The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): Origin, Characteristics, and Institutional Authorities

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

Responsibility for overseeing reconstruction in post-conflict Iraq initially fell to the Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). Established in early 2003, ORHA was
headed by Lieutenant General Jay M. Garner, U.S. Army (ret.). By June 2003, ORHA had been
replaced, or subsumed, by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which was led by
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III. On June 28, 2004, CPA ceased operations.
Whether CPA was a federal agency is unclear. Competing, though not necessarily mutually
exclusive, explanations for how it was established contribute to the uncertainty about its status.
Some executive branch documents supported the notion that it was created by the President,
possibly as the result of a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD). (This document, if it
exists, has not been made available to the public.) Another possibility is that the authority was
created by, or pursuant to, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003). Finally, two
years after CPA was established, a Justice Department brief asserted that the then-Commander of
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) had created CPA.
Given that its organizational status is uncertain, an examination of selected features of CPA might
be instructive in assessing what type of organization it was. The authority was closely aligned
with the Department of Defense (DOD); the Under Secretary of Defense designated the Secretary
of the Army as executive agent for CPA. Other significant features of the authority included its
Office of Inspector General (OIG, or IG), which was expected to work closely with the DOD and
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Offices of Inspector General; the extent of
its procurement activities; its regulatory authority; and its Program Review Board. An undated
organization chart provided some insight into the structure of the authority, although it did not
include some key offices and positions, such as the Deputy Administrator, the OIG, and the
legislative affairs staff. Provisions in several statutes included reporting requirements that bore
directly or indirectly on CPA. These included Sections 2202(b), 2203, 2207, and 3001 of P.L.

108-106 (117 Stat. 1209), and Section 1203 of P.L. 108-136 (117 Stat. 1392).

Subsequent to the dissolution of CPA, the question of its status arose in a lawsuit filed against
Custer Battles, LLC (CB), a company that performed work for CPA. Two former employees of
CB alleged in a lawsuit filed under the False Claims Act (FCA) that the company had defrauded
the federal government. (The case is United States ex rel. DRC Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC (E. Va.,
No. CV-04-199-A).) Justice Department attorneys concluded that CPA was an instrumentality of
the U.S. government for the purposes of the FCA, but the presiding judge determined, in his
August 2006 opinion, that CPA was not an instrumentality. This report will be updated as events
warrant.

Introduc tion ..................................................................................................................................... 1
The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and the Coalition Provisional
Authority ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Key CPA Personnel.........................................................................................................................3
Establishment of CPA......................................................................................................................4
National Security Presidential Directive...................................................................................4
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483...................................................................8
General Franks........................................................................................................................10
Selected Characteristics of CPA....................................................................................................12
CPA’s Relationship to the Department of Defense..................................................................13
CPA Office of Inspector General.............................................................................................16
Procurement Activities............................................................................................................17
Appropriated Funds for the Reconstruction of Iraq..........................................................17
CPA Solicitations..............................................................................................................20
Program Review Board.....................................................................................................21
Protes ts .............................................................................................................................. 21
Appropriated Funds for the Operating Expenses of CPA.................................................24
Regulatory Authority...............................................................................................................25
CPA Organization Chart..........................................................................................................26
Statutory Reporting Requirements Concerning CPA and the Reconstruction of Iraq...................28
Status and Characteristics of CPA as Related to the False Claims Act (FCA)........................32
Discussion of CPA.........................................................................................................................36
Post-CPA Organizations................................................................................................................38
Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) and Project and Contracting Office
(PCO) .......................................................................................................................... ......... 38
Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization............................................................................38
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 38
Figure 1. Coalition Provisional Authority.....................................................................................27
Table 1. Statutory Reporting Requirements Concerning the CPA and the Reconstruction
of Iraq.........................................................................................................................................29
Appendix.......................................................................................................................................40

Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................41

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA or “the authority”) was established approximately one ¹
month after United States and coalition forces took control of Baghdad in Iraq on April 9, 2003.
The authority’s mission was “to restore conditions of security and stability, to create conditions in
which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future, (including by advancing
efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative governance) and ²
facilitating economic recovery, sustainable reconstruction and development.” Information
provided on the CPA website indicated that “[t]he Governing Council and the Coalition
Provisional Authority will be dissolved” by June 30, 2004, and that “[t]his will end the
responsibilities of the Coalition as an occupying power as specified in the United Nations ³
resoluti ons.”
After examining the origin of CPA, this report discusses three views on how the authority was
established, reviews selected characteristics of the authority, identifies statutory reporting
requirements concerning the authority and the reconstruction of Iraq, examines the implications
of U.S. v. Custer Battles for CPA, explores several policy issues, and briefly describes post-CPA
organizations.

Responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance and aiding in the reconstruction of postwar
Iraq initially fell to the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). ORHA
was established by National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 24, which was signed by the
President on January 20, 2003. This document also gave DOD responsibility for post-war control ⁴
of Iraq. NPSD 24 has not been released to the public. A news article stated that ORHA was tied
to the Pentagon and that, while the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) would
handle much of the humanitarian and reconstruction work, ORHA would be in charge of the ⁵
funding. As early as February 12, it was reported that Lieutenant General Jay M. Garner, U.S.
Army (ret.), had been selected to serve as the coordinator for humanitarian and reconstruction
assistance, and that he would report to General Tommy R. Franks, then-commander of U.S. ⁶
Central Command. Lieutenant General Garner was appointed by the Secretary of Defense, and
his position description as head of ORHA stated:

¹^C^R^S^R^e^por^t^R^L³²¹^05,^Ira^q^{: F}^o^re^{ign C}^oⁿ^t^ribu^tio^{ns t}^o^St^ab^ilizat^ioⁿ^an^d^Re^c^o^nstruc^tioⁿ^,^by^C^h^rⁱ^s^t^op^he^r^{M. B}^l^aⁿ^c^h^a^r^d
^an^d^Cat^h^eriⁿ^{e Dal}^e^.
²^U^.^{S. O}^f^fⁱ^c^e^o^f^Ma^na^g^e^m^e^{nt a}^nd^B^udg^e^t^,^Re^p^o^r^t^t^o^C^o^ngr^e^s^s^Pur^s^uan^{t t}^o^Se^c^tⁱ^on¹⁵⁰⁶^of^the^Em^e^r^ge^nc^y^W^a^r^tim^e
^Sup^ple^m^eⁿ^t^a^{l A}^ppr^o^p^rⁱ^a^tio^ns^Ac^t,²⁰^{03 (}^P^.L.¹^08-¹¹⁾^{, J}^u^ne^2,²⁰⁰³^{, p.}^2.
³^Coa^liti^on^Prov^isio^na^{l A}^u^thor^ity^a^{nd Ira}^qⁱ^G^o^v^e^rning^Couⁿ^c^il,^T^h^e^No^vemb^e^{r 1}⁵^A^g^reemen^t^:^Tⁱ^melⁱⁿ^{e t}^o^{a So}^verei^gⁿ^,
^D^e^m^o^c^r^atic^an^{d Se}^c^u^r^e^I^r^a^q^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^://^ira^q^c^o^a^liti^on^.org^/^g^ov^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t/Ag^r^e^e^m^e^ntNov^15.p^d^f^.
⁴^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^of^the^Iⁿ^s^p^e^c^t^or^G^e^ne^r^a^l,^Co^nt^ra^{cts Awa}^r^d^e^{d fo}^r^th^e^Co^alit^io^{n P}^r^ov^ision^a^l
^Auth^ority^by^the^De^fe^nse^Co^ntr^a^c^ting^C^o^m^m^a^nd-^W^a^s^hⁱⁿ^gtoⁿ^{, R}^e^po^r^t^D^-²⁰^04-⁰⁵^7,^Ma^r^c^{h 1}⁸^,²⁰⁰⁴^{, p}^.^{1, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.dodig^.^os^d.m^il/A^udit/re^ports^/^F^Y^04/⁰⁴⁰⁵^7s^um^.htm^.
⁵^D^e^Y^oung^aⁿ^{d M}^o^r^g^aⁿ^{, “}^U^.S.^Plaⁿ^f^o^r^I^r^a^q’^s^F^u^tur^e^is^C^h^a^lle^ng^e^d^;^P^eⁿ^t^a^g^{on C}^ontr^o^l,^Se^c^r^e^c^y^Q^u^e^s^ti^one^d,”^{p. A}^21.
⁶^P^e^te^r^Sle^v^{in, “}^U^.S^{. Mil}^ita^r^y^L^a^y^s^O^u^t^Pos^t^w^a^r^I^r^a^{q Pla}ⁿ^{; O}^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^B^r^ie^f^C^ong^r^e^s^s^{on R}^e^buil^dⁱⁿ^g^B^a^tte^r^e^{d Ec}^on^om^y^,
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

^T^h^is^Offⁱ^ce^[OR^H^A^]^is^e^s^tablis^h^e^{d at t}^h^{e direction of}^t^h^{e P}^r^esⁱ^d^en^{t of}^th^e^Unⁱ^t^{ed State}^s^{, an}^d
^is^{located f}^o^{r adm}ⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rati^v^e^pu^rpos^es^uⁿ^d^{er B}^o^ards^{, C}^o^mm^is^sⁱ^ons^an^{d T}^a^s^k^Forces^,
^W^a^s^hⁱⁿ^g^t^oⁿ^Headqu^arters^Se^rv^ices^{. T}^h^is^O^f^{fice i}^s^uⁿ^d^{er t}^h^{e s}^u^pervⁱ^s^{ion of}^th^e^Uⁿ^der⁷
^Secretar^y^of^De^f^e^ns^{e f}^o^{r P}^o^licy^.
Signed by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on February 11, 2003, this
position description was not approved and certified by the Director, Administration and ⁸
Management, Office of the Secretary of Defense, until March 5, 2003.
As late as mid-April, it appeared that Lieutenant General Garner was still in charge of ORHA.⁹
However, a news report dated May 2 stated that President George W. Bush planned to name
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III as special envoy and civil administrator of Iraq, and that ¹⁰
Lieutenant General Garner would report to Ambassador Bremer. On May 6, 2003, President
Bush announced that he had appointed Ambassador Bremer as Presidential Envoy and that he
would serve as the senior leader of the coalition. (Unlike his appointment as an ambassador
earlier in his career, Senate confirmation was neither required nor sought.) The White House
press release also stated:
^Iⁿ^hⁱ^{s cap}^acit^y^a^s^P^r^esid^en^{tial En}^v^o^y^,^h^e^w^{ill o}^v^er^{see Co}^a^lⁱ^tioⁿ^r^e^c^oⁿ^s^t^r^u^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^e^f^f^o^r^t^s^aⁿ^d^th^e
^p^r^o^{cess b}^y^w^h^ich^th^e^I^r^aq^{i p}^e^o^p^l^{e b}^u^ild^th^{e i}ⁿ^s^tit^u^tioⁿ^s^aⁿ^d^g^o^v^e^rⁿⁱⁿ^g^str^u^ct^u^r^{es t}^h^at^w^ill
^g^uⁱ^de^th^eir^fu^t^u^{re.... Am}^bas^s^a^d^o^{r Brem}^er^w^ill^{report to Secretary}^of^De^f^eⁿ^s^e^Rum^s^f^e^{ld an}^d
^wⁱ^l^l^advⁱ^s^e^t^h^{e P}^r^es^iden^{t, t}^h^rou^g^h^t^h^{e Secretar}^y^,^oⁿ^p^o^licies^d^e^sigⁿ^ed^to^ach^ie^v^e^Am^er^icaⁿ¹¹
^an^d^Co^alitioⁿ^g^o^{als f}^o^r^I^r^aq^.
No mention was made of Lieutenant General Garner or ORHA in the press release.
On May 11, 2003, the Washington Post reported the existence of the Coalition Provisional ¹²
Authority. On May 13, 2003, the Secretary of Defense designated Ambassador Bremer as CPA ¹³
Administrator. The first regulation issued by Ambassador Bremer, dated May 16, 2003,
identified him as Administrator of CPA. The authority’s Inspector General (IG) stated, in his ¹⁴
initial report to Congress, that OHRA became CPA in May 2003. However, a March 2004 DOD
IG report stated that the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a June 16, 2003, memorandum, ¹⁵
dissolved ORHA and shifted ORHA’s functions, responsibilities, and legal obligations to CPA.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^Resh^apⁱⁿ^{g S}^o^ci^et^y^,^”^W^a^s^h^ingt^on^Pos^t^{, Fe}^br^ua^r^y^12,²⁰^03,^p.^A^21.
⁷^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^of^the^Iⁿ^s^p^e^c^t^or^G^e^ne^r^a^l,^Co^nt^ra^{cts Awa}^r^d^e^{d fo}^r^th^e^Co^alit^io^{n P}^r^ov^ision^a^l
^Auth^ority^by^the^De^fe^nse^Co^ntr^a^c^ting^C^o^m^m^a^nd-^W^a^s^hⁱⁿ^gtoⁿ^{, p. 1.}
⁸^Ibid^.
⁹^P^e^te^{r Ba}^k^e^{r, “}^U^{.S. Forc}^e^s^W^{ill R}^e^de^ploy^into^{3 Z}^one^s;^Ma^rine^{s to}^Oc^c^upy^Southe^{rn Ira}^{q a}^s^A^r^m^y^Ta^k^e^{s ov}^e^r^North;
^G^e^ne^r^a^{l W}^{ill Ov}^e^r^s^e^e^Ca^pita^l,”^Was^hⁱⁿ^gt^{on Pos}^t^,^A^p^r^{il 15}^{, 2}⁰⁰³^,^p.^A^31.
¹⁰^Mik^e^A^lle^{n, “}^E^x^p^e^r^{t on T}^e^rroris^m^{to Dire}^c^t^Re^buildiⁿ^g^,^”^Wa^sh^ing^t^on^P^o^st^{, Ma}^y^{2, 2}⁰⁰³^,^{p. A}¹^.
¹¹^W^hⁱ^t^e^Ho^u^s^e,^Of^fⁱ^{ce o}^f^t^h^{e P}^r^ess^S^ecret^ar^y^,^“P^resi^d^eⁿ^t^Nam^e^{s E}ⁿ^vo^y^t^o^Iraq^,^{” M}^a^y⁶^,²⁰⁰³^,^avai^l^a^b^l^{e at}
^http:^//w^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^ne^w^s^/r^e^l^e^a^s^e^s^/²⁰⁰^3/^05/²⁰⁰³⁰⁵^06-^5.^ht^m^l^.
¹²^P^e^t^e^{r S}^l^eviⁿ^,^“Rej^ect^Baat^h^P^a^rt^y^,^U.^S^.^T^e^l^l^s^Iraqⁱ^J^o^b^H^o^p^e^f^u^l^s^,^”^Wa^shⁱⁿ^gt^on^Po^st^{, Ma}^y^11,²⁰⁰³^,^{p. A}^22.
¹³^Dona^ld^Rum^s^fe^{ld, Se}^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of^De^fe^nse^,^“^D^e^s^ig^na^{tion a}^s^A^d^mⁱ^nistra^{tor of}^the^Coa^l^itioⁿ^P^r^ov^isio^na^{l A}^u^thority^,”
^m^e^m^o^r^a^ndum^{, May}^13,²⁰^03.
¹⁴^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^of^the^Iⁿ^s^p^e^c^t^or^G^e^ne^r^a^l,^Co^nt^ra^{cts Awa}^r^d^e^{d fo}^r^th^e^Co^alit^io^{n P}^r^ov^ision^a^l
^Auth^ority^by^the^De^fe^nse^Co^ntr^a^c^ting^C^o^m^m^a^nd-^W^a^s^hⁱⁿ^gtoⁿ^{, p. 2.}
¹⁵^Ibid^.

Apparently, no official announcement was made at the time (that is, May or June 2003) that
ORHA had been replaced, or subsumed, by CPA.
By June 18, Lieutenant General Garner no longer was the head of ORHA. A Department of
Defense (DOD) news transcript dated June 18 identified him as the former director of ORHA, ¹⁶
and indicated he had returned to the United States a couple of weeks earlier.

Ambassador Bremer’s deputy was Richard Henry Jones, who was also the U.S. Ambassador to
Kuwait. Ambassador Jones, who was on extended temporary duty (TDY) in Iraq, was assigned to ¹⁸
the CPA position sometime in November 2003.
Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the United Kingdom’s Special Representative in Iraq, was referred to, in
some news articles and documents, as a deputy to the CPA Administrator, or was identified as ¹⁹
effectively serving as a deputy to Ambassador Bremer. A news bulletin produced by the U.S.
Permanent Mission to the United Nations Office and Other International Organizations in Geneva ²⁰
identified Sir Jeremy as the CPA deputy. Sir Jeremy’s appointment as the United Kingdom’s
Special Representative was announced June 16, 2003, by the Prime Minister’s official spokesman ²¹
(PMOS). He replaced John Sawers.
Other senior CPA officials included Rear Admiral David J. Nash, U.S. Navy (ret.), who was
director of the Program Management Office (PMO), which had responsibility for monitoring
contracts funded by the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and the ²²
Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan for FY2004 (FY2004 emergency supplemental). Rear
Admiral Nash began his duties in July 2003. Major General Ronald L. Johnson, U.S. Army, was
U.S. Deputy to the PMO, and also served as the commander of the Gulf Region Division of the
Army Corps of Engineers. As of February 2004, Lawrence Crandall was the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) Deputy to the PMO. On January 20, 2004, Stuart W. Bowen

¹⁶^{U.S. De}^pa^rtm^e^{nt of}^De^fe^nse^,^“^S^e^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^Ru^m^s^f^e^{ld Me}^dia^A^v^a^ila^bility^w^{ith Ja}^y^G^a^rne^r^,”^ne^w^s^traⁿ^sc^{ript, J}^une^18,
²⁰⁰^{3, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http^://w^ww^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/^traⁿ^sc^ripts/²⁰^03/^jun²⁰⁰^3.^htm^l^.
¹⁷^{For i}ⁿ^f^o^rm^a^{tion on}^cⁱ^v^ilia^{n pe}^rs^o^nne^{l m}^a^na^g^e^m^e^{nt un}^de^{r ORHA}^a^{nd C}^P^A^,^se^e^Spe^cⁱ^a^l^Ins^p^e^c^t^{or G}^e^ne^ra^{l f}^o^{r Ira}^q
^R^e^c^ons^tr^uc^tio^n,^I^r^aq^Re^c^ons^tr^uc^ti^on:^Le^s^s^onsⁱⁿ^H^u^m^{an C}^api^{tal M}^ana^ge^m^e^nt^{, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y²⁰⁰⁶^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//www^.sig^ir.^m^il/re^ports/^pdf^/^L^e^ssons_L^e^a^rne^d_Fe^b^16.^pdf^.
¹⁸^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion pr}^ov^ide^d^by^te^le^pho^ne^by^the^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^Sta^t^e^c^ountr^y^of^fⁱ^c^e^f^o^r^K^u^w^a^{it a}^{nd B}^a^hr^aⁱ^{n t}^o^the^a^u^th^or
^on^Ma^r^c^{h 1,}²⁰⁰⁴^.
¹⁹^Ew^eⁿ^Ma^c^A^sk^{ill, “}^Ira^{q a}^f^t^e^{r the}^W^a^{r: Bla}ⁱ^{r Env}^o^y^W^a^{rns Ira}^{n on}^Me^ddliⁿ^g^,^”^G^uar^diaⁿ^{, O}^c^t^obe^r²³^{, 2}⁰⁰³^,^p.^4;
^Phili^{p Ste}^phe^ns^,^“^N^ow^B^u^s^h^C^aⁿ^Ma^k^e^a^Fr^e^s^{h Sta}^r^t,”^Fin^ancⁱ^a^{l T}ⁱ^m^e^s^{, D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^{16, 20}⁰³^{, p}^.²³^;^O^w^e^{n B}^o^w^c^{ott a}^nd
^Bria^{n W}^h^ita^k^e^{r, “}^T^rouble^L^oom^s^a^f^te^{r Coa}^{lition T}^e^lls^K^u^rds^Se^lf^R^u^le^Ca^{n Sta}^y^,”^G^uar^di^an^,^J^a^nua^r^y^6,²⁰^04,^p.¹⁷^;
^Aⁿ^{ton L}^a^G^u^a^r^dia^,^“^U^{.S. G}^e^ne^ra^l^W^{ill L}^e^a^d^Ira^{qi A}^r^m^y^,”^Daily^Te^le^grap^h^{, Ma}^r^c^h¹¹^,²⁰^04,^p.¹²^;^Pa^tr^ic^k^C^o^c^k^bur^n,
^“^B^r^e^m^e^r^T^r^ie^s^{to Sa}^lv^a^g^e^A^ppoin^t^e^d^-^G^ov^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^{t P}^l^aⁿ^A^m^{id Shia}^O^ppos^it^io^n,”^Iⁿ^de^peⁿ^d^eⁿ^t^,^J^a^nua^r^y^{17, 20}^04,^p.¹³^.
²⁰^J^udy^A^ita^{, “}^U^.N^{. Ele}^c^{tion T}^e^a^m^a^t^W^o^rk^{in Ira}^q,”^D^a^il^y^B^u^ll^e^tⁱⁿ^,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{10, 2}⁰⁰⁴^,^p.^{1, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.c^pa^-ⁱ^r^a^q.or^g^/^pr^e^s^s^r^e^l^e^a^s^e^s^/²⁰⁰⁴⁰²¹⁰^_^U^N^_ba^c^k^.htm^l.
²¹^P^r^im^e^Minis^t^e^r^’^s^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^,^“^P^r^e^s^s^B^r^ie^fⁱ^ng^{: 11A}^{M Mon}^d^a^y^{16 J}^une²⁰⁰^3,”^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^h^ttp:^//w^w^w^.num^be^r^-^10.g^o^v^.^uk^/
^out^put/^P^a^g^e³⁹²^4.a^s^p.
²²^P^.^L.¹⁰⁸^-¹⁰^6;¹¹^{7 S}^t^at^.¹²⁰⁹^.

Jr. was appointed as Inspector General by the Secretary of Defense. Rear Admiral Larry L. Poe, ²³
U.S. Navy (ret.), was the Deputy Inspector General.

Detailed information that explicitly and clearly identifies how CPA was established, by whom,
and under what specific authority, is not readily available. Instead, there are three alternative
explanations for how it was established: one version suggests that the President established CPA;
another alternative suggests that CPA was established pursuant to a United Nations (U.N.)
Security Council resolution; and the third indicates that it was created by General Tommy Franks,
U.S. Army, who was Commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) from July 6, 2000, ²⁴
through July 7, 2003. As will be discussed below, these three possibilities are not necessarily
mutually exclusive.
From the inception of CPA in 2003 until April 2005, when a Department of Justice (DOJ)
document stated that General Franks had created CPA, either of the first two alternatives
presented here seemed to be the most likely explanations for the establishment of CPA. The
Justice Department’s statement would seem to answer the question of who established CPA.
However, General Franks’s role was not revealed publicly until April 2005, nearly two years after
CPA was established, and it is not clear whether there are any written materials that document
General Franks having established CPA and that predate his retirement. Also, the revelation of his
role in CPA followed other, somewhat vague and sometimes contradictory explanations or
comments about CPA’s origin during its 13-month tenure. Therefore, some might suggest that
either of the other two alternatives could still be a valid explanation for the origin of CPA.
It is possible that the CPA, as the organization that succeeded ORHA, was established by NSPD

24. Another directive, NSPD 36, dated May 11, 2004, suggests how the President could have used ²⁵

this type of document to establish a temporary organization within the federal government. One
purpose of NSPD 36 was to establish organizations that would succeed the CPA: the Iraq
Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), within the Department of State, and the Project and ²⁶
Contracting Office (PCO), within DOD. The President established both organizations pursuant ²⁷
to 5 U.S.C. § 3161. This statutory provision addresses the employment and compensation of
employees by temporary federal government organizations. Under Section 3161(a), a temporary
organization is defined as

²³^Coa^liti^on^Prov^isio^na^{l A}^u^thor^ity^{, Off}ⁱ^c^e^of^Inspe^c^t^{or G}^e^ne^ra^{l, “}^B^iog^r^a^phie^s^,”^a^v^a^ila^ble^f^r^o^m^the^a^u^th^{or. Mr}^{. Bow}^e^n’s
^biog^ra^phy^{is still a}^v^a^ila^ble^oⁿ^t^h^e^a^g^eⁿ^c^y^we^bsite^a^t^http^://w^ww^.^s^igⁱ^r^.m^il/^a^b^o^u^t/^le^a^d^e^r^ship.a^spx^.
²⁴^U.^S^.^Dep^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^Defen^s^e,^Am^eri^can^F^o^{rce In}^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^S^e^rvi^ce,^“A^bⁱ^zai^d^S^e^t^t^o^S^u^pp^l^aⁿ^t^F^r^an^ks^{as CE}^NT^COM
^Com^m^a^nde^r,”^July^{2, 2}⁰⁰³^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^://w^ww^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^mⁱ^l/ne^w^s/^Jul2⁰⁰^3/ⁿ⁰⁷⁰²²⁰⁰³^_2⁰⁰³⁰⁷⁰²⁵^.htm^l.
²⁵^T^h^{e d}^o^c^u^m^en^tⁱ^t^s^el^fⁱ^s^uⁿⁿ^u^m^b^e^red^.^Ho^w^e^ver,^an^e-^m^aⁱ^l^m^e^s^s^ag^{e fro}^m^t^h^{e S}^t^at^{e Dep}^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^{’s Bu}^reau^o^f^L^e^gi^sl^atⁱ^v^e
^A^f^f^a^ir^s^{to the}^a^u^th^or^oⁿ^Fe^br^ua^r^y^22,²⁰⁰⁵^{, i}^d^eⁿ^tif^ie^{d the}^Ma^y^{11, 2}⁰⁰⁴^{, d}ⁱ^r^e^c^tiv^e^a^s^N^S^P^D^36.
²⁶^U.^S^.^P^r^esi^d^en^t^(G^.^W^.^Bu^sh^),^“Uni^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es G}^o^vern^men^t^Op^eratⁱ^o^{ns i}ⁿ^Iraq^,^{” Nat}ⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^S^ecu^ri^t^y^P^r^esi^d^en^tⁱ^a^l
^Dⁱ^r^e^c^tiv^e⁽^unnum^be^r^e^d)^{, Ma}^y^11,²⁰^04.
²⁷^P^.^L^.¹⁰^6-3⁹⁸^(Div^ision^A^,^T^itle^X^I^,^Se^c^.¹¹⁰¹^(a^{)), Fl}^oy^{d D. Spe}ⁿ^c^e^Na^tiona^{l De}^f^e^nse^A^u^thoriz^a^tio^{n A}^c^{t, FY20}^01;
¹¹⁴^Sta^t^.¹⁶⁵⁴^{, a}^t¹⁶^54A^-³⁰⁸^.

^{a co}^m^mⁱ^ss^ioⁿ^,^co^m^mⁱ^t^t^{ee, b}^o^a^r^d^{, o}^r^o^t^h^e^r^o^r^g^aⁿⁱ^zatioⁿ^t^h^a^t⁽¹⁾^{is estab}^lis^h^e^d^b^y^la^w^o^r
^Ex^ecu^tⁱ^v^e^{order f}^o^{r a s}^p^ecifⁱ^{c period n}^o^{t in}^ex^ces^s^of^t^h^r^{ee y}^ear^s^f^o^{r th}^{e pu}^rpos^{e of}
^perf^ormⁱ^ng^{a s}^p^ecifⁱ^{c s}^t^u^d^y^{or oth}^e^{r pro}^j^{ect; an}^{d (}²^{) is}^termⁱⁿ^{ated u}^p^oⁿ^t^h^e^c^o^m^p^l^e^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^th^e
^s^t^u^d^y^{or proj}^ect^{or u}^pon^t^h^{e oc}^cu^rren^{ce of}^a^con^dⁱ^tⁱ^{on rel}^a^t^e^{d t}^o^t^h^{e co}^m^p^l^e^tⁱ^on^{of t}^h^e^s^t^u^d^y
^{or pr}^oj^ect^.
It bears noting that none of the organizations mentioned here—CPA, IRMO, and PCO—was
established by executive order or statute. However, NSPD 36 addressed this issue in the
concluding paragraph:
^T^h^is^NSP^D^s^h^{all be eff}^ecti^v^{e i}^m^m^e^diatel^y^,^s^h^al^{l con}^s^tit^u^t^e^an^Ex^ec^u^tⁱ^v^{e order s}^o^lely^f^o^r
^pu^rpos^es^of⁵^U^.^S^.^C^.^{3161, and s}^h^al^lⁿ^o^t^{be su}^bj^ect^t^o^Ex^ec^u^tⁱ^v^{e order 1103}^{0 of}^Juⁿ^e^19,²⁸
^1962,^as^am^eⁿ^ded.
It is possible that the language found in NSPD 36 had been used in NSPD 24 to establish OHRA, ²⁹
and eventually the CPA, to oversee the reconstruction of Iraq.
In January 2006, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) issued a report on
civilian personnel management under ORHA and CPA. By confirming that 5 U.S.C. § 3161 was
used to hire some of the civilian personnel for ORHA and CPA, the report suggests that the
Administration established an organization using this provision of the U.S. Code. An excerpt from
the relevant section of the report follows:
^T^h^{e p}^r^im^ar^y^stat^u^t^o^r^y^p^r^o^v^isⁱ^oⁿ^th^at^w^a^s^u^s^ed^f^o^r^e^m^p^l^o^yⁱⁿ^g^ci^v^iliaⁿ^sⁱⁿ^I^r^a^q^w^a^{s T}^{itle 5}^,
^S^ectⁱ^oⁿ^{3161 of}^t^h^e^U^.^S^.^C^{ode. T}^h^{e 316}^{1 prov}ⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^en^abl^e^s^t^e^m^porar^y^org^aⁿⁱ^zatⁱ^oⁿ^s^t^o
^acquⁱ^{re s}^t^aff^t^h^rou^g^h^t^e^m^porar^y^appoiⁿ^t^m^eⁿ^t^s^t^o^t^h^{e ex}^cept^e^{d s}^e^rvⁱ^{ce of}^t^h^{e Ci}^vⁱ^l^S^e^rvⁱ^ce.
^O^R^H^A^and^C^{PA us}^ed³¹^{61 ex}^t^e^nsⁱ^vel^{y t}^o^hi^r^e^ci^vi^lⁱ^an^per^s^onnel^f^o^{r peri}^ods^of^u^p^t^o^on^e
^y^{ear (}^w^it^h^th^{e pos}^sⁱ^bilⁱ^t^y^of^rene^w^a^{l).... A}^ccord^ing^{to a f}^o^rm^er^C^P^A^pers^onⁿ^e^{l s}^p^e^cⁱ^a^lⁱ^s^t^,^t^h^e
³¹⁶¹^hⁱ^riⁿ^g^a^u^t^h^ori^t^y^h^a^{d l}^ong^exⁱ^s^t^e^{d un}^{der 5 C}^F^R^213.31^99,^bu^tⁱ^t^h^a^{d been}^t^y^pi^cal^l^y^us^e^d
^t^o^fⁱ^l^l^boards^{or co}^m^mⁱ^ssⁱ^oⁿ^s^.^T^h^{e prov}ⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^w^a^s^u^s^e^f^u^l^f^o^{r r}^a^pi^{d h}ⁱ^ri^ng^beca^u^s^eⁱ^t^al^l^o^w^e^d
^appoiⁿ^t^m^e^nt^s^f^r^o^m^o^u^t^sⁱ^d^{e g}^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^wⁱ^t^h^ou^t^t^h^e^u^s^u^a^l^com^p^e^tⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿ^r^e^q^uⁱ^r^e^d^uⁿ^d^e^r^f^o^rm^a^l
^j^o^{b clas}^sⁱ^fⁱ^ca^tion^s^{. T}^h^{e us}^{e of}^{3161 t}^o^s^t^af^f^t^h^{e te}^m^porary^s^t^abilization^an^{d recon}^s^tr^u^c^tioⁿ³⁰
^org^aⁿⁱ^zatioⁿ^sⁱⁿ^{Iraq appears}^t^o^h^a^v^e^been^un^preceden^ted.
It is possible to infer, from the following excerpt from a report to Congress provided by the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB), on behalf of the President, that the President may have ³¹
played a role in creating the authority. Of particular interest are the statements that the CPA

²⁸^U.^S^.^P^r^esi^d^en^t^(G^.^W^.^Bu^sh^),^“Uni^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es G}^o^vern^men^t^Op^eratⁱ^o^{ns i}ⁿ^Iraq^,^”^p^.³^.^E^x^ecu^tⁱ^v^{e Ord}^e^{r 11}⁰³⁰^go^vern^s
^the^pr^e^p^a^r^a^tⁱ^on,^pr^e^s^eⁿ^ta^ti^on,^f^ilin^g^,^a^{nd p}^u^b^lic^a^tion^of^e^x^e^c^u^tiv^e^or^de^r^s^a^{nd r}^e^q^u^ir^e^s^t^h^a^t^e^x^e^c^u^tiv^e^or^de^r^s^be^p^ubl^is^he^d
^{in t}^h^e^Fe^de^{ral Re}^giste^r^{. (}³^C^.^F.R^.⁶¹^0-⁶¹²⁽¹⁹⁶²⁾^.)
²⁹^T^h^e^le^gⁱ^s^l^a^tiv^e^his^t^or^y^c^onc^e^rⁿⁱⁿ^g^tem^por^a^r^y^or^ga^niz^a^tions^be^g^aⁿ^{in 1}⁹⁴⁴^{, w}^{ith t}^h^e^eⁿ^a^c^t^m^e^{nt of}^Pu^blic^L^a^w³⁵⁹
^durⁱⁿ^g^the⁷⁸^th^C^ong^r^e^s^s⁽³¹^U^.^S.^C^.^§¹³⁴⁷⁾^.^Se^c^tio^{n 2}¹³^of^this^s^t^a^t^ute^pr^ohi^bits^t^h^e^us^e^of^a^ppr^o^p^rⁱ^a^t^e^d^f^unds^f^o^r^,^or
^by^{, a}ⁿ^y^a^g^eⁿ^c^y^{or e}ⁿ^tity^e^s^ta^blishe^{d by}^e^x^e^c^utiv^e^orde^{r a}ⁿ^d^“ⁱ^{n e}^xⁱ^s^te^nc^e^f^o^r^m^o^re^thaⁿ^oⁿ^e^y^e^a^r^{, i}^f^the^Cong^re^{ss ha}^s
^{not a}^ppr^opria^te^d^aⁿ^y^m^one^y^spe^cⁱ^fⁱ^c^a^l^l^y^f^o^{r suc}^h^a^g^eⁿ^c^y^or^instrum^e^nta^lity^{or spe}^cⁱ^fⁱ^c^a^l^l^y^a^u^thoriz^e^d^the^e^x^pe^ndi^ture
^of^f^unds^by^it.”^Se^c^tion¹³⁴⁷^of^P.L^.^97-2⁵⁸^c^o^dⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^this^prov^is^ioⁿ^{in T}^itle³¹^of^the^U^.^{S. C}^ode^.^How^e^ver,⁵^U.^S^.^C.^§
³¹⁶¹^s^u^p^e^rsed^{es bo}^t^h^o^f^t^h^{ese st}^at^u^t^{es b}^ecau^{se i}^t^w^a^{s en}^act^ed^at^{a l}^a^t^e^{r d}^a^t^e^.
³⁰^Spe^cⁱ^a^l^Iⁿ^s^p^e^c^t^or^G^e^ne^r^a^{l f}^o^r^I^r^a^{q R}^e^c^ons^tr^uc^tio^n,^I^r^a^q^Re^c^o^ns^tr^u^c^tion:^Le^s^s^onsⁱⁿ^H^u^m^{an C}^api^tal^M^ana^ge^m^e^nt^{, p}^.
^10.⁽^I^t^a^lic^s^a^dde^d^f^o^r^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^.⁾
³¹^T^h^e^r^e^por^{t r}^e^s^p^on^ds^to^a^r^e^quir^e^m^e^{nt in Se}^c^tⁱ^on¹⁵⁰⁶^of^the^Em^e^r^g^e^ncy^W^a^r^tⁱ^m^e^Supple^m^eⁿ^ta^{l A}^p^pr^o^p^rⁱ^a^tio^ns^A^c^t,
²⁰⁰^{3 (}^P^.L^{. 10}^8-¹¹^{; H}^.^R^.¹⁵⁵⁹⁾^.

