Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Survey of Options

Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction:
A Survey of Options
Updated October 5, 2006
Sharon Squassoni
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction:
A Survey of Options
Summary
Increasingly, Congress and the Bush Administration are looking to utilize
nonproliferation assistance programs, including cooperative threat reduction, to help
reduce the risk of terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the
FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-136, Sec. 1308), Congress
authorized the Bush Administration to spend $50 million of unobligated funds from
the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program in states outside the former Soviet Union.
As of September 2006, the Administration had spent such funds only in Albania
($38.5 million) for the purpose of eliminating chemical weapons stockpiles. The
report of the 9/11 Commission called for continued support for threat reduction
assistance to keep WMD away from terrorist groups. This report, which will be
updated as needed, analyzes the range of possible applications of CTR funds, the
kinds of assistance that might be supplied, and describes legal, financial, technical,
and political constraints on possible assistance.
A key underlying issue is that the countries posing the greatest risks may be the
least amenable to cooperative approaches. A second issue is that there is an array of
U.S. domestic and international legal restrictions on the most useful kinds of
cooperation. Both the executive branch and Congress may need to consider domestic
and international legal and political restrictions on cooperation with states outside the
nonproliferation regimes, low levels of transparency exhibited by most of the
potential recipient states, and the lack of incentives for many of these states to pursue
threat reduction measures. In addition, Congress may wish to consider whether
potentially expanding the geographic scope of CTR may have a negative effect on
existing programs. One school of thought believes Russia, as the largest source of
stocks of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, should continue to be the main
focus of attention. Other observers believe there is now an opportunity to focus on
states within the nexus of terrorism and WMD.
This report complements CRS Report RL31957, Nonproliferation and Threat
Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union; CRS Report
RL31589, Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan; and CRS
Report RS21840, Expanding Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs:
Concepts and Definitions.

Contents
In troduction ......................................................1
Connecting CTR and WMD Terrorism............................2
Congressional Role............................................3
Background ......................................................4
The Threat: Nexus of WMD and Terrorism.............................5
State Sponsors of Terrorism......................................8
Cuba ....................................................8
Iran .....................................................8
Libya ...................................................9
North Korea.............................................10
Sudan ..................................................11
Syria ...................................................12
States with Terrorist Activity and WMD Programs...................12
How Significant Is the Nexus? ..................................13
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program as Precedent.....................14
Kinds of Assistance...............................................16
Weapons Security............................................16
Site Security.................................................17
Material Security.............................................18
Personnel Security............................................19
Tailoring Assistance to Countries....................................19
Tier I: North Korea and Iran....................................20
Tier II: Cuba, Sudan, and Syria..................................21
Tier III: States with WMD Capabilities and Terrorist Activities
on their Soil.............................................23
Constraints on Assistance..........................................25
Political Constraints...........................................25
Technical Constraints..........................................27
Legal Constraints: Treaty Obligations.............................28
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)........................29
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).......................30
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).......................30
Legal Constraints: Nonproliferation and Anti-Terrorism Laws..........30
Nonproliferation Laws.....................................35
Anti-terrorism Laws.......................................35
Nuclear Cooperation/Nuclear Weapons Cooperation.............36
Dual-Use Exports.........................................37
Costs and Benefits of Assistance.....................................39
Impact on Nonproliferation Regime..............................39

Sea Changes in Policy?........................................40
Recent Legislation............................................41
Costs .......................................................41
Certifications ................................................42
Other Considerations..........................................42
Appendix A......................................................44
List of Tables
Table 1. WMD Capabilities and Terrorism..............................7
Table 2. Priorities for Assistance to States within Terrorism-WMD Nexus....19
Table 3. Assistance to Tier I States...................................21
Table 4. Assistance to Tier II States...................................22
Table 5. Assistance to Tier III States..................................23
Table 6. Applicable Laws for Proliferation and Terrorism.................31

Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction:
A Survey of Options
Introduction
Nonproliferation assistance programs are a relatively new tool in combating the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.¹ The Cooperative Threat Reduction
(CTR) programs, funded by the Department of Defense (DOD), are the most visible
of these programs. Begun in 1991, CTR initially aimed to help Russia meet its²
START obligations to reduce strategic nuclear weapons. Within a decade, however,
CTR took on the goal of reducing the threat of terrorist access to weapons of mass³
destruction (WMD). Experts realized that Russia needed to protect its Cold War
overhang of WMD materials, scientists, and equipment from those who might exploit
insider opportunities and who had incentives (particularly financial) to sell WMD
technology to anyone. Now, however, many analysts support expanding cooperative
threat reduction programs beyond Russia to other geographic areas. The Bush
Administration stated in early 2003 that it had “expanded the strategic focus of the⁴
CTR program” to support the war on terrorism.
In the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-136, Sec. 1308),
Congress authorized the Bush Administration to spend $50 million of unobligated
funds from the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program in states outside the former
Soviet Union. As of September 2006, the Administration had spent $38.5 million in⁵
Albania for the purpose of eliminating chemical weapons stockpiles. The report of
the 9/11 Commission called for continued support for threat reduction assistance to
keep WMD away from terrorist groups.
This report surveys options for applying CTR programs to states that pose a
WMD and terrorism threat. It describes potential recipients of such funding (those
states with WMD programs and terrorism problems); the kinds of assistance that may
be possible; potential legal, political, and technical constraints on assistance; and
potential costs and benefits to the United States of providing such assistance. The

¹ This report was updated with the assistance of Jill Marie Parilla, research associate.
² See CRS Report RL31957, Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S.
Programs in the Former Soviet Union, by Amy Woolf, for a comprehensive review.
³ “WMD” in this paper includes nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and excludes
the missiles that can delivery such weapons, and radiological weapons.
⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates, February

2003. p. 1.

⁵ Personal communication on September 14, 2006, with official in Cooperative Threat
Reduction Policy Office, OUSD/Policy.

report begins with a brief review of why CTR programs might be considered
applicable to the threat of WMD terrorism and then takes a more detailed look at the
threat of WMD terrorism. It reviews how certain kinds of CTR assistance might help
defuse the threat and presents some options tailored for specific countries. The report
also looks at constraints involved in providing assistance and broader implications
of such assistance.
Connecting CTR and WMD Terrorism
The belief that terrorists were growing more interested in WMD grew after the
2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, despite no obvious link, and continued to
grow as U.S. policy statements drew further linkages. In his January 2002 State of
the Union Address, President Bush highlighted Iraq, Iran and North Korea as “axis
of evil” states — those that support terrorism and also have WMD. Later that year,
both the National Security Strategy and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons
of Mass Destruction Proliferation highlighted the connection between terrorists and
WMD. In 2003, the U.S. went to war with Iraq, justifying this action primarily on
the grounds that Iraq had WMD and a connection to terrorists associated with 9/11.
More recently, the exposure of the A.Q. Khan nuclear network in Pakistan, which
provided sensitive nuclear weapons technology (including a bomb design) to Libya,
Iran, and North Korea, has raised concerns not just about what could be traded
clandestinely, but also about potential terrorist access to WMD. Khan’s sale of
technology to three state sponsors of terrorism, allegations of ties to a terrorist
organization, and the Pakistan government’s precarious relationship with terrorist
groups on its soil have prompted some to call for assistance to Pakistan to reduce the
threat of terrorist access to WMD.
A key strategy in limiting the risk of terrorist access to WMD is to cut off access
at the source. For some, Russia should continue to be the main focus of efforts to
prevent and deter terrorists from acquiring WMD because of Russia’s vast Cold War
overhang of WMD technologies, material, and personnel. Others see September

2001 as a watershed after which cooperation should be extended to problem states,

such as Pakistan, Syria, Libya, and Iran. Still others see nonproliferation assistance
programs as a way to bring states outside the nonproliferation regime, like North
Korea and Pakistan, under some restraints.
The Bush Administration has advocated the use of traditional and new tools to
counter WMD proliferation, including interdiction, preemption, diplomacy, and
assistance. In a key nonproliferation speech on February 11, 2004, President Bush
introduced seven new initiatives, including expanding CTR. In particular, Bush
noted that such funds could be used for retraining weapons scientists in Iraq and
Libya or for reducing uranium enrichment levels in foreign research nuclear reactors.⁶

⁶ At the National Defense University, President Bush unveiled six other initiatives to combat
WMD: (1) expand the Proliferation Security Initiative to include “shutting down facilities,
seizing materials, and freezing assets”; (2) pass U.N. Security Council resolution requiring
all states “to criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls and secure all sensitive
materials within their borders”; (3) encourage states to renounce uranium enrichment and
(continued...)

(In fact, however, programs to retrain such scientists have used State Department
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund monies.)
A few underlying issues may influence the ultimate success of CTR-like
approaches. One is the “cooperative” element in the U.S. relationship with the state
in question. A state’s willingness to cooperate may hinge on calculations of the
WMD program’s importance to its security and other geopolitical considerations. A
second issue may be that state’s perception of CTR assistance — is this just another
name for arms control, U.S. unilateralism, or bribery? More broadly, there is the
question of whether globalizing CTR may spread resources thinly at a time when
there is still significant work to be done in Russia and the former Soviet states.
Congressional Role
Since 1991, Congress has authorized CTR funds specifically for use in the
Soviet Union, and later, in Russia and former Soviet Union (FSU) states. Before
FY2004, agencies used other sources of funding for nonproliferation assistance
programs applied outside of Russia and the FSU. In FY2004, the Bush
Administration was able to use $50 million of unobligated CTR funds outside the
FSU. The “Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act” was passed as part of the FY2004 National
Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-136) to “assist the United States in resolution
of critical emerging proliferation threats and to permit the United States to take
advantage of opportunities to achieve long-standing nonproliferation goals.” The
final language of the act requires the President to determine, and notify Congress in
writing within 10 days after obligating funds, that the: (a) project/activity will help
the United States in the resolution of a critical emerging proliferation threat; or
permit the United States to take advantage of opportunities to achieve long-standing
nonproliferation goals; (b) Department of Defense is the government agency most
capable of carrying out the project/activity; and (c) project/activity will be completed
in a short period of time. Conferees noted that they expected the President to assign
projects to the most appropriate agencies.⁷
On February 8, 2005, Senator Lugar introduced S. 313, “The Nunn-Lugar
Cooperation Threat Reduction Act of 2005,” which sought to remove restrictions
associated with using CTR funds outside of the FSU. In brief, the legislation would
have lifted CTR program-wide restrictions on spending the money (including
certifications), removed the $50-million cap, removed restrictions on spending

⁶ (...continued)
plutonium reprocessing by ensuring reliable access, at reasonable cost, to fuel for civilian
nuclear reactors and make NSG enrichment- and reprocessing-related nuclear exports
available only to states that already have a fully operational capability; (4) make signature
of the Additional Protocol a prerequisite for any nuclear imports; (5) create a special
committee of the IAEA Board of Governors for safeguards and verification; and (6)
disqualify any state currently under investigation from serving on the IAEA Board. See
[ ht t p: / / www.whi t e house.gov/ news/ r el eases/ 2004/ 02/ 20040211-4.ht ml ]
⁷ In a separate action, Rep. Schiff introduced H.R. 2063, for the same purpose. Schiff’s bill
specifically named Pakistan, India, North Korea, China, Iran, and Iraq as potential recipients
of CTR assistance.

money for chemical weapons destruction, and provided “notwithstanding” authority.
The bill was referred to the Armed Services Committee. Of the provisions in S. 313,
only the repeal of certification requirements was adopted as an amendment in the
Senate’s FY2007 National Defense Authorization bill (Section 1304, S. 2766).
However, this provision was not incorporated in the bill agreed to in conference on
September 20, 2006 (H.R. 5122).
Background
The threat of terrorist access to WMD is a relatively new concern for
nonproliferation experts. First, the nonproliferation regime has always focused on
controlling ingredients at the source as the most effective first line of defense. Such
an approach already addresses two kinds of terrorist threats: that an insider might
collaborate to sell or give a terrorist some materials and that terrorists might seek to
steal materials themselves from facilities. Second, the regime has controls for
transfers to anyone (not just states) outside the regime. Third, apart from Aum
Shinrikyo’s use of sarin gas on the Tokyo subway, few non-state actors have
conducted or attempted to conduct an attack with a functional nuclear, chemical or⁸
biological weapon.
On the other hand, the perception of an increased threat of terrorist use of WMD
has grown since the September 2001 attacks on the United States. There is evidence
that Al Qaeda assigned a high priority to acquiring a WMD capability and some
observers believe that chemical and biological weapons (CBW) capabilities are
increasingly available. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated that “the
threat of terrorists using chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN)
materials remained high” in 2003 [note the use of the word “materials,” not
weapons]. The CIA also concluded that “terrorist groups probably will continue to⁹
favor long-proven conventional tactics such as bombings and shootings.” By
February 2006, the Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte told Congress
that
Today, we are more likely to see an attack from terrorists using weapons or
agents of mass destruction than states, although terrorists’ capabilities would be
much more limited. In fact, intelligence reporting indicates that nearly 40
terrorist organizations, insurgencies, or cults have used, possessed, or expressed
an interest in chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents or weapons.

