any of its obligations under the
contract, nor impair plaintiff’s rights to enforce such obligations. Rather, the Service, acting in a
proprietary rather than sovereign capacity, sought to exercise its rights under the contract and
never suggested it was not bound by the contract. Thus, this case is “nothing more than a garden
variety contract dispute.” (Elsewhere in the opinion, the contract claim was dismissed as
untimely.)
Restrictions on commercial construction: Four Points Utility Joint Venture v. United States,

40 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1509 (W.D. Tex. 1994)

Plaintiffs-developers alleged that to protect endangered and threatened birds in the area, the
United States “by coercion and by threatening criminal penalties” attempted to prevent the
building of a multi-use development in Austin, Texas. (The FWS took no formal action to block
the development.) Plaintiffs believed that no ESA take of a protected species would occur, and so
did not apply for an ITP. They assert a Fifth Amendment taking.
Held, claim is not ripe. The plaintiffs must apply for an ITP and receive a final determination
before the court may consider their claims. What plaintiffs really seek is a court determination
that their development will not involve an ESA take, and an injunction barring the United States
from blocking it. This court will not preempt the FWS’s responsibility to make the initial ruling
regarding species protection under the ESA.

Reduction by United States in irrigation water that water district was allowed to divert
from river: Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
In 1997, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) listed the West Coast steelhead trout as
endangered. In response, the water district, operator of the Bureau of Reclamation’s Ventura
River Project, requested the Bureau to initiate a section 7 consultation with the NMFS. The result
was revised operating criteria for the Project to augment river flow for the endangered fish. Under
these new criteria, the water district had to forego exercising its appropriative water right to up to
3,200 acre-feet of water per year from the river for irrigation purposes. In the compliance option
chosen by the district or by NMFS (the facts are unclear on this), water already diverted from the
river by a Project dam and canal was rediverted to a fish passage facility that returned the water
back to the river.
Held, to be analyzed as a physical, not regulatory, taking. Three Supreme Court opinions (1931
to 1963) hold that when the U.S. physically diverts water away from plaintiff’s property, or
causes the water to be so diverted, a physical taking occurs. The government says these cases are
distinguishable since all that is involved with Casitas is a restriction on the use of water –
appropriately analyzed as a regulatory taking. This position must be rejected – the government
did not merely require some water to remain in the stream, but instead caused the physical
