Power to Regulate Commerce: Limits on Congressional Power

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provides that the Congress shall have the
power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. The plain meaning of this language might
indicate a limited power to regulate commercial trade between persons in one state and persons
outside of that state. However, the Commerce Clause has never been construed quite so narrowly.
Rather, the clause, along with the economy of the United States, has grown and become more
complex. In addition, when Congress began to address national social problems, the Commerce
Clause was often cited as the constitutional basis for such legislation. As a result, the Commerce
Clause has become the constitutional basis for a significant portion of the laws passed by the
Congress over the last fifty years, and it currently represents one of the broadest bases for the
exercise of congressional powers.
An examination of the United States Code shows that over 700 statutory provisions, covering a
range of issues, explicitly refer to either “interstate” or “foreign” commerce. Over the last decade,
however, the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison has brought
into question the breadth of the Commerce Clause. While these cases have resulted in the
overturning of a few federal laws, their overall effect has so far been relatively modest in scope. A
recently decided Supreme Court case, Gonzales v. Raich, seems to confirm that the effect of these
previous cases will be limited.

Backgr ound ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Textual Analysis........................................................................................................................2
Drafting and Ratification...........................................................................................................3
Case Law Development............................................................................................................4
The Three Categories of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence.............................................................7
Channels of Commerce.............................................................................................................7
Instrumentalities of Interstate Commerce.................................................................................8
Substantial Impact on Interstate Commerce..............................................................................9
Wickard v. Filburn..............................................................................................................9
Lopez and Morrison..........................................................................................................10
Gonzales v. Raich...............................................................................................................11
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................16

The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provides that the Congress shall have the ¹
power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. The plain meaning of this language might
indicate a limited power to regulate commercial trade between persons in one state and persons
outside of that state. However, the Commerce Clause has never been construed quite so narrowly.
Rather, the clause, along with the economy of the United States, has grown and become more
complex. In addition, when Congress began to address national social problems, the Commerce
Clause was often cited as the constitutional basis for such legislation. As a result, the Commerce
Clause has become the constitutional basis for a significant portion of the laws passed by the
Congress over the last fifty years, and it currently represents one of the broadest bases for the
exercise of congressional powers.
An examination of the United States Code shows that more than 700 statutory provisions
explicitly refer to either “interstate” or “foreign” commerce, covering a significant number of ²³⁴⁵⁶
issues. These issues include agriculture, banking, antitrust, securities, business regulation, ⁷⁸⁹¹⁰¹¹
energy regulation, hazardous substances, consumer credit, sports regulation, the internet, ¹²¹³¹⁴¹⁵¹⁶
endangered species, civil rights, child support, child pornography, abortion, criminal ¹⁷¹⁸¹⁹²⁰²¹²²
law, controlled substances, food, firearms control, terrorism, obscenity, gambling

¹^U.^S^.^C^ONS^T^{., A}^r^{t. I, §}⁸^{, c}^l^.^3.
²^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,⁷^U^.^S.C^.^§^6a⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^p^r^ohi^biti^on^on^e^x^c^e^s^sⁱ^ve^c^o^m^m^odity^s^p^ec^ula^tion)^;^{7 U}^.^S.C^.^§^{6b (}²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^p^r^o^hibi^tio^{n o}ⁿ
^f^r^au^d^,^f^a^{lse rep}^o^r^tin^g^,^o^r^d^ecep^tioⁿⁱⁿ^co^mm^o^d^ities).
³^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,¹²^U^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 9}⁵⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^r^e^g^ula^tion^of^the^ba^nk^ing^busⁱⁿ^e^s^s^;^pow^e^r^s^a^{nd d}^u^tie^s^of^na^tiona^l^ba^nk^s⁾^{; 12 U}^.^S.C^.^§
²⁵⁰^{1 (}²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^d^is^p^o^s^iti^on^of^a^b^aⁿ^d^one^{d m}^one^y^or^de^r^s^a^{nd tr}^a^v^e^l^e^r^’^s^c^h^e^c^k^s⁾^.