⁸ Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America’s Achilles’
Heel (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1998), p. 30.
⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions, 1 June Through 31 December 2003. Report pursuant to Section 721 of the
FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act. See [http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/
pdfs/721report_j uly_dec2003.pdf].

Many are capable of conducting simple, small-scale attacks, such as poisonings,¹⁰
or using improvised chemical devices.
However, Negroponte provided no further evidence to support those claims.
The Threat: Nexus of WMD and Terrorism
According to the 2002 National Security Strategy, “rogue states” are those that:
brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the
personal gain of the rulers; display no regard for international law, threaten
their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they
are party; are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along
with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or
offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes; sponsor
terrorism around the globe; and reject basic human values and hate the¹¹
United States and everything for which it stands.
The CIA has reported a growing concern that traditional state recipients of
WMD technology “may follow North Korea’s practice of supplying specific WMD-¹²
related technology and expertise to other countries or non-state actors.” When
those states are designated state sponsors of terrorism, there is the possibility they
may provide the terrorist organizations that they support with WMD materials or
weapons. While there is very little evidence to support this assumption, it cannot be
ruled out. Because these countries tend to be “pariah” states, however, they may
offer few footholds for cooperation. Nonetheless, some of the new and reinvigorated
cooperation in counterterrorism since 2001 may help spur cooperation in other areas.
Equally risky is the category of states that have terrorist activity on their soil and
WMD programs. These pose a different kind of risk: that terrorists may gain access
to WMD without the authority or knowledge of the host government, either through
insider ties or through instability engendered by terrorist activity.
Table 1, below, cross-references WMD capabilities and terrorist activities.
Estimates of WMD capabilities are drawn from semiannual CIA unclassified reports
to Congress (per Section 721 of the FY1997 Foreign Intelligence Authorization Act),
“Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions. For the
purposes of analysis, terrorism activity is divided into “state sponsors” of terrorism
(per Section 6j of the Export Administration Act of 1979); and those with activity
(terrorist incidents) on their soil. It could be argued that the list of state sponsors of
terrorism corresponds poorly with the threat because most of the formal state

¹⁰ John D. Negroponte, Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence
for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2006. Available at
[http://www.gl obalsecurity.org/intell/library/congress/2006_hr/060202-negr oponte.htm]
¹¹ White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States, available at
[ h t t p : / / www.whi t e house.go v/ nsc/ nss.ht ml ] .
¹² CIA, WMD Technology Acquisition, January-June 2002.

sponsors of terrorism provide support, or used to provide support, for older groups
and not necessarily those that appear to be most threatening now. However, such a
list provides a starting point for analysis.

Table 1. WMD Capabilities and Terrorism
NuclearBiologicalChemicalTerrorismTreaty Adherence
Weapons Weapons Weapons Thr e at NP T CWC B W C
Algeria——Research?Suspected ActivityYYY
Cuba——Reported — State sponsorYYY
EgyptR&DR&DLikelyActivityYN Y*
IndiaKnown——Has HadActivityNYY
Indonesia————SoughtActivity YYY
IranSeekingLikelyHas Had State sponsorYYY
Ir aq* Ended Ended Ended Ended Y N Y
IsraelKnownLikelyR&DLikelyActivityN Y*N
Kaza khstan —— —— Suspected —— Y Y N
Libya** Ended Declarednone Ended Ended Y Y Y
M ya n ma r — — — — L i ke l y — — Y Y* Y*
NNY
North KoreaAssumedLikelyKnownState sponsor
(NPT withdrawal)
Paki stan Known —— Likely Activity N Y Y
Saudi Arabia————Suspected ActivityYYY
South Africa EndedEndedSuspected——YYY
South KoreaEnded——Suspected——YYY
Sudan————Suspected State sponsorYYY
Syria——SeekingKnownState sponsorY N Y*
TaiwanEndedSuspected Likely — NNY
Thailand —— —— Suspected Activity Y Y Y
Vietnam —— —— Likely —— Y Y Y
Yugo s l a vi a / —— —— Suspected Activity Y Y Y
Kosovo
^Sources^:^CRS.^E^s^tim^a^t^e^s^o^f^W^M^{D c}^a^p^a^b^ilitie^{s a}^r^e^d^r^a^w^{n fr}^o^m^se^mⁱ^a^nnua^{l CI}^A^Unc^l^a^ssifie^d^Re^p^o^r^t
^to^Coⁿ^g^r^{ess o}ⁿ^th^{e A}^c^q^uⁱ^sⁱ^tioⁿ^o^f^T^echⁿ^o^lo^g^y^Relatin^g^to^W^eap^oⁿ^{s o}^f^{Mass Destr}^u^ctioⁿ^an^d
^A^d^v^aⁿ^{ced C}^oⁿ^v^eⁿ^tion^a^{l Mu}ⁿ^ition^s^(per^s^ec.⁷²¹^of^{FY1997 Foreig}ⁿ^In^tellig^en^ce^A^u^th^orization^A^c^t.)
^No^tes:
^{Y = p}^a^r^t^y^to^tr^eaty^N^P^T^{= Nu}^{clear Non}^p^rolif^eration^T^r^eaty
^Y*^{= sig}ⁿ^e^d^b^u^{t n}^o^{t r}^a^tif^ied^tr^eaty^C^W^C^{= Ch}^em^{ical W}^eap^oⁿ^{s Co}ⁿ^v^eⁿ^tioⁿ
^{N = n}^o^{t p}^a^r^t^y^to^tr^eaty^B^W^C^=B^io^lo^gⁱ^{cal an}^d^T^o^xⁱⁿ^W^eap^oⁿ^s
^Co^nve^ntⁱ^oⁿ
^*^{Iraq w}^a^s^rem^o^v^e^{d f}^r^om^t^h^{e S}^t^at^{e S}^pon^s^o^rs^of^T^e^rrori^s^m^Lⁱ^s^t^on^O^c^t^{ober 20, 2004.}
^*^*^L^iby^a^ren^o^uⁿ^{ced its}^{WMD prog}^ram^s^on^Decem^{ber 19, 2003 an}^{d w}^a^s^rem^ove^d^fr^o^m^t^h^{e S}^t^ate
^S^pon^s^o^rs^of^T^e^rrori^s^m^Lⁱ^s^t^on^Juⁿ^e^{29, 2006.}

State Sponsors of Terrorism
Per Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App.
2405 (j)), the U.S. Secretary of State currently designates five countries as state
sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Iraq was removed
from the list on October 20, 2004, and Libya was removed from the list on June 29,

2006.¹³

Cuba. Cuba was first designated a state sponsor of terrorism in 1982.
Although it has ratified all 12 counterterrorism conventions, it has remained opposed
to the U.S. global war on terrorism.¹⁴ The CIA judged in August 2003 that “We have
no credible evidence, however, that the Cuban government has engaged in or directly
supported international terrorist operations in the past decade, although our
information is insufficient to say beyond a doubt that no collaboration has
occurred.”¹⁵
The Administration’s assertions concerning Cuba’s WMD programs, which
some observers dispute, focus on limited biological weapons research and
development. Construction at the Juragua nuclear facility (two incomplete Russian
nuclear power reactors) was indefinitely postponed in 1997.
Iran. According to the State Department, “Iran remained the most active state
sponsor of terrorism [in 2005].”¹⁶ Although it is a member of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), many observers believe that it has active
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs. Inspections by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) revealed 18 years worth of undeclared nuclear
activities in Iran.
Faced with possible referral to the UN Security Council, Iran suspended its
enrichment program and allowed for IAEA inspections under the Additional Protocol¹⁷
in October 2003. In 2004 Iran resumed both construction of centrifuge components
and conversion activities. The EU-3 (France, the United Kingdom, and Germany)
brokered a deal with the Iran to suspend enrichment activities, but Iran broke the
suspension in August 2005 putting an end to negotiations. The IAEA Board of
Governors passed a resolution on September 24, 2005 that found Iran to be in

¹³ See CRS Report RL33600, International Terrorism: Threat, Policy, and Response, by
Raphael F. Perl. Presidential Determination for Libya, No. 2006-14, May 12, 2006.
Available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060515-5.html].
¹⁴ See CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List.
¹⁵ CIA’s unclassified responses to Questions for the Record from the Worldwide Threat
Hearing of February 11, 2003, dated August 18, 2003, p. 145 [hereafter CIA unclassified
responses to Worldwide Threat Hearing 2003].
¹⁶ U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, released April 2006.
Available at [http://www.mipt.org/pdf/Country-Reports-Terrorism-2005.pdf].
¹⁷ Iran signed the Additional Protocol on December 18, 2003, but the Majlis (parliament)
never ratified it.

noncompliance with its NPT safeguards agreement.¹⁸ Iran ended its voluntary
adherence to the Additional Protocol in February 2006, and resumed uranium
enrichment research and development. In March 2006, the UN Security Council
passed a Presidential Statement calling on Iran to suspend uranium enrichment,
implement the Additional Protocol, and comply with all other IAEA demands. Iran
failed to both meet the Council’s demands and respond in due time to a proposal
offered to it by the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany (the
P5+1). The Council subsequently adopted UNSCR 1696 in June 2006. UNSCR
1696, passed under Article 40 of the UN Charter, gave Iran a new deadline of August
31 to comply with Security Council requests or face stronger Council action in the
form of sanctions under Article 41. To date, Iran has evaded demands that it halt
uranium enrichment.
The United States believes that Iran “continues to seek chemicals, production
technology, training, and expertise from abroad...[and that it] has stockpiled blister,
blood, and choking agents,” and aired these concerns at the First Review Conference
of the CWC in April 2003.¹⁹ Iran, which ratified the CWC in 1997, first admitted it
had a past CW program in 1998, but it has not acknowledged its use of chemical
weapons against Iraq. Iran also reportedly provided Libya with chemical weapons
that were later used in Chad.²⁰ The CIA has reported to Congress that Iran has
continued to seek chemicals, production technology, training, and expertise from
Chinese entities. The CIA also believes that Iran has stockpiled blister, blood, and
choking agents and probably has nerve agents. In addition, the CIA reported in 2003
that Iran continued to seek dual-use biotechnical material, equipment and expertise,
from which its offensive BW program could have benefitted.²¹ The State
Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research reported in April 2003 that “Iran
probably has capabilities to produce small quantities of BW agents, but has a limited
ability to weaponize them.”²² In August 2005, the State Department reported to
Congress that “based on all available information, Iran has an offensive biological
weapons program in violation of the BWC.”²³
Libya. Libya was designated a state sponsor of terrorism from 1979 to 2006.
Over time, Libya’s involvement in supporting international terrorism declined as its
cooperation in the West increased. Early in 2003, Libya proposed a sequential
process by which the families of victims of the Pan Am 103 bombing in 1988 would

¹⁸ September 24, 2005 IAEA Board of Governors Resolution, GOV/2005/77. Available at
[ ht t p: / / www.i aea.or g/ Publ i cat i ons/ Document s / Boar d/ 2005/ gov2005-77.pdf ] .
¹⁹ U.S. National Statement, First Review Conference of the CWC; Assistant Secretary of
State for Arms Control Stephen G. Rademaker; April 28, 2003.
²⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, 1997.
²¹ CIA, WMD Technology Acquisition, January-June 2003.
²² INR’s (Assistant Secretary Carl Ford) unclassified responses to questions submitted for
the record from the February 11, 2003 Worldwide Threat Hearing, p. 191, April 30, 2003.
²³ U.S. State Department, “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” June 2005. Available
at [http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rpt/51977.htm#chapter1].

be compensated, in return for a lifting of U.N. sanctions, U.S. sanctions, and removal
from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list.
In 2003, Libya pledged to eliminate all elements of chemical and nuclear
weapons programs; eliminate all chemical weapons stocks/munitions and accede to
the Chemical Weapons Convention; declare all nuclear activities to the IAEA, accept
“international inspections” to ensure compliance with the NPT and sign the
Additional Protocol; eliminate ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding Missile
Technology Control Regime standards (300km; 500kg payload); and allow
immediate inspections and monitoring to verify these actions.²⁴ On February 5, 2004,
Libya signed the CWC and destruction of its CW program began on February 27,
2004. On March 10, 2004, Libya signed the Additional Protocol to its nuclear
safeguards agreement, but removal and destruction of nuclear-related items began in
January 2004.
On May 15, 2006, Secretary of State Rice announced that the US was
restoring full diplomatic relations with Libya. This would include, installation of an
U.S. embassy in Tripoli, removal of Libya from the list of designated state sponsors
of terrorism, and omission of Libya from the annual certification of countries not
cooperating fully with United States anti-terrorism efforts. “We are taking these
actions in recognition of Libya’s continued commitment to its renunciation of
terrorism and the excellent cooperation Libya has provided to the United States and
other members of the international community in response to common global threats
faced by the civilized world since September 11, 2001.”²⁵
North Korea. North Korea was added to the terrorism list on January 20,
1988 and remains on the list although it is not known to have sponsored any terrorist
acts since 1987. According to the State Department, North Korea did not take
substantial steps to cooperate in the war on terrorism in 2002. The State
Department’s report on terrorism reports that North Korea continued to maintain ties²⁶
to terrorist groups in 2005. North Korea has become party to 6 of the 12
international conventions. However, it has sold conventional weapons to several
terrorist groups and reportedly continues to provide safe haven to some terrorists,
which is one of the conditions that puts a country on the list.²⁷
North Korea’s WMD programs are a high priority threat for the Bush
Administration. Its nuclear program and ballistic missile capabilities are well-
documented; it has a known chemical weapons capability and is considered likely to