diversion of water away from the canal to the fish ladder, reducing Casitas’s water supply. The
government’s position that in contrast to the Supreme Court trilogy, the U.S. did not divert the
water for its own use or for use by a third party must also be rejected: preservation of endangered
species habitat is for government and third party (the public) use. Finally, the sharp distinction
made in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302 (2002), between regulatory and physical takings is not relevant here; that case did not involve
a physical taking claim.
^C^o^mmen^t^:^T^h^{e decis}ⁱ^on^doesⁿ^o^{t actu}^a^ll^y^fⁱⁿ^d^{a phy}^sⁱ^cal^ta^kⁱ^ng^{, but rath}^{er re}^m^aⁿ^d^s^{to the}
^{trial cou}^r^{t f}^o^{r f}^u^rth^e^{r proceedin}^g^s^on^{a phy}^sⁱ^cal^taking^th^eor^y^.^Non^e^th^ele^s^s^,^un^{der a ph}^y^sⁱ^c^al
^takⁱⁿ^g^t^h^eor^y^th^{e plai}ⁿ^tⁱ^f^f^is^al^m^o^s^t^s^u^{re to}^wⁱⁿ^,^un^les^s^th^{e U.}^{S. can}^con^vⁱⁿ^{ce t}^h^{e trial cou}^r^t
^th^at^w^a^ter^rⁱ^g^h^{ts i}ⁿ^Cali^f^o^rⁿ^ia^ar^{e so}^coⁿ^d^itioⁿ^a^{l (}^e^.^g^{., d}^u^e^to^th^{e s}^t^ate’^{s p}^u^b^lic^tr^u^s^{t o}^r
^reas^on^{able u}^s^{e doctrin}^es^{) t}^h^at^th^e^w^a^{ter div}^e^rs^io^{n t}^o^o^k^no^rⁱ^ght^t^h^e^p^l^aⁱⁿ^tⁱ^f^{f e}^v^e^r^ha^d^.^N^o^r
^m^a^y^t^h^{e case g}^e^{t b}^ack^to^th^{e tri}^a^{l co}^u^r^{t if}^th^{e U.S. is s}^u^cces^sfu^lⁱⁿ^{its p}^e^titioⁿ^,^fⁱ^l^e^d^D^e^c^e^m^b^e^r
^{10, 2}^008,^t^o^h^a^v^e^t^h^{e cas}^{e reheard by}^t^h^{e e}ⁿ^ban^c^F^e^deral^Cⁱ^rcuⁱ^t^.
^T^h^e^r^u^l^e^s^go^ve^rⁿⁱⁿ^g^w^hⁱ^c^h^go^ve^rⁿ^me^nt^a^c^tⁱ^o^{ns a}^r^e^t^o^b^e^aⁿ^a^l^y^z^e^d^a^s^p^h^ysi^c^a^l^t^a^kiⁿ^g^s,^aⁿ^d
^w^h^ic^h^as^reg^u^lator^y^takⁱ^ng^s^,^{are a recu}^rrin^g^is^s^u^{e. T}^h^{e is}^s^u^{e is}^piv^o^t^a^l^,^sⁱⁿ^c^e^a^t^a^kⁱⁿ^g^p^l^aⁱⁿ^t^if^f
^is^m^u^ch^m^o^r^e^lik^el^y^to^wⁱⁿ^uⁿ^d^e^r^{a p}^h^y^s^ica^l^th^eo^r^y^{. I}ⁿ^Ca^sit^a^s^{, th}^{e tr}^{ial co}^u^r^{t j}^u^d^g^{e h}^a^d^to
^{decide w}^h^et^h^e^{r h}ⁱ^s^{earlier ch}^{aracterization}ⁱⁿ^Tu^la^{re La}^ke⁽^s^e^e^b^e^l^o^w⁾^o^f^aⁿ^E^S^A^-^m^aⁿ^d^a^t^e^d
^r^e^d^u^c^tⁱ^o^{n i}ⁿ^w^a^t^e^r^d^e^lⁱ^v^e^r^y^a^s^a^p^h^y^si^c^a^l^t^a^ki^ng^go^ve^rⁿ^e^d^he^r^e^a^s^w^e^l^l^.^H^e^h^e^l^d^t^h^atⁱ^t^di^dⁿ^o^t^,
^o^wⁱⁿ^g^to^th^e^S^u^p^r^e^m^e^Co^u^r^t^’^sⁱⁿ^ter^v^enⁱⁿ^g^d^ecisⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^T^a^hoe-Si^e^r^r^aⁿ^o^t^e^{d abov}^{e, an}^d
^con^c^l^u^{ded t}^h^at^Ca^s^ita^s^w^a^s^{to be an}^al^y^{zed on}^{a reg}^u^l^ator^y^ta^kin^g^th^e^o^ry^.^Thⁱ^s^l^e^d^t^h^e^F^e^d^e^r^a^l
^Cir^c^u^{it, i}ⁿ^th^e^Ca^sita^s^{appeal, to add}^r^es^s^T^ahoe-Si^e^r^r^a^a^t^s^o^m^e^l^e^ngt^h—^c^o^nc^l^u^dⁱⁿ^g^,^a^s^no^t^e^d
^abov^{e, th}^at^T^ahoe-Si^e^r^r^aⁱⁿ^no^w^a^y^uⁿ^d^e^r^c^ut^t^h^e^S^u^p^r^e^m^e^Co^ur^t^’^{s p}^h^y^si^c^a^l^dⁱ^versi^oⁿ^t^rⁱ^l^ogy
^an^{d its}^ch^{aracterization}^of^s^u^c^h^div^e^rs^ion^s^as^phy^sⁱ^ca^{l tak}ⁱ^ng^s^.^B^u^{t becau}^s^e^Tu^la^{re La}^ke^wa^s
^{a prev}^en^tioⁿ^of^w^a^{ter us}^{e cas}^e^,^rath^{er th}^aⁿ^{a p}^h^y^s^{ical di}^v^e^rsⁱ^oⁿ^cas^{e, t}^h^{e Federal C}ⁱ^rcu^itⁱⁿ

