Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Background, Legal Analysis, and Policy Options

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

In United States v. Booker (Booker), an unusual two-part opinion transformed federal criminal
sentencing by restoring to judges much of the discretion that Congress took away when it put
mandatory sentencing guidelines in place. In the first opinion, the Court held that the current
mandatory sentencing guidelines violated defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury by
giving judges the power to make factual findings that increased sentences beyond the maximum
that the jury’s finding alone would support. In the second part, a different majority concluded that
the constitutional deficiency could be remedied if the guidelines were treated as discretionary or
advisory rather than mandatory. As a result of the decisions, the Court struck down a provision in
law that made the federal sentencing guidelines mandatory as well as a provision that permitted
appellate review of departures from the guidelines. In essence, the high Court’s ruling gives
federal judges discretion in sentencing offenders by not requiring them to adhere to the
guidelines; rather, the guidelines can be used by judges on an advisory basis.
Historically, the way in which convicted offenders are sentenced falls under one of two penal
policies—indeterminate and determinate sentences. Indeterminate sentencing practices were
predominant for several decades, leading up to the major reform efforts undertaken by many
states and the federal government in the mid-to late 1970s and early 1980s. The perceived failure
of the indeterminate system to “cure” the criminal, coupled with renewed concern about the rising
crime rate throughout the nation in the mid-1970s, resulted in wide experimentation with
sentencing systems by many states and the creation of sentencing guidelines at the federal level.
In 1984, Congress passed a sentencing reform measure, which abolished indeterminate
sentencing at the federal level and created a determinate sentencing structure through the federal
sentencing guidelines. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 reformed the federal sentencing
system by (1) dropping rehabilitation as one of the goals of punishment; (2) creating the U.S.
Sentencing Commission and charging it with establishing sentencing guidelines; (3) making all
federal sentences determinate; and (4) authorizing appellate review of sentences.
In light of the Court ruling in Booker and subsequent cases, the issue for Congress is whether to
amend current law to require federal judges to follow guided sentences, or permit federal judges
to use their discretion in sentencing under certain circumstances. Congressional options include
(1) maintain the sentencing guidelines by specifying mandatory minimum sentences and
increasing the top of each guideline range to a statutory maximum for specified offenses (hence,
codify specified sentencing ranges that are in the guidelines); (2) require jury trials for any
enhancement factor that would increase the sentence for which the defendant did not waive his or
her rights; or (3) take no action, thus permitting judicial discretion in sentencing in cases where
Congress has not specified mandatory sentences.

Introduc tion ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Supreme Court Cases......................................................................................................................2
United States v. Booker and Beyond.........................................................................................2
Penal Policy...................................................................................................................................10
Indeterminate Sentencing.........................................................................................................11
Determinate Sentencing..........................................................................................................12
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.............................................................................................12
Sentencing Guidelines...................................................................................................................13
Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines.................................................................................13
Statutory Sentencing Guidelines.......................................................................................14
Advisory or Voluntary Sentencing Guidelines..................................................................14
States’ Sentencing Guidelines...........................................................................................14
Departures from the Guidelines..............................................................................................15
Possible Policy Consideration.......................................................................................................17
Maintain the Sentencing Guidelines.................................................................................17
Provide Jury Trials............................................................................................................18
Permit Judicial Discretion in Sentencing..........................................................................18
Figure 1. Federal Sentences Under the Guidelines, 2003 (Pre-Booker)........................................16
Figure 2. Federal Sentences Under the Guidelines, 2006 (Post-Booker)......................................17
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................18

On January 12, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by ¹
jury requires that the current federal sentencing guidelines be advisory, rather than mandatory. In
doing so, the Court struck down a provision in law that made the federal sentencing guidelines ²
mandatory as well as a provision that permitted appellate review of departures from the ³
guidelines. In essence, the Court’s ruling gives federal judges discretion in sentencing offenders
by not requiring them to adhere to the guidelines; rather the guidelines can be used by judges on ⁴
an advisory basis. As a result of the ruling, judges now have discretion in sentencing defendants
unless the offense carries a mandatory sentence (as specified in law). While some may view the
ruling as an opportunity for federal judges to take into consideration the circumstances unique to
each individual offender, thus handing down a sentence that better fits the offender, others fear
that federal sentencing will give way to unwarranted disparity and inconsistencies across ⁵
jurisdictions. The Court has begun to clarify some of the lingering questions regarding the
amount of weight to be given to the guidelines and what standards appellate courts should use in
accessing the “reasonableness” of a particular sentence. In light of these rulings, the issue for
Congress is whether to amend current law to require federal judges to follow guided sentences
(hence, codify specified sentencing ranges that are in the guidelines), or to continue the status quo
and permit federal judges to use their discretion in sentencing, under certain circumstances.
The issue that brought the matter before the Court was a judge’s obligation to move from one
guideline maximum to a higher one based on the judge’s factual determination. The Court
examined “[w]hether the Sixth Amendment is violated by the imposition of an enhanced sentence
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) based on the sentencing judge’s
determination of a fact (other than a prior conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted ⁶
by the defendant.”
This report provides a legal analysis of the Court rulings leading up to and including Booker, as
well as subsequent rulings. The report then provides background information on the federal
sentencing guidelines. In doing so, the report provides a summary of U.S. penal policy, paying
particular attention to such policy at the federal level. The report then discusses legislation
enacted in 1984 that created the current federal sentencing structure. Next, the different types of
sentencing guidelines, including the one that was approved by Congress that was the basis for the
recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, are discussed. The report then provides an analysis of

¹^S^ee^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^v.^B^o^o^ker,⁵⁴³^U^.^S.²²^{0 (}²⁰⁰⁵⁾^.
²^A^c^c^o^r^d^ing^t^o^the^r^u^li^ng^{, a}^pr^ov^is^{ion i}ⁿ^c^u^r^r^e^{nt la}^w^m^a^k^e^s^the^g^u^ide^line^s^bi^ndi^ng^oⁿ^a^{ll j}^udg^e^s^{. T}^h^e^p^r^ov^is^ion,¹⁸
^U^.^S.C^.^§3⁵⁵³⁽^b)^,^r^e^qui^r^e^s^c^our^ts^t^o^im^pos^e^a^s^e^nteⁿ^c^e^w^{ithin t}^h^e^a^p^plic^a^b^le^g^uⁱ^d^e^line^s^r^a^ng^e^.
³^Se^e^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§³⁷⁴²⁽^e⁾^.
⁴^W^h^ile^the^C^o^ur^{t s}^t^r^u^c^k^dow^{n a}^pr^ov^is^ion^tha^t^m^a^de^the^f^e^de^r^a^{l s}^e^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^g^u^ide^line^s^m^a^nda^tor^y^{, the}^C^our^{t a}^l^s^oⁿ^o^te^d
^th^{at cu}^rren^t^law^{“... req}^uⁱ^{res j}^u^d^g^{es to}^tak^e^acc^ount^of^the^g^u^ide^lⁱⁿ^e^s^tog^e^the^r^w^{ith othe}^r^s^e^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^g^o^a^l^s^.^”^Se^e¹⁸
^U^.^S.C^.^§3⁵⁵³⁽^a⁾^{. T}^h^e^C^our^{t a}^l^s^o^s^t^r^u^c^k^dow^{n a}^pr^ov^is^ion^tha^t^pe^r^mⁱ^tte^{d a}^ppe^l^l^a^t^e^r^e^vⁱ^ew^of^s^e^nteⁿ^c^e^s^tha^t^w^e^r^e
^im^pos^e^d^a^s^a^re^s^u^{lt of}^a^judg^e^’^s^d^e^pa^rture^f^r^om^the^g^u^ide^line^s^{. T}^h^e^Court^no^te^d,^how^e^v^e^r^{, tha}^t^c^u^rreⁿ^t^la^w^“^{... c}^onti^nue^s
^t^o^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^{e f}^o^{r app}^eal^{s f}^r^o^m^sen^t^en^ciⁿ^g^d^eci^si^on^{s (i}^rresp^ectⁱ^v^{e o}^f^wh^et^h^e^{r t}^h^{e t}^rⁱ^a^l^j^u^d^g^{e sen}^t^en^{ces w}ⁱ^t^hⁱⁿ^o^r^o^u^t^si^d^e^t^h^e
^guⁱ^d^elⁱⁿ^{es ran}^g^e)”.^S^{ee 18}^U.^S^.^C^.^§³⁷⁴²⁽^a),⁽^b⁾^.
⁵^Se^e^f^o^{r e}^x^a^m^ple^,^Erik^L^una^{, “}^M^isg^u^ide^d^G^u^ide^line^s^{: A}^Critiq^ue^of^Fe^de^ra^{l Se}^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^,”^P^o^lⁱ^{cy A}ⁿ^al^ysi^s^{, no.}⁴⁵^8,
^No^ve^m^b^er¹^,²⁰⁰²^.
⁶^U.^S^.^v.^B^o^o^ker,⁵⁴^{3 U}^.^S^.²²⁰⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾^.

departures from the guidelines under the federal system. The report concludes with an analysis of
possible policy options Congress may wish to consider if it chooses to address this issue.

In a series of cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that given the Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury, judges cannot impose sentences beyond the prescribed statutory maximum unless the ⁷
facts supporting such an increase are found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. In Apprendi v. ⁸⁹
New Jersey (Apprendi), the Court held that except in the case of recidivists a judge could not
sentence a criminal defendant to a term of imprisonment greater than the statutory maximum
assigned to the crime for which he had been convicted by the jury. Most recently, in Blakely v. ¹⁰
Washington (Blakely), the Court held that Washington State’s sentencing guidelines violated the
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a trial by jury in criminal cases. Washington State guidelines
allowed judges, rather than juries, to make certain findings of fact that increased an offender’s
sentence. The Court found that the “statutory maximum” for Apprendi purposes is the maximum
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or
admitted by the defendant. In other words, the relevant statutory maximum is not the maximum
sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose ¹¹
without any additional facts. After Blakely, federal courts were immediately faced with
arguments that the USSG also violated the Sixth Amendment. The courts were divided sharply on ¹²
this issue.
The Court spoke to the application of Blakely to the federal sentencing guidelines in United States
v. Booker (Booker). In Booker, the defendants were each convicted of controlled substances
offenses. In both cases, application of the USSG would require sentencing within ranges beyond
those supported by the verdict alone: in Booker’s case 30 years to life rather than 17 to 21 years
and in Fanfan’s case 15 to 16 years rather than five to six years. The Court unanimously agreed
on the notion that discretionary sentencing guidelines would not implicate a defendant’s Sixth ¹³¹⁴
Amendment right. Applying its decisions in Apprendi and Blakely, the Court held that “[a]ny

⁷^S^ee^Rin^g^v.^Arizoⁿ^a^,⁵^{36 U}^.^S.⁵⁸^{4 (}²⁰⁰²⁾⁽^h^oldⁱ^ng^t^h^a^t^aⁿ^a^g^g^r^a^v^a^t^ing^cⁱ^r^c^um^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^tha^t^m^a^ke^s^a^de^f^e^nda^{nt e}^ligⁱ^b^le
^f^o^{r a d}^eat^h^sen^t^en^{ce i}^s^t^h^{e f}^uⁿ^c^tⁱ^on^al^eq^uⁱ^val^eⁿ^t^o^f^an^el^em^en^t^o^f^an^o^f^fen^s^{e f}^o^{r p}^u^r^po^{ses o}^f^t^h^{e S}ⁱ^xt^h^Amen^d^m^en^t^ri^gh^t
^{to a}^j^u^r^y^tr^ia^{l a}^{nd the}^r^e^f^or^e^m^u^s^t^be^f^ound^by^a^jur^y⁾^.
⁸⁵²^{0 U}^.^S^.⁴⁶⁶⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
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^or^pa^r^o^le^.
¹⁰⁵⁴^{2 U}^.^S^.²⁹⁶⁽²⁰⁰⁴⁾^.
¹¹^I^b^id^{. a}^t³⁰^2.
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^an^al^ysi^s^t^h^{e f}^e^d^e^ral^sen^t^en^ciⁿ^g^guⁱ^d^elⁱⁿ^es^w^e^re^indisting^uⁱ^sha^b^le^f^r^om^thoseⁱⁿ^B^l^a^kel^y^);^Co^m^p^are,^U.^S^.^v.^Ko^c^h^{, 20}⁰⁴^th^th
^WL¹⁸⁹⁹⁹^30,^*¹^-^*⁶⁽^eⁿ^ba^nc⁾⁽⁶^Cⁱ^r^.^A^u^g^u^s^t^2,²⁰⁰⁴⁾^;^U.^S^.^v.^Pi^ne^iro^{, 3}⁷⁷^F.^3d⁴⁶^4,⁴⁶^8-⁷³⁽⁵^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁴⁾^;^U.^S.^v.^th^th
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⁽^G^{ould, J}^.^dis^s^e^ntiⁿ^g⁾^{, w}^ith^U.^S^.^v.^Ko^ch^,²⁰⁰⁴^W^L¹⁸⁹⁹⁹^30,^a^t^*⁷^-^*^{13 (}^M^a^r^{tin J}^.,^dis^s^e^ntiⁿ^g⁾^;^U.^S^.^v.^Ame^line^{, 37}⁶
^F.3^d^a^t⁹^72-⁹⁷^8.
¹³^B^o^o^ker^at²³¹^(st^a^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^at^“ever^y^oⁿ^e^agr^{ees t}^h^at^t^h^{e co}ⁿ^s^tⁱ^t^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^lⁱ^ssu^{es p}^r^esen^t^e^d^b^y^t^h^{ese case}^s^w^o^u^l^d^h^a^{ve b}^een
^a^v^oide^{d e}ⁿ^tire^l^y^if^Cong^re^{ss ha}^{d om}^itte^{d f}^r^o^m^the^Se^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^Re^f^o^rm^Ac^{t of}¹⁹⁸^{4 (SRA}^{) the}^pr^ov^isi^{ons t}^h^a^t^m^a^ke^the
^G^u^id^elin^{es b}ⁱ^ndⁱⁿ^{g o}ⁿ^dⁱ^strict^judge^{s ...”); Cf}^,^B^o^o^ker^a^t⁷⁹^5-⁸⁰²⁽^T^hom^as^{, J}^{., dis}^s^e^ntiⁿ^g⁾^{. T}^h^e^m^a^jo^r^ity^doe^s^not
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the
maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be
admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” The Court reasoned
that the sentencing guidelines direct a judge in some instances to enhance sentences in a manner
which violates this principle. This violation occurs when a judge makes certain factual findings ¹⁵
supported by a preponderance of the evidence to enhance a sentence beyond the range otherwise
authorized by the jury’s verdict or the defendant’s admissions.
In rejecting the government’s arguments to Blakely’s applicability to the federal sentencing
guidelines (guidelines), the Court found that the guidelines were developed by the United States ¹⁶
Sentencing Commission rather than by Congress constitutionally insignificant. Moreover, the
Court found that Blakely’s application to the guidelines was not precluded or contradicted by ¹⁷¹⁸
recent cases dealing with other issues including perjury and the Double Jeopardy clause.
Finally, the Court noted that a separation of powers argument was precluded by its decision in ¹⁹
Mistretta v. United States.
In the first opinion, the Court sought to restore the jury’s significance in its finding of the ²⁰
underlying crime. However, in the remedial portion of the decision, the majority gave judges
more discretion in sentencing. With Justice Ginsburg joining the four dissenting judges from the
first part (Justices Breyer, O’Connor, Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist), the Court held
unconstitutional two provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA): 18 U.S.C. §3553(b)(1),
which makes the guidelines mandatory, and 18 U.S.C. §3742(e), which sets forth standards of ²¹
review for appeals of departures from the mandatory guidelines.
To reach this conclusion, the majority evaluated the likely effect of the constitutional requirement
on the SRA’s language, history and basic purpose. In other words, the Court answered the

