USA Patriot Act Sunset: Provisions That Were to Expire on December 31, 2005

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

Several sections of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act (the act) and one section of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act each relating to enhanced foreign intelligence and law
enforcement surveillance authority were to expire on December 31, 2005; their expiration date
has been postponed until March 10, 2006. The authority remains in effect only with respect to
foreign intelligence investigations begun before sunset or to offenses or potential offense begun
or occurring before that date. Aside from the fact there may be some disagreement of whether a
“potential offense” is a suspected crime, and/or an incomplete crime, and/or a future crime, after
March 10, 2006 the law reverts to its previous form unless it has been amended or extended in the
interim.
The consequences of sunset are not the same for every expiring section. In some instances the
temporary provision has been replaced with a permanent one; in some, other provisions have
been made temporary by attachment to an expiring section; in still others, the apparent impact of
termination has been mitigated by related provisions either in the act or elsewhere.
The temporary provisions are: sections 201 (wiretapping in terrorism cases), 202 (wiretapping in
computer fraud and abuse felony cases), 203(b) (sharing wiretap information), 203(d) (sharing
foreign intelligence information), 204 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) pen
register/trap & trace exceptions), 206 (roving FISA wiretaps), 207 (duration of FISA surveillance
of non-United States persons who are agents of a foreign power), 209 (seizure of voice-mail
messages pursuant to warrants), 212 (emergency disclosure of electronic surveillance), 214 (FISA
pen register/ trap and trace authority), 215 (FISA access to tangible items), 217 (interception of
computer trespasser communications), 218 (purpose for FISA orders), 220 (nationwide service of
search warrants for electronic evidence), 223 (civil liability and discipline for privacy violations),
and 225 (provider immunity for FISA wiretap assistance); and in the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act, section 6001 (“lone wolf” FISA orders).
The unimpaired provisions of Title II are: sections 203(a)(sharing grand jury information),

203(c)(procedures for grand jury and wiretap information sharing that identifies U.S. persons),

205 (employment of translators by the Federal Bureau of Investigation), 208 (adding 3 judges to
FISA court), 210 (access to payment source information from communications providers), 211
(communications services by cable companies), 213 (sneak and peek warrants), 216 (law
enforcement pen register/ trap and trace changes), 219 (single-jurisdiction search warrants for
terrorism), 221 (trade sanctions), and 222 (provider assistance to law enforcement agencies). This
report is available in an abridged version (without its footnotes, chart, and most of its citations to
authority) as CRS Report RS21704, USA PATRIOT Act Sunset: A Sketch. Related reports include
CRS Report RL33239, USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (H.R.
3199): Section-by-Section Analysis of the Conference Bill, and CRS Report RS22348, USA
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (H.R. 3199): A Brief Look).

Introduc tion ............................................................................................................................... 1
Impact of Sunset........................................................................................................................2
Temporary Law Enforcement Sections of Title II.....................................................................3
Sections 201 (Authority to Intercept Wire, Oral, and Electronic Communications
Relating to Terrorism) and 202 (Authority to Intercept Wire, Oral, and
Electronic Communications Relating to Computer Fraud and Abuse Offenses).............4
Subsections 203(b) (Authority to Share Electronic, Wire, and Oral Interception
Information) and 203(d) (General Authority to Share Foreign Intelligence
Infor mation) ................................................................................................................... .. 7
Section 204 (Clarification of Intelligence Exceptions from Limitations on
Interception and Disclosure of Wire, Oral, and Electronic Communications)..............13
Section 209 (Seizure of Voice-mail Messages Pursuant to Warrants)..............................14
Section 212 (Emergency Disclosure of Electronic Surveillance).....................................16
Section 217 (Interception of Computer Trespasser Communications).............................18
Section 220 (Nationwide Service of Search Warrants for Electronic Evidence)..............21
Section 223 (Civil Liability for Certain Unauthorized Disclosures)................................24
Temporary Foreign Intelligence Sections................................................................................26
Section 206 (Roving Surveillance Authority under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978)..............................................................................................27
Section 207 (Duration of FISA Surveillance of Non-United States Persons Who
Are Agents of a Foreign Power)....................................................................................29
Section 214 (Pen Register and Trap and Trace Authority under FISA)............................32
Section 215 (Access to Records and Other Items under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act)...........................................................................................................34
Section 218 (Foreign Intelligence Information (“The Wall”))..........................................37
Section 223 (Civil Liability for Certain Unauthorized Disclosures)................................44
Section 225 (Immunity for Compliance with FISA Wiretap)...........................................44
Section 6001 of P.L. 108-458 (Individual Terrorists as Agents of Foreign Powers).........46
USA PATRIOT Act Sections of Title II That Do Not Expire..................................................48
Table 1. Expiring USA PATRIOT Act Sections and Subsections..................................................49
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................51

⁽^a⁾^Iⁿ^Gen^e^r^a^l.—Ex^cep^{t as p}^r^o^v^id^edⁱⁿ^su^b^s^ectioⁿ⁽^b⁾^,^th^{is title an}^d^th^{e a}^m^eⁿ^d^m^en^t^s
^m^a^{de b}^y^thⁱ^s^{title (oth}^{er t}^h^an^s^e^ction^s^{203(a) 20}^3(c),²⁰^{5, 2}^08,^210,²¹^{1, 2}^13,^216,²¹^{9, 2}²¹^,
^an^{d 222, an}^{d t}^h^{e a}^m^eⁿ^d^m^eⁿ^t^s^m^a^{de b}^y^t^h^os^e^s^ectⁱ^ons^{) sh}^al^l^cea^s^e^t^o^h^a^v^e^eff^ect^oⁿ
^D^ece^m^b^{er 31, 20}^05.
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^beg^aⁿ^bef^o^{re th}^{e date on}^w^h^ic^h^th^{e prov}^is^ion^s^re^f^e^{rred to in}^s^u^bs^ectioⁿ^{(a) ceas}^{e to h}^a^v^e
^ef^f^e^c^t^{, or}^wⁱ^t^h^res^p^{ect to any}^particu^l^{ar off}^e^ns^{e or}^pot^entⁱ^a^l^o^f^f^e^ns^{e t}^h^at^beg^aⁿ^{or occu}^rred
^bef^o^{re th}^{e date on}^w^h^ic^h^s^u^ch^prov^is^ion^s^ceas^{e to h}^a^v^e^eff^ect,^s^u^ch^prov^is^ion^s^s^h^a^l^l^c^oⁿ^tⁱⁿ^u^e
ⁱⁿ^eff^ect^{. P.L}^.^107-^{56, §22}^{4, 1}⁸^U^.^S^.^C^.²⁵¹⁰ⁿ^o^t^e^(em^p^h^a^sⁱ^s^added).
^{(a) In}^G^eⁿ^e^ral^.^—^S^ectⁱ^oⁿ^101(b⁾⁽¹⁾^of^t^h^{e F}^o^rei^gⁿ^Int^e^l^lⁱ^g^eⁿ^c^e^S^u^rv^ei^l^l^aⁿ^c^e^A^c^t^o^f¹⁹⁷⁸
^{(50 U}^.^S^.^C^.¹⁸⁰⁽^b)(1^{) i}^s^am^eⁿ^{ded by}^addiⁿ^g^at^t^h^{e e}ⁿ^{d t}^h^{e f}^o^l^l^o^wⁱⁿ^gⁿ^e^w^su^bparag^r^aph^:^“⁽^C⁾
^en^g^a^g^e^{s i}ⁿⁱⁿ^terⁿ^at^ioⁿ^a^{l ter}^r^o^rⁱ^s^m^o^r^activ^{ities i}ⁿ^p^r^ep^ar^atioⁿ^th^er^ef^o^r^{e; o}^r^”.
^{(b) Su}^ns^et.—T^h^{e a}^m^en^d^m^eⁿ^t^m^a^{de b}^y^s^u^bs^ect^ion^(a)^s^h^al^l^{be s}^u^bj^{ect to th}^e^s^u^ns^et
^provⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^s^ectⁱ^oⁿ^{224 of}^P.L^.^107-⁵⁶⁽¹¹⁵^S^t^at^{. 295)}^{, i}ⁿ^cl^udiⁿ^g^t^h^{e ex}^ceptⁱ^oⁿ^provⁱ^d^{ed i}ⁿ
^s^u^bs^ectⁱ^oⁿ^{(b) of}^s^u^c^h^s^ectⁱ^oⁿ^224.^P.L^.¹⁰^8-^{458, §}⁶⁰⁰^{1, 1}¹⁸^S^t^at^{. 3742}⁽²⁰^04).
^S^ectⁱ^oⁿ^{224(a) of}^t^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^tⁱⁿ^g^an^{d S}^t^ren^g^t^h^eⁿⁱⁿ^g^A^m^eri^{ca by}^Provⁱ^dⁱⁿ^g^A^ppropri^a^t^e
^T^o^o^l^{s Re}^q^uⁱ^r^e^d^t^o^Iⁿ^t^e^r^c^e^p^t^aⁿ^d^O^b^st^r^u^c^t^T^e^rr^o^rⁱ^s^m⁽^U^S^A^P^A^T^R^I^O^T^A^C^T⁾^A^c^t^o^f²⁰⁰¹⁽¹⁸
^U^.^S^.^C^.^{510 n}^o^t^e^{) i}^s^a^m^eⁿ^{ded by}^s^t^ri^ki^ng^“^D^ece^m^b^{er 31, 20}^{05” an}^{d i}ⁿ^s^e^rtⁱⁿ^g^“F^ebru^ar^y^3,
^2006.”^P.L^.¹^09-^160,¹¹⁹^S^t^at^{. ____}^_(2⁰⁰⁵^).
^S^ectⁱ^oⁿ^224(a)^of^t^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^tⁱ^ng^an^{d S}^t^ren^g^t^h^eⁿⁱⁿ^g^A^m^eri^c^aⁿ^by^Provⁱ^dⁱⁿ^g^A^ppropri^a^t^e
^T^o^ol^s^R^e^quⁱ^r^{ed t}^o^In^t^e^rcept^aⁿ^{d O}^b^s^t^ru^ct^T^e^rr^ori^s^m^(U^SA^PA^T^R^IO^{T A}^C^T⁾^A^c^t^of²⁰⁰¹
⁽^P^.^L^.¹⁰⁷^-⁵⁶^;¹¹⁵^St^a^t^.²⁹⁵⁾ⁱ^s^a^m^eⁿ^d^e^d^b^y^st^rⁱ^kiⁿ^g^“F^ebru^ar^y^3,^2006”^an^dⁱⁿ^s^e^rtⁱⁿ^g^“^M^arc^h
^{10, 2}^006.”^H^.^R^.⁴⁶⁵^9,^P.L^.¹⁰^9-^{___, 1}^{20 S}^t^at^{. (2}⁰⁰⁶^).
Subsection 224(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act (the act) indicates that various sections in Title II of
the act are to remain in effect only until March 10, 2006. Subsection 224(b) creates two
exceptions for matters that straddle the termination date, one for foreign intelligence
investigations and the other for criminal cases. Even a quick reading of section 224 raises a
number of questions. What is the substance of the temporary sections that disappear on March 10,
2006? What is the breath of the subsection 224(b) exceptions? What is the fate and impact of
amendments to the expiring sections or to related provisions of law, enacted after passage of the
act but before March 10, 2006? What is the substance of the sections in Title II that continue on
unimpaired by virtue of their inclusion in the “other-than” list of the subsection 224(a)?
These questions are among those likely to be asked as twilight approaches. The 9/11 Commission
noted the coming sunset, and expressed the belief that as a general matter, “[b]ecause of the
concerns regarding the shifting balance of power to the government . . .a full and informed debate
on the Patriot Act would be healthy,” 9/11 Commission Report, 394 (2004).
The expiring sections deal with the power of federal authorities to conduct searches and seizures,
generally searches and seizures relating to communications. In most instances, they allow
authorities to move more quickly; they reduce the required layers of administrative and judicial
approval; they permit searches and seizures of a wider range of targets thus making these tools
available earlier in an investigation; and they allow authorities to coordinate their activities. In

doing so, they make it more likely that terrorism and crime will be prevented and that terrorists
and criminals will be caught and punished. They accomplish these things, however, by easing or
removing safeguards designed to protect individual privacy and to prevent government abuse.
And so, they increase the risk that government authority will be abused and that the privacy of
those who are neither terrorists nor criminals will be invaded. The debate over sunset is a debate
of where the balance should be struck.
To further complicate the debate, in some instances the expiring sections curtail rather than
expand governmental authority; bolster rather than erode the safeguards against governmental
overreaching or abuse of authority.
The USA PATRIOT Act sections were originally set to sunset on December 31, 2005. By then,
both Houses had passed legislation that amended and extended the expiring sections (H.R. 3199)
and a conference report resolving their differences had been issued, H.Rept. 109-433 (2005). In
order to provider further time for consideration, the expiration date has been extended twice, first
until February 3, 2006, P.L. 109-160 (2006), and more recently until March 10, 2006, H.R. 4659,
P.L. 109-____ (2006).
Subject to the exceptions of subsection 224(b), the new sections of law and the amendments to
existing law, created by the sections of the act that expire on March 10, 2006, will cease to exist
after that date. The same is true for any subsequent amendments to the expiring sections. They
expire along with their hosts. Pre-existing provisions of law, repealed or amended by the expiring
sections, will be revived automatically, unless they themselves have been repealed or amended by
intervening legislation (as several have).
The impact of subsection 224(b) is somewhat more difficult to discern. It provides two standards:
one with respect to “any particular foreign intelligence investigations that began” before sunset
and a second with respect to “any particular offense or potential offense that began or occurred”
before sunset, P.L. 107-56, §224, 18 U.S.C. 2510 note. The first seems fairly straightforward. The
authority granted by an expiring provision of the act may be exercised after sunset or may
continue to be exercised after sunset, with respect to any foreign intelligence investigation
initiated before sunset.
The second comes with questions. What is a “potential offense”? Does the phrase refer to pre-
sunset circumstances whose criminality is determined in a post-sunset investigation? Or does the
phrase also include post-crimes that evolved out of pre-sunset circumstances which themselves
constituted neither crimes nor elements of a crime? As a general rule, when Congress uses
ordinary words, it is presumed to have intended them to have their commonly understood ¹
meaning. The word “potential” usually contemplates the incomplete, the unfulfilled, the ²
undeveloped, or the unawakened possibility, rather than the suspected or uncertain possibility.

¹^N^a^ti^on^{al R}^a^ilr^o^ad^Pas^s^e^nge^r^C^o^r^p^{. v}^.^M^o^r^g^an^{, 5}³⁶^U^.^S.¹⁰^1,¹⁰⁹^-¹¹^{0 (}²⁰⁰²⁾^,^qu^oti^ng,^W^a^lte^r^s^v^.^M^e^tr^opolit^an^Ed.
^En^terp^rises,^In^c.^,⁵^{19 U}^.^S.²⁰^2,²⁰⁷¹⁹⁹⁷⁾⁽^“^Iⁿ^the^a^b^s^e^nc^e^of^aⁿⁱⁿ^dic^a^tion^to^the^c^o^ntr^a^r^y^{, w}^o^r^d^sⁱⁿ^a^s^t^a^t^ute^a^r^e
^a^s^s^u^m^e^{d to be}^a^r^t^h^eⁱ^r^or^di^na^r^y^{, c}^o^nte^m^por^a^r^y^,^c^o^m^m^on^m^e^aⁿ^ing^”⁾^.
²^“^[P]o^ten^tⁱ^a^l^,^adj.^C^a^pa^ble^of^c^o^mⁱ^ng^{into be}^ing^;^pos^sⁱ^ble^,^”^B^LA^C^K^’^S^L^A^W^D^I^CT^I^ONA^R^Y^{, 118}^{8 (}⁷^th^ed^.¹⁹⁹⁹⁾^;
^“^po^teⁿ^tⁱ^a^l.^ad^j^.^[^M^E^po^te^nc^ial^,^LL^poteⁿ^ti^alis^p^o^teⁿ^tia^l,^pow^e^r^f^u^{l, f}^r^{. LL}^poteⁿ^tial^dy^na^mⁱ^{s, sta}^t^e^o^f^tha^t^w^h^ic^{h is n}^o^t
^y^e^{t f}^u^ll^y^re^a^liz^e^d^&^L^poteⁿ^ti^a^p^o^t^eⁿ^c^y^]^1a^{. e}^x^istingⁱⁿ^possib^ility^{: ha}^vⁱ^ng^the^c^a^p^a^c^ity^{or a}^strong^p^o^ssibility^f^o^r
^de^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^{t into a}^s^t^a^t^e^of^a^c^t^ua^lity^{. . . b.}^ha^vⁱ^ng^the^c^a^p^a^c^ity^f^o^{r a}^c^ting^or^be^ing^a^c^t^e^d^u^p^oⁿ^aⁿ^{d he}ⁿ^c^e^f^o^{r unde}^rg^oing
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

That might suggest the term was intended at least in part to apply to post-sunset crimes that grow
out pre-sunset circumstances. Although hardly a term of art, earlier federal courts have used the ³
term to describe possible past offenses in some cases, and to describe possible future offenses in ⁴
others. Congress in subsection 224(b), however, is not referring to all “potential offenses,” but
only to those “that began or occurred” before sunset. Offenses occurring entirely after sunset
cannot be said to have begun or occurred beforehand. Thus, although it is scarcely beyond debate,
Congress appears to have added the term “potential offense” out of an abundance of caution lest
the exception be read to extend only to investigations of conduct whose criminality was known
prior to sunset but not of pre-sunset conduct whose innocence or criminality was only ultimately
determined after sunset.
The expiring law enforcement sections of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act involve three
communications-related aspects of federal law: wiretapping; stored electronic communications
and communication transaction records; and pen registers and trap and trace devices. Federal law
prohibits the interception of telephone, face to face, and electronic communications
(wiretapping), subject to certain exceptions including a procedure for judicially supervised law ⁵
enforcement interceptions, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2520 (Title III). With the approval of senior Justice
Department officials, federal law enforcement authorities may apply for a court order approving
the use of wiretapping in connection with the investigation of certain serious federal crimes, 18
U.S.C. 2516, 2517, 2518. The orders must be narrowly drawn, of short duration, and based upon
probable cause to believe that they will generate evidence relating to the predicate offenses under
investigation, id. When the orders expire, those whose communications have been intercepted
must be notified, 18 U.S.C. 2518.
The procedure for law enforcement access to the content of wire and electronic communications
stored with communications providers and to provider transaction records is somewhat less

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^c^h^aⁿ^g^e^{. . ..”}^W^EBS^T^ER^’^S^T^HI^RD^N^EW^I^NT^E^R^N^A^T^I^ON^AL^D^I^C^T^I^ON^A^R^{Y O}^F^T^H^E^E^NG^L^I^S^H^L^ANGU^A^G^E^U^N^A^BRI^DGE^D^{, 1775}
⁽¹⁹⁸⁶⁾⁽^p^h^one^tic^proⁿ^uⁿ^cⁱ^a^tion^g^uⁱ^de^om^itte^d).
³^E.g^{., U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^H^a^r^t^,³²^{4 F}^.^3d⁵⁷^5,⁵⁷^{9 (}⁸^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰³⁾⁽^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^a^dde^d)⁽^“^H^a^r^t^pr^ovⁱ^d^e^d^hⁱ^s^c^o^r^por^a^tⁱ^on’^s^ta^x
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^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt c}^l^e^a^r^l^y^ha^{d notic}^e^of^a^poteⁿ^tⁱ^al^offe^ns^e^”);^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es v.}^Rⁱ^vera^{, 9}⁰⁶^F.^2d³¹^9,³²^{2 (}⁷^Cir.
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^c^ita^tion^[^w^heⁿ^of^fⁱ^ce^r^s^s^t^oppe^{d R}ⁱ^v^e^r^a^’^s^ca^r^]^{: T}^h^e^m^a^te^rⁱ^a^l^obs^tr^uc^ti^{on, R}ⁱ^v^e^r^a^’^s^e^r^r^a^tic^dr^iv^ing^,^a^nd^hⁱ^s^pa^s^s^e^ng^e^r^’^s
^(l^at^{er d}ⁱ^sco^v^ered^{) n}^oⁿ^w^eariⁿ^{g o}^f^{a seat}^b^e^l^t^”^).
⁴^E.g^{., Sc}^r^e^w^s^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^{, 3}²⁵^U^.^S.⁹¹^,¹⁵^{7 (}¹⁹⁴⁵⁾⁽^R^o^b^e^r^ts^{, J}^.^,^dis^s^e^ntiⁿ^g⁾⁽^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^a^dde^d)⁽^“^B^y^{. . .}^e^s^ta^blis^hi^ng
^{as fed}^e^ral^cri^m^{es vi}^o^l^atⁱ^oⁿ^s^o^f^t^h^e^vast^,^uⁿ^dⁱ^s^cl^o^s^ed^ran^g^{e o}^f^t^h^{e F}^o^u^r^t^een^t^h^Am^en^d^m^en^t^,^t^hⁱ^s^C^o^u^r^tⁿ^o^w^creat^{es n}^e^w
^d^e^lⁱ^cat^{e an}^d^co^m^p^lⁱ^cat^ed^p^r^o^b^l^em^{s f}^o^{r t}^h^{e en}^f^o^rce^m^en^t^o^f^t^h^{e cri}^mⁱⁿ^al^l^a^w^.^T^h^{e an}^s^w^{ers gi}^ven^t^o^t^h^e^s^{e p}^r^o^b^l^em^s,ⁱⁿ
^vⁱ^ew^of^the^tr^em^e^ndous^s^c^o^p^e^of^poteⁿ^tial^offe^nse^s^a^g^aⁱ^ns^{t the}^Fo^u^r^te^eⁿ^{th A}^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t, a}^r^e^boun^{d t}^o^pr^o^duc^e^a
^coⁿ^f^u^sⁱ^oⁿ^d^e^t^rⁱ^m^en^t^a^l^t^o^t^h^{e ad}^mⁱⁿⁱ^st^ratⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^cri^mⁱⁿ^al^j^u^stⁱ^ce”);^W^y^ne^r^v^.^Str^u^hs^,²⁵^{4 F}^.^S^u^p^p^.²^d¹²⁹⁷^,¹³⁰²⁽^S^.^D^.^F^l^a^.
²⁰⁰³^)(em^p^h^a^si^{s ad}^d^e^d^)(“Do^{es t}^h^{e regu}^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^[^a^gaiⁿ^st^nu^di^t^y^oⁿ^{a s}^t^at^{e b}^each^]^{serve a si}^gnⁱ^fⁱ^can^t^go^v^e^rn^m^eⁿ^tⁱⁿ^t^e^rest^{? .}
^{. . T}^h^a^tⁱⁿ^te^re^{st in}^prote^c^tⁱⁿ^g^the^p^ublic^f^r^om^the^poteⁿ^ti^{al o}^ffe^ns^e^of^nu^dity^m^e^e^t^s^this^s^t^a^nda^r^d^”⁾^.
⁵¹⁸^U^.^S.C.²⁵¹⁰^-2⁵²²^(ch^a^p^t^er¹¹⁹^o^f^title¹⁸^o^f^th^{e Un}^ite^d^St^ates^Co^d^e^{) is}^o^f^ten^ref^e^rred^to^{as T}^{itle III, b}^ecau^{se it w}^a^s
^o^r^igⁱⁿ^a^lly^eⁿ^a^c^t^e^d^a^s^T^itle^{III o}^f^t^h^e^Omⁿⁱ^b^u^s^Crim^e^Coⁿ^t^ro^{l a}ⁿ^d^S^a^fe^Stre^e^t^{s Ac}^{t o}^f¹⁹⁶⁸^,^P.L^.⁹⁰^-³⁵¹^,⁸²^Sta^t^.²¹²
⁽¹⁹⁶⁸⁾^.^Ev^eⁿ^th^o^u^g^h^T^itle^{III e}ⁿ^c^o^m^p^a^sse^s^wⁱ^r^e^{, o}^r^a^l^aⁿ^d^e^l^e^c^t^roⁿⁱ^c^c^o^m^m^uⁿⁱ^c^a^tioⁿ^s^{it is}^o^f^teⁿ^re^f^e^r^r^e^d^to^a^s^t^h^e
^“wⁱ^r^et^ap^{” st}^at^u^t^{e as a mat}^t^e^{r o}^f^coⁿ^v^enⁱ^eⁿ^ce.

demanding, although it generally requires a court order, warrant, or subpoena, 18 U.S.C. 2701-

2702.

Pen registers and trap and trace devices surreptitiously capture the identity of the sender and
recipient of communications. The procedure for a court order approving law enforcement
installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device is less demanding still, 18 U.S.C.

3121-3127.

Federal courts may authorize wiretapping—the interception of wire, oral or electronic
communications—for law enforcement purposes in connection with the investigation of one or
more specifically designated, serious federal crimes (predicate offenses), 18 U.S.C. 2516.
Sections 201 and 202 temporarily add crimes to this predicate offense list. Section 202 places
felonious violations of 18 U.S.C. 1030 (computer fraud and abuse) on the list; section 201
contributes:
• 18 U.S.C. 229 (chemical weapons);
• 2332 (crimes of violence committed against Americans overseas);
• 2332a (weapons of mass destruction);
• 2332b (multinational terrorism);
• 2332d (financial transactions with a country designated a sponsor of terrorism);
• 2339A (providing material support to a terrorist), and
• 2339B (providing material support to a terrorist organization).
The Administration’s request for legislation submitted immediately following the attacks of
September 11, 2001 did not include any proposal comparable to either section 201 or section 202,
Administration’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the ^th^st
Judiciary (Hearing), 107 Cong., 1 Sess. (2001). Nor can any similar provision be found in the
legislation reported out of the House Judiciary Committee, H.Rept. 107-236 (2001). They appear
first, and in the language ultimately enacted, in the initial version of S. 1510, 147 Cong. Rec.
S10309 (daily ed. October 4, 2001). They were referred to as among the “number of sensible
proposals that should not be controversial,” 147 Cong. Rec. S10552 (daily ed. October 11,

2001)(remarks of Senator Leahy), and otherwise seem to have attracted little attention.

Sections 201 and 202 expire on March 10, 2006. By operation of subsection 224(b), law
enforcement officials may seek a wiretap order in conjunction with an investigation of any of the

offenses added to the predicate offense list by sections 201 or 202, as long as the particular
offense or potential offense begins or occurs before March 10, 2006.
The passing of section 201 will, in all probability, carry with it a subsequent addition to the
predicate list. Section 201 makes its additions to the wiretap predicate offense list using these
words (emphasis added), “Section 2516(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended . . . (2) by
inserting . . . the following new paragraph: ‘(q) any criminal violation section 229 (relating to
chemical weapons); or sections 2332, 2332a, 2332b, 2332d, 2339A, or 2339B of this title
(relating to terrorism); or’.”
Again with emphasis added, P.L. 107-197 (Implementation of the International Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings) subsequently provides that “Section 2516(1)(q) . . . is
amended by—(1) inserting ‘2332f’ after ‘2332,’ and (2) striking ‘or 2339B’ and inserting ‘2339B,
or 2339C’.” 116 Stat. 728 (2002).
Thus, section 201 enacts 18 U.S.C. 2516(1)(q); section 201 and therefore 18 U.S.C. 2516(1)(q)
expire on March 10, 2006; P.L. 107-197 amends subsection 2516(1)(q); and therefore on the face
of things the later amendment expires with the rest of 2516(1)(q).
Yet although the language of the statute may indicate that the P.L. 107-197 amendments expire
with the rest of subsection 2516(1)(q), the scant legislative history might suggest that Congress
intended to add the new crimes, 18 U.S.C. 2332f(bombing public buildings and places) and
2339C (financing terrorism), to the wiretap predicate offense list permanently. The House
Judiciary Committee report (there is no Senate report), for instance, notes the addition of the new
crimes not only to the wiretap predicate list, but to the list of “Federal crimes of terrorism” in 18
U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5)(B), to the predicate offense list for 18 U.S.C. 2339A (assistance of terrorists),
and to the forfeiture predicate list in 18 U.S.C. 981(a)(1)—“This section of the bill, which is not
required by the treaty but will assist in Federal enforcement, adds the new 18 U.S.C. §§2332f and
2339C to four existing provisions of law,” H.Rept. 107-307, at 14 (2001). Other than its
placement, there is nothing to indicate Congress intended to insert the new crimes temporarily on
the wiretap predicate list but permanently on the other lists. The reasons for making the section
224 provisions temporary do not seem to apply to the treaty implementing provisions; the
additions were made to implement treaty obligations not root out 9/11 terrorists.
On the other hand, the treaty deals with terrorism offenses and the crimes added to subsection
2516(1)(q) are much like those already found there. More importantly, the clearest indication of
what Congress means is what it says. It said the treaty-implementing crimes should be added to
that portion of the wiretap predicate list that is clearly scheduled to expire. In other instances
when called upon to construe a statute in apparent contradiction to its precise language, the courts ⁶
have been loath to rewrite a statute in the name of statutory construction.

⁶^Barⁿ^har^{d v}^.^Sⁱ^gm^oⁿ^C^oal^C^o^.^{, 5}³⁴^U^.^{S. 43}^{8, 46}^1-⁶²⁽²⁰⁰²⁾^,^qu^otiⁿ^g^,^C^oⁿⁿ^e^c^tic^{ut N}^a^t.^Ba^nk^v^.^G^e^r^m^ain^,5⁰³^U^.^S.
²⁴⁹^,²⁵^3-5⁴⁽¹⁹⁹²^)(“W^e^h^a^{ve st}^a^t^ed^tⁱ^m^{e an}^d^agaiⁿ^t^h^at^cou^r^t^s^m^u^st^p^r^esu^m^{e t}^h^at^{a l}^e^gi^sl^at^u^r^{e sa}^y^sⁱⁿ^{a st}^at^u^t^{e w}^h^atⁱ^t
^m^e^aⁿ^s^a^{nd m}^e^aⁿ^s^{in a}^s^t^a^t^ute^w^h^a^t^{it s}^a^y^s^the^r^e^.^W^h^eⁿ^the^w^o^r^d^s^of^a^s^t^a^t^ute^a^r^e^una^m^b^ig^uous^,^theⁿ^,^this^fⁱ^r^s^{t c}^a^non^is
^a^l^{so the}^la^{st: j}^u^dⁱ^cⁱ^a^lⁱⁿ^quiry^{is c}^o^m^p^le^te^”⁾^.

At one point, the Justice Department indicated that “several recent wiretap orders have been
based on this expanded list of terrorism offenses [authorized by section 201], including one
involving a suspected domestic terrorist, who was subsequently charged with unlawfully making
an explosive bomb, as well as another involving an individual with suspected ties to Columbian
[sic] terrorists,” U.S. Department of Justice, Report from the Field: The USA PATRIOT Act at ⁷
Work (Report), 26 (July, 2004). An official later testified that the authority under section 201 had
been used on four occasions in two cases and that the authority under section 202 had been used ⁸
twice. One of the section 201 cases “involved an Imperial Wizard of the White Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan who attempted to purchase hand grenades for the purpose of bombing abortion clinics ⁹
and was subsequently convicted of numerous explosives and firearms offenses.” The section 202 ¹⁰
case involved “a computer fraud investigation that broadened to include drug trafficking.”
Critics might argue that the authority conveyed by sections 201 and 202 is unnecessary. Federal
law would seem to provide ample authority elsewhere for wiretaps in the case of the somewhat
specific examples the Department supplied. Drug cases have long been a staple of the federal and ¹¹
state law enforcement wiretapping practices. Federal drug and explosives offenses and
conspiracy to violate them are among the existing permanent federal wiretap predicates, 18
U.S.C. 2516(1)(c), (e), (r); 844(d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i). And it is not clear why wiretaps under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) should not be adequate and perhaps even more
appropriate with respect to “an individual with suspected ties to Columbian terrorists,” 50 U.S.C. ¹²

1804, 1805, 1801. Or so critics might contend.

Such critics might argue that the statistics published annually by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts confirm that the authority under sections 201 and 202 is little used and little
needed. Terrorism offenses are not even designated as one of the major offense categories for
which court-authorized interceptions are granted, unlike narcotics (502 orders), racketeering (43),
bribery (1), gambling (2), homicide and assault (1), kidnaping (0), theft (0), or loansharking (5),

2003 Wiretap Report, Table 3 (2004), available on January 6, 2005, at http://www.uscourts.gov.

Finally, critics—particularly those who view law enforcement use of wiretapping with concern—
might argue that the appropriate question is not how many terrorists and criminals have been
caught through use of the new authority, but how often and under what circumstances the

⁷^A^v^a^ila^ble^{on J}^a^n.^6,²⁰⁰⁵^a^t^http^:^//w^w^w^.li^f^e^a^ndlibe^r^ty^.g^ov^/^doc^s^/⁰⁷¹³⁰^4_^r^e^por^t^_^f^r^om^_the^_f^ie^ld.pdf^;^s^e^e^a^l^s^o^{, U}^.^S.
^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^J^u^s^tic^e^,^Dispe^llin^g^the^M^y^{ths: Dispe}^lli^ng^S^o^me^of^t^h^e^M^a^{jor M}^y^{ths Ab}^out^the^U^S^{A PA}^{TRIOT Ac}^t
^(M^y^t^h^s⁾^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^{on J}^a^n.^6,²⁰⁰⁵^a^t^htt^p^://w^w^w^.li^f^e^a^ndlibe^r^ty^.g^ov^/^s^ubs^/^a^dd_m^y^t^hs^.htm^.
⁸^O^v^e^r^sⁱ^{ght H}^e^arⁱⁿ^{g o}ⁿ^t^h^e^I^m^ple^m^eⁿ^tati^on^{of t}^h^e^U^S^A^PATRI^O^T^Ac^t:^Effe^c^t^of^Se^c^tio^ns²⁰³⁽^b)^an^d⁽^d⁾^{on I}ⁿ^for^m^atioⁿ
^Sharⁱ^ng:^H^e^arⁱⁿ^gs^Be^for^e^t^h^e^S^u^b^c^om^m^.^on^C^r^im^e^,^Te^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^m^a^nd^H^o^m^e^lan^d^Se^c^u^r^ity^{of t}^h^e^H^o^us^e^C^o^m^m^.^oⁿ^t^h^e^th^st
^J^udicⁱ^ar^y⁽^H^ous^e^H^e^arⁱⁿ^gs⁾^{, 1}⁰⁹^Cong^{., 1}^Se^{ss. (2}⁰⁰^{5), sta}^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^Mic^h^a^e^l^S^u^lliv^aⁿ^,^Unite^d^St^a^t^e^s^A^ttorne^y^f^o^r
^the^Dⁱ^s^t^ric^t^of^Ma^s^s^a^c^hus^e^tts^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^oⁿ^J^u^ne²¹^,²⁰^{05 a}^t^htt^p^://j^udicⁱ^a^r^y^.^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^m^e^dia^/^pdf^s^/^s^u^lliv^aⁿ⁰⁵⁰³^05.^pdf^.
⁹^Id^.
¹⁰^Id^.
¹¹^S.R^e^pt.⁹⁰^-¹⁰⁹^{7, a}^t^98-^{9 (}¹⁹⁶⁷⁾^.
¹²^S^{ee a}^l^so^,^E^l^ect^ronⁱ^c^P^rⁱ^v^acy^In^f^o^rmatⁱ^oⁿ^Cen^t^er,^The^U^S^{A PA}^TRI^O^{T Ac}^{t (}^{EPIC Re}^port)^,^a^v^a^ila^ble^{on J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^25,
²⁰⁰^{4 a}^t^htt^p^://w^ww^.e^pic^.^org^/^priv^a^c^y^/^te^rrorism^/usa^pa^{triot (Se}^c^tⁱ^on²^{01 a}^d^de^{d c}^r^im^e^s^of^te^rrorism^or
^pro^duc^ti^on/^dis^s^e^mⁱ^na^{tion of}^c^h^e^m^ic^a^l^w^e^a^pons^a^s^pre^d^ic^a^t^e^of^f^eⁿ^s^e^s^unde^{r T}^itle^{III, s}^u^s^p^ic^ioⁿ^of^w^h^ic^{h e}ⁿ^a^b^le^the
^go^vern^m^eⁿ^t^t^o^ob^t^aⁱⁿ^{a w}ⁱ^ret^a^p^o^f^{a p}^a^rt^y^’^{s co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^.^Becau^{se t}^h^{e go}^vern^men^t^al^read^y^h^a^d^su^b^s^t^aⁿ^tⁱ^a^l^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^t^y
^unde^r^FI^SA^to^obtaⁱ^{n a}^wⁱ^r^e^ta^{p of}^a^s^u^s^p^e^c^t^e^d^te^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^t^{, t}^h^e^r^e^a^l^e^f^f^e^c^t^of^this^a^m^eⁿ^d^m^eⁿ^{t is}^to^pe^r^m^{it w}ⁱ^r^e^ta^pping^of^a
^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^pe^r^s^on^s^u^s^p^e^c^t^e^d^of^dom^e^s^tic^te^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^m^.

authority has been used in instances where it proved to be a false trail; where the individuals
whose conversations were intercepted proved to have no incriminating ties to terrorists ¹³
(Colombian or otherwise) or criminal events (past, present or future).
Section 201 permits the use of court-supervised wiretaps in cases involving various terrorism
offenses; section 202 permits such use in cases of felony computer fraud or abuse.
• Here and elsewhere the full extent of the “potential offense” sunset exception
(224(b)) is unclear.
• The annual wiretap report suggests this authority has been little used.
• Section 201 authority has been used in a bomb case and case involving suspected
links to Colombian terrorists.
• Some may feel that alternative, permanent authority could have been used in the
two instances where the Justice Department notes section 201 authority has been
used.
• Section 202 authority has been in one case that eventually broadened into a drug
trafficking case.
Evidence obtained through a court-ordered wiretap for federal law enforcement purposes may be
disclosed under limited circumstances (e.g., testimony in judicial proceedings or disclosure to
other law enforcement officials for official use), 18 U.S.C. 2517. Prior to the act, there was no
explicit authorization for disclosure to intelligence officials.
Subsection 203(b) amends federal wiretap law to permit law enforcement officials to disclose
wiretap evidence to various federal officials (“law enforcement, intelligence, protective,
immigration, national defense [and] national security official[s]”) when it involves foreign
intelligence, counterintelligence, or foreign intelligence information, 18 U.S.C. 2517(6).
Subsection 203(d) authorizes law enforcement officers to share foreign intelligence,
counterintelligence, and foreign intelligence information with the same set of federal officials
notwithstanding any other legal restriction.

¹³^Cf.^,^W^hⁱ^t^e^h^{ead & A}^d^en^,^For^f^e^iti^ng^“En^durⁱ^ng^Fr^e^e^dom^{” f}^o^r^“H^o^m^e^l^and^Se^c^u^r^ity^{”: A}^Co^ns^titu^tioⁿ^a^{l A}^naly^s^is^o^f^t^h^e
^{USA PAT}^{RIOT Ac}^t^an^{d t}^h^e^J^u^stic^e^De^partmeⁿ^{t’s An}^ti-Te^{rrorism In}^itiativ^e^s^{, 51}^A^ME^RI^C^A^N^U^NI^V^E^RS^I^T^Y^L^AW^R^EV^I^E^W
¹⁰⁸^1,¹¹^08-¹⁰^{9 (}²⁰⁰²⁾⁽^W^hite^he^a^d^&^A^d^eⁿ⁾⁽^“^[^W^]ⁱ^r^e^ta^p^or^de^r^s^a^r^e^vⁱ^r^t^ua^lly^ne^v^e^r^de^nie^d^{. . .}^{. D}^e^s^p^it^e^the^a^ppa^r^e^nt^la^c^k
^of^judicⁱ^a^l^c^h^e^c^k^s^on^the^a^v^a^ila^bil^ity^of^wⁱ^r^e^t^a^{p or}^de^r^s^be^f^o^r^e^the^pa^s^s^a^g^e^o^f^the^P^a^tr^{iot A}^c^{t, the}^a^c^t^e^x^pa^nds^t^h^eⁱ^r
^a^v^a^ila^bility^e^v^eⁿ^f^u^rthe^{r. Se}^c^tions²⁰^{1 a}ⁿ^{d 2}⁰²^of^the^P^a^trⁱ^o^{t A}^c^{t a}^m^e^{nd the}^Wⁱ^re^ta^{p A}^c^{t to a}^llow^th^e^{FBI to}^ob^taⁱⁿ
^wⁱ^r^e^ta^p^w^a^r^r^a^nts^f^o^r^‘^t^e^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^m^’^inv^e^s^tig^a^tions^{, ‘}^c^he^mⁱ^c^a^l^w^e^a^pons^’^inv^e^s^tig^a^tions^,^or^‘^c^om^pute^r^f^r^a^{ud a}ⁿ^{d a}^b^us^e^’
^inv^e^s^tig^a^tions^{. T}^h^is^e^x^pa^nds^t^h^e^f^e^de^r^a^{l g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt’^s^wⁱ^r^e^t^a^{p a}^u^th^or^ity^{into t}^h^e^br^oa^{d, a}^s^-^y^e^t^-^unde^fⁱ^ne^{d a}^r^e^a^of
^‘terro^rism^{’ in}^v^e^stig^atioⁿ^s^an^dⁱⁿ^v^e^s^tig^a^{tions re}^la^ting^{to c}^o^m^pute^r^u^s^e^”⁾^.