^Ca^sita^s^(f^ootⁿ^o^t^e^{16) ex}^pres^s^l^y^di^s^c^l^aⁱ^m^{ed any}^co^m^m^eⁿ^t^on^w^h^et^h^e^r^Tu^la^re^w^a^s^correctly
^deci^ded.
Reduction in irrigation contract water delivered by United States: Klamath Irrigation
District v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504 (2005)
During a drought in 2001, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation terminated delivery of irrigation water
from its Klamath Project in northern California and southern Oregon, to ensure lake levels and
river flows sufficient to protect three fish species listed under the ESA. Plaintiffs, various
agricultural landowners and water, drainage, or irrigation districts in the Klamath River Basin, all
had been receiving water from the Project.
Held, no taking. There was no taking of plaintiffs’ water rights. Plaintiffs’ interests in Klamath
Project water fall into two broad categories. As to those based on water delivery contracts with
the Bureau of Reclamation, the traditional reasons for favoring a breach of contract approach over
a takings approach apply—the United States acted in its proprietary, not sovereign, capacity in
entering into the contracts, and the plaintiffs retain the full panoply of remedies to vindicate their
contract rights. Because the individual-irrigator plaintiffs are third-party beneficiaries of the
contracts with the water districts, their claims, too, sound in contract, not takings. (While not
resolving the contract claims in this decision, the court suggested reasons why they were unlikely
to succeed.)
The remaining water rights asserted by plaintiffs are based on patent deeds from the United States
for federal land in Oregon, and state water permits from Oregon. However, these rights, assuming
they exist, were established well after the 1905 appropriation of the Klamath waters by the United
States. The United States is thus the senior right holder under the prior appropriation doctrine
used in Oregon, allowing it to insist that junior right holders, such as the plaintiffs, curtail their
use as necessary for the United States to satisfy its senior rights.
^C^o^mmen^t^:^In^a^l^a^t^e^{r deci}^sⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^t^h^{e cas}^e,^{75 F}^e^{d. C}^l^{. 677 (F}^e^d^{. C}^l^{. 2007), t}^h^{e cou}^r^t^rej^ect^ed
^th^{e plain}^tⁱ^ff’^s^breach^of^con^t^{ract clai}^m^as^w^e^{ll. On}^{appeal, th}^{e Federal C}ⁱ^rcu^{it determ}ⁱⁿ^ed
^th^{at r}^e^so^l^u^tioⁿ^o^f^th^{e ta}^kⁱⁿ^g^clai^m^hⁱⁿ^g^e^{s o}ⁿ^co^m^p^le^x^is^s^u^{es o}^f^Flo^r^id^{a p}^r^o^p^e^r^t^y^la^w^;
^accordin^g^l^y^,^on^a^2-¹^v^o^{te, it}^c^e^rtif^{ied t}^h^{ree qu}^e^s^tions^o^f^Ore^g^on^propert^y^la^w^{to t}^h^e^Oreg^oⁿ
^S^u^pre^m^e^C^o^u^r^t^.^{532 F}^.^3d¹³⁷^{6 (F}^{ed. C}ⁱ^{r. 2}⁰⁰⁸⁾^.
Reduction in irrigation contract water delivered by state: Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
District v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001)
During a drought in 1992-1994, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation reduced the amount of water
pumped from the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta in California, in order to ensure flows sufficient
to protect two fish species listed under the ESA. The result of the reduced pumping was to reduce
the water available to the interconnected California State Water Project—which project, in turn,
reduced the water delivered to two of the plaintiffs, who had water-delivery contracts with the
state. Other plaintiffs in the case received less water under their water-delivery contracts with
these two plaintiffs.
Held, a taking. There was a taking of the plaintiffs’ right to use the water, in the amount of the
reduction. The plaintiffs’ contracts with the state conferred a right to the exclusive use of
prescribed quantities of water. Thus, a mere restriction on use (as to the water not delivered)
completely eviscerates the right to that amount of water, and constitutes a physical taking. The
federal government has essentially substituted itself as the beneficiary of the contract right and