²⁴ Fact Sheet, “The Presidents’ National Security Strategy to Combat WMD: Libya’s
Announcement,” The White House, December 19, 2003.
²⁵ Statement by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, May 15, 2006. Available at
[ ht t p: / / www.st at e.gov/ secr et ar y/ r m/ 2006/ 66235.ht m]
²⁶ U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, released April 2006.
Available at [http://www.mipt.org/pdf/Country-Reports-Terrorism-2005.pdf].
²⁷ Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 81.

have a BW capability.²⁸ North Korea withdrew from the NPT in April 2003 and has
been found to have repeatedly violated U.S. missile nonproliferation laws.
Statements from North Korea on its capabilities are a bit misleading: in 2003, North
Korea repeatedly stated that it has reprocessed all its spent fuel, that it has nuclear
weapons, and on one occasion, North Korean officials threatened to export nuclear
weapons.²⁹ In January 2004, North Korean officials reportedly told an unofficial U.S.
delegation that they did not have nuclear weapons or a uranium enrichment
program.³⁰ There is no public evidence that North Korea has offered nuclear
material for sale, whether produced in the early 1990s or more recently.
On July 5, 2006 North Korea tested 7 ballistic missiles, including an
intercontinental missile that apparently failed or was aborted 42 seconds after it was
launched. On July 15, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1695
demanding that North Korea suspend all related ballistic missile activity and return
immediately to the Six-Party Talks without preconditions.³¹ According to two
chemical and biological weapons experts, “North Korea has an estimated
2,500-5,000 tons of blister and nerve agents, much of which is weaponized in
artillery shells and rockets within firing range of Seoul.”³²
Sudan. Sudan has ratified all twelve international counterterrorism
conventions and publicly foresworn support for terrorism. In 2001 the United
Nations lifted its sanctions in recognition of Sudan’s positive steps against terrorism.
In addition, Ambassador Black, the State Department’s counterterrorism coordinator,
underscored Sudan’s cooperation in 2003, which included improved access to
individuals of interest, financial institutions, and records. Nonetheless, the CIA
estimated in 2003 that al Qaeda, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Egyptian al-Gama’a al-³³
Islamiyya, PIJ, and Hamas continued to operate in Sudan. The FBI reportedly
believes that Sudan is a “permissive environment and a transit point for Islamic
extremists who engage in recruiting, training, fund-raising, and logistical support for
terrorist activity worldwide.”³⁴ According to the Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003
report, Sudan has “deepened its cooperation with the U.S. government” to apprehend
terrorists, but some concerns remain.
Sudan is suspected of having a chemical weapons program, despite being a
party to the CWC. The most recent CIA assessment states that “although Sudan has

²⁸ See CRS Report RS21582, North Korean Crisis: Possible Military Options, by Edward
F. Bruner, and CRS Report RS21391, North Korean Nuclear Weapons: How Soon an
Arsenal? by Sharon A. Squassoni.
²⁹ CIA, WMD Technology Acquisition, January-June 2003.
³⁰ “North Korea Denies It Has a Warhead,” Los Angeles Times, January 13, 2004.
³¹ Security Council Resolution 1695, July 15, 2006. Available at [http://www.un.org/
News/Press/docs//2006/sc8778.doc.htm]
³² “A long way to go in eliminating chemical weapons,” Boston Globe, 5/1/2006.
³³ CIA unclassified responses to Worldwide Threat Hearing 2003. p. 138.
³⁴ FBI’s unclassified responses to Questions for the Record from the Worldwide Threat
Hearing of February 11, 2003, p. 237.

aspired to a CW program, the US is working with Sudan to reconcile concerns about
its past attempts to seek capabilities from abroad.”³⁵ Sudan is not thought to have
nuclear or biological weapons programs.
Syria. According to the Patterns in Global Terrorism 2003 report, despite
some cooperation on al Qaeda and the Taliban, Syria continues to provide political
and material support to “Palestinian rejectionist groups,” including Hezballah,
Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. While in Damascus in May 2003, Secretary
of State Colin Powell warned Syria to withdraw support from terrorist organizations,
and Syria announced that Hamas, PIJ the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine — General Command, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
had “voluntarily” closed their offices there. On December 12, 2003, President Bush
signed into law P.L. 108-175, the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty
Restoration Act, which would impose sanctions on Syria until it ceases support for
terrorist groups, ends its occupation of Lebanon, ends WMD development, and
ceases facilitating terrorist activity in Iraq. On May 11, 2004, President Bush issued
Executive Order 13338, which implemented sanctions, including a ban on munitions
and dual-use items, as well as a ban on exports other than food and medicine and³⁶
Syrian aircraft flights to or overflights of the United States. In 2006 Congress
amended the Iran Nonproliferation Act to include Syria (P.L. 109-112).
With respect to WMD, Syria has a known CW program and is believed to be
seeking biological weapons. According to one press account, “It is the worst kept
secret in the Middle East that Damascus has one of the largest stockpiles of chemical³⁷
agents in the region.” Syria is not a party to the CWC, and has signed but not
ratified the BWC. Syria also has an arsenal of short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles. It is a party to the NPT and, despite having signed nuclear cooperation
agreements with Russia in 1998 and 2000, few believe it has serious nuclear weapons
aspirations.
States with Terrorist Activity and WMD Programs
In addition to the state sponsors of terrorism that have WMD programs, there
are other states with WMD programs that have terrorist activity on their soil.
Pakistan, India, and Israel fit in this category. The fact that none is a member of the
NPT could limit cooperation in the nuclear area. All are members of the CWC, but
many observers believe Israel and Pakistan have covert CW programs. India
declared its CW program in 1997, after initial declarations that it had no CW. India
has already destroyed 46% of its Category 1 CW stockpile and all of its Category 2
weapons; it must destroy the rest by 2007. Pakistan and India are members of the
BWC and are not thought to have BW programs; Israel has not joined the BWC and
many believe that it has carried out BW research and development.

³⁵ CIA, WMD Technology Acquisition, January-June 2003.
³⁶ See CRS Report RL32727, Syria: Political Conditions and Relations with the United
States After the Iraq War, by Alfred B. Prados and Jeremy M. Sharp.
³⁷ “We Won’t Scrap WMD Stockpile Unless Israel Does, Says Assad,” London Daily
Telegraph, January 6, 2004.

In addition to those three, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are likely concerns
for CW programs and potential terrorist access; of those three, only Egypt is not a
party to the CWC. Egypt is also a concern because it is known to have a BW
program; it has signed but not ratified the BWC. The Defense Intelligence Agency
reported in April 2003 that “we do not believe that Saudi Arabia is trying to acquire
biological or chemical agents or weapons from foreign sources.”³⁸ In January 2005,
the IAEA investigated reports that Egypt had conducted some nuclear reprocessing
at a laboratory-scale level, but did not conclude that Egypt violated its safeguards
agreem ent .³⁹
How Significant Is the Nexus?
Two factors should be considered in assessing the severity of a threat of
terrorist access to WMD: intention and opportunities. First, terrorists operating in
certain countries that have WMD programs do not necessarily have an interest in
acquiring WMD. Most of the terrorist groups with an interest in WMD tend to be
more internationally rather than domestically focused.⁴⁰ To date, the Kurdistan
Worker’s Party (PKK), Hamas, Al Qaeda, and Aum Shinrikyo have demonstrated
interest in developing weapons of mass destruction. Although the following
countries have terrorist activities on their soil, terrorists active on their soil have not
demonstrated WMD intentions: Algeria, India, Thailand, and Yugoslavia/Kosovo.
Second, the states in question present different opportunities for terrorists to
gain access. In some cases, facilities may be remotely located, with good surveillance
capabilities and good security. In addition, some facilities may be under military
control. The level of security in a country like North Korea or Israel may be much
higher than, for example, in Algeria or Egypt. Even in a country like Russia, which
many observers believe presents significant opportunities for stealing nuclear
material, the ability of terrorists to acquire material is not a given. The CIA has
judged that none of the sixteen seizures of Russian weapons-usable nuclear material
since 1992 was connected to terrorists.⁴¹ On the other hand, the inability of a state
to control either its people or its territory (which may or may not be defined as a
“failed” state) may present opportunities for terrorists to move freely within a country
and take advantage of available resources.
The dual-use nature of many materials and technologies associated with
WMD may present terrorists with the ability to enhance their WMD capabilities in
countries that do not have an obvious WMD program. In the case of nuclear
programs, for example, South Africa could be an attractive target for terrorists
because it had a nuclear weapons program and has HEU in metal form under IAEA

³⁸ Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) unclassified responses to questions for the Record
from the Worldwide Threat Hearing of February 11, 2003, dated June 30 2003, p. 223.
³⁹ Report by IAEA Director General (GOV/2005/2).
⁴⁰ This report does not cover domestic U.S. groups that have attempted to acquire WMD-
related capabilities, because of the focus on providing assistance to foreign countries on
terrorism and counterproliferation.
⁴¹ CIA unclassified responses to Worldwide Threat Hearing 2003, p. 152.

safeguards. Of course, this attractiveness could be mitigated by good security and
low terrorist activity on South African soil. It appears that the Bush Administration
has taken the position that weapons-usable material, even if it is under IAEA
safeguards, may not be secure enough.⁴² One of the seven initiatives highlighted in
President Bush’s speech on nonproliferation on February 11, 2004 was spending
more money to bring back HEU from foreign countries and in May 2004, Secretary
of Energy Spencer Abraham announced the Global Threat Reduction Initiative,
which consolidates and accelerates several existing programs to reduce this threat.
In large part, revelations about Iran’s nuclear program and the role of Pakistan
in supplying uranium enrichment equipment and technology to Iran, Libya, and North
Korea has revived a decades-old debate about whether or not certain processes and
materials should be controlled internationally or banned altogether. Not since the
Atoms for Peace program in the 1950s has international storage of plutonium, or
enriched uranium, or international control of enrichment and reprocessing facilities
been in vogue. However, the Director General of the IAEA, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei,
suggested just such an approach in 2003 and convened an experts group to study
options for multilateral management of the nuclear fuel cycle.⁴³ The basic objective
of these options would be to restrict sensitive technology in the hands of a few states,
while providing assured fuel supplies for nuclear reactors to other states. In 2004,
President Bush proposed that enrichment and reprocessing technology should not be
spread any further than it already is, and that export controls (national and
multilateral agreements) should be tightened to eliminate this possibility.⁴⁴ The G-8
adopted voluntary moratoriums on such transfers in 2004. In 2006, the Bush
Administration proposed a Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which
envisions cooperation in developing a proliferation-resistant new kind of spent fuel
reprocessing. Such new technology, according to some observers, may not be ready
for decades.
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program as
Precedent
For over a decade, U.S. government agencies (particularly the Departments
of Energy and State) have spent nonproliferation assistance funds in countries outside
of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Given the relatively new ability to expend DOD’s
CTR funds outside of the FSU, however, it may be useful to examine the CTR
program for precedents, including the origin of the program, its objectives, kinds of
work funded, and problems encountered.
Congress enacted the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
program in 1991, addressing, in Senator Lugar’s words, “the dominant international
proliferation danger: the massive nuclear, chemical and biological weapons

⁴² State Department interview.
⁴³ Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, “Towards a Safer World,” The Economist, October 18-24, 2003.
⁴⁴ See [http://www.whitehouse.gov] for text of speech.

infrastructure of the former Soviet Union.”⁴⁵ As the Soviet Union began to dissolve,
Russia could not meet its obligations to reduce strategic nuclear weapons under the
START treaty. Further, it became clear that the unraveling of the military industrial
complex could have security consequences that transcended the former Soviet
Union’s borders. The initial legislation allowed the Department of Defense to use
unobligated funds to destroy and dismantle strategic nuclear weapons, make
transportation and storage of weapons no longer in the stockpile secure, and convert
former WMD facilities and scientists.
The CTR program had four key objectives:
^!Destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction;
^!Transport, store, disable, and safeguard these weapons in connection
with their destruction;
^!Establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of these
weapons, their components, and weapons-usable materials; and
^!Prevent the diversion of scientific expertise that could contribute to
weapons programs in other nations.
Destruction and dismantlement activities included removing warheads,
deactivating missiles and eliminating launch facilities for strategic weapons under the
START I agreement. Efforts to improve the safety, security, and control over nuclear
weapons and fissile materials have included providing storage containers, bullet-
proof blankets, secure rail cars, and building a plutonium storage facility at Mayak.
Demilitarization projects have included defense conversion projects and International
Science and Technology Center projects to help WMD scientists pursue work with
peaceful objectives and military-to-military contacts.
CTR programs have evolved and expanded over time, adjusting to Russian,
FSU states, and U.S. priorities, as well as to changing perceptions about which
threats posed the greatest risk. The programs have also bowed upon occasion to
bureaucratic intransigence and practical considerations. In one notable incident,
Department of Energy officials provided blankets to facility guards who were leaving
their posts to collect wood to build fires. As the economy worsened in Russia in the
mid-1990s, CTR projects sought to provide alternative employment and sources of
income for unpaid or out-of-work WMD scientists. Increased reports of attempts to
steal nuclear material highlighted the need for CTR to address material protection,
control and accounting (MPCA) measures for nuclear material, consolidation of
nuclear weapons and material, and secure transportation. The United States
developed a practical approach: “quick-fixes,” like bars on windows, blast-proof
doors, fences, followed by a second stage that included more sophisticated security
measures like sensors, cameras, and personnel access measures. ⁴⁶

⁴⁵ CTR was an amendment to the implementing legislation of the Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe Treaty (P.L. 102-228), sponsored by Senators Nunn and Lugar, in the form
of the “Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991.” For more information, see “The
Lugar Doctrine,” [http://lugar.senate.gov/nunnlugar.html].
⁴⁶ See remarks by Rose Gottemoeller, former Deputy UnderSecretary for Defense and
(continued...)

