Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List

CRS Report for Congress
Cuba and the State Sponsors
of Terrorism List
Updated August 22, 2006
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List
Summary
Cuba was first added to the State Department’s list of states sponsoring
international terrorism in 1982, pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration
Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72). At the time, numerous U.S. government reports and
statements under the Reagan Administration alleged Cuba’s ties to international
terrorism and its support for terrorist groups in Latin America. Cuba had a history
of supporting revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and
Africa, but in 1992 Fidel Castro stressed that his country’s support for insurgents
abroad was a thing of the past. Cuba’s policy change was in large part a result of
Cuba’s diminishing resources following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the loss
of billions of dollars in annual subsidies to Cuba.
Cuba remains on the State Department’s terrorism list with four other countries:
Iran, Syria, Sudan, and North Korea. According to the State Department’s Country
Reports on Terrorism 2005 (issued in April 2006), Cuba has “actively continued to
oppose the U.S.-led Coalition prosecuting the global war on terror and has publicly
condemned various U.S. polices and actions.” The State Department report also
asserted that Cuba maintains close relationships with other state sponsors of terrorism
such as Iran and North Korea and contended that Cuba has provided safe haven for
members of several Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The report also maintained that
Cuba continues to provide safe haven to U.S. fugitives from justice but noted that
“Cuba has stated that it will no longer provide safe haven to new U.S. fugitives who
may enter Cuba.”
Cuba’s retention on the terrorism list has received more attention in recent years
in light of increased support for legislative initiatives to lift some U.S. sanctions
under the current economic embargo. Should U.S. restrictions be lifted, a variety of
trade and aid restrictions would remain in place because of Cuba’s retention on the
terrorism list. Supporters of keeping Cuba on the terrorism list argue that there is
ample evidence that Cuba supports terrorism. They point to the government’s history
of supporting terrorist acts and armed insurgencies in Latin America and Africa.
They stress the government’s continued hosting of members of foreign terrorist
organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice. Critics of retaining Cuba on the
terrorism list maintain that the policy is a holdover from the Cold War and that Cuba
no longer supports terrorism abroad. They argue that domestic political
considerations are responsible for keeping Cuba on the terrorism list and question
many of the allegations made in the State Department report.
For additional information on Cuba, see CRS Report RL32730, Cuba: Issues
for the 109^th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan. For further information on state-
sponsored terrorism and U.S. policy, see CRS Report RL33600, International
Terrorism: Threat, Policy, and Response, by Raphael Perl; and CRS Report
RL32417, The Department of State’s Patterns of Global Terrorism Report: Trends,
State Sponsors, and Related Issues, by Raphael Perl.

Contents
Sanctions Associated with the Terrorism List............................1
Removing a Country from the Terrorism List............................2
Cuba’s Initial Placement on the Terrorism List...........................3
Current Rationale for Retaining Cuba on the Terrorism List................5
Biological Weapons Issue...................................6
Arguments Supporting and Opposing Cuba’s Retention on the Terrorism List..8
Cuba’s Stance Against Terrorism ................................8
Harboring Members of Foreign Terrorist Organizations................9
Basque ETA Members......................................9
Colombian FARC and ELN Members.........................10
Harboring U.S. Fugitives from Justice.............................10
Comparison with Other Countries on the Terrorism List .............11

Cuba and the
State Sponsors of Terrorism List
Sanctions Associated with the Terrorism List
The “state sponsors of terrorism list” is mandated under Section 6(j) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2405(j)),
under which the Secretary of State makes a determination when a country “has
repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.” Cuba has remained
on the list since 1982, and at present there are four other countries on the list — Iran,
North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.
Under various provisions of law, certain trade benefits, most foreign aid, support
in the international financial institutions, and other benefits are restricted or denied
to countries named as state sponsors of international terrorism. Under the authority
of Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, validated licenses are required for
exports of virtually all items to countries on the terrorism list, except items specially
allowed by public law, such as informational materials, humanitarian assistance, and
food and medicine. Being listed as a sponsor of international terrorism also restricts
bilateral assistance in annual foreign assistance appropriations acts, as required most
recently in Section 527 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 2006 (P.L. 109-102). Section 502 of the Trade Act
of 1974 (P.L. 93-618; 19 U.S.C. 2462) makes a country ineligible for the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) if it is on the Section 6(j) terrorism list. Section 620A
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2371) also prohibits
assistance authorized under the act to the government of a country that “has
repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.” Likewise, Section 40
of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2780) prohibits the export
or other provision of munitions to a country if the government “has repeatedly¹
provided support for acts of international terrorism.”
Cuba’s retention on the terrorism list has received more attention in recent years
in light of increased support for legislative initiatives to lift some U.S. economic
sanctions under the current embargo. Should U.S. sanctions be removed, a variety of
trade and aid restrictions would nonetheless remain in place because of Cuba’s
retention on the terrorism list. At this juncture, however, sanctions have not been