The subsections use the same definitions for foreign intelligence, counterintelligence and foreign
intelligence information:
^T^h^{e ter}^m^“f^o^r^eigⁿⁱⁿ^te^lli^g^eⁿ^c^eⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^”^m^e^aⁿ^s:
⁽^a⁾ⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^,^w^h^et^h^e^r^o^rⁿ^o^t^{it co}ⁿ^cerⁿ^s^{a Un}^ited^{States p}^e^r^s^oⁿ^{, th}^{at r}^e^{lates to}^th^{e ab}^ilit^y
^of^th^{e U}ⁿ^{ited State}^s^{to protect}^ag^ains^t—
^●^actu^a^{l o}^r^p^o^t^en^{tial at}^tack^o^r^o^t^h^e^r^g^r^av^e^h^o^{stile act}^{s o}^f^{a f}^o^r^eⁱ^gⁿ^p^o^w^e^r^o^r^its^ag^eⁿ^t;
^●^sab^o^t^ag^{e o}^rⁱⁿ^terⁿ^atioⁿ^a^{l ter}^r^o^r^is^m^b^y^a^f^o^r^e^igⁿ^p^o^w^e^r^o^r^{its ag}^en^t^;^o^r
^●^clan^des^tⁱⁿ^{e in}^te^lli^g^eⁿ^{ce acti}^v^it^ies^b^y^anⁱⁿ^te^lli^g^eⁿ^{ce s}^e^r^v^{ice or n}^e^t^w^ork^o^f^a^f^o^r^eⁱ^gⁿ
^po^w^e^{r or by}ⁱ^t^s^a^g^ent^;^or
^{(b) in}^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^,^w^h^et^h^e^{r or n}^o^{t it con}^cerns^{a Un}ⁱ^t^{ed States}^pe^rs^on^,^w^ith^re^s^p^{ect to a f}^o^reign
^p^o^w^e^r^o^r^f^o^r^e^igⁿ^ter^r^ito^r^y^t^h^at^r^e^{lates to}^—
^●^th^{e n}^a^tⁱ^on^{al def}^eⁿ^s^{e or th}^e^s^e^c^u^rit^y^o^f^th^{e U}ⁿ^{ited State}^s^{; or}
^●^t^h^{e con}^d^u^c^t^o^f^t^h^e^f^o^rei^gⁿ^aff^aⁱ^r^s^of^t^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^e^s^{. 18 U}^.^S^.^C^.²⁵¹⁰⁽¹⁹⁾
^T^h^{e ter}^m^“^f^o^r^ei^gⁿⁱⁿ^telli^g^eⁿ^c^e^”^m^e^aⁿ^{s in}^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^r^e^latin^g^t^o^th^{e cap}^ab^{ilities, in}^ten^t^ioⁿ^s^,^o^r
^activ^itie^{s o}^f^f^o^r^e^igⁿ^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^{s o}^r^ele^m^en^{ts th}^er^eo^f^,^f^o^r^e^igⁿ^o^r^g^aⁿⁱ^zatioⁿ^s^{, o}^r^f^o^r^e^igⁿ
^pers^on^s^,^{or in}^tern^atioⁿ^a^{l terroris}^{t acti}^v^ities^.^{50 U.S.C}^.^401a(2^).
^T^h^{e ter}^m^“^c^o^uⁿ^t^erⁱⁿ^tell^ig^eⁿ^ce^{” m}^e^aⁿ^{s i}ⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^g^a^th^er^e^d^an^d^activ^{ities co}ⁿ^d^u^c^ted^to
^p^r^o^t^{ect ag}^ain^s^{t esp}ⁱ^oⁿ^a^g^{e, o}^t^h^e^rⁱⁿ^tellig^eⁿ^{ce acti}^v^itie^{s, sa}^b^o^t^a^g^e^,^o^r^a^s^s^a^s^sⁱⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^c^oⁿ^d^u^c^t^e^d
^b^y^o^r^oⁿ^b^e^ha^l^f^o^f^fo^r^eⁱ^g^{n go}^ve^rⁿ^m^e^nt^{s o}^r^e^l^e^m^eⁿ^t^s^t^h^e^r^e^o^f,^fo^r^eⁱ^gⁿ^org^aⁿⁱ^zatⁱ^ons^,^or^f^o^rei^gⁿ
^pers^on^s^,^{or in}^tern^atioⁿ^a^{l terroris}^{t acti}^v^ities^.^{50 U.S.C}^.^401a(3^).
Federal law has long permitted wiretap generated information to be shared with law enforcement
officers for the performance of their duties, 18 U.S.C. 2517(1) (2000 ed.). The Administration’s
initial proposal was to expand the definition of “law enforcement officer” to include all federal
officers and employees, §103, H.R.—, Hearings at 70. It contended that:
^A^t^pres^en^t^,^{18 U}^.^S^.^C^.^§2517(^{1) g}^eⁿ^e^ral^l^y^al^l^o^w^sⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^oⁿ^obt^aiⁿ^e^{d vi}^a^wⁱ^ret^a^{p t}^o^be
^dⁱ^sclo^sed^oⁿ^l^y^to^t^h^{e ex}^ten^t^th^{at it}^w^ill^as^{sist a}^crⁱ^mⁱⁿ^alⁱⁿ^v^e^stig^a^tioⁿ^.^Oⁿ^e^m^u^{st o}^b^t^aiⁿ^a
^cou^r^{t order to dis}^c^los^e^T^{itle III inf}^o^r^m^atioⁿⁱⁿⁿ^on-^cri^mⁱⁿ^{al p}^r^oceedin^g^s^.^Section^{109 [s}^ic]
^w^o^u^l^d^m^o^dⁱ^f^y^t^h^e^wⁱ^r^e^tap^stat^u^t^{es to}^p^e^r^m^{it t}^h^{e d}ⁱ^sclo^su^r^e^o^f^T^{itle I}^I^I^-^g^eⁿ^e^r^a^t^e^dⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^tⁱ^oⁿ
^{to a n}^oⁿ^-^la^w^enf^o^rce^m^eⁿ^t^of^fⁱ^cer^f^o^{r s}^u^c^h^pu^rpos^es^a^s^fu^rth^e^ri^ng^anⁱⁿ^telli^g^eⁿ^ce
ⁱⁿ^v^e^sti^g^atioⁿ^.^T^h^is^w^ill^h^a^r^m^oⁿ^{ize T}^{itle I}^I^I^stan^d^a^r^d^s^w^ith^th^o^s^{e o}^f^th^e^Fo^r^e^igⁿ^Iⁿ^tell^ig^eⁿ^ce
^Su^r^v^e^illaⁿ^{ce A}^c^{t (}^F^I^S^A⁾^,^w^h^ic^h^allo^w^s^s^u^chⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^oⁿ^-^s^h^a^rⁱⁿ^g^.^A^l^l^o^wⁱⁿ^g^dⁱ^s^c^l^o^su^r^e^uⁿ^d^e^r
^T^{itle III is}^particu^l^arl^y^appro^p^{riate g}ⁱ^v^eⁿ^t^h^{at t}^h^{e requ}^ire^m^ents^f^o^{r obtain}ⁱⁿ^g^{a T}^{itle III}
^su^r^v^eillaⁿ^{ce o}^r^d^e^{r in}^g^eⁿ^e^ral^are^m^o^{re strin}^g^eⁿ^{t t}^h^an^f^o^{r a FIS}^A^o^r^d^e^{r, an}^d^b^ecau^{se th}^e
^atten^d^an^{t priv}^ac^y^con^cerⁿ^sⁱⁿ^eith^{er s}ⁱ^t^u^atioⁿ^{are s}ⁱ^mⁱ^{lar and are ade}^q^u^a^tel^y^{protected by}
^exⁱ^s^tⁱ^ng^s^t^at^u^t^or^y^provⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^Id^.^{at 54}^.
A second Administration proposal sought general catch-all authority for criminal investigators to
share foreign intelligence information with federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective
immigration, customs, and military personnel, notwithstanding any other provision of law—

including the specifically mentioned limitations on sharing grand jury and wiretap information,
§154, H.R.—, Id. at 74. The Administration’s explanation leaned heavily on the value of grand
jury disclosure and said nothing of its other Title III sharing request, Id. at 57 (The Administration
also proposed a complementary grand jury information sharing measure, §354, H.R.—, Hearings
at 86 (text), 62-3(explanation)).
Both Houses modified the proposals. The House Judiciary Committee trimmed the
Administration’s “law enforcement officer” language so that the amendment defined law
enforcement officer to include only law enforcement, intelligence, national security and defense,
protective and immigration personnel and then only for the purposes of sharing foreign
intelligence information, §103, H.R. 2975, H.Rept. 107-236, at 5 (2001). It split off the grand jury
components from the second proposal, and permitted sharing of grand jury matters only with
court approval, §§154, 353, H.R. 2975, Id. at 8, 30.
The Senate, in the approach carried through to enactment, merged the three Administration
sections into a single four-part section 203, S. 1510, 147 Cong. Rec. S10309 (daily ed. October 4,
2001). The first and third subsections (203(a) and 203(c)) dealt with sharing grand jury
information and the Attorney General’s regulatory authority. The second, subsection 203(b), was
limited to the sharing of wiretap produced foreign intelligence information; and the fourth,
subsection 203(d), constituted a general residual grant of authority (a “catch-all” or
“notwithstanding any other law” provision) for the disclosure to federal law enforcement,
intelligence, protective, military and immigration officials of foreign intelligence information
unearthed in a criminal investigation.
Apparently, at the time of passage it was unclear what legal obstacles subsection 203(d) cleared
away. Subsection (a) addressed grand jury secrecy impediments and subsection (c) spoke to Title
III wiretap hurdles; what other legal barriers to disclosure did subsection (d) order down? Some ¹⁴
were uncertain, but the answer may be of some consequence since another section of the
act(sec. 905) requires the Justice Department to disclose to the Director of Central Intelligence
any foreign intelligence information uncovered during the course of a criminal investigation—
unless otherwise provided by law.
The authority for disclosure under subsections 203(b)(wiretap) or 203(d)(catch-all) sunsets on
March 10, 2006, unless either the foreign intelligence investigation or crime exception can be
claimed. Both subsections list “law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national
defense [and] national security official[s]” as permissible recipients. Yet since subsection 224(b)
exempts only foreign intelligence and criminal investigations, the post-March 10, 2006
exceptions might be thought to limit the continued authority of subsections 203(b) and 203(d) to
disclosure to law enforcement and intelligence officials and not to allow disclosures to protective,
immigration, national defense and national security officials. At most, the extended authority can
only apply to disclosures related to criminal or foreign intelligence investigations.

¹⁴^S^{ee e.}^g^.^,¹⁴⁷^C^o^ng^.^R^ec.^S1¹⁰⁰²^(d^aily^ed^{. Oct. 2}⁵^,²⁰⁰¹^)(rem^a^r^k^s^o^f^Sen^.^L^eah^y^)(“Ev^en^th^{e A}^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^stratioⁿ^,^w^h^ich
^w^r^o^t^{e t}^hⁱ^s^p^r^o^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^,^h^a^{s no}^t^b^{een ab}^l^e^t^o^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^{e a f}^u^l^l^y^satⁱ^s^f^a^ct^o^r^y^exp^l^an^atⁱ^oⁿ^o^fⁱ^t^s^sco^p^e^.^If^t^h^{ere are sp}^eci^fⁱ^{c l}^a^ws
^tha^t^the^A^d^mⁱ^nistra^tion^be^lie^v^e^{s im}^pe^de^the^ne^c^e^ssa^r^y^sha^r^ing^ofⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion on}^te^rrorism^a^{nd f}^o^re^ig^{n in}^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e
^wⁱ^t^hⁱⁿ^t^h^{e execu}^tⁱ^v^{e b}^r^an^ch^,^w^e^sh^o^u^l^d^a^d^d^r^{ess t}^h^o^s^{e p}^r^o^b^l^em^{s throug}^{h le}^gⁱ^sla^tio^{n t}^h^a^t^is^na^rrow^l^y^ta^rg^e^t^e^d^{to th}^ose
^s^t^a^t^ute^s^{. T}^a^c^k^ing^{on a}^blu^nde^r^bus^s^pr^ov^is^io^{n w}^hos^e^s^c^ope^w^e^doⁿ^o^{t f}^u^lly^unde^r^s^ta^nd^c^aⁿ^oⁿ^ly^le^a^d^{to c}^o^ns^e^que^nc^e^s
^tha^t^w^e^c^a^{nnot f}^o^r^e^s^ee”).

The termination of authority under subsection 203(b) may be of little consequence, since (A) the
wiretap law’s criminal disclosure and use prohibitions, 18 U.S.C. 2511(1)(c), (d), only outlaw the
disclosure and use of information gleaned from illegal wiretaps; they say nothing of the
disclosure and use for official purposes of information gathered from lawful interceptions; (B) the
civil constrains on unlawful disclosure by officials, established in section 223 of the act, likewise
expire on March 10, 2006; (C) the wiretap law elsewhere authorizes disclosure of wiretap
information to law enforcement officers, 18 U.S.C. 2517(1); and (D) the subsequently-passed
Homeland Security Act authorizes disclosure, in separate, permanent subsections, to a wide range
of officials particularly when confronted with the more serious foreign intelligence situations, ¹⁵
P.L. 107-296, §896, 116 Stat. 2257 (2002) (18 U.S.C. 2517(7),(8)).
The Homeland Security Act’s treatment of the general law enforcement disclosure to intelligence
authorities found in subsection 203(d) is a bit different. It adopts language much like that which it
provides in the wiretap context of subsection 203(b). But rather than placing the amendment in a
separate subsection so that it survives the passing of the subsection on March 10, 2006, it embeds
the amendment in subsection 203(d) thereby suggesting the amendment is intended to terminate
with the rest of subsection 203(d), P.L. 107-296, §897(a), 116 Stat. 2257 (2002)(50 U.S.C. 403-¹⁶

5d).

¹⁵^“(7⁾^Aⁿ^yⁱⁿ^ve^stⁱ^g^atⁱ^v^{e o}^r^l^a^w^en^fo^rcemen^t^o^f^fⁱ^c^e^r,^o^r^o^t^h^e^{r F}^e^d^e^ral^o^f^fⁱ^ci^alⁱⁿ^carr^yⁱⁿ^{g o}^u^t^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^d^u^tⁱ^e^{s as su}^ch
^Fe^de^r^a^{l of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^,^w^{ho by}^aⁿ^y^m^e^ans^a^u^th^or^iz^e^d^by^this^c^h^a^p^te^r^,^ha^s^obtaⁱ^ne^{d k}^now^le^dg^e^of^the^c^onteⁿ^ts^of^aⁿ^y^wⁱ^r^e^,
^o^r^al^,^o^r^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c co}^m^m^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^o^n,^o^r^evi^d^en^{ce d}^e^ri^ved^t^h^eref^ro^m^,^ma^y^dⁱ^scl^o^{se su}^ch^coⁿ^t^eⁿ^t^s^o^r^d^e^rⁱ^vatⁱ^v^{e e}^vⁱ^d^en^{ce t}^o
^a^f^o^re^ig^{n inv}^e^stig^a^tive^{or la}^w^eⁿ^forc^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^fⁱ^c^e^{r to the}^e^x^te^{nt t}^h^a^t^suc^h^di^s^c^los^u^r^e^is^a^ppr^opr^ia^te^t^o^the^pr^ope^r
^p^e^rf^o^r^m^aⁿ^{ce o}^f^t^h^{e o}^f^fⁱ^ci^al^d^u^tⁱ^e^{s o}^f^t^h^{e o}^f^fⁱ^cer^makiⁿ^g^o^r^recei^viⁿ^g^t^h^{e di}^scl^o^su^re,^and^f^o^rei^gⁿⁱⁿ^vestⁱ^g^atⁱ^v^{e o}^r^l^a^w
^en^f^o^rce^m^en^t^o^f^fⁱ^cer^s^m^a^y^u^s^{e o}^r^dⁱ^scl^o^{se su}^ch^c^oⁿ^t^ent^s^o^r^d^e^ri^vatⁱ^v^{e evi}^d^en^{ce t}^o^t^h^{e ext}^eⁿ^t^su^ch^u^s^{e o}^r^dⁱ^scl^o^su^{re i}^s
^ap^p^r^op^ri^at^{e t}^o^t^h^e^p^r^op^{er p}^e^rf^o^r^man^{ce o}^f^t^h^ei^{r o}^f^fⁱ^ci^al^d^u^tⁱ^e^s.
^“(8⁾^Aⁿ^yⁱⁿ^vestⁱ^g^atⁱ^v^{e o}^r^l^a^w^en^fo^rcemen^t^o^f^fⁱ^c^e^r,^o^r^o^t^h^e^{r F}^e^d^e^ral^o^f^fⁱ^ci^alⁱⁿ^carr^yⁱⁿ^{g o}^u^t^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^d^u^tⁱ^e^{s as su}^ch
^Fe^de^r^a^{l of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^,^w^{ho by}^aⁿ^y^m^e^ans^a^u^th^or^iz^e^d^by^this^c^h^a^p^te^r^,^ha^s^obtaⁱ^ne^{d k}^now^le^dg^e^of^the^c^onteⁿ^ts^of^aⁿ^y^wⁱ^r^e^,
^o^r^al^,^o^r^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c co}^m^m^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^o^n,^o^r^evi^d^en^{ce d}^e^ri^ved^t^h^eref^ro^m^,^ma^y^dⁱ^scl^o^{se su}^ch^coⁿ^t^eⁿ^t^s^o^r^d^e^rⁱ^vatⁱ^v^{e e}^vⁱ^d^en^{ce t}^o
^aⁿ^y^a^ppr^opr^ia^te^Fe^de^r^a^l,^Sta^t^e^,^lo^c^a^l^{, or}^f^o^r^e^ig^{n g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^{al to t}^h^e^e^x^te^{nt t}^h^a^t^s^u^c^h^c^onteⁿ^ts^o^r^de^rⁱ^v^a^tiv^e
^e^v^ideⁿ^c^e^re^v^e^a^l^{s a}^thre^a^t^of^a^c^t^ua^{l or}^poteⁿ^tia^{l a}^tta^c^k^{or ot}^he^{r g}^r^a^v^e^hostile^a^c^t^{s of}^a^f^o^re^ig^{n pow}^e^r^or^aⁿ^a^g^eⁿ^{t of}^a
^f^o^re^ig^{n pow}^e^r^{, dom}^e^s^tic^{or inte}^rn^a^tiona^{l sa}^b^o^ta^g^e^{, dom}^e^s^tic^{or inte}^rna^tio^na^{l te}^rrorism^{, or c}^l^aⁿ^de^stine^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e
^g^a^the^r^ing^a^c^tiv^itie^{s b}^y^aⁿ^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^se^rv^ic^e^{or ne}^tw^ork^of^a^f^o^re^{ign p}^o^w^e^{r or by}^aⁿ^a^g^eⁿ^{t of}^a^f^o^reⁱ^{gn p}^o^w^e^{r, w}^ithin
^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^{es o}^r^el^sew^h^ere,^f^o^{r t}^h^{e pu}^rpo^s^{e o}^f^p^r^even^tⁱⁿ^{g o}^r^resp^oⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^t^o^s^u^ch^{a t}^h^reat^.^Aⁿ^y^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^w^h^o^recei^ve^s
ⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^p^u^r^su^aⁿ^t^t^o^t^hⁱ^s^p^r^o^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^m^a^y^u^s^{e t}^h^atⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^oⁿ^l^y^{as n}^ecess^a^r^yⁱⁿ^t^h^{e co}^nd^u^c^t^o^f^t^h^at^p^e^rson^’s
^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^dutie^s^s^u^bje^c^t^{to a}ⁿ^y^li^m^ita^tions^{on t}^h^e^uⁿ^a^u^t^hor^iz^e^d^dis^c^los^u^r^e^of^s^u^c^hⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion, a}^{nd a}ⁿ^y^Sta^t^e^,^loc^a^l^,^or
^f^o^rei^gⁿ^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^w^h^o^recei^{ves i}ⁿ^f^o^rmatⁱ^oⁿ^pu^rsu^a^nt^t^o^t^hⁱ^s^p^r^o^vⁱ^sⁱ^o^{n m}^a^{y u}^s^{e t}^h^atⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^on^l^y^coⁿ^sⁱ^s^t^eⁿ^t^wⁱ^t^h^su^ch
^g^u^ide^line^s^a^s^the^A^ttorⁿ^e^y^Ge^ne^ra^{l a}^{nd Dire}^c^t^or^of^Ce^nt^ra^{l In}^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^sha^{ll jo}^intly^issue^,^”¹⁸^U.S.C.²⁵¹⁷⁽^7),(^8).
¹⁶^“^S^e^c^tion²⁰³⁽^d)⁽¹⁾^of^the^Uⁿ^iti^ng^a^{nd S}^t^r^e^ng^theⁿⁱⁿ^g^A^m^e^r^ica^by^P^r^ov^iding^A^ppr^o^p^rⁱ^a^t^e^T^ools^R^e^q^u^ir^e^d^{to I}ⁿ^te^r^c^e^p^t
^a^{nd O}^b^s^t^r^u^c^t^T^e^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^m⁽^U^S^A^P^A^T^R^I^O^T^A^C^T⁾⁽^P^.L^{. 1}^07-⁵⁶^{; 5}⁰^U^.^S.C^.⁴⁰³^-⁵^d⁾^is^a^m^e^nde^{d by}^a^ddin^g^a^t^the^e^nd^the
^f^o^llowⁱ^ng^{: ‘Cons}^is^te^{nt w}^{ith t}^h^e^re^s^ponsⁱ^b^ility^of^the^Dⁱ^re^c^t^{or of}^Ce^ntra^{l Inte}^l^lig^eⁿ^c^e^{to pr}^ote^c^tⁱⁿ^te^lli^g^e^nc^e^s^ourc^e^s^a^nd
^m^e^thods^{, a}^{nd t}^h^e^re^s^p^oⁿ^sⁱ^b^ility^{of the}^A^ttorne^y^G^e^ne^ra^{l to}^prote^c^t^s^e^ns^itiv^e^la^w^eⁿ^f^o^rc^em^eⁿ^{t inf}^o^rm^ation^,^{it s}^h^a^{ll be}
^la^wf^{ul f}^o^{r inf}^o^r^m^a^{tion re}^v^e^a^ling^a^thre^a^t^of^a^c^t^ua^{l or}^po^te^ntia^{l a}^tta^c^k^{or ot}^he^{r g}^r^a^v^e^hostile^a^c^t^{s of}^a^fore^ig^{n p}^o^w^e^{r or a}ⁿ
^a^g^eⁿ^{t of}^a^f^o^reⁱ^g^{n pow}^e^r^{, dom}^e^s^tic^{or in}^te^rna^tio^na^{l sa}^bo^ta^g^e^{, dom}^e^s^tic^{or i}ⁿ^te^rna^tio^na^{l te}^rrorⁱ^sm^{, or c}^l^a^nde^stine
^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^g^a^the^r^ing^a^c^tiv^itie^{s by}^aⁿ^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^se^rv^ic^e^{or ne}^tw^ork^of^a^f^o^reⁱ^g^{n pow}^e^r^{or by}^aⁿ^a^g^eⁿ^{t of}^a^f^o^re^igⁿ
^p^o^w^er,^wⁱ^t^hⁱⁿ^t^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es or el}^se^w^h^ere,^o^b^t^aiⁿ^e^d^{as p}^a^rt^of^a^c^r^im^ina^l^inv^e^stig^a^{tion to be}^disc^lo^se^{d to a}ⁿ^y
^ap^p^r^op^ri^at^{e F}^e^d^e^ral^,^S^t^at^e,^l^o^cal^,^o^r^f^o^rei^gⁿ^go^vern^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^f^o^{r t}^h^{e pu}^rpo^s^{e o}^f^p^r^even^tⁱⁿ^{g o}^r^respoⁿ^dⁱⁿ^{g t}^o^su^{ch a}
^t^h^reat^.^Aⁿ^y^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^w^h^o^recei^vesⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^p^u^r^su^aⁿ^t^t^o^t^hⁱ^s^p^r^o^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^m^a^y^u^s^{e t}^h^atⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^oⁿ^l^y^{as n}^ecess^a^r^yⁱⁿ
^the^c^oⁿ^duc^t^of^tha^t^pe^r^s^on’^s^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^dutie^s^s^ubje^c^t^t^o^aⁿ^y^lim^ita^tions^{on t}^h^e^uⁿ^a^u^t^hor^iz^e^d^dis^c^los^u^r^e^o^f^s^u^c^h
ⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^,^an^d^aⁿ^y^S^t^at^e,^l^o^cal^,^o^r^f^o^rei^gⁿ^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^w^h^o^recei^{ves i}ⁿ^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^oⁿ^p^u^r^s^u^an^t^t^o^t^hⁱ^s^p^r^o^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^m^a^y^u^s^{e t}^h^at
^inf^o^rm^a^{tion only}^c^onsiste^{nt w}^ith^suc^h^g^u^ide^lⁱⁿ^e^s^a^s^the^A^ttorne^y^Ge^ne^ra^{l a}^{nd Dire}^c^t^or^of^Ce^ntra^{l Int}^e^llig^eⁿ^c^e^sha^ll
^joint^l^y^is^s^u^e^,^’^”^P^.^L^.¹^07-²⁹^6,^§8⁹⁷⁽^a⁾^,¹¹⁶^Sta^t^.²²⁵⁷⁽²⁰⁰²⁾^.

Justice Department officials have explained that the section 203(b), along with several other
sections of the USA PATRIOT Act scheduled to expire, have made it possible for criminal law
enforcement and foreign intelligence investigators to share information for the more effective ¹⁷
performance of their duties, particularly in terrorism cases. By way of example, they have
testified that the authority under section 203(b) has been used to advise federal intelligence
officials of “the manner and means by which monies were funneled to Iraq,” and efforts to ¹⁸
support and supply a foreign terrorist organization. They argue that to allow section 203(b) and
other USA PATRIOT Act information sharing provisions to expire would be inconsistent with the
information sharing legislation Congress has enacted subsequently. They point particularly to
provisions that allow sharing with foreign officials: “Therefore, were section 203(b) allowed to
expire, United States law enforcement officers would be allowed to share certain foreign
information collected through criminal investigative wiretaps with foreign intelligence services, ¹⁹
such as MI-5, but would arguably not be allowed to share that same information with the CIA.”
The concern with information sharing has always been that law enforcement investigators will
call upon foreign intelligence powers in order to avoid the constitutional and other legal
safeguards that ordinarily attend the exercise of their own authority. A corresponding concern is
that foreign intelligence investigators will likewise call upon law enforcement authority to avoid
the safeguards that ordinarily attend their own foreign intelligence authority. At least one
Congressional hearing witness has speculated that the availability of section 203 may have led to ²⁰
the use of criminal law enforcement powers for purposes of an “intelligence probe.”
Others may question whether there are any real consequences of expiration. Other permanent
provisions of the wiretap law will continue to allow information sharing with other investigative ²¹²²
and law enforcement officials and in terrorism cases with intelligence authorities. The

¹⁷^E.g^.,^O^v^e^r^sⁱ^ght^{of t}^h^e^U^S^A^PATR^I^O^T^Ac^t:^H^e^arⁱⁿ^{g Be}^f^o^r^e^the^Seⁿ^a^te^C^o^m^m^.^on^the^J^u^dicⁱ^ar^y⁽^S^eⁿ^a^t^e^H^e^ar^ings⁾^,
¹⁰⁹^C^o^ng^{., 1}^st^Se^s^s^.⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^s^ta^te^m^e^{nt of}^A^ttorⁿ^ey^G^e^ne^r^a^l^A^l^be^r^t^{o R}^.^G^onz^a^l^e^s⁾^,^a^v^a^ila^ble^{on J}^u^ne^21,²⁰⁰⁵^a^t
^http:^//ju^dicⁱ^a^r^y^.^s^e^na^te^.g^ov^/^t^e^s^tim^ony^.cfm^?ⁱ^d=^1439&^w^it_id=³⁹³^6.
¹⁸^O^v^e^r^sⁱ^{ght H}^e^arⁱⁿ^{g o}ⁿ^t^h^e^I^m^ple^m^eⁿ^tati^on^{of t}^h^e^U^S^A^PATRI^O^T^Ac^t:^Effe^c^t^of^Se^c^tio^ns²⁰³⁽^b)^an^d⁽^d⁾^{on I}ⁿ^for^m^atioⁿ
^Sharⁱ^ng:^H^e^arⁱⁿ^gs^Be^for^e^t^h^e^S^u^b^c^om^m^.^on^C^r^im^e^,^Te^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^m^a^nd^H^o^m^e^lan^d^Se^c^u^r^ity^{of t}^h^e^H^o^us^e^C^o^m^m^.^oⁿ^t^h^e^th^st
^J^udicⁱ^ar^y⁽^H^ous^e^H^e^arⁱⁿ^gs⁾^{, 1}⁰⁹^Cong^{., 1}^Se^s^s^.⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^s^ta^te^m^e^{nt of}^C^h^ie^f^B^a^r^r^y^{M. Sa}^{bin, C}^o^uⁿ^t^e^r^te^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^m
^Se^c^tion,^C^r^im^ina^l^Dⁱ^vⁱ^sⁱ^{on, U}ⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^J^u^s^tic^e⁾⁽^S^abi^{n s}^t^a^t^e^m^eⁿ^t)^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^oⁿ^J^u^ne^21,²⁰⁰⁵^a^t
^http:^//ju^dicⁱ^a^r^y^.^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^m^e^dia^/^pdf^s^/^s^a^bin0⁴¹⁹⁰^5.p^d^f^.
¹⁹^Sa^bin^sta^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t c}^iting^{18 U.}^S.C.²⁵¹⁷⁽^{7) w}^h^ic^{h pe}^rm^{its sha}^r^ing^wⁱ^{th f}^o^re^ig^{n inv}^e^stig^a^tiv^e^a^{nd la}^w^eⁿ^f^o^rc^e^m^eⁿ^t
^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^s.
²⁰^H^ous^e^H^e^arⁱⁿ^gs^{, s}^t^a^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^Tⁱ^m^o^th^y^H^.^Edg^a^r^,^N^a^tiona^l^Se^c^u^rⁱ^t^y^P^o^lic^y^C^ouns^e^l^{, A}^m^e^r^ic^aⁿ^Cⁱ^vⁱ^l^Lⁱ^be^r^tie^s^Uⁿ^ion
^(“Acco^rdⁱⁿ^{g t}^o^t^h^e^Wa^shⁱⁿ^gt^on^Po^st^{, f}^e^de^ra^{l of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s ha}^v^e^soug^{ht t}^o^just^ify^the^ra^{ids ‘a}^{s a}ⁿ^inte^ll^ig^eⁿ^c^e^probe^,
^d^e^si^gn^ed^no^tⁿ^ecessari^l^y^t^o^yⁱ^el^d^cri^mⁱⁿ^al^ch^arg^e^{s b}^u^t^t^o^t^r^a^c^k^possⁱ^ble^te^rrorist^a^c^tiv^ity^.’^T^h^{is justif}^ic^a^{tion stro}^ng^ly
^s^u^g^g^e^s^t^s^tha^t^the^m^a^te^ria^l^s^e^iz^e^d^{. . . ha}^s^be^eⁿ^c^o^pie^d^aⁿ^{d s}^h^a^r^e^d^w^{ith in}^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^a^g^eⁿ^cⁱ^e^s^unde^{r s}^e^c^tion²⁰^3(d)^of^the
^P^a^tri^o^{t A}^c^t”^{), a}^v^a^ila^ble^{on J}^u^ne²¹^{, 2}⁰⁰⁵^a^t^htt^p^://j^udicⁱ^a^r^y^.^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^m^e^dia^/^pdf^s^/^s^a^bin0⁴¹⁹⁰^5.p^d^f^.
²¹^“Aⁿ^yⁱⁿ^vestⁱ^g^atⁱ^v^{e o}^r^l^a^w^en^f^o^rc^e^m^en^t^o^f^fⁱ^cer^w^h^o^,^b^y^an^y^mean^{s au}^t^h^o^rⁱ^zed^b^y^t^hⁱ^s^ch^ap^t^e^r,^h^a^{s obt}^aiⁿ^e^d
^kn^o^w^l^e^d^g^{e o}^f^t^h^{e co}ⁿ^t^en^t^s^o^f^an^y^wⁱ^re,^o^r^al^,^o^r^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^,^o^r^evi^d^en^{ce d}^e^ri^ved^t^h^erefro^m^,^m^a^y^dⁱ^scl^o^se
^su^ch^co^nt^en^t^s^t^o^ano^t^h^e^{r i}ⁿ^vestⁱ^g^atⁱ^v^{e o}^r^l^a^w^en^f^o^rce^m^en^t^o^f^fⁱ^{cer t}^o^t^h^{e ext}^eⁿ^t^t^h^at^su^ch^dⁱ^scl^o^s^u^{re i}^s^ap^p^r^op^ri^at^{e t}^o^t^h^e
^p^r^op^{er p}^e^rf^o^r^m^aⁿ^{ce o}^f^t^h^{e o}^f^fⁱ^ci^al^d^u^tⁱ^e^{s o}^f^t^h^{e o}^f^fⁱ^cer^makiⁿ^g^o^r^recei^viⁿ^g^t^h^{e d}ⁱ^scl^o^su^re,^”¹⁸^U.^S^.^C.²⁵¹⁷⁽¹⁾^.
²²^“Aⁿ^yⁱⁿ^vestⁱ^g^atⁱ^v^{e o}^r^l^a^w^en^f^o^rc^e^m^en^t^o^f^fⁱ^cer,^o^r^o^t^h^e^{r F}^e^d^e^ral^o^f^fⁱ^ci^alⁱⁿ^carr^yⁱⁿ^{g o}^u^t^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^d^u^tⁱ^e^{s as su}^ch^F^e^d^e^ral
^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^,^w^h^o^b^y^an^y^m^e^an^{s au}^t^h^ori^zed^b^y^t^hⁱ^s^ch^ap^t^e^r,^h^a^{s ob}^t^aⁱⁿ^e^d^kn^o^w^l^e^d^g^{e o}^f^t^h^{e co}ⁿ^t^ent^s^o^f^any^wⁱ^r^e^,^o^r^al^,^o^r
^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^,^o^r^evi^d^en^{ce d}^e^ri^ved^t^h^eref^ro^m^,^m^a^y^dⁱ^s^c^l^o^{se su}^ch^con^t^en^t^s^o^r^d^e^ri^vatⁱ^v^{e evi}^d^en^{ce t}^o^an^y
^ap^p^r^op^ri^at^{e F}^e^d^e^ral^,^S^t^at^e,^l^o^cal^,^o^r^f^o^rei^gⁿ^go^vern^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^t^o^t^h^{e ext}^eⁿ^t^t^h^at^s^u^ch^con^t^en^t^s^o^r^d^e^ri^vatⁱ^v^{e e}^vⁱ^d^en^ce
^re^v^e^a^l^{s a}^thre^a^t^of^a^c^t^ua^{l or pote}ⁿ^tⁱ^a^l^a^tta^c^k^{or othe}^{r g}^r^a^v^e^hostile^a^c^{ts of}^a^f^o^re^ig^{n pow}^e^r^{or a}ⁿ^a^g^eⁿ^{t of}^a^f^o^re^igⁿ
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

suggestion that information may be shared with MI-5 but not the CIA is bit perplexing. The
mantel of “investigative or law enforcement” agency ought to fit American and British ²³
intelligence services equally well. Yet it may not be an apt description of either.
At an earlier time, the Justice Department had objected to language comparable to subsection (b)
allowing the disclosure of wiretap foreign intelligence information to intelligence officials in part ²⁴
because it asserted in the more serious cases it was unnecessary.
Justice Department officials have identified a number of instances where law enforcement
authorities have shared information with foreign intelligence officials in reliance on section

203(d) including:

^In^f^o^r^m^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^about^t^h^{e org}^aⁿⁱ^z^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^{of a}^vⁱ^ol^en^t^jⁱ^h^a^{d t}^r^aiⁿⁱ^ng^ca^m^pⁱⁿ^cl^u^dⁱⁿ^g^t^r^aiⁿⁱ^ngⁱⁿ
^b^a^sic^m^ilitar^y^sk^{ills, ex}^p^l^o^s^iv^e^s^{, an}^d^w^eap^oⁿ^{s, as}^w^e^{ll a}^s^{a p}^l^o^t^to^b^o^m^b^so^f^t^t^a^r^g^e^t^s^a^b^r^o^a^d^.^.
^.^T^r^av^{el in}^f^o^r^m^ation^aⁿ^{d th}^e^manⁿ^e^{r t}^h^at^m^oⁿⁱ^es^w^e^{re ch}^a^{nneled to m}^e^m^b^er^s^of^{a cri}^mⁱⁿ^al
^con^s^pirac^yⁱⁿ^P^o^rtlan^d^w^h^{o trav}^{eled f}^r^o^m^t^h^{e U}ⁿ^{ited State}^sⁱⁿ^ten^dⁱⁿ^g^{to f}ⁱ^g^h^{t along}^sⁱ^{de t}^h^e
^T^a^liban^{. . . Inf}^o^r^m^{ation . . .ab}^o^u^t^t^h^e^m^aⁿⁿ^e^r^an^d^m^e^aⁿ^s^of^{[a] terroris}^t^g^r^ou^p’s^lo^gⁱ^s^t^ical
^s^u^{pport n}^e^t^w^or^k^{. . . [D}^]etails^reg^a^rding^th^{e application}^f^o^r^m^s^w^h^ic^h^per^m^{itted atten}^d^aⁿ^c^e^a^t
^th^{e [terroris}^t^{] trai}ⁿⁱ^ng^ca^m^p^[^o^v^e^rs^eas^{]. . . i}ⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^abou^{t t}^h^{e .}^{. . practices}^{, lo}^gⁱ^s^t^ical
^s^u^pport^an^{d t}^a^r^g^etⁱⁿ^{g i}ⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^{[of an}^A^l^-^Q^{aeda] t}^r^aiⁿⁱ^{ng ca}^m^pⁱⁿ^A^f^gh^ani^s^t^aⁿ^.^Sabiⁿ
^s^t^atement^{, 3-}^4.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^pow^e^r^{, dom}^e^s^tic^{or inte}^rna^tⁱ^ona^{l s}^a^bota^g^e^,^dom^e^s^tic^{or inte}^rⁿ^a^tio^na^{l te}^rrorism^{, or c}^l^a^nde^stine^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^g^a^the^r^ing
^a^c^tiv^itie^{s b}^y^aⁿ^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^se^rv^ic^e^{or ne}^tw^ork^of^a^f^o^re^ig^{n pow}^e^r^{or by}^aⁿ^a^g^eⁿ^{t of}^a^f^o^reⁱ^g^{n pow}^e^r^{, w}^{ithin the}^Uⁿ^ite^d
^S^t^at^{es o}^r^el^sew^h^ere,^f^o^{r t}^h^{e p}^u^r^{pose o}^f^p^r^even^tⁱⁿ^{g o}^r^resp^on^dⁱⁿ^g^t^o^su^ch^{a t}^h^reat^.^Aⁿ^y^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^w^h^o^recei^{ves i}ⁿ^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^oⁿ
^p^u^r^su^aⁿ^t^t^o^t^hⁱ^s^p^r^o^vⁱ^sⁱ^o^{n m}^a^y^u^s^{e t}^h^atⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^on^l^y^{as n}^ecess^a^ryⁱⁿ^t^h^{e co}ⁿ^d^u^c^t^o^f^t^h^at^p^e^rson^’s^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^d^u^tⁱ^e^s
^su^b^j^ect^t^o^an^y^lⁱ^mⁱ^t^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^oⁿ^t^h^{e un}^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^zed^dⁱ^scl^o^su^re^o^f^su^chⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^,^an^{d an}^y^S^t^at^e,^l^o^cal^,^o^r^f^o^rei^gⁿ^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al
^w^h^o^recei^ve^{s i}ⁿ^f^o^rmatⁱ^oⁿ^pu^rsu^a^nt^t^o^t^hⁱ^s^p^r^o^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^m^a^y^u^s^{e t}^h^atⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^oⁿ^oⁿ^l^y^coⁿ^sⁱ^s^t^eⁿ^t^wⁱ^t^h^such^guⁱ^d^elⁱⁿ^{es as}
^the^A^ttorne^y^G^e^ne^ra^{l a}^{nd Dire}^c^t^{or of}^Ce^ntra^{l In}^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^sha^ll^joiⁿ^tly^issue^,^”^{18 U.S.C.}²⁵¹⁷^(8).
²³¹⁸^U^.^S^.^C.²⁵¹⁰⁽⁷^{) (“‘I}ⁿ^v^estⁱ^g^atⁱ^v^{e o}^r^l^a^w^en^f^o^rce^m^en^t^o^f^fⁱ^cer’^mean^{s an}^y^o^f^fⁱ^{cer o}^f^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^a^t^{es o}^r^o^f^{a st}^at^{e o}^f
^polit^ic^a^l^sub^d^iv^isio^{n the}^r^e^o^f^,^w^h^o^{is e}^m^powe^r^e^d^by^la^w^{to c}^ond^uc^t^inv^e^s^tig^a^tions^of^or^t^o^m^a^k^e^a^r^r^e^s^t^s^f^o^r^of^f^e^ns^e^s
^en^u^m^erat^edⁱⁿ^t^hⁱ^{s ch}^a^p^t^e^r,^and^aⁿ^y^at^t^o^rn^e^y^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^zed^b^y^l^a^w^t^o^p^r^o^s^ecu^t^e^o^r^p^a^rtⁱ^cⁱ^p^at^{e i}ⁿ^t^h^{e p}^r^osecu^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^su^ch
^of^fe^nse^s^”⁾^.^T^h^e^r^e^m^a^y^be^a^distinc^tion^be^tw^e^eⁿ^a^g^eⁿ^ts^w^{ith f}^o^re^ig^{n inte}^llig^eⁿ^c^e^re^spoⁿ^sibil^ity^{in the}^{FBI a}^nd^th^oseⁱⁿ
^the^CIA^.^Sharⁱⁿ^g^Title^III^Ele^c^t^r^o^nic^S^u^r^v^e^illanc^e^M^a^te^rⁱ^al^W^{ith t}^h^e^Inte^lligeⁿ^c^e^Com^m^uni^ty^{, O}^p^.^O^f^f^.^Le^g^a^{l C}^ouns^e^l^,
^(Oct^.¹⁷^,²⁰⁰⁰^{) (“A}ⁿ^‘iⁿ^v^estⁱ^g^atⁱ^v^{e o}^r^l^a^w^en^f^o^rce^m^en^t^o^f^fⁱ^c^e^r,^{’ h}^o^w^e^ver,^m^u^st^h^a^{ve t}^h^{e p}^o^w^{er t}^oⁱ^nvestⁱ^g^at^{e o}^r^m^a^ke
^arrest^{s f}^o^{r o}^f^f^eⁿ^s^e^s^en^u^m^er^at^edⁱⁿ^§²⁵¹⁶^.^A^b^sen^t^so^m^e^sp^eci^fⁱ^{c au}^t^h^o^rⁱ^t^y^t^oⁱⁿ^vestⁱ^g^at^{e o}^r^{make arr}^e^st^{s f}^o^{r su}^ch
^of^fe^nse^s^{, a}^m^e^m^b^e^r^of^the^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^c^o^m^m^unit^y^{is not a}ⁿ^inv^e^sti^g^a^tiv^e^{or la}^w^eⁿ^f^o^rc^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^fⁱ^c^e^{r f}^o^{r purp}^o^se^{s of}
^T^itle^III”^{), a}^v^a^ila^b^l^e^oⁿ^Juⁿ^e²¹^{, 2}⁰⁰⁵^a^t^h^ttp^:/^/www^.u^sd^o^j^.g^o^v^/^o^lc^/title^IIIfⁱⁿ^a^l^.h^tm^.
²⁴¹⁴⁶^Con^g^.^R^ec.^S¹¹¹¹⁹⁽^d^a^ily^e^d^{. O}^c^{t. 2}⁶^,²⁰⁰⁰⁾⁽^l^e^tte^r^f^r^om^A^s^s^’^{t A}^tt’^y^G^e^{n. R}^obe^r^t^R^a^be^{n t}^o^Se^n.^Rⁱ^c^h^a^r^{d S}^h^e^l^by^,
^da^te^{d Se}^pt^{. 2}⁸^,²⁰^00)(“^Se^c^tⁱ^on¹⁰^w^{ould a}^m^e^{nd 18}^U.S.C.^§²⁵¹⁷^to^pe^rm^{it the}^sha^r^ing^of^f^o^re^ig^{n inte}^llig^eⁿ^c^e^or
^c^ounte^rⁱⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^inf^o^rm^a^{tion, c}^o^lle^c^t^e^d^by^inv^e^s^tig^a^tiv^e^{or la}^w^enf^o^rc^em^eⁿ^{t off}ⁱ^c^e^r^s^unde^{r title}^III^{, w}^{ith the}
^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^c^o^m^m^unity^.^W^e^oppo^s^e^this^pr^ov^is^ion^.^A^lt^houg^h^w^e^re^c^o^gⁿ^iz^e^the^a^r^g^u^m^e^nts^f^o^{r a}^llowⁱ^ng^title^III
^inf^o^rm^a^{tion to}^be^sha^r^e^d^a^s^a^pe^r^m^is^sible^m^a^tte^{r this}^w^{ould be}^a^m^a^jor^c^h^aⁿ^g^e^{to e}^x^is^ting^la^w^a^{nd c}^oul^{d ha}^v^e
^sⁱ^gⁿ^if^ic^aⁿ^{t i}^m^plic^a^tions^f^o^r^pr^os^e^c^u^tio^ns^aⁿ^d^the^dis^c^ov^e^r^y^pr^o^c^e^s^s^{in li}^tig^a^tion^.^Aⁿ^y^c^onside^r^a^tion^o^f^the^sha^r^ing^of^la^w
^eⁿ^f^o^rc^e^m^eⁿ^{t inf}^o^r^m^a^{tion w}^{ith the}^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^c^o^m^m^unity^m^u^st^a^c^c^om^m^oda^te^le^g^a^{l c}^onstraⁱ^{nts suc}^h^a^s^Crim^ina^l^Rule
^6(e⁾^[^r^e^l^a^tⁱⁿ^g^{to g}^r^aⁿ^{d jury}^se^c^r^e^c^y^]^a^{nd the}^ne^e^d^t^o^pr^ote^c^t^e^q^uitie^s^re^la^ting^to^ong^oi^ng^c^r^im^ina^l^inv^e^stig^a^{tions. W}^h^ile
^w^e^unde^r^s^ta^{nd t}^h^e^c^onc^e^r^ns^of^the^C^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on on T}^e^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^m^{, w}^e^b^e^lie^v^e^tha^t^la^w^eⁿ^f^o^r^c^em^eⁿ^{t a}^g^eⁿ^cⁱ^e^s^ha^v^e^a^u^thor^ity
^unde^{r c}^u^rre^{nt la}^w^{to s}^h^a^r^e^title^III^inf^o^rm^a^{tion re}^g^a^rding^te^rrori^s^m^w^{ith inte}^llig^eⁿ^c^e^a^g^eⁿ^cⁱ^e^s^w^h^eⁿ^the^inf^o^rm^a^{tion is}^of
^ov^e^r^rⁱ^ding^im^por^ta^nc^e^to^the^na^ti^ona^{l s}^e^c^u^r^ity^{. Se}^c^tion¹⁰^a^l^{so ra}^is^e^s^sigⁿ^if^ic^aⁿ^{t issue}^s^reg^a^rdⁱⁿ^g^th^e^sha^r^ing^w^ith
^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^a^g^eⁿ^cⁱ^e^s^of^inf^o^r^m^a^tⁱ^{on c}^o^lle^c^t^e^d^a^b^{out U}ⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^pe^rsons.^Suc^h^a^c^h^aⁿ^g^e^{to t}^itle^III^sho^u^ld^no^{t be}
^m^a^de^lig^htly^,^w^ithout^f^u^{ll dis}^c^us^sⁱ^on^of^the^is^s^u^e^s^aⁿ^d^im^plic^a^tions^”⁾^.

It has never been precisely clear exactly what obstacles, if any, section 203(d) cleared away.²⁵ It is
presumably intended to supplement rather than supplant the grand jury and wiretap information
sharing provisions that immediately precede it in sections 203(a) and 203(b), but even that is not
necessarily the case.
Subsection (b) permits the disclosure of wiretap-generated foreign intelligence information to
federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration and military personnel for official
use.
• Permanent authority elsewhere allows for law enforcement sharing.
• Permanent authority enacted subsequently allows authorities to share information
concerning domestic or international terrorism with federal, state, local and
foreign officials.
• A prior Justice Department letter claimed the existence of authority elsewhere to
share wiretap generated information in the presence of an overriding national
security concern.
• Subsection (d) permits the disclosure of foreign intelligence information
discovered in the course of a federal criminal investigation notwithstanding any
legal impediment.
• It is unclear what if any, legal impediments exist.
Section 204 is essentially a technical amendment. Prior wiretap law makes it clear that the general
prohibitions against wiretapping, 18 U.S.C. 2511, and against the acquisition of communications
records and stored electronic communications, 18 U.S.C. 2701, do not preclude foreign
intelligence gathering activities in international or foreign communications systems, 18 U.S.C.
2511(2)(f)(2000 ed.). Section 204 amends the provision to add that the general prohibition against
the use of pen registers or trap and trace devices, 18 U.S.C. 3121, is likewise no impediment to ²⁶
such activities, 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(f).

