The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress

The Global Peace Operations Initiative:
Background and Issues for Congress
Updated January 31, 2008
Nina M. Serafino
Specialist in International Security Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background
and Issues for Congress
For FY2008, Congress has fully funded the Bush Administration’s requested
$95.2 million for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a multilateral, five-
year program with planned U.S. contributions of some $660 million from FY2005
through FY2009. GPOI’s primary purpose is to train and equip 75,000 military
troops, a majority of them African, for peacekeeping operations by 2010. GPOI also
provides support for the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU),
an Italian training center for gendarme (constabulary police) forces in Vicenza, Italy.
In addition, GPOI is promoting the development of an international transportation
and logistics support system for peacekeepers, and is encouraging an information
exchange to improve international coordination of peace operations training and
exercises in Africa. In June 2004, G8 leaders pledged to support the goals of the
GPOI incorporates previous capabilities-building programs for Africa. From
FY1997 to FY2005, the United States spent just over $121 million on GPOI’s
predecessor program that was funded through the State Department Peacekeeping
(PKO) account: the Clinton Administration’s African Crisis Response Initiative
(ACRI) and its successor, the Bush Administrations’s African Contingency
Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. (The term ACOTA is now
used to refer to GPOI’s training program in Africa.) Some 16,000 troops from ten
African nations were trained under the early ACRI/ACOTA programs. Some $33
million was provided from FY1998 to FY2005 to support classroom training of 31
foreign militaries through the Foreign Military Financing account’s Enhanced
International Peacekeeping Capabilities program (EIPC).
Within a year after GPOI was initiated in late 2004, the Administration began
expanding the geographical scope of GPOI to selected countries in Central America,
Europe, and Asia. In 2006 and 2007, the program was further expanded to countries
in Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific. GPOI now includes over 40 “partner” nations
and organizations throughout the world, although the emphasis is still on Africa.
According to figures provided by the State Department in January 2008, over 40,000
peacekeepers trainees and peacekeeper trainers were trained. Funds allocated to the
GPOI program from FY2005 to FY2007 totaled, as of May 2007, some $278 million.
Congress has tended to view the concept of the GPOI program favorably, but the
109th Congress balked at providing funding for a number of reasons: a lack of a
strategic plan and evaluation program, perceived laxness in management, and a sense
of a less than full commitment to the program by State Department, among others.
The State Department has taken some steps to remedy these perceived shortcomings.
While fully funding GPOI for FY2008, the first session of the 110th Congress has
questioned whether the GPOI program is meeting its goals, and whether it is too

Background ...................................................... 1
GPOI Purposes and Activities........................................2
GPOI Goals and Needs.........................................2
Demand for Peacekeepers...................................3
Need for Gendarme/Constabulary Forces.......................4
U.S. Peacekeeping Training and Assistance, Pre-GPOI, in Sub-Saharan
Africa ..................................................4
The Transition to GPOI Training and Assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa ..5
Development of the “Beyond Africa” Program ......................6
Further Development in Africa and “Beyond” During FY2006
and FY2007..............................................6
Foreign Response and Contributions...............................8
Italian Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU)....8
Administration Funding Requests and Congressional Action ..............10
FY2005-FY2007 GPOI Funding.................................10
FY2005 ................................................ 10
FY2006 ................................................ 10
FY2007 ................................................ 11
FY2008 ................................................ 12th
Issues for the 110 Congress....................................15
Are GPOI Training Efforts Having the Desired Effect?...........15
Has GPOI Become Sufficiently Global?.......................16
List of Tables
Table 1. GPOI Allocations, FY2005-FY2008...........................14
Table 2. GPOI Training Summary, FY2005-December 31, 2007............17

The Global Peace Operations Initiative:
Background and Issues for Congress
Through the FY2008 omnibus appropriations legislation (P.L. 110-161),
Congress has fully funded the Bush Administration’s request for $95.2 million in1
FY2008 State Department funding for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).
The Administration launched the five-year $660 million (in FY2005-FY2009 funds)
initiative in mid-2004 as a means to alleviate the perceived shortage worldwide of
trained peacekeepers and “gendarmes” (police with military skills, a.k.a. constabulary
police), as well as to increase available resources to transport and sustain them. While
the United States has provided considerable support to implement several peace
processes and to support peacekeepers in the field from a variety of budget accounts
for well over a decade, it has provided relatively little funding to build up foreign2
military capabilities to perform peacekeeping operations.
The United States previously provided peacekeeping capacity-building assistance
to foreign militaries primarily under two programs, the African Contingency
Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA) and its predecessor program,
and the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities program (EIPC). Both
ACOTA and EPIC have been subsumed under the GPOI budget line. ACOTA is still
the term used to refer to the Africa component of GPOI, however, and is implemented
by the State Department’s Africa Bureau.
Overall responsibility for GPOI rests with the State Department Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Policy, Plans, and Analysis (PM/PPA).
(Information about GPOI is available at [
gpoi/index.htm]). PM/PPA works closely with DOD offices to plan and carry out the
Impetus for GPOI came from the Department of Defense (DOD), where officials
in the Office of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) worked with
the State Department for over a year and a half to develop the proposal. Officials in
SO/LIC’s section on peacekeeping developed the plan as a means to expand and
improve the ACOTA program — with more and better exercises and more equipment
— as well as to extend the program beyond Africa to other parts of the world.