¹ Both Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act and Section 40 of the Arms Export
Control Act have provisions similar to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act in
which the Secretary of State may publish a determination that a country is supporting
international terrorism. However, the only published determinations by the Secretary of
State have been those under Section6(j) and constitute what is known as the “state sponsors
of terrorism list.”

removed and Cuba remains subject to a comprehensive U.S. trade and financial
embargo (pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act and the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961).
In addition to the terrorism list sanctions imposed by the Export Administration
Act, Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2781)
prohibits the sale or export of defense articles and defense services if the President
determines and certifies to Congress, by May 15 of each year, that the country “is not
cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts.” This list has been issued
annually since 1997, and currently includes Cuba, as well as Iran, North Korea,
Syria, and Venezuela.²
Removing a Country from the Terrorism List
Under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, a country’s retention on
the terrorism list may be rescinded in two ways. The first option is for the President
to submit a report to Congress certifying that 1) there has been a fundamental change
in the leadership and policies of the government of the country concerned; 2) the
government is not supporting acts of international terrorism; and 3) the government
has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the
future. The second option is for the President to submit a report to Congress, at least
45 days before the proposed recision will take effect, justifying the recision and
certifying that 1) the government concerned has not provided any support for
international terrorism during the preceding six-month period; and 2) the government
has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the
future.
Over the years, three countries have been removed from the terrorism list.
South Yemen was removed in 1990 when it ceased to exist upon merging with North
Yemen. Iraq was removed from the list in 1982 and again in 2004 (after having been
added back in 1990). Libya was removed in May 2006.
Although Section 6(j) does not set forth a procedure for Congress to block the
President’s removal of a country from the terrorism list, Congress could pass
legislation on its own to block the removal. In contrast, Section 40 of the Arms
Export Control Act, which prohibits the export of munitions to governments
repeatedly providing support for international terrorism, sets forth a specific
procedure for Congress to consider a joint resolution to block the President’s removal
of a country from the terrorism list. In addition, both Section 40 of the Arms Export
Control Act and Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (which
prohibits most assistance to countries supporting international terrorism) provide
presidential waiver authority for national security interests or humanitarian reasons.

² U.S. Department of State. “Determination and Certification under Section 40A of the Arms
Export Control Act,” Public Notice 5411 (May 8, 2006), Federal Register, Vol. 71, No. 96,
p. 28897, May 18, 2006.

Cuba’s Initial Placement on the Terrorism List
Effective March 1, 1982, the Reagan Administration added Cuba to the list of
state sponsors of terrorism pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act
of 1979. Press reports at the time indicated that the Commerce Department notified
Congress on February 26, 1982, that Cuba was being added to the list of countries
that sponsor international terrorism, but that no explanation for the addition was³
given. The Commerce Department published an interim rule in the Federal Register
on April 19, 1982, stating that it was amending the export control regulations, with
an effective date of March 1, 1982, to add a statement that “Cuba has been designated
by the Secretary of State as a country that has repeatedly provided support for acts of⁴
international terrorism.” The addition of Cuba was not considered significant at the
time since the United States already had comprehensive economic sanctions on Cuba
dating back to the early 1960s; as a result, the economic sanctions associated with
being added to the terrorism list would have had no practical significance.
Although the Administration provided no explanation in the Federal Register
notice as to why Cuba was added to the terrorism list, various U.S. government
reports and statements under the Reagan Administration in 1981 and 1982 alleged
Cuba’s ties to international terrorism. In addition, a 1998 State Department
chronology on U.S.-Cuban relations and a 2003 State Department document provide
further explanation of why Cuba originally was designated a state sponsor of
terrorism.
^!The Central Intelligence Agency’s Patterns of International
Terrorism 1980, published in June 1981, stated: “Havana openly
advocates armed revolution as the only means for leftist forces to
gain power in Latin America, and the Cubans have played an
important role in facilitating the movement of men and weapons into
the region. Havana provides direct support in the form of training,
arms, safe havens, and advice to a wide variety of guerrilla groups.
Many of these groups engage in terrorist operations.”
^!In January 1982, President Reagan stated in his State of the Union
address: “Toward those who would export terrorism and subversion
in the Caribbean and elsewhere, especially Cuba and Libya, we will
act with firmness.”⁵
^!In February 1982, the Department of State published a research
paper on “Cuba’s Renewed Support for Violence in Latin America,”
originally presented in December 1981 to the Subcommittee on