²⁵^“^E^v^e^{n the}^A^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^{tion, w}^h^ic^h^w^r^ote^this^pr^ov^is^ion,^ha^sⁿ^o^t^be^eⁿ^a^b^le^t^o^pr^ov^ide^a^f^u^lly^s^a^tisf^a^c^t^o^r^y^e^x^plaⁿ^a^tion^of
ⁱ^t^s^sco^p^e^.^If^t^h^{ere are sp}^eci^fⁱ^{c l}^a^{ws t}^h^at^t^h^{e A}^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^st^ratⁱ^o^{n b}^e^lⁱ^e^{ves i}^m^p^e^d^e^t^h^{e n}^ecessar^y^sh^ariⁿ^{g o}^fⁱⁿ^f^o^rmatⁱ^oⁿ^on
^te^rrorism^a^{nd f}^o^re^ig^{n inte}^llig^eⁿ^c^e^w^{ithin the}^e^x^e^c^u^tiv^e^braⁿ^c^h^,^w^e^s^hou^{ld a}^ddre^{ss th}^ose^pr^oble^m^{s throug}^{h le}^gⁱ^sla^tioⁿ
^tha^t^is^na^r^r^ow^l^y^ta^r^g^e^t^e^d^{to t}^hos^e^s^t^a^t^ute^s^{. T}^a^c^k^ing^{on a}^blu^nde^r^bus^s^pr^ov^is^io^{n w}^hos^e^s^c^ope^w^e^doⁿ^o^{t f}^u^lly^unde^r^s^ta^nd
^c^aⁿ^only^le^a^d^{to c}^ons^e^q^ue^nc^e^s^tha^t^w^e^c^a^{nnot f}^o^r^e^s^e^e^,^”¹⁴⁷^Con^g^.^R^ec.^S1¹⁰⁰²⁽^d^aily^ed^{. Oct. 2}⁵^{, 2}⁰⁰¹^)(rem^a^r^k^{s o}^f
^S^eⁿ^a^t^o^{r L}^eah^y⁾^.
²⁶^S^{ee e.}^g^.^,^“^T^his^s^e^c^{tion is}^a^te^c^hⁿⁱ^c^a^l^a^{nd c}^onf^or^mⁱ^ng^am^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t tha}^t^w^{ould a}^{dd c}^h^a^p^te^r²⁰⁶⁽^r^e^la^ti^ng^to^peⁿ
^regi^st^ers/^t^r^ap^an^d^t^r^{ace o}^r^d^e^{rs) t}^o^sectⁱ^oⁿ^§2⁵¹¹⁽^f⁾^o^f^t^h^{e W}ⁱ^ret^a^p^S^t^at^u^t^e.^S^ectⁱ^oⁿ²⁵¹¹⁽^f⁾^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^{es t}^h^at^no^t^hⁱⁿ^{g i}ⁿ
^c^h^a^p^te^r¹^{19 (}^r^e^la^ti^ng^to^theⁱⁿ^te^r^c^e^p^tio^{n of}^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions⁾^,^c^h^a^p^t^e^r¹²¹⁽^r^e^la^ting^t^o^s^t^or^e^d^wⁱ^r^e^a^{nd e}^l^e^c^t^r^onic
^co^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^an^d^t^r^an^sactⁱ^o^{n r}^eco^rd^{s access),}^o^r^sectⁱ^oⁿ⁷⁰⁵^o^f^t^h^{e Co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^A^c^t^o^f¹⁹³⁴^,^‘sh^a^l^l^b^e^d^eemed
^{to a}^f^fe^c^t^the^a^c^quisitioⁿ^by^the^Unite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^G^o^v^e^rnm^e^nt^of^f^o^re^igⁿ^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^inf^o^rm^a^{tion f}^o^rm^inte^rna^tiona^l^or
^f^o^reigⁿ^co^mm^uⁿⁱ^catioⁿ^s^{, o}^r^f^o^rei^gⁿⁱⁿ^te^llig^en^{ce activ}^{ities co}ⁿ^d^u^c^tedⁱⁿ^acco^rd^an^ce^w^ith^o^t^h^e^rw^{ise ap}^p^licab^{le Fed}^e^ral
^la^w^.^{. . .’}^T^h^e^bill^w^{ould i}ⁿ^c^l^u^d^e^c^h^a^p^te^r²⁰⁶^u^nde^r^t^h^a^t^§²⁵¹¹⁽^f⁾^,”^H^.^R^e^{pt. 1}^07-³⁰^{7 a}^t⁵⁵⁽²⁰⁰¹⁾^.

The Administration explained in its request for this section that “This provision clarifies that the
collection of foreign intelligence information is governed by foreign intelligence authorities
rather than by criminal procedural statutes, as the current statutory scheme envisions,” Hearing,
at 54. The proposal passed in haec verba from the Administration’s draft bill (§104), through the
House and Senate bills (§104 and §204 respectively), to the USA PATRIOT Act (§204).
The authority under section 204 ends on March 10, 2006 except for investigations relating to
offenses or potential offenses begun or occurring before then. The provisions of section 204 have
not been substantively amended.
Neither of the Justice Department reports mentions section 204. Neither the continuation nor the
demise of section 204 seem likely to alter the fact that the general trap and trace device and pen
register proscriptions do not preclude the exercise of authority to use trap and trace devices and
pen registers to gather foreign intelligence information.
- Makes clear that the general trap and trace device and pen register prohibitions do not bar use of
FISA authority to use trap and trace devices and pen registers to gather foreign intelligence
information.
At one time, at least some courts felt that authorities needed a wiretap order rather than a search ^th
warrant to seize unretrieved voice mail, United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9 Cir. 1998).
Section 209 treats voice mail like e-mail, subject to seizure under a search warrant rather than a
more demanding wiretap order law, 18 U.S.C. 2703.
Section 209 likewise passed in large measure unaltered from Administration proposal to
enactment. The proposal simply sought to treat voice mail like e-mail:
^T^h^{is sectio}ⁿ^en^ab^{les la}^w^eⁿ^f^o^r^c^e^m^en^{t p}^e^r^s^oⁿⁿ^e^{l to}^{seize s}^u^sp^ected^t^e^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^t^s^’^v^oⁱ^c^e^m^aⁱ^l
^m^e^ss^ag^e^s^pu^rsu^aⁿ^t^t^o^{a s}^earch^w^a^rran^t^.^A^t^pres^ent^,^{18 U}^.^S^.^C^.^§251⁰⁽¹⁾^an^om^al^o^u^s^l^y^defⁱⁿ^e^s
^“w^{ire co}^m^m^unication^”^{to in}^cl^{ude “}^a^ny^elec^tron^{ic s}^t^orag^{e of}^s^u^ch^co^m^m^uⁿⁱ^c^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^,^”^m^e^aⁿⁱⁿ^g
^th^{at t}^h^e^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^m^u^{st ap}^p^l^y^f^o^r^{a T}^{itle I}^I^I^wⁱ^r^e^tap^o^r^d^e^r^b^e^f^o^r^e^{it ca}ⁿ^o^b^t^ain^uⁿ^o^p^eⁿ^e^d
^v^o^ice^m^a^il^m^e^ssa^g^e^{s h}^e^ld^b^y^a^ser^v^{ice p}^r^o^v^id^er^{. T}^h^{e sectio}ⁿ^a^m^en^d^s^t^h^{e d}^e^fⁱⁿ^itioⁿ^o^f^“w^ir^e
^com^m^unication^”^s^o^t^h^{at i}^tⁿ^o^lon^g^e^{r i}ⁿ^cl^u^d^es^s^t^{ored co}^m^m^uⁿⁱ^ca^tⁱ^ons^{. It}^al^s^o^a^m^eⁿ^ds¹⁸
^U^.^S^.^C^.^{§2703 t}^o^s^p^eci^fy^t^h^at^t^h^{e g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^m^a^y^u^s^{e a}^s^earc^h^w^a^rran^t⁽ⁱ^ns^t^{ead of}^a^wⁱ^ret^a^p
^{order) t}^o^com^p^el^t^h^{e produ}^ctⁱ^oⁿ^of^uⁿ^open^e^d^v^oⁱ^ce^m^aⁱ^l^,^t^h^u^s^h^a^r^m^oⁿⁱ^zⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{e r}^u^l^e^s
^{applicable to}^s^t^{ored v}^o^{ice an}^dⁿ^on-^v^o^{ice (e.g}^{., e-m}^a^{il) co}^m^m^uⁿⁱ^ca^tions^.^Hea^rⁱⁿ^g^{at 5}⁴^;^se^e
^al^s^o^{, H}^.^R^e^pt^{. 107-}²³^{6, at}⁵⁴^.

The authority under section 209 ends on March 10, 2006 except for investigations relating to
offenses or potential offenses begun or occurring before then. The provisions of section 209 have
not been substantively amended.
The Justice Department cites the ease and speed with which a warrant can be obtain as the
principal virtue of section 209:
^I^nve^stⁱ^g^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^o^f^t^e^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^m^aⁿ^d^o^t^he^r^c^rⁱ^m^e^s^ha^ve^a^l^so^l^o^{ng b}^e^en^f^r^us^t^r^at^ed^b^y^t^h^e^f^aⁱ^l^u^re
^of^f^e^{deral la}^w^{to per}^m^{it a}^g^en^t^s^{to g}^aⁱⁿ^acce^s^s^{to v}^o^ice^-^m^a^il^mes^s^a^g^e^s^wⁱ^t^h^{a s}^earc^h^w^a^rran^t^.
^P^r^io^r^to^th^{e US}^A^P^A^T^R^I^O^T^A^c^t,^f^e^d^e^r^a^{l la}^w^r^e^q^u^ir^ed^o^f^fⁱ^cer^{s to}^w^a^ste^cr^itical^ti^m^e^aⁿ^d
^res^o^u^r^ces^g^oⁱⁿ^g^t^h^rough^t^h^{e burden}^s^o^m^{e proces}^s^of^obt^aiⁿⁱ^{ng a w}ⁱ^ret^a^{p order (}^r^at^h^e^{r t}^h^an^a
^sear^ch^w^a^r^r^aⁿ^t)^to^o^b^t^ain^uⁿ^o^p^eⁿ^e^d^v^o^ice^-^m^a^{il. T}^hⁱ^s^w^a^{s so}^d^e^sp^{ite t}^h^e^f^act^th^at^au^th^o^r^itie^s
^cou^l^{d u}^s^e^{a s}^earc^h^w^a^rran^t,^f^o^{r ex}^a^m^{ple, to obtai}ⁿ^m^e^s^s^a^g^e^s^s^t^{ored on}^th^e^s^u^s^p^ect^’^s^o^wⁿ
^an^sw^eriⁿ^g^m^a^c^hⁱⁿ^{e. S}^ectⁱ^oⁿ^{209 of}^t^h^{e U}^S^A^P^A^T^R^IO^T^A^c^t^h^a^s^m^oderni^{zed f}^e^deral^l^a^w^b^y
^en^abling^inv^e^s^tig^a^t^ors^to^acces^s^m^o^re^qu^ick^l^y^s^u^s^p^e^c^t^s^’^v^oⁱ^c^e-^m^aⁱ^l^by^u^sⁱⁿ^g^a^s^e^a^r^c^h^w^a^r^r^aⁿ^t^.
^T^h^{e s}^p^{eed w}ⁱ^t^h^w^h^ich^v^o^ice^-^m^a^{il is}^s^e^{ized an}^{d s}^earch^ed^can^of^ten^{be critical to an}
ⁱⁿ^v^e^s^tⁱ^g^atioⁿ^becau^s^e^s^t^{ored v}^o^ice-m^a^{il is}^r^e^g^u^l^a^r^l^y^d^e^l^e^t^e^d^b^y^s^e^r^vⁱ^c^e^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^e^r^s^aⁿ^d^t^h^u^s^l^o^s^t
^f^o^rev^e^{r. Warran}^t^s^pu^rs^u^aⁿ^t^t^o^sectⁱ^oⁿ^{209 h}^a^v^e^been^u^s^{ed t}^o^o^b^t^aⁱⁿ^k^e^y^e^vⁱ^d^en^{ce i}ⁿ^{a v}^a^ri^e^t^y
^of^cri^mⁱⁿ^{al cas}^e^s^{, in}^cl^u^dⁱⁿ^g^v^o^ice-m^a^il^m^e^s^s^ag^e^s^{left f}^o^{r th}^os^{e participatin}^gⁱⁿ^{a larg}^e^-^s^cal^e
^ecstas^y^s^m^u^g^g^liⁿ^g^rⁱⁿ^g^b^a^sedⁱⁿ^th^{e Net}^h^er^laⁿ^d^s,^Repor^t^at^22.
The Justice Department also reports that “[s]ince passage of the act, such warrants have been used
in a variety of criminal cases to obtain key evidence, including voice mail messages left for
foreign and domestic terrorists,” Myths at §209. And it points out that while the procedure under
Title III is more demanding and consequently slower and more burdensome, the warrant
procedure necessarily involves a finding of probable cause on evidence presented under oath and
found by a neutral magistrate, Id.
Critics might suggest that Congress could have supplied consistency of treatment in a different
manner. It might have concluded that an ongoing conversation (i.e., one in which
communications are being transmitted but have not been received) should be accorded the same
level of Title III protection whether it involves a telephone conversation, a face to face
conversation, an e-mail conversation, or a voice mail conversation. As it now stands, a telephone
conversation is treated differently than an incomplete voice mail conversation. Here and
elsewhere, critics might also suggest that information on the utility of the new authority seems
somewhat general and fairly skeletal. Here and elsewhere, critics might be concerned with the ²⁷
extent to which the enhancement of government authority heralds a loss of personal privacy.

²⁷^L^ee,^T^h^{e US}^A^P^A^T^R^IOT^A^c^t^a^{nd T}^e^l^eco^mmuⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^{: P}^rⁱ^v^a^{cy U}ⁿ^d^e^{r A}^t^t^a^ck^{, 2}⁹^R^UT^GE^RS^C^OM^P^U^T^E^R^&
^T^E^C^HNO^L^OGY^L^AW^J^OURN^A^L^371,³⁸²⁽²⁰⁰³⁾⁽^“^B^y^e^lⁱ^m^ina^ting^the^b^u^r^d^eⁿ^s^o^m^e^pr^oc^e^s^s^of^obtaⁱ^ning^a^wⁱ^r^e^ta^{p or}^de^r^,
^tho^u^g^h^{, t}^h^is^prov^isio^{n u}^ltim^a^t^e^l^y^eⁿ^c^oura^g^e^s^m^o^re^g^ove^rn^m^e^nt^se^a^r^c^h^e^s^{. Ev}^eⁿ^c^a^s^e^la^w^tha^t^re^quire^{d the}^g^o^v^e^rnm^e^{nt to}
^a^p^p^l^y^f^o^{r a}^T^itle^III^w^a^rraⁿ^t^{is n}^o^w^o^v^e^r^tu^rn^e^d^”⁾^{; W}^h^ite^h^e^a^d^&^A^d^eⁿ^{, a}^t¹¹¹⁰^(“^T^h^e^P^a^trio^t^A^c^{t in}^c^o^rp^o^r^a^t^e^s^‘w^ire
^co^mm^uⁿⁱ^catioⁿ^’ⁱⁿ^to^t^h^{e d}^e^fⁱⁿ^iti^oⁿ^o^f^an^‘electroⁿⁱ^{c co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catioⁿ^s^sy^ste^m^{,’ e}^f^f^ectiv^el^y^p^e^r^m^ittin^g^{access to}^su^ch
^messa^ges^vi^{a a st}^an^d^a^rd^search^warran^t^,^{as i}^f^{a vo}ⁱ^ce^m^aⁱ^l^m^e^ss^ag^{e w}^e^r^e^m^e^rel^y^{a d}^o^c^u^m^en^t^a^r^y^reco^r^d^.^Ho^w^e^ver,^an
^indivⁱ^d^u^a^l^{’s c}^o^nstitu^tio^na^lly^re^c^o^gⁿ^iz^e^d^e^x^p^e^c^t^a^{tion of}^priv^a^c^y^{in his or he}^{r m}^e^ssa^ge^{is not}^dimⁱ^nishe^d^by^the^f^a^c^t^tha^t
^t^h^{e m}^e^ss^{age i}^s^st^o^r^ed^t^e^m^p^o^r^ari^l^yⁱⁿ^{a vo}ⁱ^{ce m}^e^ss^agiⁿ^{g s}^y^st^e^m^b^e^f^o^{re b}^eⁱⁿ^{g ret}^rⁱ^e^ved^b^y^t^h^{e reci}^pⁱ^en^t^.^Coⁿ^s^equ^eⁿ^t^l^y^,
^{this pr}^ov^isio^{n of}^the^P^a^tri^o^t^A^c^{t is}^c^ons^tit^uti^ona^lly^s^u^s^p^e^c^t^un^de^r^th^e^Four^t^h^A^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^t”⁾^.

The fact that Title III is only available in connection with the investigation of certain serious
crimes while a search warrant is available in connection with any criminal investigation does not
seem to be a consideration of any substantial force to either critics or the Justice Department.
The section permits use of a search warrant to seize unopened voice mail held by a service
provider.
• Previous requirements of a wiretap order were slow, burdensome, and not
compatible with the manner in which unopened, provider-stored e-mail was
handled.
• Critics might suggest that compatibility might have been achieved by expanding
wiretap order requirements to cover unopened e-mail.
• Critics might question the section’s continued utility if no more detailed and
extensive evidence of successful use is available.
• Search warrants can be used to secure evidence of any crime; Title III orders are
limited to investigations involve serious predicate offenses.
Prior law confined the circumstances under which service providers might disclose the particulars
of their customers’ transaction records or communications without a warrant, court order, or their
customers’ consent, 18 U.S.C. 2702, 2703 (2000 ed.). Section 212 permitted communications
service providers to disclose either customer records or the content of their customers’
communications to authorities in any emergency situation that involved an immediate danger of
physical injury, P.L. 107-56, §212(a)(1)(D), 115 Stat. 284-85 (2001). The content provision has
been repealed and replaced; the records provision has not, 18 U.S.C. 2702(b)(7), (8), 2702(c)(4).
Although with a only fleeting reference to cyber terrorism offered as justification, the proposal
for emergency provider disclosure came as part of the original package, §110, H.R.—, Hearing, ²⁸
at 72. The House and Senate proposals contained essentially the same provision, §110, H.R.

²⁸^T^h^e^J^u^s^tic^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^nt’^s^e^x^plaⁿ^a^{tion r}^a^{n a}^s^f^o^llow^s^{, “}^E^xⁱ^s^ting^la^w^c^ontaⁱ^ns^no^pr^ov^is^ions^t^h^a^t^a^l^l^o^w^pr^ov^ide^r^s^of
^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^servi^{ce t}^o^di^scl^o^{se t}^h^{e co}^m^m^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^(o^{r reco}^rd^{s rel}^a^tⁱⁿ^g^t^o^s^u^ch^co^m^m^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^{) o}^f
^t^h^ei^{r cu}^st^o^m^{ers o}^r^su^b^s^cri^b^{ers i}ⁿ^e^m^erg^eⁿ^cⁱ^e^{s t}^h^at^t^h^reat^en^d^eat^h^{or seri}^o^u^s^b^o^dⁱ^l^yⁱⁿ^j^u^ry^.^T^hⁱ^s^sectⁱ^oⁿ^am^en^d^s¹⁸
^U^.^S.C^.^§2⁷⁰^{2 to}^a^u^t^hor^iz^e^s^u^c^h^di^s^c^los^u^r^e^s^if^the^pr^ov^ide^r^r^e^a^s^oⁿ^a^b^ly^be^lie^ve^s^tha^t^aⁿ^e^m^e^r^g^e^ncy^involvⁱ^ng^im^m^e^dia^t^e
^da^ng^e^r^of^de^a^t^{h or}^s^e^rⁱ^ous^phy^sⁱ^ca^{l injur}^y^{to a}ⁿ^y^pe^r^s^{on r}^e^quir^e^s^di^s^c^los^u^r^e^of^theⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion w}^itho^u^{t de}^la^y^.
^“^C^ur^r^e^{nt la}^w^a^l^s^o^c^ontaⁱ^ns^aⁿ^o^d^d^dis^c^on^ne^c^{t: a}^pr^ov^ide^r^m^a^y^dis^c^l^o^s^e^the^con^t^eⁿ^ts^o^f^t^h^{e cu}^st^o^m^er’^s^co^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s
^{in or}^de^r^t^o^pr^ote^c^t^its^rⁱ^g^h^t^s^or^pr^o^p^e^r^ty^{but the}^c^u^r^r^e^{nt s}^t^a^t^u^t^e^doe^s^{not e}^x^pr^e^s^s^l^y^pe^r^m^{it a}^pr^ov^ide^r^t^o^v^o^lun^t^a^r^ily
^dⁱ^sclo^se^non-^c^o^nt^eⁿ^t^r^e^c^o^r^d^s⁽^s^uc^{h a}^s^a^s^ubs^c^r^ibe^r^’^s^l^o^gⁱ^{n r}^e^c^o^r^d^s⁾^{. 18}^U^.^S.C^.²⁷⁰²⁽^b⁾⁽⁵⁾^{. T}^h^is^pr^o^b^l^e^m^s^ubs^ta^ntia^lly
^hin^d^e^r^{s the}^a^bⁱ^lity^of^prov^ide^r^{s to}^prote^c^t^t^h^e^m^se^l^v^e^s^f^r^o^m^c^y^be^r-te^r^{rorists a}ⁿ^d^c^r^im^ina^l^s.^Ye^{t the}^rig^h^t^to^disc^lose^t^h^e
^c^onteⁿ^ts^of^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tions ne}^c^e^ssa^ril^yⁱ^m^plie^{s the}^le^{ss intr}^us^iv^e^a^b^ility^{to disc}^l^o^se^no^n-c^o^nteⁿ^{t re}^c^o^{rds. In}^or^de^{r to}
^pr^om^ote^the^pr^ote^c^tioⁿ^of^our^na^ti^on’^s^c^r^itic^a^lⁱⁿ^f^r^a^s^tr^uc^tur^e^s^,^this^s^e^c^tion’^s^a^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^ts^a^llow^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions
^pr^ov^ide^r^s^t^o^v^o^l^unta^r^ily^dis^c^los^e^bot^{h c}^o^nteⁿ^{t a}^nd^no^n-^con^t^en^t^rec^o^rd^{s t}^o^pro^t^ect^t^h^ei^{r co}^m^p^u^t^{er sy}^s^t^ems.^”

2975, H.Rept. 107-236, at 6-7; §212, S. 1510, 147 Cong. Rec. S10311 (daily ed. October 4,

2001).

The Homeland Security Act repealed section 212’s provision governing content disclosure in
emergency situations and recasts it as a separate provision, 18 U.S.C. 2702(b)(7), but said nothing
of the emergency disclosure of customer records, 18 U.S.C. 2703(c)(4). As a consequence, the
authority to disclose customer records in an emergency situation disappears on March 10, 2006
(except with respect to crimes or potential crimes beginning or occurring before then), but the
freestanding emergency content disclosure provision which replaced its section 212 predecessor
remains in effect.
The Justice Department cites several instances where the authority of section 212 has been used.
Although capsulized, its descriptions seem to speak of providers supplying record, rather than
content, information:
^T^h^{e co}^o^p^er^atioⁿ^o^f^th^ir^d^p^a^r^tie^{s in}^crⁱ^mⁱⁿ^{al o}^r^ter^r^o^r^{ist in}^v^e^s^tig^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^sⁱ^s^o^f^t^eⁿ^c^r^u^cⁱ^a^l^t^o^a
^p^o^s^itiv^{e o}^u^tco^m^{e. T}^h^ir^d^p^a^r^tie^{s, su}^c^h^{as teleco}^m^m^uⁿⁱ^ca^tioⁿ^s^co^m^p^anⁱ^e^s^,^o^f^t^eⁿ^c^aⁿ^a^s^sⁱ^st^l^a^w
^en^f^o^r^c^e^m^en^{t b}^y^p^r^o^v^idⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿⁱⁿ^e^m^er^g^eⁿ^c^y^s^itu^atioⁿ^s^{. P}^r^ev^io^u^s^f^e^d^e^r^a^{l la}^w^,
^h^o^w^e^v^e^r^,^dⁱ^dⁿ^o^{t ex}^p^r^essl^y^a^llo^w^teleco^m^m^uⁿ^icatioⁿ^s^co^m^p^aⁿ^ie^{s to}^dⁱ^sclo^{se cu}^sto^m^er
^records^{or com}^m^uⁿⁱ^cationsⁱⁿ^e^m^erg^eⁿ^c^ie^s^.^Ev^eⁿⁱ^f^{a prov}ⁱ^d^{er believ}^e^{d th}^{at it}^f^{aced a}ⁿ
^e^m^e^r^ge^nc^y^si^t^u^a^tⁱ^o^{n i}ⁿ^w^hⁱ^c^{h l}ⁱ^v^e^s^w^e^r^e^a^t^rⁱ^s^k^{, i}^f^th^{e p}^r^ov^{ider tu}^rn^{ed ov}^{er cu}^s^t^o^m^er
ⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^to^th^{e g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^{, it r}ⁱ^sk^ed^{, in}^so^m^e^cir^c^u^m^s^t^an^{ces, b}^eⁱⁿ^g^su^ed^f^o^r^m^oⁿ^e^y
^dam^a^g^e^s^.^C^ong^ress^re^m^e^di^{ed t}^hⁱ^s^probl^e^mⁱⁿ^s^ectⁱ^oⁿ^{212 o}^f^t^h^{e U}^S^A^P^A^T^R^IO^T^A^c^t^b^y
^allo^wⁱ^ng^electronⁱ^{c co}^m^m^uⁿⁱ^c^a^tion^s^s^e^r^v^{ice prov}^id^e^r^{s to}^dⁱ^sc^lo^se^r^e^c^o^rds^t^o^t^h^e^g^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t
ⁱⁿ^si^t^u^a^tⁱ^o^{ns i}ⁿ^vo^l^vⁱⁿ^{g a}ⁿⁱ^m^m^e^dⁱ^a^t^e^d^a^nge^r^o^f^d^e^a^t^{h o}^r^s^e^ri^o^u^s^phy^sⁱ^calⁱⁿ^j^u^r^y^t^o^any^pers^oⁿ^.
^Section^{212 h}^a^s^alread^y^a^m^pl^{y prov}^{ed its}^u^tilit^y^.
Examples:
• Section 212 was used in the investigation of a bomb threat against a school. An
anonymous person, claiming to be a student at a high school, posted on the
Internet a disturbing death threat . . . The operator of the Internet site initially
resisted disclosuring to law enforcement any information. . . Once a prosecutor
explained that the USA PATRIOT Act created a new provision allowing for
voluntary release of information in emergencies, the owner turned over evidence
that led to the timely identification of the individual responsible for the bomb
threat. . ..
• Section 212 was recently used to apprehend quickly an individual threatening to
destroy a Texas mosque before he could carry out his threat. . ..
• Section 212 was invaluable in swiftly resolving a cyber-terrorist [extortion] threat
to the South Pole Research Station. . . The hacked computer also controlled the
life support systems for the South Pole station that housed 50 scientists
“wintering over” during the South Pole’s most dangerous season. . ..
• Section 212 has further proven to be extremely useful in cases involving
abducted or missing children. The provision, for instance, was instrumental in

quickly rescuing a 13-year-old girl from Western Pennsylvania who had been
lured from her home and was being held captive by a 38-year-old man she had
met online. . .. Report at 26-7; see also, Myths at §212.
None of the examples seem to involve a victim alerting unsuspecting authorities of an intrusion,
as the section appears to contemplate; each seems to relate to a case where authorities were aware
of the intrusion and the information might have been effectively secured through the use of a
search warrant, 18 U.S.C. 2703(c). None of the examples appear to relate to the rationale offered
for the proposal’s passage—“protection of our nation’s critical infrastructure.”
Section 212 authorizes service providers in emergency situations to disclose customer
communications record information and the content of stored customer communications.
• Subsequent legislation made the content disclosure but not the record disclosure
authority permanent, P.L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2157 (2002)(18 U.S.C. 2702(b)(7)).
• The record disclosure feature has proven useful in several life-threatening
situations.
• The same benefits might be available after sunset through the use of a search
warrant.
• There are apparently no reported instances of the section’s use for its intended
purposes, protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure.
Federal wiretap law proscribes the interception of telephone, face to face, or computer
conversations, subject to certain narrow exceptions such as the issuance of a wiretap order, the
consent of one of the participants in the conversation, or a communications carrier’s protection of
its property, 18 U.S.C. 2511. Computer service providers occasionally discover that trespassers
have established electronic outposts within their systems. Section 217 allows providers to consent
to law enforcement interception of communications to and from these outposts, 18 U.S.C.

2511(2)(i).

Section 217 reflects the Administration’s original request with two exceptions, compare, §106,
H.R.—, Hearings at 71, with, §217, 115 Stat. 290-91 (2001). Section 217 excludes from the
definition of “computer trespasser,” those with contractual access to the computer system in
question (notwithstanding the fact they may be exceed their authorization), 18 U.S.C.
2510(21)(B); and limits permissible interceptions to the trespasser’s communications within the
invaded computer system, 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(i). The first exception originated in §217 of S. 1510,
as passed by the Senate, 147 Cong. Rec. S10609 (daily ed. October 11, 2001). The second
initially appeared in §217 of H.R. 2975, as passed by the House, 147 Cong. Rec. H6744-745 ²⁹
(daily ed. October 12, 2001).

²⁹^N^e^ithe^r^e^x^c^e^p^{tion a}^p^pe^a^r^e^dⁱⁿ^H^.^R^.²⁹⁷⁵^a^s^r^e^por^te^{d by}^the^H^o^us^e^J^udicⁱ^a^r^y^C^o^m^m^itte^e^,^§105^{, H}^.^R^.²⁹⁷^{5, H}^.^R^e^pt.
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

Speaking of the basic proposal, the Administration had stated that:
^Cu^r^r^eⁿ^t^la^w^m^a^yⁿ^o^{t allo}^w^vⁱ^c^tⁱ^m^{s o}^f^co^m^p^u^t^er^tr^esp^a^ssiⁿ^g^to^r^e^q^u^{est la}^w^eⁿ^f^o^r^c^e^m^en^t
^as^sⁱ^s^t^an^{ce i}ⁿ^m^onitoring^un^au^t^h^{orized attack}^s^as^th^e^y^occu^{r. B}^ecau^s^e^s^e^r^vⁱ^c^e^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^e^r^s^o^f^t^eⁿ
^lack^th^{e ex}^p^e^r^{tise, eq}^uⁱ^p^m^en^{t, o}^r^fⁱⁿ^aⁿ^c^{ial r}^e^so^u^r^ce^{s r}^e^q^u^ir^ed^to^m^oⁿ^ito^r^attack^{s th}^e^m^s^e^l^v^es
^{as p}^e^r^m^itted^uⁿ^d^e^r^cu^r^r^en^{t la}^w^,^t^h^e^y^o^f^teⁿ^h^a^v^eⁿ^o^w^a^y^to^ex^er^{cise t}^h^eir^rⁱ^g^h^{ts to}^p^r^o^t^ect
^th^e^m^s^e^l^v^es^f^r^o^m^uⁿ^a^u^t^h^o^{rized attack}^ers^.^Mo^reov^{er, s}^u^c^h^attack^ers^{can targ}^et^critical
ⁱⁿ^f^r^as^t^r^u^c^t^u^res^aⁿ^{d eng}^a^g^eⁱⁿ^c^y^{ber t}^e^rrori^s^m^.^T^o^correct^t^hⁱ^s^probl^em^{, an}^{d h}^e^l^p^t^o^prot^ect
ⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^s^e^c^u^ri^t^y^{, t}^h^{e propos}^{ed a}^m^en^d^m^en^t^s^t^o^t^h^e^wⁱ^ret^a^p^s^t^at^ut^e^w^o^u^l^{d al}^l^o^w^vⁱ^ctⁱ^m^s^o^f
^com^p^u^t^{er at}^t^a^c^k^s^t^o^au^t^h^ori^ze^pers^on^s^“^actⁱⁿ^{g un}^{der col}^o^{r of}^l^a^w^”^t^o^m^oⁿⁱ^t^o^{r t}^r^es^pas^s^e^r^s^on
^t^h^ei^{r co}^m^put^{er sy}^s^t^e^m^sⁱⁿ^{a n}^a^rrow^cl^a^s^s^of^ca^s^e^s^.^{§106, H}^.^R^.^—^,^H^e^arⁱ^ngs^at^55.
The authority under section 217 expires on March 10, 2006. There have been no amendments
relevant to section 217 since its passage and the sunset exceptions for ongoing intelligence
investigations or for investigations of earlier crimes seem likely to be of limited application here.
The exception, however, applies “with respect to any . . . potential offense that began or occurred
before” March 10, 2006. In this context, “potential offenses” may refer those crimes for which
preparation but not completion predates March 10, 2006; for example, computer trespassing with
an eye to launching a denial of service attack at some future date. On the other hand, in such
cases the initial crime of intrusion will have occurred prior sunset, a fact that would seem to
permit post-sunset exercise of the section’s authority.
The House Judiciary Committee had recommended expansion of the good faith defense to civil
liability for computer system operators who sought to take advantage of section 217, §105(3),
H.R. 2975, H.Rept. 107-236, at 5, 56 (2001). The recommendation was not included in the act,
§217, P.L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 291 (2001). The Homeland Security Act, however, added it as a ³⁰
permanent amendment to 18 U.S.C. 2520(d)(3), §225(e), P.L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2157 (2002).
The Justice Department’s post-enactment comments relating to section 217 tend to describe its
reach rather than its use:
^T^h^{e USA}^P^A^T^R^IOT^A^c^{t als}^o^em^po^w^e^{red In}^tern^e^t^s^e^rv^{ice prov}^iders^an^{d oth}^e^rs^to^eⁿ^lⁱ^s^t
^th^{e h}^e^lp^o^f^la^w^eⁿ^f^o^rce^m^eⁿ^{t to}^m^oⁿ^ito^{r t}^h^{e acti}^v^{ities o}^f^h^a^c^k^er^s^w^h^o^uⁿ^l^a^w^fu^ll^y^acces^{s th}^eⁱ^r
^com^p^u^t^erⁿ^e^t^w^orks^{. S}^e^c^tⁱ^{on 217 of}^t^h^e^A^c^t^a^l^l^o^w^s^vⁱ^ctⁱ^m^s^o^f^co^m^p^u^t^{er a}^t^t^acks^b^y^c^y^ber-
^ter^r^o^rⁱ^{sts an}^d^o^t^h^e^r^s^to^ask^la^w^en^f^o^r^c^e^m^en^{t o}^f^fⁱ^cer^{s to}^m^oⁿ^ito^r^tr^esp^a^sser^s^oⁿ^th^eir^s^y^ste^m^s.
^S^ectⁱ^oⁿ^{217 t}^h^u^s^pl^ace^s^c^y^ber-iⁿ^t^ru^ders^oⁿ^t^h^{e s}^a^m^e^f^ootⁱⁿ^g^as^phy^sⁱ^calⁱⁿ^t^r^u^d^ers^:^h^ackⁱ^ng
^vⁱ^cti^m^s^{can s}^e^e^k^la^w^-^eⁿ^f^o^rce^m^en^{t a}^s^sⁱ^s^t^an^ce^{to co}^m^b^at^h^a^c^k^e^r^s^j^u^s^t^a^s^bu^r^g^lar^y^vⁱ^ctⁱ^m^s^caⁿ
ⁱⁿ^v^{ite p}^o^{lice o}^f^fⁱ^cer^{s in}^to^t^h^eir^h^o^m^e^{s to}^catc^h^b^u^r^g^lar^s^.^Repor^t^at^28.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
¹⁰⁷^-²^36,^a^t^{5 (}²⁰⁰¹⁾^.
³⁰^{18 U}^.^S.C^.²⁵²⁰⁽^d⁾⁽³⁾⁽^“^A^g^{ood f}^a^{ith r}^e^lia^nc^e^oⁿ^.^{. .}⁽³⁾^a^g^ood^f^a^{ith de}^te^r^m^ina^tion^tha^t^s^e^c^tio^{n .}^{. .}²⁵¹¹⁽²⁾⁽ⁱ⁾^of^this
^title^pe^rm^itte^{d the}^c^o^nd^uc^{t c}^o^m^p^la^ine^d^of^{; is a}^c^o^m^p^le^te^de^f^e^ns^e^a^g^aⁱ^{nst a}ⁿ^y^cⁱ^v^{il or c}^r^im^ina^l^a^c^tion^bro^u^g^h^{t u}^nde^r^this
^c^h^a^p^te^r^or^aⁿ^y^othe^r^la^w^”⁾^.

The Department’s comments in Myths are more expansive and do include a general statement of
use:
^T^h^{e la}^w^h^a^{s a}^l^w^a^y^s^r^eco^gⁿ^ize^d^th^{e r}ⁱ^g^h^{t o}^f^laⁿ^d^o^wⁿ^e^r^s^to^as^k^la^w^eⁿ^f^o^r^c^e^m^en^t^to^h^e^lp
^ex^{pel people w}^h^{o illeg}^a^ll^y^tres^pas^s^on^th^{eir pr}^operty^.^Section^{217 m}^a^{de th}^{e la}^w^tec^hⁿ^o^logy^-
ⁿ^e^u^t^ral^,^pl^aciⁿ^g^c^y^ber-ⁱⁿ^t^r^u^d^ers^on^t^h^e^s^a^m^e^f^ootⁱⁿ^g^a^s^physⁱ^calⁱⁿ^t^r^u^d^ers^.^N^o^w^,^h^a^c^kⁱⁿ^g
^vⁱ^cti^m^s^caⁿ^s^eek^la^w^-^eⁿ^f^o^rce^m^en^t^as^sⁱ^s^t^an^c^e^t^o^c^o^m^b^a^t^h^a^ck^er^s^,^ju^s^t^a^s^b^u^r^g^l^a^ry^vⁱ^c^t^im^s^h^a^v^e
^b^een^ab^{le to}ⁱⁿ^v^{ite o}^f^fⁱ^cer^{s in}^t^o^th^eir^h^o^m^e^{s to}^catch^b^u^r^g^lar^s^{. P}^r^io^r^to^th^{e en}^act^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^t^h^e
^US^A^P^A^T^R^I^O^T^A^c^{t, th}^{e la}^w^p^r^o^h^ib^ited^co^m^p^u^t^er^ser^v^{ice p}^r^o^vⁱ^d^e^r^s^f^r^o^m^s^h^arⁱⁿ^g^wⁱ^t^h^la^w
^en^f^o^rce^m^en^{t t}^h^{at h}^a^c^k^ers^h^a^{d brok}^enⁱⁿ^{to th}^eⁱ^{r s}^y^s^t^e^m^s^.^C^o^m^p^u^t^e^r^o^p^e^r^a^t^o^r^s^a^r^eⁿ^o^t^r^e^q^uⁱ^r^e^d
^t^oⁱⁿ^v^o^l^v^{e l}^a^w^enf^o^rce^m^eⁿ^tⁱ^f^t^h^e^y^det^ect^t^r^e^s^pas^s^e^rs^on^t^h^ei^r^sy^st^e^m^s^.^S^ectⁱ^oⁿ^{217 s}ⁱ^m^p^l^y
^gⁱ^v^e^s^t^h^e^m^t^h^{e opt}ⁱ^oⁿ^of^doiⁿ^g^s^o^{. S}^ectⁱ^oⁿ^{217 pres}^erv^e^{s t}^h^{e pri}^v^ac^y^o^f^l^a^w^-^abi^dⁱⁿ^g
^com^p^u^t^{er us}^ers^.^O^f^fⁱ^cers^ca^nnot^ag^{ree t}^o^h^e^l^p^{a com}^p^u^t^{er o}^wⁿ^e^{r un}^l^e^ss^{(1) t}^h^e^y^{are en}^g^a^g^e^d
ⁱⁿ^{a la}^w^f^u^lⁱⁿ^v^e^sti^g^atioⁿ^;⁽²⁾^th^er^{e is r}^easoⁿ^to^b^e^liev^e^t^h^at^th^{e co}^m^m^uⁿⁱ^cat^ioⁿ^s^wⁱ^{ll b}^e
^r^e^lev^aⁿ^t^to^t^h^atⁱⁿ^v^e^s^tig^a^tioⁿ^;^aⁿ^d⁽³⁾^th^eir^acti^v^ities^wⁱ^l^lⁿ^o^{t a}^c^q^u^ir^{e t}^h^{e co}^m^m^uⁿⁱ^catioⁿ^s^o^f
ⁿ^on-^h^a^c^k^ers^.^This^pr^ovis^{ion has}^{played a key r}^o^{le in}^{a num}^ber^{of ter}^r^o^rⁱ^s^t^inve^s^tigations^,
^natⁱ^onal^-s^ecurⁱ^t^y^cas^e^s^,^a^{nd i}ⁿ^ves^tⁱ^gatⁱ^ons^of^ot^her^s^e^rⁱ^ous^crⁱ^m^es^.^Se^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^{217 i}^s^ex^t^r^e^m^el^y
^h^e^lpfu^l^w^h^en^co^m^p^u^t^er^h^ack^er^s^laun^ch^m^a^s^s^iv^e^d^eⁿⁱ^al^o^f^s^e^r^vⁱ^c^e^a^t^t^a^c^k^s^-^w^hⁱ^c^h^a^r^e^d^e^sⁱ^gⁿ^e^d
^{to s}^h^u^t^do^wⁿⁱⁿ^dividu^al^w^e^b^s^ites^,^co^m^p^u^t^{er n}^e^t^w^or^k^s^{, or}^ev^en^th^{e e}ⁿ^{tire Intern}^{et. T}^h^e
^defⁱⁿⁱ^tion^of^co^m^p^u^t^{er tres}^pas^s^e^{r does}ⁿ^o^{t in}^cl^u^d^{e an}ⁱⁿ^di^vⁱ^du^al^w^{ho h}^a^s^{a con}^t^ract^u^a^l
^relation^s^hⁱ^p^wⁱ^th^t^h^{e s}^e^rv^{ice prov}^ider.^T^h^u^s^{, f}^o^{r ex}^a^m^p^l^{e, America On}^lin^{e cou}^l^{d n}^o^t^a^s^k^l^a^w
^en^f^o^r^c^e^m^en^t^to^h^e^lp^m^oⁿ^ito^r^{a h}^ackⁱⁿ^g^attac^k^oⁿ^it^{s s}^y^ste^m^t^h^at^w^a^{s i}ⁿ^itiated^b^y^oⁿ^{e o}^f^its
^owⁿ^s^u^bs^c^rⁱ^b^e^r^s^.^Myth^s^{, at}^{§217 (em}^p^h^a^sⁱ^s^added).
The section’s solution does not seem to match the statement of the problem it was purportedly
designed to address. It does not remove intruders or prevent their entry; it merely permits
eavesdropping on them while they are trespassing. There is no clear explanation by word or
example of why this is preferable or effective. The Department indicated during oversight ³¹
hearings that authority under the section had been use “comparatively rarely.” They have ³²
subsequently offered its use in an identify theft investigation by way of example.
Some critics have expressed the concern that the provision might be used to circumvent the ³³
safeguards and oversight that attends Title III wiretaps.