1 For details, see the section on Administration Funding Requests and Congressional Action,
2 The term “peacekeeping” is used generically here. It covers the range of activities referred
to elsewhere as peace operations, stability operations, or stabilization and reconstruction

Policymakers hoped that the availability of peacekeeping training would encourage
more countries to participate in peacekeeping operations, enable current donors to
provide a greater number of troops, and increase the number of countries which
potentially could serve as lead nations, according to some analysts.
The GPOI budget is part of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Peacekeeping
(PKO) account, also known as the “voluntary” Peacekeeping account, under the
Military Assistance rubric. The PKO account funds activities carried out under
Section 551 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA).3 Section 551
authorizes the President to provide assistance for peacekeeping operations and other
programs to further U.S. national security interests “on such terms and conditions as
he may determine.” (This provides some flexibility to the President, but is not
tantamount to the discretion that he can exercise when funding is provided
“notwithstanding any other provision of law.”)
GPOI Purposes and Activities
In his September 21, 2004 address to the opening meeting of the 59th session of
the U.N. General Assembly, President Bush asserted that the world “must create
permanent capabilities to respond to future crises.” In particular, he pointed to a need
for “more effective means to stabilize regions in turmoil, and to halt religious violence
and ethnic cleansing.” A similar rationale prompted the Clinton Administration to
formulate the ACRI training program in 1996 and underlies the current search for new
strategies and mechanisms to prevent and control conflicts.4
GPOI Goals and Needs
To accomplish these ends, GPOI, has three major goals:
!Train some 75,000 troops worldwide, with an emphasis on Africa, in
peacekeeping skills by 2010. (The number is the total to be trained
by all participating countries, according to a State Department
!Support Italy in establishing a center to train international gendarme
(constabulary) forces to participate in peacekeeping operations (see
section below); and

3 The State Department’s Peacekeeping Operations account (i.e., PKO, also known as the
“voluntary” peacekeeping account) funds U.S. contributions to peacekeeping efforts other
than assessed contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations. U.N. assessed contributions
are funded through the State Department’s Contributions to International Peacekeeping
Account (CIPA).
4 For more information on this topic, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping and Conflict
Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities, by Nina M.
Serafino and Martin A. Weiss.

!Foster an international deployment and logistics support system to
transport peacekeepers to the field and maintain them there.
Through GPOI, the State Department also promotes the exchange of information
among donors on peace operations training and exercises in Africa. This is
accomplished through donors meetings which serve as a “clearinghouse” to facilitate
coordination. The first of these State Department meetings was held in Washington,
D.C. on October 7-8, 2004.5 The United Kingdom hosted a second meeting in
February 2006, the Russian Federation hosted a third in June 2006, and Germany
hosted a fourth in March 2007. All four of these meetings focused solely on Africa,
according to a State Department official. The State Department is planning the first
global clearinghouse for later this year (2007), which will include information
exchanges on efforts to build peacekeeping capabilities worldwide.
Demand for Peacekeepers. For many analysts, continued efforts to improve
the peacekeeping skills of African and other military forces is an important step
towards controlling devastating conflicts, particularly in Africa. In the mid-1990s,
several developed nations provided most of the peacekeepers. The perception that
developed nations would not be able to sustain the burden indefinitely, as well as the
perception that the interests of those nations in Africa were not sufficient to ensure
needed troop commitments there, led international capacity-building efforts to focus
on Africa.
As of the end of December 2004, shortly after GPOI first started up, almost
25,000 of the nearly 58,000 military personnel who were participating in the current

17 U.N. peacekeeping operations were from the 22 African troop-contributing nations.

(African nations provided over half of the military personnel — roughly 24,000 of
47,000 — in the seven U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa.) Africa’s military
contribution to U.N. peacekeeping at the end of 2004 was over double that at the end
of 2000; five of the top ten African contributors, who provided some 98% of the
military contribution, received training under the ACRI/ACOTA program. African
contributions to the U.N. international civilian police pool (CIVPOL) remained just
about the same over those four years: 1,213 in December 2004 (of a total of 6,765
from all nations) compared to 1,088 in December 2000.
African militaries also participate in regional peacekeeping operations under the
auspices of the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the
African Union (AU). (The first ECOWAS peacekeeping mission was deployed to
Liberia in 1990. Subsequent missions were deployed to Liberia once again, Guinea
Bissau, Sierra Leone, and most recently the Côte d’Ivoire. The AU deployed its first
peacekeepers to Burundi in 2003 and Sudan in 2004. All missions but Sudan
eventually became U.N. operations.) Both organizations are trying to develop an
African stand-by peacekeeping force, comprised of contributions from five regional
organizations, by 2010. Under GPOI, the United States will work to enhance and
support the command structures and multilateral staff of ECOWAS and the AU.

5 The United States European Command (EUCOM) held two previous “clearinghouse”
meetings in May and December 2004.

Need for Gendarme/Constabulary Forces. A second capability in short
supply is the specialized units of police with military skills to handle temporary hostile6
situations such as unruly crowds. Several countries have such forces (e.g., the Italian
carabinieri, the French gendarmerie, and the Spanish Guardia Civil, among others).
In the United States these are referred to as constabulary forces.
U.S. Peacekeeping Training and Assistance, Pre-GPOI, in
Sub-Saharan Africa
From 1996 through 2004, the United States provided field and staff training to
develop military capabilities for peacekeeping through the African Crisis Response
Initiative (ACRI) and its successor program, ACOTA. Early in FY2005, ACOTA was
subsumed under GPOI. Under ACRI/ACOTA, the United States trained some 16,000
troops from 10 African nations:7 Benin, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana,
Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal,8 and Uganda. (It also trained a small
number of gendarmes who received the same training as the others.)
The United States also provided non-lethal equipment to the militaries that it
trained. This included communications packages, uniforms, boots, generators, mine
detectors, Global Positioning Systems (GPS), and medical and water purification