The idea that two former adversaries could cooperate on such sensitive
matters as nuclear weapons and material security was radical in 1991, but so too was
the prospect of Russia’s WMD infrastructure unraveling. The circumstances
surrounding CTR’s inception were unique: there was previous agreement under the
START treaty to destroy nuclear weapons, agreement on both sides that those
legitimate weapons needed to be secured before they were destroyed, and absence of
international inspections because of Russia’s status as a nuclear weapons state.
Russia had already agreed to destroy weapons — the only questions were how to
implement those reductions quickly and who would pay for them. That Soviet
nuclear weapons had been targeted at the United States for so many years presented
a compelling reason for the United States to help. The same situation arose years
later when Russia signed the CWC and CTR funds were used to help destroy those
weapons. An issue that could arise in the context of expanding CTR’s scope is
whether states with stocks of chemical weapons that are bound to destroy them by
2007 under the CWC (India and one anonymous state) will see this as an opportunity
to have their obligations paid for by the United States.
Kinds of Assistance
CTR assistance to states outside the FSU might use four types of programs:
those that help secure weapons, sites, materials, and personnel. These correspond
roughly to the CTR missions of weapons destruction, ensuring transportation safety,
verifiably safeguarding against proliferation, and preventing diversion of scientific
expertise. A few differences stand out from the Soviet case: 1) not all of the
countries of concern here have actual weapons; 2) some that do have weapons
programs belong to treaties that they may be currently violating; and 3) others that
have weapons programs have no international restrictions on them and may not have
any interest in giving up their weapons. These differences will affect the kinds of
assistance the United States might want to provide to those countries and possibly
also the kinds of assistance it can legally provide.
Weapons Security
U.S. assistance to most states is unlikely to emphasize weapons security as
it did with Russia and the FSU, primarily because potential recipient states will not
be as highly armed as Russia. In the nuclear area, measures to improve the chain of
command and custody and secure transportation for nuclear warheads would likely
be highly controversial if extended to a state outside the NPT. Nonetheless, some
observers have advocated assistance to improve nuclear weapons security with the
objective of ensuring that weapons could not be stolen or detonated by an
unauthorized person. The simplest measures would be funding and training armed
guards. However, potential recipient states are likely already aware of the advantages
of protecting their nuclear weapons. Advice or equipment to ensure no unauthorized

⁴⁶ (...continued)
Nonproliferation in the Department of Energy, in a transcript of Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace Nonproliferation Roundtable, held on September 23, 2001, entitled
“Pakistan’s Nuclear Dilemma,” [http://www.ceip.org/files/events/Paktranscript.asp].

use of nuclear weapons, such as permissive action links (PALs), would require access
to nuclear weapons, which is unlikely to be granted. General information on PALs,
such as concepts or approaches, is publicly available and would not require access
to weapons. In all likelihood, however, India, Pakistan, and Israel probably have
exhausted public sources of information on that topic, but North Korea may not have.
Measures to ensure that command and control systems work would also help ensure
no unauthorized use, but could possibly enhance operational capabilities and
therefore may be undesirable.
Assistance in destroying nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads is a
different matter. It is assumed that the priority for BW and CW would be
destruction, because the respective treaties unequivocally ban those weapons.
Temporary security (weeks or months, or perhaps years in the chemical weapons
case) of biological and chemical weapons security might be appropriate prior to
destruction. In the case of chemical weapons, a non-state party to the CWC
presumably could adhere to the guidelines set out under the CWC for destruction, or
join the convention, as Libya has decided to do.
Site Security
The CTR programs developed for Russia vary in their goals for site security
across the WMD spectrum. For nuclear sites, security measures focused on helping
guard against the theft of weapons or materials by insiders or outsiders. Site security
with respect to chemical weapons has focused primarily on destruction of weapons
capabilities. Finally, site security for biological weapons has focused on
dismantlement, safety, and security at facilities for biological pathogens.
Measures include perimeter security, such as gates and other barriers like
barbed wire and personnel identification systems, which can help minimize the risk
of unauthorized entry. Sensors to detect unauthorized actions (movement,
tampering) can help against both insider and outsider threats. Measures to protect
against inside theft include checks on personnel leaving facilities (typically onerous
without technical detection measures for material or components), cameras in
sensitive areas, and accounting and access procedures. Armed guards could help, as
would operational and administrative controls.
In Russia, U.S. officials toured sites and conducted vulnerability assessments.
In other cases, even perimeter visits could be viewed as too sensitive. However, the
United States could offer information or briefings on how security is conducted at
sensitive facilities in the United States. Such information would need to be presented
in general terms, not specific to particular facilities, to protect U.S. national security.
Ideally, assistance could cover types of requirements for personnel vetting and
training and development of a security culture. Assistance of this kind in the nuclear
area is beginning to be provided under IAEA auspices to India and Pakistan. If the
United States wanted to install cameras or sensors at sensitive facilities, licenses
might be required for some of them, given restrictions on materials going to sensitive
sites (particularly if the state has a history of proliferation). It is more likely,
however, that potential recipients would use commercially available security systems,
installing them themselves.

Material Security
In the biological area, there are no international standards for pathogen
security. While rejecting the Protocol developed by BWC states, the United States
proposed that national authorities develop such measures.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, the United
States is just beginning to implement such measures in this country.⁴⁸ Moreover,
even under the rubric of CTR, the United States has not been successful in
implementing measures within Russian facilities to guard against the insider threat
of theft of pathogens.⁴⁹ As many observers have noted, the sample size of biological
agents is so small that it would be quite difficult to provide 100% assurance of no
material losses. Ken Alibek, who defected from the Soviet BW program in 1992, has
noted that some Russian BW labs required laboratory personnel to strip all their
clothes off before leaving the working zones of the building, but even this did not
prevent a few from attempting to smuggle out samples.⁵⁰
Under the CWC, state parties are required to secure CW stocks and agents,
and account for quantities of specified chemicals. Most of the verification measures,
however, pertain to destroying CW, including continuous monitoring and seals.
There is a material accounting system requiring annual reports on destruction,
transfer, and use of controlled chemicals. Further, declared sites are subject to
challenge inspections.
In the nuclear area, measures to enhance material security in Russia and other
FSU ranged from removing material (like highly enriched uranium, HEU, in
Kazakhstan and Georgia), blending HEU down into low-enriched uranium so that it
would not be usable in a weapon, to permanent storage of plutonium, and finally, to
better material protection, control and accounting (MPC&A) measures. Where
nuclear material is no longer intended for use, it can be secured at a storage site with
tamper-proof seals, cameras, and other monitoring techniques. When it is intended
for legitimate industrial or research processes, a system of accounting and control
that can follow material flows is used. International nuclear safeguards rely heavily
on state systems of accounting and control (SSACs) in measuring physical
inventories of materials. Some technical exchanges in these areas may be possible.
Some new techniques for securing material in place could be shared (one innovative
approach used in Russia was placing heavy cement blocks over plutonium
containers). The IAEA and Sandia National Laboratory conduct programs on

⁴⁷ Statement by President George W. Bush, November 1, 2001. He proposed that all BWC
parties “establish sound national oversight mechanisms for the security and genetic
engineering of pathogenic organisms.”
⁴⁸ Remarks of Under Secretary of State John Bolton, Tokyo, Japan, August 26, 2002,
referring to the USA Patriot Act (2001) and the Public Health Security and Bio-terrorist
Preparedness and Response Act (2002).
⁴⁹ U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian
Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites, GA0-

03-482, March 2003.

⁵⁰ Talk before congressional staff by Ken Alibek.

physical protection of nuclear material. It is also possible to provide equipment for
physical protection (cameras, seals, locks, or barriers) under license.
Personnel Security
In the case of the Soviet Union, chaos and poverty combined to create
incentives for Soviet scientists to proliferate WMD technology. The U.S. approach
generally has been to encourage them to stay in their own country and redirect their
work in non-weapons-related areas. U.S. programs have provided financial support
through research grants to individual scientists or through the international science
centers.⁵¹ Yet, programs also need ultimately to provide secure jobs, interesting
work, and an awareness of or commitment to nonproliferation. Programs could also
establish a database of relevant scientists in certain states, either to target funding or
to track their activities.
Tailoring Assistance to Countries
There is currently no coordinated plan for prioritizing expanded CTR
assistance. Table 2, below, summarizes potential assistance to critical states in the
nexus of WMD and terrorism, divided into three tiers. The first tier includes the two
“axis of evil” states (North Korea and Iran); the second includes other state sponsors
of terrorism (Cuba, Sudan, and Syria); and the third includes states with WMD
programs and terrorist activity on their soil.
Table 2. Priorities for Assistance to States within Terrorism-
WMD Nexus
Weapons Si t e Material P e rsonnel Terrorism
Security Security Securi t y Securi t y Thr e at
TIER I NorthNuclearNuclearNuclear? State sponsor
Korea Che m Che m Che m
Bio?Bio?Bio?
IranChemNuclearNuclear?State sponsor
Bio?ChemChem
Bio?Bio?
TIER IICubaNoneBio?Bio?Less UrgentState sponsor
SudanChem?Chem?Chem? Less UrgentState sponsor
SyriaChemChemChem??State sponsor
Bio?Bio?Bio?
TIER IIIPakistanNuclearNuclearNuclearUrgentActivity
Chem?Chem?Chem?
India Nuclear Nuclear Nuc l e a r ? Activity

Chem?Chem?Chem?
⁵¹ These include the State Department’s Bioredirect Program, and DOE’s Nuclear Cities
Initiative, and the Initiative for Proliferation Prevention.

Weapons Si t e Material P e rsonnel Terrorism
Security Security Securi t y Securi t y Thr e at
Israel Nuclear Nuclear Nuc l e a r ? Activity
ChemChemChem
Bio?Bio?
AlgeriaChem?Chem?Chem? Activity
Bio?Bio?
E gyp t C h e m? C h e m? Che m? ? Activity
Bio?Bio?
Saudi Chem? Chem? Chem? ? Activity
Arabia
^Sources^:^CRS.^E^s^tim^a^t^e^s^o^f^W^M^{D c}^a^p^a^b^ilitie^{s a}^r^e^b^a^se^d^oⁿ^se^mⁱ^a^nnua^{l CI}^A^Unc^l^a^ssifie^d^Re^p^o^r^{t to}
^Coⁿ^g^r^ess^oⁿ^th^e^A^c^q^u^isitioⁿ^o^f^T^echⁿ^o^lo^g^y^Relatin^g^to^W^eap^oⁿ^{s o}^f^Mass^Destr^u^ctioⁿ^an^d^A^d^v^aⁿ^ced
^C^oⁿ^v^eⁿ^tion^a^{l Mu}ⁿ^ition^s^{(per s}^{ec. 721 of}^FY^{1997 Foreig}ⁿ^In^tellig^en^{ce A}^u^th^orization^A^c^t.)
^{Note on Pers}^onnel:^T^h^e^gr^a^d^a^tⁱ^o^{n fr}^o^m^ur^ge^nt^,^t^o^l^e^{ss ur}^ge^nt^,^t^o^q^u^e^s^tⁱ^o^na^b^l^e⁽^?⁾ⁱ^s^b^a^se^d^oⁿ^a^l^o^o^s^e
^assessm^en^{t o}^fⁱⁿ^dⁱ^g^eⁿ^o^u^s^scien^tif^ic^an^d^en^gⁱⁿ^eerin^g^cap^ab^{ilities. Mo}^{re u}^r^g^eⁿ^c^y^{is acco}^rd^ed^to^states
^w^ith^{a k}ⁿ^o^wⁿⁱⁿ^dⁱ^g^eⁿ^o^u^s^S&^T^b^a^{se an}^d^{less u}^r^g^eⁿ^c^y^to^{states w}^ith^little^o^rⁿ^oⁱⁿ^dⁱ^g^eⁿ^o^u^s^cap^ab^ilities.
Tier I: North Korea and Iran
For North Korea and Iran, there may be equal emphasis placed on all four
kinds of assistance. Certainly in the case of North Korea there is a requirement to
secure weapons (if not actual nuclear weapons, then certainly chemical and biological
weapons), sites, material, and personnel. Many observers believe that the threat
posed by North Korea with respect to terrorists and WMD is that the regime itself
would sell excess nuclear material (plutonium or highly enriched uranium). Given
the extreme isolation of the country, the potential for scientists “freelancing” their
WMD wares is probably low. However, North Korea might pose a similar problem
as did Russia and the FSU in the 1990s because it does not have an existing market
economy. Therefore, interim measures might be needed to sustain former WMD
workers on a broad scale. Much would depend on the scope of change that would
allow cooperative threat reduction measures to be implemented. For example, one
could imagine vastly different programs depending on whether or not North Korea
completely dismantled its WMD programs, whether there was a change in
government, and/or whether reunification with South Korea was imminent.