Administrator oversees all non-military federal government programs and activities in Iraq, and
that the President vested the authority with executive, legislative, and judicial authority.
^T^h^{e A}^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^to^r^o^f^th^{e Co}^a^litioⁿ^P^r^o^v^isioⁿ^a^l^Au^th^o^r^it^y⁽^C^P^A⁾^r^e^p^o^r^{ts to}^th^e^P^r^esid^en^t
^th^roug^h^t^h^{e Secretar}^y^of^De^f^e^ns^{e. He ov}^ers^ees^{, di}^rect^s^an^{d co}^ordiⁿ^a^t^e^s^al^l^U^.^S^.^G^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t
⁽^U^SG)^p^r^o^g^r^a^m^s^an^d^activ^itiesⁱⁿ^I^r^aq^{, ex}^cep^{t th}^o^s^{e u}ⁿ^d^e^r^th^{e co}^m^m^aⁿ^d^o^f^th^e^Co^m^m^aⁿ^d^er^,
^U^.^S.^Ce^ntr^a^l^Co^mma^nd⁽^C^E^N^T^C^O^M⁾^.
^T^h^{e C}^P^A^ex^ercis^e^s^po^w^e^rs^of^g^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^te^m^poraril^yⁱⁿ^{order to p}^r^ov^{ide f}^o^{r th}^{e ef}^f^ecti^v^e
^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^tioⁿ^o^f^I^r^a^q^,^to^r^e^sto^r^{e co}ⁿ^d^itioⁿ^s^o^f^sec^u^rⁱ^t^y^aⁿ^d^st^ab^ilit^y^,^to^cr^{eate co}ⁿ^d^it^ioⁿ^sⁱⁿ
^w^h^ic^h^t^h^{e Iraqi people can}^f^r^eel^y^deter^mⁱⁿ^{e t}^h^{eir o}^w^{n political fu}^t^u^{re, ... an}^{d f}^acil^itatiⁿ^g
^econ^o^mⁱ^{c recov}^e^r^y^{, s}^u^s^t^ain^a^bl^{e recon}^s^tru^c^tioⁿ^an^{d dev}^e^lopm^ent.
^T^h^{e C}^P^A^is^v^e^s^t^{ed b}^y^t^h^{e P}^r^e^s^iden^t^wⁱ^t^h^{all ex}^ec^u^tⁱ^v^{e, leg}ⁱ^s^l^ati^v^{e an}^{d j}^u^{dicial au}^th^orit^y
ⁿ^eces^s^a^r^y^{to ach}^iev^e^it^s^obj^ecti^v^es^{, ex}^erci^s^e^{d con}^s^is^teⁿ^t^wⁱ^t^h^relev^a^{nt U.N}^.^S^e^c^u^rⁱ^ty^C^o^uⁿ^cⁱ^l³²
^r^e^so^l^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^,ⁱⁿ^c^l^udⁱⁿ^{g [}^U^.^N^.^Se^c^u^rⁱ^t^y^Co^uⁿ^cⁱ^l^]^Re^so^l^u^tⁱ^on^1483,^an^{d th}^{e la}^w^s^aⁿ^{d u}^s^a^g^es^of³³
^w^a^{r. T}^h^{e C}^P^A^A^d^mⁱ^nis^t^{rator h}^a^s^pri^m^ar^y^res^pon^sⁱ^bili^t^y^f^o^{r ex}^ercisⁱⁿ^g^t^hⁱ^s^au^t^h^orit^y^.
The clearest statement that the U.S. government played a part in establishing the authority is
found in a letter submitted to the President of the United Nations Security Council by the
Permanent Representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom. Dated two days after
Ambassador Bremer was appointed by President Bush as the Presidential Envoy to Iraq, the letter
stated, in part:
^In^{order t}^o^m^eet^t^h^es^{e obj}^ectⁱ^v^es^aⁿ^{d obl}ⁱ^g^atⁱ^ons^[di^s^ar^mⁱ^ng^{Iraq an}^{d prov}ⁱ^dⁱⁿ^g^f^o^{r t}^h^e
^h^u^m^aⁿ^itarⁱ^aⁿⁿ^eed^{s o}^f^I^r^a^qⁱ^s]ⁱⁿ^th^{e p}^o^s^t-^coⁿ^f^{lict p}^e^rⁱ^o^dⁱⁿ^I^r^a^q^,^t^h^e^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^a^t^e^s^,^t^h^e^Unⁱ^t^e^d
^Kin^g^d^o^m^aⁿ^d^Co^alitioⁿ^p^a^r^tⁿ^e^r^s^{, actin}^g^uⁿ^d^e^r^ex^istiⁿ^g^co^m^m^an^d^an^d^coⁿ^t^r^o^{l ar}^r^aⁿ^g^e^m^en^ts
^th^r^o^u^g^h^t^h^e^Co^m^m^aⁿ^d^er^o^f^Co^alitioⁿ^Fo^r^ces,^h^a^v^e^cr^eat^ed^th^e^Co^alitioⁿ^P^r^o^v^isioⁿ^a^l
^Au^t^h^o^r^it^y^,^w^h^ic^hⁱⁿ^cl^u^d^es^t^h^e^Of^fⁱ^ce^o^f^Recoⁿ^s^tr^u^c^tioⁿ^an^d^Hu^m^aⁿ^itarⁱ^aⁿ^Assi^staⁿ^{ce, to}
^e^x^e^r^cⁱ^s^e^p^o^w^e^r^s^o^f^go^ve^rⁿ^meⁿ^t^t^e^m^p^o^r^a^r^il^y^,^an^{d, as}ⁿ^eces^s^a^r^y^{, es}^peciall^y^{to prov}^{ide s}^ecu^rit^y^,³⁴
^t^o^al^l^o^w^t^h^{e del}ⁱ^v^e^r^y^o^f^hum^aⁿⁱ^t^a^ri^aⁿ^ai^{d, an}^{d t}^o^elⁱ^mⁱⁿ^at^e^w^eapons^of^m^a^s^s^des^t^r^u^ctⁱ^oⁿ^.
While this excerpt can be viewed as an acknowledgment that the United States (and the United
Kingdom) established CPA, it does not explain how the authority was established, nor does it
resolve the question of its organizational agency status.
Government documents supporting the notion that CPA was a federal entity (which suggests, in
turn, that it was created by the President) include two presidential memoranda. A May 6, 2003, ³⁵
memorandum, as amended by a December 5, 2003, memorandum, stated, in part:

³²^U^.^N^.^Se^c^u^r^ity^C^ounc^il^R^e^s^o^lu^tio^{n 1}⁴⁸³^{, w}^h^ic^{h w}^a^s^a^dopte^d^by^the^Uⁿ^ite^{d N}^a^ti^ons^Se^c^u^r^ity^C^ounc^il^on^Ma^y^22,
²⁰⁰^{3, “}^l^if^te^{d c}ⁱ^v^ilia^{n sa}^nc^tions^aⁿ^{d pr}^ov^ide^d^f^o^{r te}^rmⁱⁿ^a^tion^of^the^Oil-f^o^r-Foo^d^P^r^og^ra^m^m^e^w^{ithin six}^m^onths,
^tr^aⁿ^s^f^e^r^rⁱ^ng^r^e^s^pons^ibili^ty^f^o^r^the^a^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^{tion of}^aⁿ^y^r^e^m^a^ining^a^c^tiv^it^y^{to the}^A^u^th^or^ity^r^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^ting^the^oc^c^u^py^ing
^pow^e^r^s.”^(Unite^{d Na}^tio^{ns, Of}^fⁱ^c^e^of^the^Ira^q^P^r^og^ra^m^m^e^Oil-^f^o^r-Fo^{od, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http^://w^ww^.un.org^/^De^pts/oip/
^ba^c^k^g^r^ound/^s^c^r^s^inde^x^.^htm^l^{. U}^.^N^.^Se^c^u^r^ity^C^ounc^{il R}^e^s^o^l^u^tioⁿ¹⁴⁸³^is^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^this^w^e^bs^ite^.)
³³^U^.^{S. O}^f^fⁱ^c^e^o^f^Ma^na^g^e^m^e^{nt a}^nd^B^udg^e^t^{, “}^R^e^por^t^to^C^o^ng^r^e^s^s^P^u^r^s^ua^{nt t}^o^Se^c^tⁱ^on¹⁵⁰⁶^of^the^Em^e^r^g^e^ncy^W^a^r^tⁱ^m^e
^Sup^p^le^m^e^nta^l^A^ppropria^tio^ns^A^c^{t, 20}⁰³⁽^P^.L^{. 1}^08-¹¹^),”^J^u^ne^2,²⁰^{03 (le}^tte^r),^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^://w^w^w^.^w^hite^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/
^om^b/le^gⁱ^sla^tiv^e^.
³⁴^Sⁱ^{r Jeremy}^Green^st^o^c^k,^P^e^rm^an^eⁿ^t^Rep^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^v^{e o}^f^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^ed^Kⁱⁿ^g^d^o^m^,^an^d^J^o^hn^D.^Negro^p^oⁿ^t^e,^P^e^rm^an^en^t
^R^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^{, le}^tte^r^{to t}^h^e^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t of}^the^S^e^c^u^r^ity^C^ounc^{il, Ma}^y^{8, 2}⁰⁰³^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.g^loba^lpolic^y^.^or^g^/^s^e^c^u^r^ity^/ⁱ^s^s^u^e^s^/ir^a^q^/^doc^um^eⁿ^t/200^3/⁰⁶⁰⁸^us^uk^le^tte^r^.^h^t^m^.
³⁵^T^h^e^D^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^{5, 200}^{3, m}^e^m^o^r^a^ndum^dir^e^c^t^e^d^t^h^a^t^aⁿ^y^r^e^f^e^r^e^nc^e^s^{in t}^h^e^Ma^y^{6, 2}⁰⁰³^{, m}^e^m^o^r^a^ndu^m^{to the}^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^of
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

^In^acco^rd^an^{ce w}^ith^P^r^esid^en^tia^{l d}ⁱ^rectioⁿ^relatin^g^to^Iraq^relief^an^d^recoⁿ^s^tru^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^,^m^u^ltip^le
^ag^en^cie^s^ar^{e d}^e^p^l^o^y^ed^wⁱ^th^t^h^{e Co}^alitioⁿ^P^r^o^v^isioⁿ^a^l^Au^th^o^r^it^y⁽^C^P^A⁾^an^d^ar^{e ser}^vⁱⁿ^g^as
ⁱ^m^ple^m^en^tⁱ^ng^partn^e^rs^{or ex}^ec^u^tⁱⁿ^g^a^g^eⁿ^ts^f^o^{r prog}^ra^m^s^aⁿ^{d pro}^j^ects^.^T^h^es^{e ag}^eⁿ^cies^wⁱ^ll
ⁱ^d^eⁿ^tⁱ^f^y^f^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^r^e^q^uⁱ^r^e^m^eⁿ^t^s^f^o^r^s^u^c^h^p^r^o^g^r^a^m^s^aⁿ^d^p^r^o^j^e^c^t^{s t}^h^r^o^u^g^h^CP^A^.^OMB^w^{ill w}^o^r^k³⁶
^wⁱ^t^h^CP^A^to^tr^an^sf^er^f^uⁿ^d^{s to}^th^{e ap}^p^r^o^p^r^{iate im}^p^l^e^m^en^tⁱⁿ^g^ag^en^c^y^.
The authority’s intimate involvement in the funding process for work done by federal government
agencies in Iraq further suggests that the CPA is a federal entity.
Language in the FY2004 emergency supplemental also stated that the CPA was part of the federal
government. In describing how the apportionment of $18.649 billion was to be carried out, P.L.

108-106 stated:

^F^uⁿ^d^s^appropri^a^t^e^{d u}ⁿ^d^{er t}^hⁱ^s^h^eadiⁿ^{g [Iraq R}^e^lⁱ^e^f^aⁿ^{d Recon}^s^t^r^u^c^tⁱ^on^Fun^d^{] s}^h^a^l^l^be
^apportion^e^d^on^l^y^{to th}^{e C}^o^aliti^on^P^r^ov^is^ion^a^{l Au}^t^h^orit^yⁱⁿ^{Iraq (in}^its^capacity^as^aⁿ^eⁿ^t^ity^o^f
^th^{e U}ⁿ^{ited State}^s^Gov^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt), th}^{e Depart}^m^eⁿ^t^of^{State, t}^h^{e Depart}^m^eⁿ^t^{of Healt}^h^an^d
^Hum^aⁿ^Serv^ice^s^{, th}^{e Depart}^men^t^of^T^r^eas^u^r^y^,^t^h^{e Depart}^m^eⁿ^t^of^De^f^eⁿ^s^{e, an}^{d t}^h^{e U}ⁿ^ited³⁷
^States^Ag^en^c^y^f^o^r^Iⁿ^terⁿ^atioⁿ^a^{l Dev}^e^lo^p^m^eⁿ^{t ...}
According to this excerpt, the authority was an entity of the federal government.
Information provided by CPA itself indicated that its sector program management offices
(SPMOs) were part of the federal government. (The CPA’s PMO was supported by six SPMOs.)
In a written response to a question asked at a January 21, 2004, pre-proposal conference on
contracting opportunities, the CPA stated that “the Sector Program Management Office (SPMO) ³⁸
is a Government entity.”
Yet another organization related to CPA is on record as stating that “the U.S. government created ³⁹
CPA....” The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction included this statement in its
January 2006 report on civilian personnel management under ORHA and CPA.
Nonetheless, questions remain regarding how CPA was established, who established it, the
precise nature of its relationship to DOD (including DOD components) and other federal entities,
and whether CPA was a federal agency or some other type of government organization. Another

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^Recoⁿ^s^tru^c^tioⁿ^an^d^Hu^m^aⁿ^itarian^A^ssistan^c^e^o^r^ORHA^b^e^rep^l^aced^b^y^“Co^a^litioⁿ^Pro^v^isioⁿ^a^{l A}^u^th^o^r^ity^”^an^d^“C^P^A^,”
^resp^ectⁱ^v^el^y^.
³⁶^U^.^S.^P^r^e^sⁱ^d^eⁿ^{t (G}^{. W}^.^Bus^h^),^“^M^e^m^ora^ndum^{on D}^e^le^g^a^tion^of^the^Func^ti^ons^of^the^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t u}^nde^{r t}^h^e^H^e^a^d^ing^‘Ira^q
^R^e^lie^f^a^{nd R}^e^c^ons^tr^uc^tio^{n F}^uⁿ^d^’ⁱⁿ^the^Em^e^r^g^e^ncy^W^a^r^tⁱ^m^e^Supple^m^eⁿ^ta^{l A}^ppr^opr^ia^ti^ons^A^c^{t, 20}⁰³^,^”^Fe^de^ral
^Re^giste^r^{, Ma}^y^{9, 20}⁰³^{, v}^o^l.⁶⁸^{, n}^o^{. 9}⁰^,^p.²⁵²⁷^{5; U}^.^S.^Pr^e^s^ideⁿ^{t (}^G^{. W}^.^B^u^s^h⁾^,^“^T^r^a^ns^f^e^r^of^Funds^A^ppr^opr^ia^te^d^to^the
^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^t^un^de^{r the}^he^a^d^ing^Ope^r^a^ting^Ex^pe^nse^s^of^the^Coa^liti^on^Prov^isiona^{l A}^u^th^ority^{, a}^{nd De}^le^g^a^tion^of^the
^Func^ti^ons^of^the^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t u}^nde^r^t^h^e^he^a^dⁱⁿ^g^I^r^a^{q R}^e^lie^f^a^{nd R}^e^c^oⁿ^s^tr^uc^tio^{n F}^uⁿ^d^{, i}ⁿ^t^h^e^Em^e^r^ge^ncy^Sup^p^le^m^e^nta^l
^A^ppr^opr^ia^ti^ons^A^c^{t f}^o^r^D^e^f^e^ns^e^{and f}^o^r^t^h^e^R^e^c^ons^tr^uc^tio^{n of}^I^r^a^q^a^{nd A}^f^g^h^aⁿ^is^ta^{n, 2}⁰⁰⁴^,”^Fe^de^ra^{l Re}^giste^r^{, J}^a^nua^r^y
^9,²⁰⁰⁴^,^v^o^l^{. 69,}ⁿ^o^{. 6, p. 16}^45.
³⁷¹¹^{7 Sta}^t^{. 1}²²⁵^.
³⁸^Coa^liti^on^Prov^isio^na^{l A}^u^thor^ity^{, “}^L^ist^of^Que^s^{tions a}^{nd A}ⁿ^sw^e^r^s^Com^p^ile^{d f}^r^om^a^P^r^e^-^P^r^op^osa^l^C^onf^e^r^eⁿ^c^e^He^{ld on}
^J^a^nua^r^y^{21, 20}⁰⁴^,”^p.²⁰^.
³⁹^Spe^cⁱ^a^l^Iⁿ^s^p^e^c^t^or^G^e^ne^r^a^{l f}^o^r^I^r^a^{q R}^e^c^ons^tr^uc^tio^n,^I^r^a^q^Re^c^o^ns^tr^u^c^tion:^Le^s^s^onsⁱⁿ^H^u^m^{an C}^api^tal^M^ana^ge^m^e^nt^{, p}^.
^36.

unanswered question concerns the scope of CPA’s authority when it was functioning in its
capacity as an entity of the U.S. government.
A second possibility is that United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003) was
instrumental in creating the authority, a view supported by several documents released by the
executive branch. A solicitation issued by the Pentagon Renovation Office, on behalf of CPA, for
procuring PMO support services, stated in the “overview”: “The CPA was enacted by the United ⁴⁰
Nations Security Council under Resolution 1483 (2003).” Other government documents,
including the President’s proposed budget for FY2005 and P.L. 108-106, stated that the authority ⁴¹
was established pursuant to Resolution 1483. This statement does not necessarily contradict the
language found elsewhere in the FY2004 emergency supplemental stating that CPA is an entity of
the U.S. government, for the reason discussed above.
Nevertheless, repeated references to Resolution 1483 might be viewed by some as implying that
the resolution alone authorized or established a coalition-based organization in Iraq, or might
contribute to confusion about the organizational status of the authority. Relevant portions of the
resolution are as follows:
^T^h^{e Secur}ⁱ^t^y^C^ounci^l^{, .}^..^No^tin^g^t^h^e^l^e^t^t^e^r^o^f⁸^M^a^y²⁰⁰³^f^r^om^t^h^e^Perm^aⁿ^en^t^R^e^pres^en^t^a^tⁱ^v^e^s
^of^th^{e U}ⁿ^{ited State}^s^of^Am^eri^{ca an}^{d th}^{e U}ⁿ^{ited King}^do^m^o^f^{Great B}^r^itain^an^{d North}^e^rⁿ
^Irel^aⁿ^d^t^o^t^h^{e Pres}ⁱ^d^en^t^of^t^h^{e S}^ecu^ri^t^y^C^oun^ci^l^(S^/^2003/⁵³⁸^{) an}^{d recog}ⁿⁱ^zi^ng^t^h^{e s}^p^eci^fⁱ^c
^au^th^o^r^itie^{s, r}^e^sp^oⁿ^sib^ilitie^{s, an}^d^o^b^lig^atioⁿ^s^uⁿ^d^e^r^a^p^p^lⁱ^c^a^b^l^eⁱⁿ^t^e^rⁿ^atⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^l^a^w^o^f^th^e^s^e^s^t^a^t^es
^as^occu^p^yⁱⁿ^g^po^w^e^r^s^uⁿ^d^{er un}ⁱ^f^{ied co}^m^m^aⁿ^{d (th}^e^“A^uth^o^rit^y^{”), ..}^.^C^a^l^l^s^upon^th^{e Au}^th^o^r^it^y^,
^coⁿ^s^is^ten^t^wⁱ^th^t^h^{e C}^h^ar^ter^o^f^th^{e Un}ⁱ^t^ed^Natioⁿ^s^aⁿ^d^o^t^h^e^r^r^e^lev^aⁿ^tⁱⁿ^terⁿ^a^tioⁿ^a^{l la}^w^,^to
^prom^{ote t}^h^e^w^e^l^f^{are of}^t^h^{e Iraqi people th}^rou^g^h^th^{e e}^f^f^ecti^v^{e a}^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^tioⁿ^o^f^t^h^{e ter}^r^ito^r^y^,
ⁱⁿ^cl^u^dⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^p^a^r^ticu^l^ar^w^o^r^kⁱⁿ^g^to^w^a^r^d^{s t}^h^{e r}^e^sto^r^atioⁿ^o^f^coⁿ^d^itioⁿ^s^o^f^s^e^c^u^rⁱ^ty^aⁿ^d^s^t^a^bⁱ^l^ity
^an^{d th}^{e creation}^of^coⁿ^d^itionsⁱⁿ^w^h^ich^t^h^{e Iraqi people ca}ⁿ^f^r^eel^y^deter^mⁱⁿ^{e t}^h^{eir o}^wⁿ⁴²
^fu^t^u^r^e^.
While recognizing the responsibility to be borne by the United States and the United Kingdom in
restoring security and stability in Iraq, this resolution did not establish, or authorize the creation
of, a specific organization to carry out this responsibility. In the words of a former Administrator
of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, the resolution “noted and recognized, but did not ⁴³
establish CPA.”
Lending support to the notion that the authority was not a federal agency, but instead was an
amorphous international organization, are statements by the Department of the Army. In 2003,
two protests were filed with the General Accounting Office (GAO; this agency was renamed the
Government Accountability Office in 2004) by Turkcell Consortium, which challenged CPA’s

⁴⁰^P^e^nta^g^{on R}^e^nov^a^tio^{n O}^f^fⁱ^ce^{, s}^o^lic^ita^{tion W}⁹^14N^S-^04-^R^-⁰⁰^01,^J^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^{6, 200}^4,^p.^2.
⁴¹^U^.^{S. O}^f^fⁱ^c^e^o^f^Ma^na^g^e^m^e^{nt a}^nd^B^udg^e^t^,^B^u^d^g^e^t^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^G^o^v^e^r^nm^eⁿ^t—FY2⁰⁰⁵^{, A}^ppe^nd^ix⁽^W^a^s^hing^ton:
^G^P^O^,²⁰⁰⁴⁾^,^p^p^{. 95}^8-⁹⁵⁹^;^P^.^L^.¹⁰^8-¹^{06; 11}⁷^S^t^a^t^.¹²²⁶^.
⁴²^Uⁿ^ite^{d N}^a^ti^ons^Se^c^u^r^ity^C^ounc^il,^Re^s^o^luti^on¹⁴⁸³⁽²⁰⁰³⁾^,^S/R^E^S/¹⁴⁸³⁽²⁰⁰³⁾^{, Ma}^y^22,²⁰⁰³^{, p}^.²^,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.un.or^g^/^D^o^c^s^/s^c^/^uns^c^_^r^e^s^o^lu^ti^ons.^h^tm^{l. (Ita}^lic^{s in or}^igⁱⁿ^a^l^.)
⁴³^Aⁿ^g^e^la^{B. St}^y^l^e^s^{, “}^S^e^lle^{r Be}^w^a^r^e^{: A}^sse^ssing^the^Risk^{s of}^Ira^{q Re}^c^onstruc^tⁱ^oⁿ^Co^ntra^c^ting^,^”^Fe^de^r^a^l^C^ontr^a^c^t^s
^Re^por^t^{, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^{20, 2}⁰⁰⁴^{, v}^o^l^.⁸¹^,^no.^2,^p.⁶⁵^.

issuance of licenses for mobile telecommunications services in Iraq. GAO dismissed both protests
without having to rule on the status of CPA.
In a letter submitted to GAO during the protest process, the U.S. Army Legal Services Agency
was unequivocal in its argument that CPA is not a federal agency:
^T^h^{e C}^P^A^isⁿ^o^{t a Federal ag}^enc^y^{. R}^a^t^h^{er, as}^th^{e HC}^A^[C^P^A^’s^{Head of}^C^oⁿ^t^racting^A^c^tⁱ^vⁱ^t^y^]
^ex^p^l^ain^s^{: T}^h^{e Co}^alitioⁿ^P^r^o^v^isioⁿ^a^l^Au^t^h^o^r^it^y⁽^C^P^A⁾^{is a}^m^u^lt^i-ⁿ^a^tioⁿ^a^{l co}^alitioⁿ^t^h^at
^ex^erci^s^e^s^po^w^e^rs^of^g^o^v^e^rnm^e^nt^t^e^m^porari^l^yⁱⁿ^{order t}^o^provⁱ^d^{e f}^o^{r t}^h^{e ef}^f^ectⁱ^v^e
^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^tioⁿ^o^f^I^r^a^q^d^u^rⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{e p}^e^rⁱ^o^d^o^f^tr^an^sitioⁿ^a^{l ad}^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^tioⁿ^,^to^r^e^sto^r^{e co}ⁿ^d^itioⁿ^s
^o^f^sec^u^rⁱ^t^y^aⁿ^d^stab^il^it^y^,^to^cr^{eate co}ⁿ^d^itioⁿ^sⁱⁿ^w^h^ich^t^h^{e I}^r^a^q^{i p}^e^o^p^l^{e can}^f^r^eel^y^d^e^ter^mⁱⁿ^e
^th^eir^o^wⁿ^p^o^{litical f}^u^tu^r^e^{, in}^c^l^u^dⁱⁿ^g^b^y^ad^v^aⁿ^cⁱⁿ^g^e^f^f^o^r^t^s^t^o^r^e^s^t^o^r^e^aⁿ^d^e^s^t^a^b^lⁱ^s^hⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^an^d
^lo^{cal in}^stit^u^tioⁿ^s^f^o^r^r^e^p^r^esen^tativ^{e g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^aⁿ^{ce an}^{d f}^acili^ta^ting^econ^o^mⁱ^{c recov}^e^r^y^an^d
^s^u^s^t^aⁱ^na^b^l^e^r^e^c^o^ns^t^r^uc^tⁱ^o^{n a}ⁿ^d^d^e^ve^l^o^p^m^en^{t. C}^P^A^is^v^e^s^t^{ed with}^all^ex^ec^u^tⁱ^v^e,^legⁱ^s^l^ati^v^e^and
^j^u^{dicial au}^t^h^orit^yⁿ^eces^s^a^r^y^{to ach}^ie^v^e^it^s^obj^ectiv^es^{, to be e}^x^ercis^e^d^uⁿ^d^{er relev}^aⁿ^t^U.N.
^S^ecu^ri^t^y^C^oun^ci^l^res^o^l^u^tⁱ^ons^{, i}ⁿ^cl^u^dⁱⁿ^g^R^e^s^o^l^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^{1483 (2}⁰⁰^{3), an}^{d t}^h^{e l}^a^w^s^an^{d us}^ag^e^s^of
^w^a^{r. T}^h^is^au^t^h^orit^yⁱ^s^ex^erci^s^e^{d by}^t^h^{e C}^P^A^A^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rator.
^T^h^{e GA}^{O does}ⁿ^o^{t h}^a^v^e^j^u^ris^dⁱ^c^tion^ov^{er th}^is^protes^{t becau}^s^e^C^P^Aⁱ^sⁿ^o^t^a^F^e^d^e^r^a^l^a^g^eⁿ^cy^....
^T^h^{e C}^P^Aⁱ^s^aⁿ^org^aⁿⁱ^{zation com}^p^ri^{sed of}^m^e^m^b^ers^f^r^o^m^a^coalition^o^f^coun^{tries.... C}^P^Aⁱ^s
^an^al^og^ous^t^o^an^org^aⁿⁱ^zatⁱ^{on s}^u^ch^a^s^N^A^T^O^’^s^[N^ort^h^A^t^l^aⁿ^tⁱ^c^T^r^eat^y^O^r^g^aⁿⁱ^zatⁱ^on’^s^]
^Stab^ilizatioⁿ^Fo^r^{ce (}^SFOR)ⁱⁿ^B^o^sn^{ia a}ⁿ^d^C^r^{oatia. T}^h^{e S}^F^OR^h^a^sⁱ^t^s^o^w^{n con}^t^ractiⁿ^g
^o^r^g^aⁿⁱ^zatioⁿ^,^th^{e T}^h^eatr^e^A^llie^d^Coⁿ^t^r^actin^g^Of^fⁱ^{ce (}^T^A^C^O)^,^w^h^ic^h^m^a^y^u^tⁱ^{lize th}^{e s}^e^r^vⁱ^c^e^s
^of^Unⁱ^t^ed^States^mⁱ^l^itar^y^pers^onⁿ^e^{l. L}ⁱ^k^e^t^h^e^T^A^C^O^{, C}^P^A^isⁿ^o^t^{a f}^e^deral^ag^eⁿ^c^y^{. L}ⁱ^k^e
^NA^T^O^aⁿ^{d SF}^OR^,^C^P^Aⁱ^s^co^m^p^o^s^{ed of an intern}^atioⁿ^a^{l co}^alition^{.... UN}^Sec^u^rit^y^C^o^uⁿ^cⁱ^l
^R^e^s^o^l^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^{1483 (}²⁰⁰³⁾^recogⁿⁱ^zes^C^P^A^as^“t^h^e^A^u^t^h^ori^t^y^”^t^o^g^o^v^e^rn^{Iraq an}^{d g}^r^an^t^s^t^h^e⁴⁴
^CP^A^dⁱ^scr^e^tioⁿ^to^dⁱ^sb^u^r^{se f}^uⁿ^d^{s in}^t^h^{e De}^v^e^lo^p^m^eⁿ^{t F}^uⁿ^d^f^o^r^I^r^aq⁽^“^DFI^”⁾^.
While the CPA did employ individuals from coalition countries, there were at least two significant
differences between CPA and SFOR. The SFOR is overseen by a multinational organization, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and it was authorized by United Nations Security ⁴⁵
Council Resolution 1088 (1996). The Security Council’s resolution explicitly authorized the
establishment of SFOR (as it also did for the precursor entity, the Implementation Force (IFOR)):
^T^h^{e Secu}^rit^y^C^oun^cil^{... au}^t^h^orizes^th^e^Me^m^b^er^S^t^ates^{... to es}^tablis^h^f^o^{r a plann}^e^{d period of}
¹⁸^m^oⁿ^t^h^s^a^m^u^ltⁱⁿ^at^ioⁿ^a^l^stab^ilizatioⁿ^f^o^r^{ce (}^SFO^R)^as^t^h^{e l}^e^g^a^l^su^cce^sso^r^to^I^F^O^R^uⁿ^d^er⁴⁶
^uⁿⁱ^fⁱ^{ed co}^m^m^aⁿ^d^an^{d con}^t^rol....
Given that P.L. 108-106 and other government documents stated that CPA was a U.S. government
entity, the Army’s response raises questions. Arguably, the Army was concerned that some would
assume, precisely because of references to the authority as a government entity, that CPA was a
federal agency. Another possibility is that the Army, as the executive agent for the authority
(discussed below), assumed responsibility for certain procurement activities and tasks, such as
responding to protests, and thus argued strongly for excluding CPA from the GAO protest
process.