³¹^O^v^e^r^sⁱ^{ght H}^e^arⁱⁿ^{g o}^f^t^h^e^D^e^par^t^m^eⁿ^{t of J}^u^s^tic^e^:^H^e^ar^ing^Be^for^e^t^h^e^Seⁿ^a^te^C^o^m^m^.^on^the^J^u^dicⁱ^ar^y^{, 10}⁷^th^C^ong^.,^2d
^Se^s^s^.^a^t⁽²⁰⁰²⁾^{, q}^uote^dⁱⁿ^H^o^w^e^{ll, Se}^v^e^{n W}^e^ek^s^:^T^h^e^Ma^kⁱ^ng^of^the^U^S^A^P^A^T^R^I^O^T^A^c^{t, 72 G}^EO^R^G^E^W^AS^H^I^NG^T^ON
^L^AW^R^EV^IE^W¹¹⁴^5,¹²^{03 (}²⁰⁰⁴⁾^.
³²^H^ous^e^H^e^arⁱⁿ^gs^,^st^at^em^en^t^o^f^De^p^u^t^y^A^s^si^st^an^t^Di^rect^o^r^S^t^even^M^.^M^a^rtⁱⁿ^{ez ,}^F^B^{I Cy}^b^e^{r Di}^vi^si^oⁿ^(“t^h^{e gro}^u^p^u^s^ed
^c^h^a^t^room^s^a^{nd f}^r^a^uduleⁿ^{t w}^e^bs^ite^s^{to c}^o^m^m^{it ide}ⁿ^tity^the^f^{t, but m}^a^na^g^e^{d to pr}^ov^ide^t^h^e^m^s^e^lv^e^s^wⁱ^t^h^priv^a^c^y^b^y^us^ing
^f^a^lse^na^m^e^s^{to g}^e^{t e}^-^m^a^{il a}^c^c^ounts^.^T^h^e^m^o^s^tⁱ^m^por^ta^{nt t}^oolⁱⁿ^theⁱ^r^bid^to^r^e^m^a^{in a}^nony^m^ous^w^a^s^theⁱ^r^us^e^of^a^pr^ox^y
^{server t}^h^e^y^b^r^o^k^{e i}ⁿ^t^o^and^t^h^en^re^coⁿ^fⁱ^g^u^r^ed^.^T^h^{e i}^d^en^tⁱ^t^y^t^hⁱ^e^{ves u}^s^ed^t^h^{e p}^r^o^x^y^ser^v^{er t}^o^dⁱ^sguⁱ^{se wh}^{ere al}^l^o^f^t^h^ei^r
^In^t^e^rn^et^co^m^m^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^w^e^{re co}^mⁱⁿ^g^f^r^o^m^.^T^h^{e o}^wⁿ^e^{r o}^f^t^h^{e p}^r^ox^y^ser^v^er^w^a^{s h}ⁱ^m^s^el^f^{a vi}^ctⁱ^m^o^f^t^h^{e cri}^m^e,^hⁱ^s
^c^o^m^pute^r^ha^vⁱ^ng^e^s^s^e^ntia^ll^y^be^eⁿ^hija^c^k^e^d^a^{nd tr}^aⁿ^s^f^or^m^e^{d into}^a^h^ub^of^a^c^r^im^ina^l^ope^r^a^tion.^W^h^eⁿ^he^de^te^r^m^ine^d^tha^t
^his^c^o^m^pute^r^ha^d^be^eⁿ^ha^c^k^e^d^he^pr^ov^ide^d^the^FB^I^w^{ith c}^ons^eⁿ^{t to}^m^onitor^the^intr^ude^r^aⁿ^d^ho^pe^f^u^lly^{to c}^a^t^c^h^him^.
^T^h^e^c^o^m^pute^r^ow^ne^{r’s a}^b^ility^{to bring}^{in t}^h^e^FBI^pa^id^of^f^,^{not j}^u^{st f}^o^{r him}^but^f^o^{r the}^c^o^un^tle^{ss othe}^r^vⁱ^c^tⁱ^m^{s of}^the
^ideⁿ^tity^the^f^{t. By}^ta^kⁱ^ng^a^d^v^a^nta^g^e^of^ha^c^k^e^r^tre^s^pa^ss^e^r^m^onitori^ng^,^the^{FBI g}^a^the^r^e^d^le^a^d^{s tha}^t^re^su^lt^e^dⁱⁿ^the
^disc^ov^e^r^y^of^the^true^ideⁿ^tity^of^the^subje^c^t^{. T}^h^e^su^bje^c^t^w^a^s^la^te^{r indic}^t^e^d^a^nd^{is n}^o^{t a}^w^a^iting^tria^l”^{), a}^v^a^ila^ble^{on J}^une
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³³^N^a^ti^on^{al Se}^c^u^r^ity^{at W}^h^{at Pr}^ic^e^?^:^{A Lo}^okⁱⁿ^to^Cⁱ^v^{il Li}^be^r^t^y^C^onc^e^r^ns^{in t}^h^e^Iⁿ^for^m^at^io^{n Age}^un^de^r^the^U^S^A
^PATRI^O^T^Ac^t^of²⁰⁰¹^a^nd^{a Pr}^op^os^e^d^C^o^ns^tit^utio^nal^Te^s^t^f^o^r^Fu^tu^r^e^Le^gis^l^ati^oⁿ^{, 12}^C^ORNE^L^L^J^OUR^NAL^O^F^L^{AW A}^N^D
^P^UB^L^I^C^P^OL^I^C^Y^{447, 4}^60-⁶¹⁽²⁰⁰³⁾⁽^“^Iⁿ^a^d^diti^on^{to a}^l^l^o^wⁱ^ng^br^oa^d^dis^c^r^e^{tion a}^{nd a}^u^th^or^iz^a^tio^{n f}^o^r^b^o^{th I}^S^P^s^aⁿ^d
^c^o^m^pute^r^ow^ne^r^s^a^{nd o}^p^e^r^a^t^or^s^,^t^h^e^U^S^A^P^A^T^R^I^O^T^A^c^{t, r}^e^m^o^v^e^s^m^o^s^t^judicⁱ^a^l^ov^e^r^sⁱ^g^h^{t of}^this^pa^r^tic^ula^r^ta^s^k^{. I}ⁿ
^situa^tio^{ns tha}^t^doⁿ^o^{t re}^sultⁱⁿ^pr^o^s^e^c^u^tion,^the^c^o^m^pute^r^use^r^{s w}^hose^a^c^tiv^itie^{s a}^r^e^ta^r^g^e^t^e^d^a^r^e^lik^e^l^y^ne^v^e^{r to disc}^ov^e^r
^the^m^onitorⁱ^ng^{, a}ⁿ^d^the^r^e^f^or^e^the^y^w^{ould be}^e^f^f^e^c^tiv^e^l^y^una^ble^{to c}^h^a^lle^ng^e^the^pr^ov^is^ionⁱⁿ^c^our^t^.^F^u^r^t^he^r^m^or^e^,^la^w
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

Section 217 permits federal authorities to intercept an intruder’s communications within an
invaded computer system.
• It requires consent of the system operator, a law enforcement investigation, a
reasonable belief that the communications are relevant to the investigation, and
limits interception to the intruder’s communications.
• Statements of support have leaned heavily on descriptions of the authority rather
than examples of its use.
• The Justice Department has stated that the authority has been used
“comparatively rarely.”
• The solution does not seem to match the problem. Section 217 does not authorize
removal of computer hackers bent on denial of service attacks nor does it prevent
or punish trespassers; instead it eavesdrops on their communications.
Before the act, federal authorities could gain access to a communications service provider’s
customer records and the content of their electronic communications either through the use of a
search warrant or in some instances a court order, 18 U.S.C. 2703. Certainly in the case of the
search warrant and arguable in the case of the court order, the warrant or order could only be
issued in the judicial district in which it was to be executed, F.R.Crim.P. 41; 18 U.S.C. 3127
(2000 ed.). Federal authorities found this inconvenient and sometimes frustrating where the
criminal investigation was conducted in one district and the communications provider was located
in another, H.Rept. 107-236, at 57.
Section 220 addresses the difficulty by authorizing the court in the district where the crime
occurred to issue search warrants or orders to be served anywhere in the country for access to
electronic communications content and customer record information (which by virtue of section
209, discussed above, now includes content and records of voice, e-mail, and other electronic
communications), 18 U.S.C. 2703, 3127.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^eⁿ^f^o^r^c^em^eⁿ^{t c}^ould^un^duly^pr^e^s^s^u^r^e^ow^ne^r^s^a^{nd o}^p^e^r^a^t^or^s^of^c^o^m^pute^r^s^{to o}^b^taⁱⁿ^pe^r^m^is^sⁱ^{on f}^o^r^theⁱⁿ^te^r^c^e^p^{tion a}^{nd t}^o
^cⁱ^rc^um^v^e^{nt the}^sa^f^e^g^u^a^r^{ds built}ⁱⁿ^{to t}^h^e^P^A^T^R^IO^T^A^c^t^”^);^{EPIC Re}^port⁽^“^T^h^e^ne^w^e^x^ce^ption^[^u^nde^r^s^e^c^{tion 2}¹⁷^]^ha^s
^b^r^o^a^dⁱ^m^p^lⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^gi^ven^t^h^at^{a ‘}^p^ro^t^ect^ed^co^m^p^u^t^{er’ i}ⁿ^cl^ud^{es an}^y^‘w^hⁱ^chⁱ^s^u^s^edⁱⁿⁱⁿ^t^e^rst^a^t^e^o^r^f^o^r^eⁱ^gⁿ^co^{mmerce o}^r
^co^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^{’ (w}^hⁱ^ch^,^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^t^e^rn^et^,ⁱⁿ^cl^ud^{es eff}^ectⁱ^v^el^y^an^y^co^m^p^u^t^er).^T^h^{e ‘au}^t^h^o^rⁱ^zatⁱ^oⁿ^’^assi^st^an^{ce p}^e^r^mⁱ^t^s
^wⁱ^r^e^ta^pping^of^the^intr^ude^r^’^s^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^w^ithout^aⁿ^y^judicⁱ^a^l^ov^e^r^sⁱ^g^h^{t, in c}^o^ntr^a^s^t^t^o^m^o^s^t^f^e^der^a^l
^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tion-inte^rc^e^p^ti^on^la^w^s^tha^t^re^q^u^ire^o^b^je^c^tiv^e^ov^e^r^sⁱ^g^h^{t f}^r^om^s^o^m^e^one^outsⁱ^de^theⁱⁿ^v^e^s^tig^ativ^e^c^h^aⁱ^{n. T}^h^e
ⁿ^e^w^l^a^w^p^l^{aces t}^h^{e d}^e^t^e^r^mⁱⁿ^atⁱ^oⁿ^so^l^e^l^yⁱⁿ^t^h^{e h}^a^nd^{s o}^f^l^a^w^en^f^o^rce^m^en^t^an^d^t^h^{e sy}^st^e^m^o^wⁿ^e^{r o}^r^o^p^erat^o^r^.^In^t^h^o^s^e
^lik^e^l^y^instaⁿ^c^e^s^{in w}^h^ic^{h the}ⁱⁿ^te^r^c^e^p^tion^doe^s^not^re^{sult i}ⁿ^pr^ose^c^u^tion^,^the^ta^rg^e^t^of^the^inte^rc^e^p^ti^on^w^{ill ne}^v^e^{r ha}^v^e^aⁿ
^o^p^p^o^r^t^uⁿⁱ^t^y^t^o^ch^al^l^eⁿ^g^{e t}^h^{e act}ⁱ^vⁱ^t^y^(t^h^r^o^u^g^h^{a sup}^p^r^essi^on^p^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g).^Iⁿ^d^eed^s^u^ch^t^a^rget^w^o^u^l^d^{never e}^v^en^h^a^ve
^notic^e^of^the^f^a^c^t^tha^t^t^h^eⁱ^{r c}^o^m^m^unic^a^tio^{ns w}^e^re^subje^c^t^{to w}^a^rra^ntle^{ss inte}^rc^e^p^tio^{n. .}^..^[^T^]^h^e^a^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t ha}^{s little}^{, if}
^aⁿ^y^t^hing^{, to d}^o^w^{ith le}^g^itim^a^t^e^inv^e^stig^a^{tions of}^te^rrorism^”⁾^.

But for the addition of a technical conforming amendment, section 220 passed untouched through ³⁴
the legislative process from request to presidential signature. The justification for the proposals
was rather straightforward:
^Cur^r^eⁿ^t^l^a^w^r^e^q^uⁱ^r^e^{s t}^h^e^go^ve^rⁿ^m^e^nt^t^o^use^a^s^earc^h^w^a^{rrant to com}^p^{el a prov}^{ider to}
^dis^c^los^e^uⁿ^open^e^{d e-m}^aⁱ^l^{. 18}^U.S^.^C^.^§2703^(a).^Becau^s^e^F^e^{deral R}^u^{le of}^C^r^imⁱⁿ^a^l^P^r^o^c^e^d^u^r^e
^{41 requ}ⁱ^r^es^t^h^a^t^t^h^e^“^p^ropert^y^”^t^o^{be obt}^aiⁿ^e^d^“^b^e^wⁱ^{thin t}^h^{e dis}^t^{rict” o}^f^t^h^e^is^s^uⁱⁿ^g^cou^r^t,
^h^o^w^e^v^e^{r, t}^h^{e ru}^l^e^m^a^yⁿ^o^t^al^l^o^w^t^h^{e i}^s^su^aⁿ^{ce of}^§2703^(a)^w^a^rr^aⁿ^t^s^f^o^r^e^-^m^aⁱ^l^l^o^c^a^t^e^dⁱⁿ^o^t^h^e^r
^dis^t^ricts^.^T^h^u^s^,^f^o^{r ex}^a^m^ple,^wh^{ere an}ⁱⁿ^v^e^s^tⁱ^g^{ator in B}^o^s^t^on^is^s^e^e^kⁱⁿ^g^elec^tron^{ic e}^-^m^a^{il i}ⁿ
^th^{e Ya}^h^o^o^!^acco^uⁿ^{t o}^f^a^su^s^p^ected^ter^r^o^r^{ist, h}^e^m^a^yⁿ^e^e^d^to^co^o^r^dⁱⁿ^a^te^wⁱ^t^h^a^g^en^ts,
^pros^ecu^t^o^rs^{, an}^{d j}^u^dg^esⁱⁿ^t^h^e^N^o^rt^h^e^rn^Dⁱ^s^t^ri^ct^of^C^a^lⁱ^f^o^rnⁱ^a^{, n}^oⁿ^e^of^w^h^o^m^h^a^v^e^any^ot^h^e^r
ⁱⁿ^v^o^l^v^e^m^{ent in}^t^h^{e inv}^e^s^tⁱ^g^atioⁿ^.^T^h^is^electronⁱ^{c co}^m^m^uⁿⁱ^c^a^t^ioⁿ^sⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^c^aⁿ^b^e^c^rⁱ^tⁱ^c^a^l
ⁱⁿ^estab^lⁱ^s^hⁱⁿ^g^r^e^latioⁿ^s^hⁱ^p^s^,^m^o^tiv^es,^m^ean^{s, an}^d^p^l^aⁿ^{s o}^f^ter^r^o^r^{ists. Mo}^r^e^o^v^er^{, it is eq}^u^a^l^l^y
^r^e^lev^aⁿ^t^to^c^y^b^e^r^-ⁱⁿ^cid^eⁿ^t^sⁱⁿ^w^h^ic^h^a^ter^r^o^r^{ist m}^o^tⁱ^v^e^h^a^{s n}^o^t⁽^b^u^t^m^a^y^w^e^ll^b^e⁾^id^en^tⁱ^fⁱ^ed^.
^Fin^a^ll^y^,^ev^eⁿ^cas^es^t^h^{at requ}^ire^th^{e qu}^ick^e^s^t^res^pon^s^e^(k^idⁿ^a^pin^g^,^t^h^reats^,^{or ot}^h^e^r^d^aⁿ^g^e^r^s^t^o
^pu^blⁱ^c^s^a^f^e^t^y^{or t}^h^{e eco}ⁿ^o^m^y⁾^m^a^y^res^t^oⁿ^e^vⁱ^d^en^ce^g^a^t^h^{ered u}ⁿ^d^{er §2703(a)}^{. To f}^u^rt^h^e^r
^pu^{blic s}^a^f^e^t^y^{, th}ⁱ^s^s^ection^acco^rdin^g^l^y^a^u^t^h^orizes^cou^r^ts^wⁱ^t^h^j^u^ris^d^iction^o^v^e^rⁱⁿ^v^e^s^t^ig^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s
^to^co^m^p^{el ev}^id^eⁿ^{ce d}ⁱ^r^ectl^y^,^w^ith^o^u^{t r}^e^q^u^irⁱⁿ^g^th^{e in}^ter^v^eⁿ^tioⁿ^o^f^th^eir^co^uⁿ^ter^p^ar^{ts in}^o^t^h^e^r
^di^s^t^ri^ct^s^w^h^ere^m^a^j^o^{r In}^t^e^rn^et^s^e^rvⁱ^{ce prov}ⁱ^d^{ers are l}^o^cat^ed.^{§108, H}^.^R^.^—^,^H^e^arⁱ^ngs^{, at}^55.
The authority under section 220 terminates on March 10, 2006 except with respect to earlier
crimes or potential crimes. Section 219, however, appears to mitigate the impact of section 220’s
expiration in certain terrorism cases. Section 219 is not subject to the sunset provision. It provides
for at least nation-wide, and perhaps world-wide, service of federal search and arrest warrants in ³⁵
cases of international or domestic terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2331.

³⁴^Co^mp^a^r^e^,^§1⁰⁸^,^H.^R^.^—^,^H^e^arⁱⁿ^gs^a^t⁷²^,^wit^h^{, §2}²⁰^{, P}^.^L^.¹⁰^7-⁵⁶^{, 115}^Sta^t^.²^91-⁹²⁽²⁰⁰¹⁾^;^{see a}^l^so^,^§1^08,^H^.^R^.
²⁹⁷^5,^H^.^R^e^{pt. 10}^7-²³⁶^,^a^t^5-^{6; §2}^{20, S. 15}¹⁰^,¹⁴⁷^C^o^ng^.^R^ec.^S1⁰⁶^{10 (}^d^a^ily^e^d^{. O}^c^{t. 11}^{, 2}⁰⁰¹⁾^.
³⁵^“^[^A^]^m^a^gⁱ^stra^te^judg^e^—^{in a}ⁿ^inv^e^stig^a^{tion of}^dom^e^s^tic^te^rro^rism^o^rⁱⁿ^tern^ati^oⁿ^a^l^terro^rism^{(as d}^e^fⁱⁿ^e^dⁱⁿ¹⁸^U.S.C.
²³³^1)—^h^a^v^ing^a^u^thor^ity^{in a}ⁿ^y^distric^t^{in w}^h^ic^{h a}^c^tiv^itie^s^re^la^te^{d t}^o^the^te^rrorism^m^a^y^ha^v^e^oc^c^u^rre^{d, m}^a^y^issue^a
^w^a^r^r^aⁿ^{t f}^o^r^a^pe^r^s^on^or^p^r^o^p^e^r^ty^w^{ithin or}^outsⁱ^de^t^h^a^t^dis^t^rⁱ^c^t^,”^F.^R^.^C^r^im^.P^.⁴¹⁽^b)⁽³⁾^.
^“^[^T^]^he^te^rm^‘inte^r^na^tiona^l^te^rroris^m^’^m^e^aⁿ^{s a}^c^tiv^itie^{s tha}^t^—(^A⁾^inv^o^lv^e^vⁱ^oleⁿ^{t a}^c^t^{s or a}^c^t^s^da^ng^e^r^ou^{s to h}^u^m^a^{n lif}^e
^t^h^at^{are a vi}^o^l^atⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^{e cri}^mⁱⁿ^al^l^a^w^s^o^f^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es o}^r^o^f^an^y^S^t^at^e,^o^r^t^h^at^w^o^u^l^{d b}^e^{a cri}^mⁱⁿ^al^vi^o^l^atⁱ^o^{n i}^f
^c^o^m^m^itte^d^w^{ithin t}^h^e^juris^d^ic^tioⁿ^of^the^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^or^of^aⁿ^y^Sta^t^e^;^{(B) a}^ppe^a^r^to^beⁱⁿ^teⁿ^d^e^d^{—(i) t}^oⁱⁿ^tim^ida^t^e^or
^c^o^e^r^c^e^a^cⁱ^v^ilia^{n pop}^ula^tⁱ^{on; (}^{ii) t}^o^inf^l^ue^nc^e^t^h^e^p^o^lic^y^of^a^g^ove^rnm^e^{nt by}^intim^ida^tion^{or c}^o^e^r^cⁱ^oⁿ^;^{or (ii}ⁱ^{) to}^a^f^f^e^c^t
^the^c^oⁿ^duc^t^of^a^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt by}^m^a^s^s^de^s^t^r^u^c^{tion, a}^s^s^a^s^sⁱ^na^tio^n,^o^r^kⁱ^dna^pi^ng^{; a}ⁿ^d⁽^C⁾^oc^c^u^r^pr^im^a^r^ily^outsⁱ^de^the
^te^r^r^itorⁱ^a^l^j^u^rⁱ^s^d^ic^ti^on^of^the^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^Sta^t^e^s^,^or^tr^aⁿ^s^c^eⁿ^d^na^ti^ona^l^bo^unda^rⁱ^e^sⁱⁿ^te^r^m^s^of^the^m^e^aⁿ^s^by^w^h^ic^{h the}^y^a^r^e
^acco^m^p^lⁱ^s^h^e^d^,^t^h^{e p}^e^rson^{s t}^h^ey^ap^p^{ear i}ⁿ^t^eⁿ^d^e^{d t}^oⁱⁿ^tⁱ^mⁱ^d^a^t^e^o^r^coerce,^o^r^t^h^{e l}^o^cal^{e i}ⁿ^w^hⁱ^c^h^t^h^ei^r^p^e^rp^et^rat^o^rs^o^p^e^rat^e
^{or s}^e^e^k^a^s^y^l^u^m^{. . ..}
^“^[^T^]^he^te^rm^‘dom^e^s^tic^te^rrorism^’^m^e^aⁿ^{s a}^c^tiv^itie^{s tha}^t^—(^A⁾^inv^o^lv^e^a^c^t^{s da}^ng^e^r^{ous to}^hum^aⁿ^lif^e^th^a^t^a^r^e^a^vⁱ^ola^tion^of
^the^c^r^im^ina^l^la^{ws of}^the^Unite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^{or of}^aⁿ^y^Sta^t^e^;^(B^{) a}^ppe^a^r^to^beⁱⁿ^te^nde^d—(ⁱ^{) t}^oⁱⁿ^tim^ida^t^e^or^c^o^e^r^c^e^a^cⁱ^v^iliaⁿ
^pop^ula^tⁱ^on;⁽ⁱⁱ⁾^t^oⁱⁿ^f^l^ue^nc^e^the^p^o^lic^y^of^a^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt by}^intim^idation^or^c^o^e^r^cⁱ^on;^or⁽ⁱⁱⁱ⁾^t^o^a^f^f^e^c^t^the^c^oⁿ^duc^t^of^a
^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt by}^m^a^s^s^de^s^t^r^u^c^tion,^a^s^s^a^s^sⁱ^na^{tion, or}^kⁱ^dna^pⁱ^ng^{; a}ⁿ^{d (}^C⁾^oc^c^u^r^pr^im^a^r^il^y^w^{ithin the}^te^r^rⁱ^torⁱ^a^l^j^u^rⁱ^s^d^ic^ti^on
^o^f^th^{e Un}^ited^{States,” 1}⁸^U.S.C^.²³³¹⁽¹^),⁽⁵^).

The Justice Department asserts that section 220 has proven beneficial in a number of criminal
cases, some involving charges of terrorism.
^In^s^ectⁱ^oⁿ^{220 . . . C}^oⁿ^g^r^ess^a^d^apt^e^{d f}^e^deral^l^a^w^t^o^ch^aⁿ^gⁱ^ng^t^echn^o^l^ogy^b^y^al^l^o^wⁱ^ng
^cou^r^ts^{to order th}^{e releas}^{e of s}^t^{ored com}^m^unications^t^h^rou^g^h^a^s^earch^w^a^{rrant v}^a^lⁱ^{d in}
^an^o^t^h^e^r^sp^eci^fⁱ^ed^j^u^dⁱ^{cial d}ⁱ^strⁱ^{ct. T}^h^{e en}^h^aⁿ^ced^ab^ilit^y^to^o^b^t^ain^thⁱ^sⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^at^ioⁿ^e^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^en^t^l^y³⁶
^h^a^{s p}^r^o^v^edⁱⁿ^v^a^l^u^ab^{le in}^se^v^e^r^a^{l ter}^r^o^r^ismⁱⁿ^v^e^sti^g^atioⁿ^s^,^s^u^ch^a^s^t^h^e^Vⁱ^r^gⁱⁿⁱ^a^Ji^h^a^d^an^{d th}^e³⁷
^“s^ho^e^b^o^m^b^e^r^”^cas^e^s^{. . .}^as^{well as}^ti^m^e^-s^ens^iti^v^e^cri^mⁱⁿ^alⁱⁿ^v^e^s^tⁱ^g^ations^{, s}^u^c^h^a^s^[on^e^]³⁸
ⁱ^nvo^l^vⁱ^{ng a}^d^aⁿ^g^e^r^o^u^s^fu^gi^tⁱ^ve^{. . ..}^In^ad^d^itioⁿ^to^allo^wⁱⁿ^g^la^w^eⁿ^f^o^rce^m^eⁿ^{t to}^g^aⁱⁿ^acces^s
^toⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^at^ioⁿ^q^u^ic^k^l^yⁱⁿ^ti^m^e^-^s^en^siti^v^eⁱⁿ^v^e^st^ig^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^C^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^s^a^l^s^o^sⁱ^gⁿⁱ^fⁱ^c^aⁿ^t^ly^im^p^r^o^v^e^d
^th^{e J}^u^{stice Dep}^a^r^t^m^eⁿ^t^’^s^ab^ilit^y^to^m^o^uⁿ^{t lar}^g^e^-^{scale ch}^ild^p^o^rⁿ^o^g^r^ap^h^yⁱⁿ^v^e^sti^g^atioⁿ^s^b^y
ⁱⁿ^cl^u^d^ing^s^ection^{220 in}^th^{e U}^S^A^P^A^T^R^IOT^A^c^t.^T^h^{e abilit}^y^{to obtain}^s^ear^c^h^w^a^r^r^aⁿ^t^sⁱⁿ^th^e
^j^u^rⁱ^sd^ictioⁿ^o^f^{a ch}^ild^p^o^rⁿ^o^g^r^ap^h^yⁱⁿ^v^e^sti^g^atioⁿ^r^a^th^er^t^h^anⁱⁿ^th^{e j}^u^rⁱ^s^dⁱ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^e^Iⁿ^t^e^rⁿ^e^t
^ser^v^{ice p}^r^o^v^id^erⁱ^s^cr^itical^to^th^e^su^cce^ss^o^f^a^co^m^p^le^x^,^m^u^lti^-^j^u^r^isdⁱ^ctioⁿ^a^l^ch^ild
^porn^o^g^r^aphy^cas^{e. . .. S}^ectⁱ^oⁿ^{220 h}^a^s^al^s^o^dra^m^atⁱ^cal^l^y^{reduced t}^h^{e ad}^mⁱⁿⁱ^st^ratⁱ^v^{e b}^u^rden^s
ⁱⁿ^j^u^{dicial dis}^t^ricts^t^h^{at are h}^o^m^e^to^lar^g^{e I}ⁿ^terⁿ^{et ser}^v^{ice p}^r^o^v^id^er^s.^Repor^t^at^20-^1.
The Attorney General has expressed the view that “It is imperative that section 220 be renewed;
allowing the provision to expire would delay many time-sensitive investigations and result in the ³⁹
inefficient use of investigators’, prosecutors’, and judges’ time.”
Critics might suggest that the principal objection to section 220 is that it makes it expensive and
inconvenient for service providers to contest or request modification of orders directed to them ⁴⁰
from district courts throughout the country. For the Justice Department with United States
Attorneys Offices throughout the country, by way of contrast, the burden is simply a matter of
resource allocation, it might be argued. Some may feel that the section allows the Justice
Department to forum shop should the federal courts in the home districts of large providers prove
sympathetic to the burdens such orders impose upon the providers. They might also contend that
expiration arrives with little loss in terrorism cases since section 219 of the act which does not
expire allows for nation-wide service of search warrants in terrorism cases.

³⁶^Se^v^e^r^a^{l N}^o^r^t^he^rⁿ^Vir^g^inia^r^e^sⁱ^de^nts^w^e^r^e^c^onv^ic^te^{d or}^ple^a^d^e^d^g^uⁱ^lty^{to te}^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^m^-^r^e^la^te^{d c}^h^a^r^ge^s^inc^l^udi^ng
^pa^ra^m^ilita^r^y^“^p^aⁱ^ntba^ll”^traⁱⁿⁱ^ng^,^Uⁿ^ite^d^State^s^v^.^K^h^aⁿ^,³⁰^{9 F}^.^Su^p^p^.2^{d 7}⁸⁹⁽^E^.D^.^V^a^.²⁰⁰⁴⁾^;^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^J^u^s^tic^e
^P^r^{ess Rel}^ease,^d^a^t^e^d^A^p^ri^l^9,²⁰⁰⁴^).
³⁷^Ric^h^a^r^{d Re}^id^{, a}^Britis^{h c}^itiz^eⁿ^,^p^l^e^a^d^e^d^{to e}ⁱ^g^h^t^te^rrorism^-re^la^te^{d c}^h^a^r^g^e^{s a}^r^ising^out^of^{his e}^f^f^o^{rts to}^ig^nite
^exp^l^o^sⁱ^v^{es co}ⁿ^ceal^edⁱⁿ^hi^{s sh}^o^e^s^w^hⁱ^l^e^oⁿ^bo^ard^aⁿ^Am^eri^can^Aⁱ^rlⁱⁿ^{es f}^lⁱ^g^h^t^f^r^o^m^P^a^ri^{s t}^o^Mⁱ^amⁱ^,^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^v^.^st
^Re^id^,³⁶^{9 F.}^3d⁶^{19 (}¹^Cir.²⁰⁰⁴⁾^{. A}^s^e^c^{ond Britis}^h^re^sⁱ^de^{nt w}^a^s^la^te^{r indic}^t^e^d^a^s^Re^id’s^acco^m^p^lⁱ^ce,^Dep^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^f
^J^u^s^tic^e^P^r^e^s^s^Re^le^a^s^e^,^da^te^{d O}^c^t.^{4, 2}⁰⁰⁴^{. A}^{ll t}^h^e^mⁱ^s^c^onduc^{t he}^re^s^e^em^s^{to inv}^o^lv^e^the^ov^e^r^s^e^a^s^a^c^tⁱ^v^itie^s^of^f^o^reⁱ^gⁿ
ⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^s^;ⁱ^tⁱ^s^uⁿ^c^l^{ear ho}^w^acces^s^t^o^t^h^{e cu}^st^o^m^{er reco}^rd^{s o}^f^co^mmuⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^servi^{ce p}^r^o^vⁱ^d^{ers i}ⁿ^t^hⁱ^s^c^ountr^y^c^oul^d
^ha^v^e^be^eⁿ^he^lpf^u^l.
³⁸^Th^e^Re^por^t^re^f^e^rs^{to the}^c^a^s^e^of^aⁿⁱⁿ^te^rs^ta^te^f^u^g^itiv^e^c^h^a^r^g^e^{d w}^{ith a}^bduc^ti^{on a}^{nd s}^e^x^u^a^l^a^s^s^a^ult^of^hi^s^e^s^traⁿ^g^e^{d w}ⁱ^f^e^,
^t^r^acked^d^o^wⁿ^t^h^rou^g^h^hⁱ^{s In}^t^e^rⁿ^et^u^s^e,^an^{d u}^l^tⁱ^m^at^el^y^coⁿ^vⁱ^c^t^e^d^oⁿ^st^at^{e ch}^arges.
³⁹^H^ous^e^H^e^arⁱⁿ^gs^{, s}^t^a^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^A^t^torⁿ^e^y^G^e^ne^r^a^l^A^l^be^r^t^{o R}^.^G^onz^a^l^e^s^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^{on J}^u^ne²⁸^,²⁰^{05 a}^t
^http:^//ju^dicⁱ^a^r^y^.^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^O^v^e^r^sⁱ^g^h^tT^e^s^ti^m^oⁿ^y^.a^s^p^x^?^D^I⁼^323.
⁴⁰^Se^e^{, 1}⁸^U^.^S^.^C^.²⁷⁰³⁽^e⁾⁽^“^{. .}^{. A}^c^our^{t is}^s^uⁱⁿ^g^aⁿ^or^de^r^pur^s^u^aⁿ^{t t}^o^t^h^is^s^e^c^tion^[^f^or^the^c^onteⁿ^{t or}^r^e^c^o^r^d^s^he^ld^by
^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^pr^ovⁱ^d^e^r^s^]^,^oⁿ^a^m^o^{tion m}^a^de^pr^om^ptly^b^y^the^s^e^r^v^ic^e^pr^ov^ide^r^{, m}^a^y^qua^s^h^or^m^odi^f^y^s^u^c^h^or^de^r^,^if
^the^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion or}^r^e^c^o^r^d^s^r^e^q^u^e^s^te^{d a}^r^e^us^ua^lly^v^o^lumⁱ^nousⁱⁿ^na^t^u^r^e^or^c^o^m^p^lia^nc^e^w^{ith s}^u^c^h^or^de^r^othe^r^w^is^e^w^ould
^cau^{se u}ⁿ^d^u^e^bu^rd^{en on}^su^{ch p}^r^o^vⁱ^d^er”).

Section 220 authorizes nation-wide execution of search warrants and court orders for customer
communications records and the content of stored customer communications.
• A search warrant must ordinarily be executed in the judicial district in which it is
issued except in terrorism cases.
• The Justice Department asserts that the authority has proven useful in serious
terrorism and other criminal cases.
• The section makes it more difficult for large communications service providers to
seek modification of burdensome disclosure orders; instead of being able to
contest a warrant or order within their home federal district they must challenge
in whatever district throughout the country the warrant or order originated.
• Section 219 which does not expire permits nation-wide service of search
warrants in terrorism cases.
Unrelated to section 223, federal law imposes criminal penalties for illegal wiretapping, 18
U.S.C. 2511, unlawful access to store communications (e.g., e-mail or voice mail), or illegally
using a pen register or trap and trace device, 18 U.S.C. 3121. Except with respect to pen registers
and trap and trace devices, the same misconduct also triggers civil liability, 18 U.S.C. 2520, 2707.
There is a comparable set of provisions imposing criminal and civil liability for FISA surveillance
and physical search violations, 50 U.S.C. 1809, 1810, 1827, 1828.
Although the federal wiretap statute outlaws use or disclosure of unlawfully intercepted
communications, 18 U.S.C. 2511(1)(c), (d), and describes narrow circumstances under which
communications intercepted under a court order may be used or disclosed, 18 U.S.C. 2517,
without more, it does not expose to civil or criminal liability those who disclose or use ⁴¹
communications lawfully intercepted under a court order.
Section 223 confirms the authority of agency heads to discipline federal officers and employees
for willful or intentional violations of federal wiretap or stored communications law, 18 U.S.C.
2520(f), 2707(d). It also imposes civil liability for any willful use or disclosure of information
beyond that authorized by those two statutory schemes, 18 U.S.C. 2520(g), 2707(g). Finally, the
section creates a cause of action against the United States for the benefit of victims of willful
violations of federal wiretap law, the stored communications proscriptions, or the FISA
requirements relating to surveillance, physical searches or the use or installation of pen registers
or trap and trace devices, 18 U.S.C. 2712.

⁴¹^Dⁱ^s^c^los^u^r^e^of^the^e^x^is^te^nc^e^of^the^ta^{p (}^r^a^the^r^t^h^aⁿ^of^its^r^e^s^u^lts⁾^m^a^y^be^punis^h^a^b^le^un^de^r^t^h^e^aⁿ^ti-^ti^p^of^f^pr^ov^is^ions^of
^{18 U}^.^S.C^.²³³²⁽^d)^{, w}^h^ic^h^pr^os^c^rⁱ^b^e^s^dis^c^los^u^r^e^,^w^{ith the}ⁱⁿ^te^nt^to^obs^tr^uc^t^,^of^the^f^a^c^t^tha^t^a^wⁱ^r^e^ta^{p or}^de^r^ha^s^be^eⁿ
^s^oug^{ht or}^g^r^aⁿ^te^d,^Unite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Ag^uilar^{, 5}¹⁵^U^.^S.⁵⁹^{3 (}¹⁹⁹⁵⁾^.

Section 223 was not among those requested by the Administration, H.R.—, Hearings, at 67-90.
Nor does it appear in S. 1510 as passed by the Senate, 147 Cong. Rec. S10604-630 (daily ed.
October 11, 2001). It comes instead from the House Committee on the Judiciary where it was
added to H.R. 2975 as §161, H.Rept. 107-236, at 10-13, 305-13. As the section’s sponsor
explained:
^So^w^h^a^t^t^h^{e a}^m^eⁿ^d^m^eⁿ^t^does^is^as^f^o^llo^w^s^{: F}ⁱ^rs^{t, i}^t^s^a^y^s^t^h^at^w^h^ere^v^er^w^e^g^a^t^h^er
^inf^o^r^m^ation^,^w^h^eth^e^r^{it i}^s^peⁿ^regⁱ^s^t^{er, trace a}ⁿ^{d trap or}^wⁱ^ret^a^{p or}^w^h^ate^v^er,^wⁱ^retap^uⁿ^d^er
^oⁿ^{e statu}^t^e,^wⁱ^r^e^tap^uⁿ^d^e^r^FI^S^A^{, if}ⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^at^ioⁿ^g^aⁱⁿ^ed^d^u^rⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{e su}^r^v^eillaⁿ^{ce is}
ⁱⁿ^appropri^a^t^e^l^y^rel^e^a^s^{ed, i}^fⁱ^t^wⁱⁿ^d^s^u^p^on^t^h^{e Whi}^t^e^H^ous^{e des}^k^aⁿ^{d s}^o^m^e^body^l^e^a^k^sⁱ^t^,ⁱ^f^J.
^Edg^a^{r H}^oov^{er t}^e^l^l^s^{bad s}^t^ori^e^s^abou^t^y^o^u^,^t^h^eⁿ^y^o^u^h^a^v^e^{a ri}^g^h^t^t^o^g^oⁱⁿ^un^{der t}^h^{e F}^e^deral
^T^o^{rt C}^l^ai^m^s^A^c^{t as}^th^{e a}^g^g^r^ie^{ved party}^an^{d s}^u^{e. . .. It}^als^o^th^en^s^a^y^s^th^{at i}^f^s^o^m^e^oⁿ^{e g}^o^esⁱⁿ
^an^d^wⁱⁿ^s^th^e^la^w^s^uⁱ^{t a}^g^aiⁿ^s^t^th^e^g^o^v^e^rn^m^eⁿ^t^b^ecau^se^su^r^v^eilledⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^h^a^s^b^een
ⁱⁿ^ap^p^r^o^p^r^iately^lea^k^ed^{, t}^h^e^h^e^ad^o^f^th^at^b^u^r^eau^o^r^ag^eⁿ^c^y^eⁱ^th^er^m^u^{st i}ⁿ^itiate^dⁱ^scip^liⁿ^a^r^y
^p^r^o^ceed^{ings agai}^{nst t}^h^{e leaker}^o^r^exp^l^{ain in}^w^r^itin^{g .}^.^.^that^w^a^sn^’^t^don^e^.^H^.^R^e^pt^.^107-^236,^a^t
^{311 (}^r^em^ar^k^s^of^R^e^pres^en^t^a^tⁱ^{ve F}^r^an^k⁾^.
There have been no amendments to section 223. The precise application of the sunset provision
and its exceptions to the cause of action created in section 223 appears somewhat uncertain.
Reading only the language of termination and before considering the exception, any cause of
action created by section 223 seems to expire on March 10, 2006. This could mean either that no
suit (pending or merely actionable) survives thereafter, or alternatively that pending suits survive
but none may be filed thereafter, or that regardless of when it is filed any cause of action will only
survive with respect to matters occurring prior to that date.
Under some circumstances the demise of a cause of action deprives the courts of subject matter
jurisdiction. Longstanding Supreme Court precedent holds that “when a law conferring ⁴²
jurisdiction is repealed without any reservation as to pending cases, all cases fall with the law.”
Taking the exception into consideration, the language on its face seems to say that section 223
continues in effect “with respect to any particular foreign intelligence investigation that began
before [March 10, 2006], or with respect to any particular offense or potential offense that began
or occurred before” March 10, 2006; that is, a cause of action arising out of foreign intelligence
investigation initiated before the date of expiration or out of a criminal investigation of conduct
occurring before the date survives—regardless of when the conduct giving rise to the cause of
action occurred.
On the other hand, subsection 224(b) may speak only to investigations not to causes of action. It
may be that the exception is intended to do no more than extend investigative powers conveyed
by other expiring sections of the act. The exceptions may be calculated to do no more than to
avoid cutting off investigations pending as of March 10, 2006. Although the language seems to

⁴²^Re^pu^blic^N^a^tio^nal^Ba^nk^v^.^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^St^ate^s^,⁵⁰^{6 U}^.^S.⁸⁰^,⁵⁶^5-⁶⁶⁽¹⁹⁹²⁾⁽^T^hom^a^s^{, J}^.^c^onc^ur^rⁱ^ng⁾^,^qu^o^tin^g^,^Br^une^r^v^.
^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^{, 34}³^U^.^{S. 11}^{2, 11}^6-¹⁷⁽¹⁹⁵²⁾^;^{see a}^l^so^,^La^nd^gr^af^v^.^U^S^I^Film^Pr^od^uc^ts^{, 5}¹¹^U^.^S.²⁴^4,²⁷^{4 (}¹⁹⁹⁴⁾^.

point more strongly to a different conclusion, this view is compatible with the general rule that ⁴³
authority to sue the United States should be narrowly construed.
The Justice Department reports that “[t]here have been no administrative disciplinary proceedings
or civil actions initiated under section 223 of the actfor unauthorized disclosure of intercepts,”
Myths at §223. Critics of the section might argue that the prospect of disciplinary action might
serve as a disincentive to information sharing. The Attorney General has urged Congress to make ⁴⁴
this section permanent.
Section 223 creates a cause of action against the United States for official willful violations of
Title III or FISA, 18 U.S.C. 2712; amends individual civil liability provisions of Title III for
official unlawful disclosure or use, 18 U.S.C. 2520(g), 2707(g); confirms disciplinary authority of
agencies officials over violations of the Title III or FISA, 18 U.S.C. 2520(f), 2707(d).
• There have been no disciplinary proceedings initiated or civil actions filed under
section 223.
• The Attorney General has urged Congress to make section 223 permanent.
• Section 223 might serve as a disincentive to information sharing.
Federal law affords foreign intelligence officials authority comparable to that enjoyed by law
enforcement officials in some respects. There is a rough comparability between surveillance
(wiretap) authority under the FISA and under Title III, compare, 50 U.S.C. 1801-1811, with, 18
U.S.C. 2510-2522; there is a rough comparability between FISA physical search authority and
search warrant authority in a law enforcement context, compare, 50 U.S.C. 1821-1829, with,
F.R.Crim.P. 41; and there is a rough comparability between FISA trap and trace or pen register
orders and their law enforcement counterparts, compare, 18 U.S.C. 3121-3127, with, 50 U.S.C.

1841-1846. There are, however, significant differences.

One of the most perplexing aspects of the law in the post-9/11 universe is the relationship of the
statutory procedures and prohibitions governing wiretap and related investigative tools in the
criminal law enforcement world (Title III et al.) to those in the foreign intelligence world (FISA).
Title III and its auxiliaries are focused on crime (probable cause to believe that predicate offense
has, is or will occur; relevancy to a criminal investigation) whether the offender is an American or
not; FISA is focused on foreign powers and the agents of foreign powers (probable cause to
believe that the target is a foreign power or an officer, employee, spy, saboteur, or terrorist acting
on behalf of a foreign power) whether criminal activity is involved or not. The difficulty flows

⁴³^D^e^{pt. o}^f^Ar^m^y^v^.^Bl^ue^Fox^,^Inc^.^,⁵²⁵^U^.^S.²^55,²^{61 (}¹⁹⁹⁹⁾⁽^“^t^h^e^w^a^iv^e^r^of^s^o^v^e^r^eⁱ^g^{n im}^m^unit^y^is^{to b}^e^s^t^rⁱ^c^tly
^c^ons^tr^ue^d”⁾^;^La^ne^v^.^Peⁿ^a^{, 51}⁸^U^.^{S. 18}^{7, 19}²⁽¹⁹⁹⁶⁾^.
⁴⁴^H^ous^e^H^e^arⁱⁿ^gs^{, s}^t^a^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^A^t^torⁿ^e^y^G^e^ne^r^a^l^A^l^be^r^t^{o R}^.^G^onz^a^l^e^s^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^{on J}^u^ne²⁸^,²⁰^{05 a}^t
^http:^//ju^dicⁱ^a^r^y^.^hos^ue^.g^ov^/O^v^e^rsⁱ^g^htT^e^s^tⁱ^m^on^y^.^a^s^px^?^I^D⁼^323.

from the fact that an international terrorist may appropriately be the target of a order under Title
III et al., or FISA, or both.
Section 206 authorizes assistance for the installation and use of multi-point FISA wiretaps, 50
U.S.C. 1805(c)(2)(B). Prior to the act, a FISA wiretap order could include directions that a
specifically identified communications carrier, landlord, or other individual assist in the execution
of the order, 50 U.S.C. 1805(c)(2)(B) (2000 ed.). Section 206 amends FISA to permit a general
command for assistance where the target of the surveillance has taken steps to thwart the
identification of any specific person by “rapidly changing hotel accommodations, cell phones, ⁴⁵
Internet accounts, etc, just prior to important meetings or communications.” The law
enforcement wiretap statute has a similar provision for law enforcement orders, 18 U.S.C.

2518(4).