³ R. Gregory Nokes, “U.S. Adds Cuba, Drops Iraq from Terrorism List,” Associated Press,
February 26, 1982; William Chapman and John M. Goshko, “U.S. Lifts Curbs on Certain
Sales to South Africa; U.S. Acts to Relax Embargoes on South Africa, Israel,” Washington
Post, February 27, 1982.
⁴ Federal Register, Vol. 47, No. 75, April 19, 1982, pp. 16623-16624.
⁵ Public Papers of the Presidents, 18 Weekly Com. Pres. Doc. 76. January 26, 1982.

Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, which detailed Cuba’s support for armed insurgencies
and terrorist activities in Latin America and the Caribbean.⁶ The
State Department asserted in the paper that Cuba has “encouraged
terrorism in the hope of provoking indiscriminate violence and
repression, in order to weaken government legitimacy and attract
new converts to armed struggle.” The paper maintained that Cuba
was most active in Central America, especially Nicaragua, where it
wanted to exploit and control the revolution, and El Salvador and
Guatemala, where it wanted to overthrow the governments.⁷ Cuba
also was reported “to provide advice, safe haven, communications,
training, and some financial support to several violent South
American organizations.” This included training Colombian M-19
guerrillas, with the objective of establishing a “people’s army.”⁸
^!The State Department’s Patterns of International Terrorism: 1982
stated that “both Cuba and the Soviet Union continue to provide
financial and logistical support and training to leftist forces in the
area [Central America] that conduct terrorist activity.” The report
further stated: “In its efforts to promote armed revolution by leftist
forces in Latin America, Cuba supports organizations and groups
that use terrorism to undermine existing regimes. In cooperation
with the Soviets, the Cubans have facilitated the movement of
people and weapons into Central and South America and have
directly provided funding, training, arms, safe haven, and advice to
a wide variety of guerrilla groups, and individual terrorists.”
^!A 1998 State Department chronology of U.S.-Cuban relations from
1958 to 1998 notes that the United States added Cuba to the terrorist
list in 1982 because of its support for the M-19 guerrilla group in
Colombia.⁹ In January 1982, State Department officials asserted that
Cuba was involved in providing arms to the M-19 in exchange for

⁶ U.S. Department of State. Cuba’s Renewed Support for Violence in Latin America,”
Department of State Bulletin, February 1982, pp. 68-81.
⁷ Former U.S. diplomat Wayne Smith, who served as chief of the U.S. Interests Section in
Havana from 1979-1982, maintains that a Cuban official told him in December 1981 that
Cuba had halted all arms shipments to Central America, but that there was never any U.S.
response to this Cuban overture. Smith has been a critic of U.S. policy toward Latin
America for some years. See Anya K. Landau and Wayne S. Smith, “Cuba on the Terrorist
List: In Defense of the Nation or Domestic Political Calculation?” Center for International
Policy, November 2002, p. 3.
⁸ U.S. Department of State. Cuba’s Renewed Support for Violence in Latin America,”
Department of State Bulletin, February 1982, Ibid. p. 77.
⁹ “Chronology of U.S.-Cuban Relations, 1958-1998,” U.S. Department of State. Available
on the internet at [http://usembassy.state.gov/havana/wwwh0017.html].