⁴⁴^M^a^j^.^F^r^an^{k A}^.^M^a^rch^,^Dep^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^t^h^{e A}^r^my^,^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es A}^r^{my L}^e^gal^S^e^r^vⁱ^ces^Agen^c^y^,^“P^ro^t^e^st^o^f^T^u^rkc^e^l^l
^C^ons^or^tⁱ^um^{, B}^-²⁹³⁰^48,”^c^o^r^r^e^s^p^o^nde^nc^e^t^o^U^.^S.^G^e^ne^r^a^l^A^c^c^ountiⁿ^g^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^,^O^c^tobe^r^21,²⁰⁰³^{, p}^p^.^2-^4.
⁴⁵^No^rt^{h A}^t^l^aⁿ^tⁱ^c^T^r^eat^y^Or^ganⁱ^zatⁱ^oⁿ^,^“Hi^s^t^o^ry^o^f^N^A^T^O^-l^ed^S^t^abⁱ^lⁱ^satⁱ^oⁿ^F^o^{rce (S}^F^O^{R) i}ⁿ^B^o^snⁱ^a^and^Herzego^vⁱⁿ^a,^”
^no^da^te^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^://w^ww^.na^t^o.int^/^s^f^o^r/doc^u/^d9⁸¹¹¹^6a^.h^tm^.
⁴⁶^Uⁿ^ite^{d N}^a^ti^ons^Se^c^u^r^ity^C^ounc^il,^R^e^s^o^luti^on¹⁰⁸⁸⁽¹⁹⁹⁶⁾^{, D}^ecem^b^e^{r 1}²^,¹⁹⁹⁶^,^S^/^R^E^S^/¹⁰⁸⁸^,^avai^l^a^b^l^{e at}
^http:^//w^w^w^.na^t^o.int^/ⁱ^f^o^r^/^un/^u96¹²^12b^.htm^.

Legislative language might contribute to questions about the status of the authority. The FY2004 ⁴⁷
emergency supplemental referred to CPA as “an entity of the United States Government.” In the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2004, Section 1203(b)(1) mentioned “civilian groups ⁴⁸
reporting to the Secretary [of Defense], including” ORHA and CPA. Section 1203(b)(3) referred ⁴⁹
to the “relationship of Department of Defense entities, including” ORHA and CPA. The House
report accompanying H.R. 1588 (P.L. 108-136), the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2004, in its comments on the section that became Section 1203, mentioned “Department of ⁵⁰
Defense (DOD) civilian and military activities in post-conflict Iraq.” Eschewing the word
“agency” in favor of “entity,” “group,” and “activities” in legislation and congressional
documents could be a reflection of the Administration’s approach, an acknowledgment that CPA’s
status was uncertain, or a sign that Congress agreed that CPA was not an agency.
Documents produced by the Administration and the CPA do not state precisely how this
organization was established. In the preface to the first regulation of the CPA, dated May 16,
2003, Ambassador Bremer stated: “Pursuant to my authority as Administrator of the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CAP), relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution ⁵¹
1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of war ...” In a December 2003 memorandum on
contracting procedures for the reconstruction of Iraq, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz wrote: “The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has been established to promote ⁵²
the welfare of the Iraqi people.” Neither statement identifies by whom, or under what authority,
CPA was established.
General Tommy Franks’s role in the creation of CPA was revealed in a brief prepared by Justice
Department attorneys in April 2005 in the matter of United States ex rel. DRC Inc. v. Custer
Battles, LLC (E. Va., No. CV-04-199-A). Custer Battles (CB) had done work for CPA in Iraq, and
former employees of CB alleged in a lawsuit filed under the False Claims Act (FCA; 31 U.S.C.§§
3729-3733) that the company had defrauded the federal government. Attorneys for Custer Battles
responded, in part, that CPA was not a federal agency, so the FCA was not applicable. Initially,
the presiding judge invited the Justice Department to state the government’s position on whether
the FCA applied to CPA. Then, in response to a second order from the judge, Justice Department
attorneys addressed the question, in a supplemental brief, of whether CPA was a U.S. government
entity, agency, or instrumentality, and they concluded that it was an instrumentality. (See below
for more details.)
In their supplemental brief, which was also filed in April 2005, the Justice Department attorneys
also offered an explanation of who established CPA:

⁴⁷¹¹^{7 Sta}^t^{. 1}²²⁵^.
⁴⁸^P^.^L^.¹⁰^8-¹³⁶^;¹¹⁷^Sta^t^.¹³⁹²^a^t¹⁶⁴⁸^{; H}^.^R^.¹⁵⁸⁸^.
⁴⁹^{Sec. 1}²⁰³⁽^b⁾⁽¹^)-(3⁾^o^f^P.L^.¹⁰⁸^-¹³⁶^.
⁵⁰^{U.S. C}^ong^re^{ss, House}^Com^m^itte^e^{on A}^r^m^e^{d Se}^rv^ic^e^s^,^Nation^a^{l D}^e^fe^nse^Auth^orizati^oⁿ^Ac^{t for}^Fis^c^{al Ye}^ar²⁰⁰⁴^,
^H^.^R^e^{pt. 1}^08-¹⁰^6,¹⁰⁸^th^C^ong^,¹^st^s^e^s^s^{., May}^16,²⁰^{03 (}^W^a^s^hing^to^n:^G^P^O^,²⁰⁰³⁾^,^p.³⁵^9.
⁵¹^Coa^liti^on^Prov^isio^na^{l A}^u^thor^ity^{, “}^C^oa^litioⁿ^P^r^ov^isiona^{l A}^u^th^ority^Re^g^u^la^{tion Num}^b^e^r^1,”^Ma^y^16,²⁰⁰^{3, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//www^.ira^qc^oa^lition^.^org^/^re^g^u^la^tions/ⁱ^nde^x^.^htm^l^#Re^g^ula^tio^{ns. (}^I^ta^lic^{s in or}^ig^ina^l^.)
⁵²^P^a^u^l^W^o^l^f^o^wⁱ^t^z^,^Dep^u^t^y^S^ecret^ar^y^o^f^De^f^eⁿ^s^e,^“Det^er^mⁱⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^{and F}ⁱ^ndⁱⁿ^gs,^”^Dece^m^b^{er 5}^,²⁰⁰³^,^p^.¹^,^avai^l^a^b^l^e
^f^r^o^m^a^u^thor^.

^T^h^{e CP}^A^w^a^{s cr}^eated^b^y^t^h^{e Co}^m^m^aⁿ^d^er^o^f^th^{e Co}^alitioⁿ^F^o^r^{ces in}^I^r^a^q^,^Gen^e^r^a^l^T^o^m^m^y
^Fran^ks^{, United States}^A^r^m^y^,^w^ho^w^a^s^als^o^t^h^{e C}^o^m^m^aⁿ^d^{er of}^th^{e U.S. C}^eⁿ^t^ral^C^o^m^m^aⁿ^d^.
^T^h^{e estab}^lish^m^en^{t o}^f^th^{e CP}^A^b^y^t^h^{e Co}^alitioⁿ^w^a^{s f}^o^r^m^a^l^l^y^r^eco^gⁿⁱ^zed^b^y^U^N^S^C^R^[^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d
^Nation^s^Sec^u^rit^y^C^oun^{cil R}^e^s^o^lu^tion^{1483]. Sin}^{ce th}^{e C}^o^aliti^on^Forces^h^a^{d es}^tablis^h^e^{d an}^d
^ex^ercis^e^{d actu}^a^{l au}^t^h^orit^y^o^v^e^r^th^{e territory}^o^f^{Iraq, u}ⁿ^d^{er the la}^w^s^of^w^a^{r an}^{d occu}^patioⁿ^,
^th^{e auth}^orit^y^of^t^h^{e def}^{eated Ir}^{aqi reg}ⁱ^m^e^o^f^Sadda^m^H^u^s^s^eiⁿ^pas^s^e^{d i}ⁿ^{to th}^e^h^aⁿ^d^s^of^t^h^e
^Co^alitioⁿ^Fo^r^{ces. Gen}^e^r^a^{l Fr}^aⁿ^k^s^estab^lⁱ^s^h^e^d^th^e^CP^A^uⁿ^d^er^th^{e la}^w^s^o^f^w^a^r^t^o^p^e^r^f^o^r^m^cⁱ^vⁱ^l⁵³
^go^ve^rⁿ^me^nt^fu^nc^tⁱ^o^{ns i}ⁿ^lⁱ^b^e^r^a^t^e^d^I^r^a^q^d^u^rⁱ^{ng t}^h^e^b^rⁱ^e^{f o}^c^c^u^p^a^tⁱ^o^n.
This statement by the Justice Department may not settle the question of how CPA was ⁵⁴
established, by whom, and under what authority. The fact that CPA had a predecessor in ORHA
raises questions about the Justice Department’s explanation for the origin of CPA. Although
ORHA and CPA were responsible for essentially the same mission in Iraq, and although CPA
subsumed, or succeeded, ORHA, the origins of these two organizations apparently differed. ⁵⁵
ORHA was established by the President, through NSPD 24; CPA was established (according to ⁵⁶
the Justice Department) by the Commander of CENTCOM, “under the laws of war.” (As noted ⁵⁷
above, the CPA IG stated that OHRA became CPA in May 2003, while the DOD IG indicated
that the Deputy Secretary of Defense dissolved ORHA and shifted ORHA’s functions, ⁵⁸
responsibilities, and legal obligations to CPA.) It is unclear why two different methods were
used to create these organizations, and why, with ORHA already in place and functioning under
NSPD 24, it was necessary for the CENTCOM Commander to establish another, new
organization.
While the statement that “the authority of the defeated Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein passed ⁵⁹
into the hands of the Coalition Forces” may be accurate, and while it suggests why General
Franks established CPA, the statement appears to overlook the existence of ORHA. As noted
above, ORHA had been created in January 2003, two months prior to the fall of Baghdad. The
authority that passed into the Coalition Forces’ hands when they invaded Iraq presumably would
have been accorded to ORHA. The supplemental brief apparently fails to mention not only that
CPA was preceded by ORHA, but also that ORHA apparently was still in existence when CPA
was established.
As noted above, it appears that the Justice Department’s supplemental brief represents the initial
disclosure of the then-CENTCOM Commander’s role in creating CPA. However, the legal brief
does not include a source for this statement, and it does not otherwise indicate that there is any
written documentation of this action. It is not known how General Franks established CPA, or

⁵³^Su^pple^m^eⁿ^ta^{l Brie}^f^of^the^Unite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^{in re}^sp^onse^t^o^t^h^e^c^ourt’sⁱⁿ^v^ita^tion^a^t^p^p^.^6-7,^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^e^x^r^e^{l. D}^R^C^,
^Inc^.^a^nd^Ro^be^{rt Isak}^son^v^.^Custe^r^Battle^s,^LLC^{, e}^t^a^l^{. (E.D}^.^V^a^{. 2}⁰⁰⁴^{) (N}^o.^CV^-^04-¹⁹^9a^).
⁵⁴^Ju^stⁱ^{ce Dep}^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^at^t^o^rn^ey^{s n}^o^t^edⁱⁿ^t^h^ei^{r sup}^p^l^e^m^eⁿ^t^al^brie^f^tha^t^the^dⁱ^sc^ussion^inv^o^lvⁱⁿ^g^C^P^A^“ⁱ^s^sole^ly^f^o^{r the}
^pur^pos^e^of^aⁿ^s^w^e^r^ing^the^C^our^t’^s^que^s^tio^{n w}^{ith r}^e^s^p^e^c^t^t^o^the^FC^A^,^a^nd^not^f^o^r^aⁿ^y^othe^r^pur^pos^e^.^”⁽^I^bid.^{, p}^.²^.⁾
^Nevert^h^e^l^e^ss,^t^hⁱ^s^st^at^e^m^en^t^d^o^e^sⁿ^o^t^c^h^an^{ge t}^h^{e f}^act^t^h^at^t^h^{e at}^t^o^rne^y^{s u}ⁿ^e^q^uⁱ^vo^cal^l^y^cl^ai^m^e^d^t^h^at^CP^A^w^a^s
^e^s^ta^blis^he^{d by}^G^e^ne^r^a^{l Fr}^aⁿ^k^s^.
⁵⁵^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^of^the^Iⁿ^s^p^e^c^t^or^G^e^ne^r^a^l,^Co^nt^ra^{cts Awa}^r^d^e^{d fo}^r^th^e^Co^alit^io^{n P}^r^ov^ision^a^l
^Auth^ority^by^the^De^fe^nse^Co^ntr^a^c^ting^C^o^m^m^a^nd-^W^a^s^hⁱⁿ^gtoⁿ^{, p. 1.}
⁵⁶^Su^pple^m^eⁿ^ta^{l B}^r^ie^f^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^a^t^pp^{. 6-}^7.
⁵⁷^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^of^the^Iⁿ^s^p^e^c^t^or^G^e^ne^r^a^l,^Co^nt^ra^{cts Awa}^r^d^e^{d fo}^r^th^e^Co^alit^io^{n P}^r^ov^ision^a^l
^Auth^ority^by^the^De^fe^nse^Co^ntr^a^c^ting^C^o^m^m^a^nd-^W^a^s^hⁱⁿ^gtoⁿ^{, p. 2.}
⁵⁸^Ibid^.
⁵⁹^Su^pple^m^eⁿ^ta^{l Brie}^f^of^the^Unite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^{in re}^sp^onse^t^o^t^h^e^c^ourt’sⁱⁿ^v^ita^tion^a^t^p^p^.^6-7,^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^e^x^r^e^{l. D}^R^C^,
^Inc^.^a^nd^Ro^be^{rt Isak}^son^v^.^Custe^r^Battle^s,^LLC^{, e}^t^a^l^{. (E.D}^.^V^a^{. 2}⁰⁰⁴^{) (N}^o.^CV^-^04-¹⁹^9a^).

whether he prepared and signed any document to create CPA. Nevertheless, a CENTCOM
document that appears to be a leaflet that was developed for distribution to the Iraqi people ⁶⁰
mentions General Franks’s role in establishing CPA. This document, titled “Freedom Message
to the Iraqi People,” dated April 16, 2003, and attributed to General Franks (his name is included
at the end of the message), includes the following statement: “... I am creating the Coalition
Provisional Authority to exercise powers of government temporarily, and as necessary, especially
to provide security, to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid and to eliminate weapons of mass ⁶¹
destruction.” The complete text of this document is at the appendix.
Despite the text included in the April 16, 2003, leaflet, DOD does not appear to have issued any ⁶²
statement in 2003 documenting General Franks’ decision to establish CPA. The lack of a
document that implemented or authorized the creation of CPA also was noted by the federal judge
presiding in United States v. Custer Battles, who wrote: “This proclamation [the April 16, 2003,
leaflet] was not followed by any formal document or order establishing the CPA or defining its ⁶³
legal responsibilities.” Additionally, no mention was made of General Franks’ role in creating
CPA during a ceremony at the White House on December 14, 2004, when he, Ambassador
Bremer, and George Tenet, the former Director of Central Intelligence, were awarded Presidential ⁶⁴
Medals of Freedom by the President. The apparent lack of publicly available documentation
about the creation of CPA by CENTCOM, and the fact that disclosure of CPA’s origins was made
by the Justice Department and did not occur until spring 2005, might lead some to question
whether this explanation of CPA’s creation accurately reflects what occurred in May or June

2003.

The asserted lack of clarity concerning authorizing authority and establishment of the CPA
arguably extended to its status within the executive branch. It is not clear whether the authority
was a federal agency, or could be treated as such. What is known is that the CPA was neither an
executive department nor a government corporation. Executive departments are identified by
statute, and government corporations are “corporation[s] owned or controlled by the Government

⁶⁰^Iⁿ^its^“^l^e^s^s^o^ns^le^a^r^ne^d”^r^e^p^o^r^t^on^c^ontr^a^c^ting^,^t^h^e^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^of^the^Spe^cⁱ^a^l^Iⁿ^s^p^e^c^t^or^G^e^ne^r^a^{l f}^o^r^I^r^a^{q R}^e^c^ons^tr^uc^ti^on
^(SIG^{IR) re}^f^e^{rs to}^Gen^e^{ral Fran}^k^s^{’s messa}^{ge as an}^“o^rd^er.^”^T^h^{e S}^I^{GIR rep}^o^r^t^dⁱ^d^no^t^rep^eat^o^r^af^fⁱ^r^m^G^eⁿ^e^r^a^l^F^r^an^ks’s
^c^l^aⁱ^m^tha^t^he^c^r^e^a^t^e^d^C^P^A^;^ra^the^r^,^SIG^I^{R note}^d^t^h^a^t^“^C^P^A^initia^lly^w^a^s^r^e^c^ogniz^e^d^{as a d}ⁱ^scret^e^o^r^ganⁱ^zatⁱ^o^{n i}ⁿ^a
^C^E^N^T^O^M^or^de^r^”^is^s^u^e^d^by^G^e^ner^a^{l Fr}^aⁿ^k^s^{. (}^S^pe^cⁱ^a^l^Iⁿ^s^p^e^c^t^or^G^e^ne^r^a^{l f}^o^r^I^r^a^{q R}^e^c^ons^tr^uc^tio^n,^I^r^a^q^Re^c^ons^tr^uc^tio^n:
^Le^s^s^onsⁱⁿ^C^o^ntr^a^c^tⁱ^ng^an^{d Pr}^oc^ur^e^m^eⁿ^t^{, July}²⁰⁰^{6, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^h^ttp://w^ww^.sig^ir.^m^il/^re^ports/^pdf^/Le^ssons_L^e^a^r^ne^d_
^J^u^ly^21.pdf^{, p.}²³^.)⁽ⁱ^ta^lic^s^a^dde^d)^I^t^a^ppe^a^r^s^,^h^o^w^e^v^e^r^,^tha^t^G^e^ne^r^a^{l Fr}^aⁿ^k^s^’^s^“^F^r^e^e^dom^Me^s^s^a^g^e^{to th}^e^I^r^a^qi^P^e^o^p^le^”^is
ⁿ^o^t^c^oⁿ^s^isten^t^w^ith^{DOD’s d}^e^fⁱⁿ^itioⁿ^o^f^an^“o^rd^{er.” “Ord}^er”^is^d^e^fⁱⁿ^e^d^{as “a co}^mm^uⁿⁱ^catioⁿ^,^w^r^itten^,^o^r^al,^o^r^b^y^sigⁿ^al,
^w^hⁱ^c^h^coⁿ^v^e^y^{s i}ⁿ^st^ru^ctⁱ^oⁿ^s^f^r^o^m^{a su}^p^e^ri^o^r^t^o^{a s}^u^bo^rdⁱⁿ^at^e.^{” (Depart}^m^en^t^o^f^De^f^eⁿ^s^e,^D^e^par^tm^eⁿ^{t of}^D^e^fe^ns^e
^Dic^tion^a^ry^{of M}^ilit^ary^a^nd^Assocⁱ^ate^d^Te^rms^{, A}^p^r^{il 1}²^,²⁰⁰¹⁽^a^s^a^m^e^nde^{d thr}^oug^h^A^p^r^{il 1}⁴^,²⁰⁰⁶⁾^,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t
^http:^//w^w^w^.dtic^.m^il/^doc^tr^ine^/^je^l/n^e^w^_pubs^/^j^p1_^02.^pdf^{, p}^.³⁹⁵^.⁾^T^h^e^te^x^t^of^Fr^aⁿ^k^s^’^s^m^e^s^s^a^g^e^is^inc^l^ude^{d i}ⁿ^t^h^e
^a^ppe^nd^ix^.
⁶¹^G^e^ne^ra^l^T^o^m^m^y^{R. Fra}ⁿ^k^s^{, Com}^m^a^nde^{r of}^Coa^litio^{n F}^o^rc^e^s^{, “}^F^re^e^dom^Me^ssa^g^e^{to the}^Ira^qi^P^e^o^p^le^,”^A^p^{ril 16,}²⁰⁰³^,
^avai^l^a^b^l^{e f}^r^o^m^t^h^{e au}^t^h^o^r^.^T^hⁱ^s^d^o^cu^m^eⁿ^t^(an^d^an^A^r^abⁱ^c^-l^an^gu^age^versi^oⁿ⁾^w^e^{re p}^r^o^vⁱ^d^ed^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^c^a^l^l^y^b^y^U.^S^.
^C^e^ntr^a^{l C}^o^m^m^a^{nd, L}^e^gⁱ^s^l^a^tive^Lⁱ^aⁱ^s^{on, t}^o^t^h^e^a^u^t^hor^,^J^u^ly^13,²⁰⁰⁵^.
⁶²^A^m^ba^s^s^a^dor^B^r^e^m^e^r^’^s^a^ppoi^ntm^e^{nt a}^s^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^tia^l^Env^o^y^{to I}^r^a^q^w^a^s^the^s^ubje^c^t^of^a^W^h^ite^H^ous^e^pr^e^s^s^r^e^le^a^s^eⁱⁿ
^Ma^y^2003.
⁶³^{U.S. v}^.^C^u^ste^r^Ba^ttle^{s, 3}⁷⁶^F.^Su^pp^2d⁶¹^{7 (E}^.D.^V^a^.²⁰^{05) a}^t⁶²^0.
⁶⁴^W^hⁱ^t^e^Ho^u^s^e,^Of^fⁱ^{ce o}^f^t^h^{e P}^r^ess^S^ecret^ar^y^,^“P^resi^d^eⁿ^t^P^r^esen^t^s^Med^a^l^o^f^F^r^eed^o^m^,^”ⁿ^e^w^s^rel^ease,^Dece^m^b^{er 1}⁴^,
²⁰⁰^{4, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http^://w^w^w^.^w^hi^te^hous^e^.^g^o^v^/^ne^w^s^/^r^e^l^e^a^s^es^/200^4/^12/^print/²⁰⁰⁴¹²^14-^3.h^t^m^l^.

of the United States.”⁶⁵ If the authority was a federal government entity, it may have been an
independent establishment, which is defined as “an establishment in the executive branch (other
than the United States Postal Service or the Postal Rate commission) which is not an Executive
department, military department, Government corporation, or part thereof, or part of an ⁶⁶
independent establishment.” If it is determined that the authority was an independent ⁶⁷
establishment, CPA also would be considered an executive agency. Other possibilities are that
CPA was a component of DOD, or that it was not a federal government entity. Due to its unusual
status, this examination of certain of its characteristics or features might be instructive.
While it is clear that, ultimately, the CPA Administrator answered to the President, it is also clear ⁶⁸
that the Administrator reported to the Secretary of Defense as well. Administratively,
Ambassador Bremer and the authority fell under the Department of the Army. For Ambassador ⁶⁹
Bremer, this meant that his salary, Executive Level III, was paid by the Army. A report prepared
by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), dated March 10, 2004, showed that 558 federal
government employees were detailed to CPA. The largest contingents were from the Department
of Defense (455) and the Department of State (85). Other agencies contributing personnel
included the Department of Transportation (2), the Department of the Treasury (6), the Naval
Criminal Investigative Service (1), OPM (1), the U.S. Navy (2), and unknown (6). Three detailees
were ambassadors, 65 were from the Foreign Service, 411 were identified as “federal civilian ⁷⁰
workers,” and the remaining 79 were members of the Senior Executive Service (SES). (CPA ⁷¹
also employed individuals from coalition partner countries.) A document available on the Army
Civilian Personnel On-Line (CPOL) website indicated that all CPA civilian employees were ⁷²
realigned in 2003 to Army rolls.
In 2003, the Secretary of the Army was designated the executive agent for ORHA, and, ⁷³
subsequently, CPA, in memoranda issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Neither
memorandum is publicly available, but a third memorandum, issued by the Deputy Secretary of

⁶⁵^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.^§§¹⁰^{1 a}ⁿ^d¹⁰^3.
⁶⁶^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 1}⁰⁴⁽¹⁾^.
⁶⁷^Aⁿ^“‘ex^ecu^tⁱ^v^{e ag}^en^c^y^’^m^e^an^{s an}^E^x^ecu^tⁱ^v^{e d}^e^p^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^,^{a G}^o^verⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^co^rp^o^r^atⁱ^oⁿ^,^an^d^aⁿⁱⁿ^d^e^p^eⁿ^d^eⁿ^t
^e^s^ta^blis^hm^eⁿ^t.”⁽⁵^U^.^S.C^.^§¹⁰⁵⁾^.
⁶⁸^W^hⁱ^t^e^Ho^u^s^e,^Of^fⁱ^{ce o}^f^t^h^{e P}^r^ess^S^ecret^ar^y^,^“P^resi^d^eⁿ^t^Nam^e^{s E}ⁿ^vo^y^t^o^Iraq^,^”;^U.^S^.^Of^fⁱ^{ce o}^f^M^aⁿ^a^ge^m^eⁿ^t^an^d
^B^udg^e^t^,^Re^p^o^r^t^t^o^C^o^ngr^e^s^s^Pur^s^uan^{t t}^o^Se^c^tⁱ^on¹⁵⁰⁶^of^the^Em^e^r^ge^nc^y^W^a^r^tim^e^Su^pple^m^eⁿ^t^a^{l A}^p^p^r^opr^iatⁱ^oⁿ^s^Ac^t,
²⁰⁰^{3 (}^P^.L.¹⁰^8-¹¹⁾^.
⁶⁹^In^f^o^rm^atioⁿ^p^r^o^v^id^e^d^b^y^telep^h^oⁿ^e^b^y^th^{e DOD Off}ⁱ^{ce o}^f^Le^gislat^ioⁿ^Lⁱ^aiso^{n to th}^{e autho}^r^on^F^e^b^r^u^a^ry⁵^,²⁰⁰⁴^.
⁷⁰^L^e^tte^r^f^r^om^Kay^C^o^le^s^J^a^m^e^s^,^Dⁱ^r^e^c^t^or^{, O}^f^fⁱ^c^e^of^P^e^r^s^onne^l^Ma^na^g^e^m^e^{nt, to H}^oⁿ^.^C^.^W^.^Bⁱ^l^l^Y^o^un^g^,^C^h^aⁱ^r^m^aⁿ^,
^H^ous^e^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on A}^ppr^o^p^rⁱ^a^tⁱ^ons^,^Ma^r^c^{h 1}⁰^,²⁰⁰⁴^{. Se}^c^tioⁿ⁵⁹⁹^C^of^P.L^.¹⁰^8-¹^{99 r}^e^quir^e^s^t^h^e^O^P^{M to}^s^u^bm^{it a}
^r^e^por^{t t}^o^t^h^e^H^o^us^e^a^nd^Se^na^te^C^o^m^m^itte^e^s^{on A}^ppr^opr^ia^ti^ons^on^t^h^e^num^be^r^of^e^m^plo^y^e^e^s^{, b}^y^a^g^eⁿ^cy^{, tha}^t^a^r^e
^de^ta^ile^{d t}^o^C^P^A^.^T^h^e^initia^{l re}^p^o^r^t^w^a^s^due^Fe^brua^ry^{1, 20}⁰⁴^{, a}ⁿ^{d q}^u^a^r^te^rly^upda^te^s^w^e^r^e^a^l^s^o^re^quire^d.
⁷¹^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion pr}^ov^ide^d^e^l^e^c^t^r^onic^a^lly^b^y^C^P^A^’^s^le^gⁱ^s^l^a^tive^a^f^f^a^{irs off}ⁱ^c^e^{to the}^a^u^th^or^{on A}^p^ril^21,²⁰^04.
⁷²^A^r^m^y^Civ^ilia^{n P}^e^rso^nne^l^On-Lⁱⁿ^e^,^“^F^{Y03: T}^h^e^Ye^a^rⁱⁿ^Re^vⁱ^e^w^,”^no^da^te^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^f^r^om^the^a^u^thor^.
⁷³^“^A^r^m^y^A^s^sⁱ^gⁿ^e^d^Re^s^ponsⁱ^b^ility^{for A}^c^quis^itio^{n a}ⁿ^d^P^r^og^ra^m^Maⁿ^a^g^e^m^e^{nt Sup}^por^{t f}^o^{r C}^P^A^,^”^Fed^e^ra^{l Con}^t^ra^cts
^Re^por^t^{, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^{27, 2}⁰⁰⁴^{, v}^o^l^.⁸¹^,^no.^3,^p.⁸⁰^{. T}^h^is^a^r^tic^le^s^t^a^t^e^d^t^h^a^t^the^m^e^m^o^r^a^ndum^da^te^{d Ma}^y²¹^{, 2}⁰⁰³^,
^d^e^si^gn^at^ed^t^h^{e S}^ecret^ary^o^f^t^h^e^A^r^{my E}^x^ecu^tⁱ^v^e^Agen^t^f^o^{r t}^h^{e Off}ⁱ^c^e^o^f^Recoⁿ^s^t^r^u^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^and^Hu^m^aⁿⁱ^t^a^ri^an^A^ssi^st^an^ce
^a^{nd t}^h^a^t^the^m^e^m^o^r^a^ndum^da^te^{d J}^une²¹^,²⁰⁰³^{, d}ⁱ^{d t}^h^e^s^a^m^e^f^o^r^C^P^A^.