The Administration’s original request observed that:
^T^h^{is p}^r^o^v^isioⁿ^ex^p^aⁿ^d^{s t}^h^{e o}^b^lig^atioⁿ^s^o^f^th^ir^d^p^a^r^{ties to}^f^u^rⁿ^is^h^as^sistaⁿ^{ce to}^th^e
^g^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^un^{der F}^I^SA^.^Uⁿ^{der cu}^rren^t^F^I^SA^provⁱ^sⁱ^ons^{, t}^h^e^g^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^ca^{n s}^e^e^k
^inf^o^r^m^ation^aⁿ^{d as}^sⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^ce^f^r^om^co^m^m^oⁿ^carriers^,^laⁿ^d^lords^,^cu^s^t^odians^an^{d ot}^h^e^{r pers}^on^s
^s^p^ecifⁱ^{ed i}ⁿ^co^u^r^t-^{ordered s}^u^r^v^eillan^ce.^{Section 152}^w^o^u^l^{d a}^m^en^d^FIS^A^{to ex}^paⁿ^d^exis^ti^ng
^au^th^orit^y^{to allo}^w^,^“ⁱⁿ^cⁱ^rcum^s^t^an^ces^w^h^{ere t}^h^{e C}^o^u^r^t^fⁱⁿ^d^s^t^h^{at t}^h^{e actions}^of^t^h^{e targ}^{et o}^f
^th^{e ap}^p^licatioⁿ^m^a^y^h^a^v^e^th^{e e}^f^f^{ect o}^f^th^w^a^r^tin^g^th^{e id}^eⁿ^ti^fⁱ^cat^ioⁿ^o^f^{a sp}^ecifⁱ^ed^p^e^r^s^oⁿ^”^t^h^a^t
^{a co}^m^m^oⁿ^{carrier, lan}^d^{lord, cus}^t^odian^{or oth}^e^r^pers^onsⁿ^o^t^s^p^eci^fⁱ^{ed i}ⁿ^t^h^e^C^o^u^r^t^’^s^{order be}
^r^e^q^u^ir^ed^to^f^u^rⁿ^is^h^t^h^{e ap}^p^lican^{t i}ⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^tion^aⁿ^{d techn}ⁱ^{cal as}^sⁱ^s^t^an^ceⁿ^eces^s^a^r^y^to
^acco^m^p^li^s^h^electroⁿⁱ^{c s}^u^rv^e^ill^an^{ce in}^a^m^aⁿⁿ^e^{r t}^h^at^w^{ill p}^r^o^t^{ect its secrec}^y^an^d^p^r^o^d^u^{ce a}
^mⁱⁿⁱ^m^u^m^o^fⁱⁿ^ter^f^er^en^ce^wⁱ^t^h^th^{e ser}^v^{ices t}^h^{at su}^c^h^p^e^r^s^oⁿ^{is p}^r^o^v^idⁱⁿ^g^to^th^{e tar}^g^{et o}^f
^electr^oⁿⁱ^{c s}^u^r^v^e^illaⁿ^{ce. T}^h^is^w^o^u^l^d^en^h^aⁿ^{ce t}^h^e^FB^I^’^s^abⁱ^lit^y^to^m^oⁿ^ito^rⁱⁿ^terⁿ^atioⁿ^a^l
^t^e^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^t^s^aⁿ^dⁱⁿ^t^e^l^lⁱ^g^eⁿ^c^e^o^f^fⁱ^c^e^r^s^wh^o^a^r^e^t^r^aⁱⁿ^e^d^t^o^t^h^w^a^r^t^s^u^r^v^eillaⁿ^ce^b^y^r^a^pⁱ^d^l^y^ch^aⁿ^gⁱⁿ^g
^h^o^{tel acco}^m^m^odation^s^{, ce}^{ll phon}^es^{, In}^terⁿ^{et accoun}^t^s^{, etc., j}^u^s^t^{prior to i}^m^portan^t^m^eetiⁿ^gs
^{or com}^m^uⁿⁱ^cations^{. Un}^{der th}^e^cu^rren^{t la}^w^,^th^e^g^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^wou^l^{d h}^a^v^e^t^o^r^e^t^u^rⁿ^t^o^t^h^e^F^I^SA
^Co^u^r^t^f^o^r^an^o^r^d^e^r^th^atⁿ^a^m^e^d^th^eⁿ^e^w^car^rⁱ^er^{, lan}^d^lo^r^d^{, etc., b}^e^f^o^r^e^ef^f^ectiⁿ^g^s^u^r^v^eillaⁿ^ce.
^Uⁿ^{der t}^h^{e propos}^ed^am^eⁿ^d^m^eⁿ^t^,^t^h^{e F}^B^{I cou}^l^{d s}ⁱ^m^p^l^y^pres^eⁿ^t^t^h^eⁿ^e^w^l^y^di^s^c^o^v^{ered carri}^er^,
^l^aⁿ^d^l^o^{rd, cu}^s^t^odi^an^{or ot}^h^e^{r pe}^rs^on^wⁱ^t^h^a^g^eⁿ^e^ri^{c order i}^s^s^u^e^d^by^t^h^e^C^o^u^r^t^an^{d cou}^l^{d t}^h^eⁿ
^ef^f^e^c^t^F^I^SA^cov^e^ra^g^e^as^s^oon^as^t^echnⁱ^cal^l^y^f^e^a^sⁱ^b^l^e^{. §152,}^H^.^R^.^—^,^H^e^arⁱ^ngs^at^56.
The proposal passed through the legislative process unchanged, see, §152, H.R. 2975, H.Rept.

107-236 at 8, 59-60; §206, S. 1510, 147 Cong. Rec. S10607 (daily ed. October 11, 2001).

The subsection 224(b) exceptions provisions seem rather obviously applicable. The authority
continues in effect after March 10, 2006, with respect to any foreign intelligence investigation

⁴⁵^Adminⁱ^strati^{on’s Dra}^{ft A}ⁿ^ti-Te^rr^{orism Ac}^{t of}²⁰⁰¹^:^Hea^rⁱⁿ^g^B^e^f^o^{re t}^h^{e Ho}^u^s^{e C}^o^mm.^on^t^h^{e Ju}^di^ci^a^r^y^{, 1}⁰⁷^th^C^ong^.,
¹^st^Se^s^s^.⁵⁶⁽²⁰⁰¹⁾^{; H}^.^R^e^p^t^.¹⁰^7-³^{07 a}^t⁶⁰^.

initiated prior to that time. There have been no amendments related to section 206 since its
enactment. A subsequent amendment (which does not sunset) to a different FISA section,
however, permits roving surveillance by requiring a FISA order to identify the location and
facilities subject to surveillance only if they are known at the time of the application, P.L. 107-

108, 115 Stat. 1402 (2001)(50 U.S.C. 1805(c)(1)(B)).

The Justice Department’s Report describes section 206 and offers a hypothetical by way of
justification:
^Sin^{ce 1986, law}^enf^o^rce^m^eⁿ^{t off}ⁱ^cials^h^a^v^e^b^een^{able to obtai}ⁿ^m^u^ltiple^-^poin^t^wⁱ^retaps
^{to k}^{eep pace w}ⁱ^t^h^dru^g^dealers^an^d^m^obs^ters^w^h^{o, f}^o^{r ex}^a^m^p^l^e^,^f^r^e^q^u^eⁿ^t^ly^s^wⁱ^t^c^h^c^e^l^l^p^h^oⁿ^es
^to^ev^ad^{e su}^r^v^eillaⁿ^{ce. P}^r^io^r^to^en^act^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^t^h^{e US}^A^P^A^T^R^I^O^T^A^c^{t, su}^c^h^au^th^o^r^it^y^w^a^sⁿ^o^t
^av^ai^l^a^bl^e^uⁿ^d^er^F^I^SA^f^o^{r cas}^e^sⁱⁿ^v^o^l^vⁱⁿ^{g t}^e^rrori^s^t^s^.^S^ectⁱ^on^{206 of}^t^h^{e ac}^t^,^h^o^w^e^v^e^r,ⁿ^o^w
^p^e^r^mⁱ^t^s^o^f^fⁱ^c^e^r^sⁱⁿⁱⁿ^t^e^rⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^t^e^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^mⁱⁿ^v^e^s^tⁱ^g^a^tioⁿ^s^to^o^b^tain^{a co}^u^r^{t o}^r^d^e^r^th^{at ap}^p^{lies to}
^th^{e s}^u^s^p^{ect, rath}^{er th}^an^{a particu}^l^{ar ph}^on^{e or ph}^on^{e com}^p^any^.^T^h^isⁿ^e^w^a^u^t^h^orit^y^h^a^s^pu^t
ⁱⁿ^v^e^sti^g^ato^r^{s i}ⁿ^{a b}^e^{tter p}^o^s^itioⁿ^to^av^oⁱ^d^uⁿⁿ^eces^sar^y^ca^t-^aⁿ^d^-^m^o^u^s^e^g^a^m^e^s^wⁱ^t^h^terro^r^ists,
^w^h^o^ar^{e tr}^ain^e^d^to^th^w^a^r^t^s^u^r^v^e^illan^{ce. W}^h^{ile p}^a^r^tⁱ^c^u^l^a^r^e^x^am^p^l^e^s^o^f^t^h^e^u^s^e^o^f^m^u^ltip^le^-^p^oⁱⁿ^t
^wⁱ^ret^a^ps^p^u^rs^u^aⁿ^t^t^o^s^ectⁱ^oⁿ^{206 rem}^aⁱⁿ^cl^assⁱ^fⁱ^{ed, t}^h^e^f^o^l^l^o^wⁱⁿ^g^hy^pot^h^e^tⁱ^calⁱ^l^l^us^t^r^at^es^t^h^e
^u^tilit^y^o^f^t^hⁱ^s^au^t^h^o^r^it^y^.
^S^u^ppos^{e, f}^o^{r e}^x^a^m^p^l^{e, t}^h^{e i}^nves^tⁱ^g^a^t^ors^beco^m^e^a^w^{are of an al}^Q^{aeda pl}^ot^t^o^l^a^un^c^h^a
^bom^{b attack}^{. Inv}^e^s^tig^a^t^ors^als^o^dis^c^ov^{er a recen}^{t cellu}^lar^t^e^l^e^p^h^oⁿ^eⁿ^u^m^b^e^r^f^o^r^t^h^e^s^u^s^p^e^c^t^e^d
^bom^{ber, f}^o^r^w^h^ic^h^th^e^yⁱ^m^m^e^dⁱ^atel^y^obtain^{a FIS}^A^s^u^rv^eil^l^{ance orde}^r.^W^h^eⁿ^t^h^ey^a^t^t^e^m^p^t^t^o
^b^e^gⁱⁿ^s^u^r^v^eillaⁿ^{ce o}^f^t^h^e^su^s^p^{ect, h}^o^w^e^v^e^r^,^t^h^e^y^dⁱ^sco^v^er^th^at^h^e^h^a^{s ch}^aⁿ^g^e^d^cell^u^lar
^teleph^on^{e num}^bers^an^{d prov}^idersⁱⁿ^{order to thw}^a^{rt su}^rv^eil^l^aⁿ^{ce. Becau}^s^e^of^s^e^c^tion^{206, in}
^cas^es^w^h^{ere t}^h^{e s}^u^bj^ect’^s^actⁱ^oⁿ^s^m^a^y^h^a^v^e^t^h^{e e}^f^f^{ect o}^f^t^h^w^a^rtiⁿ^g^t^h^{e iden}^tⁱ^fication^o^f^a
^ser^v^{ice p}^r^o^v^id^er^{, in}^v^e^sti^g^ato^r^s^canⁿ^o^w^o^b^t^ain^{a FI}^S^A^m^u^ltip^l^e^-^p^oⁱⁿ^t^s^u^r^v^e^illaⁿ^{ce o}^r^d^e^r^an^d
ⁱ^m^m^e^di^at^el^y^s^e^r^v^{e i}^t^on^t^h^e^s^u^spect^{ed bom}^ber’sⁿ^e^w^cel^l^u^l^a^r^provⁱ^d^{er, al}^l^o^wⁱ^ng^un^dercov^er
^ag^en^t^s^t^o^m^oⁿⁱ^t^o^r^hⁱ^{s n}^e^w^cel^l^u^l^a^{r t}^e^l^e^p^h^on^e^num^berⁱ^m^m^e^di^at^el^y^.^Wi^t^h^ou^t^s^ectⁱ^oⁿ^206,
^h^o^w^e^v^e^r^,ⁱⁿ^v^e^st^ig^ato^r^{s i}ⁿ^su^c^h^cases^w^o^u^l^d^b^e^f^o^r^ced^to^w^a^ste^v^a^lu^ab^{le ti}^m^e^r^e^tu^rⁿⁱⁿ^g^to^th^e⁴⁶
^FI^S^A^c^o^ur^t^j^u^st^t^o^o^b^t^aⁱ^{n a}^ne^w^o^r^d^e^{r c}^o^nt^aⁱⁿⁱ^{ng t}^h^e^ne^w^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^e^r^’^{s na}^me^.^Repor^t^at^22-^3.
Critics claim section 206 is too sweeping;⁴⁷ places unfair burdens upon those called upon to ⁴⁸⁴⁹
provide assistance; and might raise constitutional concerns.

⁴⁶^J^u^s^tic^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^ha^{ve te}^s^tif^ie^{d tha}^t^the^FI^SA^c^our^t^ha^{d i}^s^s^u^e^d⁴⁹^or^de^r^s^a^u^th^or^izⁱⁿ^g^us^e^o^f^the^a^u^thorⁱ^t^y
^unde^r^s^e^c^tⁱ^on²⁰^{6 a}^s^of^Ma^r^c^h^30,²⁰^05,^H^o^us^e^H^e^ar^ings^,^s^t^a^t^e^m^eⁿ^t^of^J^a^m^e^s^A^Bak^e^{r, Couns}^e^l^f^o^{r I}ⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^P^o^lic^y^,
^Offⁱ^c^e^of^Inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^P^o^lic^y^a^{nd Re}^vⁱ^e^w^{, Unite}^{d Sta}^t^e^s^De^pa^rtm^eⁿ^t^of^Justic^e^,^a^v^a^ila^ble^{on J}^une^28,²⁰⁰^{5 a}^t
^http:^//ju^dicⁱ^a^r^y^.^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^m^e^dia^/^pdf^s^/^ba^k^e^r0428⁰⁵^.p^df^.
⁴⁷^Ch^em^eriⁿ^sk^y^,^Losⁱ^{ng Li}^be^r^tie^s^:^Applyⁱ^ng^{a F}^o^r^e^ig^{n I}ⁿ^te^l^ligeⁿ^c^e^M^ode^{l to}^D^o^m^e^s^tic^Law^Enf^o^r^c^e^m^eⁿ^t^{, 5}¹^U^C^L^A
^L^AW^R^EV^IE^W¹⁶¹^9,¹⁶^27-⁶²^{8 (}²⁰⁰⁴⁾⁽^“^Se^c^tioⁿ²⁰^{6 a}^u^t^hor^iz^e^s^the^F^I^SA^c^our^{t to a}^u^th^or^iz^e^inte^r^c^e^p^ts^{on a}ⁿ^y^ph^one^s^or
^c^o^m^pute^r^{s tha}^t^the^ta^rg^e^t^m^a^y^use^.^T^h^{is a}^u^th^ority^f^o^{r rov}ⁱ^ng^wⁱ^re^ta^{ps m}^e^aⁿ^{s tha}^t^the^p^o^lic^eⁿ^o^lo^ng^e^r^ne^e^d^t^o^list^the
^pho^neⁿ^u^m^b^e^r^s^{to be}^ta^ppe^d;^the^polic^e^c^aⁿ^lis^te^{n t}^o^aⁿ^y^pho^ne^tha^t^pe^r^s^on^mⁱ^g^h^{t us}^e^.^T^h^is^m^e^aⁿ^s^th^a^t^the^p^o^lic^e^c^aⁿ
^liste^{n to}^a^{ll p}^h^oⁿ^e^s^w^h^e^r^e^a^pe^{rson w}^o^rk^{s, or}^sho^p^s,^{or v}ⁱ^{sits. I}ⁿ^de^ba^te^{s w}^{ith FBI}^agen^t^s^o^v^{er t}^hⁱ^s^p^r^ov^is^ion,^the^y^ha^v^e
^s^t^a^t^e^d^tha^t^t^h^is^e^v^eⁿ^a^llow^s^the^ta^ppi^ng^of^pa^y^phone^s^t^h^a^t^a^pe^r^s^oⁿ^r^e^g^u^la^r^l^y^w^a^lk^s^pa^s^t^{. T}^h^e^r^e^is^{, thoug}^{h, a}
^re^quire^m^e^{nt f}^o^{r “}^m^inimⁱ^z^a^tion”ⁱⁿ^tha^t^a^g^eⁿ^{ts m}^u^{st stop liste}ⁿⁱ^ng^w^h^eⁿ^the^y^le^a^r^{n tha}^t^t^h^e^c^onv^e^r^sa^tion^{is n}^o^t^pe^rtineⁿ^t
^t^o^t^h^{e su}^b^j^ect^o^f^t^h^ei^{r w}^a^rran^t^.^T^h^{e argu}^m^eⁿ^t^f^o^{r ro}^viⁿ^g^wⁱ^ret^a^p^sⁱ^s^t^h^at^su^sp^ect^ed^t^e^rro^ri^st^{s m}ⁱ^gh^t^repeat^ed^l^y^ch^an^ge
^c^e^{ll pho}^ne^{s. T}^h^e^pr^oble^m^w^{ith thi}^s^a^r^g^u^m^e^{nt is tha}^t^t^h^e^g^o^v^e^rnm^e^nt^{, by}^de^fⁱ^nition,^c^aⁿⁿ^o^{t liste}ⁿ^to^a^pho^ne^uⁿ^til^the^y
^k^now^tha^t^{it e}^x^{ists. Onc}^e^the^y^k^now^{, the}^y^c^{ould j}^u^{st a}^d^{d t}^h^e^ne^w^nu^m^b^e^r^{to a}ⁿ^e^x^isting^w^a^rra^{nt. In de}^ba^te^{s w}^{ith FBI}
^agen^t^s^,^t^h^{e resp}^on^{se al}^w^a^{ys h}^a^{s b}^een^t^h^atⁱ^t^t^a^{kes t}^o^o^l^oⁿ^g^t^o^a^d^{d n}^e^w^nu^m^b^e^r^{to e}^x^isting^w^a^rra^{nts. But t}^h^{is c}^a^{lls f}^o^{r a}
^f^a^s^t^e^r^pr^oc^e^dur^e^t^o^d^o^s^o^,^{not r}^o^vⁱ^ng^wⁱ^r^e^ta^ps^”⁾^;^L^e^e^,^T^h^{e US}^A^P^A^T^R^IOT^A^c^t^an^{d T}^e^l^eco^mmuⁿⁱ^ca^tⁱ^on^{s: P}^rⁱ^v^a^{cy Un}^d^e^r
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

Section 206 permits roving FISA surveillance orders; orders need not specifically identify
individuals ordered to assist where targets take actions to thwart specific individuals, 50 U.S.C.

1805(c)(2)(B).

• Comparable authority has existed under Title III (18 U.S.C. 2518(4)) for some
time.
• Critics claim the provision is too sweeping, perhaps constitutionally so.
• A subsequent amendment (which does not sunset) permits roving surveillance by
requiring a FISA order to identify the location and facilities subject to
surveillance only if they are known, P.L. 107-108, 115 Stat. 1402 (2001)(50
U.S.C. 1805(c)(1)(B)).
Under FISA before passage of the act, FISA wiretap orders with the agent of a foreign power as
their target had a maximum duration of 90 days, and could be extended in 90 day increments, 50

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^Attac^k^{, 2}⁹^R^UT^GE^RS^C^O^M^PU^TER^&^T^E^C^H^N^O^L^OGY^L^AW^J^OURN^A^L^371,³⁹^{8 (}²⁰⁰³⁾⁽^“^Uⁿ^ti^{l th}^is^pr^ov^is^ion^s^uns^e^t^sⁱⁿ²⁰⁰⁵^,
^the^r^e^s^u^{lt m}^a^y^be^a^ba^c^k^door^t^o^m^a^s^sⁱ^ve^wⁱ^r^e^ta^pping⁾^;^T^h^e^U^S^{A P}^A^TRI^O^{T Ac}^t:^Viol^ati^ng^Re^as^oⁿ^a^b^l^e^Ex^pe^c^t^atio^ns^o^f
^Pr^iv^ac^y^Pr^ote^c^t^e^d^by^t^h^e^Fo^ur^th^Am^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t W}ⁱ^t^h^o^u^{t A}^d^v^ancⁱ^{ng N}^a^tio^nal^Se^c^u^r^ity^{, 82}^N^ORT^H^C^AR^O^L^I^N^{A AW}^R^EV^I^E^W
⁴¹²^{, 4}²¹⁽²⁰⁰³⁾⁽^“^Se^c^tio^{n 2}^{06 g}ⁱ^v^e^s^the^f^e^de^r^a^{l g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt e}^x^c^e^s^sⁱ^v^e^l^y^br^oa^{d a}^u^th^or^ity^{to i}ⁿ^tr^u^d^e^oⁿ^the^pr^iv^a^c^y^of
^th^ird^p^a^{rties o}^t^h^e^{r t}^h^an^t^h^{e targ}^{et o}^f^th^{e su}^rv^eillan^ce”);^{EPIC Re}^p^o^rt^(“S^u^ch^‘gen^eri^c^{’ o}^r^d^e^{rs co}^ul^d^h^a^{ve a si}^gnⁱ^fⁱ^can^t
ⁱ^m^p^act^oⁿ^t^h^{e pri}^v^ac^y^ri^gh^t^s^o^f^l^a^r^g^{e n}^u^m^b^e^{rs o}^fⁱⁿⁿ^o^cen^t^u^s^ers,^p^a^r^tⁱ^c^u^l^arl^y^t^h^o^s^{e w}^h^o^{access t}^h^{e In}^t^e^rn^et^t^h^r^o^u^g^h
^pub^lic^f^a^c^ilitie^s^s^u^c^h^a^s^libra^rie^s^,^univ^e^rs^ity^c^o^m^pute^r^la^bs^aⁿ^d^c^y^b^e^rc^af^e^s^{. U}^{pon the}^s^u^s^p^icⁱ^{on t}^h^a^t^aⁿⁱⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e
^ta^rg^e^t^mⁱ^g^h^{t use}^suc^h^a^f^a^c^ilit^y^,^the^{FBI c}^aⁿⁿ^o^w^m^{onitor a}^l^l^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tio^{ns tra}ⁿ^sm^itte^{d a}^t^t^h^e^f^a^c^ili^ty^.^T^h^e^proble^m^is
^exac^erb^a^t^e^d^b^y^t^h^{e f}^a^ct^t^h^at^t^h^{e re}^ci^pⁱ^en^t^o^f^t^h^{e assi}^st^an^{ce o}^r^d^e^{r (f}^o^rⁱⁿ^st^an^ce,^{a l}ⁱ^b^r^ary⁾^w^o^u^l^d^b^e^p^r^ohⁱ^bⁱ^t^e^d^f^r^o^m
^dⁱ^scl^o^siⁿ^g^t^h^{e f}^act^t^h^at^m^oⁿⁱ^t^o^ri^{ng i}^s^o^ccu^rriⁿ^g^”).
⁴⁸^W^h^ite^he^a^d^&^A^d^eⁿ^{, a}^t¹¹⁰⁵^(“^T^h^{is prov}^isio^{n is}^pro^b^le^m^a^tic^{in tha}^t^{it dist}^{orts tw}^{o e}^x^tre^m^e^l^yⁱ^m^porta^{nt c}^h^e^c^k^{s in t}^h^e
^le^g^a^{l s}^y^s^t^em^tha^t^his^t^oric^a^lly^ha^v^e^prov^ide^d^a^m^e^a^s^ure^of^ac^c^ounta^b^ility^f^o^{r the}^v^a^lidity^of^a^w^a^rra^{nt. Firs}^{t, t}^h^e
^a^m^en^d^m^en^t^al^l^o^w^s^t^h^{e i}^ssu^an^{ce of}^so^-cal^l^e^d^‘b^l^aⁿ^k^w^a^rran^t^,^’^w^h^ic^{h the}^pa^r^tie^s^r^e^q^u^ir^e^t^o^r^e^s^p^oⁿ^d^to^t^h^e^or^de^r^ne^e^d^not
^b^e^listed^oⁿ^th^{e f}^{ace o}^f^th^{e d}^o^c^u^m^en^{t. T}^h^{is p}^l^{aces su}^ch^c^o^mm^uⁿⁱ^catioⁿ^s^p^r^o^v^id^{ers i}ⁿ^t^h^{e p}^o^sitioⁿ^o^f^h^a^vⁱⁿ^g^to^accep^t
^the^v^a^lidity^of^the^w^a^r^r^aⁿ^{t a}^{nd i}^t^s^a^pplic^a^tio^{n t}^o^t^h^e^m^vⁱ^r^t^ua^ll^y^w^ithout^que^s^tⁱ^on⁽^a^lth^oug^{h t}^h^e^s^e^c^tion^doe^s^pe^r^m^{it a}
^prov^ide^r^t^oⁱⁿ^q^u^ire^w^{ith the}^A^ttorⁿ^e^y^Ge^ne^ra^{l a}^s^{to w}^ho,^th^ro^ug^{h hi}^{s v}^a^{rious a}^g^eⁿ^{ts, ob}^ta^ine^d^the^or^d^e^{r in t}^h^e^fⁱ^rst
^p^l^ace,^w^h^et^h^e^{r o}^r^no^t^t^h^{e o}^r^d^e^{r i}^s^valⁱ^d^).^S^eco^nd^t^h^{e o}^r^d^e^{r m}^a^yⁿ^o^t^h^a^{ve b}^eenⁱ^ssu^edⁱⁿ^t^h^{e resp}^on^dⁱ^{ng p}^a^rt^y^’^s
^jurⁱ^s^d^ic^ti^on^{, c}^r^e^a^ting^hi^ndr^aⁿ^c^e^s^o^f^ge^og^r^a^phy^a^{nd e}^x^pe^ns^e^f^o^r^a^pa^r^t^y^tha^t^de^sⁱ^r^e^s^{to c}^h^a^lle^ng^e^the^or^de^r^{in c}^our^t”⁾^.
⁴⁹^Kolla^r,^U^S^{A PA}^TRI^O^{T Ac}^t,^the^F^our^th^Am^e^ndm^eⁿ^t,^an^{d P}^a^r^aⁿ^oⁱ^a^:^C^an^The^y^Re^a^d^T^h^is^W^h^ile^I^’^m^T^y^ping^I^t^?³
^J^O^U^R^NA^L^OF^H^IG^H^T^E^C^H^N^O^L^OGY^L^AW^{67 (}²⁰⁰⁴⁾⁽^“^Ev^eⁿ^m^o^r^e^s^t^rⁱ^kⁱⁿ^g^,^Se^c^tion²⁰^{6 p}^r^ov^ide^s^a^u^t^horⁱ^t^y^f^o^r^the^FI^SC^t^o
^g^r^aⁿ^{t s}^o^-^c^a^lle^{d ‘}^r^o^vⁱ^ng^wⁱ^r^e^ta^ps^’^{not s}^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^c^{to a}^pa^r^tic^ula^r^j^u^rⁱ^s^dⁱ^c^tion,^te^le^ph^one^num^be^r^or^e^m^a^{il a}^ddr^e^s^s^but^w^h^ic^h
^c^aⁿ^c^r^{oss jurisd}^ic^tio^na^{l b}^o^u^nda^rie^s^{. T}^h^{is w}ⁱ^de^la^titude^e^f^f^e^c^tiv^e^l^y^p^e^r^m^{its the}^surv^e^illa^nc^e^of^m^u^c^h^othe^rw^ise^la^wf^ul
^a^c^tiv^it^y^,^gⁱ^vⁱ^ng^rⁱ^s^e^{to C}^ons^tit^uti^o^na^{l c}^onc^e^r^ns^of^ov^e^r^br^e^a^d^{th a}ⁿ^{d v}^a^g^u^eⁿ^e^s^s^”⁾^;^H^a^nnig^a^n,^Playⁱⁿ^{g P}^a^triot^Game^s:
^Natio^nal^Se^c^u^rity^C^halle^nge^{s Civ}^{il Li}^be^rtie^s^{, 41}^H^OUS^T^ON^L^AW^R^EV^I^E^W^1371,¹³⁸²⁽²⁰⁰⁴⁾⁽^“^T^h^e^Fo^ur^{th A}^m^eⁿ^d^m^eⁿ^t
^of^the^C^ons^ti^tuti^on^pr^ote^c^t^s^A^m^e^r^ic^aⁿ^s^f^r^o^m^unr^e^a^s^ona^ble^s^e^a^r^c^h^e^s^a^{nd s}^e^iz^ur^e^s^{. H}^o^w^e^v^e^r^,^s^e^ve^r^a^{l pr}^ov^is^ions^of^the
^P^a^tri^o^{t A}^c^{t a}^u^th^oriz^e^f^e^de^ra^{l la}^w^eⁿ^f^o^rc^e^m^eⁿ^{t to sk}^{irt the}^li^ne^of^r^e^a^s^ona^bleⁿ^e^s^s^.^F^o^r^e^x^a^m^ple^,^s^e^c^tio^{n 2}⁰⁶^of^the^P^a^trⁱ^o^t
^A^c^{t a}^m^e^{nds FISA}^a^{nd e}^a^s^e^s^re^stric^{tions i}ⁿ^v^o^lv^ing^d^o^m^e^stic^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^g^a^the^r^ing^by^a^llo^wⁱ^ng^a^sing^le^wⁱ^re^ta^{p to}
^l^e^gal^l^y^ro^a^m^f^r^o^m^d^e^vi^{ce t}^o^d^e^vi^ce,^t^o^t^a^{p t}^h^e^p^e^rsoⁿ^rat^h^{er t}^h^an^t^h^{e p}^h^oⁿ^e”);^EPIC^Re^p^o^rt^(“T^h^{e ‘g}^eⁿ^{eric’ ro}^vⁱⁿ^g
^wⁱ^re^ta^{p orde}^{rs ra}^ise^sigⁿ^if^ic^aⁿ^{t c}^onstitutⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^issue^s^{, a}^s^th^e^y^do^not^c^o^m^{port w}^{ith the}^F^ourt^h^A^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t’s re}^quire^m^e^nt
^t^h^at^an^y^search^w^a^rran^t^‘p^artⁱ^c^u^l^arl^y^d^e^scri^b^e^t^h^{e p}^l^{ace t}^o^b^e^searched^.^’^T^h^at^d^e^fⁱ^ci^en^c^y^b^eco^{mes e}^v^eⁿ^m^o^{re si}^gnⁱ^fⁱ^can^t
^w^h^{ere t}^h^{e p}^rⁱ^v^at^{e co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^o^f^l^a^w^-^abⁱ^dⁱⁿ^{g Am}^eri^can^ci^tⁱ^zen^{s m}ⁱ^gh^t^b^eⁱⁿ^t^e^rcep^t^e^d^”^).

U.S.C. 1805(e)(2000 ed.). FISA physical search orders and extensions were good for no more
than 45 days (but up to one year if a foreign power was the target), 50 U.S.C. 1824(d)(2000 ed.).
Section 207 amends the time lines. FISA wiretap orders relating to the agent of foreign power
may remain in effect for up to 120 days and may be extended at one year intervals, 50 U.S.C.
1805(e). As a general rule, FISA physical search orders and extensions may be authorized for 90
days (unless they target a foreign power), but orders with an agent of a foreign power as their
target may be issued for up to 120 days with extensions for up to one year, 50 U.S.C. 1824(d).
As is often and understandably the case where FISA is the subject, the Administration’s statement
accompanying its request here is a bit cryptic:
^T^h^{is sectio}ⁿ^r^e^f^o^r^m^{s a cr}^{itical asp}^{ect o}^f^th^{e Fo}^r^e^igⁿ^Iⁿ^te^ll^ig^en^{ce S}^u^r^v^eillaⁿ^{ce A}^c^t
⁽^F^I^S^A⁾^{. I}^t^wⁱ^{ll e}ⁿ^ab^{le t}^h^{e Fo}^r^e^igⁿ^Iⁿ^tel^lig^eⁿ^ce^Su^r^v^eillaⁿ^ce^Co^u^r^{t (}^F^I^S^C)^,^w^h^ich^p^r^esid^es
^ov^{er appl}ⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^m^a^{de b}^y^t^h^e^U^.^S^.^g^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^uⁿ^d^{er FIS}^A^{, to au}^th^{orize th}^{e s}^earc^h^an^d
^su^r^v^eillaⁿ^{ce in}^t^h^{e U.S. o}^f^o^f^fⁱ^c^e^r^s^an^d^e^m^p^l^o^y^{ees o}^f^f^o^r^e^igⁿ^p^o^w^er^{s a}ⁿ^d^f^o^r^e^igⁿ^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^o^f
ⁱⁿ^terⁿ^a^tioⁿ^a^l^ter^r^o^r^{ist g}^r^o^u^p^s^f^o^r^u^p^to^a^y^ear^.^Cu^r^r^en^tl^y^,^th^e^FI^SC^m^a^y^oⁿ^l^y^a^u^t^h^o^r^{ize s}^u^ch
^s^earch^es^an^d^s^u^r^v^eillaⁿ^ce^f^o^{r up to 45 day}^s^an^{d 90 da}^y^s^{, res}^p^e^c^tiv^el^y^.^T^h^{e propos}^{ed ch}^ang^e
^w^o^u^l^d^b^rⁱⁿ^g^th^{e a}^u^th^o^r^izatioⁿ^p^e^rⁱ^o^dⁱⁿ^lin^e^wⁱ^t^h^th^{at allo}^w^e^d^f^o^r^sear^ch^an^d^su^r^v^ei^llan^{ce o}^f
^t^h^e^fo^r^eⁱ^g^{n e}^s^t^a^b^lⁱ^s^h^m^eⁿ^t^s^fo^r^w^hⁱ^c^{h t}^h^e^fo^r^eⁱ^{gn o}^f^fi^c^e^r^{s a}ⁿ^d^e^m^p^l^o^y^ees^w^o^rk^.^T^h^e^prop^os^ed
^c^h^aⁿ^g^e^w^o^u^l^d^h^a^v^eⁿ^o^e^f^f^e^c^t^oⁿ^e^l^e^c^t^r^oⁿⁱ^c^s^u^r^v^eillaⁿ^ce^o^f^U.^S.^citizen^s^o^r^p^e^r^m^aⁿ^eⁿ^t^r^e^sid^eⁿ^t
^alⁱ^eⁿ^s^{. §151, H}^.^R^.^—^,^H^e^arⁱ^ngs^at^51;^s^{ee als}^o^{, H}^.^R^e^pt^{. 107-}^{236 at}^59.
The Senate scaled back the Administration’s request to extend the duration of orders and
extensions relating to foreign agents from one year to 120 days, but with extensions for up to one
year in the case of agents who are foreign nationals (not U.S. persons), §207, S. 1510, 147 Cong. ⁵⁰
Rec. S10607 (daily ed. October 11, 2001). The Senate view ultimately prevailed, §207, P.L.

107-56, 115 Stat. 282 (2001).

The provisions of section 207 have not been amended. They would appear to remain available for
use with respect to any foreign intelligence investigation predating March 10, 2006, but otherwise
to expire on that date.
The Justice Department apparently views section 207 as a matter of expediency and
administrative efficiency:
^T^h^{e USA P}^A^T^R^IOT^A^c^t^h^a^s^a^l^s^oⁱ^m^prov^{ed t}^h^{e e}^f^f^ecti^v^en^e^s^s^of^FIS^A^.^Un^{der FIS}^A^,^a
^f^e^deral^cou^r^t^{. . . rev}ⁱ^e^w^s^D^e^part^m^eⁿ^t^requ^e^s^t^s^f^o^{r phys}ⁱ^cal^s^earc^h^es^aⁿ^{d el}^ect^ronⁱ^c
^su^r^v^eillaⁿ^{ce o}^f^f^o^r^e^igⁿ^p^o^w^e^r^s^an^d^th^eir^ag^eⁿ^{ts. U}ⁿ^d^e^r^p^r^io^r^la^w^,^th^{e Dep}^a^r^t^m^eⁿ^t^co^u^l^d^oⁿ^ly
^con^d^u^c^t^F^I^SA^s^earch^e^s^of^ag^eⁿ^t^s^of^f^o^rei^gⁿ^po^w^e^rs^f^o^{r peri}^od^s^l^a^s^tⁱⁿ^g^u^p^t^o^{45 day}^s^pri^o^{r t}^o

⁵⁰^Se^e^{, 1}⁴⁷^C^o^ng^.^R^ec.^S1⁰⁵⁵⁷⁽^d^ai^ly^ed^{. Oct. 1}¹^,²⁰⁰¹^)(rem^a^rk^{s o}^f^Sen^.^L^eah^y⁾⁽^“^T^h^e^A^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^stratioⁿ^p^r^o^p^o^s^ed^th^{at t}^h^e
^pe^riod^of^e^l^e^c^t^ronic^surv^e^illa^nc^e^be^c^h^aⁿ^g^e^{d f}^r^om^{90 da}^y^s^to^one^y^e^a^r^{in the}^s^e^c^a^s^e^s^{. T}^h^{is prop}^osa^l^dⁱ^{d n}^o^{t e}ⁿ^sure
^a^d^e^qua^te^re^vⁱ^e^w^a^f^te^{r the}^initia^{l st}^a^g^e^to^eⁿ^sure^tha^t^the^pr^oba^ble^c^a^u^se^de^te^rm^ina^{tion re}^m^a^ine^d^justif^ie^{d ov}^e^r^tim^e^”⁾^.

^h^a^vⁱⁿ^g^to^seek^r^eⁿ^e^w^a^{l o}^f^s^u^c^h^au^t^h^o^r^it^y^f^r^o^m^t^h^{e co}^u^r^{t. T}^h^{at li}^m^itatioⁿ^r^e^q^u^ir^ed^f^e^d^e^r^a^l
^au^th^o^r^itie^{s to}^w^a^s^t^{e v}^a^l^u^ab^{le tim}^{e an}^d^r^e^so^u^r^{ces b}^y^f^r^eq^u^eⁿ^t^l^y^r^eⁿ^e^wⁱⁿ^g^co^u^r^{t o}^r^d^e^r^s^{, ev}^en
^w^h^eⁿ^t^h^ere^w^a^{s n}^o^q^u^es^tⁱ^oⁿ^ab^ou^t^t^h^{e l}^e^g^a^l^s^u^ffⁱ^cⁱ^eⁿ^c^y^of^a^partⁱ^c^u^l^{ar cas}^e.^S^ectⁱ^{on 207 of}
^th^{e U}^S^A^P^A^T^R^IOT^A^c^tⁿ^o^w^permⁱ^t^s^th^e^FIS^C^to^au^t^h^orize^phy^sⁱ^cal^s^earc^h^es^o^f^certaiⁿ
^ag^en^t^s^of^f^o^rei^gⁿ^po^w^e^r^s⁽ⁱⁿ^c^l^udiⁿ^g^U^.^S^.^pers^on^s⁾^f^o^{r 90 day}^s^,^an^{d au}^t^h^ori^zes^l^oⁿ^g^e^r^p^e^rⁱ^o^d^s
^o^f^sear^ch^{es a}ⁿ^d^electr^oⁿⁱ^{c su}^r^v^eillan^{ce f}^o^r^cer^tain^cate^g^o^r^{ies o}^f^f^o^r^eⁱ^gⁿ^p^o^w^e^r^s^aⁿ^dⁿ^oⁿ^-^U^.^S.
^pers^on^s^w^h^{o are ag}^en^t^s^of^f^o^rei^gⁿ^po^w^e^rs^{. In}^partⁱ^c^u^l^{ar f}^o^{r f}^o^rei^gⁿ^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt^s^an^{d ot}^h^e^r
^f^o^rei^gⁿ^po^w^e^rs^{, n}^on-^U^.^S^.^pers^on^of^fⁱ^cers^{or e}^m^pl^o^y^ees^of^ce^rt^aiⁿ^f^o^rei^gⁿ^po^w^e^rs^{, an}^{d n}^oⁿ^-
^{U.S. p}^e^r^s^oⁿ^m^e^m^b^er^{s o}^fⁱⁿ^terⁿ^atioⁿ^a^{l ter}^r^o^r^{ist g}^r^o^u^p^s^{, in}^iti^al^o^r^d^e^r^s^a^u^t^h^o^rⁱ^zⁱⁿ^g^s^e^a^r^ch^e^s^an^d
^s^u^r^v^eillaⁿ^ce^m^a^y^be^f^o^{r period}^s^of^{120 day}^s^{, an}^{d ren}^e^w^a^{l orders}^m^a^y^e^x^ten^d^f^o^{r periods}^of
^on^e^y^{ear. W}^h^{ile th}^{e details}^of^F^I^SA^operation^s^{are clas}^sⁱ^fⁱ^ed,^t^h^e^F^I^S^C^h^a^s^a^u^th^o^rⁱ^z^e^d⁹⁰^-^d^a^y
^an^d^y^ear-long^s^u^rv^eillaⁿ^{ce of}^foreigⁿ^po^w^e^r^s^an^{d t}^h^{eir ag}^eⁿ^ts^pu^rs^u^aⁿ^t^{to s}^ectioⁿ^{207 of}^th^e
^US^A^P^A^T^R^IOT^A^c^{t. T}^h^eref^or^{e, th}^{e A}^c^t^h^asⁿ^o^{t on}^l^y^prov^{ided addit}ⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^tⁱ^m^e^t^o^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t
ⁱⁿ^v^e^sti^g^ato^r^{s tar}^g^e^tin^g^p^o^t^en^tⁱ^a^{l ter}^r^o^rⁱ^{st activ}^it^y^,^it^h^a^{s al}^so^h^e^lp^ed^th^e^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^aⁿ^d^th^e
^FI^{SC to}^f^o^c^u^{s t}^h^eir^e^f^f^o^r^t^{s o}ⁿ^m^o^r^e^sigⁿⁱ^f^icaⁿ^{t an}^d^co^m^p^li^cated^ter^r^o^r^ism^-^r^e^lated^cases.
^Repor^t^at^17.
Under FISA before passage of the act, FISA wiretap orders with the agent of a foreign power as
their target had a maximum duration of 90 days, and could be extended in 90 day increments, 50
U.S.C. 1805(e)(2000 ed.). FISA physical search orders and extensions were good for no more
than 45 days (but up to one year if a foreign power was the target), 50 U.S.C. 1824(d)(2000 ed.).
Section 207 amends the time lines. FISA wiretap orders relating to the agent of foreign power
may remain in effect for up to 120 days and may be extended at one year intervals, 50 U.S.C.
1805(e). As a general rule, FISA physical search orders and extensions may be authorized for 90
days (unless they target a foreign power), but orders with an agent of a foreign power as their
target may be issued for up to 120 days with extensions for up to one year, 50 U.S.C. 1824(d).
This section essentially deals with the regularity of judicial supervision. The Deputy Attorney
General has pointed out that the section saved the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review
approximately 60,000 hours of attorney time in processing applications, an estimate that does ⁵¹
include time that might have had to be expended by FBI agents and attorneys. Critics might ⁵²
argue more not less supervision is appropriate given the increased use of FISA and of the FISA
court’s remarkably outspoken criticism of the accuracy, candor and sufficiency of presentations to ⁵³
the court.

⁵¹^H^ous^e^H^e^arⁱⁿ^gs^{, s}^t^a^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^D^e^puty^A^ttorⁿ^ey^G^e^ne^r^a^{l J}^a^m^e^s^B^.^C^o^m^e^y^,^av^a^ila^ble^{on J}^une²⁸^{, 2}⁰⁰⁵^a^t
^http:^//ju^dicⁱ^a^r^y^.^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^m^e^dia^/^pdf^s^/^c^o^m^e^y^060805.^pdf^.
⁵²^T^h^e^FB^I^r^e^por^te^{d a}ⁿ^85%ⁱⁿ^c^r^e^a^s^e^{in FI}^SA^a^ppl^ic^a^tions^f^r^om²⁰⁰¹^to²⁰^03,^The^FBI^’^s^C^o^unte^r^te^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^m^Pr^ogr^am
^Sinc^e^Se^pte^m^be^r²⁰⁰¹^:^Re^p^o^r^t^t^o^the^N^a^ti^on^{al C}^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^on^oⁿ^Te^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^t^Att^a^c^k^s^up^on^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^Stat^e^s^{, 64 (}^A^pr^il^14,
²⁰⁰^4).^A^nnua^{l re}^p^o^rts^t^o^Co^ng^re^s^s^{on t}^h^eⁿ^u^m^b^e^r^of^FISA^s^u^rv^e^illanc^e^a^nd^phy^sⁱ^c^a^l^s^e^a^r^c^h^a^pplic^a^tⁱ^ons^,^be^gⁱⁿⁿⁱ^ng
^w^{ith c}^a^l^e^nda^r^y^e^a^r¹⁹⁹⁵^{, a}^p^pe^a^r^oⁿ^the^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^J^u^s^tic^e^’^s^w^e^b^s^ite^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^{on Fe}^b.^11,²⁰⁰⁵^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.us^doj.g^ov^/^a^g^/^r^e^a^d^ing^r^oom^/a^g^_^f^o^ia^1.htm^.
⁵³^{In re}^All^M^a^tte^{rs Su}^bmitte^d^to^th^e^Fo^re^ign^Inte^lli^ge^nc^e^S^u^rv^e^illaⁿ^c^e^Court^,²¹^{8 F.}^Su^pp.^2d⁶^11,⁶²⁰^-^{21 (}^F^I^S^C
²⁰⁰²⁾⁽^“^Iⁿ^Se^pte^m^be^r²⁰⁰^0,^the^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt c}^a^m^e^f^o^r^w^a^r^{d to c}^onf^e^s^s^e^r^r^o^r^{in s}^o^m^e^{75 FI}^SA^a^pplic^a^t^ions^r^e^la^te^d^to
^maj^o^{r t}^e^rro^ri^st^at^t^{acks d}ⁱ^rect^ed^agaiⁿ^s^t^t^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^es.^T^h^{e erro}^{rs rel}^a^t^e^d^t^o^mⁱ^sst^at^e^m^en^t^s^an^d^o^mⁱ^ssi^oⁿ^s^o^f^m^a^t^e^ri^al
^f^a^c^t^s^.^{. .. I}ⁿ^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^of²⁰⁰⁰^{, t}^h^e^C^our^t^he^{ld a}^s^p^e^cⁱ^a^l^m^e^e^ting^{to c}^ons^ide^r^t^h^e^tr^o^u^b^ling^num^be^r^ofⁱⁿ^accu^rat^e^F^B^I
^a^f^fⁱ^da^v^{its in so m}^aⁿ^y^FIS^A^a^pplic^a^{tions. A}^f^te^{r re}^c^e^iv^ing^a^m^o^r^e^de^ta^ile^{d e}^x^plaⁿ^a^tio^{n f}^r^om^the^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^J^u^s^tic^e
^a^bout^w^h^a^t^w^e^nt^w^r^ong^{, bu}^{t n}^o^t^w^h^y^,^the^C^our^t^de^cⁱ^de^d^no^{t to}^accep^tⁱⁿ^accu^rat^e^af^fⁱ^d^a^vi^t^s^f^r^o^m^F^B^I^agen^t^s^w^h^et^h^e^{r o}^r
^not^inteⁿ^tio^na^lly^fa^lse^.^One^{FBI a}^g^eⁿ^{t w}^a^{s ba}^rre^{d f}^r^om^a^ppe^a^r^ing^be^f^o^re^the^{Court a}^s^a^FI^SA^a^f^fⁱ^aⁿ^{t . . . I}ⁿ^Ma^rc^h^of
²⁰⁰^1,^the^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt r}^e^por^te^{d s}ⁱ^m^ila^r^mⁱ^ss^ta^tem^e^nts^{in a}^nothe^r^s^e^rⁱ^e^s^of^FI^SA^a^pplic^a^tions^.^{. .”}⁾^.