facilitating U.S.-bound drug smuggling.¹⁰ M-19 was responsible for
hijacking a plane from Colombia in January 1982; the incident
ended when the hijackers were given safe passage to Cuba.¹¹
^!A 2003 State Department document broadened the explanation of
why Cuba was designated a state sponsor of terrorism in 1982.¹²
Reflecting the rationale set forth in the documents from 1981 and
1982 described above, the State Department maintains that Cuba
was added to the list because of its support for terrorist groups in
Latin America. It contends that Cuba was providing support for
terrorist organizations at the time, including the Puerto Rican
nationalist group known as the Armed Forces of National Liberation
(FALN), the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in
El Salvador, and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in
Nicaragua. It also asserts that “Cuba helped transship Soviet arms
to Nicaragua and El Salvador for use by terrorist organizations,
trained anti-American insurgents elsewhere in Latin America, and
supported insurgencies or war efforts in Angola and Ethiopia.”¹³
Current Rationale for Retaining Cuba
on the Terrorism List
According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2005¹⁴
report (issued in April 2006), Cuba has “actively continued to oppose the U.S.-led
Coalition prosecuting the global war on terror and has publicly condemned various
U.S. polices and actions.” The report also asserted that “Cuba did not undertake any
counterterrorism efforts in international and regional fora.”
The State Department report also noted that Cuba maintains close relationships
with other state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran and North Korea and asserted that
it has provided safe haven for members of several Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
The report maintained that Cuba provides safe haven to various Basque ETA
members from Spain and to members of two Colombian insurgent groups, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army
(ELN), although the report also maintained that there is no information concerning

¹⁰ George Gedda, “U.S. Claims Cuba Linked to Drug Smuggling Activities,” Associated
Press, January 27, 1982; Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas
Enders testified before Congress in March 1982, with the same allegations. See Jim
Anderson, U.S. Charges Cuba Using Drug Ring to Funnel Arms,” United Press
International. March 12, 1982.
¹¹ “Hijackers Release 74 Hostages; Fly to Cuba,” Associated Press, January 29, 1982
¹² U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Cuba
Policy,” July 30, 2003, [http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/22905pf.htm].
¹³ Ibid.
¹⁴ This report replaces the State Department’s annual Patterns of Global Terrorism report.

terrorist activities of these or other organizations in Cuba. The State Department’s
2002 and 2003 terrorism reports acknowledged that Colombia acquiesced to this
arrangement and that Colombia publicly said that it wanted Cuba’s continued
mediation with the ELN in Cuba.
The 2005 report also maintained that Cuba continues to permit U.S. fugitives
from justice to live legally in Cuba but noted that “Cuba has stated that it will no
longer provide safe haven to new U.S. fugitives who may enter Cuba.” The report
asserted that the U.S. government periodically requested Cuba to return wanted
fugitives to the United States but that Cuba continues to be non-responsive. (The
2004 terrorism report contended that more than 70 fugitives from U.S. justice were
in Cuba.) Many of the fugitives are accused of hijacking or committing violent
actions in the United States, including Joanne Chesimard, who is wanted for the
murder of a New Jersey State Trooper in 1973. Most of the of the fugitives entered
Cuba in the 1970s. The report also noted that Cuba publicly demanded return of five
of its agents convicted of espionage in the United States, the so-called “Cuban Five.”
The 2005 reported noted that Cuba demanded that the United States surrender
to Cuba Luis Posada Carriles, alleged to be responsible for a plot to assassinate Fidel
Castro in 2000 and for the 1976 bombing of a Cubana Airlines plane in 1976. In May

2005, Posada was arrested by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

and charged with entering the United States illegally. He remains at a federal
immigration facility in El Paso, Texas. A Department of Homeland Security press
release indicated that ICE does not generally deport people to Cuba or countries
believed to be acting on Cuba’s behalf.¹⁵ Posada had been imprisoned in Venezuela
for the bombing of the Cuban airliner but reportedly was allowed to “escape” from
prison in 1985 after his supporters paid a bribe to the prison warden.¹⁶ In November
2000, Posada had been imprisoned and ultimately convicted in Panama, along with
three Cuban Americans, for weapons charges in the plot to kill Fidel Castro. In
August 2004, however, then Panamanian President Mireya Moscoso pardoned
Posada along with the three U.S. citizens. (For more on the Posada case, see CRS
Report RL32488, Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy, by Mark P.
Sullivan.)
Biological Weapons Issue. Until the 2005 terrorism report, past State
Department annual reports on global terrorism did not mention controversial
allegations first made by some State Department officials in 2002 that Cuba has been
involved in developing biological weapons.¹⁷ The 2005 report, however, asserted
that while Cuba invests heavily in biotechnology, “there is some dispute about the
existence and extent of Cuba’s offensive biological weapons program.”