⁴^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,¹⁵^U.S^.^C.^{§ 2}⁶^b⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾^(a^pplic^a^tⁱ^on^of^the^aⁿ^titr^{ust la}^w^s^{to pr}^of^e^ssiona^{l m}^a^{jor le}^a^g^ue^ba^se^ba^ll).
⁵^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,¹⁵^U.S^.^C.^{§ 7}⁷^e⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾^(dom^e^s^tic^se^c^u^ritie^{s; prohi}^biti^ons^re^la^ting^{to i}ⁿ^te^rsta^te^c^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^a^{nd the}^m^a^{ils); 15}
^U.S.C.^{§ 7}⁷^{l (}²⁰^05)(c^iv^{il l}ⁱ^a^b^ilit^ie^{s a}^r^isingⁱⁿ^c^o^nne^c^tⁱ^{on w}^ith^prosp^e^c^t^use^s^a^{nd c}^o^m^m^unic^a^tions.
⁶^{15 U}^.^S.C.^§⁷⁹^{h (}²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^p^u^b^lic^u^t^ility^holdi^ng^c^o^m^p^aⁿ^ie^{s; a}^c^quirin^g^inte^re^{st in e}^l^e^c^t^ric^aⁿ^d^g^a^{s c}^o^m^p^aⁿ^ie^{s se}^rv^ing
^sa^m^e^te^rritor^y^{); 15 U.S}^.^C.^{§ 7}⁹^{i (}²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^p^u^b^lic^ut^ility^hol^ding^c^o^m^p^aⁿ^ie^{s; a}^c^quisiti^on^of^se^c^u^ritie^{s a}^{nd ut}^ility^a^sse^{ts a}^nd
^othe^rⁱⁿ^te^r^e^s^t^s⁾^.
⁷^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,^§¹⁵^U^.^S.C^.^§⁷¹^5b⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽ⁱ^nte^r^s^t^a^t^e^tr^aⁿ^s^por^ta^ti^on^of^pe^tr^ole^u^m^pr^od^uc^ts^{; i}ⁿ^te^r^s^ta^te^tr^aⁿ^s^p^o^r^ta^tion^of
^c^ontr^a^baⁿ^d^{oil f}^o^r^bⁱ^ddeⁿ⁾^;1^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.^§⁷¹^{7 (}²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽ⁿ^a^t^ur^a^l^g^a^s^;^r^e^g^u^la^tion^of^na^tur^a^{l g}^a^s^c^o^m^p^aⁿ^ie^s⁾^{; 16 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁸¹³
^(pow^e^r^eⁿ^te^ring^int^oⁱⁿ^te^rsta^te^c^o^m^m^e^rc^e^;^re^g^u^la^tion^of^ra^te^{s, c}^h^a^r^g^e^s).
⁸^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,¹⁵^U.^S^.^C.^§¹²⁶³⁽²⁰⁰^5)(h^azar^dous^s^ubs^ta^nc^e^s^{; pr}^oh^ibite^{d a}^c^t^s⁾^{; 1}⁵^U^.^S.C^.^§¹²⁶⁵⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^h^azar^dous
^su^b^s^t^aⁿ^ces;^sei^z^u^r^es);¹⁵^U.^S^.^C^.^{§ 1}²⁷⁰⁽²⁰⁰⁵^)(h^azard^o^u^s^sub^s^t^aⁿ^ces;^exa^mⁱⁿ^atⁱ^oⁿ^s^an^dⁱⁿ^vestⁱ^g^atⁱ^oⁿ^s^);¹⁵^U.^S^.^C.^§
¹²⁷¹⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^h^azar^dous^s^ubs^ta^nc^e^s^{; r}^e^c^o^r^d^s^of^inte^r^s^ta^te^s^hⁱ^p^m^e^nt)^.
⁹^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,¹⁵^U^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 1}⁶⁴⁴⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^c^ons^um^e^r^c^r^e^d^{it pr}^ote^c^tⁱ^on;^f^r^a^uduleⁿ^{t us}^e^of^c^r^e^d^{it c}^a^r^ds^{; pe}^na^lti^e^s⁾^;^{15 U}^.^S.C^.^§
¹⁶⁷^9a⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^c^oⁿ^s^u^m^e^r^c^r^e^d^{it pr}^ote^c^tion^;^c^r^e^d^{it r}^e^pa^ir^or^g^a^niz^a^tio^ns⁾^.