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^e^x^plaⁱ^{n how}^c^h^aⁿ^gⁱ^ng^t^h^e^m^a^nda^tory^na^ture^of^the^g^u^ide^lⁱⁿ^e^s^to^dis^c^re^tiona^ry^c^u^re^{s the}^c^onstitutⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^de^fⁱ^cⁱ^eⁿ^c^y^.
¹⁴^T^hⁱ^s^o^pⁱⁿⁱ^on^o^f^t^h^{e Cou}^r^t^,ⁱⁿ^p^a^rt^,^w^a^{s d}^e^lⁱ^v^ered^b^y^Ju^stⁱ^{ce S}^t^even^s^,^w^h^o^w^a^{s j}^oⁱⁿ^ed^b^y^Ju^stⁱ^{ces S}^calⁱ^a^,^S^o^ut^er,
^T^hom^as^a^{nd G}ⁱ^ns^bur^g^.
¹⁵^A^p^r^ep^oⁿ^d^e^ran^{ce o}^f^t^h^{e evi}^d^en^{ce i}^s^“t^h^e^great^{er wei}^g^h^t^o^f^t^h^{e evi}^d^en^ce;^su^p^e^ri^o^r^evi^d^eⁿ^tⁱ^a^ry^w^eⁱ^g^h^t^t^h^at^,^t^h^rou^g^h^no^t
^suff^ic^ie^{nt to f}^r^e^e^the^mⁱ^{nd w}^holly^f^r^o^m^a^{ll re}^a^s^ona^ble^d^o^u^b^{t, is}^st^ill^suf^fⁱ^cⁱ^eⁿ^{t to i}ⁿ^c^line^a^f^a^{ir a}^nd^im^pa^rtia^{l m}ⁱ^{nd to}^oⁿ^e
^sⁱ^de^of^the^is^s^u^e^r^a^the^r^thaⁿ^the^ot^he^r^.^”^B^r^y^aⁿ^A^.^G^a^rⁿ^e^r^{, Edito}^r^,^“^B^la^c^k^’^s^L^a^w^Dⁱ^c^tiona^r^y^,”^Se^c^ond^Editi^on,⁽^S^t.^P^a^ul^,
^MN^{: W}^e^s^t^G^r^{oup: 20}⁰¹⁾^.
¹⁶^B^o^o^ker^a^t²³^{8. T}^h^e^dis^s^e^nte^r^sⁱⁿ^pa^r^t^{, J}^u^s^tic^e^B^r^e^y^e^r^{, C}^h^ie^f^J^u^s^tic^{e R}^e^hnq^uis^t^,^a^{nd J}^u^s^tic^e^s^O^’^C^oⁿⁿ^o^r^a^{nd K}^eⁿⁿ^e^d^y
^f^{ound t}^h^a^t^B^l^a^kel^y^sh^ou^l^d^no^t^appl^y^t^o^t^h^{e f}^e^d^e^ral^sen^t^en^ciⁿ^g^guⁱ^d^elⁱⁿ^{es as t}^h^ey^{are n}^o^t^st^at^u^t^{es no}^{r re}^p^r^esen^t^el^em^en^t^s
^o^f^{a cri}^m^{e b}^u^t^rat^h^{er are sen}^t^en^ciⁿ^g^f^act^s.
¹⁷^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^v.^Duⁿⁿ^igaⁿ^{, 5}⁰⁷^U^.^{S. 8}⁷⁽¹⁹⁹³⁾⁽^h^o^l^di^ng^tha^t^t^h^e^p^r^ov^is^ions^of^the^g^u^ide^lⁱⁿ^e^s^tha^t^r^e^quir^e^a^s^e^nteⁿ^c^e
^en^h^aⁿ^cem^en^{t if}^th^{e ju}^d^g^{e d}^e^termⁱⁿ^{es th}^{at t}^h^{e d}^e^f^eⁿ^d^aⁿ^t^co^m^m^itted^p^e^rju^r^y^d^oⁿ^o^{t v}ⁱ^o^l^{ate th}^e^p^r^iv^ileg^e^o^f^th^{e accu}^sed^to
^te^s^tif^y^{on he}^r^ow^{n be}^ha^lf⁾^.
¹⁸^S^ee^W^itte^v.^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^{, 5}^{15 U}^.^S.³⁸^{9 (}¹⁹⁹⁵⁾⁽^hol^ding^t^h^a^t^t^h^e^D^oub^le^J^e^opa^r^d^y^C^l^a^u^s^e^didⁿ^o^t^ba^r^a^pr^os^e^c^u^ti^on
^f^o^r^c^onduc^t^tha^t^ha^d^pr^ovⁱ^d^e^d^t^h^e^ba^sⁱ^s^f^o^r^aⁿ^e^nha^nc^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^the^d^e^f^e^nda^nt’^s^s^e^nteⁿ^c^eⁱⁿ^a^prⁱ^o^r^c^a^s^e^.
¹⁹⁴⁸^{8 U.S}^.³⁶¹⁽¹⁹⁸^{9) (c}^oⁿ^c^l^ud^ing^tha^t^e^v^eⁿ^th^oug^h^the^C^o^m^m^issioⁿ^pe^rf^orm^e^{d politic}^a^l^ra^the^r^thaⁿ^a^d^judⁱ^c^a^t^ory
^f^uⁿ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^C^oⁿ^g^{ress d}ⁱ^d^no^t^exceedⁱ^t^s^con^s^tⁱ^t^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^lⁱ^mⁱ^t^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^sⁱⁿ^c^r^eatⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^{e Co}^mmⁱ^ssi^oⁿ⁾^.
²⁰^B^o^o^ker^at²³⁷^(st^a^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^at^t^h^{e “}ⁿ^ew^s^eⁿ^t^en^ciⁿ^g^p^r^actⁱ^{ce f}^o^rced^t^h^e^Co^u^r^t^t^o^a^d^d^r^{ess t}^h^e^q^u^e^stⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^ho^w^t^h^{e ri}^gh^t^o^f
^jury^tria^{l c}^ould^be^pre^s^e^r^v^e^{d, i}ⁿ^a^m^e^aⁿ^ing^f^ul^w^a^y^g^u^a^r^aⁿ^t^e^eⁱ^ng^tha^t^the^j^u^ry^w^{ould still}^staⁿ^d^be^tw^e^e^{n the}ⁱⁿ^divⁱ^dua^l
^a^{nd t}^h^e^p^o^w^e^r^of^the^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt unde}^r^the^ne^w^s^e^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^r^e^gⁱ^m^e^.^”⁾^.
²¹^T^h^e^soluti^on^urg^e^{d by}^Justic^e^Ste^v^eⁿ^{s w}^{ith but t}^h^re^e^of^{his c}^o^lle^a^g^ue^{s w}^{ould be}^{to a}^v^oi^{d c}^o^nstitu^tio^na^{l inf}ⁱ^rm^itie^{s b}^y
^al^l^o^wⁱⁿ^g^j^u^ri^{es t}^o^d^eci^d^e^t^h^{e f}^act^{s t}^h^at^h^a^{ve gu}ⁱ^d^elⁱⁿ^{e con}^s^eq^u^eⁿ^ces.^T^h^{e Co}^u^r^t^f^o^uⁿ^d^t^h^at^t^h^{e rem}^aⁱⁿ^d^e^{r o}^f^t^h^{e S}^R^Aⁱ^s
^c^onstitu^tio^na^{l, c}^aⁿ^f^unc^ti^onⁱⁿ^de^p^e^nde^ntly^{, a}^{nd is c}^onsiste^nt^w^{ith C}^ong^re^ss’^ba^sic^obje^c^tiv^e^s^{in e}ⁿ^a^c^ting^the^SRA^.

question of what “Congress would have intended” in light of the Court’s constitutional holding.
The Supreme Court based its decision to delete the mandatory requirement of the guidelines on
the supposition that, given the choice, Congress would not have enacted a mandatory system ²²
modified to accommodate Blakely. This majority considered three options: (1) invalidating the
act in its entirety; (2) engrafting the Sixth Amendment “jury trial” requirement; and (3) severance
and excision of the offending parts of the SRA. The Breyer majority opined that Congress would
have preferred “the total invalidation of the Act to an Act with the Court’s Sixth Amendment ²³
requirement engrafted onto it.” In addition, it concluded that Congress would have preferred the
“excision of some of the Act, namely the Act’s mandatory language to the invalidation of the ²⁴
entire Act.” The Breyer majority noted that severance and excision was closer to Congress’
intended system by “maintaining a strong connection between the sentence imposed and the ²⁵
offender’s real conduct....” As such, the Court concluded that 18 U.S.C. §3553(b)(1) and 18
U.S.C. §3742(e) should be severed and excised to match Congress’ intent of increased uniformity
of sentencing. The Court called upon Congress to decide whether its declaration of judicial ²⁶
discretion merits legislative action.
A possible issue arising under Booker involves the degree of deference the advisory guidelines ²⁷
command. At one end of the spectrum is the view embodied in United States v. Wilson (Wilson)
in which the judge flatly decreed that he will follow the guidelines and impose their prescribed ²⁸
sentence “in all but the most exceptional cases.” At the opposite end is the view reflected in ²⁹
United States v. Ranum (Ranum) where the judge elected to treat the guidelines as just one of a
number of sentencing factors spelled out in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a), including the defendant’s history ³⁰
and characteristics. Applied to Ranum—a sympathetic defendant with compelling personal
qualities, appealing family circumstances and strong proof in mitigation—this approach yielded a ³¹
year and a day sentence where the guidelines called for 37 to 46 months. A third perspective