totally displaced the contract holder. And plaintiffs’ state contracts hold harmless for reduced
water delivery only the state, not the United States. Finally, background principles of state law
(public trust doctrine, doctrine of reasonable use, and nuisance law) do not limit plaintiffs’ right to
use the water, since that right was defined by their contracts and the state’s water allocation
scheme. The state may change the contracts and its water allocation scheme to reflect these state-
law background principles, but critically here, it chose not to do so in the 1992-1994 period.
^C^o^mmen^t^:^In^Dece^m^b^{er, 2004, plain}^tiff^s^aⁿ^{d th}^{e U}ⁿ^{ited St}^ates^s^e^{ttled t}^h^{e cas}^e^f^o^{r $16.}⁷
^m^illioⁿ^.^T^h^{e settle}^m^eⁿ^t^ag^r^e^e^m^en^{t p}^r^o^v^id^{es th}^{at it “s}^h^a^{ll n}^o^t^b^e^c^oⁿ^s^t^r^u^e^d^a^s^aⁿ^a^d^mⁱ^ssⁱ^oⁿ^b^y
^Def^eⁿ^d^an^{t of}^aⁿ^y^{... liabilit}^y^a^s^{to any}^{or all of}^t^h^{e P}^l^ain^tⁱ^f^f^’^s^clai^m^s^f^o^{r liabilit}^y^.^”
^Tu^la^{re La}^ke^g^eⁿ^e^r^a^ted^h^ead^liⁿ^e^{s f}^o^r^sev^e^r^a^{l r}^easoⁿ^s^{. Fir}^s^{t, it i}ⁿ^v^o^l^v^ed^ES^A^-^b^a^sed^cu^tb^ack^s
ⁱⁿ^d^e^li^v^e^r^y^o^f^ir^rⁱ^g^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^w^a^te^r^,^{a h}ⁱ^g^h^l^y^e^m^o^tioⁿ^a^l^iss^u^{e i}ⁿ^t^h^{e W}^e^{st a}ⁿ^d^oⁿ^{e t}^h^at^h^a^s
^g^eⁿ^e^r^a^ted^o^t^h^e^r^takⁱⁿ^g^{s s}^u^it^{s n}^o^t^edⁱⁿ^th^{is r}^e^p^o^r^{t. Mo}^r^e^o^v^er^{, a}^t^th^{e ti}^m^e^it^w^a^{s d}^ecid^e^d^{it w}^a^s
^th^e^onl^y^co^u^r^{t d}^eci^sioⁿⁱⁿ^v^o^lvⁱⁿ^g^any^ES^A^circ^um^s^t^aⁿ^{ce t}^h^a^t^f^o^uⁿ^d^a^takⁱ^ng^{. Secon}^d^{, t}^h^e
^co^u^r^t’^{s r}^a^tioⁿ^a^{le in}^cl^u^d^ed^so^m^e^coⁿ^t^r^o^v^e^r^s^{ial co}ⁿ^c^lu^sioⁿ^s^—e^.g^{., th}^{at a r}^e^g^u^l^a^t^o^r^y^r^e^s^t^rⁱ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ
^ef^f^e^c^t^{ed a}^physⁱ^cal^takⁱⁿ^g^,^{and th}^{at th}^{e plain}^tⁱ^f^f^s^acquⁱ^{red g}^r^{eater rig}^h^t^s^ag^aiⁿ^s^{t t}^h^{e U.S.}
^uⁿ^d^{er t}^h^{eir contracts}^wⁱ^{th t}^h^{e s}^t^{ate th}^aⁿ^th^e^y^h^a^{d ag}^aⁱ^ns^{t t}^h^e^s^t^{ate. T}^h^{ird (an}^d^{related to th}^e
^s^econ^d^{), th}^e^Depart^m^eⁿ^t^of^J^u^s^tice^h^a^{d receiv}^e^d^{at lea}^s^t^f^o^u^r^letters^f^r^o^m^ot^h^e^r^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t
^a^g^eⁿ^cⁱ^e^s^—^t^w^o^fr^o^m^t^h^e^N^a^tⁱ^o^na^l^M^a^rⁱ^ne^Fⁱ^s^h^e^rⁱ^e^s^Serv^{ice, a}ⁿ^{d on}^{e each}^f^r^o^m^t^h^{e C}^a^li^f^o^rnⁱ^a
^A^tto^rⁿ^e^y^Geⁿ^e^r^a^l^’^{s O}^f^fⁱ^{ce a}ⁿ^d^th^{e Ca}^lif^o^rⁿⁱ^{a W}^a^ter^Reso^u^r^{ces Co}ⁿ^t^r^o^{l B}^o^ar^d^—^u^r^gⁱⁿ^g^t^h^e
^Dep^a^r^t^m^eⁿ^tⁿ^o^{t to}^{settle, b}^u^{t to}^ap^p^eal.^T^h^{e Calif}^o^rⁿⁱ^{a lett}^er^{s ad}^d^itioⁿ^a^ll^y^asser^t^ed^th^at