Table 3. Assistance to Tier I States
Tier I WeaponsSecuritySiteSecurityMaterialSecurityPersonnelSecurityNotes
NorthNuclearNuclearNuclear? No inspections now under
KoreaChemChemChemBWC, only treaty which NK
Bio?Bio?Bio?belongs to. Threat from
personnel unlikely now, given
extreme isolation of regime, but
measures should be considered
if regime gives up WMD.
IranChemNuclearNuclear?Iran has undergone enhanced
Bio?ChemCheminspections under Additional
Bio?Bio?Protocol to NPT. Challenge
inspections under CWC?
^Sources^:^CRS.^E^s^tim^a^t^e^s^o^f^W^M^{D c}^a^p^a^b^ilitie^{s a}^r^e^d^r^a^w^{n fr}^o^m^se^mⁱ^a^nnua^{l CI}^A^Unc^l^a^ssifie^d^Re^p^o^r^t
^to^Coⁿ^g^r^{ess o}ⁿ^th^{e A}^c^q^u^isitioⁿ^o^f^T^echⁿ^o^lo^g^y^Relatin^g^to^W^e^a^p^oⁿ^{s o}^f^{Mass Destr}^u^ctioⁿ^an^d
^A^d^v^aⁿ^{ced C}^oⁿ^v^eⁿ^tion^a^{l Mu}ⁿ^ition^s^{(per s}^{ec. 721}^of^{FY1997 Foreig}ⁿ^In^tellig^en^ce^A^u^th^orization^A^c^t).
Iran poses very different issues. It appears fairly evident that although Iran
had made great strides toward putting in place the technical capabilities to produce
fissile material for a nuclear weapon, it is unlikely so far that there are actual nuclear
weapons to secure. There is limited experience in applying enhanced inspections
under interim application of Iran’s Additional Protocol, from December 2003 to
January 2006. Should Iran become a candidate for CTR-like assistance, ratification
of its Additional Protocol would be necessary. IAEA inspections can also provide
feedback on nuclear personnel issues, as inspectors develop relationships with
scientific personnel. Iran is known to have chemical weapons and thought likely to
have biological weapons. In this context, measures to secure such weapons, their
sites, and materials could be useful, if political agreement could be reached on their
eradication. As a member of the CWC, however, declaring and inspecting weapons
before their destruction would be required.
Iraq is no longer covered in this report as a Tier I state because it was
removed from the state sponsors of terrorism list in October 2004. However, the
United States budgeted $900 million to the Iraq Survey Group (in FY2003 and
FY2004 supplemental requests) to find and destroy weapons of mass destruction.
Although no actual weapons were uncovered, sites and material were secured, and
a program was established to retrain Iraqi WMD scientists, beginning with a $2M
effort by the State Department to provide alternative employment.
Tier II: Cuba, Sudan, and Syria
Cuba, Sudan, and Syria comprise the second tier of state sponsors of terrorism
with WMD capabilities.⁵² Of these four, Cuba and Sudan may pose less serious

⁵² Libya, before June 2006, was designated a State Sponsor of Terrorism and had previously
(continued...)

WMD threats. Concerns over Syria’s WMD focus largely on chemical weapons.
Table 4, below, breaks out these capabilities and potential areas of assistance.
Table 4. Assistance to Tier II States
Tier IIWeaponsSiteMaterialPersonnelNotes
Security Security Security Security
CubaNoneBio?Bio?Less UrgentIntelligence mixed on Cuba’s bio
program.
SudanNoneChem?Chem? Less UrgentChemical weapons aspirations
are suspected, even though a
signatory to CWC. Challenge
inspections?
SyriaChemChemChem?Strong capabilities in chemical
Bio?Bio?Bio?weapons; less certain about bio.
Repressive regime may make
“freelancing” difficult for
scientists
^Sources^:^CRS.^E^s^tim^a^t^e^s^o^f^W^M^D^c^a^p^a^b^ilitie^s^a^r^e^d^r^a^w^{n fr}^o^m^se^mⁱ^a^nnua^{l CI}^A^Unc^l^a^ssifie^d^Re^p^o^r^t
^to^Coⁿ^g^r^{ess o}ⁿ^th^{e A}^c^q^u^isitioⁿ^o^f^T^echⁿ^o^lo^g^y^Relatin^g^to^W^e^a^p^oⁿ^{s o}^f^{Mass Destr}^u^ctioⁿ^an^d
^A^d^v^aⁿ^ced^C^oⁿ^v^eⁿ^tion^a^{l Mu}ⁿ^ition^s^{(per s}^{ec. 721}^of^{FY1997 Foreig}ⁿ^In^tellig^en^{ce A}^u^th^orization^A^c^t).
The WMD threat from Cuba focuses mostly on dual-use biotechnology
capabilities. Although Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and
Nonproliferation John Bolton has highlighted Cuba’s BW capability, some
intelligence estimates have cast doubt on both Cuba’s intentions and capabilities in
that area. In short, the intelligence is mixed here. If such a capability were put up for
negotiation with the United States, measures would likely focus on site and material
security.
Sudan has featured less prominently in Bush Administration descriptions of
the threat of terrorism and WMD, and has been lauded for its counterterrorism
cooperation. As noted earlier, the most recent CIA unclassified assessment states
that “although Sudan has aspired to a CW program, the US is working with Sudan
to reconcile concerns about its past attempts to seek capabilities from abroad.”⁵³ Any
assistance would likely focus on site and material security; with few indigenous
capabilities, personnel security is less likely to be an urgent issue.
Syria has a known CW program and is believed to be seeking biological
weapons. Should it agree to give up its chemical weapons, assistance could run the
gamut from weapons to personnel security. It is not known to what extent Syrian
scientists may have cooperated (with or without government approval) with other
states or possibly terrorist organizations. As in other cases of repressive regimes,

⁵² (...continued)
been included in this tier.
⁵³ CIA, WMD Technology Acquisition, January-June 2003.

however, it is possible that “freelancing” opportunities for scientists may have, until
now, been quite limited. In the biological area, assistance could focus on site and
material security.
Tier III: States with WMD Capabilities and Terrorist Activities
on their Soil
Table 5, below, summarizes kinds of assistance that might be critical to states
with WMD capabilities and terrorist activities on their soil, but which are not state
sponsors of terrorism.
Table 5. Assistance to Tier III States
Tier IIIWeaponsSiteMaterialPersonnelNotes
Security Security Security Security
PakistanNuclearNuclearNuclearUrgentNuclear weapons, site, material
Chem?Chem?Chem?& personnel security; perhaps
most urgent proliferation
problem today. Political
instability adds to threat.
Although a member of CWC,
suspected CW capability.
IndiaNuclearNuclearNuclear?Like Pakistan, also not a
Chem?Chem?member of the NPT. Generally
less concern than in the case of
Pakistan about terrorist access
to nuclear capabilities. CW
destruction ongoing as declared
under CWC.
IsraelNuclearNuclearNuclear?Presumed tight security on
ChemChemChemnuclear weapons. CW unknown
Bio?Bio?but thought likely. Bio in R&D
stage?
AlgeriaChem?Chem?Chem??Suspected CW capability; Bio
Bi o? Bi o? R&D.
EgyptChem?Chem?Chem??Likely CW capability; reported
Bio?Bio?BW research.
SaudiChem?Chem?Chem??Suspected CW capability,
Arabiadespite CWC membership.
^Sources^:^CRS.^E^s^tim^a^t^e^s^o^f^W^M^{D c}^a^p^a^b^ilitie^{s a}^r^e^d^r^a^wⁿ^fr^o^m^se^mⁱ^a^nnua^{l CI}^A^Unc^l^a^ssifie^d^Re^p^o^r^t
^to^Coⁿ^g^r^{ess o}ⁿ^th^{e A}^c^q^u^isitⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^T^echⁿ^o^lo^g^y^Relatin^g^to^W^eap^oⁿ^{s o}^f^{Mass Destr}^u^ctioⁿ^an^d
^A^d^v^aⁿ^{ced C}^oⁿ^v^eⁿ^tion^a^{l Mu}ⁿ^ition^s^(per^s^ec.⁷²¹^of^FY1997^Foreigⁿ^In^tellig^en^{ce A}^u^th^orization^A^c^t.)
In Pakistan, repeated assassination attempts on President Musharraf,
allegations and admissions of nuclear assistance to North Korea, Iran, and Libya, and
a continuous battle with terrorist elements within the country, have made Pakistan
the most crucial node of the nexus of terrorism and WMD proliferation. In addition,

a combination of doctrinal preference (for first use of nuclear weapons) and
conventional force inferiority has given Pakistan strong incentives to forward-deploy
its nuclear forces, leading many observers to conclude that assistance to secure
Pakistan’s nuclear warheads could be critical.⁵⁴ With respect to the known nuclear
program and chemical weapons, assistance could run the range of options, from
weapons to personnel security. Recent revelations about Pakistani assistance to the
Iranian nuclear program also have heightened longstanding concerns regarding
proliferation by prominent scientists, with or without Pakistani government approval.
Nonetheless, Pakistani officials’ repeated statements to the press about the security
of their arsenal appear to reflect a “hands-off” attitude, implying that Pakistan is quite
able to protect and secure its own weapons.⁵⁵ More importantly, however, the
sensitivity surrounding nuclear weapons in the past has been such that even between
the closest of allies — for example, the United States and the United Kingdom —
proposals to share permissive action links (PALs, which only allow authorized
parties to arm the warhead) reportedly were met with disinterest.⁵⁶
The proliferation potential of the Indian nuclear program appears to be less
severe than it is for Pakistan. However, multiple Indian suppliers have been
sanctioned by the Bush Administration for supplying chemical weapons precursors
to countries such as Iraq and Iran.⁵⁷ India is currently destroying its chemical
weapons under the CWC, but some assistance could possibly help speed that process.
In both the case of India and Pakistan, assistance in the nuclear area is likely to be
severely curtailed by their non-NPT status (see discussion on constraints).
Nonetheless, on January 12, 2004, President Bush announced a new strategic
partnership with India that would focus on three areas of cooperation: civilian nuclear
technology, space technology and high-technology trade.⁵⁸ U.S. officials reportedly
stated that any space technology must not be used in India’s ballistic missile program
and civilian nuclear technology must not be used in India’s nuclear weapons
program.⁵⁹
Israel fits into a similar category as India and Pakistan, but there are several
key differences. Israel has adhered to a policy of ambiguity about its nuclear
weapons capabilities (which likely would limit its receptivity to assistance) and has

⁵⁴ See CRS Report RL31589, Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan,
for a discussion of the pros and cons of such assistance.
⁵⁵ Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry issued the following statement: “Our nuclear assets are 100%
secure, under multiple custody.” Kyoto News Service, October 2, 2001.
⁵⁶ Stein, Peter and Feaver, Peter, Assuring Control of Nuclear Weapons: The Evolution of
Permissive Action Links, Center for Science and International Affairs, CSIA Occasional
Paper No. 2, Harvard University, 1987, p. 86. Stein and Feaver wrote that the United States
attempted to describe PAL technology to the British, who did not show much interest.
⁵⁷ See [http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c15231.htm].
⁵⁸ See [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040112-1.html] for press
release.
⁵⁹ “U.S. to Send India Nuclear, Space Technology,” Washington Post, January 13, 2004.
See CRS Report RL33016, US Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress, for a
description of the status of US-India nuclear cooperation and issues for Congress.