6 Gendarme/constabulary forces are trained in both military and policing skills, but are less
heavily armed than soldiers. According to the Clinton Administration’s Presidential
Decision Directive 71 (PDD-71), constabulary tasks include the regulation of peoples’
movements when necessary to ensure safety; interventions “to stop civil violence, such as
vigilante lynchings or other violent public crimes” and to “stop and deter widespread or
organized looting, vandalism, riots or other mob-type action;”and the dispersal of “unruly
or violent public demonstrations and civil disturbances.” (Text: The Clinton Administration
White Paper on Peace Operations, February 24, 2000, pp 9-10.) Constabulary forces often
can deploy more rapidly than other international civilian police because they usually deploy
as “formed units” (i.e., in previously formed working groups) instead of as individuals. They
also are often equipped with their own communication and logistical support. See CRS
Report RL32321, Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Problems and
Proposed Solutions, by Nina M. Serafino.
7 ACRI provided training in traditional peacekeeping skills where there is an existing cease-
fire or peace accord. The more muscular ACOTA, initiated in 2002, has also provided
training in the skills needed for African troops to perform peacekeeping tasks in more
hostile environments, including force protection, light-infantry operations and small-unit
tactics. Information from a State Department official and Col. Russell J. Handy, USAF,
Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance: Developing Training Partnerships for
the Future of Africa. Air and Space Power Journal, Fall 2003, as posted online at
also put greater emphasis on the “train the trainer” aspect. As of 2005, training packages
included Command and Staff Operations Skills, Command Post Exercises (i.e., exercises,
often computer-bases, of headquarters commanders and staff) and Peace Support Operations
Soldier Skills field training, according to a State Department fact sheet.
8 Military personnel from two of these nations were trained only briefly under ACRI.
Training for the Côte d’Ivoire was halted because of a military coup, and for Uganda,
because of that country’s involvement in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Initially, under ACRI, U.S. soldiers provided field training and oversaw
classroom training provided by private contractors. Because of the demand for U.S.
soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, private contractors also began to conduct field
training. By the time GPOI was initiated, private contractors, many of whom
reportedly were retired military personnel and reservists, conducted most of the
training, while active duty military officers played a minimal role. This remains true
Funding for ACRI, which like ACOTA was provided under the State
Department’s Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, totaled $83.6 million during
its six fiscal years (FY1997-FY2002). (Additional support for ACRI was provided
through the Foreign Military Financing program.) ACOTA was funded at $8 million
in FY2003 and $15 million in FY2004.
Other support for classroom training of foreign militaries was provided through
the EIPC, a “train the trainer” program which began in FY1998 and was subsumed
under the GPOI rubric. EIPC provided assistance to selected countries — some 31
as of early 2005 — by designing and implementing a comprehensive, country-specific
peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance training and education program to enhance
a nation’s institutional structure to train and deploy peacekeepers. EIPC funding,
provided under the Foreign Military Financing Program, totaled about $31.5 million
through FY2004.
The Transition to GPOI Training and Assistance in Sub-
Saharan Africa
GPOI was designed as a program with worldwide reach, but its emphasis was
always intended to remain on Africa. In FY2005, all but a few hundred peacekeeper
trainees were from outside Africa, and thus far the great majority of trainees are
Africans. (For a detailed account of the number of trainees from each country, see
Table 4 at the end of this report. This table provides the number of trainees trained
using the funds from each fiscal year, not the number of trainees actually trained in
that fiscal year. Because training is still being conducted with previous fiscal year
funds, these numbers will change.) Training in Africa continues to be conducted
under the ACOTA program, which is implemented by the State Department’s Africa
During FY2005, nearly 11,000 African troops were trained, using funds initially
appropriated for ACOTA under the regular budget and additional funds appropriated
for GPOI . (A total of 14,000 troops were expected to be trained with FY2005 funds;
some FY2005-funded training is still pending.). This included the training of six
battalions from Senegal that were subsequently deployed to specific peacekeeping
missions9 and three battalions from Botswana that anticipated deployment. Training
for a seventh Senegalese battalion began in FY2005 and continued training into
FY2006. Other ACOTA partners whose troops were trained using FY2005 funds
were Ghana, Malawi, Mali, and Mozambique. Two new partners were trained using

9 The Senegalese have been trained to participate in missions in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC), the Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Darfur.

FY2005 funds: Gabon and Nigeria; at least one other may have been trained with
FY2005 funds.
Development of the “Beyond Africa” Program
The State Department initiated the “Beyond Africa” training and equipping
program in mid-July 200510 in order to extend GPOI training to three new regions:
Latin America, Europe, and Asia. (As in Africa, some equipment is provided during
training, but only that needed for the training itself. Trained troops are not provided
with equipment needed for operations until they deploy.)
In Central America, GPOI funds have been used to train and equip soldiers from
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, as well as to upgrade an existing
facility in order to establish a peacekeeping training center in Guatemala. The
intention is to stand up a battalion of about 600 Central American troops, as part of
the Conferencia de Fuerzas Armadas Centroamericanas (CFAC).
In Europe, the first countries whose troops were offered training and other
support under GPOI were Albania, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and the Ukraine. Bosnia
was provided information technology support for its training center and a U.S.
instructor with FY2005 funds. Of these, only Bosnia appears to have received training
thus far.
GPOI funds have also been used to provide pre-deployment equipment for the
“South East Europe Brigade” (SEEBRIG), a multinational military organization with
seven members: Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Macedonia, Albania, Italy, and Greece.11
In Asia, the first countries to be extended train-and-equip assistance and provided
some logistical support were Bangladesh, Malaysia, Mongolia, and Thailand (which
was subsequently suspended because of a military coup). GPOI funds were also used
establish and install communications equipment in a Peace Support Operations
Collaboration Center (PSOCC) in Mongolia.12
Further Development in Africa and “Beyond” During FY2006
and FY2007
GPOI expanded its reach considerably in the past two years. At least 16 new
partner countries (i.e., countries eligible to receive bilateral GPOI support and