¹⁰^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,¹⁵^U^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 6}³⁰⁷^b⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^p^r^o^f^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l box}^ing^s^a^f^e^t^y^{; pr}^ote^c^{tion f}^r^om^c^o^e^r^cⁱ^v^e^c^ontr^a^c^t^s⁾^.
¹¹^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,¹⁵^U^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 7}⁷⁰⁴⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽ⁿ^oⁿ^-^s^olic^ite^d^p^o^rⁿ^og^r^a^phy^a^nd^m^a^r^k^e^ting^;^pr^ote^c^tions^f^o^r^us^e^r^s^o^f^c^o^m^m^e^r^cⁱ^a^l
^el^ect^roⁿⁱ^{c m}^aⁱ^l⁾^.
¹²^{16 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹⁵³⁸⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^e^nda^ng^e^r^e^d^s^p^e^cⁱ^e^s^{; pr}^o^h^ibite^{d a}^c^t^s⁾^.
¹³^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,¹⁸^U.S^.^C.^{§ 2}⁴⁵⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾^(c^iv^{il rig}^h^{ts; f}^e^de^ra^ll^y^prote^c^t^e^d^a^c^tiv^itie^{s); 42 U.}^S.C.^§²⁰^00a⁽²⁰⁰^5)(c^iv^{il rig}^h^ts;
^p^r^ohⁱ^bⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿ^agaiⁿ^s^t^dⁱ^scri^mⁱⁿ^a^tⁱ^o^{n o}^r^segregatⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ^p^l^{aces o}^f^p^u^b^lⁱ^c^acco^mm^o^d^a^tⁱ^oⁿ⁾^.
¹⁴^{18 U}^.^S.C.^§²²^{8 (f}^a^ilure^to^pa^y^le^g^a^{l c}^h^{ild su}^pp^ort^oblig^a^tio^ns).
¹⁵^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§²²⁵¹⁽^s^e^x^ua^{l e}^x^ploit^a^tion^of^c^h^ildr^eⁿ⁾^.
¹⁶^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹⁵³¹⁽^p^a^r^tia^l-^bir^t^h^a^bor^ti^ons^pr^o^hⁱ^b^ite^d)^.
¹⁷^T^h^e^r^e^a^r^e^ov^e^r^a^hundr^e^d^c^r^im^ina^l^la^w^s^w^h^ic^{h us}^e^the^te^r^m^“ⁱ^nte^r^s^t^a^t^e^c^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^.^”^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,¹⁸^U^.^S.^C^.^§¹⁰³³
⁽²⁰^05)(f^ra^{ud a}ⁿ^{d f}^a^lse^sta^t^e^m^eⁿ^ts^{; c}^r^im^e^s^by^{or a}^f^f^e^c^ting^pe^{rsons e}ⁿ^g^a^g^e^{d in the}^busiⁿ^e^{ss of}^insuraⁿ^c^e^w^hose^a^c^tiv^itie^s
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

devices,²³ labor,²⁴ industrial safety,²⁵ pensions,²⁶ environmental law,²⁷ fish and wildlife,²⁸ medical ²⁹³⁰³¹³²³³³⁴
products, water pollution, atomic energy, shipping, motor vehicle safety, airplanes and ³⁵
tort litigation.
Recent Supreme Court case law, however, has brought the limits of the Commerce Clause into ³⁶
question. While these cases have resulted in the overturning of federal laws, their overall affect
has so far been relatively modest in scope. A recently decided Supreme Court case, Gonzales v. ³⁷
Raich, seems to confirm that the effect of these previous cases will be limited.