²²^B^o^o^ker^a^t²⁴^{9 (}^s^ta^ting^t^h^a^t^“^s^e^v^er^a^l^c^ons^ide^r^a^tⁱ^ons^c^o^nv^inc^e^us^t^h^a^t^{, w}^e^r^e^the^C^our^t’^s^c^o^ns^tit^utio^na^l^r^e^quir^e^m^e^nt
^a^dde^d^ont^{o t}^h^e^SRA^a^s^c^u^rre^ntly^w^r^itte^{n, the}^re^qu^ire^m^eⁿ^t^w^{ould s}^o^traⁿ^sf^orm^the^sc^he^m^e^tha^t^Cong^re^{ss c}^r^e^a^t^e^d^tha^t
^C^ong^r^e^s^s^lik^e^l^y^w^ould^not^ha^v^e^inte^nde^{d the}^A^c^{t a}^s^s^o^m^odifⁱ^e^d^to^s^t^a^nd.”⁾^.
²³^I^b^id^{. a}^t²⁴^8.
²⁴^Ibid^{. T}^h^e^disse^nte^r^{s o}^pⁱⁿ^e^d^t^h^a^tⁱ^f^the^c^onstitu^tio^na^{l pr}^oble^m^w^a^{s a}^vⁱ^ola^tio^{n of}^the^rig^h^t^to^tria^l^by^jury^{, the}^soluti^on
^s^houl^{d a}^l^s^o^la^y^w^{ith the}^jur^y^{: to r}^e^quir^e^pr^os^e^c^u^tor^s^t^o^m^a^k^e^m^o^r^e^s^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^c^indic^t^m^e^nts^a^{nd to}^pr^e^s^eⁿ^{t to t}^h^e^j^u^r^y^aⁿ^y
^f^a^c^t^tha^t^w^ould^inc^r^e^a^s^e^a^s^e^nteⁿ^c^e^be^y^{ond the}^or^di^na^r^y^r^a^ng^e^.^J^u^s^tic^e^Ste^v^eⁿ^s^s^a^{id tha}^tⁱⁿ^a^v^oidi^ng^t^h^is^s^o^l^u^ti^{on a}ⁿ^d
ⁱⁿ^st^ead^ch^an^giⁿ^g^t^h^{e n}^a^t^u^{re o}^f^t^h^e^guⁱ^d^elⁱⁿ^{es t}^h^em^sel^v^es,ⁱ^t^w^a^{s “cl}^{ear t}^h^at^t^h^{e cou}^r^t^’^{s creat}ⁱ^v^{e re}^m^e^d^yⁱ^s^an^ex^erci^{se o}^f
^l^e^gi^sl^atⁱ^v^e,^rat^h^{er t}^h^an^j^u^dⁱ^ci^al^,^po^w^e^r,^{” o}ⁿ^e^t^h^at^“^v^iola^te^{s the}^tra^dⁱ^tion^of^judⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^re^stra^int.”
²⁵^I^b^id^{. a}^t²⁵^{3 (}^s^ta^ting^t^h^a^t^“^u^nif^o^r^m^it^y^doe^s^{not c}^o^ns^is^{t s}ⁱ^m^p^ly^o^f^sⁱ^m^ila^r^se^nteⁿ^c^e^s^f^o^r^thos^e^c^onv^ic^te^{d of}^vⁱ^ola^tio^ns^of
^the^s^a^m^e^s^t^a^t^ute^{... It}^c^ons^is^ts^,^m^o^re^im^porta^ntly^{, of}^sⁱ^m^ila^{r re}^la^tions^tha^t^Co^ng^re^s^s^’^s^e^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^s^t^a^t^ut^e^s^he^lpe^d^t^o
^ad^van^{ce an}^d^t^h^at^J^u^stⁱ^{ce S}^t^even^{s’ ap}^p^r^o^ach^w^o^u^l^d^uⁿ^d^e^rmⁱⁿ^e.^”).
²⁶^I^b^id^{. a}^t²⁶^{3 (}^s^ta^ting^t^h^a^t^“^o^ur^s^,^of^c^our^s^e^{, is}^not^the^la^{st w}^o^rd:^T^h^e^ba^{ll n}^o^w^lie^{s in Co}^ng^re^{ss’ c}^ourt.”⁾^.
²⁷³⁵^{0 F}^.^Su^pp^.2^{d 9}¹⁰⁽^D^{. U}^t^a^h^J^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^{13, 20}⁰⁵⁾^.
²⁸^Id^.^a^t⁹²^5;^{see a}^l^s^o^,^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^Pe^ac^h^,³²⁷^F.S^u^p^p^.^2d¹⁰⁸¹⁽^D^.^N^.^D^.^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{15, 2}⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^c^oⁿ^c^l^u^d^ing^t^h^a^t^the
^c^{ourt w}^{ill c}^oⁿ^tin^ue^to^gⁱ^v^e^c^onsid^e^r^a^{tion t}^o^t^h^e^a^d^vⁱ^sory^se^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^g^u^ide^line^s^{, w}^h^ic^{h w}^{ill be}^a^f^f^o^rde^d^su^bsta^ntia^l
^w^eⁱ^g^h^tⁱⁿ^sen^t^en^ciⁿ^g^h^eariⁿ^{gs b}^e^c^a^u^s^{e t}^h^{e f}^e^d^e^ral^sen^t^en^ciⁿ^g^guⁱ^d^elⁱⁿ^es,^po^lⁱ^c^y^st^at^e^m^en^t^s^,^an^d^t^h^{e sen}^t^en^ciⁿ^g^t^a^bl^es
^a^{nd r}^a^ng^e^s^w^e^r^e^c^r^e^a^t^e^d^a^t^the^dir^e^c^{tion of}^C^o^ng^r^e^s^s^a^{nd the}^s^t^a^t^uto^r^y^pur^pos^e^s^of^s^e^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^{, a}^s^dir^e^c^t^e^d^by^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,
^{are b}^e^st^ref^l^e^c^t^e^dⁱⁿ^t^h^{e gu}ⁱ^d^elⁱⁿ^es).
²⁹³⁵^{3 F}^.^Su^pp^.2^{d 9}⁸⁴⁽^E^.D^{. W}ⁱ^s^.^J^a^nua^r^y^___,²⁰⁰⁵⁾^.
³⁰^Id^.^at⁹⁸⁶^(st^a^tⁱⁿ^g^t^h^at^“iⁿ^ever^y^case,^co^u^r^t^s^m^u^stⁿ^o^w^coⁿ^sⁱ^d^{er al}^l^o^f^t^h^{e §3}⁵⁵³⁽^{a) f}^act^o^r^s,^no^t^j^u^st^t^h^{e gu}ⁱ^d^elⁱⁿ^es.^”^).
³¹^Ib^id^.^at¹³^;^acco^r^d^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^ate^s^v.^J^one^s^{, 3}⁵²^F.S^u^p^p^.^2d²²⁽^D^{. M}^e^{. J}^a^nua^r^y^{21, 2}⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽ⁱ^m^pos^ing^dis^c^r^e^tiona^r^y
^pr^o^b^a^tio^{n te}^r^m^unde^r^§3⁵⁵³⁽^a⁾^w^h^e^r^e^de^f^e^nda^{nt, w}^hos^e^g^u^ide^lⁱⁿ^e^s^e^nteⁿ^c^e^w^a^s^a^t^le^as^{t one}^y^e^a^r^{, did}^not^qua^lif^y^f^o^r
^dow^nw^a^r^{d de}^pa^r^t^ur^e⁾^;^Unⁱ^t^ed^St^a^t^es^v.^R^evo^ck^{, 353}^F.S^u^p^p^.^2d¹²⁷⁽^D^{. Me}^{. J}^a^nua^r^y^28,²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^c^uttiⁿ^g^de^f^e^nda^nt’^s
^s^e^nteⁿ^c^e^{to e}^lim^ina^t^e^dis^p^a^r^ity^a^m^ong^c^ode^f^e^nda^nts^,^aⁿ^im^pe^r^m^issⁱ^ble^de^pa^r^t^ur^e^g^r^ou^nd^un^de^r^t^h^e^g^u^ide^line^s⁾^;^Un^ite^d
^S^t^a^t^{es v.}^Myers^{, 35}^{3 F}^.^S^u^p^p^.^2d¹⁰²^{6 (}^S^.D^{. I}^o^w^a^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^26,²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^s^eⁿ^te^ncⁱⁿ^g^de^f^e^nda^{nt to}^thr^e^e^m^onths^pr^o^b^a^tioⁿ
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

comes from the Northern District of Oklahoma in United States v. Barkley (Barkley).³² In a
somewhat ironic twist, the Barkley Court exercised its procedural discretion under Booker to
implement the remedy offered by the first Booker merits majority. As such, in trial cases in this
district, juries will find the facts necessary to support relevant sentencing enhancements by proof ³³
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Booker and its progeny appear to stand for the proposition that the Guidelines are just one of the ³⁴
factors district courts must consider under §3553(a) to determine a reasonable sentence. While
an appellate court may considerable a sentence within a Guidelines range to be presumptive ³⁵
reasonable, a court may not consider a sentence outside the Guidelines range to be per se ³⁶
unreasonable. It would appear that as long as a district court judge follows proper procedure by
correctly calculating the Guidelines range, addressing §3553(a) factors and articulating
reasonable considerations of the factors, appellate courts are required to give such analysis
deference. As such, the issue of how much weight or deference a sentencing judge must give to
the advisory guidelines remains unanswered.
In Booker’s aftermath, questions remain regarding the decision’s retroactivity. It appears that the ³⁷
Booker Court did not intend that every case on appeal be remanded for resentencing. Rather,
appellate courts were directed “to apply ordinary prudential doctrines, determining, for example, ³⁸
whether the issue was raised below and whether it fails the ‘plain-error’ test.” Although the ³⁹
Supreme Court did not address the issue of its retroactivity on collateral review, the Court’s

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^ins^t^e^a^d^of^usⁱⁿ^g^the^g^uⁱ^d^e^line^r^aⁿ^g^e^of^20-^{30 m}^ont^hs^{; f}ⁱ^ndi^ng^Ra^nu^m^pe^r^s^ua^sⁱ^v^e⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^State^s^v^.^W^e^s^t^{, 20}^{05 W}^L
¹⁸⁰⁹³^{0 (}^S^.D^.N^.Y^.,^J^a^nua^r^y^27,²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^f^ollowⁱ^ng^Ran^u^m^,ⁱⁿ^t^h^at^gui^d^e^lⁱⁿ^{es are on}^l^y^oⁿ^e^f^act^o^r^t^o^co^nsi^d^er).
³²³⁶^{9 F}^.^Su^pp^.2^{d 1}³⁰⁹⁽^N^.D^{. O}^k^la^.^J^a^nua^r^y^{24, 20}⁰⁵⁾^.
³³^Ib^id^{. at}¹³²⁵^-²⁶^.^In^p^l^{ea cases, th}^{e Co}^u^r^{t w}^{ill f}ⁱⁿ^d^eⁿ^h^aⁿ^cⁱⁿ^g^f^actsⁱⁿ^acco^rd^an^{ce w}^ith^th^e^Fed^e^{ral R}^u^{les o}^f^Ev^id^en^ce,
^a^l^s^o^a^pplyⁱ^ng^the^r^e^a^s^ona^ble^do^ub^{t s}^t^a^nda^r^d^;^{see a}^l^so^,^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^v^.^H^u^e^r^ta-^R^odrⁱ^gue^z^,³⁵^{5 F.}^Su^pp^.2d¹⁰¹⁹⁽^D^{. N}^e^b.
^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{1, 20}⁰⁵⁾^.
³⁴^S^ee^{Rita v}^.^Unite^{d St}^ate^s^,¹²^{7 S.}^C^t^{. 2}⁴⁵⁶⁽²⁰⁰⁷⁾⁽^h^ol^ding^t^h^a^t^aⁿ^a^ppe^lla^te^c^o^ur^{t m}^a^y^vⁱ^ew^the^G^u^ide^line^s^r^a^ng^e^a^s
^pr^e^s^um^ptiv^e^r^e^a^s^ona^ble^,^a^ltho^u^g^h^the^pr^e^s^um^ptio^{n is}^no^nbi^nd^ing⁾^;^{Gall v}^.^Un^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, 2}⁰⁰⁷^W^L⁴²⁹²¹¹⁶
⁽²⁰⁰⁷⁾⁽^hol^ding^t^h^a^t^w^h^ile^a^ppe^lla^te^c^our^t,^{in r}^e^vⁱ^e^w^ing^the^r^e^a^s^ona^bleⁿ^e^s^s^of^a^s^e^nteⁿ^c^e^outsⁱ^de^a^d^vⁱ^s^o^r^y^G^u^ide^line^s
^r^a^ng^e^,^m^a^y^tak^e^de^g^r^e^e^o^f^v^a^rⁱ^aⁿ^ce^into^a^c^c^ount^{, the}^r^e^is^no^r^u^le^t^h^a^t^r^e^quir^e^s^“^e^x^tr^a^o^r^dⁱⁿ^a^r^y^”^cⁱ^r^c^um^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^s^{to jus}^tif^y
^sen^t^en^{ce o}^u^t^si^d^e^G^uⁱ^d^elⁱⁿ^{es ran}^g^e);^Kⁱ^m^b^r^o^ug^{h v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, 2}⁰^{07 W}^L⁴²⁹²⁰⁴⁰⁽²⁰⁰⁷⁾⁽^h^oldi^ng^t^h^a^t^a^dis^t^rⁱ^c^t^c^our^t
^j^u^d^g^{e m}^u^stⁱⁿ^cl^ud^{e t}^h^{e G}^uⁱ^d^elⁱⁿ^{es ran}^g^{e i}ⁿ^t^h^{e array}^o^f^f^act^o^r^s^w^a^r^r^an^tⁱⁿ^{g co}ⁿ^sⁱ^d^eratⁱ^oⁿ^,^b^u^t^t^h^{e j}^u^dge^m^a^y^d^e^t^e^r^mⁱⁿ^e
^t^h^at^,ⁱⁿ^t^h^{e p}^a^rtⁱ^c^u^l^{ar case,}^{a w}ⁱ^t^hⁱⁿ^G^uⁱ^d^elⁱⁿ^{es sen}^t^en^{ce i}^s^“great^{er t}^h^anⁿ^ecessar^y^{” t}^o^{serve t}^h^{e o}^b^j^ec^tⁱ^v^{es o}^f
^s^e^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^un^de^r^§³⁵⁵³⁽^a⁾^.
³⁵^S^ee^{Rita v}^.^Unite^{d St}^ate^s^,¹²^{7 S.}^C^t^{. 2}⁴⁵⁶⁽²⁰⁰⁷⁾^.
³⁶^S^ee^{Gall v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^{, 2}⁰⁰⁷^WL⁴²⁹²¹^{16 (}²⁰⁰⁷⁾^.
³⁷^B^o^o^ker^a^t²⁶^{8 (}^a^pp^ly^ing^the^C^o^u^r^t’^s^hol^di^ng^{to a}^l^l^c^a^s^e^s^pe^nding^oⁿ^dir^e^c^t^r^e^vⁱ^e^w⁾^.
³⁸^Ibⁱ^d^.^S^o^m^e^co^u^r^t^s^{are req}^uⁱ^riⁿ^g^au^t^o^m^a^tⁱ^c^resen^t^en^ciⁿ^g^w^h^{ere a S}ⁱ^xt^h^Am^en^d^m^en^t^cl^ai^mⁱ^s^p^r^eserve^d^,^ei^t^h^{er i}ⁿ
^e^x^plic^it^Appr^eⁿ^di/^B^lak^e^l^y^te^r^m^s^or^by^c^onte^s^ting^a^ju^dicⁱ^a^l^e^nha^nc^e^m^eⁿ^{t on}^ot^he^r^g^r^ou^nds^.^Se^e^,^e^.^g^.,^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^v.^th^th
^Coffe^y^,³^{95 F.3}^d⁸⁵⁶⁽⁸^Cⁱ^r^.^J^aⁿ^21,²⁰⁰⁵⁾^;^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^State^s^v.^Da^vis^{, 3}⁹⁷^F.^3d³⁴^{0 (}⁶^Cⁱ^r^.^J^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^21,^th
²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^uⁿ^p^u^b^lis^he^d)^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^ate^s^v.^R^eese^,^{397 F.3}^d¹³³⁷⁽¹¹^Cⁱ^r^.^J^a^nua^r^y^{27, 2}⁰⁰⁵⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v.^Ha^rro^wer^{, no}^.^th
^04-⁴⁸^53,²⁰⁰⁵^W^L²²⁶¹⁶⁴⁽⁴^Cⁱ^r^.^J^a^nua^r^y^31,²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^uⁿ^p^u^b^lis^he^d)^{. O}^t^he^r^c^our^ts^ha^v^e^s^u^g^g^e^s^t^e^d^tha^t^e^v^eⁿ
^unp^r^e^s^e^r^v^e^d^B^ook^e^r^vⁱ^ola^tions⁽ⁱ^.^e^{., im}^pos^ing^m^a^nda^tor^y^e^nha^nc^em^eⁿ^ts^{on j}^udg^e^-^f^oun^{d f}^a^c^t^s⁾^a^l^w^a^y^s^am^{ount to}^plaⁱⁿ^th
^erro^{r w}^a^rran^tin^g^{a re}^m^aⁿ^d^f^o^{r resen}^t^en^cin^g^.^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v.^Hu^gh^es^,³^{96 F.3}^d³⁷⁴⁽⁴^Cⁱ^r^.^J^a^nua^r^y^24,
²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^f^indi^ngⁿ^o^p^l^aⁱ^{n e}^r^r^o^r^w^h^e^r^e^“^o^v^e^r^w^he^l^m^ing^”^e^v^ideⁿ^c^e^s^uppor^te^d^obs^tr^uc^tio^{n of}^jus^tic^e^eⁿ^haⁿ^c^em^eⁿ^t)^;^Unite^d^th
^State^s^v^.^Mⁱ^l^aⁿ^,³^{98 F.3}^d⁴⁴⁵⁽⁶^Cⁱ^r^.^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{10, 2}⁰⁰⁵⁾^.
³⁹^Colla^te^ra^{l re}^vⁱ^e^w^oc^c^u^{rs a}^f^te^r^fⁱ^na^{l judg}^m^e^{nt. For a}^disc^ussioⁿ^of^re^troa^c^tiv^it^y^{in c}^r^im^ina^l^la^w^,^se^e^{CRS Re}^port
^R^L³²⁶¹^3,^Staⁿ^d^a^r^d^s^F^o^r^Re^tr^o^a^c^tiv^e^Applic^ati^{on B}^a^s^e^{d U}^p^oⁿ^G^r^o^und^br^e^a^kⁱⁿ^g^Su^pr^e^m^e^C^our^{t D}^e^cⁱ^sⁱ^onsⁱⁿ^C^r^imⁱⁿ^al
^Law^,^b^y^P^a^u^l^S^t^aret^t^W^a^l^l^{ace Jr.}