^Tu^la^{re La}^ke^mⁱ^s^c^h^a^{racterized th}^{e s}^t^ate^’^s^w^a^{ter la}^w^,^an^{d u}^r^g^e^{d J}^u^s^{tice on}^{appeal t}^o^re^qu^es^t
^cer^tif^icatioⁿ^o^f^th^e^state^w^a^ter^la^wⁱ^s^s^u^{es i}ⁿ^th^{e ca}^{se to}^th^e^Cali^f^o^rⁿ^{ia h}ⁱ^g^h^co^u^r^{t. Fi}ⁿ^a^ll^y^,
^s^e^v^e^r^a^l^M^e^m^b^e^r^s^o^f^C^a^lⁱ^f^o^rⁿⁱ^a^’^s^c^oⁿ^g^r^e^ss^ioⁿ^a^{l d}^e^leg^a^tioⁿ^to^o^k^p^u^b^{lic p}^o^s^itioⁿ^s^oⁿ^t^h^{e p}^r^o^p^e^r
^co^u^r^{se o}^f^actioⁿ^f^o^r^th^{e Dep}^a^r^t^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^J^u^st^ice—^w^h^et^h^e^r^to^{settle o}^r^ap^p^eal.
^Th^e^Tu^la^{re La}^ke^d^ecisioⁿ^w^a^{s p}^oⁱⁿ^t^ed^l^y^cr^iticized^b^y^t^h^r^{ee later}^d^ecisioⁿ^s,^K^l^am^at^h
^Ir^rⁱ^gatⁱ^{on D}ⁱ^s^t^{. v. U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^d^St^at^e^s^{, 67 F}^e^d.^C^l^{. 504}^{, 5}^37-⁵³⁸⁽²⁰^05),^A^l^l^e^g^r^e^t^tⁱ^&^C^o^{. v. C}^ount^y
^of^Im^perⁱ^al^{, 42 C}^a^l^.^R^p^t^r^{. 3d}¹^{22, 1}^29-^{132 (C}^al^{. A}^{pp. 20}^06),^an^d^Meeker^{v. Belr}^idge^W^a^ter⁴⁸
^St^or^{age D}ⁱ^s^t^{., 20}^{06 U}^.^S^.^Dⁱ^s^t^{. L}^E^X^I^S^{91774, at}^*^{36 (E.}^D^{. C}^a^l^.^Jan^.^{17, 2}⁰⁰⁶^).^It^s
^ch^{aracterization}^of^t^h^{e redu}^ce^d^w^a^{ter deliv}^er^y^as^{a phy}^sⁱ^ca^{l, rath}^{er th}^an^regu^lator^y^{, ta}^kⁱⁿ^g
^w^a^s^als^o^s^u^bs^eq^u^eⁿ^t^l^y^repu^diat^{ed by}^th^{e j}^u^dg^e^w^h^o^w^r^{ote th}^{e decis}ⁱ^on^–^s^e^e^C^o^m^m^eⁿ^t^uⁿ^d^e^r
^C^a^sⁱ^t^a^s^M^uni^ci^pal^W^a^t^e^r^Dⁱ^s^t^ri^ct^{v. U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^d^St^at^es^,^s^upr^a^p^a^ges^14-^{15, f}^o^{r f}^u^rt^h^e^{r di}^s^c^u^s^sⁱ^on^.
Reduction in irrigation contract water delivered by United States: Barcellos and Wolfsen,
Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 849 F. Supp. 717 (E.D. Cal. 1993), affirmed sub nom. O’Neill v. ^th
United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9 Cir. 1995)
During a drought in 1993-1994, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation reduced the amount of water
pumped to certain water users from the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta in California, in part to
ensure flows sufficient to protect two fish species listed under the ESA. The result of the reduced
pumping was that plaintiffs, landowners and water users within the Westlands Water District,
received up to 50% less water than the amount otherwise available under Westlands’ contract with
the United States.
Held, no taking.⁴⁹ The fact that the Westlands contract was entered into before enactment of the
ESA and another statute does not mean that application of those statutes to modify the contract