10 The Department of Defense transferred the $80 million in P.L. 108-447 (Division J
Section 117) supplemental appropriations to be used for GPOI programs in June 2005.
Funds became available for obligation in mid-July, 15 days after the State Department
notified Congress of its spending plans.
11 Original plans were to provide pre-deployment training for troops participating in the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the NATO peacekeeping operation in
Afghanistan, but were changed when it was determined there was not requirment for it.
12 This project was part of plans for what was formerly referred to as the Asia-Pacific Area
Network (APAN).

training) were been added through the use of FY2006 and FY2007 funds since GPOI’s
first year in FY2005. Others were under consideration, but CRS does not have current
information on these. (Funds must be obligated in the year of their appropriation but
are available for expenditure for five years after obligation and, therefore, may be
spent in years subsequent to their appropriation. References to fiscal year are to the
funding year.)
More than 40,000 peacekeeping troops, gendarmes, and trainers have been
trained through December 31, 2007. (For details on the number of troops trained per
country, see Table 2 at the end of this report. Not all countries receive training and
other support during every fiscal year.)
The breakdown of partner countries, by region, as of the date of this report, is as
!GPOI’s Africa ACOTA component consists of 20 partners: Benin,
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya,
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda,
Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Assistance
continues to the African Union and ECOWAS.
!In the Western Hemisphere, GPOI supports four Central American
countries: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
Paraguay was added as a new partner in FY2006, but it is not clear
from information available to CRS whether it has received support.
!Of the four Asian partners eligible for support as of FY2005 —
Bangladesh, Malaysia, Mongolia, and Thailand — Thailand was
suspended because of a military coup in September 2006. Six new
Asian partners were eligible to receive support beginning in FY2006:
India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka,
although it is not clear whether Pakistan and Kazakhstan have
received support. By December 2008, it appears that two new Asian
partners were added (i.e., Cambodia and the Philippines). It is not
clear that Tajikistan, which was under consideration, was added.
!Currently, GPOI has six partners in greater Europe (i.e, Europe and
Eurasia): Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania, Macedonia,13
SEEBRIG, and the Ukraine.
!GPOI’s first Middle Eastern partner, Jordan, was added in FY2006.

13 SEEBRIG as an entity has not received the presidential determination necessary to receive
direct GPOI support, but GPOI treats SEEBRIG as a partner by providing support for the
organization through direct assistance to Romania, which hosted the SEEBRIG

Foreign Response and Contributions
G8 leaders14 endorsed the GPOI goals (above) at their June 2004 summit meeting
at Sea Island, GA, adopting an “Action Plan on Expanding Global Capability for
Peace Support Operations.”15 (This was actually the third G8 Action Plan concerning
peacekeeping in Africa. In June 2002, the G8 Summit at Kananaskis, Canada,
adopted a broad Africa Action Plan that contained sections on conflict resolution and
peace-building efforts. The more specific Joint Africa /G8 Plan to Enhance African
Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations was developed over the next year
and presented at the June 2003 Summit at Evian-les-baines, France.16)
As indicated by the GPOI “clearinghouse” concept, several G8 countries already
have significant programs in Africa. In addition to the United States, France and the
United Kingdom (UK) conduct bilateral training programs with African militaries.
Germany and the UK provided the assistance necessary to launch the regional Kofi
Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Ghana, which opened in 2004,
and Germany is providing continuing assistance. The European Union and other
countries, most prominently Canada, Italy, France and the Netherlands, have also
assisted the Center. In addition to their training and equipment assistance to African
peacekeeping troops and centers, Canada and the UK are also providing equipment
to the peacekeeping training center in Guatemala. Australia and Singapore are
providing instructors and training in the East Asia/Pacific Island region. The
Administration is working with Japan to identify areas where it could contribute to
GPOI goals.
Italian Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU). In
his September 2004 speech to the United Nations, President Bush referred to Italy as
a joint sponsor of GPOI, because it co-sponsored with the United States the Sea Island
G8 peacekeeping action plan. Italy also had moved to establish a school for training
gendarme forces even before the United States Congress had provided funding for
U.S. support for the school. Italian carabinieri, who are widely viewed as a leading
model and have played a prominent role in providing constabulary forces to
peacekeeping and stabilization operations,17 established the Center of Excellence for
Stability Police Units (CoESPU) as an international training center at Vicenza in
March 2005.
Italy is providing not only the facility, but also most of the staff for the “train the
trainer” program. As of mid-2006, some 145 carabinieri were attached to CoESPU,

14 G8 refers to the “Group of 8” major industrialized democracies: Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. G8 heads of state,
plus representatives from the European Union, meet at annual summits.
15 Text available at [].
16 Texts available at [] and
[ h t t p : / / www.g8.gc . c a / AFRIQUE-01j une -e n.a s p ] .
17 According to Carabinieri officials interviewed by the author, as of mid-November 2004,
some 1,300 carabinieri were deployed in missions to Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Albania,
and Palestine.