Section 207 extends the permissible duration of FISA surveillance and physical search orders and
extensions, 50 U.S.C. 1805(e), 1824(d).
• The Justice Department sees section 207 as a time saver that allows for more
productive allocation of Department and judicial resources.
• Critics might argue more not less judicial supervision is called for.
Section 214 makes several adjustments in the FISA pen register/trap and trace device procedures.
FISA once permitted applications for a FISA pen register or trap and trace device order for
telephone communications in order to acquire information relevant to a foreign intelligence or
international terrorism investigation and upon the additional certification that the communications
monitored would likely be either (1) those of an international terrorist or spy (“individual . . .
engaged in international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities that . . . involve a violation
of [U.S.] criminal laws”) or (2) those of a foreign power or its agent relating to the criminal
activities of an international terrorist or spy, 50 U.S.C. 1842(a)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3), (i)(2000 ed.).
Section 214 opens the FISA pen register/trap and trace device procedure to both wire and
electronic communications (e.g., telephone, e-mail, Internet communications), 50 U.S.C.
1842(d)(2)(A). It drops the requirement that the communications be those of international
terrorists or spies or be related to their activities, 50 U.S.C. 1842(c)(2). It adds the caveat that any
investigation of a U.S. person for which a order is secured “to protect against international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities” may not be conducted based solely on activities
protected by the first amendment to the Constitution, 50 U.S.C. 1842(a)(1), (c)(2). It adds this
same caveat with respect to emergency FISA pen register or trap and trace device use, 50 U.S.C.

1843(a),(b)(1).

The Administration’s original request sought to make pen register and trap and trace device
procedures more compatible:
^W^h^en^{added to FISA}^t^w^o^y^ears^ag^{o, th}^{e pen}^regⁱ^s^t^{er/trap an}^{d trace s}^ection^w^a^sⁱⁿ^t^eⁿ^d^e^d
^t^o^mⁱ^{rror t}^h^{e cri}^mⁱⁿ^al^pen^/^t^r^a^p^au^t^h^ori^t^y^defⁱⁿ^e^{d i}ⁿ^{18 U}^.^S^.^C^.^§312^3.^T^h^{e F}^I^S^A^au^t^h^ori^t^y
^dⁱ^f^f^e^r^s^f^r^o^m^t^h^{e cr}ⁱ^mⁱⁿ^{al au}^t^h^o^r^it^yⁱⁿ^t^h^{at it r}^e^q^uⁱ^r^e^{s, in}^ad^d^iti^oⁿ^to^{a sh}^o^wⁱⁿ^g^o^f^r^e^lev^aⁿ^ce,
^an^ad^d^itioⁿ^a^l^f^actu^a^{l s}^h^o^wⁱⁿ^g^th^at^th^e^co^m^m^uⁿⁱ^ca^tioⁿ^s^d^e^vⁱ^c^e^h^a^{s b}^een^u^s^ed^to^coⁿ^t^{act a}ⁿ
^“a^ge^nt^o^f^a^fo^r^eⁱ^g^{n p}^o^w^e^r^”^eⁿ^ga^ge^dⁱⁿⁱⁿ^t^e^rⁿ^a^tⁱ^o^na^l^t^e^r^r^o^rⁱ^{sm o}^r^c^l^aⁿ^d^e^stⁱⁿ^eⁱⁿ^t^e^l^lⁱ^ge^nc^e
^activ^itie^{s. T}^h^{is h}^a^{s t}^h^{e ef}^f^{ect o}^f^m^a^kⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{e FI}^S^A^p^eⁿ^/tr^ap^au^th^o^r^it^y^m^u^c^h^m^o^r^e^dⁱ^f^f^ic^u^{lt to}
^obt^aiⁿ^.^In^f^act^,^t^h^e^proces^s^of^obt^aiⁿⁱ^ng^F^I^SA^pen/^t^r^ap^au^t^h^ori^t^yⁱ^s^oⁿ^l^y^slⁱ^g^h^t^l^y^l^e^ss
^b^u^r^d^en^so^m^e^t^h^an^t^h^{e p}^r^o^{cess f}^o^r^o^b^tainⁱⁿ^g^f^u^{ll electr}^oⁿⁱ^{c s}^u^r^v^eillan^c^e^a^u^th^o^rⁱ^t^y^uⁿ^d^e^r^F^I^SA^.
^T^hⁱ^s^st^aⁿ^d^sⁱⁿ^st^a^r^{k c}^o^nt^r^a^st^t^o^t^h^e^c^rⁱ^mⁱⁿ^a^l^p^e^n/^t^r^a^p^au^t^h^ori^t^y^,^w^hⁱ^c^h^caⁿ^be^obt^aiⁿ^e^d^quⁱ^c^k^l^y
^f^r^o^m^{a local cou}^r^{t, on}^th^{e ba}^sⁱ^s^of^{a certi}^fⁱ^ca^tioⁿ^t^h^{at t}^h^eⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^to^b^e^o^b^t^ain^e^d^is
^r^e^l^e^va^nt^t^o^aⁿ^o^ngoⁱⁿ^{g i}^nve^stⁱ^g^a^tⁱ^o^n.^T^h^e^a^m^eⁿ^d^m^eⁿ^t^si^m^p^l^y^e^lⁱ^mⁱⁿ^a^t^e^s^t^h^e^“a^ge^nt^o^f^a
^f^o^r^e^igⁿ^p^o^w^e^r^”^p^r^oⁿ^g^f^r^o^m^t^h^{e p}^r^ed^icatioⁿ^,^an^d^th^u^s^m^a^k^e^{s th}^{e FI}^SA^a^u^th^o^r^it^y^m^o^r^e^clo^s^e^l^y
^t^r^ack^t^h^{e cri}^mⁱⁿ^al^a^u^t^h^ori^t^y^.^{§155, H}^.^R^.^—^,^H^e^arⁱ^ngs^{at 5}⁷^;^s^{ee als}^o^{, §155, H}^.^R^.^2975,
^H^.^R^e^pt^{. 107-}^{236 at}^61.

The Senate added the instruction that denies pen register/trap and trace device authority in the
case of an investigation predicated entirely upon its target’s exercise of first amendment rights,
§214, S. 1510, 147 Cong. Rec. S10608 (daily ed. October 11, 2001).
Except for on-going investigations, the FISA pen register/trap and trace device provisions revert
to form on March 10, 2006. No relevant amendments have been enacted since passage of the act.
The streamlined authority apparently has been used in the investigation of suspected al Qaeda
agents in this country:
^T^h^{e U}^S^A^P^A^T^R^IO^T^A^c^t^al^s^o^h^a^{s u}^pdat^e^d^f^e^deral^pen-^t^r^{ap l}^a^w^un^{der F}^I^SA^b^y^m^a^kⁱ^ng
^th^{e le}^g^a^{l r}^e^q^u^ir^e^m^eⁿ^ts^f^o^r^o^b^t^ainⁱⁿ^g^co^u^r^{t p}^e^r^mⁱ^ssioⁿ^f^o^r^p^eⁿ^/tr^ap^o^r^d^e^r^sⁱⁿⁱⁿ^terⁿ^a^tioⁿ^a^l
^ter^r^o^rⁱ^smⁱⁿ^v^e^s^tig^a^tioⁿ^s^m^o^r^e^si^m^ilar^to^th^e^stan^d^a^r^d^{s t}^h^{at ap}^p^l^yⁱⁿ^o^r^dⁱⁿ^a^r^y^crⁱ^mⁱⁿ^{al ca}^ses.
^P^r^ev^io^u^s^l^y^{, FI}^S^A^-^a^u^t^h^o^rⁱ^zed^p^eⁿ^/tr^ap^o^r^d^e^r^s^w^e^r^e^av^ailab^l^{e i}ⁿ^ter^r^o^rⁱ^s^mⁱⁿ^v^e^st^ig^at^ioⁿ^s^oⁿ^ly
^if^t^h^{e s}^u^s^p^ect^w^a^s^,^or^w^a^s^comm^un^icatiⁿ^g^wⁱ^t^h^an^“^a^g^e^{nt of}^{a f}^o^reign^po^w^e^{r.” FIS}^A^t^h^u^s
^prev^en^t^e^{d off}ⁱ^ci^a^l^{s f}^r^o^m^u^sⁱ^{ng pen}^/^t^r^{ap dev}ⁱ^ce^sⁱⁿ^m^a^ny^s^e^t^tⁱⁿ^gs^t^h^at^mⁱ^gh^t^h^a^v^e^rev^eal^ed
ⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^oⁿ^rel^e^v^a^nt^t^o^{a f}^o^rei^gⁿⁱⁿ^t^e^l^lⁱ^g^eⁿ^{ce i}ⁿ^v^e^s^tⁱ^g^atⁱ^oⁿ^.^Uⁿ^{der s}^ectⁱ^oⁿ^{214 of}^t^h^{e act}^,
^h^o^w^e^v^e^{r, t}^h^e^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^ntⁿ^o^w^can^{obtain a pe}ⁿ^{/trap order}^w^h^en^t^h^e^inf^o^r^m^atioⁿ^lⁱ^k^e^l^y^{to be}
^o^b^t^ain^e^d^{is f}^o^r^e^igⁿⁱⁿ^telli^g^eⁿ^{ce in}^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^o^r^{is r}^e^le^v^aⁿ^t^toⁱⁿ^v^e^sti^g^atioⁿ^sⁱⁿ^teⁿ^d^ed^to
^p^r^o^t^{ect ag}^ain^s^{t i}ⁿ^terⁿ^atioⁿ^a^{l ter}^r^o^rⁱ^s^m^o^r^“^c^lan^d^estiⁿ^eⁱⁿ^telli^g^eⁿ^{ce act}ⁱ^v^itⁱ^e^s^.^”^Whⁱ^l^e^s^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^c
^ex^a^m^pl^e^s^of^t^h^e^u^s^{e o}^f^pen^/^t^r^{ap dev}ⁱ^ces^pu^rsu^aⁿ^t^t^o^s^ectⁱ^oⁿ^{214 rem}^aⁱⁿ^cl^assⁱ^fⁱ^{ed, t}^h^e
^Depart^m^eⁿ^t^h^a^s^u^tⁱ^{lized s}^ect^ion^{214 on}^s^e^v^e^{ral occas}^ionsⁱⁿⁱⁿ^terⁿ^ation^a^l^terrorism
ⁱ^nve^stⁱ^g^a^tⁱ^o^ns,ⁱⁿ^c^l^udⁱ^ngⁱ^nve^s^tⁱ^g^a^tⁱ^o^ns^of^su^s^p^ect^{ed al}^Q^{aeda operat}ⁱ^v^esⁱⁿ^t^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^es,
^an^d^th^{e str}^e^a^m^lⁱⁿ^e^d^p^eⁿ^/tr^ap^au^th^o^r^it^y^h^a^s^m^a^d^e^{it easier}^toⁱ^d^en^tif^y^ad^d^itioⁿ^a^{l su}^b^j^{ects in}
^ter^r^o^rⁱ^smⁱⁿ^v^e^st^ig^at^ioⁿ^s^.^Repor^t^{, at}^25-^6.
Critics might argue that streamlining the FISA pen register/trap and trace device procedure is
particularly ill-advised. First, the procedure is already subject to a minimum of judicial
supervision; orders are issued upon the FBI’s certification of relevance not upon the court’s ⁵⁴
finding of relevance; unlike wiretap orders, there is no requirement that the targets of the order
be notified after the order expires unless the results are to be used as evidence in official ⁵⁵
proceedings; unlike comparable orders in the criminal sphere, there is no requirement of a ⁵⁶
subsequent report to the court of the particulars of execution; criminal orders call for judicial re-⁵⁷
examination every 60 days, FISA orders every 90 days. Second, the nature and extent of the
expanded authority is substantial. Where orders once permitted authorities to monitor the
identification of parties to telephone conversations over particular instruments, they now permit ⁵⁸
authorities to monitor Internet use. Third, in terrorism cases officials presumable enjoy adequate

⁵⁴⁵⁰^U^.^S^.^C^.¹⁸⁴²^.
⁵⁵^Co^mp^a^r^e^,⁵⁰^U.^S^.^C^.¹⁸⁴⁵^,^w^ith^,¹⁸^U^.^S.C^.²⁵¹⁷⁽⁸⁾⁽^d⁾^.
⁵⁶^Co^mp^a^r^e^,⁵⁰^U.^S^.^C^.¹⁸⁴²^,^w^ith^,¹⁸^U^.^S.C^.³¹²³⁽^a⁾⁽³⁾^.
⁵⁷^Co^mp^a^r^e^,⁵⁰^U.^S^.^C^.¹⁸⁴²⁽^e⁾^,^wit^h^{, 1}⁸^U^.^S.C^.³¹²³⁽^c⁾^.
⁵⁸^W^h^ite^he^a^d^&^A^d^eⁿ^{, a}^t¹¹⁰⁶⁽^“^T^h^e^s^e^e^x^pa^nde^{d pow}^e^r^s^{to m}^onitor^t^e^le^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^[ⁱ^{n s}^e^c^tio^ns²^{14 a}ⁿ^d²¹⁶^]^a^r^e
^p^a^rtⁱ^c^u^l^arl^y^p^r^oⁿ^e^t^o^abu^s^{e i}ⁿ^t^h^e^In^t^e^rn^et^age,^siⁿ^{ce p}^e^{n regi}^st^{er an}^d^t^r^ap^aⁿ^d^t^r^{ace o}^r^d^e^{rs no}^w^dⁱ^scl^o^{se n}^o^t^oⁿ^l^y
^st^an^d^a^rd^t^e^l^e^ph^on^{e nu}^m^b^{ers cal}^l^e^d^b^y^o^r^dⁱ^alⁱⁿ^{g i}ⁿ^t^o^{a su}^b^j^ect^,^b^u^t^al^so^In^t^e^rⁿ^et^URL^s^an^d^d^e^di^cat^ed^lⁱⁿ^{es f}^o^{r d}^a^t^a
^traⁿ^sm^{ission. T}^h^e^a^b^ility^{to m}^{onitor Inte}^rⁿ^e^t^site^{s v}ⁱ^site^d^by^the^su^b^j^e^c^t^{to a}^se^a^r^c^h^{, in}^the^a^b^se^nc^e^of^a^show^ing
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

law enforcement authority under section 216 of the act which does not expire. Some critics find ⁵⁹
the section disquieting for constitutional reasons.
Section 214 recasts FISA pen register/trap & trace order procedures so that they apply to
electronic (e-mail and other Internet communications as well as to telephone communications),

50 U.S.C. 1842.

• The change is comparable in some respects to a similar enlargement for law
enforcement in §216 which does not expire, 18 U.S.C. 3123(b), 3127(4)).
• The section precludes exercise of emergency authority or issuance in connection
with an investigation based solely on the exercise of first amendment rights.
• The section is constitutionally permissible, but requires a court order nonetheless
and is first amendment sensitive.
• Critics might argue that the expansion to cover Internet use is dramatic; that the
FISA expansion lacks some of the safeguards found in its law enforcement
counterparts; and that in terrorism cases the authority available to law
enforcement officials under section 216 of the act which does not expire should
be sufficient.
FISA originally authorized a FISA court order (in a terrorism investigation or an effort to gather
foreign intelligence information) for FBI access to the business records of hotels, motels, car and
truck rental agencies, and storage rental facilities, 50 U.S.C. 1862 (2000 ed.). An application for
such an order had to assert that there were “specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe
that the person to whom the records pertain [was] a foreign or an agent of a foreign power,” 50

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^p^r^o^b^ab^{le cau}^{se o}^r^ev^en^reasoⁿ^a^b^l^{e su}^sp^icioⁿ^,^{is a}ⁿ^uⁿ^p^r^eced^en^ted^ex^p^aⁿ^s^ioⁿ^o^f^f^e^d^e^{ral su}^rv^eillan^{ce p}^o^w^ers”);^N^a^tional
^Se^c^u^r^ity^{at W}^h^at^Pr^ic^e^?^:^{A L}^ookⁱⁿ^{to C}ⁱ^v^{il Li}^be^r^t^y^C^onc^e^r^nsⁱⁿ^t^h^e^Iⁿ^for^m^at^io^{n A}^g^e^u^nde^r^the^U^S^{A P}^A^TRI^O^{T Ac}^t^of
²⁰⁰¹^an^{d a}^Pr^o^pos^e^d^C^ons^t^itutⁱ^o^nal^Te^s^t^for^Fut^u^r^e^Le^gis^l^atioⁿ^{, 1}²^C^ORNE^L^L^J^O^U^R^NA^L^OF^L^AW^AN^D^P^UBL^I^C^P^OL^I^C^Y
⁴⁴⁷^,⁴⁶^{0 (20}⁰³^)(“T^h^{e eff}^e^ct^o^f^p^eⁿ^regi^st^{ers o}ⁿ^p^e^rsoⁿ^a^l^ri^ght^{s i}^s^t^h^at^p^eⁿ^regi^st^{ers can}^cap^t^u^{re a great}^d^eal^m^o^re
^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion tha}ⁿ^m^e^r^e^l^y^a^te^le^phone^num^be^r^.^N^o^t^r^e^quirⁱ^ng^pr^oba^bl^e^c^a^u^s^e^f^o^r^the^s^e^de^vⁱ^c^e^s^r^e^s^t^e^d^oⁿ^ju^dicⁱ^a^l
^reasoⁿⁱⁿ^g^t^h^atⁿ^eⁱ^t^h^er^t^h^{e t}^r^{ap an}^{d t}^r^{ace n}^o^r^t^h^{e p}^e^{n regi}^st^{er d}^e^vi^ces^,^co^u^l^d^,^p^rⁱ^o^{r t}^o^t^h^{e US}^A^P^A^T^R^I^O^T^A^c^t^cap^t^u^{re t}^h^e
^s^ubs^ta^ntiv^e^m^a^te^rⁱ^a^l^of^the^c^o^m^m^unic^a^tio^{n i}ⁿ^que^s^tio^n.^the^U^S^A^PA^T^R^I^O^T^A^c^t’^s^ex^pa^ns^ion^of^a^nd^c^ons^oli^d^a^tioⁿ^of^the
^d^e^fⁱⁿⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^o^f^p^eⁿ^regi^st^{ers an}^d^t^r^ap^an^d^t^r^{ace d}^e^vi^{ces en}^d^aⁿ^g^{er t}^h^{e o}^rⁱ^gⁱⁿ^al^dⁱ^stⁱⁿ^ctⁱ^oⁿ^up^on^w^hⁱ^c^h^t^h^{e l}^o^w^e^{r l}^e^vel^o^f
^s^c^r^u^tiny^w^a^s^jus^tif^ie^{d. T}^h^e^e^x^paⁿ^d^e^d^de^fⁱ^niti^on^w^ould^now^s^e^em^{to c}^o^v^e^r^W^e^{b s}^u^r^f^ing^,^e^-^m^a^il^m^e^s^s^a^g^e^s^,^e^l^e^c^t^r^onic^f^a^x
^dis^t^rⁱ^b^u^ti^ons^{, a}^{nd a}ⁿ^y^othe^r^e^l^e^c^t^r^onic^f^o^r^m^of^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion. T}^h^e^FB^I^jus^t^if^ie^s^the^s^e^de^fⁱ^nitiona^{l e}^x^pa^ns^io^ns^by
^inte^rpre^ti^ng^W^e^{b tra}^f^fⁱ^c^a^s^substa^ntia^lly^si^m^ila^{r to te}^le^ph^one^c^o^nv^e^r^s^a^tions^{. D}^e^s^p^ite^t^h^e^s^u^bs^ta^ntia^l^dⁱ^f^f^e^r^eⁿ^c^e^s^,
^inc^l^u^d^ing^t^h^e^v^a^s^t^am^ount^of^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion a}^v^a^ila^ble^f^r^om^aⁿ^e^-^m^a^{il r}^outiⁿ^g^pr^otoc^o^l^t^h^a^t^c^aⁿⁿ^o^{t be}^g^l^e^a^ne^{d f}^r^om
^liste^ning^t^o^a^p^h^oⁿ^e^c^onv^e^r^sa^tion^,^{this issue}^ha^{s ne}^v^e^{r be}^eⁿ^lit^ig^a^t^e^d^aⁿ^d^re^m^a^{ins unre}^s^olv^e^d”^).
⁵⁹^{EPIC Re}^p^o^rt^(“^T^h^e^a^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t s}ⁱ^gⁿ^if^ic^aⁿ^tl^y^e^v^is^c^e^r^a^t^e^s^the^c^onstit^utio^na^{l ra}^tio^na^le^f^o^{r the}^re^la^tiv^e^l^y^la^x
^re^quire^m^e^{nts tha}^t^a^pply^{to f}^o^re^ig^{n inte}^llig^eⁿ^c^e^surv^e^illa^nc^e^.^T^h^a^t^la^xⁱ^t^y^{is pre}^m^is^e^d^on^the^a^ssum^p^tio^{n tha}^t^the
^Ex^e^c^u^tiv^e^Braⁿ^c^h^{, in}^purs^u^it^of^its^na^tio^na^{l s}^e^c^u^rity^re^s^pons^ibili^tie^s^{to m}^onit^o^{r t}^h^e^a^c^tiv^itie^s^of^f^o^re^{ign p}^o^w^e^rs^a^{nd the}ⁱ^r
^a^g^eⁿ^ts^s^houl^{d n}^o^t^be^uⁿ^d^u^ly^r^e^s^t^r^a^ine^d^by^C^ong^r^e^s^s^a^{nd t}^h^e^c^our^ts^.^T^h^e^r^e^m^o^v^a^{l of}^the^‘^f^or^eⁱ^gⁿ^pow^e^r^’^pr^e^d^ic^a^t^e^f^o^r
^p^eⁿ^regⁱ^ster/trap^an^d^{trace su}^rv^eillan^{ce u}^p^s^{ets th}^at^d^e^{licate b}^a^lan^c^e^”^).

U.S.C. 1862(b)(2)(2000 ed.). Section 215 expands the authority to include not only business
records but any tangible item regardless of the business or individual holding the item and upon
the simple assertions that the records are sought in an effort to obtain foreign intelligence (not
based solely on the first amendment protected activities of a U.S. person) or in a terrorism ⁶⁰
investigation, 50 U.S.C. 1861.
Section 215 began as a request for administrative subpoena authority to replace a more narrowly
drawn FISA procedure:
^T^h^{e “}^b^u^sⁱⁿ^ess^records^”^s^ectⁱ^oⁿ^of^F^I^S^A^{(50 U}^.^S^.^C^.^{§§ 1}⁸⁶¹^aⁿ^{d 1862}^{) re}^quⁱ^r^e^s^a^f^o^rm^a^l
^pleadin^g^{to t}^h^{e C}^o^u^r^{t a}ⁿ^{d t}^h^{e s}ⁱ^gn^at^u^r^{e of}^{a FIS}^A^j^u^d^g^{e (or}^m^a^gis^t^{rate). In}^{practice, this}
^m^a^k^e^s^t^h^{e a}^u^th^orit^y^un^a^v^aila^{ble f}^o^r^m^o^s^tⁱⁿ^v^e^s^tⁱ^g^ati^v^{e co}^ntex^ts^{. T}^h^{e ti}^m^e^aⁿ^{d diff}^ic^u^l^t^y
ⁱ^nvo^l^v^e^dⁱⁿ^ge^t^tⁱ^ng^suc^h^p^l^e^a^dⁱⁿ^g^s^b^e^fo^r^e^t^h^e^Co^ur^t^us^ua^l^l^{y o}^u^t^w^eⁱ^g^{hs t}^h^eⁱ^m^p^o^r^t^a^nc^e^o^f^t^h^e
^bu^sⁱⁿ^e^s^s^records^s^ough^t^.^Sⁱⁿ^c^{e i}^t^s^en^act^m^eⁿ^t^{, t}^h^{e au}^t^h^ori^t^y^h^a^s^been^s^oug^h^t^l^e^s^s^t^h^aⁿ^fi^v^e
^ti^m^e^s^.^T^h^is^s^ection^w^o^u^l^{d delete th}^{e old au}^th^orit^y^a^{nd replace it w}ⁱ^t^h^{a g}^eⁿ^e^ral
^“^a^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^r^atⁱ^v^{e s}^u^bpoen^{a” aut}^h^ori^t^y^f^o^{r docum}^eⁿ^t^s^an^{d recor}^d^s^.^T^hⁱ^s^au^t^h^ori^t^y^,^m^ode^l^e^d^oⁿ
^th^{e ad}^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rati^v^e^s^u^bpoen^a^au^th^orit^y^a^v^{ailable to dru}^g^inv^e^s^tig^a^t^ors^pu^rs^u^aⁿ^t^{to T}^{itle 2}¹^,
^allo^w^s^th^e^A^t^to^rⁿ^e^y^Geⁿ^e^r^a^{l t}^o^co^m^p^{el p}^r^o^t^ec^tⁱ^o^{n o}^f^s^u^c^h^r^e^c^o^r^d^{s up}^oⁿ^a^fi^ndⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^a^t^t^h^e
ⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^oⁿⁱ^s^rel^e^v^aⁿ^t^{. §156,}^H^.^R^.^—^,^H^e^arⁱ^ngs^{, at 57.}
The House Judiciary Committee converted the request into an amendment of the earlier FISA
procedure. In doing so it preserved at least a modicum of judicial supervision while acceding to ⁶¹
the Administration’s request for more expansive authority.
Section 215 expires on March 10, 2006, except with respect to on-going foreign intelligence
investigations, at which point the law reverts to the hotel-motel-car-rental business records
procedure that the predates the act. There are no subsequent amendments to the act or to FISA
that alter the consequences of that reversion, but the impact of expiration may be mitigated by
changes in the law governing “national security letters” that provide access to a wider range of
business records after sunset.
Provisions in the Right to Financial Privacy Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and chapter 121
of title 18 of the United States Code, authorize the FBI when investigating international terrorism
or clandestine intelligence activities to request access to business records held by banks, credit
report agencies, and communications carriers, 12 U.S.C. 3414, 15 U.S.C. 1681, 18 U.S.C. 2709.

⁶⁰^T^h^e^a^c^t^itse^l^f^li^m^ite^{d a}^u^thority^u^nde^{r se}^c^tio^{n 2}¹⁵^{to c}^a^s^e^s^inv^o^lvⁱⁿ^g^“ⁱ^nv^e^s^tig^a^{tions to pr}^ote^c^t^a^g^aⁱ^{nst inte}^rna^tⁱ^ona^l
^te^rrorism^a^{nd c}^l^a^nde^stineⁱⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^a^c^tiv^itie^s,”^{but a}^la^te^{r i}ⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^a^u^thoriz^a^tⁱ^{on a}^c^t^a^m^e^nde^{d t}^h^e^se^c^{tion t}^o
ⁱⁿ^cl^ud^{e “i}ⁿ^v^estⁱ^g^atⁱ^oⁿ^s^t^o^ob^t^aⁱⁿ^f^o^rei^gⁿⁱⁿ^t^e^l^lⁱ^g^en^{ce i}ⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^no^t^con^cernⁱⁿ^g^{a Un}ⁱ^t^ed^S^t^at^es^p^e^rsoⁿ^,^”^P^.^L^.¹⁰⁷^-¹⁰⁸^,
^§31⁴⁽^a⁾⁽⁶⁾^,¹¹⁵^Sta^t^.¹⁴⁰²⁽²⁰⁰¹⁾^.
⁶¹^“^T^he^A^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^{tion ha}^d^s^oug^h^t^a^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tiv^e^s^ubpoe^na^a^u^t^h^o^r^ity^w^ithout^ha^vⁱ^ng^{to g}^o^{to c}^our^t^.^Iⁿ^s^t^e^a^d^{, s}^e^c^tion
¹⁵⁶^a^m^e^{nds title}⁴⁰^U.S.C^.^§¹⁸⁶¹^by^prov^iding^f^o^{r a}ⁿ^a^pplic^a^tⁱ^{on t}^o^the^FISA^c^{ourt f}^o^{r a}ⁿ^orde^r^dire^c^ting^the
^pr^o^duc^ti^on^of^ta^ng^ible^ite^m^s^s^u^c^h^a^s^book^s^,^r^e^c^o^r^d^s^,^pa^pe^r^s^{, d}^o^c^u^m^e^nts^a^nd^ot^he^r^ite^m^s^{upon c}^e^r^tif^ic^a^{tion t}^o^t^h^e^c^o^u^r^t
^t^h^at^t^h^{e reco}^r^d^{s sou}^g^h^t^are^re^le^v^{ant t}^o^aⁿ^on^goi^ng^fore^ig^{n i}ⁿ^te^lli^ge^nc^e^inv^e^s^tiga^tioⁿ^.^T^h^{e am}^en^d^m^en^t^al^so^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^{es a}
^g^{ood f}^a^ith^de^f^e^ns^e^f^o^r^pe^r^s^ons^pr^oducⁱⁿ^g^ite^m^s^pur^s^u^aⁿ^{t t}^o^t^h^is^s^e^c^tion^w^h^ic^{h d}^o^e^s^not^c^ons^t^itute^a^w^aⁱ^v^e^r^of^aⁿ^y
^p^rⁱ^vⁱ^l^e^{ge i}ⁿ^an^y^o^t^h^e^{r p}^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g,^{” H.}^Rep^t^.¹⁰⁷^-²³⁶^,^at¹⁶^(em^p^h^a^si^{s ad}^d^e^d⁾^.

Section 374 of the 2004 intelligence authorization act amends the Right to Financial Privacy Act
to give the FBI access to business records held not only by banks, but by credit card companies,
car dealers, real estate agencies, stock brokers, jewelers, and certain other business occasionally
marked by large cash transactions, P.L. 108-177, 117 Stat.2628 (2003) (amending 12 U.S.C. 3414
to the make the definition of “financial institution” found in 31 U.S.C. 5312 applicable).
Section 215 has been among the more hotly debated sections of the act. Librarians and library
associations have been among its more vocal critics. The Justice Department has responded that:
^T^h^{e lib}^r^a^r^y^h^a^b^{its o}^f^o^r^dⁱⁿ^a^r^y^Am^er^ican^{s ar}^{e o}^fⁿ^oⁱⁿ^ter^e^st^to^th^o^s^{e co}ⁿ^d^u^c^tiⁿ^g^ter^r^o^rⁱ^s^m
ⁱⁿ^v^e^sti^g^atioⁿ^s^.^Ho^w^e^v^e^r^,^hⁱ^sto^r^icall^y^ter^r^o^r^ists^an^d^sp^{ies h}^a^v^e^u^s^e^d^lⁱ^b^r^a^rⁱ^e^s^t^o^p^l^aⁿ^aⁿ^d^c^a^r^r^y
^o^u^{t acti}^v^itie^{s t}^h^{at t}^h^r^eateⁿ^o^u^rⁿ^a^tioⁿ^a^{l sec}^u^rⁱ^t^y^{. . .}^Ob^tainⁱⁿ^g^b^u^sⁱⁿ^e^{ss r}^eco^r^d^{s is}^{a lo}ⁿ^g^-
^st^aⁿ^dⁱ^{ng l}^a^w^eⁿ^fo^r^c^e^m^eⁿ^t^t^a^c^tⁱ^c^.^O^r^dⁱ^na^r^y^gr^aⁿ^d^j^u^rⁱ^e^s^fo^r^y^e^ars^h^a^v^eⁱ^s^s^u^ed^su^bpoen^a^s^t^o^al^l
^m^aⁿⁿ^{er of}^b^u^sⁱⁿ^e^ss^es^{, i}ⁿ^cl^u^dⁱⁿ^g^lⁱ^b^rari^es^an^{d book}^s^t^ores^,^{for recor}^d^s^rel^e^v^aⁿ^t^t^o^cri^mⁱⁿ^al
ⁱⁿ^quⁱ^rⁱ^e^s^.^{. ..}^S^ectⁱ^{on 215 au}^t^h^ori^{zed t}^h^e^F^I^SA^cou^r^t^t^oⁱ^ssu^e^sⁱ^mⁱ^l^a^{r orders}ⁱⁿⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l
^s^ecu^rit^y^inv^e^s^tig^at^ion^s^{. It con}^t^ain^s^{a num}^{ber of}^s^a^f^e^g^u^a^r^d^s^t^h^a^t^p^r^o^t^e^c^t^civ^il^lib^er^ties.^Sectioⁿ
^{215 requ}ⁱ^r^es^F^B^{I ag}^ent^s^t^o^g^e^t^{a cou}^r^t^{order. . . S}^ectⁱ^{on 215 has}^aⁿ^a^rro^w^s^c^{ope. . . It}^caⁿⁿ^o^t
^{be u}^s^{ed t}^oⁱⁿ^v^e^s^tⁱ^g^at^{e ordi}ⁿ^a^ry^cri^m^e^s^{, or ev}^en^do^m^e^s^tⁱ^c^t^e^rrori^sm^{. S}^ectⁱ^oⁿ^{215 pres}^erv^e^s
^Fⁱ^rs^t^A^m^eⁿ^d^m^en^t^ri^g^h^t^s^.^{. .. S}^e^ctⁱ^oⁿ^{215 p}^r^ovⁱ^d^es^f^o^r^c^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^o^v^e^r^sⁱ^g^h^t^.^Myth^s^at^§215^.
Section 215 authority appears to have been relatively little used. Justice Department officials have
testified that 35 orders have been issued under section 215 authority, none of which involved ⁶²
library, book store, medical, or gun sale records. At the same time they argue against the ⁶³
creation of a safe haven in public services that terrorists have been known to use.
Critics decry the section’s expansion beyond agents of a foreign power as well as its secrecy ⁶⁴⁶⁵
provisions. They also question its constitutionality.

⁶²^H^ous^e^H^e^arⁱⁿ^gs^,^st^at^em^en^t^o^f^Keⁿ^W^aⁱⁿ^st^eiⁿ^,^Uni^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es A}^t^t^o^rne^y^f^o^{r t}^h^{e Di}^st^ri^ct^o^f^Co^l^u^m^bⁱ^a^,^avai^l^a^b^l^{e o}ⁿ^Jun^e
^28,²⁰⁰⁵^a^t^h^ttp:/^/ju^dicⁱ^a^r^y^.^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^m^e^dia^/^pdf^s^/^w^a^ins^t^eⁱⁿ⁰⁴²⁸^05.^pdf^.
⁶³^{Id. s}^t^a^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^J^a^m^e^s^A^.^Bak^e^{r, Couns}^e^l^f^o^{r I}ⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^P^o^lⁱ^c^y^,^O^f^fⁱ^ce^of^Inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^P^o^lic^y^a^{nd Re}^vⁱ^ew^{, U}ⁿ^ite^d
^S^t^at^{es Dep}^a^rt^men^t^o^f^Ju^stⁱ^{ce (“W}^hⁱ^l^e^sectⁱ^o^{n 21}⁵^h^a^{s n}^e^{ver b}^een^used^t^o^o^b^t^aiⁿ^su^{ch reco}^rd^s,^l^a^st^y^e^ar,^{a m}^e^m^b^{er o}^f^a
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^his^c^onf^e^d^e^r^a^t^e^s^{. Fur}^t^he^r^m^or^e^,^w^e^k^now^tha^t^s^p^ie^s^ha^v^e^us^e^d^pu^blic^libr^a^r^y^c^o^m^pute^r^s^to^do^r^e^s^e^a^r^c^h^{to f}^u^r^t^he^r^t^h^eⁱ^r
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^w^o^rkiⁿ^{g at}^t^h^{e Nat}ⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^Recoⁿⁿ^ai^ssan^{ce O}^f^fⁱ^ce,^w^h^o^recen^t^l^y^w^a^{s c}^oⁿ^vⁱ^c^t^e^d^o^f^espⁱ^on^age,^ext^eⁿ^sⁱ^v^el^y^u^s^ed^co^m^p^u^t^ers
^at^fⁱ^{ve p}^u^b^lⁱ^c^lⁱ^b^rari^{es i}ⁿ^No^rt^h^e^r^Vⁱ^rgiⁿⁱ^a^and^M^a^ry^l^aⁿ^d^t^o^{access ad}^d^r^{esses f}^o^{r t}^h^{e em}^b^a^s^sⁱ^e^{s o}^f^cer^t^aⁱⁿ^f^o^rei^gⁿ
^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nts^.^A^te^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^t^us^ing^a^c^o^m^pute^r^{in a}^li^br^a^r^y^s^houldⁿ^o^t^be^a^f^f^o^r^d^e^d^g^r^e^a^t^e^r^pr^iv^a^c^y^pr^ote^c^{tion t}^h^a^t^a^te^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^t
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⁶⁴^L^ee,^T^h^{e US}^A^P^A^T^R^IOT^A^c^t^a^{nd T}^e^l^eco^mmuⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^s^{: P}^rⁱ^v^a^{cy U}ⁿ^d^e^{r A}^t^t^a^ck^{, 2}⁹^R^UT^GE^RS^C^OM^P^U^T^E^R^&
^T^E^C^HNO^L^OGY^L^AW^J^OURN^A^L^371,³⁷⁹^-⁸^{0 (}²⁰⁰³⁾⁽^“^B^y^ex^pa^nding^t^h^e^s^c^ope^{, C}^o^ng^r^e^s^s^ha^s^now^pu^{t the}^c^o^m^pute^r^s^e^r^v^e^r^s^,
^reco^rd^{s, an}^d^o^t^h^e^{r p}^r^o^p^e^rty^o^f^{ISPs an}^d^o^t^h^e^{r teleco}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catioⁿ^s^eⁿ^{tities w}^ithⁱⁿ^g^r^{eater reach}^o^f^{law en}^f^o^rce^m^en^t
^agen^t^s^.^On^{e p}^a^rtⁱ^c^u^l^{ar con}^cern^wⁱ^t^h^t^hⁱ^s^an^{d si}^mⁱ^l^a^{r p}^r^o^vⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^s^,ⁱ^s^t^h^at^on^{e w}^h^o^s^{e reco}^rd^{s are so}^u^g^h^tⁿ^eed^no^t^b^e^an
^ag^en^{t o}^f^{a f}^o^rei^gⁿ^p^o^w^{er. Un}^ited^{States citizen}^{s co}^u^l^d^p^o^ten^t^ially^b^eⁱⁿ^v^e^stig^ated^oⁿ^acco^uⁿ^t^o^f^activ^{ities c}^onne^c^tⁱⁿ^g
^the^m^{to a}ⁿ^inv^e^s^tig^a^tion^of^inte^rⁿ^a^tiona^{l te}^r^r^or^is^m^,^pr^ov^ide^d^t^h^a^t^t^h^e^inv^e^s^tig^a^{tion is}ⁿ^o^{t c}^oⁿ^duc^te^{d s}^o^le^ly^upon^the
^ba^{sis of}^a^c^tiv^itie^{s prote}^c^t^e^d^by^the^{First Am}^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t to t}^h^e^Co^nstit^u^tion^.^T^h^{is se}^c^tion^is^pr^oble^m^a^tic^{in ot}^he^{r w}^a^y^s^.
^J^udg^e^s^{, f}^o^r^e^x^am^ple^,^ha^v^e^{no a}^u^th^or^ity^{to de}^ny^a^r^e^que^s^t^if^the^a^pplⁱ^c^a^{tion m}^e^e^t^s^the^r^e^quir^e^m^e^nts^of^the^s^e^c^tion.^I^t^is
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^doe^sⁿ^o^{t w}^a^iv^e^aⁿ^y^pr^iv^ile^g^e^{, pe}^r^s^ons^s^e^r^v^e^d^by^aⁿ^or^de^r^a^r^e^g^a^g^g^e^{d. F}^u^r^t^he^r^m^or^e^,^the^a^c^t^ov^e^r^rⁱ^de^s^f^e^de^r^a^{l pr}^iv^a^c^y
^sta^t^ute^s^a^{nd e}^x^plic^itly^ba^{rs no}^tic^e^to^t^h^e^pa^rty^w^hose^re^c^o^{rds a}^r^e^beⁱⁿ^g^disc^lose^d.^In^divⁱ^dua^{ls w}^oul^d^b^e^una^w^a^re^of
^w^h^e^t^he^r^the^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt is}^unf^aⁱ^r^l^y^inquirⁱ^ngⁱⁿ^to^theⁱ^r^e^x^tr^e^m^e^l^y^pr^iv^a^t^e^inf^o^r^m^a^tion”⁾^.

Section 215 provides access to tangible items under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1861, by authorizing ex parte FISA court orders in foreign intelligence (as
amended), international terrorism, and clandestine intelligence cases.
• It reverts at sunset to the vehicle rental, transportation, storage rental, and
housing accommodation business records pertaining to foreign power or agent,

50 U.S.C. 1861, 1862 (2000 ed.).

• Other legislation expanding the definition of financial institution for national
security letter purposes, P.L. 108-177, 117 Stat. 2628 (2003)(12 U.S.C. 3414)
might be thought to compensate for reduced authority upon reversion.
• Grand juries can subpoena the same material with fewer restrictions or
protections; section 215 FISA orders demand senior official and judicial
approval, explicit first amendment adherence, and Congressional reporting.
• In many instances the same material is available using national security letter
(nsl) authority.
• It is only to be used in serious national security cases.
• The authority had been used in 35 instances as of March 30, 2005.
• The section produces an environment of abuse through its elimination of
safeguards (limited to third parties; requires neither probable cause nor
“articulable facts;” and need not be limited to items relating to the target of the
investigation) and through its use of a procedure that already carries reduced
safeguards (use of a secret court, which does not weigh the evidence; and one-
way gag orders of unknown breath and duration).
At one time, applications for a FISA wiretap or physical search order were required to certify that
“the” purpose for seeking the order was to obtain foreign intelligence information, 50 U.S.C.
1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B)(2000 ed.). This, and FISA’s minimization requirements, among
other things, led to the view that FISA required a wall of separation between law enforcement and
intelligence investigations. Section 218 was designed to promote greater cooperation and
information sharing among criminal and foreign intelligence investigators, to remove the “wall”
that had been administratively constructed between. It does so by authorizing FISA wiretap or

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
⁶⁵^The^U^S^{A PAT}^RI^O^T^Ac^t:^Vⁱ^ol^atiⁿ^{g Re}^as^oⁿ^a^b^le^Ex^pe^c^t^atio^ns^o^f^Prⁱ^v^ac^y^Pr^ote^c^t^e^d^by^t^h^e^Fo^ur^th^Am^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t W}^ith^ou^t
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^t^o^Unⁱ^t^ed^S^t^at^es^p^e^rsoⁿ^s^con^t^rary^t^o^t^h^{e pu}^rpo^s^{e o}^f^F^I^S^A^an^d^t^h^{e s}^pⁱ^rⁱ^t^o^f^t^h^{e F}^o^u^r^t^h^A^m^en^d^m^en^t^”^).

physical search order applications even if the acquisition of foreign intelligence information is no
more than a “significant” reason for the application, 50 U.S.C.1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B). The
FISA review court concluded that this standard permits applications where intelligence
information collection supplies some measurable reason for the application and that the provision
passes constitutional muster, In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 735-46 (F.I.S.Ct.Rev. 2002).
The Supreme Court has held that the assertion of the President’s national security powers will not
excuse the failure to comply with the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirements during the
course of an investigation of domestic terrorists, United States v. United States District Court
(Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 314-21 (1972). The Court expressly declined to address or express any
opinion with regard to “the issues which may be involved with respect to activities of foreign
powers or their agents,” Id. at 321-22. Nor would the Court hold that standards and procedures
similar those of Title III need necessarily have to be duplicated in such cases, Id. at 22.
Prior to Keith, “[f]or decades Presidents had claimed inherent power to conduct warrantless
electronic surveillance in order to gather foreign intelligence in the interests of national security,”
ACLU v. Barr, 952, F.2d 457, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Following Keith, when defendants in criminal
proceedings raised constitutional challenges the lower federal courts in at least three circuits
“sustained the President’s power to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance for the primary ⁶⁶
purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information, Id. at 461(emphasis added). After
Congress enacted FISA, several courts used this “primary purpose” language to respond to the
arguments of criminal defendants who challenged the FISA “the purpose” certification and who
argued that FISA had been used solely to avoid the more stringent Title III requirements ⁶⁷
demanded in a criminal investigation.
In the aftermath of 9/11, the Administration sought to change the “the purpose” certification
requirement to a “a purpose” certification requirement, §153, H.R.—, Hearing, at 74. Its
explanation was concise, “Current law requires that FISA be used only where foreign intelligence
gathering is the sole or primary purpose of the investigation. This section will clarify that the
certification of a FISA request is supportable where foreign intelligence gathering is ‘a’ purpose

⁶⁶^Citing^,^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^Br^owⁿ^{, 4}^{84 F.2}^d⁴¹⁸⁽⁵^th^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷³⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^v^.^B^u^te^nk^o^,⁴⁹^{4 F}^.²^d⁵^{93 (}³^{d C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁷⁴⁾^;
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^v^a^lid^FISA^su^rv^eillan^{ce is n}^o^t^tain^ted^si^m^p^ly^b^ecau^{se th}^{e g}^o^v^e^rn^men^t^can^an^tici^p^{ate th}^{at t}^h^{e f}^r^u^{its o}^f^su^ch^su^rv^eillan^ce
^m^a^y^la^te^{r be}^use^d^{, a}^s^a^llow^e^{d by}^§18⁰⁶^(b),^a^s^e^v^ideⁿ^c^e^{in a}^c^r^im^ina^l^tria^l”^);^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Pe^lt^on^,⁸³⁵^F.^2d¹⁰⁶⁷^,^th
¹⁰⁷^5-¹⁰^{76 (}⁴^Cir.1⁹⁸⁷^)(“^W^e^a^l^s^o^re^je^c^t^P^e^lto^n’s^c^l^aⁱ^m^tha^t^the¹⁹⁸⁵^FISA^s^u^rv^e^illa^nc^e^w^a^s^c^onduc^te^{d prim}^a^r^ily^f^o^r
^the^p^u^rp^ose^of^{his c}^r^im^ina^l^prose^c^u^tio^{n, a}^nd^not^prim^a^r^ily^‘^f^{or the}^p^u^rp^ose^of^obtaⁱ^{n f}^o^re^ig^{n inte}^llig^eⁿ^c^e^inf^o^rm^a^{tion’ a}^s
^re^quire^d^by^{50 U.S.C}^.¹⁸⁰²^(b)^{. .}^{. W}^e^a^g^re^e^w^{ith the}^distri^c^t^c^o^urt^tha^t^the^prim^a^r^y^purpose^of^the^s^u^rv^e^illa^nc^e^,^both
^initia^lly^a^{nd t}^h^ro^ug^ho^{ut, w}^a^{s to g}^a^the^r^f^o^re^ig^{n inte}^llig^eⁿ^c^e^inf^o^rm^a^tion”^);^c^f^{., U}ⁿ^ite^d^State^s^v^.^J^o^hⁿ^s^oⁿ^{, 95}^{2 F.2}^d⁵⁶⁵^,^st
⁵⁷²⁽¹^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹¹⁾⁽^“^FI^SA^a^pplic^a^tions^m^u^s^t^c^oⁿ^t^aⁱ^{n, a}^m^ong^ot^he^r^t^h^ing^s^{, a}^c^e^r^tif^ic^a^{tion t}^h^a^t^the^pur^p^o^s^e^of^the
^re^que^ste^d^surv^e^illa^nc^e^{is t}^h^e^g^a^the^r^ing^of^f^o^re^ig^{n inte}^llig^eⁿ^c^e^inf^o^rm^a^{tion. .}^{.. A}^lth^oug^{h e}^v^ideⁿ^c^e^obt^aⁱ^ne^{d u}^nde^r^FISA
^s^ubs^e^que^ntly^m^a^y^be^us^e^d^{in c}^r^im^ina^l^pr^os^e^c^u^tio^ns^{, t}^h^e^inv^e^s^tig^a^tio^{n of}^c^r^im^ina^l^a^c^tiv^it^y^c^a^{nnot be}^t^h^e^pr^im^a^r^y^pur^pos^e^th
^o^f^th^{e su}^rv^eillan^ce”);^but^s^e^e^,^Unⁱ^t^ed^S^t^a^t^{es v.}^Sa^rki^ssi^aⁿ^,⁸⁴^{1 F}^.²^d⁹⁵⁹^,⁹⁶^{4 (}⁹^Cir.¹⁹⁸⁸⁾⁽^d^e^c^liniⁿ^g^{to a}^d^op^{t the}^th
^“^p^rⁱ^m^a^r^y^pur^pos^e^”^s^t^a^nda^r^d⁾^;^Uⁿⁱ^t^ed^S^t^a^t^{es v.}^Ha^mmou^d^,³⁸^{1 F}^.³^d³¹⁶^,³³^{4 (}⁴^Cir.²⁰⁰⁴^)(coⁿ^struⁱⁿ^g^FISAⁱⁿ^{its p}^r^e-
^USA^P^A^TRIOT^Ac^{t f}^o^r^m^{) (“}^e^v^eⁿ^if^the^prim^a^r^y^purpose^re^q^u^ire^m^eⁿ^{t te}^{st a}^p^plie^{s, it}^{is sa}^tisfⁱ^e^d^he^re^”⁾^.

of the investigation. This change would eliminate the current need continually to evaluate the
relative weight of criminal and intelligence purposes, and would facilitate information sharing
between law enforcement and foreign intelligence authorities which is critical to the success of
anti-terrorism efforts,” Hearing at 56-7.
Both House and Senate bills substituted the final language, “a significant purpose,” §153, H.R.