The Commerce Clause provides that “The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” The word

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^a^ffe^c^t^inte^rsta^te^c^o^m^m^e^rc^e⁾^{; 18 U.S.C.§}³³⁽^d^e^s^truc^tio^{n of}^m^o^{tor v}^e^hic^l^e^s^{or m}^o^{tor v}^e^hic^l^e^f^a^c^ilitie^s⁾^{; 18}^U.S.C^.^§¹⁹⁵²
⁽ⁱ^nte^r^s^t^a^t^e^a^{nd f}^o^r^e^ig^{n tr}^a^v^e^l^or^tr^aⁿ^s^por^ta^ti^on^{in a}ⁱ^{d of}^r^a^c^k^e^t^e^e^r^ing^eⁿ^te^r^p^rⁱ^s^e^s⁾^{; 18}^U^.^S.C^.^§¹⁹⁵⁸⁽^u^s^e^of^inte^r^s^ta^te
^c^o^m^m^e^rc^e^f^a^c^ilitie^{s in the}^c^o^m^mⁱ^{ssion of}^m^u^rde^r-f^or-hire⁾^.
¹⁸^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,²¹^U^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 8}⁰¹⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^d^r^u^g^a^bus^e^pr^e^v^eⁿ^tio^{n a}ⁿ^d^c^oⁿ^t^r^o^{l; c}^o^ng^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l f}ⁱ^ndi^ng^s^a^nd^de^c^l^a^r^a^tions⁾^;²¹
^U^.^S.C^.^{§ 8}⁶³⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^d^r^u^g^a^bus^e^p^r^e^v^eⁿ^{tion a}ⁿ^{d c}^o^ntr^o^l^;^dr^ug^pa^r^a^p^h^e^r^na^lia⁾^.
¹⁹^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,²¹^U^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 6}⁰²⁽^m^e^a^tⁱⁿ^s^p^e^c^tio^{n; c}^o^ng^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l s}^t^a^t^e^m^{ent of}^fⁱ^ndi^ng^s⁾^.
²⁰^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,²⁶^U.^S^.^C.^§⁵⁸⁶¹⁽²⁰⁰^5)(machⁱⁿ^{e gu}ⁿ^s^,^d^e^st^ru^ctⁱ^v^{e d}^e^vi^ces,^an^d^cert^aⁱⁿ^o^t^h^e^{r f}ⁱ^rearms;^p^r^ohⁱ^bⁱ^t^e^d^act^s).
²¹^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,¹⁸^U^.^S.C^.^§²³³²^a⁽^u^s^e^of^w^e^a^pons^of^m^a^ss^de^s^t^r^u^c^tion)^.
²²^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹⁴⁶²⁽ⁱ^m^por^ta^tio^{n or}^tr^aⁿ^s^por^ta^tio^{n of}^o^b^s^c^eⁿ^e^m^a^tte^r⁾^.
²³^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,¹⁵^U^.^S^.^C^..^§¹¹^{72 (}²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^t^r^a^ns^p^o^r^t^a^tioⁿ^of^g^a^m^b^ling^de^vⁱ^c^e^s^a^s^unla^w^f^u^{l; e}^x^c^e^p^tions^{; a}^u^t^h^or^ity^of^Fe^de^r^a^l
^T^r^ad^{e Co}^mmⁱ^ssi^oⁿ^).
²⁴^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,²⁹^U^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 2}⁰⁷⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^f^aⁱ^r^la^bor^s^t^a^nda^r^d^s^;^m^a^xⁱ^m^u^m^hour^s⁾^.
²⁵^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,²⁹^U^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 6}⁵¹⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^o^c^c^upa^tio^na^{l s}^a^f^e^t^y^a^{nd he}^a^{lth; c}^ong^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l s}^t^a^t^e^m^eⁿ^{t of}^fⁱ^nding^s^a^nd^de^c^l^a^r^a^tion
^of^pur^p^o^s^e^a^nd^po^lic^y⁾^.
²⁶^S^ee,^e.^g^.^{, 2}⁹^U.S^.^C.^{§ 1}⁰⁰¹⁽²⁰⁰⁵^)(e^m^p^loy^e^e^re^tire^m^eⁿ^{t inc}^o^m^e^se^c^u^rity^prog^ra^m^;^c^ong^re^ssiona^{l f}ⁱ^nd^ing^s^{); 29}^U.S.C.