of which about 25 were instructors and training staff. At the same point, two U.S.
military service members were attached to the center. One serves as the Deputy
Director, although DOD’s commitment to fill that slot extends only through 2010.
CoESPU would like a commitment of five U.S. military service m embers, one as
Deputy Director and others to assist with information, training, and studies and
research efforts, including the development of doctrine. France and Russia will be
providing instructions in 2007, according to a U.S. State Department official.
A U.S. contribution of $10 million for the school’s operation and training
programs was transferred to Italy in late September 2005. (According to CoESPU
officials, the U.S. contribution covers about one-third the cost of running the school.)18
CoESPU’s goal, by 2010, is to train 3,000 mid-to-high ranking personnel at Vicenza
and an additional 4,000 in formed units in their home countries.
CoESPU offers high-level courses (for staff officers ranking from Lt. Colonels
to Colonels and their civilian equivalents) consisting of four-and-a-half weeks of
classes (approximately 150 classroom hours) in international organizations,
international law (including international humanitarian law), military arts in peace
support operations, tactical doctrine, operating in mixed international environments
with hybrid chains of command, and the selection, training, and organization of police
units for international peace support operations.
The Center also offers a course for junior officers and senior non-commissioned
officers (sergeant majors to captains) and their civilian equivalents. This course
covers the materials taught in the high-level course with an emphasis on training in
the more practical aspects, including checkpoint procedures, VIP security and escorts,
high-risk arrests, border control, riot control, election security, and police self-defense
The first high-level class graduated 29 officers on December 7, 2005. The first
class consisted of officers from Cameroon, India, Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, and
Senegal. A pilot course for the middle-management level began on January 13, 2006,
and seven weeks later graduated about 100 officers. Students for this course were
drawn from the same six countries as those at the first-high level course.
On April 19, 2007, CoESPU graduated its fifth high-level class and its sixth
middle-management class. These classes were attended by officers from the same
countries as the first courses, minus Morocco and with the addition of Nigeria, Serbia
and the Ukraine.19 Many more countries have indicated that they would like to send
students to the CoESPU courses.
CoESPU is also developing a lessons-learned and doctrine writing capability in order
to serve as an interactive resource for SPUs. It intends to develop a coherent and
comprehensive SPU doctrine to promote interoperability in the field, to ensure that

18 Author’s interviews at CoESPU, June 2006.
19 Remarks by Consul for Political and Economic Affairs Andrea Brouillette-Rodriguez,
Vicenza, April 19, 2007. United States Consulate General in Milan. Accessible at
[ h t t p : / / www.mi l a n.usconsul at e.go v/ news/ m] .

doctrine is the basis of training standards and methods, and to respond to questions
from SPU commanders in the field, as well as to support pre-mission and in-theater
training exercises.
Administration Funding Requests and
Congressional Action
FY2005-FY2007 GPOI Funding
FY2005. Although the initiative had long been in the works, President Bush
approved GPOI in April 2004, two months after the FY2005 budget request was
submitted to Congress. To fund the initiative at approximately $100 million in
FY2005, the Administration proposed that 80% be DOD funds and the remaining 20%
be ACOTA State Department funds. The Armed Services committees did not back
GPOI because of concerns that its inclusion in the DOD budget would divert funds
from U.S. troops. GPOI’s strongest support seemed to come from Senate foreign
affairs authorizers and appropriators. At the end of 2004, Congress provided $96. 7
million for GPOI funding in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 (H.R.

4818/P.L. 108-447), split about as the Administration had proposed, with almost 20%

in the Department of State budget and the remaining 80% as a transfer from the DOD
FY2006. The Bush Administration requested $114.4 million for FY2006 GPOI
funding. Congress did not earmark funding for GPOI (or for any other program in the
PKO account) in the conference version of the FY2006 Foreign Operations
appropriation bill (H.Rept. 109-265, P.L. 109-102, signed into law November 14,
2005), which funded the PKO account at $175 million — $20.8 million below the
Administration’s request of $195.8 million. The State Department eventually
allocated an estimated $100.4 million for FY2006 GPOI, some $14 million below the21

20 Congress divided the FY2005 GPOI funding in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for
FY2005 (H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447) as follows. Section 117 of Division J (“Other Matters”)
provided that “$80 million may be transferred with the concurrence of the Secretary of
Defense” to the Department of State Peacekeeping Operations account, where it was
allocated to GPOI. The transfer authority was provided notwithstanding any other provision
of law, except section 551 of Division D (the Foreign Operations appropriations section of
the bill), i.e., the “Leahy Amendment” which prohibits the training of military units credibly
accused of gross violations of human rights. State Department officials explain that the
“notwithstanding” language was requested to provide an exemption from FAA Section 660,
which limits U.S. assistance for the training of foreign police in order to allow funding for
COESPU. Division D of H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447 contained $20 million in State Department
PKO funding for the ACOTA account and nearly $1.8 million in EPIC Foreign Military
Financing funding. Both accounts which are now subsumed under GPOI.
21 The House FY2006 Foreign Operations appropriations bill, H.R. 3057 (as reported by the
House Appropriations Committee (HAC), H.Rept. 109-152, on June 24 and passed on June
28), contained $96.4 million for GPOI. In its report, the HAC expressed its support for

FY2007. For FY2007, the Administration requested $102.6 million for GPOI
funding. House and Senate action signaled some discontent with the program. The22
House was disinclined to provide full funding. Senate appropriators expressed
discontent with State Department management of the program. They proposed that
GPOI funding be transferred to a new FMF program and recommended that the
COESPU program be either fully funded by other countries or be transferred to the
State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