⁴⁸^S^{ee a}^l^so^Me^lin^da^H^.^B^e^ns^on,^T^h^e^Tul^a^re^Case^{: W}^a^te^{r Ri}^ghts,^The^En^d^aⁿ^g^e^r^e^d^S^p^e^cⁱ^e^s^Ac^{t, a}^{nd t}^h^e^Fifth
^Am^e^ndm^eⁿ^t^{, 32}^E^NVT^L^.^L^.^{551 (}²⁰⁰²⁾^.
⁴⁹⁸⁴^{9 F}^.^S^u^p^p^{. a}^t⁷³^{0. I}^t^isⁿ^o^t^eⁿ^ti^re^ly^cl^ear^f^r^o^m^t^h^{e co}^u^r^t^’^s^b^rⁱ^e^f^dⁱ^scu^ssi^oⁿ^t^h^at^t^h^e^p^l^ai^ntⁱ^f^f^s^{were r}^aⁱ^sⁱⁿ^{g a t}^a^kiⁿ^g
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

was a taking of contract rights and violation of due process. (These issues were not reached in the
decision on appeal.)

Livestock killed by listed predators: Gordon v. Norton, 322 F.3d 1213 (10^th Cir. 2003)
In 1994, the Secretary of the Interior adopted an updated Northern Rocky Mountain Wolf
Recovery Plan, under which gray wolves were introduced near plaintiff’s ranch. From 1997 to
1998, and despite the efforts of FWS and state officials, a number of cattle, and some dogs, were
killed by wolves at plaintiff’s ranch.
Held, no jurisdiction. Because compensation for any taking by the United States is available in ⁵⁰
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act, the district court below lacked
jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s taking claim. The Supreme Court decision in Eastern Enterprises v.
Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), in which a plurality approved district court jurisdiction over a taking
claim against the United States, is easily distinguished as involving an alleged taking based on
monetary liability. Here, by contrast, we deal with an alleged taking of physical things; hence,
there is no reason to reverse the presumption of Tucker Act availability.
Livestock killed by listed predators: Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9^th Cir. 1988)
In 1982, grizzly bears began attacking Christy’s herd of sheep, which he grazed on leased land in
Montana. By July 9, the bears had killed about 20 sheep. That evening, Christy shot and killed a
grizzly bear moving toward his herd. The FWS’s efforts to catch the bears were unsuccessful,