2975, H.Rept. 107-236, at 8; §218, S. 1510, 147 Cong. Rec. S10313 (daily ed. October 4, 2001).

The House Judiciary Committee characterized the change as “a compromise between current law
and what the Administration has proposed,” H.Rept. 107-236, at 60, and the FISA review court
concluded that the change “imposed a requirement that the government have a measurable
foreign intelligence purpose, other than just criminal prosecution of even foreign intelligence
crimes,” In re Sealed Case,310 F.3d 717, 735 (F.I.S.Ct.Rev. 2002).
Section 218 sunsets on March 10, 2006 except with respect to foreign intelligence investigations
initiated before that date. Whether the wall of separation between criminal and foreign
intelligence investigations will be or must be reconstructed at that point is unclear at best. Section
504 of the act(which does not sunset) adds language to the FISA wiretap and physical search
schemes calling for continued cooperation and declaring cooperation no bar to the certification in ⁶⁸
a FISA application of an intelligence-gathering purpose, 50 U.S.C. 1806(k), 1825(k).
Moreover, the Department of Justice and the FISA review court now appear to doubt that FISA ⁶⁹
prior to passage of the act required such a wall of separation. Thus, the expiration of section 218
may not require reconstruction of the wall, although applications for FISA wiretap or search
orders would once again have to certify that foreign intelligence gathering constituted “the”
purpose for the application.

⁶⁸^“^F^e^d^e^r^a^l^of^fⁱ^c^e^rs^w^{ho c}^oⁿ^duc^{t e}^l^e^c^t^ronic^surv^e^illa^nc^e^to^a^c^quire^f^o^re^ig^{n inte}^llig^eⁿ^c^e^inf^o^rm^a^{tion u}ⁿ^d^e^r^this^title^m^a^y
^c^ons^ult^w^{ith Fe}^de^r^a^{l la}^w^eⁿ^f^o^r^c^em^eⁿ^{t of}^fⁱ^ce^r^s^{to c}^oor^dina^te^e^f^f^o^r^t^s^{to i}ⁿ^v^e^s^tig^a^t^e^or^pr^ote^c^t^a^g^aⁱ^ns^t^—⁽^A⁾^a^c^t^ua^{l or}
^poteⁿ^tia^{l a}^tta^c^k^{or ot}^he^{r g}^r^a^v^e^hostile^a^c^t^{s of}^a^f^o^re^ig^{n pow}^e^r^{or a}^g^eⁿ^{t of}^a^f^o^re^ig^{n pow}^e^r^{; (B) sa}^bota^g^e^{or in}^te^rna^tio^na^l
^te^rrorism^b^y^a^f^o^reⁱ^g^{n pow}^e^r^{or a}ⁿ^a^g^eⁿ^{t of}^a^f^o^re^ig^{n pow}^e^r^{; or (C)}^c^l^a^nde^stineⁱⁿ^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^a^c^tiv^itie^{s by}^aⁿ^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e
^s^e^r^v^ic^e^or^ne^tw^or^k^of^a^f^o^r^e^ig^{n pow}^e^r^or^by^aⁿ^ag^eⁿ^{t of}^a^f^o^r^e^ig^{n pow}^e^r^{. (}²⁾^C^oor^di^na^ti^{on a}^u^th^or^iz^e^d^unde^r^pa^r^a^g^r^a^ph
⁽¹⁾^s^h^a^ll^no^{t pr}^e^c^l^u^d^e^the^c^e^r^tif^ic^a^tion^r^e^quir^e^{d by}^s^e^c^{tion 1}⁰⁴⁽^a⁾⁽⁷⁾⁽^B⁾^[⁵⁰^U^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁰⁴^]^or^the^eⁿ^tr^y^of^aⁿ^or^de^r^un^de^r
^s^e^c^{tion 1}⁰⁵^[⁵^{0 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁰⁵^]^,”⁵⁰^U^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁰⁵⁽^k⁾^.^Sim^ila^r^la^ng^ua^ge^a^ppe^a^r^sⁱⁿ¹⁸²⁵⁽^k⁾^f^o^r^p^h^y^s^ic^a^l^s^e^a^r^c^h^e^s^.
⁶⁹^“[^I^]^tⁱ^s^quⁱ^t^e^pu^zzlⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^at^t^h^{e J}^u^stⁱ^{ce Dep}^a^rt^men^t^,^at^so^m^e^p^oⁱⁿ^t^duriⁿ^{g t}^h^e¹⁹⁸⁰^s^,^b^e^gan^t^o^{read t}^h^e^st^at^u^t^{e as}
^lim^iting^the^De^pa^rtm^e^{nt’s a}^b^ility^{to o}^b^taⁱⁿ^FISA^orde^{rs if}^{it i}ⁿ^teⁿ^d^e^d^to^pr^ose^c^u^te^the^ta^rg^e^t^e^d^a^g^eⁿ^{ts . . . A}^ppa^re^nt^ly^to
^a^v^{oid r}^uⁿⁿⁱ^ng^a^f^{oul of}^the^pr^im^a^r^y^pur^pos^e^te^s^t^us^e^d^by^s^o^m^e^c^our^ts^{, the}¹⁹⁹⁵^P^r^oc^e^dur^e^s^lim^ite^{d c}^o^nta^c^t^s^be^tw^e^eⁿ^the
^{FBI a}^nd^the^Crim^ina^l^Divⁱ^sionⁱⁿ^c^a^s^e^s^w^h^e^r^e^FIS^A^surv^e^illa^nc^e^{or se}^a^r^c^h^e^s^w^e^r^e^be^ing^c^oⁿ^duc^te^d^b^y^the^{FBI f}^o^r
^f^o^re^ig^{n inte}^llig^eⁿ^c^e^{(FI) or f}^o^re^ig^{n c}^o^uⁿ^te^rin^t^e^llig^eⁿ^c^e^{(FCI) p}^u^rp^o^s^e^s^{. T}^h^e^proc^e^dure^s^sta^t^e^d^t^h^a^t^‘th^e^{FBI a}^nd
^Cri^mⁱⁿ^al^Di^vi^si^oⁿ^w^o^u^l^d^en^s^u^{re t}^h^at^ad^vi^{ce i}ⁿ^t^e^nd^ed^t^o^p^r^{eserve t}^h^{e o}^p^tⁱ^o^{n o}^f^{a cri}^mⁱⁿ^al^p^r^o^s^ecu^tⁱ^{on d}^o^e^sⁿ^o^t
ⁱⁿ^ad^vert^en^t^l^y^resu^l^tⁱⁿ^ei^t^h^{er t}^h^{e f}^act^o^r^t^h^{e app}^earan^{ce o}^f^t^h^{e Cri}^mⁱⁿ^al^Di^vi^si^oⁿ^’^s^dⁱ^rectⁱⁿ^{g o}^r^co^nt^ro^l^lⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^{e F}^I^o^r^F^C^I
^inv^e^stig^a^{tion tow}^a^{rd la}^w^eⁿ^f^o^rc^e^m^eⁿ^{t obje}^c^tiv^e^s^{’. A}^lthoug^h^the^s^e^pr^oc^e^dur^e^s^pr^ov^ide^d^f^o^r^sⁱ^gⁿ^if^ic^{ant i}ⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^tion
^s^h^a^r^ing^a^{nd c}^oor^dina^ti^on^{. .}^{. t}^h^e^y^e^v^eⁿ^tua^lly^c^a^m^e^{to be}^na^r^r^o^w^l^yⁱⁿ^te^r^p^r^e^te^{d w}^ithiⁿ^the^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^nt^of^J^u^s^tic^e^{. . . a}^s
^re^quiri^ng^{. .}^{. a}^w^a^{ll to pre}^v^eⁿ^{t t}^h^e^{FBI in}^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s f}^r^o^m^c^o^m^m^unic^a^ting^w^{ith the}^Crim^ina^l^Divⁱ^{sion re}^g^a^rding
^ong^oi^ng^{FI or}^{FCI i}ⁿ^v^e^s^tig^a^tions^.^T^h^e^D^e^pa^rt^m^e^nt’s^a^ttitude^c^h^aⁿ^g^e^{d s}^o^m^e^w^h^a^t^a^f^t^e^{r [}ⁱⁿ^t^e^r^na^{l a}ⁿ^{d G}^e^ne^ra^{l A}^c^c^ounting
^O^f^fⁱ^ce^r^e^por^ts^]^c^onc^l^ude^d^tha^t^the^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^nt’^s^c^onc^e^r^{n ov}^e^r^how^the^FI^SA^c^our^t^or^othe^r^f^e^de^r^a^{l c}^our^ts^mⁱ^g^h^t
^inte^rpre^{t t}^h^e^prim^a^r^y^purp^o^se^te^{st ha}^{d i}^nhi^bite^d^ne^c^e^ssa^r^y^c^oordina^tⁱ^on^be^tw^e^eⁿ^inte^llig^eⁿ^c^e^a^{nd la}^w^eⁿ^f^o^rc^e^m^eⁿ^t
^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^.^[^T^he^inte^rⁿ^a^l^]^r^e^por^{t a}^l^s^o^c^onc^l^ude^d,^ba^s^e^{d on}^the^te^x^t^of^FI^SA^a^{nd its}^le^gⁱ^s^l^a^tiv^e^his^t^or^y^,^tha^tⁿ^o^t^only^s^houl^d
^the^p^u^rp^ose^of^the^inv^e^stig^a^tionⁿ^o^{t be}ⁱⁿ^quire^d^int^o^by^the^c^ourts,^{but a}^l^s^o^tha^t^Co^ng^re^{ss a}^f^fⁱ^r^m^a^tiv^e^l^y^aⁿ^tic^ipa^t^e^tha^t
^the^u^nde^rlyⁱ^ng^inv^e^stig^a^{tion m}ⁱ^g^h^{t w}^e^{ll ha}^v^e^a^c^rⁱ^m^ina^l^a^s^w^e^{ll a}^s^fore^ig^{n inte}^ll^ig^eⁿ^c^e^obje^c^tiv^e^,^”³¹^{0 F.}^3d^a^t⁷^23,⁷^25,
⁷²⁷^.

Section 218 is perhaps the most fundamental of the changes accomplished by the expiring
sections of the act. Therefore it is not surprising that the Justice Department’s defense of the
section is both extensive and explicit:
^T^h^{e USA}^P^A^T^R^IOT^A^c^{t au}^t^h^o^r^izes^g^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^a^g^en^cie^s^{to s}^h^{are in}^tell^ig^eⁿ^{ce s}^o^th^{at a}
^co^m^p^lete^m^o^{saic o}^fⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^tioⁿ^caⁿ^b^e^co^m^p^iled^to^uⁿ^d^er^staⁿ^d^b^e^tter^w^h^at^ter^r^o^rⁱ^sts^mⁱ^g^h^t
^{be pl}^anⁿⁱ^ng^an^{d t}^o^prev^en^t^at^t^a^ck^s^.^Pri^o^{r l}^a^w^,^asⁱⁿ^t^e^rpret^e^{d a}ⁿ^{d i}^m^pl^e^m^en^t^e^{d, h}^a^{d t}^h^{e e}^f^f^e^ct
^o^f^s^h^ar^p^l^y^li^m^itiⁿ^g^t^h^{e ab}^ilit^y^o^f^la^w^eⁿ^f^o^r^c^e^m^eⁿ^{t a}ⁿ^dⁱⁿ^telli^g^eⁿ^{ce o}^f^fⁱ^cer^s^to^s^h^ar^e
ⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^,^w^h^ic^h^se^v^e^r^e^l^y^h^a^m^p^er^ed^ter^r^o^r^ismⁱⁿ^v^e^sti^g^ato^r^s’^ab^ilit^y^to^coⁿⁿ^{ect t}^h^{e d}^o^t^s.
^Ho^w^e^v^e^r^,^th^{e U}^S^A^P^A^T^R^I^O^T^A^c^{t, alo}ⁿ^g^wⁱ^t^h^ch^aⁿ^g^e^{s i}ⁿ^A^t^t^o^rⁿ^e^y^Geⁿ^e^r^a^{l Gu}^id^elin^e^s^an^d
^Fo^r^e^igⁿ^Iⁿ^telli^g^eⁿ^ce^Su^r^v^eillaⁿ^ce^A^c^{t (}^F^I^S^A⁾^co^u^r^{t p}^r^o^ced^u^r^{es, b}^r^o^u^g^h^{t d}^o^wⁿ^t^h^is^w^a^ll
^s^e^paratin^{g i}ⁿ^telli^g^eⁿ^ce^f^r^o^m^l^a^w^enf^o^rce^m^eⁿ^t^an^d^g^r^eatl^y^en^h^aⁿ^ced^f^o^reignⁱⁿ^tel^lig^eⁿ^ce
ⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^s^h^arⁱⁿ^g^a^m^oⁿ^g^f^e^d^e^r^a^{l la}^w^eⁿ^f^o^r^c^e^m^en^{t a}ⁿ^dⁿ^a^tioⁿ^a^l^sec^u^rⁱ^t^y^p^e^r^s^oⁿⁿ^el,
ⁱⁿ^telli^g^eⁿ^{ce ag}^eⁿ^{cies, a}ⁿ^d^o^t^h^e^r^en^{tities e}ⁿ^tr^u^s^ted^wⁱ^th^p^r^o^t^ectin^g^th^eⁿ^a^tioⁿ^f^r^o^m^{acts o}^f
^ter^r^o^rⁱ^sm^{. T}^hⁱ^sⁱⁿ^cr^eased^ab^ilit^y^to^s^h^ar^{e i}ⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^h^a^s^b^eenⁱⁿ^v^a^l^u^ab^{le to}^t^h^{e co}ⁿ^d^u^c^{t o}^f
^ter^r^o^rⁱ^smⁱⁿ^v^e^sti^g^atioⁿ^s^an^d^h^a^{s d}ⁱ^r^ectl^y^led^to^th^{e d}ⁱ^sr^u^p^tioⁿ^o^f^ter^r^o^rⁱ^{st p}^l^o^t^{s an}^dⁿ^u^m^e^r^o^u^s
^arres^t^s^,^pros^ecu^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^{, a}ⁿ^{d conv}ⁱ^c^tⁱ^onsⁱⁿ^t^e^rrori^s^m^cas^e^s^.
^T^h^e^recen^tⁱⁿ^v^e^s^t^ig^at^ion^an^d^pros^ecu^tioⁿ^o^f^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^o^f^aⁿ^a^l^Q^a^e^d^a^c^e^l^lⁱⁿ^L^a^c^k^a^w^aⁿⁿ^a^,
^N^e^w^Y^o^r^kⁱ^l^l^ust^r^a^t^e^s^t^h^e^b^e^ne^fⁱ^t^s^o^f^t^h^eⁱⁿ^c^r^e^a^se^dⁱⁿ^fo^r^m^a^tⁱ^o^{n sha}^rⁱⁿ^{g b}^r^o^ught^a^b^o^u^t^b^y^t^h^e
^US^A^P^A^T^R^IOT^A^c^{t. T}^h^is^cas^{e in}^v^o^l^v^{ed s}^e^v^e^{ral res}ⁱ^deⁿ^t^s^{of L}^ack^a^w^aⁿⁿ^a^,^w^h^{o trav}^{eled to}
^Afg^h^aⁿⁱ^s^t^anⁱⁿ^{2001 to receiv}^e^trainⁱ^ng^{at a}ⁿ^{al Qaeda-}^a^f^f^ili^{ated cam}^pⁿ^{ear Kan}^d^ah^{ar. T}^h^e
ⁱⁿ^v^e^s^tⁱ^g^atⁱ^oⁿ^of^t^h^{e “L}^ac^k^a^w^aⁿⁿ^a^Sⁱ^x^”^be^g^aⁿ^du^ri^ng^t^h^e^s^u^mm^{er of}^{2001, w}^h^en^t^h^{e F}^B^I
^receiv^e^{d an an}^oⁿ^y^m^o^u^s^letterⁱⁿ^dicatiⁿ^g^t^h^at^th^e^s^e^sⁱ^xⁱⁿ^di^vⁱ^du^al^s^aⁿ^{d ot}^h^e^rs^mⁱ^g^h^{t be}
ⁱⁿ^v^o^l^v^{ed i}ⁿ^cri^mⁱⁿ^{al ac}^tivⁱ^t^y^aⁿ^{d as}^s^o^ciatiⁿ^g^wⁱ^t^h^f^o^reign^terroris^ts^{. T}^h^{e FB}^{I con}^c^lu^{ded th}^a^t
^ex^istⁱⁿ^g^la^w^r^e^q^u^ir^ed^t^h^{e cr}^eati^oⁿ^o^f^t^w^o^sep^a^r^a^{te i}ⁿ^v^e^sti^g^atioⁿ^sⁱⁿ^o^r^d^e^r^to^r^e^tain^th^e^o^p^tioⁿ
^of^usⁱⁿ^{g F}^I^SA^:^{a cri}^mⁱⁿ^alⁱⁿ^v^e^s^tⁱ^g^atⁱ^{on of}^possⁱ^bl^{e drug}^cri^m^es^aⁿ^{d a}ⁿⁱⁿ^t^e^l^lⁱ^g^eⁿ^ce
ⁱⁿ^v^e^sti^g^atioⁿ^r^e^lated^to^ter^r^o^rⁱ^s^{t th}^r^eat^{s. Ov}^er^t^h^{e en}^suⁱⁿ^g^m^oⁿ^t^h^s^{, t}^w^o^sq^u^a^d^s^car^rⁱ^ed^oⁿ
^th^es^{e t}^w^{o s}^e^{parate inv}^e^s^tⁱ^g^atioⁿ^s^sⁱ^m^u^ltaⁿ^e^ous^l^y^{, an}^{d t}^h^ere^w^e^r^e^tⁱ^m^es^w^h^en^th^eⁱⁿ^t^e^l^lⁱ^g^en^c^e
^o^f^fⁱ^cer^{s a}ⁿ^d^th^{e la}^w^eⁿ^f^o^r^c^e^m^eⁿ^{t ag}^eⁿ^{ts co}ⁿ^c^l^u^d^e^d^th^{at th}^e^y^c^o^u^l^dⁿ^o^{t b}^eⁱⁿ^th^{e sa}^m^e^r^o^o^m
^du^ring^briefⁱⁿ^g^s^{to dis}^c^us^s^t^h^eⁱ^{r res}^p^ectiv^{e inv}^e^s^t^ig^at^ion^wⁱ^t^h^each^oth^e^r.
^T^h^{e USA}^P^A^T^R^I^O^T^A^c^{t, h}^o^w^e^v^e^r^,^to^o^k^d^o^wⁿ^th^e^“w^a^{ll” sep}^a^r^a^tin^g^t^h^{ese t}^w^o
ⁱⁿ^v^e^s^tⁱ^g^atioⁿ^s^b^y^m^a^kⁱ^ng^{clear th}^{at th}^{e s}^h^ariⁿ^g^o^f^cas^e^-^s^eⁿ^s^iti^v^e^inf^o^r^m^at^ion^bet^w^een^t^h^es^e
^t^w^o^g^r^o^u^p^s^w^a^{s allo}^w^e^d^.^A^s^{a r}^e^su^{lt o}^f^k^e^yⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^sh^ar^ed^b^yⁱⁿ^telli^g^eⁿ^{ce i}ⁿ^v^e^sti^g^ato^r^s^,
^la^w^eⁿ^f^o^rce^m^eⁿ^{t a}^g^en^t^s^w^e^re^{able to learn}^th^at^anⁱⁿ^di^vⁱ^du^al^m^eⁿ^tion^e^{d i}ⁿ^t^h^{e an}^oⁿ^y^m^o^u^s
^letter^w^a^s^aⁿ^a^g^en^{t o}^f^{al Qaed}^{a. Fu}^rt^h^e^{r inf}^o^r^m^at^ion^s^h^ared^bet^w^eeⁿⁱⁿ^telli^g^eⁿ^{ce an}^{d la}^w
^en^f^o^rce^m^en^{t pers}^onn^{el t}^h^en^dra^m^aticall^y^ex^{pedited th}^{e i}ⁿ^v^e^s^t^ig^ation^o^f^th^e^L^a^ck^aw^anⁿ^a^Sⁱ^x
^an^{d allo}^w^e^{d c}^h^arg^e^s^{to be f}ⁱ^l^e^{d ag}^ains^{t th}^e^s^{e i}ⁿ^divⁱ^d^u^als^.^Fiv^e^o^f^th^e^L^a^c^k^a^w^aⁿⁿ^a^Six
^pl^{eaded g}^uⁱ^l^t^y^t^o^provⁱ^dⁱⁿ^g^m^a^t^e^ri^al^s^u^pport^t^o^al^Q^aeda,^aⁿ^{d t}^h^{e s}ⁱ^x^t^h^pl^{eaded g}^uⁱ^l^t^y^t^o
^con^d^u^c^tiⁿ^g^traⁿ^s^actioⁿ^s^un^la^wf^ull^y^wⁱ^th^{al Qaeda. T}^h^es^{e in}^divⁱ^du^al^s^w^e^{re th}^en^s^eⁿ^t^en^c^e^d^t^o
^pri^s^on^t^e^r^m^s^raⁿ^gⁱ^ng^f^r^o^m^s^e^ven^t^o^t^eⁿ^y^ear^s^.
^Bef^o^{re t}^h^{e pass}^ag^{e o}^f^t^h^{e U}^S^A^P^A^T^R^IO^T^A^c^t^,^applⁱ^catⁱ^ons^f^o^{r orders}^au^t^h^ori^zⁱⁿ^g
^electr^oⁿⁱ^{c su}^r^v^eillaⁿ^{ce o}^r^p^h^y^s^{ical sear}^ch^{es u}ⁿ^d^e^r^FI^S^A^h^a^d^t^oⁱⁿ^clu^d^{e a cer}^tif^icatioⁿ^f^r^o^m^a
^hⁱ^g^h^-^r^aⁿ^kⁱⁿ^g^E^x^ecu^ti^v^e^B^r^an^c^h^o^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^{al t}^h^at^th^e^p^u^r^p^o^s^{e o}^f^t^h^{e s}^u^r^v^eillaⁿ^c^e^o^r^sear^ch^w^a^s^to
^g^a^th^er^f^o^r^e^igⁿⁱⁿ^tel^lig^eⁿ^{ce i}ⁿ^f^o^r^m^at^ioⁿ^.^A^sⁱⁿ^ter^p^r^e^ted^b^y^t^h^{e co}^u^r^{ts an}^d^later^th^{e J}^u^stice
^Dep^a^r^t^m^eⁿ^t^{, t}^h^{is r}^e^q^u^ir^e^m^eⁿ^{t m}^ean^{t th}^{at t}^h^{e p}^rⁱ^m^ar^y^p^u^r^p^o^s^{e o}^f^th^{e co}^llectioⁿ^h^a^d^to^b^e^to
^o^b^t^ain^f^o^r^eⁱ^gⁿⁱⁿ^telli^g^eⁿ^c^eⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^at^ioⁿ^r^a^t^h^er^t^h^{an ev}^ideⁿ^ce^of^{a cri}^m^{e. O}^v^{er t}^h^e^y^ears^,^t^h^e
^p^r^ev^ailin^gⁱⁿ^ter^p^r^e^tatioⁿ^aⁿ^dⁱ^m^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^tatⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^th^{e p}^rⁱ^m^ar^y^p^u^r^p^o^s^{e stan}^d^a^r^d^h^a^d^t^h^{e ef}^f^ect
^o^f^li^m^itiⁿ^g^co^o^r^dⁱⁿ^a^tioⁿ^aⁿ^dⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^s^h^arⁱⁿ^g^b^e^t^w^eenⁱⁿ^t^e^llig^eⁿ^{ce a}ⁿ^d^la^w^eⁿ^f^o^r^c^e^m^eⁿ^t
^pers^onⁿ^e^{l. B}^ecau^s^e^t^h^{e cou}^r^ts^ev^alu^a^{ted th}^{e g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^’s^purpos^{e f}^o^{r u}^s^ing^FIS^A^at^l^e^a^s^tⁱⁿ

^part^by^e^x^a^mⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^t^h^eⁿ^a^t^u^re^an^{d ext}^eⁿ^t^{of su}^c^h^coordiⁿ^a^tⁱ^on^{, t}^h^e^m^o^re^coordiⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^t^h^at
^o^ccu^r^r^e^d^,^th^{e m}^o^{st li}^k^e^l^y^co^u^r^ts^w^o^u^l^d^fⁱⁿ^d^th^{at la}^w^en^f^o^r^cem^eⁿ^{t, r}^a^th^er^th^aⁿ^f^o^r^e^igⁿ
ⁱⁿ^telli^g^eⁿ^{ce, h}^a^{d beco}^m^e^th^{e p}^rⁱ^m^ar^y^pu^rpos^{e of}^t^h^{e s}^u^rv^eil^l^aⁿ^{ce or s}^earch^.
* * *
^In^recen^t^tes^tⁱ^m^ony^be^f^o^{re the Sen}^a^te^J^u^diciar^y^C^o^m^mⁱ^t^t^ee^{, P}^a^trick^Fitz^g^e^{rald, U.S.}
^A^t^t^o^rⁿ^e^y^f^o^{r t}^h^{e N}^o^rt^h^e^rⁿ^Dⁱ^s^t^ri^ct^of^Il^lⁱⁿ^oⁱ^s^{, recoun}^t^e^{d f}^r^o^m^pers^on^al^ex^peri^eⁿ^{ce h}^o^w^t^hⁱ^s
^“w^all^’^bet^w^eeⁿ^la^w^enf^o^rce^m^eⁿ^{t an}^{d i}ⁿ^telli^g^eⁿ^{ce pers}^onⁿ^e^{l o}^p^{erated in}^practice:
^I^w^a^{s o}ⁿ^{a p}^r^o^s^ecu^tioⁿ^tea^mⁱⁿ^Ne^w^Yo^r^k^th^a^t^b^e^g^aⁿ^{a cr}ⁱ^mⁱⁿ^{al in}^v^e^sti^g^atioⁿ^o^f^U^s^a^m^{a B}ⁱⁿ
^L^a^{den i}ⁿ^earl^y^{1996. T}^h^{e t}^eam^—^p^ros^ecu^t^o^{rs an}^d^t^h^e^F^B^{I a}^g^en^t^s^a^s^sⁱ^gn^{ed t}^o^t^h^{e cri}^mⁱⁿ^al
^cas^e—h^a^{d acce}^s^s^{to a}ⁿ^u^m^b^er^of^s^o^u^r^ces^{. W}^e^cou^l^{d ta}^{lk to ci}^tizen^s^.^W^e^cou^l^{d tal}^k^to^local
^{police of}^fⁱ^cers^.^W^e^co^u^l^{d tal}^k^t^o^oth^e^{r U.S. Gov}^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^ag^eⁿ^cies^{. W}^e^cou^l^{d tal}^k^to^f^o^reign
^{police of}^fⁱ^cers^.^Ev^eⁿ^f^o^rei^gⁿⁱⁿ^telli^g^eⁿ^{ce pers}^onⁿ^e^l.^An^{d f}^o^r^e^igⁿ^ci^tizens^.^Aⁿ^d^w^e^{did all}
^th^os^{e thing}^s^as^often^as^w^e^{could. W}^e^c^o^u^l^{d ev}^en^talk^{to al Q}^a^e^d^a^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^—^an^d^w^e^dⁱ^d^.^W^e
^actu^a^ll^y^called^s^e^v^e^ral^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^an^{d as}^s^o^ciates^o^f^al^{Qaeda t}^o^tes^tⁱ^f^y^be^f^o^{re a g}^r^aⁿ^{d j}^u^r^yⁱⁿ
^Ne^w^York^.^An^d^w^e^e^v^{en debrief}^e^{d al}^Qaeda^m^e^m^b^ers^ov^e^r^s^eas^w^{ho a}^g^{reed to beco}^m^e
^cooperatⁱⁿ^g^wⁱ^tⁿ^e^s^s^e^s^.
^B^u^{t th}^er^e^w^a^{s o}ⁿ^{e g}^r^o^u^p^o^f^p^e^o^p^l^{e w}^e^w^e^r^eⁿ^o^{t p}^e^r^m^itted^to^talk^to^{. W}^h^o^?^T^h^{e FB}^I
^ag^en^t^s^acr^o^s^{s t}^h^e^str^eet^f^r^o^m^u^sⁱⁿ^lo^w^e^r^Man^h^attaⁿ^a^ssi^gⁿ^ed^to^a^p^a^r^a^{llel i}ⁿ^telli^g^eⁿ^c^e
ⁱⁿ^v^e^s^tⁱ^g^atioⁿ^of^U^s^a^m^{a B}ⁱⁿ^L^a^den^an^{d al Qaeda. W}^e^cou^l^{d not learn}^w^h^a^t^inf^o^r^m^a^tion^t^h^e^y
^h^a^{d g}^a^t^h^{ered. T}^h^{at w}^a^s^t^h^{e “}^w^all.”
^T^h^e^U^S^A^P^A^T^R^I^O^T^A^c^t^b^r^o^ught^d^o^wⁿ^t^h^e^“^w^a^l^l^”^se^p^a^r^a^tⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^t^e^l^lⁱ^ge^nc^e^o^f^fi^c^e^r^s^fr^o^m
^la^w^eⁿ^f^o^rce^m^{ent ag}^eⁿ^ts^{. . ..}
^S^ectⁱ^oⁿ^{218 of}^t^h^{e U}^S^A^P^A^T^R^IO^{T A}^c^t^elⁱ^mⁱⁿ^a^t^{ed t}^h^{e “}^p^ri^m^a^ry^pu^r^p^o^s^e^”^r^e^q^uⁱ^r^em^en^t^.^.
^..
^T^h^e^D^e^p^a^r^t^m^eⁿ^t^ha^s^m^o^ve^d^a^g^gr^e^ssi^ve^l^y^t^oⁱ^m^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t^se^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^s²¹⁸^an^d⁵⁰⁴^of^t^h^e^U^S^A
^PA^T^R^IO^T^A^c^t^an^{d bri}ⁿ^g^do^wⁿ^“t^h^e^w^a^l^l^.”
^T^h^es^{e ef}^f^o^rts^{to in}^creas^{e coordin}^a^tion^aⁿ^{d inf}^o^r^m^atioⁿ^s^h^arin^g^b^e^tw^e^eⁿⁱⁿ^t^e^l^lⁱ^g^eⁿ^c^e^an^d
^l^a^w^eⁿ^f^o^rce^m^en^t^offⁱ^cers^,^w^hⁱ^c^h^w^e^re^m^a^{de pos}^sⁱ^bl^{e by}^t^h^{e U}^S^A^PA^T^R^IO^T^A^c^t^,^h^a^v^e
^yⁱ^el^{ded ex}^t^r^aordiⁿ^ar^y^di^vⁱ^de^nds^b^y^eⁿ^ablⁱⁿ^g^t^h^e^D^e^part^m^eⁿ^t^t^o^{open num}^erou^{s cri}^mⁱⁿ^al
ⁱⁿ^v^e^s^tⁱ^g^atⁱ^oⁿ^s^{, di}^s^r^u^p^t^t^e^rrori^s^t^pl^ot^s^,^briⁿ^g^num^erou^{s cri}^mⁱⁿ^al^c^h^arg^e^s^,^aⁿ^{d conv}ⁱ^c^t
ⁿ^u^m^e^rousⁱⁿ^di^vⁱ^du^al^sⁱⁿ^t^e^rrorⁱ^s^m^ca^s^e^s^.
Examples:
• The removal of the “wall” separating intelligence and law enforcement personnel
played a critical role in the Department’s successful dismantling of a Portland,
Oregon terror cell, popularly known as the “Portland Seven.” Members of this
terror cell had attempted to travel to Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002 to take up
arms with the Taliban and al Qaeda against United States and coalition forces
fighting there. . .. [A]t least one member of the cell [Battle] had contemplated
attacking Jewish schools or synagogues and had even cased such buildings to
select a target for such an attack. By the time investigators received this
information from the undercover informant, they had suspected that a number of
other persons . . . had been involved in the Afghanistan conspiracy. But while
several of these other individuals had returned to the United States from their

unsuccessful attempts to reach Afghanistan, investigators did not yet have
sufficient evidence to arrest them.
^Bef^o^{re t}^h^{e U}^S^A^P^A^T^R^IO^T^A^c^t^,^pros^ecu^t^o^rs^w^o^u^l^{d h}^a^v^e^f^a^c^e^{d a di}^l^e^m^m^aⁱⁿ^deci^di^ng
^w^h^et^h^e^r^to^ar^r^e^{st B}^a^ttleⁱ^m^m^e^dⁱ^atel^y^.^I^f^p^r^o^s^ecu^to^r^s^h^a^d^f^a^ile^d^to^{act, liv}^e^s^co^u^l^d^h^a^v^e^b^een
^lo^{st t}^h^r^o^u^g^h^a^d^o^m^e^st^{ic ter}^r^o^r^{ist attac}^k^{. B}^u^{t i}^f^p^r^o^s^ecu^to^r^s^h^a^d^ar^r^e^sted^B^a^{ttle in}^o^r^d^e^r^to
^prev^en^{t a poten}^{tial attack}^{, t}^h^{e oth}^e^{r s}^u^s^p^ect^sⁱⁿ^t^h^{e inv}^e^s^tⁱ^g^a^tion^w^o^u^l^{d h}^a^v^e^un^dou^btedl^y
^s^{cattered or attem}^p^{ted to cov}^e^r^u^p^th^{eir cri}^m^es^{. Becau}^s^e^of^s^e^ction^s^{218 an}^{d 50}^{4 .}^{. .}^{it w}^a^s
^clear^th^{at th}^{e FB}^I^ag^eⁿ^{ts co}^u^l^d^coⁿ^d^u^c^{t FI}^S^A^s^u^r^v^eillaⁿ^{ce o}^f^B^a^{ttle to}^d^e^{tect w}^h^et^h^e^r^h^e^h^a^d
^receiv^e^{d orders}^f^r^o^m^aⁿⁱⁿ^ternation^a^{l terroris}^t^g^r^ou^p^{to reins}^t^{ate th}^e^do^m^e^s^{tic at}^{tack plan on}
^J^e^wⁱ^s^h^tar^g^ets^aⁿ^{d k}^{eep pros}^ecu^torsⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^{ed as}^to^w^h^at^t^h^e^y^w^e^{re lear}ⁿⁱⁿ^g^.^T^hⁱ^s^g^a^v^e
^p^r^o^s^ecu^to^r^s^th^{e co}ⁿ^f^id^en^{ce n}^o^t^to^ar^r^e^{st B}^a^ttle^p^r^em^at^u^r^el^y^wh^{ile th}^e^y^coⁿ^tⁱⁿ^u^e^d^to^g^a^th^er
^ev^iden^ce^on^t^h^e^oth^e^r^m^e^m^b^ers^{o t}^h^{e cell.}^Ulti^m^a^tel^y^{, pr}^os^ecu^tors^w^e^re^{able to collec}^t
^s^u^ff^icieⁿ^t^ev^ideⁿ^{ce to ch}^arg^e^s^e^v^eⁿ^def^eⁿ^d^an^t^s^an^{d th}^eⁿ^{to s}^ecu^{re conv}^ictions^an^{d pris}^on
^s^eⁿ^t^eⁿ^ces^rang^ing^f^r^o^m^th^ree^{to eig}^h^teen^y^ears^f^o^{r t}^h^{e s}ⁱ^x^d^e^f^eⁿ^d^aⁿ^ts^tak^eⁿⁱⁿ^{to c}^u^s^t^od^y^.
^Cha^r^ge^{s a}^g^aⁱⁿ^s^t^t^h^e^se^ve^nt^{h d}^e^fe^nd^aⁿ^t^w^e^r^e^dⁱ^s^mⁱ^sse^d^a^f^t^e^r^he^w^a^{s ki}^l^l^e^dⁱⁿ^P^a^ki^st^aⁿ^b^y
^Pakⁱ^s^t^ani^t^r^oops^{. .}^..^Wi^t^h^ou^t^s^e^ctⁱ^oⁿ^s^{218 an}^{d 50}^{4 of}^t^h^{e U}^S^A^PA^T^R^IO^T^A^c^t^,^h^o^w^e^v^e^{r, t}^hⁱ^s
^cas^{e li}^k^e^w^o^u^l^d^h^a^v^e^{been re}^f^e^{rred to as}^th^e^“^P^o^r^tlan^d^Oⁿ^{e” r}^a^th^er^t^h^aⁿ^t^h^e^“^P^o^r^tlan^d
^Se^ve^n.^”
• The Department shared information pursuant to sections 218 and 504 before
indicting Sami Al-Arian and several co-conspirators on charges related to their
involvement with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). PIJ is alleged to be one the
world’s most violent terrorist outfits. . ..
^In^t^hⁱ^s^ca^s^e^{, s}^e^c^tⁱ^ons^{218 an}^d^{504 . . . en}^abl^e^{d pros}^ecu^t^o^{rs t}^o^con^sⁱ^d^{er al}^l^evi^d^en^ce
^ag^ains^t^A^l^-A^riaⁿ^an^{d h}ⁱ^s^co-^c^oⁿ^s^p^irators^,ⁱⁿ^cl^u^d^ing^ev^ideⁿ^{ce obtain}^e^{d pu}^rs^u^aⁿ^t^t^o^F^I^S^A^th^a^t
^provⁱ^d^{ed t}^h^{e n}^eces^s^a^r^y^f^act^u^a^l^s^u^pport^f^o^{r t}^h^{e cri}^mⁱⁿ^a^l^cas^{e. By}^consⁱ^d^eriⁿ^g^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^t^e^l^lⁱ^g^eⁿ^c^e
^aⁿ^d^l^a^w^eⁿ^fo^r^c^e^m^eⁿ^tⁱⁿ^fo^r^m^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^ge^t^h^{er, pros}^ecu^tors^w^e^{re a}^b^{le to create}^{a com}^p^{lete h}ⁱ^s^t^or^y
^f^o^{r th}^{e cas}^{e a}ⁿ^{d pu}^{t each}^piece^of^ev^iden^{ce i}ⁿ^its^{proper con}^t^ex^{t. . .}
• Prosecutors and investigators also used information shared pursuant to sections

218 and 504 . . . in investigating the defendant in the so-called “Virginia Jihad”

case . . .
• The information sharing between intelligence and law enforcement personnel
made possible by sections 218 and 504 . . . was useful in the investigation of two
Yemeni citizens . . . who were charged last year with conspiring to provide
material support to al Qaeda and HAMAS. . .
• The Department used sections 218 and 504 to gain access to intelligence, which
facilitated the indictment of Enaam Arnaout, the Executive Director of the
Illinois-based Benevolence International Foundation(BIF). . . Arnaout ultimately
pleaded guilty to a racketeering charge, admitting that he diverted thousands of
dollars from BIF to support Islamic military groups in Bosnia and Chechnya. He
was sentenced to over 11 years in prison.
• The broader information sharing and coordination made possible by sections 218
and 504 . . . assisted the prosecution in San Diego of several persons involved in
an al Qaeda drugs-for-weapons plot, which culminated in several guilty pleas.
Two defendants admitted that they conspired to distribute approximately five
metric tons of hashish and 600 kilograms of heroin originating in Pakistan to
undercover United States law enforcement officials. Additionally, they admitted

that they conspired to receive, as partial payment for the drugs, four “Stinger”
anti-aircraft missiles that they then intended to sell to the Taliban. . .
• Sections 218 and 504 were critical in the successful prosecution of Khaled Abdel
Latif Dumeisi, who was convicted . . . of illegally acting as an agent of the
former government of Iraq. . . During this investigation, intelligence officers
conducting surveillance of Dumeisi pursuant to FISA coordinated and shared
information with law enforcement agents and prosecutors investigating Dumeisi
for possible violations of criminal law. Because of this coordination, law
enforcement agents and prosecutors learned from intelligence officers of an
incriminating telephone conversation that took place in April 2003 between
Dumeisi and a co-conspirator. This phone conversation corroborated other
evidence that Dumeisi was acting as an agent of the Iraqi government and
provided a compelling piece of evidence at Dumeisi’s trial. Report, at 2-8.
The absence of the wall has stimulated concerns that the cooperation between law enforcement
and intelligence officials creates the risk that coordination could be used to evade the restricting
safeguards the law imposed upon each.
The FISA appellate court found no Fourth Amendment infirmity in section 218:
^Ev^en^wⁱ^t^h^ou^t^takⁱ^ngⁱⁿ^{to acco}^uⁿ^t^t^h^{e P}^r^es^id^en^t^’^s^inh^e^ren^t^c^oⁿ^s^tit^u^tioⁿ^a^{l a}^u^th^orit^y^to
^coⁿ^d^u^c^t^w^a^r^r^aⁿ^tle^ss^f^o^r^e^igⁿⁱⁿ^telli^g^eⁿ^{ce su}^r^v^eillaⁿ^ce,^{we th}ⁱⁿ^k^t^h^{e p}^r^o^ced^u^r^{es an}^d
^go^ve^rⁿ^me^nt^s^h^o^wⁱⁿ^gs^r^e^q^uⁱ^r^e^d^und^e^r^FI^S^A^,ⁱ^f^t^h^e^y^d^o^no^t^m^e^e^t^t^h^e^miⁿⁱ^mu^m^Fo^ur^t^h
^Am^eⁿ^d^m^eⁿ^t^w^a^rran^t^s^t^aⁿ^dards^,^certain^l^y^co^m^e^clos^e.^W^e^{, th}^e^r^ef^{ore, believ}^e^fⁱ^r^m^l^y^{. .}^{. t}^h^at
^FIS^A^as^a^m^en^{ded [b}^y^s^ectioⁿ^{218] is}^con^s^titu^tioⁿ^a^{l becau}^s^e^th^{e s}^u^rv^ei^llan^c^e^s^{it a}^u^th^orizes
^{are reas}^on^able.^{In r}^e^Se^al^{ed C}^a^s^e^{, 310 F}^.^{3d 7}^17,⁷⁴⁶^(F^.I.S^.^C^t^.^R^e^v^.^2002).
Yet “commentators have reached differing conclusions regarding the In re Sealed Case court’s
Fourth Amendment holding. The court’s Fourth Amendment analysis has been criticized for
‘resting on shaky and previously unexplored ground’ and reach[ing] the wrong conclusion under ⁷⁰
Fourth Amendment principles and precedent.”
By virtue of section 218 FISA surveillance or physical search applications need only certify that
foreign intelligence gathering is a “significant” purpose for seeking the order rather than “the”
purpose, 50 U.S.C. 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B).
• The section makes it clear that a “wall” between FBI criminal and intelligence
investigators is unnecessary.