not been subject to U.S.-proliferation-related sanctions. Israel has not ever been
named as a proliferator by U.S. government sources and few have expressed concerns
about the safety or security of its WMD arsenals. Some assistance in securing its
nuclear program would likely be curtailed, as in the case of India and Pakistan, by
international and U.S. laws prohibiting assistance to states outside the NPT.
Assistance in the CW and BW areas could probably focus on site, material, and
personnel security.
Algeria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia all have significant problems with terrorism
on their soil and all three are suspected of having chemical weapons capabilities.
Algeria and Egypt additionally are thought to have conducted BW research. Algerian
and Saudi CW capabilities could be handled by the OPCW (Secretariat for the
CWC), but Egypt is not a member of the CWC.
Constraints on Assistance
There may be political, technical, and legal constraints on U.S. assistance to
some of the states mentioned above. Above all, these countries have to be willing
to negotiate with the United States on reducing the WMD threat. In the best possible
world, that would mean abandoning their WMD programs (like Libya has done); less
desirable would be for them to curtail such programs. And in some cases, it may
even be difficult for countries to admit they have such programs. States would need
to calculate the value of such WMD programs to the state’s national security,
prestige, and regional stature, the potential benefits for abandoning such programs,
and the likelihood of punitive actions by the United States (and/or the world
community) if it does not abandon such programs. Such political constraints may
pose the most formidable hurdles to U.S. assistance.
Technical hurdles are clearly secondary constraints, but they can lead to
questions about the effectiveness of verifying threat reduction programs. CTR
programs in the former Soviet Union, despite political willingness to participate in
the CTR program, have been dogged for years by questions about their effectiveness
for both political and technical reasons. Technical constraints stem primarily from
incomplete knowledge of a country’s WMD program, which makes it difficult to
scope and prioritize the proliferation problems. Lastly, there may be legal hurdles in
providing assistance, both because of U.S. treaty obligations and domestic laws
prohibiting assistance to proliferators and state sponsors of terrorism.
Political Constraints
In some cases, no amount of pressure from the United States is likely to
convince some states to give up certain WMD programs — for example, the nuclear
programs of India, Pakistan, and Israel. These states perceive nuclear weapons as
crucial to balancing regional security, and ultimately, to their own survival. Barring
a change in the regional balance of power that would make nuclear weapons
unnecessary, there likely will be strong resistance to efforts to increase transparency
of those weapons programs. And, in fact, transparency may not always improve
stability in some regions, nor may it be perceived to help a country’s national

security. One could argue that in the case of North Korea, ambiguity has served its
national security better than the relative transparency of the Agreed Framework years.
In the Middle East, countries such as Israel, Iraq, and Iran have relied on ambiguity
or outright deception to mask their WMD programs. In the case of Pakistan, which
has taken fewer pains to hide its nuclear program, its history of clandestine foreign
procurement and sales of sensitive technologies could make greater transparency
politically painful. In short, a culture of secrecy, which was not easily overcome in
the case of Russia, may be as difficult, if not more difficult, to overcome in the case
of other states. On the other hand, professional pride on the scientific or military
levels may provide for some cooperation.
Other countries may perceive direct and indirect benefits to foreswearing
WMD programs. Such countries are unlikely to be lured merely by the promise of
nonproliferation assistance, but adhering to the nonproliferation regime may bring
greater political acceptance, more technical assistance in other areas, and the lifting
of sanctions. Many observers believe that Libya was largely motivated to foreswear
its WMD programs because it was one of the last major concessions required before
lifting U.S. sanctions. In addition, however, Libyan leaders may have perceived their
WMD programs as no longer vital to Libya’s national security, regional stature, or
prestige. Some might argue that Libya gave up its WMD precisely because they were
not very successful programs. This is exactly the kind of cost-benefit analysis U.S.
nonproliferation efforts seek to promote.
Assuming, whether coerced or persuaded, a country has ended its WMD
programs, some constraints may still arise. In the case of Iraq, the U.S. search for
WMD-related items and to provide for site, material, and personnel security, has been
hampered by the chaos caused by the war and a decade of deception. For example,
there is a significant gap in information about mid-level Iraqi WMD scientists, which
complicates decisions about who should receive assistance. In general, incomplete
knowledge of a country’s WMD program can complicate provision of assistance. In
the case of Russia, political willingness to accept assistance did not extend to all
areas of Russia’s WMD programs. For example, U.S. officials have never gained
access to the four military facilities associated with Russia’s biological weapons
program. With respect to nuclear material protection, control, and accounting
programs, most of the material, according to one report, remains outside of the
program because the United States cannot gain access to sensitive facilities.⁶⁰ It is
not difficult to imagine that the same levels of secrecy encountered in the case of
Russia might be encountered in other states. It is possible that more secrecy may be
attached to biological and nuclear weapons programs than for chemical weapons
programs. In addition, it may be possible to know about some kinds of sites (dual-
use facilities like chemical production sites, uranium enrichment or plutonium
reprocessing) but not others — for example, weapons machining or assembly sites.
If a country has made a decision to end one but perhaps not other WMD
programs (e.g., Pakistan decides to give up chemical weapons but not nuclear
weapons), the need to preserve secrecy about the other WMD program(s) may limit

⁶⁰ U.S. General Accounting Office, WMD: Reducing the Threat from the Former Soviet
Union: An Update, GAO/NSIAD-95-165, June 1995.

transparency. If a country accepts some assistance for an ongoing WMD program
(e.g., Pakistan accepts security assistance for its nuclear warheads but does not give
them up), providing such assistance could raise the question of whether the United
States tacitly accepts that WMD program. In fact, some kinds of assistance (like
permissive action links to make nuclear weapons safe from unauthorized use) could
be viewed as actively helping a WMD program and would likely be prohibited by
U.S. and international laws (see Legal Constraints discussion below).
The existing level of cooperation between the United States and some of these
countries will likely affect some aspects of assistance. A country that has not been
cooperating with the United States on counterterrorism may be less likely to
cooperate on nonproliferation. On the other hand, a country like Pakistan, which has
been cooperating closely with the United States in the war on terrorism, may be given
a “free ride” on proliferation, for fear of eroding antiterrorism cooperation and
jeopardizing delicate political balances in the region.
Technical Constraints
There are two basic technical constraints in providing assistance: getting
accurate information and being able to verify it and ensuring that assistance does not
aid or benefit a WMD capability that will continue to exist.
Information about weapons of mass destruction programs is closely held even
in the most open of societies. While U.S. intelligence assets can pick up remarkable
details about WMD programs, the recent U.S. government assessments of WMD
capabilities in Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya point strikingly to the fact that what
we know is just a small fraction of the entire picture. Even for advanced WMD
programs that have existed for years, details are few. For example, a senior Bush
administration official described on Pakistan’s nuclear program, saying “It’s what we
don’t know that worries us, including the critical question of how much fissile
material Pakistan now holds — and where it holds it.” ⁶¹ More recently the
Washington Post reported that Pakistan was building a new plutonium production
reactor, sparking a debate about how much U.S. officials really knew about the
react or.⁶²
Although the United States is certain that North Korea has a uranium
enrichment program, it has only been able to narrow down the location of an
enrichment plant to three sites. For chemical and biological weapons programs,
which rely on extensive dual-use materials and facilities, there may be even fewer
details on which to base assessments. Information from the defector Ken Alibek
revealed a far more extensive Soviet BW program than previously thought and even
though the U.S. CTR program has elements for BW site, material, and personnel
security, there are few who would agree that we know the full extent of the program
even today.

⁶¹ “A Nuclear Headache: What if the Radicals Oust Musharraf?” New York Times,
December 30, 2003.
⁶² “Pakistan Expanding Nuclear Program,” Washington Post, July 24, 2006.

In general, it may be possible to know more about material production sites
than about weapons production/assembly or weapons storage sites. Without
knowledge of where vulnerabilities lie, it will be difficult to target even the most
rudimentary assistance. In the case of Russia and the NIS, U.S. government officials
have complained for years that Russia has not provided the kinds of access necessary
for the United States to ensure that its goals are being met. With respect to the
material protection, control and accounting programs, most of the material, according
to one report, remains outside of the program because the United States cannot gain
access to sensitive facilities.⁶³
A second technical hurdle is ensuring that U.S. assistance does not improve
WMD capabilities. Some kinds of assistance do not run this risk — for example,
providing physical security barriers for facilities or improving personnel reliability
testing. Improving weapon transportation and storage security, however, might run
such a risk. Some innovations may have unintended consequences. For example,
permissive action links, which were developed by the United States in the 1960s,
were designed so that unauthorized users would not be able to produce a nuclear
yield from the weapon. At the same time, however, it was recognized that weapons
with PALs on them are more deployable. Such devices, if given to India and
Pakistan in the name of decreasing the possibility that such weapons could be stolen
and used, could also increase those weapons’ operational readiness.
Legal Constraints: Treaty Obligations
Treaty obligations may play a role in limiting assistance, both from the
perspective of U.S. obligations and for the states in question. The relevant treaties
are the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). The United
States is a party to all three treaties. Each of these treaties contains language that
generally prohibits transferring such weapons, assisting, encouraging or inducing any
other state (under the NPT, non-nuclear weapon states) to manufacture or acquire
weapons. (For the text of the relevant language in each treaty, see Appendix A.) In
addition, the United States is prohibited by the NPT from helping non-nuclear
weapon-states “control” nuclear devices (with the term “control” left undefined) and
prohibited under the CWC from engaging in preparations to use chemical weapons,
which could be broadly interpreted.
In general, questions of treaty compliance were not publicly raised by U.S.
assistance to Russia and the FSU. Nuclear assistance to the Soviet Union, because
it was a nuclear weapons state by the terms of the NPT, was never questioned. In the
CW area, most of the assistance to Russia has focused on helping Russia comply
with the CWC (primarily in destruction). While some CW scientists may have
participated in the International Science Centers, there has been no public criticism
that assistance has helped the Russian CW program. With respect to Russia’s
biological weapons program, there has been some uncertainty about whether
assistance to BW scientists in certain institutes could benefit the Russian BW

⁶³ U.S. General Accounting Office, WMD: Reducing the Threat from the Former Soviet
Union: An Update. GAO/NSIAD-95-165, June 1995.

program, but no one has publicly suggested that the United States has not complied
with its BWC obligations.⁶⁴
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Under Article I of the NPT, the
United States is prohibited from transferring to any state (nuclear weapon state, non-
nuclear weapon state, party or non-party to the Treaty) nuclear weapons, nuclear
explosive devices or control over such weapons or devices, directly or indirectly. It
is not readily apparent what is meant by “control” over such weapons; a narrow⁶⁵
interpretation would focus on the ability of another state to use such a weapon. A
broader interpretation might conclude that better safety, security, or command and
control measures would provide another state with improved control of its nuclear
weapons, perhaps violating this obligation not to (indirectly) transfer control.
The second part of the obligation lies in not assisting, encouraging or
inducing non-nuclear weapon states to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or
explosive devices. The negotiators of the NPT reportedly intended to interpret
“manufacture” broadly, from the beginning of the acquisition cycle to the end.⁶⁶
Non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT are obligated not to seek or receive any
assistance in the manufacture of such weapons under Article II.⁶⁷ Presumably, this
would cover assistance that enhanced command and control of weapons, including
permissive action link (PAL) technology. India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea
would not be bound by such an obligation since they are not parties to the NPT. Iran,
on the other hand, would be bound by that obligation.
The U.S. State Department has not made a public finding on what might
constitute a violation of Article I under the NPT, but its legal advisors have examined
precedents in the application of U.S. domestic law. In general, they have advised that
the closer assistance is attached to the nuclear weapons programs, the more likely it
could run afoul of U.S. legal obligations, both under international treaty obligations

⁶⁴ U.S. General Accounting Office, Biological Weapons: Effort to Reduce Former Soviet
Threat Offers Benefits, Poses New Risks, GAO/NSIAD-00-138, April 2000. See discussion
of risks of assistance, which include sustaining Russia’s existing BW infrastructure,
maintaining or advancing Russian scientists’ skills to develop offensive BW and potential
misuse of U.S. assistance to fund offensive research, pp. 29-34.
⁶⁵ During the negotiation of the NPT, concerns about transferring “control” focused on allies
(e.g. NATO) making command and control decisions for U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in
Europe. See Willrich, Nonproliferation Treaty, p. 71 ff. Stein and Feaver argue that
Permissive Action Links were introduced as a result of congressional concern about loose
command and control of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. See also Feaver, Peter Douglas,
Guarding the Guardians, (NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 199ff.
⁶⁶ Willrich, Nonproliferation Treaty, pp. 91-93.
⁶⁷ “Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer
from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or
of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture
or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek
or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.” Article II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

and domestic law. Thus, some kinds of aid (e.g., food or humanitarian aid) could be
considered, in the extreme, to be assisting or encouraging a nuclear weapons program
because they free up resources that the target government can put towards a nuclear
weapons program but are permitted in practice because they do not have a close
association with a nuclear weapons program. If assistance took the form of
transferrable funds, however, the possibility of linkage to a nuclear weapons program
might be considered to be greater.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). There are two provisions in
Article I of the CWC that might affect U.S. assistance: first, the prohibition on
engaging in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; and second, the
prohibition on assisting, encouraging, or inducing, in any way, anyone to engage in
any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention. Although U.S.
assistance clearly would not aim to contravene the treaty, some actions, even
temporary, could be interpreted as violating that obligation if they resulted in greater
security of chemical weapons and not immediate destruction. If weapons security
measures were implemented (e.g., security from terrorist access), they would need
to be accompanied by demilitarization measures (separation from weapon launchers,
etc.). As evidenced by delays in the destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons
stockpile, destruction could take years. Any such activities with non-CWC parties
(Egypt, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria, for purposes here) could be interpreted as
falling under the prohibition against assisting, encouraging, or inducing...anyone to
engage in any activity prohibited under the Convention.
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). As in the cases of the NPT
and CWC, a key provision here may be the prohibition on assistance, encouragement,
or inducing of any State, group of States or international organization to acquire
agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, or means of delivery prohibited by the
Convention. Measures that included just assistance to scientists but not BW
destruction, or measures that included weapons and site security but no destruction
might fall into that category. The likelihood is small, but future recipients may be
just as reluctant as the Russians have been to allow access to the most sensitive BW-
related sites, accepting assistance at lesser sites.
Legal Constraints: Nonproliferation and Anti-Terrorism Laws
U.S. domestic laws contain the following restrictions that may be relevant to
providing assistance to the states covered in this report: restrictions on financial
assistance, exports (defense and dual-use) to states that have poor proliferation
records (as recipients or suppliers of proliferation-related goods and technology);
restrictions on financial assistance, exports to states on state sponsors of terrorism
list; and restrictions on nuclear material and nuclear weapons cooperation. Many of
these restrictions overlap in the legislation. For example, the Foreign Assistance Act
carries prohibitions for both proliferation- and terrorism-related activities. Table 6,
below, lists the key legislation.