decision in Schriro v. Summerlin,⁴⁰ may provide guidance on the point. Generally, the question of
retroactivity turns on whether the Court announced a new rule and whether the new rule is
substantive (in which case it may apply retroactively) or procedural (in which case it would not ⁴¹
apply retroactively unless it qualified as “watershed”). The Summerlin Court concluded that its
previous decision in Ring v. Arizona holding that “any increase in a defendant’s authorized
punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, including eligibility for the death penalty must be ⁴²
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt” cannot be treated as a new substantive rule, a rule ⁴³
that “alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes.” As such, the
Summerlin Court held that Ring is not retroactive on collateral review. In McReynolds v. United ⁴⁴
States, a lower court found that Booker, like Apprendi and Ring, must be treated as a procedural ⁴⁵
decision for purposes of retroactivity analysis. As such, the court concluded that Booker does
not apply retroactively to criminal cases that became final before its release on January 12, 2005.
Due to the severance of 18 U.S.C. §3553(b)(1) and 18 U.S.C. §3742(e)⁴⁶ district courts are not
bound to apply the guidelines. However, they must consult and consider the guidelines when ⁴⁷
sentencing. In addition, the Court preserved a right to appeal. A sentence that is outside the
guidelines-determined range is subject to reversal if it fails to meet a “reasonableness” standard, a
term the Court did not define. Some may contend that this lack of definition for
“unreasonableness” may signal a return to pre-guidelines. For example, Justice Scalia noted in his
dissent from the opinion’s second holding, “what I anticipate will happen is that
‘unreasonableness’ review will produce a discordant symphony of different standards, varying
from court to court and judge to judge.” Justice Breyer’s majority felt that the “reasonableness”
standard of review would not be a foreign concept to appellate courts as they have experience in
dealing with reviews of departures and reviews of sentences imposed in the absence of applicable
guidelines. As such, this majority feels that it is fair to assume that appellate judges will prove
capable of handling the task. However, subsequent to the Booker decision, circuits have been split ⁴⁸
as to the use of a presumption of reasonableness for within-guidelines sentences.

⁴⁰⁵⁴^{2 U}^.^S^.³⁴⁸⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^a^p^p^ly^ing^Appr^eⁿ^di’^s^p^rⁱⁿ^ci^p^l^{es t}^o^a^p^a^rtⁱ^c^u^l^a^r^su^b^j^ectⁱ^sⁿ^o^t^ret^r^o^actⁱ^v^{e o}ⁿ^co^l^l^at^eral^revi^e^w^).
⁴¹^I^b^id^a^t³^51-⁵²^{. A}^pr^oc^e^dur^a^l^de^cⁱ^sⁱ^{on m}^a^y^be^a^pplie^{d r}^e^tr^oa^c^tiv^e^l^y^if^{it e}^s^ta^blis^he^s^one^of^thos^e^r^a^r^e^“^w^a^t^e^r^s^h^e^d^r^u^le^s
^of^c^rⁱ^m^ina^l^pr^oc^e^d^ur^e^im^plic^a^ting^the^f^unda^m^e^nta^l^f^a^ir^ne^s^s^a^{nd a}^c^c^ur^a^c^y^of^the^c^r^im^ina^l^pr^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g.^{” Ib}ⁱ^d^.^at²⁵²²^.
⁴²^Rin^g^v.^Arizoⁿ^a^{, 5}³⁶^U^.^S.⁵⁸^4,⁶^{02 (}²⁰⁰²⁾^.
⁴³^S^u^mmerlin^a^t³^52.
⁴⁴³⁹⁷^F.^3d⁴⁷^{9 (}⁷^th^Cⁱ^r^.^J^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^{13, 20}⁰⁵⁾⁽^c^onc^l^udi^ng^tha^t^B^o^o^ker^do^{es n}^o^t^ap^pl^y^ret^r^o^actⁱ^v^el^y^t^o^cri^mⁱⁿ^al^cas^{es t}^h^at
^be^c^a^m^e^fⁱ^na^{l be}^f^o^r^e^its^r^e^le^a^s^e^{on J}^a^nua^r^y^{12, 2}⁰⁰⁵⁾^.
⁴⁵^S^{ee al}^so^,^V^a^re^{la v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^,⁴⁰⁰^F.^3d⁸⁶^{4 (}¹¹^th^{Cir. Fe}^br^ua^ry^17,²⁰⁰⁵^)(g^ra^nting^c^e^r^tif^ic^a^t^e^of^a^ppe^a^l^a^b^ility^{, bu}^t
^c^onc^lu^ding^t^h^a^t^a^lth^oug^h^ne^it^he^r¹¹^th^Cⁱ^r^c^uit^nor^Su^pr^e^m^e^C^our^{t h}^a^v^e^a^ddr^e^s^s^e^{d r}^e^tr^oa^c^tiv^it^y^of^B^l^a^kel^y^a^nd^B^o^o^ker^;
^al^so^st^atⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^at^U^.^S^.^S^u^p^r^em^{e Co}^u^r^t^case,^Sc^hir^o^v^.^S^u^m^m^e^r^lin^{, “}ⁱ^s^e^sse^ntia^ll^y^dispositiv^e^”^of^issue⁾^;^Hu^mp^h^r^{ess v.}^th
^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^,³⁹⁸^F.^3d⁸⁵^{5 (}⁶^Cⁱ^r^.^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{25, 2}⁰⁰⁵⁾^Kⁱ^{ng v}^.^J^e^te^r^{, 200}^{5 W}^L¹⁹⁵⁴⁴^{6 (}^N^.D^{. T}^e^x^.^J^a^nua^r^y^27,
²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^s^ta^ti^ng^tha^t^B^o^o^ker^{, lik}^e^B^l^a^kel^y^{, doe}^s^not^im^plic^a^t^e^pe^tition^e^{r’s c}^onv^ic^tion^f^o^{r a}^s^ubsta^ntiv^e^o^f^f^e^nse^,^a^{nd tha}^t
^Book^e^r^{is n}^o^{t re}^troa^c^tiv^e^w^h^eⁿ^fⁱ^{rst ra}^ise^d^on^c^o^lla^te^ra^{l re}^vⁱ^e^w^);^Tuttamore^v^.^Un^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, 2}⁰⁰⁵^W^L²³⁴³⁶⁸⁽^N^.D^.
^O^h^io^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{1, 2}⁰⁰⁵⁾^;^Un^ite^d^S^t^ate^s^v^.^Ce^ja^,²⁰⁰⁵^W^L³⁰⁰⁴¹⁵⁽^N^.D^{. I}^ll.^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{7, 2}⁰⁰⁵⁾^.
⁴⁶^Se^v^e^r^a^nc^e^of^this^s^e^c^{tion r}^eⁿ^d^e^r^s^ina^p^plic^a^b^le^§⁴⁰¹⁽^d⁾⁽¹⁾^of^the^P^r^os^e^c^u^torⁱ^a^l^R^e^m^e^die^s^a^{nd O}^t^he^r^T^ools^{to e}^{nd t}^h^e
^Ex^ploita^ti^on^of^C^h^ild^r^e^{n T}^oda^y^A^c^{t of}²⁰⁰^{3 (}^P^R^O^T^E^C^T^A^c^t)^{, P}^.^L^.¹⁰⁸^-²^{1, w}^h^ic^{h a}^d^de^{d a}^deⁿ^o^v^o^s^t^a^nda^r^d^of^r^e^vⁱ^ew
^f^o^r^de^pa^r^t^ur^e^s^f^r^om^the^s^e^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^g^u^ide^line^s^.
⁴⁷^J^u^s^tic^e^B^r^e^y^e^r^note^d^t^h^a^t^t^h^e^b^o^d^y^o^f^f^e^de^r^a^{l s}^e^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^a^ppe^lla^te^l^a^w^de^cⁱ^de^{d s}ⁱ^nc^e^the^g^u^ide^lⁱⁿ^e^s^’^a^dopt^io^{n r}^e^m^a^ins
^{in e}^f^fe^c^t^{to g}^u^ide^f^e^de^ra^{l c}^ourts.
⁴⁸^Co^m^p^are^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^a^t^{es v.}^Do^rcel^y^{, 45}^{4 F.}^3d³^66,³^{76 (}^D^.C^{. C}ⁱ^r^J^u^ly^{21, 20}⁰⁶⁾⁽^u^sⁱ^ng^pr^e^s^um^ption)^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^v^.
^Green^{, 43}^{6 F.}^3d⁴^49,⁴^{57 (}⁴^th^{Cir Feb}^r^u^a^ry⁶^,²⁰⁰⁶^)(sam^e);^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^v^.^Aloⁿ^z^o^,⁴^{35 F.3}^d⁵⁵^{1, 5}⁵⁴⁽⁵^th^Cir.^th
^J^a^nua^r^y^{09, 20}⁰⁶⁾⁽^s^a^m^e⁾^;^Unite^d^State^s^v^.^W^illi^ams^,⁴³^{6 F.}^3d⁷^06,⁷⁰⁸⁽⁶^Cⁱ^r^.^Janu^ar^y³¹^,²⁰⁰⁶⁾⁽^s^ame)^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^ate^s^th^th
^v.^Mykytⁱ^u^k^{, 415}^F.^3d⁶⁰^6,⁶⁰^{8 (}⁷^Cⁱ^r^.^J^u^ly^5,²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^s^a^m^e⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^v^.^Li^nc^olⁿ^,⁴¹^{3 F}^.³^d⁷¹⁶^,⁷¹^{7 (}⁸^{Cir. Ju}^ly
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