with the result that Christy lost a total of 84 sheep to the bears by the time he removed his sheep
from the leased land. The Department of the Interior assessed a $3,000 civil penalty against
Christy for killing the bear, grizzlies being a threatened species under the ESA. A Department
administrative law judge reduced the fine to $2,500.
Held, no taking. Undoubtedly, the bears had physically taken the sheep, but such takings cannot
be attributed to the federal government. Case law generally rejects the proposition that the
government is answerable for the conduct of protected wildlife prior to their being reduced to
possession by capture, which did not occur here. Neither is there a regulatory taking: the losses
sustained by the plaintiffs are merely the incidental result of reasonable regulation.
^Co^mmeⁿ^t^:^Ch^risty^r^e^m^aⁱⁿ^s^t^h^e^l^e^a^dⁱ^{ng d}^e^cⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^for^th^e^propos^ition^th^{at g}^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^li^mⁱ^t^s^on
^th^{e def}^eⁿ^sⁱ^v^e^m^e^a^s^u^r^es^a^v^ailab^l^{e to pr}^{otect on}^e’^s^prop^e^r^t^y^a^g^aiⁿ^s^t^m^a^r^a^u^dⁱⁿ^g^an^im^a^l^s^a^r^eⁿ^o^t
^takⁱⁿ^g^s^.^P^r^ope^rty^righ^t^s^adv^o^cates^w^e^{re h}^earteⁿ^e^{d b}^y^J^u^s^tice^W^h^ite’s^dis^s^eⁿ^t^f^r^om^th^e^d^eⁿⁱ^al
^o^f^c^e^r^tⁱ^o^r^a^rⁱ^,ⁱⁿ^w^hⁱ^c^h^he^a^s^ke^d^w^h^e^t^he^r^“a^G^o^ve^rⁿ^m^e^nt^e^dⁱ^c^t^b^a^r^rⁱ^{ng o}ⁿ^e^fr^o^m^r^e^si^stⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^e

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^cl^ai^mⁱⁿ^ad^dⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^t^h^ei^{r du}^{e p}^r^o^{cess cl}^ai^m^.
⁵⁰^{28 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹⁴⁹¹^.

^l^o^s^s^{of on}^e^’^{s propert}^yⁱ^s^t^h^{e co}ⁿ^s^tⁱ^t^u^tⁱ^on^al^eq^uⁱ^v^a^l^eⁿ^t^{of an edi}^c^t^t^a^ki^ng^s^u^c^h^propert^yⁱⁿ^t^h^e
^fⁱ^rs^{t place.” 490 U.S}^.^{at 1115-}^{1116. H}^o^w^e^v^e^{r, late}^{r cou}^r^{t de}^cisⁱ^ons^h^a^v^eⁿ^o^{t pick}^{ed u}^p^on
^J^u^s^{tice W}^h^ite^’^s^lⁱⁿ^e^o^f^an^al^y^sⁱ^s^.