¹⁵ Department of Homeland Security, Office of Public Affairs, Statement, May 17, 2005.
¹⁶ Ann Louise Bardach, “Our Man’s in Miami. Patriot or Terrorist?,” Washington Post, Apr.

17, 2005.

¹⁷ For more, see CRS Report RL32730, Cuba: Issues for the 109^th Congress, by Mark P.
Sullivan.

The controversial allegations date back to May 2002, when then Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton stated that
“the United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological
warfare research-and-development effort” and “has provided dual-use technology to
other rogue states.” Bolton called on Cuba “to cease all BW-applicable cooperation
with rogue states and to fully comply with all of its obligations under the Biological
Weapons Convention.”¹⁸
When questioned on the issue, Secretary of State Powell maintained that Under
Secretary Bolton’s statement was not based on new information. Powell asserted that
the United States believes Cuba has the capacity and the capability to conduct
research on biological weapons but emphasized that the Administration had not
claimed that Cuba had such weapons. Some observers viewed Powell’s statement
as contradicting that of Under Secretary Bolton.¹⁹ In late June 2003, news reports
stated that an employee of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and
Research maintained that Under Secretary Bolton’s assertions about Cuba and
biological weapons were not supported by sufficient intelligence.²⁰
In March 30, 2004, congressional testimony before the House International
Relations Committee, Under Secretary of State John Bolton asserted that “Cuba
remains a terrorist and BW threat to the United States.” According to Bolton: “The
Bush Administration has said repeatedly that we are concerned that Cuba is
developing a limited biological weapons effort, and called on Fidel Castro to cease
his BW aspirations and support of terrorism.” Bolton went on to add a caveat,
however, that “existing intelligence reporting is problematic, and the Intelligence
Community’s ability to determine the scope, nature, and effectiveness of any Cuban
BW program has been hampered by reporting from sources of questionable access,
reliability, and motivation.”²¹ The New York Times reported on September 18, 2004,
that the Bush Administration, using more stringent intelligence standards, had
“concluded that it is no longer clear that Cuba has an active, offensive bio-weapons
program.”²²
An August 2005 State Department report to Congress indicated that while
observers agree that Cuba has the technical capability to pursue some aspects of

¹⁸ John R. Bolton, “Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass
Destruction,” The Heritage Foundation, Heritage Lectures, May 6, 2002.
¹⁹ David Gonzalez, “Carter and Powell Cast Doubt on Bioarms in Cuba,” New York Times,
May 14, 2002.
²⁰ James Risen and Douglas Jehl, “Expert Said to Tell Legislators He Was Pressed to Distort
Some Evidence,” New York Times, June 25, 2003.
²¹ House International Relations Committee, “The Bush Administration and
Nonproliferation: A New Strategy Emerges,” Hearing, March 30, 2004. Federal News
Service.
²² Steven R. Weisman, “In Stricter Study, U.S. Scales Back Claim on Cuba Arms,” New
York Times, September 18, 2004.

offensive biological warfare, there is disagreement over whether Cuba has an active
biological warfare effort now or even had one in the past.²³
Arguments Supporting and Opposing Cuba’s
Retention on the Terrorism List
In general, those who support keeping Cuba on the terrorism list argue that there
is ample evidence that Cuba supports terrorism. They point to the government’s
history of supporting terrorist acts and armed insurgencies in Latin America and
Africa. They point to the government’s continued hosting of members of foreign
terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice. Critics of retaining Cuba on
the terrorism list maintain that it is a holdover of the Cold War. They argue that
domestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list, and maintain that
Cuba’s presence on the list diverts U.S. attention from struggles against serious
terrorist threats.
Cuba’s Stance Against Terrorism
Those who concur with the Administration’s current rationale for keeping Cuba
on the state sponsor of terrorism list point to strong anti-American statements made
by Fidel Castro and other Cuban officials. Fidel Castro stated that the September 11,