Defense and dated January 14, 2004, addressed acquisition and program support for the authority
and confirmed the existence of the previous memoranda:
^P^u^rs^u^aⁿ^t^{to Section}^{113 of}^T^{itle 10,}^Un^{ited States}^C^{ode, th}^{e S}^ecretary^of^t^h^e^A^r^m^y^is^h^e^reb^y
^assi^gⁿ^e^d^t^h^{e au}^th^o^r^it^y^an^d^r^e^sp^oⁿ^sib^ilit^y^f^o^r^th^{e p}^r^o^v^isioⁿ^o^f^acq^uⁱ^si^tioⁿ^aⁿ^d^p^r^o^g^r^a^m
^m^aⁿ^a^g^e^m^eⁿ^t^su^{pport to th}^{e C}^P^A^{(Iraq an}^{d Was}^hⁱⁿ^gton^{, D}^C^{) an}^{d any}^su^cces^s^o^{r entit}^y^.^T^h^e
^S^ecret^ar^y^of^D^e^f^eⁿ^s^{e sh}^al^l^d^e^t^e^r^mⁱⁿ^{e an}^{d pri}^o^ri^tⁱ^{ze t}^h^{e r}^e^quⁱ^r^e^m^eⁿ^t^s^t^o^{be su}^pport^e^d
^p^u^r^s^u^aⁿ^t^to^thⁱ^s^as^sigⁿ^m^eⁿ^{t o}^f^r^e^sp^oⁿ^sib^ilit^y^,^{as n}^ece^ssar^y^.
^{For pu}^rpos^es^of^th^is^m^e^m^o^randum^{, acqu}ⁱ^s^ition^s^u^{pport is}^inten^d^{ed to in}^clu^d^{e th}^{e a}^w^ard,
^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^tioⁿ^an^d^o^v^er^sig^h^{t o}^f^{all co}ⁿ^t^r^acts,^g^r^an^t^s^{, an}^d^o^t^h^e^r^acq^uⁱ^sitioⁿ^actioⁿ^sⁱⁿ^dⁱ^r^ect
^s^u^{pport of}^th^{e C}^P^A^an^{d a}ⁿ^y^su^ccess^o^{r en}^tit^y^.^P^r^og^ra^m^m^a^nag^e^m^eⁿ^t^s^u^{pport com}^p^ris^e^s^all
^as^pects^of^proj^{ect ov}^ersⁱ^g^h^t^,ⁱⁿ^cl^u^d^ing^plannⁱⁿ^g^,^s^c^h^e^du^lⁱ^ng^an^{d ex}^ec^u^tioⁿ^,^as^m^a^y^be
^r^e^q^u^ir^ed^b^y^th^e^sco^p^e^o^f^w^o^r^k^{, d}ⁱ^r^ected^ti^m^e^liⁿ^e^{s, a}ⁿ^d^ap^p^licab^{le f}ⁱⁿ^aⁿ^c^ial^m^aⁿ^a^g^e^m^eⁿ^t
^r^e^gul^a^tⁱ^o^ns.
^A^l^l^addres^s^ees^[lⁱ^s^t^e^{d on}^t^h^e^m^e^m^o^raⁿ^dum^{] sh}^al^l^provⁱ^d^{e su}^pport^t^o^t^h^{e S}^ecret^ar^y^o^f^t^h^e
^A^r^m^y^{, a}^s^t^h^{e Secretar}^y^of^th^e^A^r^my^cons^idersⁿ^ece^s^s^a^r^y^{, t}^o^carry^o^u^{t t}^h^is^a^s^sⁱ^gnm^en^t^of
^r^e^sp^oⁿ^sib^ilit^y^.^Ser^v^ice^s^an^d^su^p^p^{lies p}^r^o^v^id^ed^to^th^{e CP}^Aⁱⁿ^f^u^r^t^h^e^r^aⁿ^{ce o}^f^th^is
^m^e^m^o^raⁿ^dum^sh^{all be}^m^a^{de av}^{ailable i}ⁿ^accordan^ce^wⁱ^th^{DoD In}^s^t^ru^c^tion^{4000.19 an}^d
^applⁱ^cabl^e^fⁱⁿ^aⁿ^cⁱ^a^l^m^aⁿ^a^g^e^men^t^regu^l^a^tⁱ^ons^{. M}^y^m^e^m^o^ran^d^{a of}^May^{21, 2003}^,^d^e^sⁱ^gⁿ^a^tⁱⁿ^g
^th^{e Secretar}^y^o^f^th^e^A^r^my^a^s^Ex^ec^u^tⁱ^v^e^A^g^eⁿ^t^f^o^{r th}^{e O}^f^fⁱ^{ce of}^R^ecoⁿ^s^tr^u^c^tion^aⁿ^d
^H^u^m^aⁿⁱ^t^a^rⁱ^aⁿ^As^sⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^,^aⁿ^d^J^uⁿ^e¹⁶^,²⁰⁰³^,^p^r^o^vⁱ^dⁱⁿ^g^f^o^r^t^h^e^ex^er^cise^o^f^th^at^r^e^sp^oⁿ^sⁱ^b^ilit^y⁷⁴
ⁱⁿ^su^{pport of}^th^{e C}^P^A^,^are^m^odifⁱ^{ed accordin}^g^l^y^.
The following description of a DOD executive agent indicates that executive agents are assigned
responsibility for DOD missions, activities, or tasks:
^T^h^{e Head of}^{a DoD}^C^o^m^pon^eⁿ^{t to}^w^h^o^m^t^h^{e Secretar}^y^{of D}^e^f^e^ns^{e or t}^h^{e Deput}^y^Secretar^y
^of^De^f^e^ns^e^h^a^s^a^s^sⁱ^gn^{ed s}^p^e^c^if^{ic res}^pons^ibilit^ies^,^f^uⁿ^c^tio^ns^{, an}^{d a}^u^t^h^orities^{to prov}^ide
^defⁱⁿ^e^{d l}^e^v^e^l^s^o^f^su^pport^f^o^{r operat}ⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^mⁱ^ssⁱ^ons^{, or ad}^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^ratⁱ^v^e^{or ot}^h^e^{r des}ⁱ^gn^at^ed
^activ^itie^{s t}^h^atⁱⁿ^v^o^lv^e^t^w^o^o^r^m^o^r^e^o^f^t^h^{e Do}^D^Co^m^p^oⁿ^en^ts^{. T}^h^{e n}^a^tu^r^e^aⁿ^d^sco^p^e^o^f^t^h^e
^{DoD Ex}^ec^u^tⁱ^v^e^Ag^ents^res^pons^ib^ilities^,^fun^c^tions^{, a}ⁿ^{d au}^t^h^o^r^ities^s^h^all^{... be pres}^{cribed at}
^th^{e ti}^m^e^of^as^si^gⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^[an^d^{] ... rem}^aⁱⁿⁱⁿ^eff^ect^un^{til t}^h^{e Secre}^t^ar^y^of^De^f^e^{nse or th}^{e Depu}^t^y⁷⁵
^Secretar^y^of^De^f^e^ns^{e rev}^o^k^e^s^{or s}^u^s^p^en^ds^t^h^e^m^.
This definition would arguably cast CPA as a DOD component. A broad interpretation, though,
might allow the Secretary, or Deputy Secretary, to appoint an executive agent for a non-DOD
entity or even a non-governmental entity. DOD’s policy governing the use of executive agents
leaves open this possibility.
^4.1.^T^h^{e D}^o^D^Ex^ecutⁱ^v^e^A^g^eⁿ^t^desⁱ^gn^atⁱ^oⁿ^sh^a^l^l^{be conf}^er^red^w^h^eⁿ^:^{4.1.1. N}^o^exⁱ^s^tⁱ^ng
^m^eans^{to accom}^p^li^s^h^{DoD objectiv}^es^e^x^is^t^s^{. 4.1.}^2.^{DoD res}^o^u^r^cesⁿ^{eed to be f}^o^cu^s^e^{d on}^a
^s^p^ecifⁱ^{c area or areas}^of^res^p^oⁿ^s^ibili^t^yⁱⁿ^orde^{r t}^o^mⁱⁿⁱ^mⁱ^ze^du^plⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^{or redu}ⁿ^d^an^c^y^{, or}
^4.1.3.^S^u^ch^desⁱ^gⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿⁱ^s^requⁱ^r^{ed by}^l^a^w^,^E^x^ecu^tⁱ^v^e^order,^{or G}^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^-wⁱ^d^e⁷⁶
^r^e^gul^a^tⁱ^o^n.

⁷⁴^P^a^{ul W}^o^lf^ow^itz^{, D}^e^puty^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^f^o^{r D}^e^f^e^ns^e^,^“A^s^s^igⁿ^m^eⁿ^{t of}^Res^ponsⁱ^b^ility^f^o^{r A}^c^quis^itio^{n a}ⁿ^d^Prog^ram
^Ma^na^g^e^m^e^{nt Supp}^{ort f}^o^{r t}^h^e^Coa^litioⁿ^P^r^ov^is^iona^{l A}^u^th^ority^,”^m^e^m^o^ra^ndum^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^14,²⁰^04.
⁷⁵^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^Dⁱ^r^e^c^tiv^{e 51}^01.^1,^D^o^{D E}^xecu^tⁱ^{ve A}^g^eⁿ^t^,^S^e^pte^m^be^r^{3, 20}^{02 (}^c^e^r^tif^ie^{d c}^u^r^r^e^{nt a}^s^of
^Nov^e^m^b^e^r^21,²⁰^03),^p.^2,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^ht^tp:/^/www^.dtic^.m^il/^w^h^s/dire^c^tiv^e^s^/.
⁷⁶^Ibid^{., p. 3.}

Aside from the question of whether an executive agent can be assigned to a non-DOD or non-
governmental entity, it appears that item 4.1.1, item 4.1.2, or both might have applied to the
circumstances surrounding DOD and CPA. It seems likely that item 4.1.3 would not have applied,
because no law, executive order, or government regulation had been enacted, issued, or produced
that required or authorized the Army to serve as executive agent. No mention is made in the
Deputy Secretary’s January 14, 2003, memorandum of which rationale applied to the authority.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz did note that Department of Defense Instruction Number
4000.19 applied to the provision of supplies and services to the CPA. This document provides
guidance for intragovernmental and interservice support, which are defined as follows:
^In^t^r^ag^ov^er^nm^en^t^a^l^s^u^pportⁱ^s^s^u^pport^provⁱ^d^{ed by}^{a D}^o^D^actⁱ^vⁱ^t^y^t^o^{a n}^on-^D^o^D^F^e^deral
^activ^it^y^aⁿ^{d v}ⁱ^ce^v^e^rs^{a—[it] d}^o^esⁿ^o^{t in}^c^l^u^d^e^su^{pport prov}^{ided to or receiv}^e^{d f}^r^om^f^o^reign
^go^ve^rⁿ^me^nt^s.
^In^t^e^rs^ervⁱ^ce^s^u^pportⁱ^s^su^pport^provⁱ^d^{ed by}^on^{e D}^o^D^actⁱ^vⁱ^t^y^t^o^{a D}^o^D^actⁱ^vⁱ^t^y^o^f^an^ot^h^e^r
^Militar^y^Ser^v^{ice, Def}^eⁿ^s^e^Ag^en^c^y^{, Un}ⁱ^f^ied^Co^m^b^ataⁿ^{t Co}^m^m^an^d^,^A^r^m^y^Re^ser^v^e^s^,^Na^v^y
^R^e^s^e^rv^e^s^,^Aⁱ^{r Force R}^e^s^e^rv^e^s^{, Marin}^e^C^o^rps^R^e^s^e^r^v^es^,^Aⁱ^{r Natio}ⁿ^a^{l Gu}^{ard, or Field}⁷⁷
^Ac^tⁱ^vⁱ^t^y^.
Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz’s memorandum did not indicate whether the authority received
support from the Army under an interservice or an intragovernmental agreement, which leaves
unanswered the question of whether CPA was part of DOD, or simply attached to it for the
purposes of facilitating coordination with, and receiving support from, the Department of the
Army. Nevertheless, DOD Instruction 4000.19 clarifies that a non-DOD entity may receive
support from DOD. In either case, intragovernmental or interservice agreement, documentation is
required.
^Broad^areas^of^recu^rriⁿ^gⁱⁿ^t^e^rservⁱ^{ce an}^{d i}ⁿ^t^r^a^g^ov^ernm^eⁿ^t^a^l^su^pport^an^{d co}^oper^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^t^h^a^t^d^o
ⁿ^o^{t r}^e^q^u^ir^{e r}^e^im^b^u^r^s^e^m^en^{t sh}^o^u^ld^b^e^d^o^c^u^m^eⁿ^ted^wⁱ^t^h^a^m^e^m^o^r^aⁿ^d^u^m^o^f^ag^r^e^em^en^t⁽^M^OA⁾
^or^m^e^m^o^ran^d^um^{of un}^ders^t^a^ndiⁿ^g^(MO^U^{). R}^e^c^u^rriⁿ^gⁱⁿ^t^e^rservⁱ^{ce an}^dⁱⁿ^t^r^a^g^ov^er^nm^eⁿ^t^a^l
^s^u^pport^t^h^at^requⁱ^r^es^rei^m^bu^r^s^e^m^ent^s^h^a^l^l^{be docu}^m^eⁿ^t^e^{d on}^{a D}^D^[D^epart^m^eⁿ^t^of^D^e^f^eⁿ^s^e^]
^F^o^r^m^{1144, “}^S^u^pport^Ag^ree^m^en^t^”^{... , or s}ⁱ^mⁱ^l^a^r^f^o^r^m^at^t^h^at^con^t^ai^ns^al^l^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^on
^requ^{ired on}^{DD Form}^{1144. Su}^{pport th}^{at ben}^e^f^its^{a receiv}^e^r^w^ith^ou^{t creati}ⁿ^g^addition^a^{l cos}^t
^t^o^t^h^e^s^u^pplⁱ^e^{r (e.g}^.,^g^a^t^e^gu^ards^{, f}ⁱ^{re prot}^ectⁱ^oⁿ⁾^m^a^y^{be i}ⁿ^cl^u^d^{ed on}^{a D}^D^F^o^r^m^{1144, bu}^t
^m^u^{st b}^e^id^en^tif^ied^{as n}^oⁿ^-^r^eⁱ^m^b^u^r^s^ab^{le. P}^r^o^v^isioⁿ^o^f^{a sin}^g^{le ite}^m^o^r^oⁿ^{e ti}^m^e^ser^v^{ice, sale}^s
^of^D^e^f^eⁿ^s^e^Bu^sⁱⁿ^e^ss^O^p^eratⁱ^oⁿ^s^Fun^d^(D^BO^F⁾^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^produ^ct^s^an^{d s}^e^rvⁱ^c^e^s^{, an}^d
ⁱⁿ^trag^o^v^ernm^eⁿ^{tal s}^a^le^s^s^p^eci^ficall^y^directed^{or au}^th^{orized by}^la^w^m^a^y^{be acco}^m^p^li^s^h^{ed on}⁷⁸
^t^h^{e bas}ⁱ^s^o^f^an^{order or re}^quⁱ^sⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿ^wⁱ^t^h^ou^t^prepariⁿ^g^{a su}^pport^ag^ree^m^eⁿ^t^.
Apparently, documentation was required for the support agreement between the Army and CPA.
If an applicable document exists and is available to the public, it might clarify what type of
agreement existed between the Army and the authority.

⁷⁷^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^Iⁿ^s^t^r^u^c^tⁱ^{on N}^u^m^b^e^r⁴⁰⁰^0.1⁹^,^Iⁿ^te^r^s^e^r^v^ic^e^and^Iⁿ^tr^ag^ov^e^r^nm^eⁿ^tal^S^u^p^por^t^,^A^u^gu^st⁹^,¹⁹⁹⁵^,^p^.
^{15, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http^://w^ww^.dtic^.^m^il/^w^h^s/^dire^c^tiv^e^s^/c^orre^s/pdf^/40⁰⁰¹⁹^p.^pdf^.
⁷⁸^Ibid^{., p. 4.}

An Office of the Inspector General was established for CPA by Title III of the FY2004 emergency ⁷⁹
supplemental. The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, appointed ⁸⁰
the Inspector General, and the Inspector General reported to the CPA Administrator. As of
March 20, 2004, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) employed 58 persons and had obtained ⁸¹
the services of an auditing and accounting firm.
In addition to having the duties, responsibilities, and authorities outlined in the Inspector General ⁸²
Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. Appendix), the CPA Inspector General (IG) was authorized to “conduct,
supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations of the treatment, handling, and expenditure of ⁸³
appropriated funds by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq.” This involved, for example,
monitoring obligations and expenditures, reconstruction activities, contracts, and transfers of
funds and associated information between and among the CPA and other departments, agencies, ⁸⁴
and entities of the federal government. It seems that the CPA IG was to be treated the same as
any federal agency’s OIG. The CPA office was to coordinate with the DOD and USAID Offices of ⁸⁵
Inspector General. Additionally, any federal department or agency that was asked to provide ⁸⁶
information or assistance to the CPA OIG was to do so. In his statement on the emergency
supplemental, the President apparently placed some restrictions on CPA’s OIG. He noted that the
Inspector General was to:
^r^e^f^r^ain^f^r^o^mⁱⁿ^itiatiⁿ^g^{, car}^r^yⁱⁿ^g^o^u^t,^o^r^co^m^p^letin^g^aⁿ^a^u^d^{it o}^rⁱⁿ^v^e^sti^g^atioⁿ^,^o^r^f^r^o^m^is^suⁱⁿ^g
^{a s}^u^bpoen^a^,^w^h^ich^requ^ire^s^acces^s^{to s}^eⁿ^s^it^iv^{e operation plan}^s^,ⁱⁿ^telli^g^eⁿ^ce^m^a^t^t^ers^,
^c^o^unt^e^rⁱⁿ^t^e^l^lⁱ^ge^nc^e^m^a^t^t^e^r^s^,^o^ngoⁱⁿ^{g c}^rⁱ^mⁱⁿ^a^lⁱ^nve^stⁱ^g^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^b^y^o^t^he^r^a^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^ratⁱ^v^e^unⁱ^t^s^of
^th^{e Dep}^a^r^t^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^De^f^eⁿ^s^{e r}^e^lated^toⁿ^a^tioⁿ^a^{l sec}^u^rⁱ^t^y^{, o}^r^o^t^h^e^r^m^a^t^t^er^{s th}^{e d}ⁱ^sc^lo^su^r^e^o^f
^w^h^ic^h^w^o^u^l^d^coⁿ^s^t^itu^{te a th}^r^e^{at to}ⁿ^a^tioⁿ^a^{l sec}^u^rⁱ^t^y^{. T}^h^{e Se}^cr^etar^y^o^f^De^f^eⁿ^s^e^m^a^y^m^a^k^e⁸⁷
^ex^cep^tioⁿ^s^to^t^h^{e f}^o^r^e^g^oⁱⁿ^g^dⁱ^r^ectioⁿⁱⁿ^t^h^{e p}^u^b^{lic i}ⁿ^ter^e^st.
The CPA IG was to terminate its operations six months after the “authorities and duties” of CPA ⁸⁸
“cease to exist,” which occurred June 28, 2004. Instead, Section 1203 of P.L. 108-375, which
amended Title III of P.L. 108-106, redesignated the CPA IG as the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and made termination of the office contingent upon the obligation of ⁸⁹
appropriated funds. SIGIR is to cease operations

⁷⁹^P^.^L^.¹⁰^8-¹⁰⁶^;¹¹⁷^Sta^t^.¹²⁰⁹^{, a}^t¹²³^4.
⁸⁰^Se^c^.³⁰⁰¹⁽^c⁾^a^{nd (}^e⁾^of^P.L^.¹⁰^8-¹⁰⁶^.
⁸¹^Coa^liti^on^Prov^isio^na^{l A}^u^thor^ity^{, Off}ⁱ^c^e^of^Inspe^c^t^{or G}^e^ne^ra^l,^M^e^ss^age^from^the^Iⁿ^spe^c^t^{or Ge}^ne^ral^of^the^Co^aliti^on
^Prov^ision^a^{l A}^u^t^hority^{, p. 13}^.
⁸²^P^.^L^.^95-⁴⁵^{2, Se}^c^.^1;^O^c^tobe^r^12,¹⁹⁷^{8; 92}^Sta^t^{. 11}⁰¹^.
⁸³^Se^c^.³⁰⁰¹⁽^f⁾⁽¹⁾^a^{nd (}^g⁾^of^P^.^L^.¹^08-¹⁰^6.
⁸⁴^Se^c^.³⁰⁰¹⁽^f⁾⁽¹⁾^of^P.L^.¹⁰^8-¹⁰⁶^.
⁸⁵^Se^c^.³⁰⁰¹⁽^f⁾⁽⁴⁾^a^nd⁽⁵⁾^of^P.L^.¹^08-¹⁰^6.
⁸⁶^Se^c^.³⁰⁰¹⁽^h)⁽⁴⁾^of^P^.^L^.¹^08-¹⁰^6.
⁸⁷^U^.^S.^P^r^e^sⁱ^d^eⁿ^{t (}^G^{. W}^.^B^u^s^h⁾^,^“^S^t^a^tem^e^{nt on S}ⁱ^gⁿ^ing^t^h^e^Em^e^r^ge^nc^y^Supple^m^eⁿ^ta^l^A^ppr^opr^ia^tio^ns^A^c^{t f}^o^r^D^e^f^e^ns^e
^a^{nd f}^o^r^the^R^e^c^o^ns^tr^uc^ti^on^of^I^r^a^q^a^{nd A}^f^g^h^aⁿ^is^ta^{n, 20}^04,”^Weekl^{y Co}^mpⁱ^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^P^r^esi^d^entⁱ^a^l^Do^cumen^t^s^{, v}^o^l.^39,
^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^{6, 2}⁰⁰³^,^p.¹⁵^49.
⁸⁸^Se^c^.³⁰⁰¹⁽^o)^of^P.L^.¹⁰^8-¹^06.
⁸⁹^For^a^dditi^ona^l^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion o}ⁿ^SI^G^I^{R, se}^e^http://www^.sig^ir.^m^il.

¹⁰^m^oⁿ^t^h^s^af^ter^th^e^d^a^{te, as}^d^e^ter^mⁱⁿ^ed^b^y^t^h^e^Secretar^y^of^State^aⁿ^{d th}^e^Secretar^y^of
^D^e^fe^nse^,^oⁿ^w^hⁱ^c^{h 8}⁰^p^e^r^c^eⁿ^t^o^f^t^h^e^a^m^o^unt^{s a}^p^p^r^opri^a^t^e^d^or^ot^h^e^r^wⁱ^s^{e m}^a^de^av^aⁱ^l^a^bl^e^t^o^t^h^e⁹⁰
^I^r^a^q^Relief^an^d^Recoⁿ^s^tr^u^c^tioⁿ^Fuⁿ^d^b^y^ch^ap^ter²^o^f^{title I}^I^o^f^th^is^A^c^t^h^a^v^e^b^e^eⁿ^o^b^lⁱ^g^a^t^e^d^.
During the 109^th Congress, the SIGIR’s term initially was shortened, but then was extended.
Section 1054(b) of P.L. 109-364, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act, FY2007,
stated that the Inspector General would terminate on October 1, 2007. Subsequently, P.L. 109-440
changed the termination date so that
^[t]h^{e Off}ⁱ^{ce of}^Iⁿ^s^p^{ector General s}^h^{all ter}^mⁱⁿ^{ate 10}^m^oⁿ^t^hs^af^{ter 80 percen}^{t of}^th^e^fuⁿ^d^s
^appro^p^riated^or^oth^e^r^wⁱ^s^e^m^a^d^e^av^{ailable to th}^{e Iraq}^R^e^lief^an^{d R}^econ^s^tr^u^c^tion^F^uⁿ^d^h^a^v^e
^been^ex^pen^d^{ed.... For}^pu^rpos^e^s^of^calcu^lati^ng^th^{e ter}^mⁱⁿ^at^ion^of^th^{e O}^f^{fice of}^th^{e In}^s^p^ector
^G^eⁿ^e^ral^un^{der t}^hⁱ^s^s^u^bs^ectⁱ^{on, any}^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^es^f^uⁿ^d^s^appropri^a^t^e^d^or^ot^h^e^r^wⁱ^s^e^m^a^de
^av^ai^l^a^bl^{e f}^o^{r f}ⁱ^s^cal^y^{ear 2006 f}^o^{r t}^h^{e recon}^s^t^r^u^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^of^{Iraq, i}^r^res^p^ectⁱ^v^{e of}^t^h^e^d^e^sⁱ^gⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f
^s^u^c^h^fuⁿ^d^s^,^sh^al^l^be^dee^m^{ed t}^o^{be a}^m^o^uⁿ^t^s^appropri^a^t^e^{d or ot}^h^e^r^wⁱ^s^e^m^a^{de a}^v^ai^l^a^bl^e^t^o^t^h^e⁹¹
^I^r^a^q^Re^lⁱ^e^{f a}ⁿ^d^Re^c^o^nst^r^uc^tⁱ^o^{n F}^und^.
The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction reports to both the Secretary of Defense
and the Secretary of State.
The Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act for FY2003,⁹² which was the first
supplemental to provide funds for the reconstruction of Iraq, was signed on April 16, 2003, prior
to the announcement that Ambassador Bremer would be the Administration’s Presidential Envoy
to Iraq. Accordingly, there was no mention of CPA (or ORHA) in this statute. The $2.475 billion
appropriated to the President for the reconstruction of Iraq could be apportioned only to USAID ⁹³
and the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services (HHS), State, and the Treasury.
The FY2004 emergency supplemental, which was signed by the President on November 6, 2003,
included CPA in the list of organizations to which the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund could ⁹⁴
be apportioned. The other five organizations in the list were the ones included in the first
supplemental.
While the authority was eligible to receive funds for the reconstruction of Iraq, apparently it did
not award any contracts funded by the FY2004 emergency supplemental. Deputy Secretary
Wolfowitz’s December 5, 2003, memorandum identifying countries whose companies were
eligible to compete for contracts funded by the FY2004 emergency supplemental also stated that

⁹⁰^Se^c^.¹²⁰³⁽^o)^of^P.L^.¹⁰^8-³^75.
⁹¹^Se^c^.²^of^P^.^L^.¹⁰^9-⁴^40.
⁹²^P^.^L^.¹⁰^8-¹¹^;¹¹^{7 S}^t^a^t^{. 5}⁵⁹^,^a^t⁵⁷^3.
⁹³^“^A^ppor^tio^n”^r^e^f^e^r^s^{to a}^pr^oc^e^dur^e^w^h^e^r^e^b^y^the^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^t^,^t^h^r^o^ug^h^O^M^B^,^dis^t^rⁱ^bu^te^s^a^ppr^opr^ia^te^d^f^unds^t^o^e^x^e^c^u^tiv^e
^agen^ci^es.⁽³¹^U.^S^.^C.^§¹⁵¹³⁽^b⁾⁽¹⁾^.^Ou^t^sⁱ^d^e^t^h^{e execu}^tⁱ^v^{e b}^r^an^ch^,^“t^h^e^o^f^fⁱ^ci^al^h^a^viⁿ^g^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^st^ratⁱ^v^e^coⁿ^t^rol^o^f^an
^ap^p^r^op^ri^atⁱ^oⁿ^avai^l^a^b^l^{e t}^o^t^h^{e l}^e^gi^sl^atⁱ^v^{e b}^r^an^ch^,^t^h^{e j}^u^dⁱ^ci^al^b^r^aⁿ^ch,^t^h^{e Uni}^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es In}^t^e^rn^atⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^T^r^ad^{e Co}^mmⁱ^ssi^oⁿ^,
^{or the}^Distrⁱ^c^t^of^Col^u^m^b^ia^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt ... sha}^{ll a}^p^p^o^rtio^{n t}^h^e^a^ppr^opria^ti^on^{in w}^r^iting^.^”⁽³^{1 U.}^S.C.^§15¹³^(a^).)
⁹⁴¹¹^{7 Sta}^t^.1²²^5.

the construction and services contracts funded by the supplemental “are to be awarded by the ⁹⁵
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and by the Department of Defense, on behalf of CPA.”
Solicitations for the major design/build construction contracts were issued by the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM), and the
Naval Facilities Engineering Command. Proposals were to be submitted to the office that issued ⁹⁶
the solicitation. Offerors also were required to submit copies of their proposals to the Iraq
Reconstruction Contracting Office, which was located in Alexandria, Virginia. The Pentagon
Renovation Office issued the solicitations for support for the CPA’s Program Management Office
(PMO) and sector PMOs. Proposals were to be submitted to the Pentagon Renovation Office, but
there was no requirement for proposals for the program management office PMO and sector
program management offices (SPMOs) contracts to be submitted to the Iraq Reconstruction
Contracting Office. Solicitations were issued on January 6, 2004, and by March 26, 2004, all 17 ⁹⁷
contracts were awarded.
Apparently, no official explanation as to why the CPA did not issue these solicitations was
offered. A possible factor in the decision to decentralize the solicitation, evaluation, and award
processes might have been the scheduled termination of the CPA. Knowing that the CPA would
terminate operations by June 30, 2004, Administration officials might have chosen the route they
did in order to maintain continuity. Another possible reason why CPA was limited to monitoring
contracts may be that government officials ascertained that the authority did not have enough
personnel, or enough personnel with sufficient experience in the types of work to be done in Iraq,
to develop solicitations and evaluate proposals for seven major sectors, the PMO, and the
SPMOs. The fact that CPA needed contractor support for its PMO and SPMOs tends to support
the notion that it did not have enough resources to perform all of the necessary procurement tasks.
A third consideration might have been the possibility of protests, particularly the possibility that a
contractor would file a protest with GAO challenging the authority’s actions or decisions
concerning the award of a contract. As discussed below, a few companies did file protests with
GAO concerning CPA decisions. Perhaps the U.S. government wanted to avoid the possibility
that additional protests targeting CPA would be filed with GAO. (As noted below, CPA’s own