Interstate commercial transport of endangered species: United States v. Kepler, 531 F.2d 796, ^th

797 (6 Cir. 1976)

As of the ESA’s effective date in 1973, Kepler allegedly held several animals for purposes lawful
under the ESA. Thereafter, he transported two of them, a cougar and a leopard, from Florida to
the “Dogpatch Zoo” in Kentucky—where he was arrested and the animals seized by Department
of the Interior agents. He was later convicted of violating the ESA ban against interstate transport ⁵¹
of endangered species in the course of a commercial activity.
Held, no taking. There is no taking by virtue of plaintiff’s animals being seized and his being
subject to criminal prosecution for the attempted sale of them. The ESA does not prevent all sales
of endangered wildlife, only those in interstate or foreign commerce. The act does not reach
intrastate sales, and presumably Kepler could have sold the animals in Florida. In addition, ESA
section 10 allows the interstate transport or sale of endangered animals if the Secretary of the
Interior approves it for scientific purposes. These remaining uses of the animals deflect the taking
claim.
Sale of endangered species parts: United States v. Hill, 896 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Colo. 1995)
A criminal indictment charged Hill with the sale of parts of various endangered species (black
rhinoceros, tiger, clouded leopard, and snow leopard), in violation of the ESA and other wildlife
protection statutes. He moved to dismiss all counts on the ground that the ESA and the other
statutes are, as applied here, an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment.
Held, no taking. There was no taking of Hill’s property interest in these animal parts. He has not
been denied all economic use of his property, since personal property may have value or generate
income in ways other than by sale. Further, the ESA permits one to sell endangered and ⁵²
threatened species if one obtains a permit under section 10(a) of the act. Finally, at the time Hill
acquired the animal parts in the early 1980s, they were already subject to the ESA proscriptions at
issue here. Therefore, he obtained no property right to sell the animals and so lost no right for
which he can claim compensation.
^C^o^mmen^t^:^T^h^{is d}^ecisioⁿ^r^e^{lies in}^p^a^r^t^oⁿ^Andr^us^v.^Al^l^a^r^d^,⁴⁴⁴^U^.^S.⁵¹⁽¹⁹⁷⁹⁾^,^t^h^e^on^l^y^U^.^S^.
^S^u^pre^m^e^C^o^u^r^t^Fⁱ^f^t^h^A^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^t^t^a^ki^ng^{s deci}^sⁱ^{on t}^h^at^di^rect^l^y^deal^s^wⁱ^t^h^wⁱ^l^d^lⁱ^f^e
^prot^ectⁱ^oⁿ^.^Andr^usⁱⁿ^v^o^lv^{ed the Eag}^l^{e P}^r^otection^A^c^{t an}^{d Mig}^r^ator^y^Bⁱ^rd^T^r^eaty^A^c^t,^w^h^ich
^b^aⁿ^co^m^m^e^r^c^{ial tr}^an^sac^tioⁿ^sⁱⁿ^bⁱ^r^d^p^a^r^t^{s ev}^enⁱ^f^th^e^y^w^e^r^e^la^w^f^u^l^l^y^acq^uⁱ^r^e^d^p^r^io^r^to^th^e
^ban^.^T^h^{e C}^o^u^r^t^f^o^uⁿ^dⁿ^o^t^a^kⁱ^ng^{, ex}^pl^aiⁿⁱ^ng^t^h^a^t^w^hⁱ^l^e^t^h^{e ban}^f^o^recl^os^{ed t}^h^e^m^o^st^profⁱ^t^a^b^l^e
^u^s^{e of}^t^h^{e bi}^{rd part}^s^(s^al^e),^ot^h^e^{r u}^s^es^{, i}ⁿ^cl^u^dⁱⁿ^g^pos^s^e^s^sⁱ^on^{, t}^r^aⁿ^s^port^,^don^atⁱ^oⁿ^,^or
^ex^hⁱ^bitⁱ^on^f^o^{r an}^ad^mⁱ^s^s^ions^c^h^arg^e^{, re}^m^aⁱⁿ^{ed to th}^{e plai}ⁿ^tⁱ^f^f^s^.

⁵¹^ESA^§⁹⁽^a)(1⁾⁽^E).
⁵²^{16 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹⁵³⁹⁽^a⁾^.

^R^obert^Mel^t^z
^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^at^iv^{e A}^t^torn^e^y
^r^m^el^t^z^@^c^rs^.l^oc.g^ov^{, 7-}⁷⁸⁹¹