CRS-31
Table 6. Applicable Laws for Proliferation and Terrorism
^Tⁱ^tle^P^roliferation^T^erroris^m^E^ffect^Countries^Affected^Pres^idential
^Sa^nctⁱ^oⁿ^s^Sa^nctⁱ^oⁿ^s^Waiver?
^port^-^Im^port^Ban^k^A^c^t^of^{1945 (P.L}^.^X^X^Fⁱⁿ^an^cin^g^cu^tof^f^f^o^{r th}^os^{e w}^h^{o v}ⁱ^{olate n}^u^c^lear^North^{Korea, Iraq}^Yes
^173;^P.L^.^107-¹⁸⁹⁾^S^{ec 2 (b) (4)}^s^a^f^e^g^u^a^rds^ag^reem^en^{t an}^{d th}^os^{e w}^h^{o deton}^a^te^(w^ai^v^e^{d), Iran}^{, C}^u^ba,
^Nu^clearⁿ^u^c^l^{ear ex}^pl^osⁱ^v^{e dev}ⁱ^{ce af}^t^e^{r 1977.}^Lⁱ^by^{a (w}^aiv^e^d),
^Sud^a^{n, Sy}^rⁱ^a,
^P^a^kⁱ^s^t^an^(w^aiv^e^d),
^In^{dia (w}^aiv^e^d)
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32359}^omⁱ^c^En^erg^y^A^c^t^of¹⁹⁵⁴^X^N^oⁿ^u^c^l^{ear cooperat}ⁱ^oⁿ^w^/ⁿ^u^c^l^{ear cooperat}ⁱ^oⁿ^No^rth^Ko^rea,^Yes
^g/w^{. 83-}⁷⁰³⁾^Nu^{clear, Sec. 129}^ag^reem^en^{t. Non}^-ⁿ^u^c^{lear w}^eapon^s^t^ates^m^u^s^t^h^a^v^e^P^a^kⁱ^s^t^an^{, In}^{dia, Is}^rael
^s^.or^{full sc}^o^p^e^sa^fe^gua^r^d^s.
^le^ak^rei^gⁿ^A^s^sⁱ^s^t^an^{ce A}^c^t^of^{1961 (P.L}^.^X^X^Ai^d^c^u^t^o^ff^North^{Korea, Iraq}^Yes
^://wiki¹⁹⁵⁾^S^{ec 620 E (e)}^(P^res^s^l^er)^S^{ec 620 A}^N^o^f^o^rei^gⁿ^/^f^{ood ai}^{d, Ex}^-^I^m^ban^k^f^o^{r s}^t^at^es^on^ter^r^o^r^ism^list^(w^ai^v^e^{d), Iran}^{, C}^u^ba,^Lⁱ^by^a*^{, S}^u^dan^,^S^y^ri^a,^Aⁿ^ti-^ter^r^o^r^ism^,
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^prog^ram

CRS-32
^Tⁱ^tle^P^roliferation^T^erroris^m^E^ffect^Countries^Affected^Pres^idential
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^m^s^Ex^p^o^r^{t Co}ⁿ^t^r^o^{l A}^c^t^X^X^Ex^port^s^{, ai}^{d cu}^t^o^f^f^North^{Korea, Iraq}^Yes
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CRS-33
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ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32359}^{. 109-}^112);^am^en^{ded by}^S^.^{3728 (n}^o^b^{lic law}ⁿ^u^m^b^e^r^y^e^{t av}^ailab^l^e)^law^s^s^u^ppl^yⁱⁿ^g^WMD^-^r^e^lated^item^s^to^o^r
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^h^ttp^{itle VIII, P}^L^106-¹¹³⁾^Nu^clear^A^g^{reed Fram}^ew^ork^;
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^cooperatⁱ^oⁿ^ag^reem^en^t
⁶⁸ A presidential determination terminated ILSA for Libya on April 23, 2004. The President determined that Libya fulfilled
requirements of all U.N. resolutions relating to the downing of Pan Am 103. See CRS Report RS20871 and Presidential Determination
No. 2004-30, Available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040423-10.html]

CRS-34
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^Sa^nctⁱ^oⁿ^s^Sa^nctⁱ^oⁿ^s^Waiver?
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^P^r^o^g^r^a^m^s^A^p^p^r^o^p^r^iatioⁿ^s^A^c^t,^of^t^e^rrori^s^m^{Korea, Iran}^,^S^y^ri^a^{Sec. 507}
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^{act to an}^y^couⁿ^t^ry^w^h^ich^th^{e P}^r^es^iden^t^fo^r^na^tⁱ^o^na^l
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ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32359}^{. 108-}¹⁷⁵⁾^item^s^C^h^oi^{ce of}^{2 of}^{6 s}^aⁿ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^s
^g/w
^s^.or
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^://wiki
^h^ttp

Nonproliferation Laws. Nonproliferation laws generally seek to prohibit
sensitive technologies from going to states that are suspected proliferators and to
impose sanctions on states and individuals for objectionable proliferation behavior.
Many of these laws have provisions for a waiver if the President determines that U.S.
national security interests are better served by engagement rather than restrictions.
(A complete list of legislation is available in CRS Report RL31502, Nuclear,
Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation Sanctions: Selected Current Law,
and CRS Report RL31559, Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status.)
In brief, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended, (42 USC 2053 et seq)
ensures that U.S. nuclear technology will not go to proliferators; for the most part,
it is unlikely that the kinds of assistance the United States might offer under an
expanded CTR program (for weapons, site, material, or personnel security) would
fall under the categories covered by these laws. The Foreign Assistance Act and the
Arms Export Control Act punish proliferators by prohibiting U.S. military sales and
economic or military assistance. The Export Administration Act of 1979 restricts
exports of goods and technologies, including dual-use technologies, for foreign
policy and national security reasons, and the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945
includes restrictions on the extension of credit for proliferation and terrorism reasons.
It should be noted that all proliferation-related sanctions against Pakistan and India
stemming from the 1998 nuclear explosive tests have been lifted; many of these
constraints can be lifted by Presidential waiver. In 2005, the Energy Policy Act (P.L.
109-58; Section 632) amended the Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act to include
a cutoff of nuclear exports to states that are designated state sponsors of terrorism.
Anti-terrorism Laws. Sanctions against other countries for their support
for international terrorism are four basic types:
^!ban on arms-related exports and sales
^!controls on dual-use item exports (requires 30-day congressional
notification)
^!prohibition on economic assistance
^!miscellaneous financial and other restrictions, including U.S.
opposition to World Bank, IMF loans, and ban on DOD contracts
over $100,000.⁶⁹
The specific laws that contain these bans have been described in great detail in other
CRS reports.⁷⁰ In general, Cuba, Libya, and Iran are all subject to comprehensive
embargoes; North Korea is subject to economic sanctions, and Sudan and Syria are
subject to specific sanctions. In addition, Iran is subject to the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act.

⁶⁹ Patterns in Global Terrorism 2002, p. 77.
⁷⁰ See, for example, CRS Report RL32727, Syria: Political Conditions and Relations with
the United States After the Iraq War; CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy
Responses; CRS Report RL32604, Libya: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions;
CRS Report RL31696, North Korea: Economic Sanctions, CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and
the State Sponsors of Terrorism List.

Perhaps the most salient legislation is what has become known as the “state
sponsors of terrorism list,” as provided for in Section 6 (j) (1) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)l). States can be removed from
that list in two ways. First, the President could submit a report to Congress certifying
that (1) there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the
government of the country concerned; (2) the government is not supporting acts of
international terrorism; and (3) the government has provided assurances that it will
not support acts of international terrorism in the future. The second option is for the
President to submit a report to Congress, at least 45 days before the proposed recision
will take effect, justifying the recision and certifying that (1) the government
concerned has not provided any support for international terrorism during the
preceding six-month period; and (2) the government has provided assurances that it
will not support acts of international terrorism in the future. Both Iraq and Libya have
been removed from the list in the last few years.
In addition, however, two other “terrorism lists” may apply. The first is
Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, which prohibits the export of munitions
to governments that repeatedly provide support for international terrorism, and
Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which prohibits most assistance
to countries supporting international terrorism. Section 40 of the AECA has a
specific procedure for Congress to consider a joint resolution to block the President’s
removal of a country from the terrorism list. Both Section 40 of the AECA and
Section 620A of the FAA include presidential waiver authority for national security
interests or humanitarian reasons. It is likely that a sweeping lift of sanctions would
occur only in the context of overall improved relations and with Congressional
concurrence that the sanctions regime ought to be undone.
Nuclear Cooperation/Nuclear Weapons Cooperation. The Atomic
Energy Act (AEA) governs nuclear cooperation and restricts sharing of information
related to nuclear weapons. It is unlikely that the United States would include
“significant” nuclear cooperation with any of the states in question under an
expanded CTR program (e.g., sales of nuclear reactors, nuclear material, or major⁷¹
reactor components). Significant nuclear cooperation with states such as India,
Pakistan, Israel, or North Korea would require that they abandon their nuclear⁷²
weapons programs and adopt full-scope safeguards. Moreover, Section 129 of the
AEA states that
No nuclear material and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology shall be
exported to: (1) any non-nuclear-weapon state that is found by the President
to have, at any time after March 10, 1978 a) detonated a nuclear explosive
device; or b) terminated or abrogated IAEA safeguards; or c) materially
violated an IAEA safeguards agreement; or d) engaged in activities
involving source or special nuclear material and having direct significance
for the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, and has

⁷¹ Major reactor components include primary coolant pumps, pressure vessels, control rod
drive systems, and on-line fuel charging and discharging equipment for CANDU reactors.
⁷² In 2005, however, President Bush proposed to conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement
with India. On July 27, 2006, the House passed H.R. 5682, which authorizes the President
to create an exception for India from current restrictions on nuclear cooperation.

failed to take steps which, in the President’s judgment, represent sufficient
progress toward terminating such activities...
Some states are additionally subject to country-specific restrictions on nuclear
cooperation agreements. For example, the North Korea Threat Reduction Act of
1999 stipulated that no significant nuclear cooperation could occur with North Korea
unless relevant congressional committees were informed that North Korea: a) was in
full compliance with its nuclear safeguards agreement; b) gave the IAEA full access
to nuclear sites; c) took steps to implement the Joint Declaration on the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; d) had no enrichment or reprocessing
activities and made no significant progress in acquiring, testing, producing, or
deploying a nuclear explosive device; and e) had no nuclear weapons. In addition,
the President must notify Congress that the transfer of key nuclear components was
in the national security interests of the United States. Some of these requirements are
already contained in existing laws, but others are not — for example, implementing
the joint declaration.
In the event that the United States contemplates sharing sensitive nuclear
information (e.g., information related to safety and security of nuclear weapons),
Section 144 of the AEA stipulates that the Secretary of Energy may release Restricted
Data on various aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle except those related to the design
or fabrication of atomic weapons. The Secretary of Defense may exchange Restricted
Data if it is necessary to a) develop defense plans; b) train personnel in employing
and defending against nuclear weapons; c) evaluate the capabilities of potential
enemies in employing nuclear weapons; d) develop compatible delivery systems for
nuclear weapons.
The President can authorize the Secretary of Energy, with the assistance of
the Department of Defense, to exchange Restricted Data on atomic weapons with
another country provided that a) communication of Restricted Data is necessary to
improve that nation’s nuclear weapon design, development, or fabrication capability;
and b) that nation has made “substantial progress in the development of atomic
weapons.” When the language on “substantial progress” was added in 1958, the only
nation that met the qualification was the United Kingdom. In general, most weapons-
related data, including some on safety, security, fuze and firing, are classified as
restricted data or formerly restricted data. It is unlikely that the President would
authorize such an exchange of Restricted Data under this provision of the Atomic
Energy Act, particularly to states such as India and Pakistan.
Dual-Use Exports. Transfers of nuclear-related equipment or nuclear
material that do not meet the requirement for an agreement of cooperation could
possibly still require full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply under the Nuclear
Suppliers’ Group (NSG) guidelines. Since 1992, NSG member states have required⁷³

full-scope safeguards as a condition for supplying items on the NSG “trigger list.”
⁷³ The “trigger list” governs the “export of items that are especially designed or prepared
for nuclear use. These include (i) nuclear material; (ii) nuclear reactors and equipment
therefor; (iii) non-nuclear material for reactors; (iv) plant and equipment for the
reprocessing, enrichment and conversion of nuclear material and for fuel fabrication and
(continued...)