In Rita v. United States,⁴⁹ the Court provided some guidance on how appellate courts should
undertake the “reasonableness” review of a lower court’s sentencing decision. Mr. Rita was
convicted of perjury, making false statements, and obstructing justice. A pre-sentencing report
calculated the applicable guideline range of 33-41 months. After hearing sentencing arguments
from both sides, the judge imposed a sentence of 33 months. On appeal, the defendant argued that
his 33-month sentence was “unreasonable” because (1) it did not adequately take into account
“the defendant’s history and characteristics,” and (2) it “is greater than necessary to comply with
the purposes of the sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).” The Fourth Circuit stated that
a sentence imposed within properly calculated guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. As
such, the court rejected Mr. Rita’s arguments and upheld the sentence. The issue before the
Supreme Court was whether a presumption of reasonableness should apply to a sentence within
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Justice Breyer, writing for the Court,⁵⁰ held that an appellate court may view the Guideline range ⁵¹
as presumptively reasonable, although the presumption is non-binding. The plurality also
concluded that the guidelines are rightly owed a presumption of reasonableness as the guidelines
embody the culmination of an academic effort to craft ranges which accurately reflect the severity
of the charged conduct, while balancing statutory considerations and seeking uniformity and ⁵²
predictability in sentences. However, according to the Court, this presumption is applicable only ⁵³
on appellate review. As such, a sentencing judge is apparently forbidden from using a similar ⁵⁴
presumption that the guideline sentence is a correct or reasonable one. Rather, the sentencing
judge, after determining the guideline range, may decide that the guideline sentence
^s^h^{ould n}^o^{t appl}^y^,^perh^aps^bec^a^u^s^{e (a}^s^t^h^{e G}^u^ideliⁿ^es^t^h^e^m^s^e^lv^es^f^o^res^{ee) t}^h^{e ca}^s^e^at^h^aⁿ^d
^f^a^lls^ou^t^s^{ide t}^h^e^“h^eartlan^d^”^t^o^w^h^ic^h^t^h^e^C^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^teⁿ^d^sⁱⁿ^dividu^al^Gu^ideliⁿ^es^to
^apply^,^U.^{S.S.G. §5K2.0, perh}^aps^becau^s^e^t^h^{e G}^u^ideliⁿ^es^s^eⁿ^t^en^ce^its^e^l^{f f}^aⁱ^l^s^properl^y^to
^ref^l^{ect § 355}^3(a)^con^s^ideration^s^{, or pe}^rh^aps^th^{e cas}^e^w^a^rraⁿ^ts^a^dⁱ^f^f^e^r^eⁿ^t^s^eⁿ^t^en^c^e^r^e^g^a^r^d^l^e^s^s^.
^S^{ee R}^u^l^e^32(f⁾^{. T}^h^u^s^{, t}^h^e^s^eⁿ^t^eⁿ^ci^ng^cou^r^t^su^bj^ect^s^t^h^{e def}^eⁿ^d^an^t^’^s^s^eⁿ^t^eⁿ^{ce t}^o^t^h^{e t}^h^orough⁵⁵
^adv^e^rs^{arial tes}^tⁱⁿ^g^con^t^e^m^p^l^at^{ed by}^f^e^{deral s}^eⁿ^t^eⁿ^ciⁿ^g^procedu^r^e.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
⁵^,²⁰⁰⁵^)(sam^e);^an^d^Unite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Kristl^,⁴³^{7 F.}^3d¹⁰⁵⁰^,¹⁰^54-¹⁰^{54 (}¹⁰^th^Cⁱ^r^.^Fe^br^ua^r^y^17,²⁰⁰⁶⁾⁽^p^e^r^st
^cu^ri^am^)(s^a^m^e),^wⁱ^t^h^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es v.}^Ji^men^e^z-B^e^l^t^r^e^{, 440}^F.^3d⁵¹^4,⁵¹^{8 (}¹^Cⁱ^{r. March}⁹^,²⁰⁰⁶^{) (en}^b^aⁿ^c^{) (n}^o^t^u^sⁱⁿ^g^nd
^pr^e^s^um^ption)^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Fe^r^nan^de^z^,⁴⁴^{3 F}^.³^d¹⁹^,²⁷⁽²^Cⁱ^r^.^A^p^r^{il 3,}²⁰⁰⁶⁾⁽^s^a^m^e⁾^;^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es v.}^Co^op^er^{, 4}³⁷^rd^th
^F^.^3d³²^4,³³^{1 (}³^Cⁱ^r^.^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{14, 2}⁰⁰⁶⁾⁽^s^a^m^e⁾^{; a}^nd^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Tal^l^e^y^,⁴³¹^F.^3d⁷⁸^4,⁷⁸^{8 (}¹¹^Ci^r.^Decem^b^e^{r 2}^,
²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^p^{er cu}^ri^am^)(sa^m^e).
⁴⁹¹²^{7 S}^.^C^t^.²⁴^{56 (}²⁰⁰⁷⁾^.
⁵⁰^I^t^s^h^o^u^l^d^be^note^d^t^h^a^t^the^C^our^t^’^s^opi^nioⁿ^c^o^ns^is^te^d^of^f^our^pa^r^t^s^,^none^of^w^h^ic^{h r}^ecei^ved^{a m}^a^j^o^ri^t^y^vo^t^e^.^A^r^gu^ab^l^y^,
^eⁱ^g^h^{t jus}^tic^e^s^c^onc^ur^r^e^{d i}ⁿ^t^h^e^ju^d^g^m^e^{nt of}^the^C^our^t^w^{ith J}^u^s^tic^e^S^oute^r^be^ing^the^lo^ne^dis^s^e^nte^r^.
⁵¹¹²^{7 S}^.^C^t^{. a}^t²⁴⁶³⁽ⁿ^oting^t^h^a^t^by^the^tim^e^the^a^ppe^lla^te^c^our^{t r}^e^vⁱ^e^w^s^a^w^ithin-^g^uide^line^s^s^e^nteⁿ^c^e^,^bot^{h t}^h^e
^“^s^eⁿ^te^nc^ing^judg^e^aⁿ^{d the}^Se^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^Com^m^{ission w}^{ill ha}^v^e^re^a^c^he^{d the}^sa^m^e^c^onc^{lusion a}^s^t^o^t^h^e^p^r^ope^{r se}^nteⁿ^c^eⁱⁿ
^t^h^{e p}^a^rtⁱ^c^ul^{ar case.}^T^h^at^d^o^u^b^l^{e det}^e^r^mⁱⁿ^atⁱ^oⁿ^si^gnⁱ^fⁱ^can^t^l^yⁱⁿ^creas^{es t}^h^{e l}ⁱ^k^elⁱ^h^oo^d^t^h^at^t^h^{e sen}^t^en^ceⁱ^s^{a reaso}ⁿ^a^b^l^e
^one^.”⁾^.
⁵²^Id^.^a^t²⁴^66-⁶⁷^{. T}^h^e^pl^ura^lity^a^l^{so note}^d^t^h^a^t^{, a}^lth^oug^h^a^ppe^lla^te^c^o^{urts m}^a^y^pre^s^u^m^e^re^a^s^ona^ble^a^w^ithin-g^ui^de^li^ne
^sen^t^en^ce,^t^h^ey^m^a^yⁿ^o^t^p^r^esu^m^{e a}ⁿ^oⁿ^-^guⁱ^d^aⁿ^{ce sen}^t^en^{ce t}^o^b^e^un^reasoⁿ^a^b^l^e.
⁵³^Id^.^a^t²⁴⁶⁵^.
⁵⁴^Id^.⁽^s^ta^ti^ng^tha^t^“^t^he^s^e^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^c^our^t^doe^s^not^eⁿ^joy^the^be^ne^f^{it of}^a^le^g^a^{l pr}^e^s^um^{ption tha}^t^the^G^u^id^e^line^s^s^e^nteⁿ^c^e
^s^houl^{d a}^p^ply^.^”⁾^.
⁵⁵^Id^.^Iⁿ^addⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿ^,^Ju^stⁱ^{ce S}^t^even^{s’ co}ⁿ^c^u^rren^{ce app}^a^ren^t^l^y^assu^{res d}ⁱ^st^ri^ct^co^u^r^t^s^t^h^at^t^h^{e gu}ⁱ^d^elⁱⁿ^{es are t}^r^u^l^y^ad^vi^so^r^y^.
^Id^.^a^t²⁴^{73 (}^S^te^v^e^ns^{, J}^.^c^o^nc^ur^rⁱⁿ^g⁾^.

As such, the Court affirmed the broad sentencing discretion district judges posses under Booker
and stated that they may impose non-guideline sentences by departing or applying §3553(a).
However, the Court also stressed the importance of providing reasons for the sentencing ⁵⁶
decision. These reasons may be brief when a sentencing judge imposes a guideline sentence.
However, the sentencing judge must respond when a “party contests the Guidelines sentence
generally under §3553(a) - that is argues that the Guidelines reflect an unsound judgment, or, for
example, that they do not generally treat certain defendant characteristics in a proper way—or ⁵⁷
argues for departure[.]”
While the guidelines can be considered reasonable as a starting point for appellate review, the ⁵⁸
plurality cautions that this should not be interpreted to be obligatory. Justice Stevens, in a
concurrence signed by Justice Ginsburg in part, appears to pick up on this point and seeks to draw
a distinction between the process described in Rita and prior practices that were deemed ⁵⁹
unconstitutional in Apprendi and Booker. Justice Souter, the lone dissenter in the case, appears
to be concerned that affording the Guideline range a presumption of reasonableness moves the
federal sentencing system back in the direction of the prior mandatory scheme that was found ^th
unconstitutional in Booker, and is incongruous with the 6 Amendment protections outlined in ⁶⁰
Apprendi.
In the aftermath of this decision, it appears that, while it is permissible for appellate courts to
apply a non-binding presumption of reasonableness to within-guidelines sentences, questions
linger as to what factors the appellate courts may or should consider to overcome the
presumption. Moreover, given that the Court apparently approved only one method of reviewing
sentences, questions remain as to other methods the Court might approve and whether the
acceptable methods of appellate review apply in other instances where sentences are not within
guideline range.
In two recent decisions, Gall v. United States⁶¹ and Kimbrough v. United States,⁶² the Court
provided additional clarification to both sentencing and appellate courts as to crafting and

⁵⁶^Id^.^a^t²⁴⁶⁸^.
⁵⁷^Id^.
⁵⁸^Id^.^a^t²⁴⁶⁴⁽^s^ta^ting^t^h^a^t^a^“ⁿ^oⁿ^-^bⁱ^ndi^ng^a^ppe^lla^te^pr^e^s^um^ptio^{n t}^h^a^t^a^G^u^ide^line^s^is^r^e^a^s^ona^ble^doe^sⁿ^o^{t r}^e^q^u^ir^e^the
^sen^t^en^ciⁿ^g^j^u^d^g^{e t}^oⁱ^m^p^o^s^{e t}^h^at^s^eⁿ^t^en^ce.^”).
⁵⁹^Id^{. a}^t²⁴⁷³⁽^S^te^v^e^ns^{, J}^.^c^o^nc^ur^rⁱⁿ^g⁾⁽^s^ta^ting^tha^t
^B^o^o^ker’s^s^t^a^nda^r^d^of^r^e^vⁱ^ew^a^llow^s^—ⁱ^nde^e^d^{, r}^e^quir^e^s^—^dis^t^rⁱ^c^t^ju^dg^e^s^{to c}^onsⁱ^d^e^r^a^ll^of^the^f^a^c^t^or^s
^lis^te^{d in}^§³⁵⁵³⁽^a⁾^aⁿ^{d t}^o^a^p^ply^them^{to the}ⁱ^ndivⁱ^dua^l^de^f^e^nda^nts^b^e^f^o^r^e^them^{. A}^ppe^lla^te^c^our^ts
^m^u^s^t^theⁿ^gⁱ^v^e^de^f^e^r^e^nc^e^{to the}^s^e^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^de^cⁱ^sⁱ^ons^m^a^de^by^thos^e^judg^e^s^{, w}^h^e^t^he^r^the^r^e^s^u^l^ting
^se^nteⁿ^c^e^{is inside}^or^outsi^de^the^a^d^vⁱ^sory^G^u^ide^line^s^ra^ng^e^,^un^de^{r t}^r^a^d^itio^na^{l a}^b^use^-^of^-disc^r^e^tion
^p^rⁱⁿ^ci^p^l^es.^A^s^t^h^{e Co}^u^r^t^ackn^o^w^l^e^d^g^es,^m^o^reo^v^er,^p^r^esu^m^p^tⁱ^v^el^y^re^asoⁿ^a^b^l^{e do}^{es no}^t^m^ean^al^wa^y^s
^r^e^a^s^ona^ble^;^the^pr^e^s^um^ption^,^of^c^our^s^e^{, m}^u^s^t^be^g^e^nui^ne^ly^r^e^butta^b^l^e^.
⁶⁰^{Id. a}^t²⁴⁸⁷^(Ste^v^e^{ns, J.}^disse^ntin^g^)(sta^ting^tha^t
^{But if}^se^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^ju^dg^e^s^a^ttribu^t^e^d^su^bsta^ntia^{l g}^r^a^v^ita^tiona^l^pu^{ll t}^o^theⁿ^o^w^-^disc^re^tiona^ry
^G^u^ide^line^s^{, if}^the^y^tre^a^t^e^d^the^G^uⁱ^d^e^line^s^r^e^s^u^{lt a}^s^pe^r^s^ua^sⁱ^v^e^or^pr^e^s^um^ptiv^e^l^y^a^ppr^opr^ia^te^{, t}^h^e
^B^o^o^ker^rem^e^d^y^w^o^u^l^dⁱⁿ^p^r^actⁱ^cal^t^e^rm^{s p}^r^eser^{ve t}^h^{e ver}^y^feat^u^r^{e o}^f^t^h^{e G}^uⁱ^d^elⁱⁿ^{es t}^h^at^t^h^reat^en^ed
^{to tr}^iv^ia^liz^e^the^j^u^r^y^rⁱ^g^h^{t. For}^a^p^r^e^s^um^{ption of}^G^u^ide^line^s^r^e^a^s^ona^bleⁿ^e^s^s^w^{ould te}^{nd t}^o^pr^o^duc^e
^G^u^ide^line^s^se^nteⁿ^c^e^s^a^l^m^o^{st a}^s^re^g^u^la^rly^a^s^m^a^nda^tory^G^u^ide^line^s^ha^{d d}^one^,^w^{ith ju}^dg^e^s^fⁱ^nding
^t^h^{e f}^act^{s n}^eed^ed^f^o^{r a sen}^t^en^{ce i}ⁿ^an^u^p^p^e^{r sub}^r^an^ge.^T^hⁱ^s^w^o^u^l^d^o^p^en^t^h^e^d^o^o^r^t^o^un^d^e^rmⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g
^Appr^eⁿ^d^{i itse}^l^f^,^aⁿ^d^this^{is w}^h^a^t^h^a^{s ha}^ppe^ne^d^to^da^y^.
⁶¹²⁰^{07 W}^L⁴²⁹²¹¹^{6 (}²⁰⁰⁷⁾^.
⁶²²⁰^{07 W}^L⁴²⁹²⁰⁴^{0 (}²⁰⁰⁷⁾^.