⁷⁰^The^U^S^{A PAT}^RI^O^T^Ac^t:^Vⁱ^ol^atiⁿ^{g Re}^as^oⁿ^a^b^le^Ex^pe^c^t^atio^ns^o^f^Prⁱ^v^ac^y^Pr^ote^c^t^e^d^by^t^h^e^Fo^ur^th^Am^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t W}^ith^ou^t
^Adv^ancⁱ^{ng N}^a^ti^on^al^Se^c^u^r^ity^{, 8}²^N^ORT^H^C^AR^O^L^I^N^A^L^AW^R^EV^I^E^W^412,⁴²^{5 (}²⁰⁰³⁾^{, q}^uot^ing^,^F^o^re^ign^Inte^lligeⁿ^c^e
^Surv^e^illa^nc^e^Court^of^Re^vⁱ^e^w^Hol^d^{s th}^{at Pr}^ose^c^u^{tors M}^a^y^S^p^y^oⁿ^A^m^e^r^ic^{an Age}ⁿ^{ts of}^Fore^ig^{n P}^o^we^{rs W}^ithou^{t a}
^W^a^r^r^ant—I^{n r}^e^Se^a^l^e^d^C^a^s^e^,³¹⁰^F.3d⁷¹⁷⁽^F^.I.^S^.Ct.Re^v^.²⁰⁰²^),¹¹^{6 H}^AR^V^A^R^D^L^AW^R^EV^I^E^W²²⁴⁶^{, 2}²⁵⁰⁽²⁰⁰³⁾^{, a}ⁿ^d
^c^iting^,^W^h^ite^he^a^d^&^A^d^eⁿ^{, a}^t¹¹⁰¹^-1^04.^Se^e^als^o^{, Le}^av^ing^FIS^A^Be^hin^d^{: T}^h^e^Ne^e^d^to^Re^turⁿ^to^W^a^rrantle^{ss F}^o^re^ign
^Inte^lligeⁿ^c^e^Surv^e^illa^nc^e^,¹¹^{3 Y}^A^LE^L^AW^J^OURN^A^L^{179, 1}^{99 (}²⁰⁰³⁾⁽^“^sw^e^e^p^ing^opinⁱ^oⁿ^tha^t^c^ontr^a^dic^t^e^d^lo^ng^s^t^a^ndi^ng
^inte^rpre^ta^tio^{ns of}^FISA^acro^{ss t}^h^{e ci}^rcuⁱ^t^s^”);^The^{Fuss Ov}^e^r^Two^S^m^{all W}^o^rds:^Th^e^Unc^onstit^uti^oⁿ^a^lity^of^the^USA
^{PATRIOT Ac}^t^Ame^ndmeⁿ^ts^to^FI^SA^Uⁿ^de^r^the^F^our^t^h^Am^eⁿ^dm^eⁿ^t^,^{71 G}^EO^R^G^E^W^AS^HI^NG^T^ON^L^AW^R^EV^I^E^W^291,³⁴⁵
⁽²⁰^03)(“^the^Re^vⁱ^e^w^{Court f}^a^{r f}^r^o^m^re^so^lv^e^d^the^issue^of^w^h^e^t^he^{r F}^I^SA^{is c}^onstituti^ona^l^u^nde^{r t}^h^e^Fo^{urth A}^m^eⁿ^d^m^eⁿ^t
^a^{nd its}^hol^di^ng^re^m^a^{ins v}^u^lne^r^a^b^l^e^{to c}^o^lla^te^ra^{l a}^tta^c^k^{in t}^h^e^f^e^de^ra^{l c}^ourts”⁾^.

• Section 504 (50 U.S.C. 1806(k); 1825(k))(law enforcement cooperation does not
preclude purpose certification) which does not expire may be sufficient to
prevent reconstruction of the wall.
• In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (F.I.S.Ct.Rev. 2002) suggests that even prior to
the USA PATRIOT Act the wall was neither constitutionally nor statutorily
required.
• Facially, FISA procedure for issuance of a surveillance order seems more
demanding than Title III (law enforcement wiretaps) but more accommodating
after issuance.
• Use of FISA has increased dramatically over the years; Title III seems to be
seldom used in terrorism cases (mostly used in drug trafficking cases).
• The existence of the wall is like trying to do one jigsaw puzzle on two separate
tables.
• The wall prevented effective communication and cooperation in terrorism cases;
removal has been beneficial.
• The wall was designed to guarantee that law enforcement and intelligence officer
would honor the limitations placed upon their respective wiretapping and search
warrant authority.
Section 223 is discussed above.
Federal wiretap law immunizes those who assist in the execution of a law enforcement
interception order, 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(a), FISA supplies a similar immunity for those who assist in
the execution of a FISA pen register or trap and trace device order, 50 U.S.C. 1842(f). On its face,
section 225 seems to grant immunity to anyone who complies with a FISA order—surveillance
(wiretap), physical search, pen register/trap and trace device, or access to tangible items—that is, ⁷¹
providing a grant of immunity for compliance with an order under the entire Act. It may be,
however, the immunity is only available for compliance with a FISA surveillance order; hence,
the reference to a FISA wiretap in the caption, and the subsection’s placement in 50 U.S.C. 1805
which relates to the issuance of FISA wiretap orders and which empowers the court to order a
“common carrier, landlord, custodian, or other specified person” to furnish “all information,
facilities, or technical assistance” for execution of a surveillance order.

⁷¹^{50 U}^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁰⁵⁽^h⁾⁽^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^a^d^d^e^d)⁽^“^N^o^c^a^u^s^e^of^a^c^{tion s}^h^a^l^l^lieⁱⁿ^aⁿ^y^c^our^{t a}^g^aⁱ^ns^{t a}ⁿ^y^pr^ov^ide^r^of^a^wⁱ^r^e^or
^e^l^e^c^t^r^onic^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion s}^e^r^v^ic^e^,^la^nd^lor^d^{, c}^u^s^t^odiaⁿ^,^or^ot^he^r^pe^r^s^{on (}ⁱ^nc^lu^ding^aⁿ^y^of^fⁱ^c^e^r^{, em}^ploy^e^e^,^a^g^eⁿ^{t, or}^othe^r
^sp^ecifⁱ^ed^p^e^rsoⁿ^th^ereo^f⁾^th^{at f}^u^rⁿ^ish^e^{s an}^yⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^,^f^{acilities, o}^r^techⁿⁱ^{cal assistan}^{ce in}^acco^rd^an^ce^w^ith^{a co}^u^r^t
^o^r^d^e^{r or req}^u^e^st^f^o^{r em}^ergen^c^{y as}^si^st^an^ce^unde^r^t^h^is^Ac^t^”).

Section 225 came late to the legislative process. It cannot be found in the Administration request,
Hearings, at 67-90, or in S. 1501 as passed by the Senate, 147 Cong. Rec. S10604-630 (daily ed.
October 11, 2001), or in H.R. 2975 as passed by the House, 147 Cong. Rec. H6726-758 (daily ed.
October 12, 2001). It first appears at the eleventh hour in H.R. 3162, 147 Cong. Rec. H7166
(daily ed. October 23, 2001). The section-by-section analysis that accompanied consideration of
the bill simply states, “Provides immunity from civil liability from subscribers, tenants, etc. for
entities that comply with FISA wiretap orders,” 147 Cong. Rec. H7198 (daily ed. October 23,

2001).

Except for assistance provided with respect to investigations begun beforehand, section 225
immunity disappears on March 10, 2006. As with the expiring “cause of action”clauses of section
223, the expiring “no cause of action” clauses of section 225, may be subject to a number of
interpretations. If the sunset exception in section 224(b) does no more than continue pending
investigations in place, then it is no more likely to preserve a grant of immunity than to grant a
cause of action. Conversely, both a cause of action and immunity from liability arising out of an
investigation might be thought to survive because they can be characterized as matters “[w]ith
respect to any particular foreign intelligence investigation” or “with respect to any particular
offense or potential offense” began or occurring before March 10, 2006.
In the absence of an explicit enforcement device, explicit immunity provisions encourage
communications providers and other third parties to cooperate in the execution of a FISA order.
On the other hand, immunity from civil liability removes one of the principal incentives for a
third party addressed in a FISA order to petition the court to quash or modify the order.
Justice Department officials have argued that the assistance of providers can be critical to the
timely execution of an order; that comparable immunity has long existed for assistance in the
execution of a court ordered law enforcement wiretap; and that the authority has been effectively ⁷²
used at least once by an FBI field office in an espionage investigation.
Critics might question why recourse to a FISA wiretap order was necessary when law
enforcement wiretap orders—which afford immunity to assisting communications providers—are
available for espionage investigations, 18 U.S.C. 2516.
Section 225 establishes immunity for assistance in the execution of a FISA surveillance order, and
perhaps for compliance with any FISA order, 50 U.S.C. 1805(h).
• It encourages cooperation and discourages court challenges.

⁷²^H^ous^e^H^e^arⁱⁿ^gs^,^st^at^em^en^t^o^f^M^a^r^y^Bet^h^Bu^ch^an^an^,^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^es^A^t^t^o^rn^ey^f^o^{r t}^h^{e W}^e^st^ern^Di^st^ri^ct^o^f^P^eⁿⁿ^s^y^l^vanⁱ^a,
^a^v^a^ila^ble^{on J}^u^ne²⁸^,²⁰^{05 a}^t^htt^p^://ju^dic^a^r^y^.^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^m^e^dia^/^pdf^s^/^buc^ha^naⁿ⁰⁴²⁶⁰^5.p^d^f^.

As noted at the outset, section 6006 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, P.L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3742 (2004), (a) amends the definition of “agent of a foreign
power” for FISA purposes to include a foreign national who is preparing for or engaging in
international terrorism, and (b) makes the sunset provisions of section 224 applicable to the ⁷³
amendment. FISA makes agents of a foreign power the appropriate targets for FISA surveillance
and physical search orders, 18 U.S.C. 1805, 1824. The definition of agents of a foreign power
already included individuals preparing for or engaging in international terrorism for or on behalf
of a foreign power, 50 U.S.C. 1801(b)(2)(C). Section 6001 excuses the need to show that the
illicit activity is being conducted at the behest or benefit of a foreign power—as long as the target
is not an American (not a U.S. person).
The language of section 6001 is identical to that of section 1 of S. 113, as passed by the Senate, ⁷⁴
149 Cong. Rec. S5899 (daily ed. May 8, 2003); S.Rept. 108-40 (2003). On the House side, the
Judiciary Committee report on H.R. 10 had recommended a comparable provision in the form of
a presumption, H.Rept. 108-724, Pt. 5, at 34,170-1 (2004). Similar legislative proposals had been ^th
considered during the 107 Congress, see e.g., S. 2586 and S. 2659, Amendments to the Foreign ^th
Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107
Cong., 2d Sess. (2002).
The Senate report explains the rationale for the section as it appeared in S. 113:
^T^h^e^p^u^r^p^o^s^e^o^f^S.¹¹³ⁱ^s^t^o^a^m^eⁿ^d^t^h^e^Fo^r^eⁱ^g^{n I}ⁿ^t^e^l^lⁱ^ge^nc^e^Su^rv^ei^l^l^an^{ce A}^c^t^of¹⁹⁷⁸^(F^IS^A⁾^.
^{. . to}^p^e^r^mⁱ^t^su^r^v^eillaⁿ^{ce o}^f^so^-^called^“^l^oⁿ^e^w^o^l^f^{” f}^o^r^e^igⁿ^ter^r^o^r^{ists. S. 1}¹³^w^o^u^l^d^allo^w^a
^F^I^SA^w^a^rran^t^t^oⁱ^s^su^e^u^pon^probabl^{e cau}^s^e^t^h^at^aⁿ^oⁿ^-^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es pers}^onⁱ^s^eⁿ^g^a^g^e^{d i}ⁿ^or
^p^r^ep^arⁱⁿ^g^f^o^rⁱⁿ^terⁿ^atioⁿ^a^l^ter^r^o^rⁱ^s^m^,^wⁱ^t^h^o^u^t^r^e^q^uⁱ^rⁱⁿ^g^a^s^p^e^cⁱ^a^l^s^h^o^wⁱⁿ^g^th^a^t^t^h^eⁿ^oⁿ^-^Unⁱ^t^e^d
^{States p}^e^r^s^oⁿ^also^{is a}^f^f^iliated^wⁱ^t^h^{a f}^o^r^e^igⁿ^p^o^w^e^r^.^B^y^eli^mⁱⁿ^atiⁿ^g^t^h^{e r}^e^q^u^ir^e^m^eⁿ^{t o}^f^a
^f^o^rei^gⁿ^-^po^w^e^{r l}ⁱ^nk^f^o^{r F}^I^SA^w^a^rran^t^sⁱⁿ^su^{ch cas}^e^s^{, S}^.¹¹³^w^o^u^l^{d al}^l^o^w^U^.^S^.ⁱⁿ^t^e^l^lⁱ^g^eⁿ^c^e
^ag^en^cie^s^to^m^oⁿ^ito^r^f^o^r^e^igⁿ^ter^r^o^r^ists^w^h^o^,^th^o^u^g^hⁿ^o^{t af}^f^iliat^e^d^wⁱ^t^h^a^g^r^o^u^p^o^r^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^,
^pos^{e a s}^e^ri^ou^s^t^h^reat^t^o^t^h^{e pe}^opl^{e of}^t^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^e^s^{. In}^lⁱ^g^h^t^of^t^h^e^sⁱ^gnⁱ^fⁱ^c^aⁿ^t^ri^sk^of
^dev^a^s^t^atiⁿ^g^attac^k^s^th^at^can^{be carried ou}^{t by}ⁿ^oⁿ^-^Unⁱ^t^{ed States}^pers^on^s^act^ing^aloⁿ^e,
ⁱⁿ^di^vⁱ^d^u^al^t^e^rrori^s^t^s^m^u^s^t^{be m}^oⁿⁱ^t^o^{red an}^d^s^t^{opped, reg}^a^rd^l^e^s^s^o^f^w^h^e^t^h^e^{r t}^h^e^y^operat^eⁱⁿ
^coordiⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^wⁱ^t^h^ot^h^e^{r i}ⁿ^di^vi^du^al^s^{or org}^aⁿⁱ^zatⁱ^oⁿ^s^{,” S}^.^R^e^p^t^{. 108-}^{40 at}^2.

⁷³^Se^c^tion⁶⁰⁰¹^pr^ov^ide^s^{, “}⁽^a⁾^{In G}^e^ne^ra^l.—Se^c^tion¹⁰^1(b)⁽¹⁾^of^the^Fore^ig^{n In}^te^llig^eⁿ^c^e^Surv^e^illa^nc^e^A^c^{t o}^f¹⁹⁷^{8 (5}⁰
^U^.^S.C^.¹⁸⁰¹⁽^b)⁽¹⁾⁾^is^a^m^e^nde^{d by}^a^ddi^ng^a^t^the^eⁿ^{d t}^h^e^f^o^llowⁱ^ngⁿ^e^w^s^ubpa^r^a^g^r^a^{ph: ‘}⁽^C⁾^eⁿ^g^a^g^e^s^{in inte}^rⁿ^a^tⁱ^ona^l
^te^rrorism^{or a}^c^tiv^itie^{s in pre}^p^a^r^a^tⁱ^{on t}^h^e^r^e^f^ore^;^{or’. (}^b^{) S}^unse^t^.—T^h^e^a^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t m}^a^de^b^y^subse^c^tion^(a^{) sha}^{ll be}
^s^ubje^c^t^to^the^s^uns^e^t^pr^ov^is^io^{n i}ⁿ^s^e^c^{tion 2}²⁴^of^P^.^L^.¹^07-^{56 (}¹¹⁵^S^t^a^t^{. 2}⁹⁵⁾^,^inc^l^udi^ng^the^e^x^c^e^p^tioⁿ^pr^ov^ide^dⁱⁿ
^su^b^s^ectⁱ^o^{n (}^b⁾^o^f^su^ch^sectⁱ^o^{n 22}^4.^”
^FISA^d^e^fⁱⁿ^e^{s in}^tern^atioⁿ^a^l^terro^ri^s^m^to^m^ean^“acti^v^{ities th}^at—(1⁾ⁱⁿ^v^o^lv^{e v}ⁱ^o^l^en^{t acts o}^r^acts^d^aⁿ^g^ero^u^s^t^o^h^u^m^aⁿ^lif^e
^t^h^at^{are a vi}^o^l^atⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^{e cri}^mⁱⁿ^al^l^a^w^s^o^f^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es o}^r^o^f^an^y^S^t^at^e,^o^r^t^h^at^w^o^u^l^{d b}^e^{a cri}^mⁱⁿ^al^vi^o^l^atⁱ^o^{n i}^f
^c^o^m^m^itte^d^w^{ithin t}^h^e^juris^d^ic^tioⁿ^of^the^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{or a}ⁿ^y^Sta^t^e^;^{(2) a}^ppe^a^r^t^o^be^inte^nde^d—(A^{) to}^intim^ida^t^e^or
^c^o^e^r^c^e^a^cⁱ^v^ilia^{n pop}^ula^tⁱ^{on; (B)}^t^o^inf^l^ue^nc^e^t^h^e^p^o^lic^y^of^a^g^ove^rnm^e^{nt by}^intim^ida^tion^{or c}^o^e^r^cⁱ^oⁿ^;^{or (C) t}^o^a^f^f^e^c^t
^the^c^oⁿ^duc^t^of^a^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt by}^as^s^a^s^sⁱ^na^{tion or}^kⁱ^dna^ping^{; a}ⁿ^{d (}³⁾^oc^c^u^r^t^o^ta^lly^outsⁱ^de^t^h^e^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, or}^tr^aⁿ^s^c^eⁿ^d
ⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^bo^un^d^a^ri^{es i}ⁿ^t^e^rm^{s o}^f^t^h^{e mean}^{s b}^y^w^hⁱ^c^h^t^h^ey^ar^{e acco}^mp^lⁱ^s^h^e^d,^t^h^e^p^e^rsoⁿ^s^t^h^ey^ap^p^{ear i}ⁿ^t^eⁿ^d^e^d^t^o^co^erce
^o^rⁱⁿ^tⁱ^mⁱ^d^at^e,^o^r^t^h^{e l}^o^cal^{e i}ⁿ^w^hⁱ^c^h^t^h^ei^r^p^e^rp^et^rat^o^rs^o^p^e^rat^e^o^r^{seek as}^y^l^u^m^,^”⁵⁰^U.^S^.^C.¹⁸⁰¹⁽^c)^.
⁷⁴^Se^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^S²²⁰¹^1,^Iⁿ^t^e^l^lⁱ^g^en^{ce R}^e^f^o^{rm an}^{d T}^e^rro^ri^{sm P}^r^even^tⁱ^oⁿ^A^c^t^o^f²⁰⁰⁴^{: “}^L^on^{e Wo}^l^f^”^A^m^en^d^m^en^t^t^o
^the^Fore^ig^{n I}ⁿ^te^lli^ge^nc^e^Surv^e^ill^aⁿ^c^e^Ac^t.

Section 6001 explicitly embraces the sunset exception found in section 224(b). Thus, the
amendment in section 6001 continues to apply after March 10, 2006 with respect to any particular
foreign intelligence investigation begun prior to that date.
At first blush, there might be some question of whether a provision, that declares that agents of a
foreign power need not be agents of a foreign power, is sufficient to come within Keith case ⁷⁵
reservations concerning the fourth amendment’s application in terrorism cases. The multi-
national definition of “international terrorism” and the limitation of the section’s amendment to
foreign nationals may suffice, but the question seems to have troubled some, but not all, of the ^th⁷⁶
witnesses who testified regarding similar legislation in the 107 Congress. Some Members of
the Senate Judiciary Committee also suggested that section’s rationale might have to be ⁷⁷
reenforced if it is to be reauthorized.
Section 6001 amends the FISA definition of “agent of a foreign power” to include a foreign
national who is preparing for or engaging in international terrorism thereby excusing the need to
show that the illicit activity is being conducted at the behest or benefit of a foreign power—as
long as the target is not an American (not a U.S. person).
• Although Justice Department believes the section is constitutional, there might be
some question of whether defining an agent of a foreign power as one who need
not be an agent of foreign power comes within Keith reservations for agents of a
foreign power.

⁷⁵^“^W^e^ha^v^e^{not a}^ddre^sse^{d, a}ⁿ^{d e}^x^p^r^e^{ss no o}^pⁱⁿ^io^{n a}^s^to^{, the}^issue^s^whic^{h m}^a^y^be^inv^o^lv^e^d^w^{ith re}^spe^c^t^{to a}^c^tiv^itie^{s of}
^f^o^rei^gⁿ^p^o^w^{ers o}^r^t^h^ei^{r agen}^t^s^,^”^Uⁿ^ite^d^State^s^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^Dⁱ^s^t^rⁱ^c^t^C^our^t^,⁴⁰⁷^U^.^{S. 29}^{7, 32}^1-²²⁽¹⁹⁷²⁾^.
⁷⁶^{S. 25}^{86 an}^d ^S.²⁶^59,^Am^e^ndm^eⁿ^t^s^{to t}^h^e^For^e^ig^{n I}ⁿ^te^lli^ge^nc^e^Sur^v^e^illanc^e^Ac^t:^H^e^arⁱ^ng^Be^for^e^the^Se^nate^Se^le^c^t
^{Comm. o}ⁿ^In^te^lligeⁿ^c^e^{, 10}⁷^th^C^oⁿ^g^{., 2d}^Se^s^s^.⁽²⁰⁰²⁾^,^c^o^m^par^e^,^st^at^e^m^en^t^o^f^M^r^.^James^A^.^Baker,^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^es
^De^pa^rtm^e^{nt of}^Justic^e^Couⁿ^se^{l f}^o^{r Inte}^llig^eⁿ^c^e^P^o^lⁱ^c^y^{, a}^t^{24 (“}^T^h^e^De^pa^rtm^e^{nt ha}^{s c}^onc^l^ude^d^tha^t ^S^.²⁵⁸⁶^is
^c^onstitu^tio^na^l”^{), w}^{ith, sta}^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^{Mr. Je}^rr^y^Be^r^m^aⁿ^{, Ex}^e^c^u^tiv^e^Dire^c^t^{or of}^the^Ce^nte^r^f^o^{r De}^m^o^c^r^a^c^y^a^nd
^T^e^c^hnolog^y^,^a^t^{41 (}^“^B^o^th^[^S^.²⁵⁸⁶^aⁿ^d ^S.²⁶⁵⁹^{] c}^r^e^a^t^e^g^r^ounds^f^o^r^s^e^rious^c^o^ns^titu^tio^na^{l c}^h^a^lle^ng^e^s^by^def^e^nda^ntsⁱⁿ
^cri^mⁱⁿ^al^cas^{es i}^fⁱⁿ^f^o^rmatⁱ^oⁿ^co^l^l^ect^ed^uⁿ^d^e^{r t}^h^{ese w}^a^rran^t^{s are u}^s^ed^{as evi}^d^en^{ce i}ⁿ^cri^mⁱⁿ^al^p^r^o^s^ecu^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^”). ^S.Re^p^t^.
¹⁰⁸^-4^{0 a}^t⁹⁸^-1⁰²^re^priⁿ^{ts a}^m^o^re^e^x^te^nsiv^e^e^x^plaⁿ^a^tion^of^the^Justi^c^e^De^pa^rt^m^e^{nt’s v}ⁱ^e^w^of^the^c^onstituti^ona^lity^of ^S.
²⁵⁸^6.
⁷⁷^S.R^e^pt.¹^08-^{40 a}^t¹¹^-²⁽^a^d^d^iti^ona^{l v}ⁱ^e^w^s^of^Se^ns^{. L}^e^a^h^y^a^{nd Fe}^ing^o^{ld (}^“^Iⁿ^m^aⁿ^y^w^a^y^s^, ^{S. 11}^{3 s}^e^e^m^s^{to be}^a
^l^e^gi^sl^atⁱ^v^{e ch}^an^{ge i}ⁿ^search^o^f^{a r}^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^e^.^Fⁱ^rst^,^w^e^were^{told t}^h^a^t^t^h^{is a}^m^eⁿ^d^m^eⁿ^{t to FI}^SA^w^ould^ha^v^e^a^llow^e^{d the}^FBI
^t^o^ob^t^aⁱⁿ^{a w}^a^rran^t^b^e^f^o^{re 9}^-¹¹^t^o^search^t^h^{e co}^m^p^u^t^{er an}^{d b}^e^l^oⁿ^gⁱⁿ^{gs o}^f^Z^acari^a^{s M}^o^u^ssao^uⁱ^.^T^h^en,^af^t^e^{r i}^t^b^eca^m^e
^cl^{ear .}^.^.^t^h^at^t^h^e^F^B^{I h}^a^d^al^l^t^h^{e e}^vⁱ^d^en^{ce i}^tⁿ^eed^ed^t^o^p^r^o^c^u^r^{e su}^{ch a w}^a^rran^t^.^.^.^t^h^{e rat}ⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^e^ch^an^ged^.^Next^,^w^e^w^e^r^e
^to^ld^th^at^th^{e b}^{ill w}^a^{s n}^ecessar^y^to^coⁿ^d^u^c^{t su}^rv^eillan^{ce o}^f^‘loⁿ^{e w}^o^lf^terro^{rists,’ w}^h^o^p^u^r^p^o^r^te^d^l^y^o^p^e^{rate in}^iso^l^ati^oⁿ^.
^Ne^x^t^{, a}^f^te^{r it be}^c^a^m^e^c^l^e^a^r^tha^t^fe^w^,^if^aⁿ^y^,^inte^rna^tⁱ^ona^{l te}^rr^orists^w^o^rk^a^l^one^a^{nd t}^h^a^t^e^x^isting^c^r^im^ina^l^to^{ols suc}^h^a^s
^T^itle^{III we}^re^su^ff^ic^ieⁿ^t^to^h^aⁿ^d^le^th^o^s^e^ra^re^c^a^s^e^s^{, we}^we^re^to^ld^th^a^t^th^e^m^e^a^s^u^r^e^w^a^{s n}^e^c^e^ssa^r^y^b^e^c^a^u^se^{it w}^a^{s h}^a^rd^to
^pr^ov^e^the^c^o^nne^c^tⁱ^on^be^tw^e^eⁿ^te^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^t^s^.^N^o^w^,ⁱⁿ^this^r^e^por^t^,^the^im^plic^a^tio^{n is re}^vⁱ^v^e^{d tha}^t^t^h^e^FBI’s^pre^-^9/^{11 f}^a^ilure^s
^w^e^r^e^dueⁱⁿ^la^rg^e^pa^{rt to}^pro^b^le^m^s^w^{ith the}^la^w^.^{. .. It a}^pp^ears,^ho^w^e^ver,^t^h^at^t^h^{e search}^f^o^{r a rat}ⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^e^t^o^sup^p^o^r^t^t^hⁱ^s
^bill—aⁿ^{d o}ⁿ^e^t^h^a^t^c^aⁿ^be^put^f^o^{rth w}^ithou^{t m}^e^aⁿ^ing^f^{ul ov}^e^r^sig^h^{t of}^FISA^’s^a^c^t^ua^{l im}^ple^m^eⁿ^ta^tion—c^onti^nue^{s in}^f^u^ll
^f^o^rc^e^.^W^h^eⁿ^the^sunse^t^oⁿ^t^h^{is m}^e^a^s^ure^a^rriv^e^s^w^e^w^{ill ne}^e^d^strong^e^r^ra^tiona^le^{s t}^h^aⁿ^t^h^is^t^o^j^u^stify^{its e}^x^te^nsion”^).

Subsection 224(a) cites several sections and subsections of Title II that are not subject to its
declaration of sunset. They are:
• section 203(a)(authority to share grand jury information) (permitting the
disclosure of matters occurring before a federal grand jury—that involve foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence or foreign intelligence information—to federal
law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or
national security officials), F.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(D);
• section 203(c)(procedures) (directing the Attorney General to establish
procedures for the disclosures authorized in section 203(a)[grand jury matters]
and 203(b)[relating to similar disclosure of information secured through the
execution of a court order authorizing the interception of wire, oral or electronic
communications for law enforcement purposes] that identify a “United States
person”), 18 U.S.C. 2517 note;
• section 205 (employment of translators by the Federal Bureau of Investigation)
(authorizing the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to expedite the hiring of
translators to support counterterrorism investigations and operations), 28 U.S.C.

532 note;

• section 208 (designation of judges) (authorizing the expansion of the FISA court
from 7 to 11 judges and insisting that at least 3 of the judges reside within 20
miles of the District of Columbia), 50 U.S.C. 1803;
• section 210 (scope of subpoenas for records of electronic communications)
(expands the authority for subpoenas directing communications service providers
to disclose customer-identifying information to include information concerning
customer payment sources (e.g., credit card or bank account), 18 U.S.C. 2703;
• section 211 (clarification of scope) (makes it clear that when cable companies
provide Internet or other communications services they are subject to the same
law enforcement access procedures that apply to other communications service
providers and not to the cable provider procedures that require customer
notification when law enforcement access is to be afforded), 47 U.S.C. 551;
• section 213 (authority for delaying notice of the execution of a warrant)
(authorizes sneak and peek warrants, i.e., warrants that call for delayed
notification of their execution for a reasonable period if notification would have
adverse consequences and that only permit the seizure of tangible property when
reasonably necessary), 18 U.S.C. 3103a(b);
• section 216 (modification of authorities relating to the use of pen registers and
trap and trace devices) ((1) modifies the pen register/trap and trace device
procedure—the procedure for court orders authorizing law enforcement
installation and use of pen registers or trap and trace devices (essentially
surreptitious caller id devices that identify only the source and destination of
telephone calls)—to apply to electronic communications (e.g., e-mail addresses
and Internet URL’s); and (2) permits execution of the orders anywhere within the
United States, rather than only in the judicial district in which the order is
issued), 18 U.S.C. 3121, 3123;

• section 219 (single-jurisdiction search warrants for terrorism) (amends the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to permit magistrates in terrorism cases to
issue search and arrest warrants to be executed outside of the judicial district in
which they are sitting), F.R.Crim.P. 41(b)(3);
• section 221 (trade sanctions) (makes it clear that the Trade Sanctions Reform and
Export Enhancement Act does not limit the application of criminal and civil
sanctions available for violation of various anti-terrorism provisions), 22 U.S.C.
7210; and
• section 222 (assistance to law enforcement agencies) (confirms that those who
help law enforcement authorities execute an order approving the installation and
use of trap and trace devices or pen registers are entitled to reasonable
reimbursement and that nothing in the act is intended to impose technical
obligations or requirements upon them), 18 U.S.C. 3124 note.
Table 1. Expiring USA PATRIOT Act Sections and Subsections
^{Section Description}^Observation
²⁰¹⁽¹⁸^U.S.C.^{Adds to the wiretap p}^{redicate off}^{ense list: 18}^{P.L. 107-1}^{97, §30}^{1(a), 116}^{Stat. 7}^{28 (2}⁰⁰^{2) adds}
²⁵¹^6(1)(q))^U.S.C^{. 229 (che}^{mical weapons), 2}³³²^{(crimes of}^{new crimes (}^{18 U.S.C. 2332}^{f (bo}^{mbing p}^ublic
^{violence against Americans overs}^{eas), 233}^2a^{places), 233}^{9C (finan}^{cing ter}^{rorism)) to the}
^{(weapons of mass dest}^{ruction), 2}³³²^b^expiring^{portion of the wireta}^{p p}^{redicate list,}
^{(multinational terrorism), 2332d}^(financial^{18 U.S.C. 2516(}^1)(q)
^{transactions with te}^{rrorist cou}^nt^{ries), 233}^9A
^(supporting^{terrorists), 23}^{39B (s}^upporting
^{terrorist organizations)}
²⁰²⁽¹⁸^U.S.C.^{Adds to the wiretap p}^{redicate off}^{ense list: 18}^{What does “potential offense” m}^{ean for t}^his
²⁵¹^6(1)(c))^U.S.C^{. 1030 (com}^puter^fra^{ud & a}^buse)^{and other sections of t}^{he act?}^{A s}^uspected
^{crime? Or cond}^{uct t}^{hat may}^{blossom into a}
^{crime? (E.g., computer tre}^spass^b^{efore 12/}^31/⁰⁵
^{for pu}^{rposes lau}^nching^{a denial of service attack}
^thereafte^{r?) Or}^both?
²⁰³⁽^b)(18^{Authorizes disclosure of foreign i}^ntelligence,^{Disclosure to law enforcement o}^{fficials is}
^U.S.C^{. 2517(}⁶⁾⁾^{counterintelligence, and foreign i}^ntelligence^{authorized under a}^pe^rmane^{nt s}^u^{bsection, 18}
^{information -gathered th}^{ru a Title III cou}^rt^U.S.C^{. 2517(}^{1); P.L. 107-2}^{96, §8}⁹^{6, 11}^{6 Stat.}
^{ordered wiretap- to law enforce}^ment,²²⁵^{7 (2}⁰⁰^{2) pe}^rmane^{ntly aut}^{horizes disclosure}
^{intelligence, protective, immigrati}^{on, national}^{to foreign law enforceme}^{nt officials, and in}
^{defense, and na}^{tional security offi}^cials^{cases of count}^{erintelligence, inter}^national
^{terrorism, or clandestine intelligence to federal,}
^{state, and/or foreign officials, 18}^U.S.C^{. 2517}
^{(7), (8)}
^203(d)(5⁰^Other^{provisions of law notwiths}^tanding,^{P.L. 107-2}^{96, §89}^{7(a), 116}^{Stat. 2}²⁵⁷⁽²⁰^02),
^U.S.C^{. 403-5d)}^{authorizes disclosure of foreign i}^ntelligence,^{amends the}^tempora^{ry p}^{rovisions of §203(d) to}
^{counterintelligence, and foreign i}^ntelligence^{permit disclosure whe}^{n consiste}ⁿ^t^{with the}
^{information -gathered in a c}^{riminal investigation}^{needs to protect so}^{urces a}^{nd me}^{thods and}
^{- to law enforcement, intelligence, protective,}^{sensitive law enforceme}^{nt inform}^{ation; the}
^{immigration, national defense, and national}^{amendment e}^xpire^{s with its host}
^{security officials}
²⁰⁴⁽¹⁸^U.S.C.^{Makes it clear that}^{the ge}^{neral pe}^{n register/tra}^p^{Amendment seems pur}^ely^tech^nical

²⁵¹^1(2)(f))^{& trace device p}^{roscriptions do n}^{ot bar foreign}
^{intelligence gathering involving foreign}
^{communications system}^s.

^{Section Description}^Observation
²⁰⁶⁽⁵⁰^U.S.C.^{Authorizes directives in FISA sur}^veillance^Permanent^{law elsewhere a}^uthor^{izes FISA}
¹⁸⁰^5(c)(2)(B))^{orders commanding th}^{e assistanc}^{e of individuals}^{surveillance orders with t}^{he desc}^{ription (if}
^{not specifically identified in the order (where}^{identity unknow}^{n) of the ta}^{rget a}^{nd without}
^{the target}^{has take}^{n ste}^{ps to p}^r^e^{vent the}^{specifying t}^{he targeted}^{place or fa}^cilit^{ies (if}
^{identification of specific individual}^s)(“roving^unk^{nown), 50 U.S.C. 180}^{5(c) (1)}^{(A), (B}^{); the}
^{surveillance”)}^{target must}^{be identified if the}^{place or facilities}
^{are not in t}^{he law enforce}^ment^s^{ection, 18}
^U.S.C^{. 2518(}^{4), (11)}
²⁰⁷⁽⁵⁰^U.S.C.^Exte^{nds the}^{permissible du}^ration^{of FISA}^{The expiring}^{section also tempor}^{arily extends}
¹⁸⁰^5(e),^{surveillance and}^{physical searc}^{h o}^{rders directed}^{the gene}^{ral maximum}^{duration of}^{FISA physical}
¹⁸²^4(d))^{against agents of a}^{foreign power}^{to 120 days}^{search orders}^from^{45 to}^{90 days}
^{and permits e}^xten^{sions at interva}^{ls of up to one}
^{year (up}^from^{90 days (s}^{urveillance) & 45}^days
^{(searches) for}^{both original orders and}
^extensions)
²⁰⁹⁽¹⁸^U.S.C.^{Makes it clear that}^{the law e}^nforc^{ement acces}^s^{At least one court}^{had held that}^{seizure of}
²⁷⁰^9,^{to voice mail requires only a sear}^{ch warra}^nt^{voice mail required a Title III cou}^{rt order,}^U.S.
²⁵¹^0(1),(14))^{v. Smith}^{, 155 F.3d}¹⁰^{51 (9}^th^{Cir. 1}^{998); e}^xce^pt
^{while being sent, e-mail can}^{be se}^{ized pursua}^nt
^{to a search wa}^rrant,^{18 U.S.C. 27}⁰³
²¹²⁽¹⁸^U.S.C.^{Permits communications ser}^vice^{providers to}^{P.L. 107-2}^{96, §22}^{5(d), 116 Stat. 2}¹⁵⁷⁽²⁰⁰²⁾
²⁷⁰^{2, 2}⁷⁰³⁾^{disclose either customer records}^{or the}^{repeals the}^emerge^{ncy cont}^{ent di}^sclosure
^{content of c}^{ustomer comm}^unicat^{ions in an}^{provision and replaces it with}^br^oader,
^emergency^{situation involving the}^immediate^perma^nent^{provision, 18 U.S.C. 2702(}^b)(7);
^{danger of serious}^{bodily injury}^emergency^{record disclosure aut}^{hority expires}
^{on 12/}^31/⁰⁵
²¹⁴⁽⁵⁰^U.S.C.^{Permits the u}^{se of FISA pe}^{n regis}^{ter/trap &}^{The expiring}^{section also declares, with respect}
¹⁸⁴^{2, 1}⁸⁴³⁾^{trace device orders with}^respec^t^{to electronic}^{to FISA pen register/t}^{rap &}^trace^{device orders}
^{communications (e-mail address, URL}^{or the us}^{e of su}^{ch devices in FIS}^{A emergenc}^y
^{identification but not conte}^{nt) u}ⁿ^{der procedur}^e^{situations, that U.S. persons may}^{not be}^st
^{previous limited to wire commun}^ications^{targeted based solely on their}¹^Amendment
^{(telephone n}^umb^{er of sou}^{rce and}^addressee);^{protected activities}
^{eliminates the req}^uireme^{nt that t}^he
^{communication either}^{be t}^{hat of}^{terrorists or}
^{spies or related to their criminal}^activities
²¹⁵⁽⁵⁰^U.S.C.^{Authorizes FISA court orders}^for^{FBI access to}^Language^{revived u}^{pon s}^{unset of}^§215
¹⁸⁶^{1, 1}⁸⁶²⁾^{tangible items in investigations to protect}^{authorizes FISA court orders i}ⁿ^f^oreign
^{against terrorism or s}^{pying (or p}^{er P.L. 107-}^{intelligence information or terror}^ist
^{108, §3}^{14(a)(6), 15}^{Stat. 14}^{02 (2}⁰^{01) to obtain}^{investigations for FBI access to b}^usiness
^{foreign intelligence information n}^{ot concerning}^{records relating to pu}^{blic trans}^portation,
^{a U.S. person)}^lodg^{ing, vehicle rental, or storage rental u}^pon
^{an assertion of t}^{he p}^resen^{ce of s}^{pecific and}
^{articulable facts giving reaso}^{n to}^{believe that}
^{the records}^{related to a foreign p}^{ower or agent}
^{of foreign power; P.L. 10}^8-17^{7, §374,}¹¹^{7 Stat.}
²⁶²^{8 (2}⁰⁰^{3) ex}^{pands t}^{he Right to}^Financial
^{Privacy Act’s national security let}^{ter provision}
^{to allow access - in terrorism or spy}
^{investigations - to business}^recor^{ds held by}
^{banks, credit card com}^{panies, car}^{dealers, real}
^{estate agencies, stock b}^{rokers, jewelers,}
^{casinos and certain ot}^her^busines^{s that may}^be
^{party to large cas}^{h tra}^nsactions,^{12 U.S.C. 3414}

^{Section Description}^Observation
²¹⁷⁽¹⁸^U.S.C.^{Authorizes the inte}^{rception of co}^mmunications^{Does the su}^{nset e}^{xception for a}^{“potential”}
²⁵¹^1(2)(i),^{to and from a tres}^passe^{r within a}^protected^{crime apply to a}^{uthority u}^{nder §}²¹⁷^with
²⁵¹⁰⁽²¹⁾⁾^computer^{respect to t}^respas^{s before}^b^{ut a}^{communication}
^{after 1}^2/3^1/0^{5 relating to a denial of service}
^{attack after s}^uns^et?
²¹⁸⁽⁵⁰^U.S.C.^{Permits FISA surveillance or sear}^{ch orders}^{In re Sealed Case}^{, 310 F.3d 7}^{17 (F.I.S.Ct}^.Rev.
¹⁸⁰^4(a)(7)(B),^{based on a ce}^{rtification that foreign intelligence}²⁰⁰^{2); the}^{Justice De}^{pt. study cit}^{ed there; and}
¹⁸²^3(a)(7)(B))^gathering^{provides a “significant”}^{reason for}^perma^{nent FISA ame}^ndment^{s in t}^{he USA}
^{seeking the order; ea}^{rlier languag}^{e (revived at}^{PATRIOT Act (50 U.S.C. 1806(k)}^{, 182}^5(k))
^sunset)^refer^{red to “the” rea}^son^{and was one}^{suggest t}^{hat pe}^rha^{ps the}^{earlier intelligence/law}
^{basis for the}^{early conclusion t}^h^a^t^FISA^enforceme^{nt wall of separation w}^{ill/need not be}
^{investigations and any r}^{elated criminal}^reconstr^{ucted after}¹^2/31/⁰⁵
^{investigation should be seq}^ue^{ntial rather}^thaⁿ
^cooperative
²²⁰⁽¹⁸^U.S.C.^{Authorizes service a}^nywhe^{re in t}^{he world of a}^{Section 219, whic}^{h does not s}^uns^{et, allows}
²⁷⁰^{3, 3}¹²⁷⁾^{court order gra}^{nting law en}^force^{ment acces}^{s to}^{federal magistrates in inter}^nation^{al and}
^{the conte}^{nt of voice mail and e-mail}^{domestic terrorism cases to issu}^{e search}^or
^{communications (and/or related}^{records) held}^{arrest war}^{rants t}^{hat may}^{be e}^xec^uted
^{by service}^{providers ; p}^{rior to §220 s}^uch^anywhe^{re in t}^{he world, F.R}^.Crim.^{P. 41(b)(3)}
^{orders had to be iss}^{ued in the}^pla^{ce where}^they
^{were to be e}^xecut^ed
²²³⁽¹⁸^U.S.C.^{Creates a cau}^{se of action against}^{the U.S. for}^{There hav}^{e bee}^{n no administrativ}^{e or judicial}
²⁵²^0(f),(g),^{willful vio}^lati^{ons of Title III (18 U.S.C. ch.119)}^{cases filed; the Attorney}^Gen^{eral has}
²⁷⁰^7(d),(g),^{or of FISA; makes it clear that t}^h^e^improper^{recommended that}^{the se}^{ction b}^e^made
²⁷¹²⁾^{disclosure of information gathere}^{d in a court-}^perma^nent
^{ordered wiretaps, or use of a}^pe^{n register or}
^{trap & t}^{race device, or access to}^{wire or}
^{electronic communications (e.g., e-mail, vo}^ice
^{mail) is unlawful; confirms the}^aut^{hority of}
^agency^{heads to take disciplinary}^{action based}
^{on willful/intentional privacy viola}^tions
²²⁵⁽⁵⁰^U.S.C.^{Provides immunity for those w}^{ho aid in the}^Civil^liabil^{ity for FISA viol}^{ations under}
¹⁸⁰^5(h)^{execution of FISA s}^{urveillance or}^{search orde}^r^perma^nent^{provisions is predicat}^{ed upon}
^{or in the}^performa^{nce of a}ⁿ^eme^{rgency FISA}^{intentional, unaut}^{horized violat}^io^{n of FISA (50}
^{wiretap or searc}^h^U.S.C^{. 1810, 1}⁸⁰^{9, 1}⁸²^{8, 18}²⁷⁾
^C^h^arle^s^Do^y^l^e
^Senⁱ^o^r^Sp^{ecialist i}ⁿ^Am^er^icaⁿ^P^u^b^{lic L}^a^w
^cdoy^l^e^@^c^rs^.l^oc.g^o^v^{, 7-}⁶⁹⁶⁸