⁹⁵^P^a^u^l^W^o^l^f^o^wⁱ^t^z^,^Dep^u^t^y^S^ecret^ar^y^o^f^De^f^eⁿ^s^e,^“Det^er^mⁱⁿ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^{and F}ⁱ^ndⁱⁿ^gs,^”^avai^l^a^b^l^{e f}^r^o^m^t^h^{e au}^t^h^o^r^.^In^t^hⁱ^s
^doc^um^eⁿ^{t, the}^De^p^u^ty^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^u^s^e^d^the^“^p^ublic^inte^re^st”^e^x^c^e^p^{tion (se}^e^FA^{R 6.30}^2-7)^to^f^u^{ll a}ⁿ^d^o^p^eⁿ^c^o^m^p^e^titio^{n a}^s
^the^a^u^th^ority^f^o^{r lim}^iting^c^o^m^p^e^tition^f^o^{r re}^c^onstruc^ti^on^c^ont^ra^c^t^{s t}^o^fⁱ^rm^{s “}^f^rom^the^Unite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^{, I}^r^a^q^{, Coa}^lit^ioⁿ
^pa^r^t^ne^r^s^aⁿ^d^f^o^r^c^e^c^ontrⁱ^b^u^ti^ng^na^tions^.”⁽^I^bi^d.)^I^t^be^a^r^s^no^ting^,^ho^w^e^v^e^r^,^tha^t^the^D^e^puty^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of^D^e^f^e^ns^e^{did n}^o^t,
^a^{nd d}^o^e^sⁿ^o^t,^ha^v^e^a^u^thor^ity^{to us}^e^or^a^p^p^l^y^this^e^x^c^e^p^{tion. U}ⁿ^de^r^F^A^R^6.302-⁷⁽^c⁾^,^only^the^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of^D^e^f^e^ns^e^,^the
^S^ecret^ari^e^{s o}^f^t^h^e^Aⁱ^{r F}^o^rce,^A^r^my^,^an^d^Nav^y^,^t^h^{e S}^ecret^ar^y^o^f^Ho^mel^aⁿ^d^S^ecu^ri^t^y^f^o^{r t}^h^{e Co}^ast^G^u^ard^,^t^h^e
^A^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^st^rat^o^{r o}^f^t^h^{e Nat}ⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^A^e^r^oⁿ^a^u^tⁱ^c^{s an}^d^S^p^{ace A}^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^st^ratⁱ^oⁿ^,^and^t^h^{e h}^ead^o^f^an^y^o^t^h^e^{r exec}^u^tⁱ^v^{e agen}^c^y^m^a^y
^e^x^e^r^cⁱ^s^e^{this a}^u^th^ority^{, w}^h^ic^{h m}^a^y^{not be}^de^le^g^a^te^d.
⁹⁶^Aⁿ^of^f^e^r^o^r^is^a^busⁱⁿ^e^s^s^tha^t^s^u^b^m^its^a^pr^opos^a^lⁱⁿ^r^e^s^p^oⁿ^s^e^to^a^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt s}^o^lic^ita^tion.
⁹⁷^T^h^e^c^ontra^c^t^{s w}^e^re^a^w^a^r^de^{d to A}^E^{COM (}^P^{MO s}^u^p^port,^$^21.^{6 m}^illion),^CH2M^Hill/^P^a^rsoⁿ^{s (p}^ub^lic^w^o^rk^{s a}^{nd wa}^te^r
^S^P^{MO su}^pp^ort;^$2^8.^{4 m}^illion),^B^e^rg^e^r^{/URS (tra}^nsporta^tio^n/c^o^m^m^unic^a^tio^ns^S^P^{MO su}^pp^ort,^$8^{.4 m}^illio^n;
^se^c^u^rity^/justic^e^SP^{MO su}^pp^ort,^$⁸^.4^m^illio^n;^bui^ldiⁿ^g^s^/e^duc^a^tio^n/h^e^a^{lth S}^P^{MO s}^u^p^port^,^$¹⁰^.^{7 m}^illio^{n), Ira}^q^P^o^w^e^r
^A^llia^nc^e^{Joint V}^e^nture^(e^le^c^t^ric^a^l^se^rv^ic^e^s^{SPMO sup}^por^t,^$4^3.3^mⁱ^llion)^{, F}^o^ste^r^W^h^e^e^l^e^r^{(oil S}^P^MO^sup^port,^$⁸^.4
^m^{illion), Fl}^uor^A^M^{EC LL}^{C (pow}^e^r^g^e^ne^ra^{tion f}^a^c^ilitie^{s, $50}⁰^m^illion;^pu^blic^w^o^rk^{s a}^{nd w}^a^te^r—nort^h^e^r^{n re}^gⁱ^on^{, $}⁶⁰⁰
^m^{illion; p}^ubl^ic^w^o^rk^{s a}^{nd w}^a^te^r^—^southe^rⁿ^re^gⁱ^on^{, $}⁵⁰⁰^m^illion)^,^W^a^shing^t^{on I}ⁿ^te^rna^tio^na^{l I}ⁿ^c^.^aⁿ^{d Bla}^c^k^a^nd^V^e^a^t^c^h
^(w^a^t^e^r^re^sourc^e^s^{, $60}^{0 m}^illio^n),^W^a^shing^t^{on Inte}^rⁿ^a^tio^na^{l In}^c^.^(e^le^c^t^ricⁱ^t^y^—northe^rⁿ^re^gⁱ^oⁿ^{, $5}⁰⁰^m^{illion), P}^e^rinⁱ
^Corp.^(e^le^c^t^ric^ity^—^s^outhe^rn^re^gⁱ^{on, $}⁵⁰⁰^m^illio^{n), C}^ontr^a^c^k^/A^ICI/^O^C^I/A^r^c^h^{irodon J}^oⁱⁿ^t^V^e^nt^ure^(tr^a^ns^porta^ti^on,^$³²⁵
^m^{illion), L}^u^c^eⁿ^{t T}^e^c^hnol^og^ie^s^World^Se^rv^ic^e^s^{, Inc}^.^(c^om^m^uni^c^a^tions^{, $}⁷⁵^m^{illion), a}^nd^P^a^rs^ons^D^e^l^a^w^a^re^(buildiⁿ^g^s^,
^e^duc^a^tion^,^aⁿ^{d he}^a^l^t^h^,^$5^{00 m}^illi^{on; s}^e^c^u^rity^{, jus}^tic^e^,^aⁿ^{d s}^a^f^e^t^y^{, $900}^m^illion).^(Coa^liti^on^P^r^ov^isⁱ^oⁿ^a^{l A}^u^thority^,
^P^r^o^g^ram^M^aⁿ^a^g^e^m^eⁿ^t^O^f^fⁱ^ce,^“^Aⁿ^o^t^h^e^{r Con}^t^ractⁱⁿ^P^l^{ace t}^o^C^oⁿ^tⁱⁿ^u^e^Con^s^t^r^u^c^tⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^Iraq^,^”^p^r^{ess rel}^ease,^A^p^ri^l²^,
²⁰⁰^{4, a}^v^a^ila^ble^f^r^om^the^a^u^thor^.

contracting procedures applied only to non-appropriated funds, and only allowed for protests to
be filed with CPA officials.)
The former Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, in writing about
contracting with the authority, offered another possible explanation of why government officials
chose to have DOD components issue solicitations and award contracts for the reconstruction of
Iraq:
^Th^e^C^P^A^is^not^t^h^e^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^St^a^t^e^s^go^ve^rⁿ^me^nt^.^A^c^c^o^r^dⁱⁿ^gl^y^,ⁱ^f^on^e^en^ter^sⁱⁿ^{to a con}^t^ract^u^a^l
^r^e^latioⁿ^s^hⁱ^p^wⁱ^th^t^h^{e CP}^A^,^oⁿ^e^{is n}^o^{t en}^terⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^to^{a co}ⁿ^t^r^actu^a^{l r}^e^latioⁿ^s^hⁱ^p^wⁱ^t^h^th^e^Unⁱ^t^e^d
^States^{. T}^h^{e righ}^ts^aⁿ^{d re}^m^e^die^s^av^{ailable to pa}^r^{ties co}ⁿ^t^r^actiⁿ^g^wⁱ^th^t^h^{e U}ⁿ^ited^State^s^w^ill
ⁿ^o^{t be a}^v^{ailable i}ⁿ^a^con^t^ract^{ual relation}^s^hⁱ^p^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^e^C^P^A^.^T^h^{e re}^m^e^dies^a^v^{ailable to a}ⁿ
^ag^g^rⁱ^e^v^e^{d con}^t^ractⁱⁿ^g^part^y^wⁱ^l^l^{be det}^e^rmⁱⁿ^{ed i}ⁿ^part^by^t^h^{e s}^o^u^r^{ce of}^t^h^e^m^oⁿ^e^y^t^h^rou^gh⁹⁸
^w^h^ic^h^th^{e co}ⁿ^t^r^actin^g^p^a^r^t^yⁱ^s^p^a^id^.
Government officials may have considered the question of the CPA’s organizational status and the
possibility that a contract with the authority would not be a contract with the U.S. government.
These considerations might have contributed to a determination that it would not be appropriate
for CPA to enter into contracts funded by appropriated funds.
There is some question as to whether the authority used appropriated funds for projects involving
the reconstruction of Iraq. In a letter it submitted to GAO on the matter of the Turkcell
Consortium protest (see below), the United States Army Legal Services Agency stated: “The
funds CPA is using for contracts are not appropriated funds.... Even if this action [issuing licenses
for mobile telecommunications] was a procurement that involved the use of funds, CPA would ⁹⁹
use DFI [Development Fund for Iraq] funds, not U.S. appropriated funds for its CPA mission.”
This letter was written a few weeks before the FY2004 emergency supplemental was enacted, so
possibly the Army was commenting only on conditions at the time. If so, then the Army’s
assertion in the Turkcell Consortium bid protest might not have applied to subsequent
procurement actions.
Other evidence suggests that CPA used appropriated funds for reconstruction activities. A news
article that mentioned the activities of the CPA’s Program Review Board (see below) indicates the
authority spent appropriated funds:
^Fr^o^m^mⁱⁿ^u^t^e^s^p^u^b^lis^h^e^d^b^y^th^{e CP}^A’^{s P}^r^o^g^r^a^m^Re^vⁱ^e^w^B^o^a^r^d^,^{it ap}^p^ear^{s th}^at^th^e^CP^A^h^a^s
^t^h^{e po}^w^e^{r t}^o^shⁱ^f^t^m^oⁿⁱ^e^s^bet^w^een^appropri^a^t^e^{d f}^uⁿ^d^{s account}^s^an^{d t}^h^e^D^e^v^e^l^o^p^m^eⁿ^t^Fuⁿ^d
^of^{Iraq (w}^hⁱ^ch^cont^ai^ns^fun^d^s^from^bot^h^Iraqi^an^{d f}^o^rei^gⁿ^don^at^{ed s}^o^u^r^ces^):^“^{#352, R}^e^s^t^ore
^{Iraqi In}^f^r^as^tru^c^t^u^{re, $711M.}^[^m^illioⁿ^]^T^h^{e B}^o^a^r^{d c}^oⁿ^s^{idered th}^{e requ}^es^{t f}^r^o^m^T^a^s^k^Force
^RI^{O [}^R^es^to^r^e^I^r^a^qⁱ^Oil]^f^o^r^c^h^an^gⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{e f}^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^so^u^r^ce^f^r^o^m^ap^p^r^o^p^r^iated^f^uⁿ^d^s^to^th^e
^D^e^v^e^l^o^p^m^eⁿ^t^F^uⁿ^d^o^f^{Iraq a}^prevⁱ^o^u^s^l^y^approv^{ed requ}^est⁽^{#352, t}^o^t^a^l^am^o^u^nt^approv^ed
^$962M)^.^{$251M w}^a^s^al^read^y^provⁱ^d^{ed f}^r^o^m^t^h^e^N^a^t^u^ral^R^e^sou^r^{ce R}ⁱ^s^k^R^e^m^e^di^atⁱ^oⁿ^F^uⁿ^d
^(NR^R^R^F^{), a}ⁿ^{appropriated f}^unds^accouⁿ^{t. T}^F^R^I^Oⁱⁿ^{dicated t}^h^{at $711M is}^o^u^ts^taⁿ^dⁱⁿ^{g an}^d
^requⁱ^r^{ed bu}^t^of^t^h^at^a^m^oun^t^{$466M w}^a^sⁱ^m^m^e^di^at^el^y^requⁱ^r^{ed t}^o^c^o^m^p^l^e^t^e^proj^ect^s^uⁿ^d^er
^Ph^as^{e I.}^T^h^{e Boar}^{d i}^d^en^tⁱ^fⁱ^e^{d $5}^{00M as}^rem^aⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^av^ai^l^a^bl^{e f}^r^om^t^w^{o appropri}^a^t^e^d
^accouⁿ^t^s^—^t^h^{e Iraq R}^econ^s^truction^an^d^R^e^lie^f^F^uⁿ^d^(IR^R^F⁾^an^{d th}^e^NR^R^R^{F an}^{d t}^h^ere^f^ore

⁹⁸^Aⁿ^g^e^la^{B. St}^y^l^e^s^{, “}^S^e^lle^{r Be}^w^a^r^e^{: A}^sse^ssing^the^Risk^{s of}^Ira^{q Re}^c^onstruc^tⁱ^oⁿ^Co^ntra^c^ting^,^”^Fe^de^r^a^l^C^ontr^a^c^t^s
^Re^por^t^{, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^{20, 2}⁰⁰⁴^{, v}^o^l^.⁸¹^,^no.^2,^p.⁶⁵^{. (Ita}^lic^sⁱⁿ^orig^ina^l^.)
⁹⁹^M^a^j^.^F^r^an^{k A}^.^M^a^rch^,^Dep^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^t^h^{e A}^r^my^,^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es A}^r^{my L}^e^gal^S^e^r^vⁱ^ces^Agen^c^y^,^“P^ro^t^e^st^o^f^T^u^rkc^e^l^l
^C^ons^or^tⁱ^um^{, B}^-²⁹³⁰^48,”^c^o^r^r^e^s^p^o^nde^nc^e^t^o^U^.^S.^G^e^ne^r^a^l^A^c^c^ountiⁿ^g^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^,^O^c^tobe^r^21,²⁰⁰³^{, p}^p^.^{3 a}ⁿ^d^4.

^t^h^{e requ}ⁱ^r^e^m^eⁿ^t^w^a^s^approv^{ed t}^o^co^m^e^f^r^o^m^t^h^{e appropri}^a^t^e^{d f}^uⁿ^d^s^.^Aⁿ^e^w^v^o^t^e^m^a^y^be
^requⁱ^r^{ed f}^o^{r t}^h^{e re}^m^aⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^a^m^ouⁿ^t^{$211M bu}^t^t^hⁱ^s^w^a^s^def^e^r^r^ed.
^A^g^eⁿ^{da It}^e^m^#398^(‘^Polⁱ^{ce eq}^uⁱ^p^m^eⁿ^t^-^O^f^t^h^{e $90M au}^t^h^ori^{zed (f}^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^s^o^u^r^c^e^t^o^b^e^eⁱ^t^h^e^r
^appro^p^ri^at^ed^{or D}^F^I),^t^h^{e C}^P^A^’^s^Miⁿⁱ^s^t^r^y^of^In^t^e^ri^{or t}^e^a^mⁿ^e^e^d^s^anⁱ^m^m^e^di^a^t^e^dⁱ^s^b^u^r^s^e^m^eⁿ^t
^of^{$5M. T}^hⁱ^s^requ^es^tⁱ^s^f^o^{r t}^h^{e reprog}^ram^mⁱⁿ^g^o^f^{$5M f}^r^o^m^appropri^a^t^e^{d o}^r^D^F^{I (t}^{o be}¹⁰⁰
^determⁱⁿ^{ed) to v}^e^s^t^ed^f^uⁿ^d^s^.^T^h^{e requ}^es^t^w^a^s^reco^m^m^eⁿ^{ded f}^o^{r approv}^al.
The latter passage also shows that CPA might have reprogrammed funds among the various
funding sources available to it (see below).
CPA issued solicitations, which means it also awarded contracts, for some time. In early March

2004, the list on CPA’s website included solicitations for aerators, AK-47 assault rifles, sand bags,

portable X-Ray units, battery cells, vehicles, berets, turbine parts, a police records management
system, information technology products, agricultural equipment, satellite data communications, ¹⁰¹
and railroad equipment, parts, and services. It is unknown what funds CPA used to purchase
items and services listed in its solicitations. If CPA used Iraqi funds, then CPA Memorandum
Number 4 applied. Iraqi funds were defined in this memorandum as:
^Fuⁿ^d^s^uⁿ^d^{er t}^h^{e co}ⁿ^t^ro^{l o}^f^th^e^[Co^a^litioⁿ^P^r^o^v^isioⁿ^a^l]^Au^t^h^o^r^it^y^coⁿ^sⁱ^s^tiⁿ^g^o^f^{(a) p}^r^o^ceed^s
^f^r^o^m^{Iraqi s}^t^ate-^o^w^{ned prope}^rty^t^h^at^h^a^s^been^v^e^s^t^{ed or s}^e^izedⁱⁿ^accor^d^aⁿ^c^e^wⁱ^th^a^p^p^lⁱ^c^a^b^l^e
^la^w^an^d^m^a^{de a}^v^ailable^{to t}^h^e^C^P^{A to as}^sⁱ^s^t^t^h^{e Iraqi people an}^{d as}^sⁱ^s^tⁱⁿ^t^h^{e recons}^tru^c^tⁱ^on
^o^f^I^r^a^q^;^an^d⁽^b⁾^f^uⁿ^d^{s i}ⁿ^t^h^{e De}^v^e^lo^p^m^eⁿ^{t F}^uⁿ^d^f^o^r^I^r^aq^{, th}^{e e}^s^tab^lis^h^m^eⁿ^{t o}^f^w^h^ic^h^isⁿ^o^ted
ⁱⁿ^R^e^s^o^l^u^tⁱ^oⁿ¹⁴⁸³⁽²²^03).^A^s^u^s^{ed i}ⁿ^t^hⁱ^s^Me^m^o^raⁿ^dum^{, “}^I^r^a^qⁱ^F^uⁿ^d^s^”^d^oⁿ^o^tⁱⁿ^c^l^u^d^e^f^uⁿ^d^s
^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^e^d^t^h^r^o^{ugh t}^h^e^a^p^p^r^o^p^rⁱ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^proces^s^of^C^o^alitioⁿ^m^e^m^b^er^g^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^s^(f^{or ex}^a^m^pl^e,
^f^uⁿ^d^{s p}^r^o^v^id^ed^dⁱ^r^ectly^to^th^e^CP^A^b^y^t^h^{e g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^s^of^{the Un}^{ited States}^{or th}^{e Un}ⁱ^t^ed¹⁰²
^Kⁱ^ng^do^m⁾^.
If CPA used appropriated funds, it would seem reasonable for authority personnel to have
followed the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which governs federal agency procurement
activities. A review of three CPA solicitations showed that two (sand bags and information
technology) included numerous references to the FAR (sand bags and information technology
products). The third solicitation, for berets, included only one reference to the FAR. Without
additional, detailed information about the authority’s contracting activities, it is difficult to
ascertain the source of funds and the guidance used for each procurement. The former
Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) has stated that “no rules [are] ¹⁰³
in place for contracting by the CPA with U.S. appropriated funds.” In the absence of a clear
statement on the organizational status of the CPA, however, this assessment may or may not be
accurate.

¹⁰⁰^C^h^rⁱ^s^t^o^phe^r^R^.^Y^u^kⁱ^ns^a^nd^Mo^ha^{b K}^h^a^tta^b^,^“^I^r^a^{q R}^e^c^ons^tr^uc^tioⁿ^A^w^a^r^d^s^Sho^u^ld^N^o^{t B}^e^I^m^m^une^f^r^o^m^R^e^vⁱ^ew^,”
^Fe^de^r^a^{l C}^o^ntr^a^c^t^s^Re^por^t^{, No}^vem^b^er¹⁸^,²⁰⁰³^,^vo^l.⁸⁰^,ⁿ^o^.¹⁸^,^p^.⁵¹²^.
¹⁰¹^T^h^e^{list is n}^o^l^ong^e^r^a^v^a^ila^ble^on^the^C^P^A^we^bsite^.
¹⁰²^Coa^liti^on^Prov^isio^na^{l A}^u^thor^ity^{, “}^C^ontra^c^t^aⁿ^d^G^r^aⁿ^{t P}^r^oc^e^dure^s^A^pplic^a^b^le^to^V^e^ste^d^aⁿ^{d Se}^iz^e^d^I^r^a^qⁱ^P^r^o^p^e^r^ty
^a^{nd t}^h^e^D^e^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^{t Fun}^d^f^o^r^I^r^a^q,”^C^o^a^lit^ioⁿ^P^r^ov^is^iona^{l A}^u^th^or^it^y^Mem^o^r^a^ndum^N^u^m^b^e^r^{4, pp}^{. 3}^-^4.
¹⁰³^Sty^l^e^s^{, “}^S^e^lle^{r Be}^w^a^r^e^{: Asse}^ssin^g^the^Risk^{s of}^Ira^{q Re}^c^onstruc^ti^oⁿ^Co^ntra^c^ting^,^”^p^.⁶⁵^.

Ambassador Bremer established, through Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 3, a
Program Review Board (PRB), which reported directly to him. The board’s general duty was to
be “responsible for recommending expenditures of resources from the Development Fund for Iraq
and other resources identified” elsewhere in the regulation. In developing funding plans, the PRB
recommends disbursements of appropriated funds, “Iraqi property lawfully vested in the U.S.
Treasury,” funds, cash, or other financial instruments owned by Iraq or the (former) regime, and
the Development Fund for Iraq. A news article asserted that the PRB “really controls only the ¹⁰⁴
Iraqi money.” However, as noted above, a news article indicated the PRB was involved in
spending appropriated funds. The board was also responsible for proposing “principles and
standards for expending funds for the relief and recovery of Iraq in a fair, consistent and ¹⁰⁵
transparent manner, through contracts or otherwise.”
The board consisted of a chairman, who was appointed by the CPA Administrator; the directors of
economic policy, civil affairs policy, the USAID—Iraq mission, operations, and security affairs
(all of whom apparently were CPA personnel); and authorized representatives of the commander
of coalition forces, the Iraqi Ministry of Finance, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the
chairman of the Council for International Coordination. If the PRB took action on any matter
relating to the disposition of appropriated funds, then the voting membership was also to include
authorized representatives of DOD, and Departments of the Treasury and State. Additionally, the
status of the authorized representatives of the Iraqi Ministry of Finance, the United Kingdom,
Australia, and Council for International Coordination shifted from voting to nonvoting on the
disposition of appropriated funds. Others who were permitted to attend board meetings as
nonvoting members included the CPA Comptroller and General Counsel; Program Coordinator of
the board; and authorized representatives of OMB, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the United Nations Special Representative of the ¹⁰⁶
Secretary General for Iraq, and the International Advisory and Monitoring Board.
Protests challenging the authority were filed with GAO. On October 14, 2003, GAO received a
bid protest from Turkcell Consortium, which challenged the award of mobile telecommunications
licenses in Iraq by CPA. This was the first protest filed that involved the authority. The protest
was dismissed because it was based on speculation, not factual grounds, that errors occurred in ¹⁰⁷
the award process. Turkcell Consortium filed a second protest on October 27, 2003, which was
also dismissed by GAO because the procurement did not involve “the provision of property or ¹⁰⁸
services to the federal government.”

¹⁰⁴^Jacki^e^S^pⁱⁿⁿ^e^{r and}^A^rⁱ^aⁿ^a^E^uⁿ^j^un^{g Ch}^a,^“U.^S^.^Deci^si^on^{s on}^Iraq^S^p^en^diⁿ^g^M^a^d^eⁱⁿ^P^rⁱ^v^at^e,^”^W^a^s^h^ingt^on^Pos^t^,
^D^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^{27, 2}⁰⁰³^,^{p. A}^15.
¹⁰⁵^Coa^liti^on^Prov^isio^na^{l A}^u^thor^ity^{, “}^C^oa^litioⁿ^P^r^ov^isiona^{l A}^u^th^ority^Re^g^u^la^{tion Num}^b^e^r^3,^P^r^og^ra^m^R^e^vⁱ^e^w^Boa^r^d,”
^June¹⁸^,²⁰^03,^p.^7,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^h^ttp://w^ww^.c^pa^-ira^q.org^/^re^g^u^la^tion^s^/
²⁰⁰³⁰⁶¹^9_C^P^A^R^E^G^_3_^P^r^og^r^a^m^_^R^e^vⁱ^ew^_B^oa^r^d_.^pdf^.
¹⁰⁶^I^b^id^.,^pp.^3-^4.
¹⁰⁷^M^e^lanⁱ^{e I.}^D^o^o^l^ey^,^{“GAO Dis}^mⁱ^{sses T}^u^rk^{cell P}^r^{otest o}^f^Iraq^T^e^leco^m^Lⁱ^cen^ses;^T^u^{rkcell F}^{iles Ne}^w^P^r^o^t^{est af}^ter
^Recei^viⁿ^g^Deb^rⁱ^e^fⁱⁿ^g^,^”^Fe^de^r^a^{l C}^ontr^a^c^t^s^Re^por^t^,^BN^A^,^Inc^{., O}^c^t^obe^{r 2}⁸^,²⁰⁰⁴^{, v}^o^l.⁸⁰^,^no.¹⁵^.^p.⁴⁰⁵^.
¹⁰⁸^Me^la^nie^{I. D}^oole^y^{, “}^{GAO Dis}^mⁱ^sse^{s T}^u^rkc^e^{ll’s Se}^c^ond^P^r^ote^s^{t of}^Ira^{q T}^e^le^c^o^m^Lⁱ^c^eⁿ^se^{s but L}^e^a^v^e^s^{Door Ope}ⁿ^,”
^Fe^de^r^a^{l C}^o^ntr^a^c^t^s^Re^por^t^{, No}^vem^b^er¹⁸^,²⁰⁰³^,^vo^l.⁸⁰^,ⁿ^o^.¹⁸^,^p^.⁵⁰⁷^.

While CPA was the organization that awarded the contract for mobile telecommunications
licenses, GAO’s second bid protest decision identified the cognizant agency as “Department of ¹⁰⁹
the Army, for the agency.” Reportedly, the U.S. Army was also listed as the cognizant agency ¹¹⁰
on GAO’s docket for the first protest, and the solicitation number was listed as “unknown.”
Citing a dismissal request submitted by the Army, GAO stated, in its decision on the second
protest: “The Department of the Army argued that our Office lacks jurisdiction to hear this protest ¹¹¹
because the CPA is not a ‘federal agency.’” Due to the fact that both protests were dismissed on
other grounds, there was no need for GAO to resolve the question of “whether the CPA is a
federal agency for purposes of our [GAO] bid protest jurisdiction under CICA [Competition in ¹¹²
Contracting Act of 1984].” In its second decision on this case, however, GAO explained its
authority to decide bid protests and described circumstances under which it could have
jurisdiction to handle bid protests concerning CPA:
^T^h^{e au}^t^h^ori^t^y^of^ou^{r O}^f^fⁱ^{ce t}^o^deci^{de bi}^d^pr^ot^es^t^sⁱ^s^bas^e^{d on}^t^h^{e C}^o^m^p^etⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^C^oⁿ^t^r^a^c^tⁱⁿ^g
^A^c^t^o^f^{1984 (C}^ICA⁾^{... an}^{d e}ⁿ^co^m^p^ass^e^s^“^a^w^rⁱ^t^t^e^{n obj}^ectⁱ^oⁿ^b^y^aⁿⁱⁿ^t^e^res^t^{ed part}^y^t^o^a
^s^o^lⁱ^cⁱ^t^a^tⁱ^{on or ot}^h^e^{r requ}^e^s^t^b^y^{a f}^e^deral^a^g^eⁿ^c^y^f^o^{r o}^f^f^e^r^s^f^o^r^{a con}^t^ract^f^o^{r t}^h^{e procu}^r^e^m^eⁿ^t
^of^propert^y^or^s^e^rvⁱ^c^e^s^{.” O}^u^{r j}^u^ri^s^dⁱ^c^tⁱ^{on does}ⁿ^o^t^t^u^rn^oⁿ^w^h^et^h^e^r^appropri^a^t^e^{d f}^uⁿ^d^{s are}
ⁱⁿ^v^o^l^v^{ed ... or on}^w^h^et^h^e^{r th}^e^com^p^eti^tion^requ^ire^m^ents^of^CICA^appl^y^.
^{We n}^o^{te ... th}^{at ev}^en^if^w^e^u^l^tⁱ^m^atel^y^deter^mⁱⁿ^{e th}^{at t}^h^{e C}^P^{A is}ⁿ^o^{t a f}^e^d^e^r^a^l^a^g^eⁿ^cy^,^w^e^m^a^y
^w^e^l^l^a^s^sum^e^j^u^ri^s^dⁱ^c^tⁱ^oⁿⁱ^f^t^h^{e ch}^al^l^eⁿ^g^e^{d procu}^r^e^m^eⁿ^tⁱ^s^condu^ct^{ed on}^t^h^{e C}^P^A^’^s^beh^a^l^f^by
^an^en^ti^t^y^t^h^{at is}^a^f^e^{deral ag}^eⁿ^c^y^(s^u^c^h^as^t^h^{e Depart}^m^eⁿ^t^of^th^e^A^r^m^y^{).... In}^any^e^v^eⁿ^t,^w^e
^w^o^u^l^{d als}^o^coⁿ^s^{ider a requ}^e^s^t^b^y^t^h^e^C^P^{A f}^o^{r o}^u^{r O}^f^{fice to}^con^s^{ider protes}^ts^ou^t^s^{ide t}^h^e¹¹³
^f^r^am^ew^o^r^k^o^f^C^I^C^A^.
CPA’s award of a contract to Nour USA to equip the Iraqi armed forces and the Iraqi civil defense
corps also was the subject of protests. A solicitation was issued on November 11, 2003, and CPA
(which was explicitly identified as the contracting activity in the press release) received 19 ¹¹⁴
bids. In a press release dated January 31, 2004, CPA announced that it had awarded a contract
for $327 million to Nour USA.
In mid-February, it was reported that two companies, Cemex Global Inc. and Bumar Group, had
filed separate protests, which were combined by GAO into one protest, challenging the awarding
of this contract to Nour USA. Among their concerns were (1) the relatively low cost of the Nour
USA proposal, which was $231 million lower than the Bumar Group’s proposal; (2) the fact that
Nour’s president was A. Huda Faouki, who allegedly is a friend of Ahmad Chalabi, who had been
a member of the Iraqi Governing Council; and (3) the belief that Nour USA, which apparently
was established in May 2003, had no experience in performing the work necessary to fulfill the ¹¹⁵
terms of the contract. Subsequently, four additional protests were filed with GAO. In each of

¹⁰⁹^U^.^{S. G}^e^ne^r^a^{l A}^c^c^ountiⁿ^g^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^,^T^u^r^k^c^e^{ll C}^ons^or^ti^um^{bid pr}^ote^s^t,^f^ile^B^-²⁹³⁰⁴⁸^.2,^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^{12, 2}⁰⁰³^{, p}^.¹^.
¹¹⁰^M^e^lanⁱ^{e I.}^D^o^o^l^ey^,^{“GAO Dis}^mⁱ^{sses T}^u^rk^{cell P}^r^{otest o}^f^Iraq^T^e^leco^m^Lⁱ^cen^ses;^T^u^{rkcell F}^{iles Ne}^w^P^r^o^t^{est af}^ter
^Recei^viⁿ^g^Deb^rⁱ^e^fⁱⁿ^g^,^”^Fe^de^r^a^{l C}^ontr^a^c^t^s^Re^por^t^,^O^c^tobe^r²⁸^{, 2}⁰^{03, v}^o^l^.^80,ⁿ^o^.^15,^p.⁴^05.
¹¹¹^U^.^{S. G}^e^ne^r^a^{l A}^c^c^ountiⁿ^g^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^,^T^u^r^k^c^e^{ll C}^ons^or^ti^um^{bid pr}^ote^s^t,^{p. 2}^.
¹¹²^I^b^id^{., p. 1; 31}^U^.^S.C^.^§§³⁵⁵¹^-³⁵^56.
¹¹³^U^.^{S. G}^e^ne^r^a^{l A}^c^c^ountiⁿ^g^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^,^T^u^r^k^c^e^{ll C}^ons^or^ti^um^{bid pr}^ote^s^t,^pp.^2-^3.
¹¹⁴^Coa^liti^on^Prov^is^io^na^{l A}^u^thor^ity^{, P}^r^og^ra^m^Ma^na^ge^m^e^{nt O}^f^fⁱ^c^e^,^“^U^.^S^.-Ira^qi-^P^olis^h^G^r^{oup R}^ecei^{ves S}^ecu^ri^t^y
^Equi^pm^eⁿ^{t C}^ontr^a^c^t^,”^pr^e^s^s^r^e^le^as^e^,^J^a^nua^r^y^{31, 20}⁰⁴^.
¹¹⁵^Jo^{e Harp}^er,^“^P^o^lⁱ^s^h^A^r^{ms Co}^m^p^an^y^Ch^al^l^eⁿ^g^{es CP}^A^Aw^a^r^{d to U.S. Firm}^{, A}^lle^ge^{s Bid Ev}^a^l^ua^tion^Unf^a^ir,”^Fe^de^ral
^C^ontr^a^c^t^s^Re^por^t^,^Fe^br^ua^ry^{24, 2}⁰⁰⁴^{, v}^o^l.⁸¹^,^no.^7,^p.¹^99;^Me^laⁿⁱ^e^{I. Doole}^y^{, “}^C^oa^litioⁿ^P^r^ov^ision^a^{l A}^u^thority^to
^R^e^vⁱ^ew^N^our^{, O}^t^he^r^O^f^f^e^r^o^r^s^{to Equi}^{p I}^r^a^q^A^r^m^y^,”^Daⁱ^l^y^R^e^p^o^r^t^f^o^{r E}^xecu^tⁱ^ves^{, Ma}^r^c^{h 5}^,²⁰⁰⁴^,^no^.^43,^p.^A^-^24.