21 (...continued)
GPOI as a means for the United States to “reduce the emphasis on the use of military troops
for these operations.” It explained that it had provided $18 million less than the request
because it did not expect that all $63 million indicated for equipment and transportation
outside of Africa could be obligated and spent in 2006. The Senate version of the bill (as
reported June 30 and passed July 20), contained $114.0 million for GPOI.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee version of the State Department
authorization bill for FY2006 and FY2007 (S. 600, S.Rept. 109-35, reported on March 10,
2005, and returned to the calendar on April 26) would authorize $114.4 million for FY2006
and such sums as may be necessary for FY2007 for GPOI. The House version (H.R. 2601,
H.Rept. 109-168, as reported by the House International Relations Committee on July 13,
2005 and passed on July 20) does not mention GPOI and does not detail accounts in such
a way as to indicate whether GPOI is funded. There was no further action on the bill.
22 The House version of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Bill for FY2007 (H.R. 5522, passed July 9, 2006), contained $82 million
for GPOI. This was $20.6 million below the request and $18.4 below the FY2006 level.
No explanation was provided in the House Appropriations Committee’s explanatory report
(H.Rept. 109-486) for the reduction. The report did state the committee’s expectation that
the FY2008 budget request for GPOI “include a detailed summary of the achievements of
GPOI to date and specific information linking the budget request to fiscal year 2008
performance objectives.” The committee also “strongly” encouraged the Secretary of State
“to consider sending GPOI participants to common educational programs in the United
States, including the Naval Postgraduate School.”
The Committee report also noted it did not authorize the use of GPOI funds
notwithstanding section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended), which is
necessary to provide funds for CoESPU. Although the committee expressed support for
COESPU, it stated that it expected that either other G8 nations support the program or that
the Administration use funding from other accounts with the necessary authority, such as
the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account.
23 In the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) version of H.R. 5522, the State, Foreign
Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Bill for FY2007 (S.Rept. 109-277),
approved by SAC on June 29, 2006, funding for GPOI would be transferred from the PKO
account to a new program under the Foreign Military Financing Program. S.Rept. 109-277
stated that the State Department “has failed to demonstrate a requisite level of commitment
to the program, instead viewing funds provided for GPOI as a funding source for other
activities.” [The State Department transferred $57 million in GPOI funds to support urgent
needs of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in Darfur, Sudan, according to a State
Department official.] The report also scored the State Department for ignoring committee
guidance on GPOI and for its inability “to articulate any plan for the use of fiscal year 2005
funding until calendar year 2006.” S.Rept. 109-277, p. 92.
The SAC recommended that a Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund be created

The final continuing resolution24 that funded most government operations and
programs through FY2007, including GPOI, left the decision on the amount of GPOI
funding for FY2007 largely to the State Department, albeit in the context of a reduced
availability of funds.25 The State Department estimate of FY2007 GPOI obligations
is $81 million (i.e., $1 million less than provided for in the House-passed FY2007
Foreign Operations bill, H.R. 5522). (An earlier version of the Continuing Resolution
had set the House-passed amount as the level for FY2007 GPOI funding.)
FY2008. In its February 2008 budget request, the Administration asked for
$92.5 million in GPOI funding. Congress fully funded the request in the omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (H.R. 2764, Division J; P.L. 110-161, signed
into law December 26, 2007). Although the Act does not specify funding for GPOI,
the Joint Explanatory Statement on the final version of the omnibus appropriations bill
specifies that the executive branch is to take into account House and Senate
Committee report language on bills incorporated into the omnibus when
implementing the legislation. The House Report (H.Rept. 110-197) accompanying
the original State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
appropriations bill recommends full funding. In that report, the House
Appropriations Committee stated its expectation that the FY2009 budget request for
GPOI would “include a detailed summary of GPOI’s achievements to date and
specific information linking the budget request to fiscal year 2009 performance
In action on the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act, the Senate Armed
Services Committee (SASC), in Section 1204 of its version of the bill (S. 1547,
reported June 5, 2007), calls for a Government Accountability Office (GAO) study
describing and assessing the activities and implementation of the GPOI program. This
requirement was retained in the final bill (H.R. 4986, P.L. 110-181, signed into law
January 28, 2008).

23 (...continued)
under FMF, the purpose of which would be “identical to GPOI, namely, to identify the
critical shortfalls in the training, equipment, and capabilities of our allies to serve in
peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.” To decide on the allocation of funds, the
Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military [Pol-Mil] Affairs would consult with
commanders of the U.S. regional military commands (U.S., Pacific, Central, European, and
Southern) to identify “the most critical training and equipment shortfalls of our
peacekeeping partners and regional allies” in order to develop a three year plan and program
to address those needs. S.Rept. 109-277, p. 92.
24 Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007 (H.J.Res. 20, P.L. 110-5, signed into
law February 15, 2007. Amends P.L. 109-289, division B, as amended by P.L. 109-369 and
P.L. 109-383.)
25 Congress, in effect, reduced the amount of funding available for the GPOI program by
funding the overall PKO budget at $223.25 million, while earmarking $50 million for
peacekeeping operations in Sudan. Congress thus provided $173.25 million for other (than
Sudan peacekeeping) PKO programs in FY2007, i.e., $27.25 million less than the
Administration’s $200.5 million PKO budget request and the same as the FY2006 PKO
budget. State Department plans for FY2007 included spending for two new programs
totaling some $31 million, the Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) and
Liberia, that were not included in the FY2006 budget.

In the SASC report accompanying the Senate version of the bill (S.Rept. 110-77),
SASC stated that it wanted to “strengthen the likelihood that GPOI will be
administered in such a fashion, and that there will be an expectation, if not a
requirement, that GPOI training recipient countries contribute troops to U.N. missions
in the near-term, and that GPOI will increase the number of peacekeepers who can
remain ready via sustained training and equipping programs.” SASC expressed
concern as to whether the readiness of GPOI-trained troops “is being monitored or
maintained” and noted that program objectives calling for the establishment of an
equipment depot for and of a multilateral transportation logistics support arrangement
(TLSA) have not been fulfilled.26 SASC also expressed concern that participation by
other G-8 members has not met expectations. (See the Issues for Congress section,
below, for further discussion of this and other matters addressed by this legislation.)
Among the points the SASC requested the GAO to address are: (1) the extent
to which contributing and participating countries maintain records and databases; (2)
the quality and sustainability of the training of individuals and units, (3) the extent to
which those trained are equipped and remain equipped to deploy in peace operations,
(4) participating countries capacity to mobilize those trained; (5) the extent to which
trained individuals are deployed, and (6) the extent to which contractors are used and
the quality of their results. The Committee also requested an assessment of whether
GPOI is achieving its goals and recommendations as to whether a country’s
participation in GPOI “should require reciprocal participation.” The report is to be
submitted by March 1, 2008 to the Congressional defense and foreign affairs