reviewing sentences in a post-Booker regime. In Gall, the Court ruled that judges may deviate
from the guidelines without having to demonstrate that “extraordinary circumstances” required ⁶³
sentencing outside the guidelines. Gall, while in college, joined a criminal enterprise to sell ⁶⁴
“ecstasy”. Gall withdrew from the enterprise and obtained steady employment and ultimately ⁶⁵
became a successful entrepreneur. Approximately three years after withdrawing from the ⁶⁶
enterprise, Gall pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute ecstasy. The guideline range from this ⁶⁷
crime was imprisonment between 30 to 37 months. However, the sentencing judge gave him 36 ⁶⁸
months on probation, largely based on Gall’s most recent behavior. The Eighth Circuit reversed
the decision on the ground that a sentence outside the guidelines must be supported by ⁶⁹
“extraordinary circumstances.”
In a 7-2 decision, the Court disagreed and held that the acceptable method of appellate review for
all sentences, whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the guidelines range, was a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Justice Stevens writing for the majority rejected a
presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the guidelines range. As such, the
appellate court must first ensure that the sentencing court followed proper procedure to include
correctly calculating the guidelines range and considering the §3553(a) factors with appropriate ⁷⁰
explanation. The appellate court may consider the extent of any deviation from the guidelines
range. However, the appellate court “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that ⁷¹
the §3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” The fact that an appellate
court would have concluded a different sentence was more appropriate, “is insufficient to justify
reversal of the district court.”
Similarly, In Kimbrough v. United States, another 7-2 decision, the Court held that a sentence
outside the guidelines range is not per se unreasonable when it is based on a disagreement with ⁷²
the sentencing disparity for crack and powered cocaine offenses. In reaching its decision, the ⁷³
Court found that the cocaine guidelines, like all other guidelines, are only advisory. As such, the
cocaine guidelines are just one of the factors warranting consideration under §3553(a) when ⁷⁴
determining an appropriate sentence. Under relevant statutes, Kimbrough pleaded guilty to a
myriad of offenses including conspiracy to distribute crack and powder cocaine; possession with
intent to distribute more than 50 grams of crack; possession with intent to distribute powder; and ⁷⁵
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense. Kimbrough’s plea subjected
him to a minimum prison term of 15 years and a maximum of life. The applicable guidelines
range was 19 to 22.5 years. The district court judge found that a sentence within this range would

⁶³²⁰^{07 W}^L⁴²⁹²¹¹⁶^*⁷^-^10.
⁶⁴^Id^.^a^t^*²^.
⁶⁵^Id^.
⁶⁶^Id^{. a}^t^*³^.
⁶⁷^Id^.^a^t^*³^-4.
⁶⁸^Id^.
⁶⁹^Id^.^a^t^*⁶^.
⁷⁰^Id^.^a^t^*^12.
⁷¹^Id^.^a^t^*^12-^13.
⁷²²⁰^{07 W}^L⁴²⁹²⁰⁴^{0 a}^t^*¹^.
⁷³^Id^.^a^t^*^10-^11.
⁷⁴^Id^.
⁷⁵^Id^.^a^t^*⁵^.

have been greater than necessary to achieve the sentencing purposes of §3553(a).⁷⁶ In making its
determination, the district court took into account Kimbrough’s “history and characteristics” and ⁷⁷
also took exception with the relative treatment of crack and powdered cocaine.
As in Gall, the Court noted that the district court followed appropriate procedure by properly
calculating and considering the guidelines range. In addition, the district court addressed the
relevant §3553 factors in crafting its sentence. The Court noted that the district court “homed in
on the particular circumstances of Kimbrough’s case and accorded weight to the U.S. Sentencing
Commission’s consistent and emphatic position that the crack/powder disparity is at odds with ⁷⁸
§3553(a).” As such, the Court found that a reviewing court “could not rationally conclude that ⁷⁹
the ...reduction Kimbrough received qualified as an abuse of discretion.”
Taken together, these cases arguably provide federal district court judges some discretion in
crafting reasonable sentences, regardless of whether the sentence falls within or outside the
guidelines range. It would appear that judges have more flexibility in determining sentences in
drug cases as judges can disagree with the crack versus cocaine disparity. However, it should be
noted that this flexibility does not eliminate the mandatory minimums established by statute
under federal law.

Historically, the way in which convicted offenders are sentenced falls under one of two penal
policies—indeterminate and determinate sentences. Indeterminate sentencing practices were
predominant for several decades, leading up to the major reform efforts undertaken by many
states and the federal government in the mid-to late 1970s and early 1980s (see discussion in the
next section). Many states and the federal government have variations of determinate sentencing,
including sentencing guidelines. Some states, however, continue to operate under indeterminate
sentencing.
Early penal policy in the United States served the goals of retribution and punishment. Beginning
in 1870, however, rehabilitation became the focus of criminal sentencing, which led to the
adoption of an indeterminate sentencing system in the federal penal system. At the time,
indeterminate sentencing was seen as the preferred mechanism to rehabilitate offenders, which
was the stated goal of punishment. Under the federal indeterminate sentencing scheme, Congress
established the penalty range within which the judge imposed a sentence. Typically, after one-
third of the sentence was served, a parole board would determine if the offender had been
rehabilitated and could be released from prison and placed on parole.
Federal sentencing policy was reexamined by Congress in the early 1970s, and in 1973, a
proposal to revise the entire Federal Criminal Code was introduced, which ultimately included a ⁸⁰
reform of the federal sentencing system. It wasn’t until 1984, however, that Congress passed a

⁷⁶^Id^.
⁷⁷^Id^.
⁷⁸^Id^.^a^t^*^15.
⁷⁹^Id^.^T^h^is^de^cⁱ^sⁱ^on^doe^s^not^c^h^aⁿ^g^e^the^s^t^a^t^ut^or^y^100:^{1 r}^a^ti^{o u}^nde^r^f^e^de^r^a^{l la}^w^.
⁸⁰^T^h^e^C^r^im^ina^l^J^u^s^tic^e^C^odifⁱ^c^a^{tion, R}^e^vⁱ^sⁱ^on^a^{nd R}^e^f^o^r^m^A^c^{t (}^S^{. 1}⁾^w^a^s^a^pr^oduc^{t of}^the^m^o^v^e^m^e^{nt to r}^e^vⁱ^s^e^the
^Fe^de^ra^{l Crim}^ina^l^Code^t^h^a^t^be^g^aⁿⁱⁿ¹⁹^{52 w}^{ith t}^h^e^dra^f^ting^of^a^Mo^de^l^P^e^na^{l C}^ode^by^the^Am^e^r^ic^aⁿ^L^a^w^Institute
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

sentencing reform measure, which abolished indeterminate sentencing at the federal level and
created a determinate sentencing structure through the federal sentencing guidelines (see
discussion below).
As stated previously, federal sentencing was indeterminate throughout much of the 20^th century.
Defendants sentenced under an indeterminate sentencing scheme do not know the length of time
they will serve. At the federal level, primary control over sentencing rested with the district court.
With few exceptions, Congress provided only maximum terms of incarceration for federal crimes,
while judges set the minimum sentence in individual cases, and the U.S. Parole Board decided
when the offender was released. At the state level, a range of sentences for a particular crime is
established according to statute (e.g., 12 to 20 years) and a judge would sentence the defendant to
that range. The precise amount of time an offender serves, however, is left to prison officials,
usually a parole board. Sentences were indeterminate because the actual length of time that would
be served could not be determined at the time of sentencing.
Indeterminate sentencing, once viewed as a major reform designed to individualize the treatment
of offenders and facilitate rehabilitation, came under attack because it was perceived as
promoting unwarranted disparity in sentences as well as uncertainty of punishment. Critics
contended that the unlimited judicial discretion, without documented justification and review by ⁸¹
an appellate court produced sentencing disparities.
The perceived failure of the indeterminate system to “cure” the criminal (usually measured by
recidivism rates), coupled with renewed concern about rising crime rates throughout the nation in
the mid-1970s, resulted in experimentation with sentencing systems by several states and the
creation of sentencing guidelines at the federal level. Despite these developments, however,
indeterminate sentencing remains “the predominate sentencing structure for most states ...
although these laws are becoming increasingly determinate in structure ... by greater use of
mandatory minimums, truth in sentencing provisions, and reduction in the amount of good time ⁸²
credits an inmate can earn while incarcerated.”

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^(Institute^).^T^h^a^t^d^o^c^u^m^e^{nt w}^a^{s re}^fine^d^duriⁿ^g^the^f^o^llowⁱ^ng¹⁰^y^e^a^r^{s, a}^{nd i}ⁿ¹⁹⁶²^the^Iⁿ^stitute^pu^blis^he^{d a}^“^P^ro^pose^d
^O^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^D^r^af^t^”^of^a^Mode^l^P^e^na^l^C^ode^{. I}ⁿ¹⁹⁶⁶^{, C}^ong^r^e^s^s^c^r^e^a^t^e^d^a^N^a^tiona^{l C}^o^m^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^{on on R}^e^f^o^r^m^o^f^Fe^de^r^a^l
^C^r^im^ina^l^Law^s⁽^t^he^B^r^ow^{n C}^o^m^m^issⁱ^on)^aⁿ^{d m}^a^nda^te^{d tha}^tⁱ^t^s^t^u^d^y^a^{nd r}^e^vⁱ^ew^U^.^{S. s}^t^a^t^utor^y^a^nd^c^a^s^e^law^a^{nd m}^a^k^e
^re^c^o^m^m^e^nda^{tions f}^o^{r its im}^prov^e^m^eⁿ^{t. T}^h^e^Brow^{n Com}^m^issi^{on’s re}^{port w}^a^{s tra}ⁿ^sm^itte^{d to Cong}^re^{ss a}^{nd t}^h^e^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^t
^{in 1}⁹⁷¹ⁱⁿ^t^h^e^f^o^r^m^of^a^“w^or^k^ba^sⁱ^s^,^”^f^r^o^m^w^h^ic^{h S.}^{1 w}^a^s^de^rⁱ^v^e^{d. Se}^e^U^.^{S. C}^ong^r^e^s^s^,^Se^na^te^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on the}^th^st
^Ju^dⁱ^ci^ary^,^C^r^im^{inal C}^o^de^Re^for^m^Ac^t^{of 19}⁷⁷^{, R}^e^p^o^r^t^on^S.¹⁴³⁷^,⁹⁵^Cong^.,¹^s^e^s^s^.,^S.Re^pt.⁹⁵^-6⁰⁵^{, pa}^rt^I
⁽^W^a^s^hing^{ton: G}^o^v^t^.^P^rⁱⁿ^{t. O}^f^f^{., 1977}⁾^p^p^.^10-¹⁵^.
⁸¹^S^{ee f}^o^{r exa}^m^p^l^e,^M^a^rviⁿ^E^.^F^r^ankel^,^C^r^im^inal^Se^nteⁿ^c^e^s^:^L^a^w^Wⁱ^t^hou^{t O}^r^de^r^(N^e^w^Y^o^rk^{: H}^{ill a}^nd^W^a^ng^{, 1973)}^;
^R^e^por^t^of^the^T^w^eⁿ^tie^{th C}^e^ntu^r^y^Fun^d^{, T}^a^s^k^For^c^e^{on C}^r^im^ina^l^Se^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^,^F^a^ir^an^{d C}^e^r^t^ai^{n P}^unis^h^m^e^nt^(New^Yo^rk^:
^Mc^G^r^a^w^{-Hill Book}^Com^p^aⁿ^y^,¹⁹^{76); a}^{nd A}^ndre^w^V^o^{n Hirsc}^h^,^D^o^{ing J}^u^s^tic^e^,^The^C^h^oⁱ^c^e^{of P}^unis^h^m^e^nts^(New^Yo^rk^:
^{Hill a}ⁿ^d^W^a^ng^{, 197}^6).
⁸²^U.^S^.^Dep^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^Ju^stⁱ^ce,^Offⁱ^{ce o}^f^Ju^stⁱ^{ce P}^r^o^g^ram^s^,^Bu^reau^o^f^Ju^stⁱ^{ce A}^ssi^st^an^ce,^{1996 N}^a^ti^on^a^l^Sur^{vey o}^f^S^t^a^t^e
^Se^nteⁿ^cⁱⁿ^g^Str^u^c^t^ur^e^s^,^BJA^M^o^no^grap^h^,^p^p^.^xi^an^{d 18}^.^A^cco^rdⁱⁿ^g^t^o^{a 19}⁹⁶^{DOJ BJA}^rep^o^r^t^,³⁶^st^at^{es an}^d^t^h^{e Di}^st^ri^ct
^o^f^Co^l^u^m^bⁱ^a^h^a^d^at^t^h^at^tⁱ^m^{e an}ⁱⁿ^d^e^t^e^rmⁱⁿ^at^{e sen}^t^en^ciⁿ^g^st^ru^ct^u^r^e^.