the six protests, the Department of the Army was listed as the cognizant agency and the ¹¹⁶
solicitation number (FY5866-04-R-0001) was included. Reportedly, CPA indicated on March 3 ¹¹⁷
that it would reevaluate all timely proposals and make a new source selection decision. In light ¹¹⁸
of the government’s decision to reevaluate proposals, GAO dismissed all protests. In a March
5, 2004, press release, the CPA PMO briefly described plans for rectifying the situation, which
involved the Army, but not CPA:
^T^o^day^t^h^e^A^r^m^y^aⁿⁿ^oun^{ced it}^wⁱ^l^l^ter^mⁱⁿ^ate^its^contract^wⁱ^t^h^Nou^r^{, US}^A^,^{to equ}ⁱ^{p t}^h^{e Ne}^w
^Iraqi^A^r^m^y^{. Prot}^es^t^s^w^e^{re f}ⁱ^l^e^{d s}^u^bs^equ^eⁿ^t^t^o^t^h^{e a}^w^{ard t}^o^N^o^u^r^{. Prot}^es^t^s^{are part}^of^a
^tran^s^p^aren^{t an}^{d f}^a^{ir procu}^r^em^en^{t proces}^s^.^A^s^{a res}^u^l^t^of^anⁱⁿ^tern^{al revie}^w^{, th}^e^A^r^m^y^h^a^s
^d^e^ter^mⁱⁿ^ed^t^h^er^e^w^e^r^e^ir^r^e^g^u^l^ar^{ities in}^thⁱ^s^sp^eci^fⁱ^{c co}ⁿ^t^r^act^actioⁿ^,^an^d^to^o^k^ap^p^r^o^p^r^iate
^m^eas^u^r^es^{to as}^s^e^s^s^t^h^{e v}^a^lidit^y^of^th^{e protes}^ts^.
^T^h^{e A}^r^m^y^wⁱ^{ll co}ⁿ^d^u^c^{t a co}^m^p^{lete r}^e^-^s^o^licitatioⁿ^;^sc^h^e^d^u^{le r}^e^{lease o}^f^t^h^e^s^o^lⁱ^cⁱ^t^a^tⁱ^oⁿⁱ^s^t^o^b^e
^determⁱⁿ^{ed. T}^h^{e A}^r^m^y^w^aⁿ^t^s^{to en}^s^u^{re t}^h^{e pro}^{cess is tr}^aⁿ^sp^ar^en^{t, f}^a^ir^an^d^coⁿ^d^u^c^{t in}^aⁿ¹¹⁹
^ex^p^e^d^itio^u^s^m^aⁿⁿ^e^r^.
Reportedly, control of the procurement process transferred from CPA to the Army Materiel ¹²⁰
Command.
No explanation was provided as to why the Army terminated the contract when the press release
that announced the award of a contract to Nour identified CPA as the contracting activity (see
above). A possible question could be posed, for example, why CPA, if it was the organization that
awarded the contract initially, did not cancel the contract. While the Department of the Army
provided support to CPA, particularly in the area of acquisition, it is unclear how, why, or under
what circumstances, a federal agency might cancel a contract awarded by another entity and
assume responsibility for subsequent procurement activities.
Neither CPA nor DOD disclosed why the Department of the Army, and not the authority, was
listed on GAO’s bid protest docket for protests involving contracting actions apparently
undertaken by CPA. As for reconstruction contracts funded by the FY2004 supplemental, the fact
that DOD components, such as the Army Corps of Engineers and the Naval Facilities Engineering
Command, were the contracting activities would seem to preclude the possibility that an offeror
would file a protest with GAO challenging CPA. Considering the Department of the Army’s
assertion, during the protest by Turkcell Consortium, that CPA was not an agency, it suggests that ¹²¹
there might have been some (unknown) advantages to shielding CPA from protests. Without
further information about CPA’s procurement process and organizational status, it is unclear
whether any advantages existed, and, if so, what they might have been.
It is unknown whether any offerors filed protests under the provisions of Coalition Provisional
Authority Memorandum Number 4, which, as noted above, provided procurement rules for what

¹¹⁶^T^h^e^f^ile^num^be^r^s^a^s^sⁱ^gⁿ^e^d^by^G^A^O^{to the}^s^e^pr^ote^s^ts^w^e^r^e^B^-²⁹³⁶^76.⁰⁰^{1 t}^h^r^o^ug^{h B}^-²⁹³⁶⁷⁶^.⁰⁰⁶^.
¹¹⁷^Doole^y^{, “}^C^oa^lition^P^r^ov^isiona^{l A}^u^th^ority^{to Re}^vⁱ^e^w^N^{our, Othe}^{r Off}^e^{rors to Equ}ⁱ^{p Ira}^{q A}^r^m^y^,”^{p. A-24.}
¹¹⁸^Ibid^.
¹¹⁹^Coa^liti^on^Prov^isio^na^{l A}^u^thor^ity^{, P}^r^og^ra^m^Ma^na^ge^m^e^{nt O}^f^fⁱ^c^e^,^“^U^.^S^{. A}^r^m^y^T^e^r^m^ina^t^e^s^Contra^c^t^to^Equi^{p Ne}^w^Ira^qi
^A^r^m^y^,”^Ma^rc^{h 5, 2}⁰⁰⁴^.
¹²⁰^A^bby^Bo^w^l^e^s^{, “}^A^r^m^y^Ma^te^rie^l^C^o^m^m^a^{nd Put i}ⁿ^Cha^r^g^e^of^Re^solic^iting^Ira^{q A}^r^m^y^Equipm^eⁿ^{t Co}^ntr^a^c^t^Awa^rde^d^to
^N^our^,”^Fe^de^r^a^{l C}^o^ntr^a^c^t^s^Re^por^t^,^Ma^r^c^{h 1}⁶^,²⁰^04,^v^o^l.⁸¹^{, n}^o^.¹⁰^,^{p. 2}⁷⁹^.
¹²¹^Ma^r^c^{h, “}^P^r^o^te^s^t^of^T^u^r^k^c^e^{ll C}^ons^or^tium^,^B^-²⁹³⁰⁴⁸^,”^p^p^.^2-^4.

may be referred to collectively as Iraqi, or non-appropriated, funds. The paragraph on protests
stated:
^A^coⁿ^t^r^acto^r^wⁱ^s^hⁱⁿ^g^to^o^b^j^ect^to^th^{e ter}^m^{s o}^f^{a so}^licitatioⁿ^,^th^{e ter}^mⁱⁿ^at^ioⁿ^o^f^{a so}^licita^tioⁿ^,
^th^{e a}^w^{ard of}^{a con}^t^{ract, or}^th^{e ter}^mⁱⁿ^a^tion^of^t^h^{e a}^w^{ard of}^{a con}^t^{ract, s}^h^al^{l pres}^en^{t th}^e^m^a^t^t^e^r
^{to th}^{e C}^oⁿ^t^ractiⁿ^g^O^f^fⁱ^{cer f}^o^{r an}ⁱⁿ^it^{ial decis}ⁱ^on^.^T^h^e^con^t^ractor^s^h^all^s^t^a^t^e^t^o^t^h^e^C^oⁿ^t^r^a^c^tⁱⁿ^g
^Offⁱ^{cer t}^h^{e bas}ⁱ^s^f^o^{r th}^e^protes^{t. If th}^e^coⁿ^t^{ractor does}ⁿ^o^{t ag}^ree^wⁱ^{th th}^e^C^oⁿ^t^ractiⁿ^g
^Of^fⁱ^cer^’^sⁱⁿ^{itial d}^ecisioⁿ^{, th}^e^Coⁿ^t^r^acto^r^m^a^y^ap^p^{eal th}^{e i}ⁿ^{itial d}^ecisioⁿ^to^t^h^{e Head}^o^f
^C^oⁿ^t^ractiⁿ^g^A^c^tⁱ^vⁱ^t^y^{, C}^P^A^,^f^o^{r res}^o^lu^tion^.^T^h^{e decis}ⁱ^on^of^th^e^{Head of}^C^oⁿ^t^r^a^c^tⁱⁿ^g^A^c^tⁱ^vⁱ^t^y^,¹²²
^CP^A^,^s^h^{all b}^e^th^e^fⁱⁿ^a^{l d}^ecisioⁿⁱⁿ^t^h^e^m^a^tter^.
Not only did this provision fail to provide for any sort of external, independent review or
adjudication process (such as provided by GAO), it also omitted any requirements or procedures
for CPA personnel to respond in a timely fashion, or to provide an explanation for their decision.
The FY2004 supplemental (P.L. 108-106) appropriated $933 million to the President for the
authority’s operating expenses. Expenses could have included “personnel costs, transportation,
supply, equipment, facilities, communications, logistics requirements, studies, physical security,
media support, promulgation and enforcement of regulations, and other activities needed to ¹²³
oversee and manage the relief and reconstruction of Iraq and the transition to democracy....”
These funds are “to remain available until September 30, 2005: Provided, That the appropriation
of funds under this heading shall not be construed to limit or otherwise affect the ability of the
Department of Defense to furnish assistance and services, and any other support, to the Coalition ¹²⁴
Provisional Authority.” In a memorandum dated December 5, 2003, the President transferred
these funds to the Secretary of Defense:
^T^h^{e f}^uⁿ^d^{s ap}^p^r^o^p^r^iated^to^th^{e P}^r^esid^en^{t u}ⁿ^d^e^r^th^e^h^eadⁱⁿ^g^Op^er^atin^g^E^x^p^eⁿ^s^e^o^f^t^h^e
^Co^alitioⁿ^P^r^o^v^isioⁿ^a^l^A^u^th^o^rⁱ^t^yⁱⁿ^th^{e E}^m^er^g^eⁿ^c^y^Su^p^p^l^e^m^en^tal^A^p^p^r^o^p^r^iatioⁿ^s^A^c^{t f}^o^r
^D^e^f^eⁿ^s^{e an}^{d f}^o^{r t}^h^{e R}^ecoⁿ^s^t^r^uctⁱ^oⁿ^of^{Iraq an}^{d A}^f^g^h^aⁿⁱ^s^t^an^,²⁰⁰⁴⁽P.L. 108-106⁾^,^o^rⁱⁿ^aⁿ^y
^sub^s^e^q^ue^nt^a^p^p^r^o^p^rⁱ^a^tⁱ^o^{n und}^e^r^t^hⁱ^s^he^a^dⁱ^ng,^a^r^e^tran^s^f^{erred to th}^{e Secretary}^of^De^f^eⁿ^s^e^,^f^o^r
^an^acco^uⁿ^{t d}^e^si^gⁿ^ated^Op^er^atin^g^Ex^p^eⁿ^s^e^s^o^f^th^e^Co^al^itioⁿ^P^r^o^v^isioⁿ^a^l^Au^t^h^o^r^it^y^,¹²⁵
^Iⁿ^terⁿ^atioⁿ^a^{l Reco}ⁿ^s^tr^u^c^tioⁿ^aⁿ^d^Oth^e^r^A^s^sis^t^an^ce,^A^r^m^y^.
Information is not available to explain whether the CPA Administrator had access to these funds,
or if he relied on the Secretary of Defense for purchasing supplies and equipment needed by CPA.

¹²²^Coa^liti^on^Prov^isio^na^{l A}^u^thor^ity^{, “}^C^ontra^c^t^aⁿ^d^G^r^aⁿ^{t P}^r^oc^e^dure^s^A^pplic^a^b^le^to^V^e^ste^d^aⁿ^{d Se}^iz^e^d^I^r^a^qⁱ^P^r^o^p^e^r^ty
^a^{nd t}^h^e^D^e^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^{t Fun}^d^f^o^r^I^r^a^q,”^p.^B^-^3.
¹²³¹¹^{7 Sta}^t^{. 1}²²⁶^.
¹²⁴^Ibid^.
¹²⁵^U^.^S.^P^r^e^sⁱ^d^eⁿ^{t (}^G^{. W}^.^B^u^s^h⁾^,^“^T^r^a^ns^f^e^r^of^Funds^A^ppr^opr^ia^te^{d t}^o^t^h^e^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^t^u^nde^r^t^h^e^he^a^dⁱⁿ^g^O^p^e^r^a^ting
^Ex^pe^nse^s^of^the^Coa^liti^on^Prov^isi^ona^{l A}^u^th^ority^{, a}^{nd De}^le^g^a^tion^of^the^F^unc^ti^ons^of^the^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^t^uⁿ^d^e^r^the^he^a^d^ing
^I^r^a^{q R}^e^lie^f^a^{nd R}^e^c^ons^tr^uc^ti^on^Fu^nd,ⁱⁿ^the^Em^e^r^g^e^ncy^Supple^m^eⁿ^t^a^{l A}^ppr^opr^ia^ti^ons^A^c^{t f}^o^r^D^e^f^e^ns^e^a^{nd f}^o^r^the
^R^e^c^ons^tr^uc^tioⁿ^of^I^r^a^{q a}^{nd A}^f^g^h^anis^ta^n,²⁰⁰⁴^,”^Fe^de^{ral Re}^giste^r^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^{9, 20}^04,^v^o^l.⁶⁹^{, n}^o^.^6,^p.¹⁶⁴^5.

The CPA Administrator exercised rule-making authority, which apparently was derived from the
executive authority invested in CPA by the President. Unlike the heads of federal agencies,
however, the Administrator did not follow the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which ¹²⁶
governs informal and formal rule making. For example, the authority did not announce any
proposed, interim, or final regulations in the Federal Register.
The first regulation issued by CPA outlined the Administrator’s authority in issuing regulations, ¹²⁷
memoranda, orders, and public notices:
^Iⁿ^car^r^yⁱⁿ^g^o^u^{t th}^{e a}^u^th^o^r^it^y^aⁿ^d^r^e^sp^oⁿ^sib^ilit^y^v^e^stedⁱⁿ^th^e^C^P^A^,^th^e^A^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^to^r^w^{ill, as}
ⁿ^eces^s^a^r^y^{, i}^s^s^u^e^R^e^gu^latioⁿ^s^aⁿ^{d Orders}^{. R}^e^gu^lations^s^h^all^{be th}^os^e^ins^t^rum^eⁿ^t^s^t^h^{at defin}^e
^th^{e in}^stit^u^tioⁿ^s^aⁿ^d^au^t^h^o^r^ities^o^f^th^{e CP}^A^.^Or^d^e^r^s^ar^{e b}ⁱⁿ^dⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^s^t^r^u^ctioⁿ^sⁱ^s^s^u^ed^b^y^t^h^e
^CP^A^.^Re^g^u^l^a^tioⁿ^s^aⁿ^d^Or^d^e^r^s^w^ill^r^e^m^aⁱⁿⁱⁿ^f^o^r^ce^uⁿ^til^r^e^p^ealed^b^y^t^h^e^A^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^r^a^to^r^o^r
^su^p^e^r^s^ed^ed^b^y^legⁱ^slatioⁿ^is^su^e^d^b^y^d^e^m^o^cr^{atic i}ⁿ^st^itu^tioⁿ^s^o^f^I^r^aq^{. Reg}^u^l^atioⁿ^s^aⁿ^d^Or^d^e^r^s
^is^s^u^{ed by}^t^h^e^A^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^{rator s}^h^{all tak}^e^preceden^ce^ov^{er all oth}^e^{r la}^w^s^an^{d pu}^blicatioⁿ^s^{to th}^e
^ex^ten^t^su^c^h^o^t^h^e^r^la^w^s^an^d^p^u^b^licatioⁿ^s^ar^{e in}^coⁿ^s^is^ten^t^{. T}^h^{e A}^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^to^r^m^a^y^al^so^f^r^o^m
^ti^m^e^{to ti}^m^e^is^s^u^e^P^u^{blic Notic}^es^{.... T}^h^e^A^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rator^m^a^y^is^s^u^e^Me^m^o^raⁿ^d^{a i}ⁿ^relatioⁿ^to¹²⁸
^th^{e in}^ter^p^r^e^tatioⁿ^an^d^ap^p^licati^oⁿ^o^f^an^y^Re^g^u^latioⁿ^o^r^Or^d^e^r^.
Enacting a regulation, order, memorandum, or public notice was accomplished by the
Administrator signing off on, or approving, the document. Subjects of these documents included:
• Regulations: Development Fund for Iraq, Program Review Board, Governing
Council of Iraq, Council for International Coordination, Iraq Property Claims
Commission, and International Donor Assistance;
• Orders: Penal Code, Management and Use of Iraqi Public Property, Prohibited
Media Activity, Regulation of Oil Distribution, Creation of a New Iraqi Army,
and Status of the Coalition, Foreign Liaison Missions, Their Personnel and
Contractors;
• Memoranda: Criminal Procedures, contract and Grant Procedures,
Implementation of De-Baathification Order No. 1, Implementation of Weapons
Control Order 3, and Appointment of Deputy Ministers;
• Public notices: Managing Financial Resources, Regarding a Responsible Iraqi
Media, Regarding the Council for International Coordination, Regarding Public ¹²⁹
Incitement to Violence and Disorder.

¹²⁶^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.^§§⁵⁵^1-⁵^59;⁶⁰^Sta^t^{. 2}³⁷^{. Se}^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^t^R^L³²²^40,^T^h^e^F^e^d^e^ra^l^R^u^l^e^ma^ki^ng^P^r^o^{cess: A}ⁿ^Overvi^ew^{, b}^y
^{Curtis W}^.^Co^pe^la^nd.
¹²⁷^A^{list of}^CP^A^re^g^u^la^tions,^orde^rs^{, m}^e^m^o^ra^nda^{, a}^{nd p}^u^b^licⁿ^o^tic^e^sⁱ^s^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http:/^/www^.ira^qc^oa^lition^.^org^/
^r^e^g^u^la^tions^/ⁱ^nde^x^.^htm^l^{, v}ⁱ^s^ite^{d Fe}^br^ua^r^y^{24, 2}⁰⁰⁵^.
¹²⁸^Coa^liti^on^Prov^isio^na^{l A}^u^thor^ity^{, “}^C^oa^litioⁿ^P^r^ov^isi^ona^{l A}^u^th^ority^Re^g^u^la^{tion Num}^b^e^r^One^,^”^p^.²^.
¹²⁹^Coa^liti^on^Prov^isio^na^{l A}^u^thor^ity^{, “}^C^P^A^Offⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^Doc^u^m^e^nts”^w^e^bsi^t^e^,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http^://w^ww^.^c^pa^-ira^q.org^/
^r^e^g^u^la^tions^/ⁱ^nde^x^.^htm^l^#R^e^g^ula^tio^ns^{, v}ⁱ^s^ite^{d Fe}^br^ua^r^y^24,²⁰^05.

An undated CPA organization chart is shown in Figure 1.¹³⁰ While several sub-units are missing,
and it is possible that the actual organization varied from this depiction, the chart provides insight
into the authority’s chain of command and organizational scope. Organizational subunits and
positions not shown on the chart include the Deputy Administrator, Office of Inspector General,
Program Management Office and Sector Program Management Offices, legislative affairs staff
(which was located in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area), and contracting offices
(apparently, there were two contracting offices, one each in Iraq and the Washington, DC,
metropolitan area).

¹³⁰^O^r^g^a^niz^a^{tion c}^h^a^r^t^pr^ov^ide^d^e^l^e^c^t^r^onic^a^lly^by^C^P^A^’^s^le^gⁱ^s^l^a^tiv^e^af^f^a^ir^s^o^f^fⁱ^c^e^{to the}^a^u^t^hor^on^Fe^br^u^a^r^y^{24, 2}⁰⁰⁴^.

Figure 1. Coalition Provisional Authority
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32370}
^g/w
^s^.or
^le^ak
^://wiki
^h^ttp

Even prior to the inception of the CPA, Congress established reporting requirements concerning
efforts to reconstruct Iraq. Table 1 lists significant reporting requirements concerning this effort
and, in particular, CPA.

Table 1. Statutory Reporting Requirements Concerning the CPA and the Reconstruction of Iraq
^Statut^{e (date of}^{Responsible Official}^or^Recipient(s)^Deadline(s)^{Summary o}^f^Co^{ntent of Rep}^ort
^enactment)^Office
^{P.L. 108-1}^{1, Sec. 150}^6(a)^President^{House and Senat}^{e Committees}^{Not later than}⁴⁵^{days after}^{1. Description of duties, roles, and}
^{(April 16, 20}⁰³⁾^{on App}^ropriations^{date of enactme}^nt.^{responsibilities of U.S. g}^overnme^nt
^{agencies, foreign governme}^{nts, an}^d
^{international organizations.}
^{2. A strategy for}^{coordinating the}
^{activities of these entities.}
^{3. Cost estimates associated with such}
^{activities and a strategy for distributing}
^{responsibility for paying}^costs
^{associated with reconstru}^ction
^activities.
^{P.L. 108-1}^{1, Sec. 150}^6(b)^President^{House and Senat}^{e Committees}^{Not later than}⁹⁰^{days after}^{1. Separate lists of reconst}^ruction
^{(April 16, 20}⁰³⁾^{on App}^ropriations^{date of enactme}^{nt and eve}^ry^{activities that are anticipated, or were}
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32370}^{90 days t}^herea^fter^{until Sept.}^{30, 2}⁰⁰^4.^{initiated or completed.}^{2. Cost estimates for conducting}
^g/w^{proposed activities and source of}
^s^.or^funds.
^le^ak^{3. Updated list of financial pledges and}
^{contributions made}^{by foreign}
^://wiki^government^{s or inter}^national
^h^ttp^{organizations.}
^{P.L. 108-1}^{06, Sec. 22}⁰²⁽^b)^{CPA Administrator, or agency}^{1. House Committees on}^{Not later than}^seven^{Justification of the}^{use of other}^t^han
^{(Nov. 6, 200}³⁾^head^Approp^{riations, Governme}^nt^{calendar days be}^{fore the}^{full and open com}^{petition proced}^ures,
^{Reform, and Inter}^national^{award of a contract}^under^{a description of the s}^{cope of th}^e
^Relations^{other tha}^{n f}^{ull and open}^{contract, a description of th}^{e p}^rocess
^{2. Senate Committees on}^{competition procedures.}^{the agenc}^{y used in}^{identifying and}
^Approp^{riations, Governme}^nt^{[Sec. 220}^{2(b) does not}^solicit^{ing offers, the amou}^{nt of th}^e
^{Affairs, and Foreign Relations}^{include an ex}^{piration date.]}^{contract, and justification and ap}^p^roval
^documents.

^Statut^{e (date of}^{Responsible Official}^or^Recipient(s)^Deadline(s)^{Summary o}^f^Co^{ntent of Rep}^ort
^enactment)^Office
^{P.L. 108-1}^{06, Sec. 22}⁰³^{CPA Administrator ,or agency}^{Publish in the}^{Federal Register}^and^{Not later than}^seven^days^{Amount and s}^{cope of t}^{he contra}^ct,
^{(Nov. 6, 200}³⁾^head^{post on the CPA we}^bsite.^{before th}^{e date on w}^{hich a}^{how contractors we}^{re identified and}
^{contract is ente}^{red into for}^solicite^{d, justificat}^{ion and approv}^al
^{contracts awarded}^under^documents.
^{other tha}^{n f}^{ull and open}
^{competition procedures.}
^{[Sec. 220}^{3 does not include}
^{an ex}^{piration date.]}
^{P.L. 108-1}^{06, Sec. 22}⁰⁷^{Director, OMB, in consultation}^{House and Senat}^{e Committees}^{Not later than}^Jan^uary^5,^{1. Proposed uses of f}^unds^{for Ira}^q
^{(Nov. 6, 200}³⁾^{with CPA Administrator and the}^{on App}^ropriations²⁰⁰^{4. Updated re}^{ports are}^{relief and reconstr}^uction
^{House and Senat}^{e Committees}^{to be su}^{bmitted to the}^{2. Distribution of duties and}
^{on App}^ropriations^{committees every t}^hree^{responsibilities regarding}
^{months. Sec. 22}^{07 e}^xpire^s^reconstr^{uction projects among}^U.S.
^{on October}^{1, 2}⁰⁰^7.^government^agencies
^{3. Funds}^{provided by foreign}
^government^{s and inte}^rnational
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32370}^{organizations}
^g/w^{4. Foreign assets seized or frozen}^.
^s^.or^{P.L. 108-1}^{06, Sec. 22}^15(a)^{CPA Administrator}^{1. House a}^{nd Senate Committees}^{Initial report due within}³⁰^{Iraqi oil production, oil revenues, and}
^le^ak^{(Nov. 6, 200}³⁾^{on App}^ropriations^{days after date of e}^nactme^nt.^{uses of oil reven}^ues.
^{2. Post on CPA}^{’s website}^Subseq^uent^report^{s due on a}
^://wiki^{monthly basis}^until
^h^ttp^September³^{0, 20}^06.
^{P.L. 108-1}^{06, Sec. 30}^01(i)(1)^{CPA Inspector}^Ge^neral^{1. Senate Committees on}^{Not later than}^Marc^h^30,^{A detailed statement of all obligat}^ions,
^{and (4), (j)}^Approp^{riations, Armed Services,}²⁰⁰^{4, and eve}^{ry calendar}^expe^{nditures, and re}^ven^{ues assoc}^iated
^{(Nov. 6, 200}³⁾^{and Foreign Relations}^quarte^{r the}^reafter.^{with reconstr}^{uction and}^reha^bilit^ation
^{2. House Committees on}^[Appare^{ntly, this}^{activities in Iraq (including the}
^Approp^{riations, Armed Services,}^requirem^{ent will continue}^{operating ex}^pens^{es of CPA and a}
^{and Inte}^{rnational Relations}^{until OIG}^expire^{s, which will}^{discussion of how CPA used oth}^er
^{3. Post on CPA website}^happ^{en six}^month^{s after}^{than f}^{ull and open}^competition
^{4. CPA Administrator}^{CPA is disso}^{lved. (Sec}^.^procedures).

³⁰⁰^1(o).)]

^Statut^{e (date of}^{Responsible Official}^or^Recipient(s)^Deadline(s)^{Summary o}^f^Co^{ntent of Rep}^ort
^enactment)^Office
^{P.L. 108-1}^{06, Sec. 30}^01(i)(3)^{CPA Inspector}^Ge^neral^{1. Senate Committees on}^{Not later than}^Ju^{ne 3}^0,^{Summary of t}^{he activities of the}^OIG
^{and (4), (j)}^Approp^{riations, Armed Services,}²⁰⁰^{4, and se}^miann^ually^{in the p}^{revious six mo}^{nths (for}
^{(Nov. 6, 200}³⁾^{and Foreign Relations}^thereafte^r.^{example, significant p}^{roblems, ab}^uses,
^{2. House Committees on}^[Appare^{ntly, this}^{and deficiencies, and OIG’s}
^Approp^{riations, Armed Services,}^requirem^{ent will continue}^{recommendations for corr}^ective
^{and Inte}^{rnational Relations}^{until OIG}^expire^{s, which will}^action).
^{3. Post on CPA website}^happ^{en six}^month^{s after}
^{4. CPA Administrator}^{CPA is disso}^{lved. (Sec}^.
³⁰⁰^1(o).)]
^{P.L. 108-1}^{36, Sec. 12}⁰³^{Secretary of Defe}^nse^Congress^{Not later than}⁹⁰^{days after}^{Range of infrastr}^uct^ure
^{(Nov. 24, 20}⁰³⁾^{date of enactme}^nt.^reconstr^{uction, civil administrati}^o^n,
^huma^{nitarian assistance, inte}^rim
^{governance, a}^{nd political devel}^opment
^{activities undertaken in}^Ira^{q by}^DOD
^{officials and those civilians reporting}
^{to the secreta}^{ry. A A re}^quired
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL32370}^{element is a discussion of the}
^g/w^{evolution of the organizational}
^s^.or^struct^{ure of t}^{he civilian groups}^{(ORHA and CPA) reporting to t}^he
^le^ak^Secretary.
^://wiki^{P.L. 108-1}^{99, Sec. 59}^9C^OPM^{House and Senat}^{e Committees}^{Initial report due Feb}^rua^{ry 1,}^Num^{ber of detailees, by agen}^{cy, t}^hat
^h^ttp^{(Nov. 25, 20}⁰³⁾^{on App}^ropriations²⁰⁰^{4. Subs}^eq^uent^reports^due^{every qua}^{rter until}^May^{are detailed to CPA}^.
²⁰⁰^5.

A lawsuit filed under the False Claims Act (FCA; 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733), and unsealed in
2004, revealed that, as part of its defense, Custer Battles, LLC (CB), contended that CPA was not
a federal agency. Because the FCA applies only to the submission of false or fraudulent claims to
the government, Custer Battles argued that if CPA were not part of the government, the FCA
would not apply. (CPA has been identified as the contracting agency for two contracts awarded to
Custer Battles involving the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) and the Iraqi Currency ¹³¹
Exchange (ICE).) In United States ex rel. DRC Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC (E. Va., No. CV-04-

199-A), two former employees of CB alleged “that security contractor Custer Battles (CB) ¹³²

submitted $50 million in fraudulent contract claims” to the federal government. Custer Battles
argued that CPA was not part of the U.S. government and that it (CB) was paid with seized funds
and DFI funds, which meant, therefore, that the U.S. government was not involved in these
contracting activities and U.S. government funds were not expended.
Although some may concur with the judge’s 2006 analysis of the status of CPA (see below),
arguably the significance of Custer Battles, aside from the outcome, may have more to do with ¹³³
the insight provided by Department of Justice attorneys and Judge T.S. Ellis, III. In a brief
dated April 1, 2005, and submitted to Judge Ellis, DOJ attorneys examined two issues related to
financial transactions involving Custer Battles and the BIAP and ICE contracts:
^T^h^u^s^{, t}^h^e^s^p^ecifⁱ^c^is^s^u^e^{to be}^determⁱⁿ^{ed i}^s^w^h^et^h^e^{r t}^h^e^m^oⁿ^e^y^w^h^{ich def}^eⁿ^d^an^t^s^[^C^us^ter
^B^a^ttles]^r^e^q^u^ested^f^r^o^m^th^e^CP^{A v}ⁱ^a^t^h^eirⁱⁿ^v^o^ices^uⁿ^d^e^r^t^h^es^{e t}^w^o^coⁿ^t^r^acts^w^a^s^to^b^e^p^a^id
^ou^t^,^provⁱ^d^ed^{or ap}^prov^ed^by^t^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^e^s^G^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^{. T}^h^{e an}^sw^{er l}ⁱ^e^sⁱⁿ^t^h^eⁿ^a^t^u^r^e^o^f
^th^e^f^uⁿ^d^s^u^s^{ed to}^fuⁿ^d^t^h^es^e^t^w^{o con}^t^ract^s^.^T^h^{e s}^econ^dⁱ^s^s^u^{e is}^w^h^et^h^e^{r th}^{e cla}ⁱ^m^s^w^e^re¹³⁴
^pres^en^{ted to U.S. Gov}^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^of^fⁱ^cial^s^.
The Department of Justice determined that the U.S. government possessed, controlled, and/or
administered the funds used to pay Custer Battles; the U.S. government paid out, approved, or
provided these funds; and Custer Battles had presented claims for funds to “an officer or

¹³¹^Brie^f^of^the^Unite^{d Sta}^t^e^sⁱⁿ^re^sp^onse^to^the^c^o^{urt’s i}ⁿ^v^ita^tio^{n a}^t^p.^19,^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^ate^s^e^x^r^e^{l. D}^R^C^,^Iⁿ^c^.^an^{d R}^obe^r^t
^I^s^ak^s^{on v}^.^C^u^s^t^e^r^Bat^tle^s^,^LLC^,^e^t^a^l^{. (}^E^.D^.^Va^.²⁰⁰⁴⁾⁽^N^o^.^C^V^-⁰^4-^199a⁾^.
¹³²^Ma^rtha^A^.^Ma^tthe^w^{s, “}^D^istric^{t C}^ourt^Se^{ts Fe}^br^ua^ry^{10 He}^a^r^ing^on^W^h^e^t^he^{r FCA}^Re^a^c^he^{s Coa}^litioⁿ^P^r^ov^isiona^l
^A^u^thor^ity^C^ontr^a^c^t^s^,^D^e^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^{t Fu}^{nd f}^o^r^I^r^a^q^M^onie^s^,”^Fe^de^r^a^l^C^ontr^a^c^t^s^Re^por^t^,^J^a^nua^r^y^{11, 20}^{05, p. 24}^.^Iⁿ
^a^dditi^on^{to t}^h^e^la^w^s^{uit f}^ile^{d by}^{two f}^o^rm^e^r^e^m^plo^y^e^e^{s, th}^e^Aⁱ^{r Forc}^e^suspe^nde^d^Custe^r^Ba^ttle^{s e}^f^f^e^c^tiv^e^Se^pte^m^be^{r 30,}
²⁰⁰^4.^(Ex^c^lude^d^P^a^rtie^{s L}ⁱ^{st Sy}^st^e^m^{, a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http://w^ww^.e^pls.g^o^v^/^{.) A}^s^re^porte^{d in t}^h^e^Le^g^a^{l Ti}^m^e^s^,^t^h^{e A}ⁱ^{r F}^o^rce
^s^u^s^p^eⁿ^sⁱ^oⁿ^m^e^m^o^r^a^ndum^s^t^a^t^e^d^tha^t^the^c^o^m^p^aⁿ^y^ha^{d “}^pur^c^h^a^s^e^d^c^a^b^ins^,^tr^uc^k^s^{, a}^{nd e}^q^uipm^eⁿ^{t a}ⁿ^d^c^r^e^a^t^e^d^f^a^lse
^l^{eases b}^e^t^w^een^{CB an}^d^t^h^{e s}^h^am^co^m^p^anⁱ^e^s,^m^a^kiⁿ^gⁱ^t^ap^p^{ear t}^h^at^t^h^{e sh}^am^co^m^p^anⁱ^e^{s w}^e^r^e^l^easiⁿ^g^t^h^{e go}^od^{s t}^o^t^h^e
^CP^A^t^h^r^o^u^g^h^CB.^T^h^{e sch}^e^{me al}^l^o^w^e^d^{CB t}^o^l^{ease t}^h^{e go}^od^{s t}^o^t^h^e^C^P^A^at^p^rⁱ^{ces exc}^eedⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^{e o}^rⁱ^gⁱⁿ^al^co^st^o^f^t^h^e
^g^oods^.”⁽^J^a^s^on^Mc^L^u^r^e^{, “}^H^ow^a^C^ontr^a^c^t^or^C^a^s^h^e^dⁱⁿ^oⁿ^I^r^a^q^,^”^Le^{gal Tim}^e^s^{, Fe}^br^ua^r^y^{28, 2}⁰⁰⁵^,^p.^13.)
¹³³^T^h^e^De^pa^rt^m^e^{nt of}^Justic^e^(DOJ)^{is pe}^rm^itte^{d to j}^oⁱⁿ^a^su^it^f^ile^{d un}^de^{r the}^FCA^,^b^u^{t it}^ha^{s be}^eⁿ^re^por^te^{d tha}^t^the
^de^pa^rtm^e^{nt de}^c^line^dⁱⁿ²⁰⁰⁴^t^o^j^o^{in t}^h^e^la^w^s^{uit f}^ile^{d a}^g^aⁱ^{nst Custe}^r^Ba^ttle^s.(Mc^L^ure^,^“^H^ow^a^Contra^c^t^{or Ca}^she^dⁱⁿ^oⁿ
^Ira^q,”^p.¹³^{.) S}^ubse^q^ue^ntly^{, in De}^c^e^m^b^e^r²⁰⁰^{4, Ju}^dg^e^T^.^S.^Ellis^III^{, w}^{ho he}^a^r^{d t}^h^e^c^a^s^e^{in t}^h^e^{U.S. D}ⁱ^stric^t^Cour^{t f}^o^r
^the^Ea^ste^r^{n Distric}^t^of^Vⁱ^rg^inia^,ⁱⁿ^v^ite^{d the}^f^e^de^ra^{l g}^o^v^e^rn^m^e^{nt “}^t^{o f}^ile^{... a}^brie^f^se^tting^f^o^{rth t}^h^e^g^o^v^e^rn^m^e^{nt’s positi}^on
^w^{ith re}^s^p^e^c^t^{to w}^h^e^t^he^{r the}^FCA^[Fa^l^s^e^Claⁱ^m^s^A^c^t]^a^ppl^ie^s^{to f}^a^ls^e^c^l^aⁱ^m^s^m^a^de^{or pre}^s^eⁿ^te^{d t}^o^t^h^e^CP^A^....”^(Mc^L^ure^,
^“^H^ow^a^C^ontr^a^c^t^or^C^a^s^h^e^dⁱⁿ^oⁿ^I^r^a^q,”^p.¹³^.)
¹³⁴^Bri^e^f^o^f^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es at}^p^.²⁷^.