2001 terrorist attacks in the United States were in part a consequence of the United²⁴

States having applied “terrorist methods” for years. Cuba’s subsequent statements
became increasingly hostile, with Cuba’s mission to the United Nations describing
the U.S. response to the U.S. attacks as “fascist and terrorist” and asserting that the
United States was using the attack as an excuse to establish “unrestricted tyranny²⁵
over all people on Earth.” Castro himself said that the U.S. government was run by
“extremists” and “hawks” whose response to the attack could result in an “infinite²⁶
killing of innocent people.”
Those who question Cuba’s retention on the terrorism list point out that Cuba
has ratified all 12 international counterterrorism conventions in.²⁷ They further point
to Cuba’s expression of sympathy and offer of support to the United States in the
aftermath of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks in 2001, including the
offer of medical and humanitarian assistance and the use of airspace and airports to

²³ “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament
Agreements and Commitments,” U.S. Department of State, August 2005.
²⁴ Andrew Cawthorne, “Cuba’s Castro Urges U.S. to Keep Calm,” Reuters, September 11,

2001.

²⁵ Kevin Sullivan, “Castro Warns About U.S. Military Plans,” Washington Post, September

23, 2001, p. A38.

²⁶ Ibid.
²⁷ Anya K. Landau and Wayne S. Smith, “Cuba on the Terrorist List: In Defense of the
Nation or Domestic Political Calculation?” Center for International Policy, November 2002,
p. 5.

receive planes headed to the United States.²⁸ (Cuba’s critics view these offers as
gratuitous.) Those questioning Cuba’s retention on the terrorism list also contend
that Cuba has made repeated offers to the United States since November 2001 for a
bilateral agreement to fight terrorism, but that the United States has not responded.²⁹
Some who question the Administration’s rationale for keeping Cuba on the terrorism
list, while acknowledging Cuba’s history of supporting revolutionary movements and
governments in Latin America and Africa point to several versions of the State
Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism report in the 1990s that stated that Cuba
no longer actively supported armed struggle in Latin America or other parts of the
world.
Harboring Members of Foreign Terrorist Organizations
In reference to the Administration’s allegations that Cuba hosts members of
foreign terrorist organizations, some observers maintain that this is line with Cuba’s
long-time hostility toward the United States and the remnants of its very active
involvement in supporting terrorist groups in the past. On the other side, some
observers maintain that Cuba has shed its past as a supporter of terrorist and
insurgent groups, and members of terrorist organizations who reside in Cuba do so
pursuant to agreements or the acquiescence of the home countries of the terrorist
organizations.
Basque ETA Members. Some observers maintain the presence of Basque
ETA members in Cuba stems from a 1984 agreement with the Spanish and
Panamanian governments.³⁰ Cuba asserts that the ETA members have never used
Cuban territory for terrorist activities against Spain or any other country and that the
issue is a bilateral matter between Cuba and Spain.³¹ On the other side, some
observers maintain that after the 1984 agreement, some 20 ETA members sought by
the Spanish authorities for killings in Spain were known to have found refuge and³²
support in Cuba. Moreover, the Spanish government requested the extradition of
an ETA suspect from Cuba in August 2003, and according to the State Department,³³

publicly requested Cuba to deny ETA members sanctuary in November 2003.
²⁸ Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations. “Declaration by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
Cuba has nothing to hide, and nothing to be ashamed of,” May 2, 2003.
²⁹ Ibid.
³⁰ Anya K. Landau and Wayne S. Smith, “Cuba on the Terrorist List: In Defense of the
Nation or Domestic Political Calculation?” Center for International Policy, November 2002.
³¹ Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations. “Declaration by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
Cuba has nothing to hide, and nothing to be ashamed of,” May 2, 2003. Available on the
internet at [http://www.iacenter.org/cuba_may303.htm]
³² Cuban American National Foundation, “Castro’s Cuba: Continuing Sponsor of
Terrorism,” October 2001.
³³ “Spain to Request Extradition of Suspected ETA Members from Mexico, Cuba,” Xinhua
General News Service, August 2, 2003.