In addition, the Department of Commerce requires a license for exporting items on
the NSG’s dual-use list (those with nuclear and other applications) to states outside
the NSG. Many of the states that could be potential recipients of U.S. CTR
assistance are not members of the NSG.
More broadly, the Commerce Control List specifies what items are regulated
and why, but an equally important consideration is the question of the end-user. One
technique for streamlining the export control system and making it more
understandable for exporters was the development of the entities lists. The
Department of Commerce maintains a list of entities subject to license requirements
(see Supplement 4 to Part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations). At
present, the entities of proliferation concern are located in China, India, Israel,
Pakistan, and Russia. Exports of items controlled for nuclear proliferation and missile
technology reasons are reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
Under the 1990 Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI), the
Department of Commerce can impose licensing requirements on exports and
reexports of goods and technology that would normally be uncontrolled where there
is an unacceptable risk of diversion to activities related to nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons or missile proliferation. U.S. exporters are required to apply for
a license if they have knowledge of or have reason to know that such exports will be
used directly or indirectly in any one of the following activities: nuclear explosive
activities, unsafeguarded nuclear activities, or safeguarded and unsafeguarded
activities to produce special nuclear material (through reprocessing or enrichment),
produce heavy water or fabricate nuclear fuel that uses plutonium. Section 744.2 of
the Export Administration Regulations provides eight criteria for assessing license
applications. Potentially, the most significant of these criteria is the nonproliferation
credentials of the importing country, which include whether the state adheres to the
NPT, has full-scope safeguards, and has an agreement for cooperation with the
United States and whether the actions, statements, and policies of the state support
nuclear nonproliferation.⁷⁴

⁷³ (...continued)
heavy water production; and (v) technology associated with each of the above items.” The
“dual-use” list governs the export of nuclear related dual-use items and technologies, that
is, items that can make a major contribution to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or
nuclear explosive activity, but which have non-nuclear uses as well, for example in industry.
See [http://www.nsg-online.org/guide.htm].
⁷⁴ Paragraph 744.2 (d) License Review Standards for Restrictions on Certain Nuclear End-
Uses, Part 744 of Export Administration Regulations. The assessment of nonproliferation
credentials is based on a) adherence to NPT or international nuclear nonproliferation
agreement; b) full-scope safeguards or equivalent; c) agreement for cooperation with US;
d) whether state supports nuclear nonproliferation; e) degree to which state cooperates in
nonproliferation policy; and f) intelligence data on state’s nuclear intentions and activities.

Costs and Benefits of Assistance
The United States has provided nonproliferation assistance to many countries
over many years. In some instances, the United States funded projects or programs
because the country in question did not have the resources to fix proliferation
problems. However, as the United States looks increasingly to bilateral “fixes,” two
questions need to be raised: are there enough resources for the United States to tackle
these multiple problems, and do bilateral approaches undermine the multilateral
nonproliferation regime? Two potential costs of undermining international
institutions are decreased global pressure on proliferators and possibly decreased
international support for U.S. policy objectives in other areas. A bilateral approach
may risk capturing the “easy” proliferation problems — like Libya — and
undermining support to tackle the “hard” proliferation problems — like Pakistan and
North Korea. Without clear disarmament steps, assistance could be seen as
rewarding bad behavior, which has been a recent U.S. concern in the case of North
Korea.
Impact on Nonproliferation Regime
For states that are parties to the NPT, BWC, and/or CWC, some treaty
compliance issues may arise. In the case of the BWC, which does not have an
inspection regime, there likely will be less controversy about bilateral inspections
superceding or undermining the treaty. Likewise, there may be less pressure to bring
noncompliance issues to light. For example, Russia, a party to the BWC, declared
that it had an offensive BW program in 1992, twenty years after it signed the treaty.
In the case of the CWC, compliance issues might be handled differently.
Under the CWC, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Israel have not openly
declared stockpiles or capabilities and yet all are suspected of having CW. For
example, if Pakistan has a covert chemical weapons stockpile that it is willing to
dismantle with U.S. help, should Pakistan be declared in violation of the CWC?
Further, would destruction be verified bilaterally or multilaterally under the CWC?
In the case of Libya, the OPCW is overseeing CW destruction, but the United States
has taken on the destruction tasks related to Libya’s nuclear program. If U.S. or other
sanctions were applicable, would they need to be waived?
Hard-core nuclear proliferators pose a different challenge. These states have
remained steadfastly outside the treaty regime and are unlikely to dismantle their
arsenals (with the possible exception of North Korea). If assistance were accepted,
would this confer acceptance of their nuclear weapons status? Would such
acceptance be good or bad for the nonproliferation regime? For example, on January
2, 2004, President Bush stated that “he believes the [Pakistani nuclear] weapons “are
secure.” “That’s important,” he said. “It’s also important that India, as well, have a
secure nuclear weapons program.”⁷⁵ The President’s proposal to engage in peaceful
nuclear cooperation with India has sparked significant criticism that the deal
legitimizes India’s nuclear weapons program. On the other hand, it is clear that

⁷⁵ “Bush Says Pakistan’s Arsenal is Secure,” Washington Post, January 2, 2004.

nuclear weapons status will not be awarded to Iran, and North Korea’s case still
seems ambiguous.
For some observers, the impact of assistance to “new nuclear states” on the
nonproliferation regime is moot because the nuclear programs of India, Pakistan,
Israel, North Korea, Iran, and, formerly, Libya, prove that the regime is broken.
Some observers also believe that CWC or BWC treaty compliance is essentially
impossible to verify and that new tools should be used to mitigate the threat wherever
possible.
Issues for 110^th Congress
Sea Changes in Policy?
Many U.S. administrations have fought both proliferation of WMD and
terrorism but few have connected or coordinated the two. A policy that seeks to
eliminate the nexus of terrorism and WMD confronts more than a few challenges.
One particular challenge is obtaining active cooperation from a diverse group of
states around the world, many of which are not traditional allies of the United States.
According to one observer, the United States hasn’t made really clear “how...a former
state supporter of terrorism stand(s) with the United States and with the rest of the
international community in dealing with that common scourge.”⁷⁶ Libya may provide
an unfolding example of how a former state supporter of terrorism can be redeemed.
An equally challenging question may be how states that were considered
former proliferators stand with the United States and the rest of the international
community. Here, Libya may not offer the best example. Although a long-time
successful supporter of international terrorism (albeit with waning activity in the last
decade), Libya was at best a mediocre proliferator, and decided to give up both
activities in exchange for the lifting of burdensome economic sanctions. A more
troubling example is states that retain their WMD programs but not the stigma of
being a proliferator. Pakistan raises the largest issue for the Bush Administration in
its matrixed war against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction proliferation: has
one goal assumed priority over the other? There have been ample statements from
administration officials since 2001 to the effect that Pakistan has not been pressed on
its proliferation activities because of its strong support in the war against terrorism.
Despite evidence of sales of uranium enrichment equipment to Iran and Libya (and,
the Bush administration maintains, to North Korea), Pakistani proliferation activities
since 2001 are no longer reported to Congress in the semi-annual unclassified Section
721 (of the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act) reports on the acquisition of
technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional
munitions.
The sea change in nonproliferation policy can be traced to the September
2002 National Security Strategy, in which President Bush noted that “The gravest
danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our

⁷⁶ PBS Newshour interview with David Mack on Libya, August 18, 2003.

enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction.”
A few months later, the December 2002 Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction opened with the statement, “Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) —
nuclear, biological, and chemical — in the possession of hostile states and
terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States.”
[emphasis added] Focusing on the terrorism axis has shifted policies to combat
WMD proliferation away from global approaches (at least rhetorically) to tailored
approaches. Paradoxically, this focus on hostile states and terrorists may leave the
global community vulnerable to the proliferation activities of friendly states, whoever
those happen to be at the time.
Recent Legislation
The 109^th Congress considered the following legislation that could restrict the
provision of CTR assistance to some countries. The State Department’s annual
foreign operations appropriations bill, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, includes provisions that prohibit assistance
to ceratin countries. Section 507 of the FY2006 foreign operations appropriations
bill (P.L.109-102) states that no funds will be “obligated or expended to finance
directly any assistance or reparations to Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Iran, or Syria.”
The FY2007 bill passed in the House (H.R. 5522) and awaiting passage in the Senate
includes the same provision. The Iran Freedom Support Act, introduced in both the
House and the Senate (H.R. 282/S. 333), could make supplying CTR assistance to
Iran more difficult. The Iran-Libya Sanction Act (P.L. 104- 172) has been extended
through September 2011, pursuant to the Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293).
Sudan has been severely limited from receiving U.S. assistance since 1997 by a
combination of executive order and U.S. law. These include Executive Order 13067,
Section 520 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2006 (P.L. 109-102), the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of

2004 (P.L. 108-497) and The Sudan Peace Act (P.L. 107-245).

The 109^th also considered legislation that could affect third party states, or any
state that could potentially receive CTR assistance, to the extent such states are
considered for these initiatives. For example, Section 542 of the FY2006 foreign
operations bill (P.L.109-102) prohibited assistance to countries that provide lethal
military equipment to State Sponsors of Terrorism. Other examples include P.L.
109-267 which extended the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, the Iran Nonproliferation
Amendments Act (P.L. 109-112), which added Syria to that Act, and the North Korea
Nonproliferation Act of 2006 (S. 3728), which added North Korea to the Iran —
Syria Nonproliferation Act.
Costs
In its oversight capacity, Congress may wish to consider whether or not
expanding CTR assistance could have a “snowball” effect, particularly if the United
States insists on using its own resources rather than existing multinational
inspectorates. Costs of assistance are likely to be minimal the first one or two years,
but these could escalate, depending on the objectives of the program. In the nuclear
area, the nuclear programs of India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea are far smaller

than Russia’s and unlikely to incur the kinds of costs that the CTR program has thus
far incurred. On the other hand, data are scarce on the state of nuclear materials in
those countries, so it is difficult to determine the scope and time-frame of such a
program. At a minimum, however, such a program is likely to be incrementally
implemented. Costs could be minimal if a quick-fix, low-technology, information-
oriented approach is taken or they could be more substantial if a sophisticated, high-
technology approach is taken that would incorporate cameras, encryption, remote
monitoring, and other means. The same is true in the BW and CW areas; the scope
of the undertaking in Russia greatly outweighs the combination of programs of
relevant states. However, the management of multiple programs could present
particular difficulties.
Certifications
In 1991, the legislation that created the Nunn-Lugar program stipulated that
U.S. assistance in destroying nuclear and other weapons may not be provided to the
Soviet Union, any of its republics, or successor entities unless the President certifies
to the Congress that the proposed recipient is committed to:
^!making a substantial investment of its resources for dismantling or
destroying such weapons;
^!forgo any military modernization that exceeds legitimate defense
requirements or is designed to replace destroyed WMD;
^!forgo the use of fissile materials and other components from
destroyed nuclear weapons in new nuclear weapons;
^!facilitate U.S. verification of weapons destruction that uses U.S.
money;
^!comply with all relevant arms control agreements; and
^!observe internationally recognized human rights, including the
protection of minorities.
Certifications, according to some Administration officials, allow the United
States to hold the recipient states’ “feet to the fire,” providing a source of leverage.
In the view of others, however, they pose unnecessary and even dangerous delays in
implementing CTR programs. In the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act
(P.L. 109-163), Section 1303 of Title XIII extended the three-year authority to waive
certification requirements indefinitely. Section 1304 of S. 2766, the Senate’s version
of the FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act, would have repealed all
certification requirements. However, the version of the defense authorization act
passed in conference (H.R. 5122) does not include provisions to repeal restrictions.
Other Considerations
Congress may wish to consider the implications of providing U.S. assistance
to countries that are not democratically governed. Section 508 of the Foreign^th
Operations bill (P.L.109-102) in the 109 Congress prohibited direct assistance “to
the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed
by decree or military coup.” Most of the six state sponsors of terrorism would fall
in this category. In addition, Pakistan has been subject to such restrictions. P.L. 107-

57, which exempted Pakistan from existing restrictions prohibiting foreign assistance
to any country governed by a military that overthrew a democratically elected regime,
requires the President to determine that foreign assistance “facilitates the transition
to democratic rule in Pakistan” and “is important to United States efforts to respond
to, deter, or prevent acts of international terrorism.”⁷⁷ Pakistan’s exemption was to
run out by October 1, 2003, but this was extended through the end of FY2004 by
language in the emergency supplemental bill (P.L. 108-106), and then through
subsequent foreign operations bills. Currently it is extended through the foreign
operation FY2006 appropriation bill (P.L. 109-102) until the end of FY2006, and
would be extended through FY2007 if the foreign operation FY2007 appropriation
bill passes Congress in its current form (H.R. 5522). The law raises two pertinent
issues: will President Musharraf restore democracy to Pakistan and if not, how would
continued military leadership in Pakistan affect U.S. cooperative efforts, particularly
if new military leadership emerges? In the absence of regime change, similar
questions might be raised about efforts conducted with Cuba and Syria.

⁷⁷ See CRS Report RS20995, India and Pakistan: Current U.S. Economic Sanctions.

Appendix A.
Relevant treaty texts relating to obligations not to assist non-weapon states in
acquiring nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons capabilities.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Article I:
The NPT states in Article I that nuclear weapon states commit:
not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or nuclear
explosive devices or control over such weapons or devices, directly or
indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-
nuclear weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or
explosive devices.
Chemical Weapons Convention, Article XX
The CWC extends the prohibition to all states, stating that
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any
circumstances:
(a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons,
or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;
(b) To use chemical weapons;
(c) To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons;
(d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Article III
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any
recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist,
encourage, or induce any State, group of States, or international
organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins,
weapons, equipment, or means of delivery specified in article I of the
Convention.