26 According to a 2006 State Department document, GPOI provided peace operations
equipment and logistics technical advisors to equipment depots in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
(for the African Union) and in Freetown, Sierra Leone (for ECOWAS) and will establish
“a substantial equipment cache in a location to be determined that maximizes the U.S.’
ability to deploy the equipment in response to a crisis anywhere in the world.” The
document also stated that the United States would coordinate with Russia, the 2006 G8
President, and other G8 members, to formally establish the TLSA in 2006.” U.S.
Department of State, Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis, Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs. Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI): Summary of GPOI Strategy for Fiscal
Years 2005-2009. September 4, 2006. pp 52-53.

Table 1. GPOI Allocations, FY2005-FY2008
(in $ millions)
F Y 2005a F Y 2006 a F Y 2007 a F Y 2008a
Category Ac t u al Estimates Estimates Request
African Contingency
Operations Training and
Assistance (ACOTA)28.9235.0040.3940.26
Africa Regional HQ
Support: African Union
(AU) and the Economic
Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) 6.305.725.157.26
East Asia and the Pacific7.7411.06.556.00
Europe and Eurasia5.
Near East (i.e., Jordan)00.651.31.60
South & Central Asia0.935.007.3612.83
Western Hemisphere6.4911.708.457.05
Deployment Equipment and
Depots 20.69 19.52 3.79 6.00
Center of Excellence for
Stability Police Unitsa
( CoESPU) 15.00 0 0 4.00
Transportation and Logistics
Support Arrangement5.
Program Management0.551.8001.0
Tot a l 96.67 100.38 81.0 95.20
Source: Department of State, as of May 7, 2007.
Note: Some totals do not add due to rounding.
a. As GPOI was not created until late 2004, FY2005 actuals include funds originally appropriated
elsewhere: $14.88 million in Peacekeeping Account (PKO) funds for ACOTA; $1.79 million in
Foreign Military Financing for Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC), and
an $80 million transfer from DOD.
FY2006 estimates include FY2006 actual allocations from FY2006 annual appropriations and
FY2006 estimated allocations from FY2006 supplemental appropriations. Estimated allocations from
supplemental funding totals $57.0 million and will wholly fund Europe and Eurasia, Near East, South
and Central Asia, and Western Hemisphere activities. Actual FY2006 allocations wholly fund Africa
Regional support. Estimated supplemental increases for FY2006 allocations are: $5.53 million for
ACOTA over the $29.47 million actual allocation; $7 million for East Asia Pacific over the $4 million
actual allocation, $15.53 million for deployment equipment and depots over the $3.99 million actual
allocation; and $1.6 million for program management over the $0.2 million actual allocation.

FY2007 Preliminary allocations were agreed upon by the GPOI Coordinating Committee on April
20, 2007. The FY2008 allocations may vary depending upon actual FY2008 appropriations.
Of FY2005 COESPU funding, $4.5 million remained to be obligated as of mid-May 2007.

Issues for the 110th Congress
Members of the 109th Congress tended to be supportive of the GPOI concept, but
some expressed concerns over several shortcomings: a lack of a strategic plan and
evaluation program, perceived laxness in program management leading to severe
delays in planning and implementation, and a sense of a less than full commitment to
the program by State Department, in particular. The State Department has taken steps
to remedy these problems, producing a strategic plan (the executive summary of which
is publically available),27 facilitating procedures to speed planning and
implementation, and implementing an evaluation program. It is not yet clear whether
these steps will satisfy congressional critics who attempted through appropriations
legislation to move the program elsewhere (as noted above). (The terms of the final
continuing resolution, P.L. 110-5, left the program unchanged.)
Given the current congressional scrutiny of private contractors performing
security functions and security force training in Iraq and elsewhere, some may
eventually question the predominance of private contractors, and more recently other
nations, in GPOI training, although Congress has not yet raised this as an issue.28 (The
FY2008 defense authorization bill (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181), cited above, does
request GAO to describe the extent to which GPOI uses contractors and to assess “the
quality and timeliness of the results achieved by the contractors, and whether the
United States Government might have achieved similar or better results without
contracting out functions.”
As of the beginning of the second session of the 110th Congress, two practical
issues concerning GPOI seemed most salient. One is whether the ongoing evaluations
of GPOI demonstrate that the program is meeting its goals and, if not, how to adjust
the program to achieve them. A second is whether GPOI has become sufficiently
global in its reach.
Are GPOI Training Efforts Having the Desired Effect? Members
wonder whether the GPOI program is meeting its goal of providing well-trained
peacekeepers for U.N. and other operations. There are four questions of particular
concern: (1) Is GPOI meeting its target number of trainees? (2) Are those trained by
GPOI to be trainers actually training other troops? (3) Are the soldiers (and police)
trained under GPOI actually deployed to international peacekeeping operations? (4)
Is the training provided sufficient to enable soldiers (or police in the case of COESPU
training) to handle the necessary range of peacekeeping tasks effectively? These and

27 U.S. Department of State. Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis. Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs. Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI): Summary of GPOI Strategy
for Fiscal Years 2005-2006. September 4, 2006.
28 According to a conversation with a State Department official in May 2007: (1) ACOTA
training is provided by Northrup Grummon Information Technology and MPRI; (2) A
worldwide, five-year GPOI indefinite quantity contract for up to $200 million, under which
Northrup Grummond, MPRI, and Blackwater USA will provide services, was finalized
recently; (3) Some GPOI training is also provided by the Center for Civil-Military Relations
at the Naval Post-Graduate School; and (4) the United States has worked with Argentina,
Chile, and Uruguay in providing training to Central Americans.