Colombian FARC and ELN Members. With regard to Colombian guerrilla
group members in Cuba, the State Department annual reports on global terrorism for
2002 and 2003 acknowledged that Colombia acquiesced to the presence of
Colombian guerrillas in the country, and has publicly said that it wants Cuba’s
continued mediation with the ELN in Cuba. The Cuban government maintains that
it has been actively involved in hosting peace talks, and that its contributions to peace³⁴
talks have been acknowledged by Colombia and the United Nations. On the other
hand, some observers contend that Cuba’s role in supporting the terrorist activities
of the FARC was demonstrated by the arrest of three alleged Irish Republican Army
(IRA) operatives in Colombia in August 2001 — one of whom, Niall Connolly, had
lived in Havana as Sinn Fein’s representative since 1996. The three went into hiding
in June 2004 after they had been acquitted by a lower court on charges of training the
FARC in bombing techniques. In December 2004, however, they were subsequently
convicted of the charges by a Colombian appeals court in absentia and sentenced to
17 years in prison. Connolly, who has denied being an IRA member, maintains that
he was in Colombia to observe the conflict resolution process. The three announced
that they were back in Ireland in early August 2005, days after the IRA announced
that it was ending its armed campaign.³⁵
Harboring U.S. Fugitives from Justice
Supporters of keeping Cuba on the terrorist list point to the more than 70
fugitives from U.S. justice residing in Cuba. These include such fugitives as: Joanne
Chesimard, who was convicted for the killing of a New Jersey state trooper in 1973;
Charles Hill and Michael Finney, wanted for the killing of a state trooper in new
Mexico in 1971; Victor Manuel Gerena, member of a militant Puerto Rican separatist
group, wanted for carrying out the robbery of a Wells Fargo armored car in
Connecticut in 1983; and Guillermo Morales, another member of a Puerto Rican
militant group, who was convicted of illegal possession of firearms in New York in
the 1970s.
Those who oppose this rationale for keeping Cuba on the terrorist list argue that
this has nothing to do with terrorism and that many countries (e.g. Mexico and El³⁶
Salvador) harbor fugitives from U.S. justice, but are not on the terrorist list.
Moreover, they argue that Cuba has expressed interest in considering negotiation of
the mutual extradition of fugitives. For example, Cuba would like to see the
extradition of Orlando Bosch, a Miami resident, and Luis Posada Carriles. Both are
accused of responsibility for the bombing a Cuban airliner in 1976, while Posada, as
described above, was imprisoned in Panama for several years on weapons charges
in a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro. Opponents of this rationale also point out that

³⁴ Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations. “Declaration by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
Cuba has nothing to hide, and nothing to be ashamed of,” May 2, 2003.
³⁵ “Questions Remain on the Extradition Fight that Shook the Peace Process,” The Irish
Examiner, August 8, 2006.
³⁶ Mexico, for example, reportedly harbors hundreds of fugitives from justice. See Guy
Taylor, “Home a Safe Haven for Mexican Suspects; Death Penalty Halts Extradition for
U.S. Crimes,” Washington Times, January 9, 2004, p. A1.

Cuba has vowed not to allow new U.S. fugitives from justice to live in Cuba. Several
years ago it deported two fugitives from justice to the United States; U.S. drug
fugitive Jesse James Bell was deported in January 2002, and William Joseph Harris,
wanted on child abuse charges, was deported in December 2001.
Comparison with Other Countries on the Terrorism List
The level of terrorist activity by countries on the state sponsors of terrorism list
varies considerably. As noted above, in addition to Cuba, there are four other
countries on the list — Iran, Syria, Sudan, and North Korea. Iran is considered the
most active state sponsor of terrorism, while countries believed to be less active
supporters of terrorism include Sudan and Cuba.
Given this wide range of activity, some suggest that there should be a tiered
approach with sanctions calibrated to the degree of support for terrorism, while others
maintain that any level of support for terrorism is unacceptable and must be met with
strong sanctions. Some suggest that should there be more flexibility in the ability
to add and remove countries from the terrorism list in order to bring about behavioral
changes in the states that are involved in terrorist activities; others believe that there
is already sufficient flexibility in the legislative conditions set forth in the Export
Administration Act for the Administration to add and remove countries according to
their behavior.