employee of the United States Government or to a member of the Armed Forces of the United ¹³⁵
States.” Following from these determinations, the Justice Department attorneys concluded that
^Cu^ster^B^a^ttles^’^s^clai^m^s^p^r^esen^ted^to^t^h^{e CP}^A^uⁿ^d^e^r^th^{e B}^I^A^P^an^d^I^C^{E co}ⁿ^t^r^act^s^w^o^u^l^d
^vi^o^l^a^t^e^F^C^{A i}^f^t^h^e^c^l^aⁱ^ms^a^r^e^s^h^o^w^{n t}^o^ha^ve^b^e^eⁿ^kⁿ^o^wⁱⁿ^gl^y^fa^l^s^e^becaus^e^th^os^e^clai^m^s^w^e^r^e
^f^o^r^f^uⁿ^d^{s in}^w^h^ic^h^th^{e U.S. h}^a^d^anⁱⁿ^ter^e^{st o}^r^ex^er^cised^cer^tain^d^o^mⁱⁿ^ioⁿ^an^d^w^e^r^e^t^o^b^e^p^aⁱ^d
^ou^t^,^provⁱ^d^{ed o}^r^ap^prov^{ed by}^t^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^es^an^{d t}^h^e^y^w^e^{re u}^l^tⁱ^m^a^t^e^l^y^pres^eⁿ^t^e^{d t}^o^an¹³⁶
^of^fⁱ^{cer or e}^m^plo^y^{ee of}^t^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^{ed States}^g^o^v^e^rnm^e^nt.
In response to an order from the U.S. district court, dated April 12, 2005, Justice Department
attorneys filed a supplemental brief that addressed the question of whether CPA was a U.S.
government entity, agency, or instrumentality for the purposes of the FCA. In their supplemental
brief, the attorneys emphasized several times that determining the status of CPA was unnecessary,
yet they did present a set of criteria for determining whether CPA was part of the U.S. ¹³⁷
government for the purposes of the False Claims Act.Their criteria and excerpts from their
responses follow:
^Ho^w^aⁿ^{d u}ⁿ^d^er^w^h^{at circum}^s^t^an^ces^w^a^s^th^{e e}ⁿ^tit^y^created?^T^h^{e C}^P^A^w^a^s^{created b}^y^th^e
^Co^m^m^aⁿ^d^er^o^f^th^{e Co}^alitioⁿ^F^o^r^{ces in}^I^r^aq^{, Gen}^e^r^a^l^T^o^m^m^y^Fr^an^k^s^{, Un}^ited^State^s^A^r^m^y^,
^w^h^o^w^a^{s al}^so^th^e^Co^m^m^aⁿ^d^er^o^f^th^e^{U.S. Ce}ⁿ^t^r^a^l^Co^m^m^aⁿ^d^{. T}^h^{e estab}^lish^m^eⁿ^{t o}^f^th^e^CP^A
^by^t^h^{e C}^o^ali^tion^w^a^s^f^o^r^m^al^l^y^recogⁿⁱ^{zed b}^y^UNS^C^R^[Uⁿⁱ^t^e^{d Nation}^s^Sec^u^rit^y^C^oun^cil
^R^e^s^o^l^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^]^1483.
^Is^th^{e en}^tit^y^s^u^bj^{ect to th}^{e g}^eⁿ^e^{ral s}^u^perv^is^ioⁿ^an^{d direction}^of^th^{e Ex}^ec^u^tⁱ^v^{e B}^r^an^ch^?^Is^its
^h^{ead appoi}ⁿ^t^{ed b}^y^t^h^{e Pres}ⁱ^d^en^t^aⁿ^{d conf}ⁱ^r^m^e^{d b}^y^t^h^e^S^eⁿ^a^t^e^?^T^h^{e C}^P^A^A^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^rat^o^r^w^a^s
^s^u^bj^{ect to th}^{e direction}^of^th^{e Pres}^iden^{t. A}^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^{rator B}^r^em^e^r^s^e^rv^{ed as}^P^r^es^iden^{tial En}^v^o^y
^an^{d reported t}^o^th^{e P}^r^es^iden^{t th}^rou^g^h^t^h^{e Secretar}^y^of^Def^e^ns^e.
^Is^th^{e en}^tit^y^’^s^f^uⁿ^d^ing^{or its}^{capital f}^o^r^m^{ed or}^re^{placed ou}^{t of}^th^{e pu}^{blic treas}^u^r^y^?^An^{d are}
^an^y^g^aⁱⁿ^{s r}^e^tu^rⁿ^ed^to^th^{e p}^u^b^{lic tr}^easu^r^y^?^T^h^{e C}^P^A^’^s^operatⁱⁿ^g^f^uⁿ^d^s^w^e^{re appro}^p^ri^at^ed^by
^C^ong^res^s^.
^A^r^{e al}^l^of^t^h^{e e}ⁿ^tⁱ^t^y^’^s^offⁱ^cers^an^{d ot}^h^e^{r pers}^onⁿ^e^l^e^m^pl^o^y^ee^s^of^t^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^es^?^Manyⁱ^f
ⁿ^o^t^m^o^st^offⁱ^cers^aⁿ^{d e}^m^pl^o^y^e^e^s^of^t^h^{e C}^P^A^w^e^{re e}^m^p^l^o^y^ee^s^of^t^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^e^s^{. O}^t^h^e^rs
^w^e^r^e^e^m^p^l^o^y^{ees o}^f^o^t^h^e^r^m^e^m^b^er^{states o}^f^th^e^Co^alitioⁿ^.
^A^r^{e t}^h^er^{e clo}^s^{e b}^u^d^g^etar^y^,^au^d^itin^g^an^d^fⁱ^{scal co}ⁿ^t^r^o^{ls t}^h^{at r}^e^se^m^b^{le t}^h^o^s^{e i}^m^p^o^sed^oⁿ^th^e
^o^r^dⁱⁿ^a^r^y^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^a^g^eⁿ^c^y^?^W^hⁱ^l^e^C^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^sⁱⁿ^itia^ll^yⁱ^m^p^o^s^edⁿ^o^clo^s^{e b}^u^d^g^etar^y^,^au^d^itiⁿ^g
^an^{d f}ⁱ^s^{cal con}^t^rols^ov^{er t}^h^{e C}^P^A^operation^s^wⁱ^th^re^g^a^{rd to th}^{e DFI [Dev}^elop^m^eⁿ^t^F^uⁿ^d^f^o^r
^{Iraq] th}^{at res}^e^m^b^{le th}^os^{e i}^m^pos^{ed on}^th^{e ordin}^a^r^y^g^o^v^e^rnm^e^{nt ag}^en^c^y^{... , C}^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^s^created
^t^h^{e O}^f^fⁱ^{ce o}^f^Iⁿ^s^p^ect^{or G}^eⁿ^e^ral^f^o^{r t}^h^e^C^P^A^t^o^perf^or^m^t^h^os^e^t^y^{pes of ov}^ersⁱ^gh^t^fuⁿ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^.
^Is^th^e^s^t^ru^c^t^u^r^{e o}^f^t^h^{e e}ⁿ^tit^y^sⁱ^m^p^l^y^an^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^ratⁱ^v^e^de^vⁱ^ce^es^tablis^h^e^d^f^o^{r th}^{e p}^u^rpos^{e of}
^carryⁱⁿ^g^ou^t^{a f}^e^deral^prog^ra^m^wⁱ^t^h^pu^blⁱ^c^fun^d^s^?^T^h^{e C}^P^A^w^a^s^t^h^{e ad}^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^ratⁱ^v^e^devⁱ^ce

¹³⁵^B^r^ie^f^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^a^t^pp.^28-^30,³⁴^-³^5,^37,³⁹^.
¹³⁶^I^b^id^{., p. 40.}
¹³⁷^A^s^re^porte^{d in}^the^Wa^shing^t^on^P^o^st^{, “}^T^he^brie^f^s^c^a^m^e^a^f^t^e^r^m^u^ltip^le^re^que^{sts f}^r^om^[^J^udg^e^]^{Ellis, w}^h^{o c}^hⁱ^d^e^d^t^h^e
^Ju^{stice Dep}^a^rtmen^t^{... f}^o^r^oⁿ^l^y^relu^ctan^tly^w^e^ig^hⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^oⁿ^t^h^{e case. Ellis said}^it^m^a^y^b^e^b^ecau^{se th}^{e g}^o^v^ern^m^en^{t d}^o^e^sn^’t
^w^aⁿ^t^t^o^exp^o^s^{e i}^t^s^el^f^t^o^lⁱ^a^bⁱ^lⁱ^t^y^fo^{r t}^h^{e C}^P^A^’^{s act}ⁱ^oⁿ^s^.^[^J^u^s^tⁱ^{ce Dep}^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^at^t^o^rn^ey^Mⁱ^ch^ael^F^.^]^He^rt^{z ackn}^o^w^l^e^d^g^e^d
^tha^t^the^g^o^v^e^rnm^e^{nt ha}^{d w}^r^itte^{n it}^{s brie}^f^s^{in the}^c^a^s^e^‘a^s^na^rrow^l^y^a^s^[ⁱ^t^]^c^o^u^l^d’.”^(G^riff^W^itte^{, “}^J^udg^e^Conside^r^s
^W^h^istle^-Blow^e^{rs’ Ira}^{q Contra}^c^tin^g^Suit,”^Wa^shing^t^on^P^o^st^{, Ma}^y^{13, 2}⁰⁰⁵^,^p.^E3.)

^th^{at t}^h^{e Co}^alitioⁿ^cr^eated^uⁿ^d^er^th^{e la}^w^s^aⁿ^d^u^s^a^g^{es o}^f^w^a^r^to^p^e^r^f^o^r^m^ci^v^{il g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t
^f^uⁿ^c^tioⁿ^sⁱⁿ^{liberated Iraq du}^rin^g^t^h^{e brief}^{period of}^occu^pati^on^{. As}^an^act^iv^e^m^e^m^b^{er of}^t^h^e
^Co^alitioⁿ^,^t^h^e^Unⁱ^t^ed^State^s^p^l^a^y^ed^anⁱ^m^p^o^r^tan^t^r^o^{le in}^,^an^d^h^a^d^cer^tain^r^e^sp^oⁿ^sib^ili^ties^f^o^r^,
^th^{e o}^ccu^p^a^tioⁿ^,^w^h^ich^{it ch}^o^s^{e to}^f^u^l^f^{ill t}^h^r^o^u^g^h^cr^eatioⁿ^o^f^aⁿ^d^p^a^r^tⁱ^cⁱ^p^a^tⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^t^h^e^C^P^A^.^Th^e
^C^P^A’^s^s^t^r^u^ct^u^r^e^w^a^sⁿ^o^{t es}^tablis^h^e^{d b}^y^C^ong^res^s^{, an}^{d th}^us^{, th}^{e s}^t^ru^ct^u^r^{e is}ⁿ^o^{t th}^{e t}^y^pⁱ^cal¹³⁸
^coⁿ^g^r^es^sioⁿ^all^y^cr^eated^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^tiv^{e d}^e^vⁱ^{ce to}^f^u^l^f^{ill a g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^f^uⁿ^c^tioⁿ^.
In reaching their determination that CPA was an instrumentality of the U.S. government, the
Justice Department attorneys wrote:
^{... tw}^o^f^actors^{tip th}^{e s}^{cale in}^f^a^v^o^{r of}^th^{e con}^c^lusⁱ^on^t^h^{at th}^e^CP^A^s^h^o^u^{ld be dee}^m^e^d^t^o^b^e^aⁿ
ⁱⁿ^str^u^m^eⁿ^t^a^lit^y^o^f^t^h^{e U}ⁿ^ited^S^t^ates^f^o^r^p^u^r^p^o^s^es^o^f^th^e^Fal^s^e^Clai^m^s^A^c^t.^Fir^s^t^is^th^eⁿ^a^tu^r^e
^of^t^h^{e appoi}ⁿ^t^m^eⁿ^t^aⁿ^{d s}^u^pe^rvⁱ^sⁱ^oⁿ^of^A^m^bass^{ador Brem}^{er as}^Presⁱ^d^en^tⁱ^a^l^En^v^o^y^aⁿ^d
^A^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^to^r^o^f^th^{e CP}^A^.^A^{ll a}^u^t^h^o^r^it^y^o^f^t^h^{e CP}^A^r^e^s^t^edⁱⁿ^th^e^A^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^r^a^to^r^,^an^d
^A^m^bass^{ador Brem}^er^w^a^s^e^m^pl^oy^{ed b}^y^t^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^{d State}^s^{, s}^e^rv^{ed at th}^{e plea}^s^u^{re of}^t^h^e
^P^r^es^iden^{t, an}^d^w^a^s^un^{der th}^e^s^u^pervⁱ^s^ion^o^f^th^{e P}^r^es^iden^{t a}ⁿ^{d th}^{e Secretar}^y^o^f^De^f^e^ns^e.
^Secon^d^{, cou}^p^{led w}^ith^t^h^{e s}^t^at^us^of^Am^bas^s^{ador B}^r^em^{er, is}^{the f}^{act th}^{at all}^o^f^th^e^m^oⁿ^e^y^u^s^ed
^f^o^{r th}^{e t}^w^{o con}^t^racts^{at i}^s^s^u^{e i}ⁿ^this^cas^e^w^a^s^s^p^{ent on}^l^y^oⁿ^t^h^{e au}^t^h^orit^y^aⁿ^{d con}^t^{rol of}^an
^of^fⁱ^{cer or e}^m^plo^y^{ee of}^t^h^{e U}ⁿ^{ited States}^{or a}^m^e^m^b^{er of}^th^e^A^r^m^e^{d Forces}^of^th^{e U}ⁿ^ited
^States^{.... T}^h^u^s^,^w^h^ile^w^e^e^m^p^h^as^{ize ag}^aiⁿ^t^h^{at t}^h^{e a}ⁿ^s^w^{er to}^th^{e C}^o^u^r^t’s^late^s^t^qu^e^s^tion^oⁿ
^th^{e n}^a^t^u^{re of}^t^h^{e C}^P^A^isⁿ^o^{t n}^e^ces^s^a^r^y^{to deter}^mⁱⁿ^e^w^h^eth^e^r^{or n}^o^{t def}^eⁿ^d^an^t^s^vⁱ^{olated th}^e
^FC^A^w^h^en^t^h^e^y^pres^{ented clai}^m^s^{to th}^{e C}^P^A^un^{der th}^{e t}^w^{o con}^t^racts^{at is}^s^u^{e i}ⁿ^thⁱ^s
^litig^at^ioⁿ^,^w^eⁿ^e^v^e^r^t^h^e^le^{ss co}ⁿ^c^lu^d^e^th^{at t}^h^{e CP}^A^{is an}ⁱⁿ^s^t^r^u^m^eⁿ^t^alit^y^o^f^t^h^{e Un}^ited^State^s¹³⁹
^f^o^{r pu}^rpos^es^of^th^{e Fa}^ls^{e C}^l^ai^m^s^A^c^t.
In July 2005, Judge Ellis issued an opinion noting first that, if CPA had been a U.S. government
agency, the question of whether the FCA applied to CPA contract actions “would be largely ¹⁴⁰
resolved.” However, the judge went on to note that “the essential nature of the CPA is shrouded
with ambiguity ... the CPA’s origins are difficult to pin down, as there is no formal document—
whether statute, United Nations Security Council resolution, or other organic document—that ¹⁴¹
plainly establishes the CPA or provides for its formation.” Near the end of his opinion, the
judge suggested that the question of CPA’s status might need to be addressed again at some later
date: “Although it initially appeared otherwise, it now appears unnecessary to reach and decide at
this time whether the CPA is an instrumentality of the United States.... [T]he dispute as to the ¹⁴²
nature of the CPA may ultimately prove to be material....”
Judge Ellis then turned to the question of the source and ownership of the three funds in ¹⁴³
question—vested funds, seized funds, and the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI)—and ¹⁴⁴
determined that the FCA applies to vested and seized funds, but it does not apply to the DFI.

¹³⁸^Su^pple^m^eⁿ^ta^{l B}^r^ie^f^of^the^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^a^t^pp^{. 6-}¹²^.
¹³⁹^Ibid^.,^pp.¹³^-1^4.
¹⁴⁰^Custe^r^Batt^le^s^{, 3}⁷⁶^{F. S}^u^p^p^.^2d^a^t⁶²^0.
¹⁴¹^Ibid^.
¹⁴²^Custe^r^Batt^le^s^{, 3}⁷⁶^{F. S}^u^p^p^.^2d^a^t⁶²^{0 a}ⁿ^d⁶⁴^{9. (}^I^t^a^lic^sⁱⁿ^o^r^ig^ina^l^.⁾
¹⁴³^Ve^s^t^e^d^f^uⁿ^d^s^a^r^e^“^I^r^a^{qi f}^unds^[^t^h^a^{t w}^e^r^e^]^c^onf^is^c^a^t^e^d^by^the^P^r^e^s^id^eⁿ^{t a}ⁿ^d^v^e^s^t^e^d^{in t}^h^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^the
^T^r^e^a^s^u^r^y^.”^Se^iz^e^d^f^unds^a^r^e^“^I^r^a^{qi s}^t^a^t^e^a^s^s^e^ts^{, pr}^im^a^r^il^y^{in the}^f^o^r^m^o^f^c^u^r^r^e^ncy^a^{nd ne}^g^o^tia^ble^ins^t^r^u^m^e^nts^,^[^t^ha^{t w}^e^r^e^]
^seized^b^y^th^{e Co}^alitioⁿ^F^o^{rces o}^ccu^p^yⁱⁿ^g^Iraqⁱ^territo^ry^{.” T}^h^{e De}^v^e^lo^p^m^en^{t Fu}ⁿ^d^f^o^{r Iraq}ⁱⁿ^clu^d^{es p}^r^o^ceed^{s f}^r^o^m^th^e
^U^.^N^.^“^O^{il f}^o^r^Fo^od”^pr^og^r^a^m^,^r^e^ve^nue^s^f^r^om^the^s^a^le^of^I^r^a^{qi oil a}ⁿ^{d g}^a^s^,^inte^rⁿ^a^tⁱ^ona^l^do^na^tio^ns^{, a}ⁿ^{d r}^e^pa^tr^ia^te^{d I}^r^a^qi
^assets.⁽^Custe^r^Battle^s^,³⁷^{6 F}^.^S^u^p^p^.²^d^at⁶²^{3 an}^{d 62}⁶^.⁾
¹⁴⁴^Ibid^.

Specifically, he ruled that “any request submitted to the CPA for payment from Seized or Vested
Funds constitutes a ‘claim’ within the meaning of the FCA. Requests for payment from funds in
the DFI, however, were requests for Iraqi funds and thus did not constitute an FCA ‘claim.’”
Judge Ellis’s ruling permitted the case against Custer Battles to go forward—because vested and
seized funds were used to pay the BIAP contract, and seized funds were used, in part, to pay for
the ICE contract—and, in March 2006, it was reported that a jury found that CB had “submitted ¹⁴⁵
$3 million in false claims against funds seized by the United States ....” However, in August
2006, Judge Ellis issued a second opinion in response to Custer Battles’ request for a directed
judgment overturning the jury’s verdict. He ruled in favor of Custer Battles, noting that the ¹⁴⁶
“relators did not prove that the claims were presented to the United States.”
In crafting his 2006 opinion, which addressed the Iraqi Currency Exchange project, Judge Ellis ¹⁴⁷
concluded that it was necessary to address the question of CPA’s status. After revisiting the
analysis of CPA included in his 2005 opinion, the judge wrote:
^{... [}^T^]h^{e res}^u^l^t^of^t^h^at^aⁿ^al^y^sⁱ^sⁱ^s^cl^ear—al^t^h^ough^t^h^e^C^P^A^w^a^s^priⁿ^ci^pal^l^y^con^t^rol^l^e^{d an}^d
^f^uⁿ^d^{ed b}^y^t^h^e^{U.S., t}^h^is^de^g^r^{ee of}^con^t^{rol di}^dⁿ^o^{t r}ⁱ^se^to^t^h^{e le}^v^e^{l o}^f^e^x^clu^sⁱ^v^{e co}ⁿ^t^r^o^l
^r^e^q^u^ir^ed^to^q^u^alif^y^a^s^anⁱⁿ^str^u^m^eⁿ^t^alit^y^o^f^th^{e U.S. g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^.^S^{ee Ra}ⁱⁿ^wa^ter^{, 35}^{6 U}^.^S^.^a^t
^592-^{54. In}^f^act^{, t}^h^{e e}^vⁱ^d^en^{ce c}^l^earl^y^es^t^a^blⁱ^s^h^e^s^t^h^atⁱ^t^w^a^s^cre^a^t^e^{d t}^h^roug^{h an}^d^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^{ed b}^y¹⁴⁸
^m^u^ltiⁿ^a^tion^a^{l co}ⁿ^s^eⁿ^t....
Judge Ellis ruled on the claim involving Custer Battles’ Baghdad International Airport contract in
early 2007. He determined that Custer Battles had not “fraudulently induced Iraq’s Coalition
Provisional Authority (‘CPA’) to award it a contract to perform security services for the Baghdad ¹⁴⁹
International Airport (‘BIAP’) by representing that it would provide 138 security personnel.”
Specifically, Judge Ellis noted the following:
^Iⁿ^s^u^m^m^ar^y^,^uⁿ^dⁱ^sp^u^t^ed^f^act^s^m^aⁿⁱ^f^e^stl^y^d^e^m^oⁿ^s^tr^ate^t^h^a^t^Relato^r^s^canⁿ^o^{t e}^s^tab^lis^h^a
^f^r^au^d^u^len^tⁱⁿ^du^ce^m^eⁿ^t^clai^m^un^{der th}^{e FC}^A^becaus^e^th^e^y^h^a^{ve f}^a^{iled to s}^h^o^w^{(i) th}^{at C}^u^s^t^e^r
^B^a^ttles^m^a^d^e^{a f}^a^l^s^{e state}^m^eⁿ^{t r}^e^g^a^r^dⁱⁿ^g^fⁱ^x^e^d^secu^rⁱ^t^y^p^e^r^s^oⁿⁿ^e^{l s}^t^af^fⁱⁿ^g^lev^e^l^s^{; (}ⁱⁱ⁾^th^at
^Cu^ster^B^a^ttles^kⁿ^o^wⁱⁿ^g^l^y^m^a^d^e^thⁱ^s^alle^g^e^d^l^y^f^a^lse^state^m^eⁿ^{t; an}^d⁽ⁱⁱⁱ⁾^t^h^{at t}^h^is^alle^g^e^d^l^y
^f^a^ls^{e s}^t^a^t^e^m^eⁿ^t^w^a^s^m^a^{terial t}^o^th^{e C}^P^A^’^s^decisⁱ^on^{to a}^w^ar^{d th}^{e B}^I^A^P^con^t^{ract to}^C^u^s^t^er¹⁵⁰
^B^a^ttles.
Except for a summary of what transpired previously in this case, the judge did not re-visit the
issue of the status of CPA in his 2007 opinion.

¹⁴⁵^Ma^rtha^A^.^Ma^tthe^w^s^,^“^J^ur^y^Find^s^Cus^t^e^r^Ba^ttle^s^Ma^de^$³^Mⁱⁿ^Fa^ls^e^Claⁱ^m^s^unde^{r O}ⁿ^e^Ira^q^Co^ntra^c^t^,”^Fe^de^ral
^C^ontr^a^c^t^s^Re^por^t^,^v^o^l.⁸⁵^{, n}^o^.¹⁰^,^p.²⁸^3.
¹⁴⁶^{U.S. v}^.^C^u^ste^r^Ba^ttle^{s, No.}⁰⁴^-1⁹⁹^{, 2}⁰⁰⁶^U.^{S. Dist.}^L^E^X^I^S⁵⁸²¹⁷^a^t^*²^{(E.D. V}^a^{. A}^u^g^u^{st 1}⁶^,²⁰^06).^T^h^e^te^r^m
^“rel^at^o^r^{” refers t}^o^{a p}^rⁱ^v^at^{e i}ⁿ^dⁱ^vi^d^u^a^l^w^h^o^m^a^y^“b^riⁿ^g^{a l}^a^wsuⁱ^t^oⁿ^b^e^h^a^l^f^o^f^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^es,^w^h^{ere t}^h^{e p}^rⁱ^v^at^e
^pe^rson^ha^{s inf}^o^rm^a^{tion tha}^t^the^na^m^e^{d de}^f^e^nda^{nt ha}^{s k}^now^ing^l^y^subm^itte^{d or c}^a^u^se^{d t}^h^e^subm^ission^of^fa^lse^or
^f^r^a^uduleⁿ^{t c}^l^aⁱ^m^s^{to the}^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^a^t^e^s^.”⁽^U^{.S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^J^u^s^tic^{e, “}^F^a^l^s^e^C^l^aⁱ^m^s^A^c^{t C}^a^s^e^s^:^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nt
^Inte^rv^eⁿ^tionⁱⁿ^{Qui T}^a^m⁽^W^histle^blow^e^{r) Suits,”}^n.d^.,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^h^ttp://w^ww^.usdoj.g^ov^/usa^o/^pa^e^/^Doc^u^m^e^nts/
^f^c^a^p^r^o^c^e^s^s²^.pdf^{, p}^.^1.⁾
¹⁴⁷^“^[^O^]ⁿ^J^a^nua^ry^30,²⁰^06,^the^BIA^P^c^ontra^c^t^c^l^aⁱ^m^s^w^e^re^s^e^v^e^re^d^f^r^om^the^{ICE c}^ontra^c^t^c^l^aⁱ^m^s^{... be}^c^a^us^e^the^c^l^aⁱ^m^s
^inv^o^lv^e^d^w^holly^se^pa^ra^te^f^a^c^t^ua^l^a^{nd le}^g^a^{l issue}^s^.”^{(U.S. v}^.^C^u^ste^r^Ba^ttle^{s, No.}^04-¹⁹^9,²⁰^{07 U.}^{S. Di}^{st. L}^E^X^I^S⁸⁴^{73 a}^t
^*⁹^(E.D^{. V}^a^{. Fe}^brua^ry^{2, 2}⁰⁰⁷^).
¹⁴⁸^{U.S. v}^.^C^u^ste^r^Ba^ttle^{s, 2}⁰⁰⁶^U.S^.^{Dist. L}^E^X^I^S⁵⁸²¹^{7 a}^t^*^31.
¹⁴⁹^{U.S. v}^.^C^u^ste^r^Ba^ttle^{s, 2}⁰⁰⁷^U.S^.^{Dist. L}^E^X^I^S⁸⁴⁷³^{, a}^t^*²^.
¹⁵⁰^I^b^id^{., a}^t^*^40-^*^41.

Custer Battles has yielded two views of the status of CPA: DOJ attorneys determined, for the
purposes of the FCA, that it was an instrumentality of the U.S. government, but Judge Ellis
reasoned that it was not. Additionally, at least one alternative explanation still exists regarding the
creation of CPA, which was discussed above. That is, the President may establish an organization
under 5 U.S.C. § 3161. However, without access to NSPD 24, which apparently created, or
authorized the establishment of, ORHA, and which also may have been the instrument under
which CPA was created, it is difficult to ascertain whether this could be a valid alternative
explanation, or the definitive explanation.
Yet another possibility is that CPA was a hybrid organization, meaning that it had multiple
origins. Perhaps, then, the seemingly contradictory explanations actually are a reflection of the
organization’s hybrid status. Furthermore, if CPA was a hybrid organization, could this mean that
it was part U.S. government organization and part multinational organization? If so, how might
this arrangement have affected how CPA operated, what would the implications have been for
CPA’s activities, and to whom was CPA accountable?
The differing interpretations offered by Justice Department attorneys and Judge Ellis and the
questions surrounding NSPD 24 highlight the difficulties inherent in attempting to discern the
true origins of CPA. Thus, it appears that the question of how CPA was established, by whom, and
under what circumstances remains unanswered, at least for some.