Prior to many states and the federal government adopting sentencing guidelines and other forms
of sentencing policies, the only alternative to indeterminate sentencing was determinate or
“fixed” sentencing. As sentencing policy evolved, so did the scope of determinate sentencing. For
example, beginning in the 1970s and continuing into the 1990s, Congress and many states passed
legislation that revised sentencing laws and required, in many cases, the mandatory imprisonment
of offenders for committing certain types of crimes. In many instances, such legislation required a
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. In addition to mandatory minimum laws, Congress
and several states passed legislation that created sentencing commissions charged with
establishing sentencing guidelines. Congress and some states also passed “three-strikes”
provisions, which usually required a life sentence after the third strike and truth-in-sentencing
measures, which required an offender to serve a large percentage of his or her sentence.
Many of the current sentencing alternatives to indeterminate sentencing are variations of
determinate sentencing. There are usually explicit standards specifying the amount of punishment
and a set release date that is not subject to review by an administrative body (i.e., a parole board).
Under determinate sentencing, however, time served can be reduced by good time or earned time.
Both indeterminate and determinate sentencing practices have been criticized by many who
believe that such practices lead to abuse by criminal justice officials and unwarranted disparities
in sentences. Critics of both penal policies contend that such sentences give way to a nonuniform
application of sentences across jurisdictions. With respect to determinate sentences, for example,
judges sentence offenders to a fixed period based on statute, which some contend does not take
into consideration individual offender characteristics. Indeterminate sentencing practices, on the
other hand, lead to disparities due to the potential for “two defendants committing the same crime
under similar circumstances receiving very different sentences depending on a particular judge’s ⁸³
sentencing idiosyncrasies.”

In 1984, Congress passed legislation that led to the creation of federal sentencing guidelines. The
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Chapter II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984;
P.L. 98-473), in essence, eliminated indeterminate sentencing at the federal level. The act created
the United States Sentencing Commission, an independent body within the judicial branch of the
federal government and charged it with promulgating guidelines for federal sentencing. The
purpose of the Commission was to examine unwarranted disparity in federal sentencing policy, ⁸⁴
among other things. In establishing sentencing guidelines for federal judges, the Commission
took into consideration factors such as (1) the nature and degree of harm caused by the offense;
(2) the offender’s prior record; (3) public views of the gravity of the offense; (4) the deterrent ⁸⁵
effect of a particular sentence; and (5) aggravating or mitigating circumstances. In addition to
these factors, the Commission also considered characteristics of the offender, such as age,

⁸³^Ameri^can^{Bar Asso}^ci^atⁱ^oⁿ^,^Ju^stⁱ^{ce Ken}ⁿ^e^d^y^Co^mmi^ssi^oⁿ^,^Re^p^o^r^t^w^{ith Re}^c^o^m^m^eⁿ^dati^ons^{to t}^h^e^AB^{A H}^ous^e^of
^D^e^le^gate^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t²⁰^04,^p.¹⁴^.
⁸⁴^T^h^e^C^o^m^m^issⁱ^{on w}^a^s^a^l^s^o^m^a^nda^te^{d to e}^x^a^m^ine^the^e^f^f^e^c^t^s^of^s^eⁿ^t^eⁿ^cⁱ^ng^po^lic^y^upon^pr^is^oⁿ^r^e^s^o^ur^c^e^s⁽^e^.g^.,
^ov^e^r^c^r^ow^ding⁾^a^{nd the}^us^e^of^ple^a^ba^r^g^aⁱ^ningⁱⁿ^the^f^e^de^r^a^{l c}^r^im^ina^l^jus^tic^e^s^y^s^t^em^.
⁸⁵^S^{ee 1}⁸^U^.^S^.^C^.^§9⁹⁴⁽^c⁾^.

education, vocational skills, and mental or emotional state, among other things.⁸⁶ Prior to the
recent Supreme Court ruling, the guidelines were binding, and they were also subjected to
congressional directives and mandatory minimum penalties for specific offenses set by ⁸⁷
Congress.
In summary, the Sentencing Reform Act reformed the federal sentencing system in the following
ways:
• It abandoned one of the traditional goals of punishment, rehabilitation, and
asserted the following goals: retribution, education, deterrence and ⁸⁸
incapacitation.
• It consolidated the power that had been exercised by judges and the U.S. Parole
Board to decide the type of punishment and its length by abolishing paroles and
creating the U.S. Sentencing Commission and charging it with establishing ⁸⁹
sentencing guidelines.
• It made all federal sentences determinate.⁹⁰
• It authorized appellate review of sentences in which the judge departed from the ⁹¹⁹²
guidelines and review of other sentences under certain circumstances.

Sentencing guidelines can be presumptive, statutory, advisory or voluntary. The most notable of
these are the presumptive sentencing guidelines, which had been in place at the federal level at
the time of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Booker.
Prior to the Court’s ruling in Booker, the federal sentencing guidelines were characterized as
being presumptive, rather than statutory, advisory or voluntary. Presumptive sentencing
guidelines are contained in or based on legislation, which are adopted by a legislatively created
body, usually a sentencing commission. Presumptive sentencing guidelines set a range of
penalties for an offense that is based on the seriousness of the offense and the defendant’s ⁹³
criminal history. “The guidelines are presumptive in the sense that they set sentencing standards

⁸⁶^S^{ee 1}⁸^U^.^S^.^C^.^§9⁹⁴⁽^d⁾^.
⁸⁷^M^aⁿ^d^a^t^o^ry^mⁱⁿⁱ^m^u^m^s^eⁿ^t^en^ciⁿ^g^l^a^w^s^{are sep}^a^rat^e^f^r^o^m^t^h^{e f}^e^d^e^ral^sen^t^en^ciⁿ^g^guⁱ^d^elⁱⁿ^es.^{Over t}^h^{e years,}^Coⁿ^g^ress
^ha^{s dire}^c^t^e^d^t^h^e^U.S.^Se^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^Com^m^{ission to i}ⁿ^te^g^r^a^t^e^m^a^nda^tory^mⁱⁿⁱ^m^u^m^pe^na^ltie^{s it ha}^{s pa}^sse^{d in}^{to t}^h^e^f^e^de^ra^l
^s^e^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^g^u^ide^lⁱⁿ^e^s^{. Ex}^a^m^ple^s^of^f^e^de^r^a^{l m}^a^nda^tor^y^mⁱⁿⁱ^m^u^m^senteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^la^w^s^inc^l^ude^t^h^e¹⁹⁸⁶^aⁿ^{d 1}⁹⁸⁸^Aⁿ^ti-^D^r^ug
^A^buse^A^c^{ts (P}^.L^{. 9}⁹^-5^{70 a}^nd^P.L^.¹⁰^0-6⁹⁰⁾^{. In}^a^ddi^tio^{n t}^o^m^a^nda^to^ry^mⁱⁿⁱ^m^u^m^pe^na^ltie^{s f}^o^{r c}^e^r^ta^{in drug}^vⁱ^ola^tⁱ^ons,
^Cong^re^{ss ha}^{s pa}^sse^{d m}^a^nda^tory^mⁱⁿⁱ^m^u^m^pe^na^ltie^{s f}^o^{r c}^e^r^ta^{in g}^{un v}ⁱ^ola^tⁱ^{ons a}ⁿ^{d se}^x^of^f^e^nse^s^.
⁸⁸^Se^e^{28 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁹⁹⁴⁽^k⁾^a^nd¹⁸^U^.^S.C^.^§³⁵⁵³⁽^a⁾⁹²⁾^.
⁸⁹^S^{ee 2}⁸^U^.^S^.^C^.^§9⁹¹^,⁹⁹⁴^an^{d 99}⁵⁽^a)⁹¹⁾^.
⁹⁰^Se^e^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§³⁶²⁴⁽^a⁾^{, (}^b⁾^.
⁹¹^Se^e^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§³⁷⁴²⁽^e⁾^.
⁹²^Se^e^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§³⁷⁴²⁽^a⁾^{, (}^b⁾^.
⁹³^A^t^t^h^{e f}^e^d^e^ral^l^e^v^e^l^,^an^ap^p^lⁱ^cab^l^e^sen^t^en^ciⁿ^g^guⁱ^d^elⁱⁿ^{e h}^a^{s b}^{een desi}^gn^at^ed^f^o^{r each}^o^f^t^h^{e m}^o^re^f^r^e^q^u^eⁿ^t^l^y
^pr^os^e^c^u^te^{d f}^e^de^r^a^{l c}^r^im^e^s^.^T^h^e^g^u^ide^line^be^gⁱ^ns^by^a^s^sⁱ^gⁿ^ing^a^ba^s^e^of^f^e^ns^e^le^v^e^{l (}^t^he^r^e^a^r^e^{43 of}^f^e^nse^le^v^e^ls⁾^.^For
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

for individual cases that were presumed to be appropriate and that judges were expected to ⁹⁴
follow” unless they documented the reasons for departing. At the federal level, after the
guidelines have been adopted by the sentencing commission they are submitted to Congress and
they become effective, barring other congressional action. While judges were required to adhere
to the guidelines, they could depart from them. Departures under presumptive sentencing
guidelines, however, are subject to appellate review.
Statutory sentencing guidelines are created by a legislative body. Statutory sentencing guidelines
are sometimes confused with presumptive sentencing guidelines. While both types of guidelines
are ultimately authorized by a legislative body, statutory sentencing guidelines are directly
authorized by a legislative body, while presumptive sentencing guidelines are established by a
sentencing commission that is usually legislatively created.
The Booker ruling now makes the federal sentencing guidelines advisory. Under an advisory or
voluntary sentencing guideline scheme, judges are not required to follow the sentences set forth
in the guidelines but can use them as a reference.
According to the National Center for State Courts, 23 states and the District of Columbia have ⁹⁵
implemented presumptive, statutory, or voluntary/advisory sentencing guidelines. Some states,
however, may only have presumptive sentencing guidelines that are applicable to specific
offenses (e.g., certain felonies). Unlike the federal system, states that have adopted presumptive
sentencing guidelines generally do not have enhancement factors built into the guidelines’
structure.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^e^x^am^ple^,^the^g^u^ide^line^f^o^r^a^t^h^e^f^{t of}^f^e^ns^e^,^U^.^S.S.G^.^§2B^1.1^,^ha^s^a^b^a^s^e^of^f^e^ns^e^lev^e^{l of}^{6. O}^f^f^e^ns^e^leve^{l a}^d^jus^t^m^e^nts^a^r^e
^av^ailab^l^{e to}^acco^mm^o^d^a^{te a}^g^g^r^a^v^atin^g^aⁿ^d^m^itig^atin^g^circu^m^stan^c^e^s^asso^ciated^w^ith^{a p}^a^rticu^l^{ar case. T}^h^{e th}^ef^t
^g^u^ide^line^ha^s^of^f^e^ns^e^lev^e^{l inc}^r^e^a^s^e^s^f^o^r^the^am^ount^of^m^one^y^inv^o^lv^e^d^{, the}^a^m^ount^of^plaⁿⁿⁱ^ng^tha^t^w^e^{nt into t}^h^e
^of^f^e^ns^e^,^a^{nd the}^na^tur^e^of^the^pr^o^p^e^r^ty^ta^ke^{n, a}^m^ong^othe^r^thiⁿ^g^s^.^T^h^e^fⁱ^na^{l of}^f^e^ns^e^lev^e^{l dic}^t^a^t^e^s^a^ba^nd^of^sⁱ^x^s^e^nteⁿ^c^e
^r^a^ng^e^s^{, ba}^s^e^{d on}^the^of^f^e^nde^r^’^s^c^r^im^ina^l^his^t^or^y^.^T^h^e^s^e^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^r^a^ng^e^f^o^r^the^f^{t a}^t^the^ba^s^e^of^f^e^ns^e^le^v^e^{l of}^{6 f}^o^r^a^fⁱ^r^s^t
^tim^e^o^f^f^e^nde^r^is^0-⁶^m^onths^{; t}^h^a^t^is^{, a}^b^s^e^{nt a}^de^pa^r^t^ur^e^,^a^s^eⁿ^t^eⁿ^cⁱⁿ^g^c^our^{t m}^a^yⁱ^m^pos^e^a^s^e^nteⁿ^c^e^of^im^pr^is^onm^eⁿ^{t a}^t
^aⁿ^y^te^r^m^{up to s}ⁱ^x^m^onths^o^r^sⁱ^m^p^lyⁱ^m^pos^e^a^fⁱ^ne^{. T}^h^e^s^e^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^r^a^ng^e^f^o^r^aⁿ^of^f^e^ns^e^le^v^e^{l of}^{6 in}^the^c^a^s^e^of^a^r^e^pe^a^t
^of^f^e^nde^r^w^{ith m}^o^r^e^thaⁿ^f^our^prⁱ^o^r^f^e^lony^c^onv^ic^tions^is¹²^-¹^{8 m}^onths^{; t}^h^a^t^is^{, a}^b^s^eⁿ^t^a^de^pa^r^t^ur^e^,^a^s^e^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^c^our^t
^m^u^stⁱ^m^p^o^s^{e a sen}^t^en^{ce b}^e^t^w^een^a^y^{ear an}^d^{a year-an}^d^-^a-h^a^l^f^.
⁹⁴^Mⁱ^ch^ael^T^o^rn^y^an^d^Kat^h^l^een^Hat^l^est^a^d^,^ed^s.^,^Se^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^Re^for^mⁱⁿ^O^v^e^r^c^r^ow^de^{d Tim}^e^s^(New^Yo^rk^:^Ox^f^o^rd
^Uⁿ^iv^e^r^sⁱ^t^y^P^r^e^s^s^,¹⁹⁹⁷⁾^,^pp.^7-^8.
⁹⁵^T^h^e^{23 s}^t^a^t^e^s^inc^l^ude^A^K^{, A}^R^{, D}^E^{, IN}^{, K}^A^{, LA}^{, MD}^{, MI, MN}^{, M}^O^{, N}^C^{, N}^J^{, O}^H^,^O^R^,^P^A^{, RI,}^SC,^T^N^{, U}^T^{, V}^A^,
^VT^{, W}^A^a^{nd W}^I^{. Se}^e^N^a^tiona^{l C}^e^nte^r^f^o^r^Sta^t^e^C^our^ts^,^B^l^a^kel^y^v.^W^a^s^h^ing^t^oⁿ^:^I^m^pl^ic^ati^ons^f^o^r^S^t^at^e^C^our^ts^{, J}^u^ly^16,
²⁰⁰^{4, A}^ppe^ndix^E.