related concerns were among those raised by the Senate Armed Services Committee
in the report accompanying its version of the FY2008 National Defense Authorization
Act, S. 1547, S.Rept. 110-77. See section on FY2008 Congressional Action above.
In an effort to measure results of its training, the State Department awarded in
September 2005 a contract to DFI International to develop a system to evaluate GPOI
and to monitor its results against that “metrics” system. Thus far, the DFI GPOI
evaluation team has gathered figures that answer the first question with some
Figures on the numbers of troops trained compiled by the GPOI evaluation
program indicate that it is possible that U.S.-funded GPOI training efforts may indeed
reach the GPOI goal of 75,000 troops trained if funding continues at current levels
through FY2009, as planned. GPOI evaluation data show just over 40,000 foreign
troops trained to standard29 through 2007 (i.e., through the third year of the program).
The goal of 75,000 would indicate a pace of 17,500 soldiers trained per year through
2010, when the program is scheduled to end. The pace of training will have to speed
up if the goal is to be met.
One area in which the numbers may fall short of some expectations is the
proportion of peacekeeping trainers who are trained. GPOI was initially billed as a
program with a significant “train-the-trainer” component, which implied a large
number of trainers prepared to teach other soldiers to deploy on peacekeeping
missions. Thus far, the available data show that trainers have comprised only 6.6%
of those trained.
Has GPOI Become Sufficiently Global? As GPOI advances into its third
year of operation, some Members question whether it has obtained the commitment
and participation from other countries that was originally anticipated. The SASC
report referred to above (S.Rept. 110-77, accompanying S. 1547) raises this concern:
“Participation among the G-8 members is uneven,” it states, “and there appears to be
no effort to solicit partnership with non-G-8 countries such as India, which has rich
peacekeeping experience...” (Although India has recently become a GPOI “partner,”
that term is used by GPOI to mean countries that receive training and support, rather
than those that provide it, which seems to be the sense intended here.) The SASC
report suggests that the State Department’s division of labor on GPOI may contribute
to the problem: “One possible challenge to obtaining greater contributions or
participation in GPOI may be the fact that at the Department of State, GPOI appears
to be mainly administered by the Africa Bureau, rather than the Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs.” SASC provisions, as incorporated in the FY2008 omnibus
appropriations bill (P.L. 110-181, discussed above), call for a GAO study to describe
the President’s efforts to solicit contributions for and participation in GPOI, as well
as the activities conducted by each member state of the G-8, by non-G-8 member
nations, and by organizations and institutions. They also call for GAO to examine
whether the State Department and the Defense Department “should concentrate
administration [of GPOI] in one office or bureau, and if so, which one....”

29 The standard is mastery of at least 80% of the coursework and an attendance record of

80% or better.

Whether GPOI is too Africa-centric may also be a concern regarding the relative
proportion of troops trained from Africa vs. the rest of the world. Although GPOI was
always intended to focus more on Africa than on the rest of the world, some members
may regard the results thus far as too weighted towards that continent. Table 4, below,
shows that of the 40,133 troops trained with GPOI funds as of December 31, 2007,
some 38,465 or 96%, were from Sub-Saharan Africa.
Table 2. GPOI Training Summary, FY2005-December 31, 2007
(#s trained to standard)
Total #Total #
Region/Country/PeacekeepersPeacekeeperTotal #
OrganizationTrainedTrainers Trained
Sub-Saharan Africa
Benin 2,150 94 2,244
Botswana 118 47 165
Burkina Faso1,6711101,781
Burundi 1,473 0 1,473
Gabon 1,238 155 1,393
Ghana 2,900 87 2,987
Malawi 1,048 25 1,073
Moza mbique 868 161 1,029
Nige ria 4,479 432 4,911
Rwanda 8,037 325 8,362
Senega l 6,746 412 7,158
South Africa16281243
Uganda 1,852 103 1,955
Sub-Total Africa36,0132,45238,465
Asia/South Asia/Pacific Islands/Middle East

Total #Total #
Region/Country/PeacekeepersPeacekeeperTotal #
OrganizationTrainedTrainers Trained
Bangladesh 59 24 83
Fiji (Khaan Quest
participant, see
Mongolia 405 55 460
Nepal 224
Philippines (Khaan
Quest participant, see
Sri Lanka48452
Thailand —
Suspended 242 36 278
Tonga (Khaan Quest
participant, see
Asia/South Asia/the
pacific 1,094 150 1,244
Greater Europe (Europe and Eurasia)
B o s n i a -H e r ze go vi n a 1 0 1
Western Hemisphere
El Salvador15419
Guatemala 292 10 302
Subtotal Western
Hemisphere 388 35 321
Total 37,496 2,637 40,133

Sources: Compiled from information provided by the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs, January 2008.
Notes: This table does not include soldiers trained by GPOI-trained trainers. The standard used by
evaluators for inclusion was mastery of at least 80% of the coursework and an 80% or better attendance
record. NA = Not Available.

This table includes three countries that are not GPOI partners but were provided support because
they participated in the GPOI-funded August 2006 Khaan Quest multilateral peacekeeping training
exercise in Mongolia on the invitation of the Mongolian government. It also includes Cameroon, which
is not a GPOI partner (i.e., eligible to receive bilateral assistance). It is listed here as receiving training
because it sends students to the Italian Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU).
# Peacekeepers = # soldiers (and occasionally gendarmes) trained in peacekeeping skills in GPOI
courses in order to deploy to peacekeeping operations.
# Peacekeeper Trainers = # soldiers trained to train other military personnel in peacekeeping
skills for deployment to peacekeeping operations (i.e., soldiers trained under the “train-the-trainer”