The status of this organization remains open to question. A letter exists that states that the United
States, and the United Kingdom, created the authority; in 2005, Justice Department attorneys
identified General Franks as the individual who established CPA; and the possibility exists that
the organization’s origins are to be found in NSPD 24. No explicit, unambiguous, and
authoritative statement has been provided that declares how CPA was established, under what
authority, and by whom, and that clarifies the seeming inconsistencies among alternative
explanations for how CPA was created.
Perhaps this ambiguity allowed the authority to perform multiple roles, each with its own chain of
command, stakeholders or constituents, funding, and accountability policies and mechanisms. A
statement in the FY2004 emergency supplemental—“in its [CPA] capacity as an entity of the
United State government”—suggested that U.S. government entity is only one of CPA’s roles.
Other roles might have included temporarily aiding in the governing of Iraq and serving as part of
a coalition. Possibly, the mix of arrangements allowed CPA to operate with greater discretion and
more authority, and have access to more resources, than if it had been solely a federal agency, or ¹⁵¹
an arm of the United Nations. CPA personnel also might have been able to work more

¹⁵¹^In^{a b}^rⁱ^e^fⁱⁿ^g^oⁿ^con^t^ractⁱⁿ^{g p}^r^o^g^ra^m^sⁱⁿ^Iraq^,^L^a^w^r^en^c^e^Di^Ri^t^a^,^P^rⁱⁿ^ci^p^a^l^Depu^t^y^A^ssi^st^an^t^S^ecret^ar^y^o^f^De^f^eⁿ^s^e^f^o^r
^Publ^ic^A^f^f^a^ir^s^,^s^t^a^t^e^d^{: “}^W^e^’^r^eⁱⁿ^a^w^a^r^,^w^e^’^r^e^{in a}^g^l^oba^{l w}^a^r^{on te}^r^r^o^r^.^W^e^ha^v^e^—^m^aⁿ^y^of^the^r^e^s^t^rⁱ^c^tions^on^how
^m^oney^is^a^ppr^opr^ia^te^d^aⁿ^d^s^p^eⁿ^t^a^r^e^ba^s^e^{d on r}^u^le^s^aⁿ^{d s}^t^a^t^ute^s^t^h^a^t^ha^v^e^de^v^e^lope^d^ov^e^r^a^c^our^s^e^of^tim^e^tha^t^w^a^s^not
^a^pe^rⁱ^od^of^w^a^r^.^{So w}^e^’^v^e^g^o^{t a}^c^e^r^ta^{in dis}^c^o^nne^c^t^be^tw^e^eⁿ^the^ne^e^d^to^s^p^eⁿ^{d m}^one^y^quic^k^l^y^now^{, and w}^e^’^v^e^g^o^t
^c^e^r^ta^{in f}^unds^a^v^a^ila^ble^to^do^tha^t^—^t^he^C^E^R^P^[^C^om^m^a^nde^r^s^E^m^e^r^g^e^ncy^R^e^s^pons^e^P^r^og^r^a^m^]^is^a^pot^of^m^oney^tha^t^’^s
^g^o^{t f}^e^w^e^{r res}^t^ric^tions^{, re}^la^tiv^e^l^y^s^p^e^a^k^ing^,^a^tta^c^h^e^d^to^it.^It^is^c^e^r^ta^inly^unde^rs^ta^nda^ble^tha^t^a^m^ilita^ry^c^o^m^m^a^nde^{r w}^ho
^ju^{st k}ⁿ^o^w^{s if}^h^e^h^a^d^$¹⁰^m^illioⁿ^h^e^can^ad^d^r^{ess so}^m^e^issu^es^{, isn}^’^t^g^oⁱⁿ^g^toⁿ^ecessaril^y^b^e^th^{e o}ⁿ^e^w^h^o^’^s^p^a^tien^t^en^o^u^g^h
^t^o^so^rt^t^h^r^o^u^{gh al}^l^t^h^{e p}^eacetⁱ^m^{e rest}^ri^ctⁱ^oⁿ^s^on^t^h^{e u}^s^e^o^f^f^unds^{. T}^h^a^t^’^s^s^o^m^e^body^e^l^se^’^s^{job; pe}^ople^a^r^e^doing^t^h^a^t^.
^T^h^{ese rest}^ri^ctⁱ^oⁿ^{are real}^,^t^h^ey^w^e^{re p}^u^tⁱⁿ^p^l^{ace f}^o^{r a ver}^y^g^{ood r}^e^a^s^{on. B}^u^{t t}^h^e^y^’^r^e^r^e^s^t^rⁱ^c^tions^tha^t^b^e^a^r^s^o^m^e^s^c^r^u^tiny
ⁿ^o^w^t^h^at^w^e^{’re t}^r^yⁱⁿ^g^t^o^ad^d^r^{ess a p}^r^ob^l^e^m^t^h^atⁱ^s^real^tⁱ^m^e;^an^dⁱ^t^’^sⁿ^o^t^on^l^y^{a real}^-tⁱ^m^{e p}^r^o^b^l^em^,ⁱ^t^’^{s a real}^-tⁱ^m^e
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

efficiently and effectively under this mix. By operating under more than one set of laws,
regulations, and policies, CPA possibly could have expanded the scope and reach of the
organization’s authority beyond what it would be otherwise. For example, the CPA Administrator
drafted the regulations, orders, memoranda, and public notices that applied to Iraq; and the
Program Review Board had jurisdiction over four funding sources, including appropriated funds.
An advantage of having the CPA treated as part of the Department of Defense is that the chain of
command ran through the executive branch, which would not have been the case if CPA were
purely an international organization or coalition.
Billing itself as an international coalition, while eschewing the label “federal agency,” might be
construed as an effort to make the organization more palatable, at least symbolically, to Iraqis and
others. For example, the CPA website address ended “.com” and the PMO website ended “.net.”
United States government website addresses typically end “.gov.” Furthermore, the Iraqi flag is
the only flag that appeared on the two websites. No flags from coalition countries were displayed.
Potential drawbacks of this arrangement were that the lines of authority and accountability could
have become tangled, or even obscured. CPA personnel possibly could have found it difficult to
understand and delineate clearly—on a daily basis—the organization’s different roles and ¹⁵²
associated funds, laws, and rules. Personnel might have been hampered by this tangle of
resources, laws, and documents, and could have found themselves engaging in questionable, and
perhaps unethical or criminal, activities. This scenario also could have proven challenging for
organizations that attempted to monitor CPA and its activities. When the authority made a
decision or expended funds, it might not have been clear to external parties under what authority
it was acting. Without transparency, the CPA might have given the appearance of shifting funds,
personnel, and tasks among different roles. Further compounding the problem, oversight
initiatives might have been met with the response that the activity in question was carried out
under an authority over which the oversight body—Congress—had no jurisdiction.
While greater transparency possibly could have helped to clarify CPA’s role(s), knowing how
CPA was established and under what authority would go a long way in helping to determine
whether it was a federal agency, the scope of its authority, and the forms, types, and mechanisms
of accountability to which it was subject. These questions remain relevant even after CPA’s

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^pro^b^le^m^w^h^e^r^e^pe^ople^a^r^e^be^ing^k^ille^d...^{. Bu}^{t I c}^aⁿ^te^ll^y^{ou tha}^t^t^h^e^pe^ople^w^{ho a}^r^e^re^sp^onsi^b^le^{, w}^ho^ha^v^e^tha^t^m^o^re^—
^w^{ho ha}^v^e^tha^t^br^oa^de^r^vⁱ^e^w^of^how^this^m^oney^is^a^lloc^a^t^e^d^a^{nd w}^h^a^t^thos^e^r^e^s^t^rⁱ^c^tio^ns^a^r^e^,^a^r^e^w^o^r^k^ing^thr^o^ug^{h t}^h^e
^pro^b^le^m^{in a}^v^e^r^y^a^g^g^r^e^s^sⁱ^v^e^w^a^y^—^A^m^ba^s^s^a^{dor Bre}^m^e^r^{, G}^e^ne^ra^{l A}^b^iz^aⁱ^{d, G}^e^ne^ra^{l Sa}^nc^he^z^{.... W}^e^ha^v^e^a^{lot of}
^r^e^s^t^rⁱ^c^tions^oⁿ^t^h^e^w^a^y^s^o^m^e^m^oney^c^aⁿ^be^s^p^eⁿ^{t, f}^e^w^e^r^r^e^s^t^rⁱ^c^tions^on^the^w^a^y^othe^r^m^oney^c^aⁿ^be^s^p^eⁿ^{t, a}^{nd w}^e^’^r^e
^tr^yⁱ^ng^our^be^s^t^to^kⁱ^nd^of^m^a^k^e^thos^e^de^te^r^m^ina^tions^a^{ll t}^h^e^tim^e^.^”⁽^R^e^a^r^A^d^mⁱ^r^a^{l Da}^vⁱ^{d J}^.^N^a^s^h⁽^r^e^t.)^,^Dⁱ^r^e^c^t^or^{, C}^P^A
^P^r^o^g^ram^M^aⁿ^a^g^e^m^eⁿ^t^O^f^fⁱ^ce,^an^d^L^a^w^r^en^{ce Di}^Ri^t^a^,^P^rⁱⁿ^ci^p^a^l^Dep^u^t^y^A^s^si^st^an^t^S^ecret^ar^y^o^f^D^e^fen^s^{e f}^o^{r P}^u^b^lⁱ^c
^Aff^a^{irs, “}^B^rie^f^ing^{on Contra}^c^tⁱⁿ^g^P^r^og^ra^m^s^,^”^ne^w^s^traⁿ^sc^{ript, Ma}^rc^{h 1}⁰^,²⁰^04,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^://w^ww^.de^f^eⁿ^se^link^.^m^il/
^tran^scrip^t^s/^tran^scrip^t^.^a^sp^x?tran^scrip^tid⁼²²⁹¹^.⁾
¹⁵²^{In te}^stim^ony^prov^ide^d^t^o^t^h^e^Seⁿ^a^te^Com^m^itte^e^{on Hom}^e^l^aⁿ^d^S^ecu^ri^t^y^an^d^G^o^vern^m^eⁿ^t^al^Affai^r^s,^t^h^{e S}^p^eci^al
^Inspe^c^t^{or G}^e^ne^ra^{l f}^o^{r Ira}^{q Re}^c^ons^truc^tio^{n sug}^g^e^ste^d^tha^t^t^h^e^m^u^ltit^ude^of^pr^oc^ure^m^eⁿ^{t rule}^{s w}^a^{s proble}^m^a^tic^{. Unde}^r
^the^he^a^dⁱⁿ^g^“^P^olic^y^a^nd^P^r^oc^e^s^s^K^e^y^L^e^s^s^ons^,”^he^a^d^vⁱ^s^e^{d: Es}^ta^bli^s^{h a}^sⁱ^ng^le^s^e^{t of}^sⁱ^m^p^le^c^ontr^a^c^ting^r^e^g^u^la^tions^aⁿ^d
^pr^oc^e^dur^e^s^t^h^a^t^p^r^ov^ide^unif^o^r^m^dir^e^c^tion^to^a^{ll c}^o^ntr^a^c^ting^pe^r^s^oⁿⁿ^e^lⁱⁿ^c^ont^ing^e^nc^y^eⁿ^vⁱ^r^onm^eⁿ^ts^{. T}^h^e^c^ontr^a^c^ting
^pr^oc^e^s^s^{in I}^r^a^q^r^e^c^ons^tr^uc^tio^{n s}^u^f^f^e^r^e^{d f}^r^o^m^the^v^a^rⁱ^e^t^y^of^r^e^g^u^la^tions^a^ppl^ie^d^by^div^e^r^s^e^ag^eⁿ^cⁱ^e^s^,^w^h^ic^{h c}^a^u^s^e^d
^inc^ons^is^te^nc^ie^s^a^{nd i}ⁿ^e^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^eⁿ^cⁱ^e^s^tha^tⁱⁿ^hi^bite^{d m}^a^na^g^e^m^e^{nt a}^{nd ov}^e^r^sⁱ^g^h^{t. (}^U^{.S. C}^ong^r^e^s^s^,^s^e^na^te^C^o^m^m^itte^e^on
^H^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^a^{nd G}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^nta^l^A^f^f^a^ir^s^,^s^t^a^t^em^eⁿ^{t of}^Stua^r^t^W^.^B^o^w^e^{n, J}^r^{., Spe}^cⁱ^a^l^Iⁿ^s^p^e^c^t^or^G^e^ne^r^a^{l f}^o^r^I^r^a^q^th^nd
^R^e^c^ons^tr^uc^tio^n,^un^pu^blis^he^{d he}^a^r^ing^,¹⁰⁹^Cong^.,²^s^e^s^s^{., A}^u^g^u^s^t^2,²⁰^06,^a^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^htt^p^://^hs^g^a^c^.^s^e^na^te^.g^ov^/^_^f^ile^s^/
⁰⁸⁰²⁰^6B^ow^eⁿ^.p^df^.)

dissolution on June 28, 2004, for questions remain about what it did, how it spent money, and
what it accomplished.
While information gleaned from CPA personnel would be potentially useful in the near future, it
also could be useful in the long-term in informing any future efforts to provide aid to countries
faced with similar problems.

On June 28, 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority ceased operations and the United States ¹⁵³
established diplomatic relations with the Iraqi government. Two organizations were established
by National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 36, dated May 11, 2004, to carry on some of
the work of the CPA: the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), within the ¹⁵⁴
Department of State; and a Project and Contracting Office (PCO), within DOD. IRMO is ¹⁵⁵
responsible for “facilitat[ing] the transition in Iraq.” The PCO
^m^aⁿ^a^g^e^s^th^e^{$18.4 billion}^appr^{opriated by}^th^e^{U.S. C}^oⁿ^g^r^e^s^s^[P^.L^{. 108-}¹⁰⁶^{] to s}^u^{pport th}^e
^r^ecoⁿ^s^tr^u^c^tioⁿ^o^f^I^r^aq^{i in}^f^r^astr^u^c^tu^r^e^{. T}^h^{is o}^f^fⁱ^{ce is r}^e^sp^oⁿ^si^b^l^{e f}^o^r^{all activ}^{ities asso}^ciated
^wⁱ^t^h^prog^ra^m^,^proj^ect^{, as}^s^e^t^,^c^oⁿ^s^t^r^u^c^tⁱ^on^aⁿ^d^fⁱⁿ^aⁿ^cⁱ^a^l^m^a^nag^e^m^eⁿ^t^{of t}^h^at^portⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^e¹⁵⁶
^recon^s^tru^c^tioⁿ^eff^o^{rt un}^dertaken^b^y^th^e^U.S.
In 2004, the Department of State established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization (S/CRS) pursuant to Section 408 (Division D) of P.L. 108-447, the FY2005
Consolidated Appropriations Act. The office is responsible for, among other things, monitoring
and inventorying the non-military resources and capabilities of executive agencies, monitoring
unstable situations around the world, and planning for response efforts to crises in other countries ¹⁵⁷
or regions.

The Coalition Provisional Authority represented a multinational effort to rebuild Iraq, restore
stability, and aid in establishing an interim Iraqi government. While its mission statement was

¹⁵³^U^.^{S. M}ⁱ^s^sⁱ^on^I^r^a^{q, I}ⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^tⁱ^ona^l^P^r^e^s^s^C^e^nte^r^{, O}^f^fⁱ^c^e^of^Str^a^tegⁱ^c^C^o^m^m^unic^a^tions^{, “}^A^m^b^a^s^s^a^dor^N^e^g^r^oponte
^A^rri^v^e^{s i}ⁿ^Bagh^d^a^d^,^{” n}^e^w^s^rel^eas^e,^Juⁿ^e²⁸^,²⁰⁰⁴^,^recei^ved^b^y^e^m^aⁱ^l^,^Jun^e²⁸^,²⁰⁰⁴^.
¹⁵⁴^U.^S^.^P^r^esi^d^en^t^(G^.^W^.^Bu^sh^),^“Uni^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es G}^o^vern^men^t^Op^eratⁱ^o^{ns i}ⁿ^Iraq^,^”^p^.³^.
¹⁵⁵^I^b^id^.,^pp.^2-^3.
¹⁵⁶^I^r^a^q^P^r^oje^c^t^a^{nd C}^oⁿ^t^r^a^c^ting^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^,^“A^bout^PC^O^,^”^n.^d.,^a^v^a^ila^ble^f^r^o^m^the^a^u^thor^.
¹⁵⁷^For^a^dditi^ona^l^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion, s}^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^t^R^S²²⁰³¹^,^Pea^cekeepⁱⁿ^g^aⁿ^d^P^o^st-Coⁿ^flic^{t C}^a^p^a^bⁱ^lities^:^Th^e^S^t^a^t^e
^D^e^par^tm^eⁿ^t’^s^O^ffic^e^for^Re^c^ons^tr^uc^tio^{n a}ⁿ^d^St^abilⁱ^z^a^ti^on^{, by}^Nⁱ^na^{M. Se}^r^a^fⁱ^{no a}ⁿ^{d Ma}^r^tⁱⁿ^A^.^W^e^is^s^.

fairly clear, other aspects of the authority were more obscure, particularly how it was established,
under what authority, and by whom (within the U.S. government). Available information about
the authority found in materials produced by the Administration alternatively (1) denies that it
was a federal agency; (2) states that it was a U.S. government entity or instrumentality; (3)
suggests that it was enacted under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483; (4) refers to ¹⁵⁸
it, and OHRA, as “civilian groups ... reporting to the Secretary [of Defense]”; (5) states that it
was created by the United States and United Kingdom; and (6) asserts that it was established by
the then-Commander of CENTCOM. Without a clear, unambiguous statement that declares the
CPA’s organizational status, clarifies what its relationship was with DOD and other federal
agencies, and addresses the competing explanations for how it was created, various questions are
left unanswered, including whether, and to what extent, CPA might be held accountable for its
programs, activities, decisions, and expenditures.

¹⁵⁸^Se^c^.¹²⁰³^of^P^.^L^.¹^08-¹³^6.

This is the text of the document issued by General Tommy R. Franks on April 16, 2003, to the
Iraqi people. The heading or title of the message is “Freedom to the Iraqi People.”
^P^{eace b}^e^u^p^oⁿ^y^o^u^.^Co^alitioⁿ^Fo^{rces in}^Iraq^h^a^v^e^co^m^e^as^lib^erato^r^{s, n}^o^{t as co}ⁿ^q^u^e^ro^{rs. W}^e
^h^a^v^e^co^m^e^t^o^elⁱ^mⁱⁿ^a^t^{e an}^oppr^es^sⁱ^v^e^an^{d agg}^r^es^sⁱ^v^e^regⁱ^m^e^t^h^at^re^f^u^s^e^d^t^o^c^o^m^p^l^y^wⁱ^t^h^U^N
^Secu^rⁱ^t^y^Co^uⁿ^cⁱ^l^r^e^so^lu^tioⁿ^s^r^e^q^u^irⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{e d}^e^str^u^ctioⁿ^o^f^w^e^ap^oⁿ^{s o}^f^m^a^{ss d}^e^s^t^r^u^ctioⁿ^.^T^h^e
^Co^alitioⁿ^{is co}^m^m^itted^to^h^e^l^pⁱⁿ^g^th^e^p^e^o^p^l^{e o}^f^I^r^aq^h^eal^t^h^eir^w^o^uⁿ^d^s^{, b}^u^ild^t^h^eir^o^wⁿ
^repres^en^tativ^e^g^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^{, be}^com^e^a^f^r^{ee a}ⁿ^{d i}ⁿ^depen^d^ent^{people an}^{d reg}^aⁱⁿ^a^res^p^ected
^p^l^{ace in}^th^e^w^o^rld^.^W^e^w^{ill en}^s^u^{re th}^{at Iraq}^’^s^o^{il is p}^r^o^t^ected^a^s^{a n}^a^tioⁿ^a^{l as}^set^o^f^aⁿ^d^f^o^r^t^h^e
^I^r^a^qⁱ^p^e^o^p^l^e.^I^r^aq^an^d^{its p}^r^o^p^er^t^y^b^e^loⁿ^g^to^th^{e I}^r^aq^{i p}^e^o^p^l^{e an}^d^th^{e Co}^alitioⁿ^m^a^k^e^sⁿ^o
^clai^m^o^f^o^wⁿ^e^r^s^hⁱ^p^b^y^f^o^r^{ce o}^f^ar^m^s^{. Co}^alitioⁿ^f^o^r^{ces r}^e^sp^{ect th}^{e I}^r^aq^{i p}^e^o^p^l^e^,^t^h^eⁱ^r^r^e^lⁱ^gⁱ^o^u^s
^p^r^{actices, h}ⁱ^sto^r^y^aⁿ^d^cu^lt^u^r^{e, an}^d^w^{ill sa}^f^e^g^u^ar^d^I^r^aq^’^s^uⁿ^it^y^an^d^ter^r^ito^rⁱ^{al in}^teg^r^it^y^.
^W^e^ar^e^w^o^r^kⁱⁿ^g^wⁱ^th^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^terⁿ^atioⁿ^a^{l co}^m^m^uⁿ^it^y^to^eⁿ^s^u^r^e^th^{e d}^e^liv^er^y^o^f^h^u^m^aⁿ^itarⁱ^aⁿ
^as^sⁱ^s^t^an^{ce a}ⁿ^{d to pr}^om^{ote la}^w^an^{d order}^s^o^th^{at Iraqis}^can^liv^{e in}^s^ecu^rit^y^{, f}^r^ee^f^r^om^f^e^a^r^.^W^e
^ar^e^estab^lis^hⁱⁿ^g^th^{e stab}^ilit^y^t^h^{at w}ⁱ^ll^allo^w^ear^l^y^p^r^o^g^r^e^ss^to^w^a^r^d^p^o^{litical f}^r^eed^o^m^aⁿ^d
^ecoⁿ^o^mⁱ^{c p}^r^o^s^p^e^rⁱ^t^y^{. Ou}^r^sta^yⁱⁿ^I^r^aq^w^{ill b}^e^te^m^p^o^r^ar^y^,ⁿ^o^loⁿ^g^e^r^t^h^an^{it ta}^k^e^{s to}^eli^mⁱⁿ^ate
^t^h^{e t}^h^reat^pos^{ed by}^S^a^dda^m^H^u^s^s^eⁱⁿ^’s^w^eapon^s^of^m^a^s^s^des^t^r^u^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^,^aⁿ^d^t^o^e^s^t^a^b^lⁱ^s^h^s^t^a^bⁱ^lⁱ^t^y
^an^{d h}^e^{lp Iraqis}^f^o^r^m^a^f^uⁿ^c^tioⁿⁱ^ng^g^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^t^h^{at res}^p^ects^th^{e ru}^{le o}^f^la^w^an^{d reflects}^t^h^e
^wⁱ^l^l^{, i}ⁿ^teres^t^s^,^aⁿ^{d righ}^t^s^o^f^t^h^{e people of}^{Iraq. Meanw}^h^ile,ⁱ^t^is^es^s^eⁿ^t^{ial t}^h^at^{Iraq h}^a^v^e^aⁿ
^au^t^h^ori^t^y^t^o^prot^ect^lⁱ^v^es^aⁿ^{d propert}^y^,^an^{d ex}^pedi^t^e^t^h^{e del}ⁱ^v^ery^o^f^hum^ani^t^a^ri^an^a^s^sⁱ^s^t^an^ce
^to^th^o^s^e^w^h^oⁿ^eed^{it. T}^h^er^ef^o^r^e^,^I^am^cr^eatin^g^th^{e Co}^alit^ioⁿ^P^r^o^v^isⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^A^u^th^o^rⁱ^t^y^t^o^e^x^e^r^cⁱ^s^e
^po^w^e^rs^of^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^te^m^poraril^y^,^an^{d as}ⁿ^eces^s^a^r^y^{, es}^pecia^l^l^y^to^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^e^s^e^c^u^rⁱ^ty^,^t^o^a^l^l^o^w
^th^{e d}^e^liv^er^y^o^f^h^u^m^aⁿ^itarⁱ^aⁿ^ai^d^an^d^to^elimⁱⁿ^ate^w^eap^oⁿ^{s o}^f^m^a^s^s^d^e^str^u^ctioⁿ^.^T^o^f^acilitate
^th^{ese o}^b^j^ectiv^{es, I}^p^r^o^c^laim^t^h^{e f}^o^llo^wⁱⁿ^g^:
^Me^m^b^ers^of^th^{e ar}^m^e^{d f}^o^rces^aⁿ^{d s}^ecu^rit^y^org^aⁿⁱ^zat^ioⁿ^s^s^h^a^l^l^l^a^y^d^o^wⁿ^t^h^eⁱ^r^a^r^m^s^,^s^t^ay^aw^ay
^f^r^o^m^t^h^eir^w^eapons^{, an}^{d re}^m^aⁱⁿⁱⁿ^{place. T}^h^e^y^s^h^{all obe}^y^th^e^orders^of^th^eⁿ^eares^t^C^o^alition
^m^ilitar^y^co^m^m^an^d^e^r^.^A^l^{l o}^t^h^e^r^I^r^a^qⁱ^sh^o^u^ld^coⁿ^tin^u^e^th^eirⁿ^o^r^m^{al d}^a^il^y^act^ivⁱ^ties;^o^f^fⁱ^cial^s
^sh^o^u^l^d^rep^o^r^{t to}^th^{eir p}^l^{aces o}^f^w^o^rk^uⁿ^{til to}^ld^o^t^h^e^r^wⁱ^s^e.^A^ll^th^o^s^{e e}ⁿ^g^a^g^e^dⁱⁿ^th^{e d}^e^li^v^e^r^y
^o^f^esseⁿ^{tial ser}^v^{ices s}^h^o^u^ld^r^e^tu^rⁿ^to^th^eir^j^o^b^s^.^T^h^{e A}^r^ab^So^cⁱ^{alist Re}ⁿ^a^is^saⁿ^c^e^Pa^r^t^y^o^f^I^r^a^q
^(Hⁱ^z^{b al}^-^B^a’^t^h^al^-A^rabi^al^-^I^sh^tⁱ^rakⁱ^al^-^I^raqi^{) i}^s^h^e^reb^y^di^s^e^s^t^a^b^lⁱ^s^h^e^{d. Propert}^y^of^t^h^{e Ba’t}^h
^P^a^r^t^y^s^h^o^u^ld^b^e^tu^rⁿ^ed^o^v^er^th^{e Co}^alitioⁿ^P^r^o^v^isioⁿ^a^l^Au^th^o^r^it^y^.^Sad^d^a^m^H^u^s^s^ein^’^s
ⁱⁿ^t^e^l^lⁱ^ge^nc^e^aⁿ^d^se^c^u^rⁱ^t^y^a^p^p^a^r^a^t^u^s,^t^h^e^A^l^-M^u^kha^b^a^r^a^t^a^l^-I^r^a^qⁱ^yya^,ⁱ^s^he^r^e^b^y^d^e^pri^v^ed^of^al^l
^po^w^e^rs^an^{d au}^t^h^orit^y^.^A^{ll Iraqis}^{are n}^o^{t f}^r^{ee to ex}^pres^s^th^{eir v}ⁱ^e^w^s^wⁱ^t^h^{out f}^{ear of}
^retribu^tion^.^A^t^aⁿ^approp^{riate t}ⁱ^m^e^{, f}^r^{ee electio}^ns^wⁱ^l^l^m^a^ke^I^r^a^qⁱ^s^se^l^f^-go^v^e^rⁿⁱ^ngⁱⁿ^l^o^c^a^l^,
^r^e^gⁱ^oⁿ^{al, an}^d^so^oⁿ^{, n}^a^tioⁿ^a^{l af}^f^a^ir^{s. A}^{ll p}^a^r^{ties an}^d^p^o^{litical g}^r^o^u^p^s^m^a^y^p^a^r^ticip^{ate in}^I^r^aq^’^s
^p^o^{litical lif}^{e, e}^x^cep^{t t}^h^o^s^e^w^h^o^ad^v^o^{cate o}^r^p^r^{actice v}ⁱ^o^l^en^ce.^I^r^aq^is^m^u^stⁿ^o^{t see}^k^r^e^v^eⁿ^g^e^.
^T^h^er^e^w^ill^b^e^{a j}^u^st^leg^a^l^p^r^o^{cess t}^h^at^w^ill^saf^e^g^u^ar^d^th^e^h^oⁿ^o^r^an^d^dⁱ^gⁿ^it^y^o^f^t^h^{e I}^r^aqⁱ
^p^e^o^p^l^e.^T^h^{e Co}^alitioⁿ^P^r^o^v^isioⁿ^a^{l Au}^t^h^o^r^it^y^wⁱ^{ll see}^k^{a f}^aⁱ^r^an^d^p^r^o^m^p^t^so^lu^tioⁿ^to^th^e
^problem^o^f^dis^p^{laced pers}^ons^an^{d re}^f^u^g^ees^{. T}^h^ere^wⁱ^{ll be}^{a leg}^a^{l, or}^g^aⁿⁱ^{zed proces}^s^to
^ad^d^r^{ess r}^e^stit^u^tioⁿ^o^f^h^o^m^e^s^th^{at h}^a^v^e^b^e^eⁿ^se^ized^b^y^th^e^f^o^r^m^er^r^e^gⁱ^m^e^.^T^h^{e Co}^alitioⁿ^wⁱ^ll
^w^o^rk^wⁱ^t^h^Iraqis^{to s}^e^{t u}^p^{a co}^mm^is^sⁱ^on^{to deal}^wⁱ^t^h^s^u^ch^claⁱ^m^s^{. I call u}^pon^Iraqis^t^oⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m
^C^o^alition^Forces^reg^a^rding^t^h^{e lo}^cation^of^w^eapons^of^m^a^s^s^de^s^t^ru^ctioⁿ^{or related m}^a^terials^,
^f^acilit^ies^w^h^er^{e su}^c^h^w^eap^oⁿ^s^ar^{e m}^a^d^e^,^aⁿ^dⁱⁿ^dⁱ^vⁱ^d^u^al^s^coⁿⁿ^ected^to^w^eap^oⁿ^s^o^f^m^a^ss
^d^e^str^u^ctioⁿ^.^A^{ll r}^eco^r^d^{s co}ⁿ^c^e^rⁿⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{ese acti}^v^itie^{s s}^h^o^u^ld^b^e^p^r^eser^v^e^d^.^I^r^aq^{is sh}^o^u^ldⁿ^o^t
^pas^s^w^eapon^s^o^f^m^a^ss^des^t^ru^ctⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^t^e^rrori^s^t^s^{or t}^e^rrori^s^t^org^aⁿⁱ^zatⁱ^ons^{. I cal}^l^u^pon^Iraqi^s^t^o
ⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^Co^alitioⁿ^Fo^r^{ces r}^e^g^a^r^dⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{e lo}^catioⁿ^o^f^:^f^o^r^e^igⁿ^fⁱ^g^h^t^e^r^s^aⁿ^d^t^e^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^t^s^;^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^o^f
^t^h^{e reg}ⁱ^m^e^’^s^s^e^c^u^ri^t^y^apparat^u^s^;^aⁿ^{d i}ⁿ^di^vⁱ^d^u^al^s^w^h^o^h^a^{ve perpet}^rat^e^{d cri}^m^es^ag^aⁱ^ns^t
^h^u^m^aⁿⁱ^t^y^o^r^w^a^r^crⁱ^m^e^s^.^A^l^l^r^eco^r^d^{s co}ⁿ^cerⁿⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{ese ac}^tiv^itie^{s s}^h^o^u^l^d^b^e^p^r^eser^v^e^d^.
^R^e^w^a^rds^m^a^y^{be prov}ⁱ^d^{ed f}^o^{r e}^s^peci^al^l^yⁱ^m^port^aⁿ^tⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atⁱ^oⁿ^on^t^h^es^e^m^a^t^t^e^r^s^.^A^l^l^b^a^r^rⁱ^e^r^s
^{to f}^r^ee^m^o^v^e^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^{people and g}^oods^{, in}^cl^u^d^ing^ille^g^a^{l roadblock}^s^aⁿ^{d ch}^ec^k^poin^t^s^,^m^u^s^t

^co^m^e^d^o^wⁿ^{. W}^e^w^ill^w^o^r^k^wⁱ^t^h^r^e^gⁱ^oⁿ^{al lead}^er^{s, e}ⁿ^titie^{s, an}^d^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^{s t}^h^{at ar}^e
^com^mⁱ^{tted to peace an}^d^dem^o^c^r^acy^{to in}^te^g^r^{ate th}^e^mⁱⁿ^t^o^t^h^e^C^o^a^litioⁿ^s^’^acti^v^itie^{s. Co}^alitioⁿ
^Forces^are^h^e^{re to e}ⁿ^s^u^{re s}^a^f^e^t^y^aⁿ^{d s}^e^c^u^rit^y^{, a}ⁿ^{d to}^h^e^{lp t}^h^e^{people of}^{Iraq create a better}
^f^u^t^u^{re f}^o^{r t}^h^ei^{r coun}^t^r^y^.^{We pl}^edg^e^ou^{r s}^u^pport^t^o^al^l^I^r^aqi^s^w^{ho s}^eek^Iraq’^s^f^r^eedo^m^an^d
^pros^perity^{, an}^{d t}^h^{e bles}^sⁱ^ng^s^o^f^{peace an}^{d s}^ecu^rit^y^.
^{16 A}^p^ri^l²⁰⁰³
^G^e^ne^r^a^l^T^o^mmy^R.^Fr^aⁿ^ks¹⁵⁹
^Co^m^m^aⁿ^d^er^o^f^Co^alitioⁿ^Fo^r^c^es
^L.^E^l^aⁱ^ne^H^a^l^c^hiⁿ
^An^al^y^s^{t i}ⁿ^Am^erican^Natⁱ^on^al^Gov^e^rnm^e^nt
^eh^al^chiⁿ^@^c^rs^.l^oc.g^o^v^{, 7-}⁰⁶⁴⁶

¹⁵⁹^G^e^ne^ra^l^T^o^m^m^y^{R. Fra}ⁿ^k^s^{, Com}^m^a^nde^{r of}^Coa^litio^{n F}^o^rc^e^s^{, “}^F^re^e^dom^Me^ssa^g^e^{to the}^Ira^qi^P^e^o^p^le^,”^A^p^{ril 16,}
²⁰⁰^{3, a}^v^a^ila^ble^f^r^om^the^a^u^thor^.