Departures from the sentencing guidelines in the federal system can take three forms: substantial
assistance departures, other downward departures and upward departures. Substantial assistance
departures are a form of downward departures and occur when a defendant provides substantial
assistance to the prosecution. Of the three types of departures, upward departures are used least
often and substantial assistance departures are used most often. While departures are available for
judges, the guidelines explicitly prescribe when a judge can depart from the guidelines. As the
Supreme Court asserted in the Booker ruling, “... departures are not available in every case, and in
fact are unavailable in most. In most cases, as a matter of law, the Commission will have ⁹⁶
adequately taken all relevant factors into account, and no departure will be legally permissible.”
Prior to the Booker decision, Congress weighed in on the issue of downward departures in the ^th

108 Congress when an amendment to the PROTECT Act was passed that restricted the grounds ⁹⁷

upon which a federal judge could apply a downward departures. Among other things, the
amendment struck language in current law (18 U.S.C. §3742(e)) that required appellate courts to
“give due deference to the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts” with respect
to departures and in cases wherein the district court failed to provide a written statement of ⁹⁸
reasons for the sentence.
As previously discussed, the Booker case had an impact on federal judges’ use of departures in
sentencing defendants. The Blakely case, albeit indirectly, also had an impact on federal judges’
sentencing behavior. Although the Blakely case pertained to Washington State’s sentencing ⁹⁹
guidelines, federal judges weighed in on the implications Blakely’s decision had on federal
sentencing.
The majority of federal sentences are handed down under the guidelines, with approximately 1% ¹⁰⁰
of federal sentences falling outside the guideline’s jurisdiction. The following figures (Figures
1 and 2) depict aggregate departure data pre-and post-Booker (2002 and 2006). As previously
mentioned, Blakely also had an impact on federal judges’ sentencing behavior. However, the
decision was handed down on June 24, 2004, less than seven months prior to the Booker decision.
As a result, there is not a complete year of data for which CRS could provide analysis on the
Blakely decision. Therefore, this section analyzes data pre- and post-Booker (2003 and 2006).
As Figure 1 shows, the majority of pre-Booker departures were downward departures. The
majority of the downward departures occurred due to the defendant providing substantial
assistance to the prosecution or the judge finding mitigating factors, which in both cases would
necessitate a downward departure. In 2003, federal judges departed from the sentencing
guidelines 29.7% of the time, of which less than 1% of the departures were upward departures.

⁹⁶^U.^S^.^v.^B^o^o^ker^,^{73 U}^.^S.L^.^W^.³⁰⁷⁷⁽²⁰⁰⁴⁾^,^p.¹⁰^.
⁹⁷^P^r^os^e^c^u^torⁱ^a^l^R^e^m^e^die^s^a^{nd T}^ool^s^A^g^aⁱ^ns^{t the}^Ex^plo^ita^tioⁿ^of^C^h^il^dr^eⁿ^T^oda^y⁽^P^R^O^T^E^C^T⁾^A^c^{t of}²⁰⁰³⁽^P^.L^{. 1}^08-
²¹⁾^.
⁹⁸^For^a^dditi^ona^l^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion, s}^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^t^R^L³¹⁹¹⁷^,^T^h^{e P}^R^O^T^E^CT⁽^A^mb^{er A}^l^ert⁾^A^c^t^aⁿ^d^t^h^{e S}^e^nt^en^ciⁿ^g
^Guⁱ^d^elⁱⁿ^es^,^b^y^Ch^arl^e^{s Do}^y^l^e.
⁹⁹^A^s^pr^e^v^ious^l^y^dis^c^us^s^e^{d, in}^Blak^e^l^y^,^t^h^{e Cou}^r^t^d^eci^d^e^d^t^h^at^t^h^{e j}^udi^ci^al^ap^p^lⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^{a sen}^t^en^ciⁿ^g^en^h^aⁿ^cem^en^t
^unde^r^the^W^a^s^h^ing^t^oⁿ^s^t^a^t^e^’^s^s^e^nt^eⁿ^cⁱ^ng^g^u^ide^line^s^vⁱ^o^l^a^t^e^d^a^de^f^e^nda^nt’^s^Six^t^{h A}^m^e^ndm^eⁿ^{t r}ⁱ^g^h^{t t}^o^a^jur^y^tr^ia^l.
¹⁰⁰^{For e}^x^a^m^ple^,^de^f^e^nda^nts^w^{ho a}^r^e^f^ound^g^u^ilty^of^aⁿ^A^c^{t of}^Cong^re^s^s^a^pplic^a^b^le^e^x^c^l^us^iv^e^l^y^{in the}^Dⁱ^s^t^ric^t^of
^C^o^lum^b^ia^a^nd^de^f^e^nda^nts^c^onv^ic^t^e^{d of}^pe^tty^c^rⁱ^m^e^s^a^r^e^{not s}^e^nteⁿ^c^e^{d un}^de^r^t^h^e^g^u^ide^lⁱⁿ^e^s^.

These figures have remained relatively constant for the years preceding 2003.¹⁰¹ Since the Booker
decision, however, the percentage of sentences that fell within the guideline range has dropped,
while the percentages for both upward and downward departures have increased, as discussed
below.
Figure 1. Federal Sentences Under the Guidelines, 2003 (Pre-Booker)
^Source:^{CRS prese}^{ntation of fed}^{eral senten}^{cing data.}
Figure 2 depicts a similar picture as in Figure 1 with respect to the majority of sentences falling
within the guideline range. However, there were some variances. In 2006 (post-Booker), there
was an almost 8% drop of federal judges sentencing within the guideline range. As a result, both
downward and upward departures increased by almost 7% and 1%, respectively. In order to fully
understand the changes in federal judicial sentencing practices post-Booker, one would need to
take a more nuance examination of the data at the district and circuit court level.

¹⁰¹^S^{ee Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es S}^eⁿ^t^en^ciⁿ^g^Commi^ssi^oⁿ^,^S^our^c^e^b^o^o^k^o^f^Fe^de^r^a^l^Se^nteⁿ^cⁱ^ng^St^atis^tic^s^,⁽¹⁹⁹⁹^,²⁰⁰⁰^,²⁰⁰¹^and
²⁰⁰²⁾^,^T^a^ble^26.

Figure 2. Federal Sentences Under the Guidelines, 2006 (Post-Booker)
^Source:^{CRS prese}^{ntation of fed}^{eral senten}^{cing data.}
In both years examined, the data revealed that the vast majority of departures were downward
departures. While proponents view downward departures as necessary in a structured system
because their use allows judges to individualize sentences, critics argue that the frequent use of
downward departures is a mechanism for judges to circumvent the limits imposed on them
through the sentencing guidelines. Moreover, such critics argue that departures should be
eliminated because they produce unwarranted disparity. Unlike the structure that exists with the
prescribed sentencing ranges in the guidelines, departures provide an opportunity for judges to
sentence outside that range. Critics contend that permitting a judge to sentence outside the
specified range could be problematic because judges could potentially increase or decrease a
defendant’s sentence substantially, depending on the circumstances. Departures, however, are not
always viewed as a negative tool. Some view departures as a mechanism for judges to tailor a
sentence that reflects the totality of circumstances regarding an offender and the offense.

In light of the Court’s ruling in Booker and its subsequent rulings in Gall and Kimrough, the issue
for Congress is whether to amend current law to require federal judges to follow guided
sentences, or continue to permit federal judges to use their discretion in sentencing, under certain
circumstances. Following is a discussion and analysis of several selected options Congress could
consider.
One option Congress may wish to consider could be to maintain the sentencing guidelines by
specifying mandatory minimum sentences and increasing the top of each guideline range to a
statutory maximum for specified offenses (hence, codify specified sentencing ranges that are in
the guidelines). In essence, this option would require any upward departures to coincide with the
statutory maximum for the offense in question, in which case a statutory maximum would have to
be specified. This option was first presented to the U.S. Sentencing Commission shortly after the

U.S. Supreme Court decision in Blakely by Frank Bowman, who concluded with respect to such
an option:
^T^h^{e practical ef}^f^{ect o}^f^s^u^c^h^aⁿ^a^m^en^d^m^ent^w^o^u^l^{d be to pres}^erv^e^c^u^rren^t^f^e^{deral practice}
^al^m^o^st^uⁿ^c^h^aⁿ^g^e^d^.^Gu^id^eliⁿ^{es f}^acto^r^s^w^o^u^l^dⁿ^o^{t b}^e^ele^m^eⁿ^{ts. T}^h^e^y^co^u^l^d^still
^con^s^tit^u^tioⁿ^a^ll^y^{be deter}^mⁱⁿ^e^d^by^pos^t-^coⁿ^vⁱ^c^tion^j^u^dicial^fⁱⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^s^of^f^{act.... T}^h^{e on}^ly
^th^{eoretical diff}^eren^ce^w^{ould be th}^{at j}^u^dg^es^co^u^l^{d s}^eⁿ^t^eⁿ^{ce def}^eⁿ^d^aⁿ^t^s^abov^{e t}^h^{e t}^{op of}^t^h^e¹⁰²
^cu^rren^t^gu^ideliⁿ^{e rang}^es^wⁱ^th^o^u^{t th}^e^f^o^r^m^al^it^y^o^f^an^u^p^w^a^{rd departu}^r^e....
Congress could consider a measure that has been implemented in Kansas. Kansas had ¹⁰³
presumptive sentencing guidelines that were invalidated by the state’s supreme court. In
response to the court ruling, the state’s legislature chose to retain the sentencing structure by ¹⁰⁴
incorporating jury fact-finding as the basis for enhanced sentences. Under this scheme, for each
enhancement that would increase the sentence beyond the guideline maximum for which the
defendant did not waive his or her rights, the judge has the option of trying aggravating factors
before the jury, either during the main trial or in a separate, bifurcated proceeding. The jury would
have to find that the enhanced factors exist beyond a reasonable doubt in order for the enhanced
sentence to be applicable. While this option may satisfy constitutional questions, it may prove to
be an expensive and time-consuming.
Congress may also allow federal judges to exercise their discretion in sentencing in cases where
Congress has not specified a mandatory term of sentence. This option could possibly mirror the
indeterminate sentencing scheme that was in place prior to the sentencing reform effort in 1984.
While such an option would allow judges to individualize sentences to the extent that Congress
has not established a mandatory sentence for the offense, it could also result in a lack of
uniformity due to judges applying different sentences across jurisdictions.
^Lⁱ^{sa M. Se}^g^h^etti ^Alⁱ^s^oⁿ^M^.^S^mⁱ^t^h
^Sp^{ecialist i}ⁿ^Do^m^e^{stic Sec}^u^rⁱ^t^y^an^d^I^m^mⁱ^g^r^atioⁿ^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^at^iv^{e A}^t^torn^e^y
^P^o^licy^a^m^smⁱ^t^h@^crs^.^l^o^c.g^o^v^,⁷^-⁶⁰⁵⁴
^l^s^egh^e^t^tⁱ^@^c^rs^.l^oc.g^o^v^{, 7-}⁴⁶⁶⁹

¹⁰²^F^r^an^{k Bo}^wm^an^,^“A^P^r^o^p^o^s^al^f^o^{r Bri}ⁿ^giⁿ^g^t^h^{e F}^e^d^e^ral^S^eⁿ^t^en^ciⁿ^g^G^uⁱ^d^elⁱⁿ^{es In}^t^o^Con^f^o^r^mⁱ^t^y^wⁱ^t^h^B^l^a^kel^y^v.
^Wa^shⁱⁿ^gt^on^,”^Fe^de^r^a^l^Seⁿ^t^eⁿ^cⁱⁿ^g^Re^por^te^d^{, v}^o^l.¹⁶^{, n}^o^.³⁶^{4 (}^J^une²⁰⁰⁴⁾^,^p.^7.
¹⁰³^Sta^t^e^v.^Go^uld^,²³^P^.^3d⁸^{01 (}^K^aⁿ^{. 20}⁰¹⁾^.
¹⁰⁴^K^a^ns^a^s^s^t^a^t^ute^aⁿⁿ^o^ta^te^d^§21^-⁴⁷¹⁸⁽^b)^.