^{§ 1}⁰⁰¹^a⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^e^m^p^loy^e^e^r^e^tir^em^eⁿ^{t inc}^o^m^e^s^e^c^u^r^ity^pr^og^r^a^m^;^a^dditiona^l^fⁱ^nding^s⁾^.
²⁷^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,³³^U^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 1}³²²⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^w^a^t^e^r^poll^u^tioⁿ^pr^e^v^eⁿ^tion^aⁿ^d^c^ontr^o^{l; m}^a^rⁱ^ne^s^a^nita^tion^de^vⁱ^c^e^s⁾^;⁴²^U^.^S.C^.^§
⁷⁶⁷^1d⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^s^tr^a^t^os^p^h^e^r^ic^oz^one^pr^ote^c^tⁱ^on;^p^h^a^s^e^-^out^of^pr^od^uc^ti^{on a}ⁿ^{d c}^o^ns^um^ptio^{n of}^c^l^a^s^s^I^I^s^u^bs^ta^nc^e^s⁾^.
²⁸^{16 U}^.^S.C^.^§³³⁷²⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^f^is^{h a}ⁿ^d^w^ildlif^e^;^pr^ohi^bite^{d a}^c^t^s⁾^.
²⁹^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,⁴²^U^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 2}⁶²⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^lic^eⁿ^sⁱ^ng^of^bio^l^og^ic^a^l^pr^od^uc^ts^a^{nd c}^lin^ic^a^l^la^bor^a^t^or^ie^s^;^r^e^g^u^la^ti^on^of^biol^og^ic^a^l
^pr^o^duc^ts⁾^.
³⁰^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,⁴²^U^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 3}⁰⁰^j^-²^{3 (}²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^s^a^f^e^t^y^o^f^public^w^a^te^r^sy^s^t^em^s^;^dr^inkⁱ^ng^w^a^te^r^c^oole^r^s^c^ontaⁱ^ning^le^a^d⁾^.
³¹^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,⁴²^U.S^.^C.^{§ 2}⁰¹²⁽²⁰⁰⁵^)(a^tomⁱ^c^eⁿ^e^r^gy^{; f}ⁱ^nding^{s); 42 U.}^{S.C. §}²⁰¹⁹⁽²⁰⁰^5)(a^tomⁱ^c^eⁿ^e^r^g^y^{: a}^pplic^a^b^ility^of
^f^e^de^r^a^{l pow}^e^r^ac^{t )}^;^{42 U}^.^S.C^.^§²⁰⁷³⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^s^pe^cⁱ^a^lⁿ^u^c^l^e^a^r^m^a^te^rⁱ^a^{l; dom}^e^s^tic^dis^t^rⁱ^b^u^tioⁿ^of^s^p^e^cⁱ^{al nuc}^le^a^r
^material).
³²^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,⁴⁶^U.S^.^C.^§⁴³⁰⁷⁽²⁰⁰⁵^)(recreatioⁿ^a^{l v}^e^{ssels; p}^r^o^hⁱ^b^ited^{acts); 4}⁶^U.S^.^C.^§⁴³¹¹⁽²⁰⁰⁵^)(re^creatioⁿ^a^l
^v^e^sse^{ls; pe}^na^ltie^{s a}^{nd inj}^unc^ti^ons)^;⁴⁶^U.S.C.^a^ppe^ndix^{§ 8}⁰¹⁽²⁰⁰⁵^)(ship^p^ing^a^c^{t; de}^fⁱ^niti^ons).
³³^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,⁴⁹^U^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 3}⁰¹⁰¹⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^m^otor^v^e^hic^l^e^s^a^f^e^t^y^{; pur}^p^o^s^e^a^{nd p}^o^lic^y⁾^{; 49 U}^.^S.C^.^{§ 3}⁰¹¹²⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^m^otor
^v^e^hic^l^e^s^a^f^e^t^y^{; prohibi}^tio^ns^oⁿ^m^a^nuf^a^c^t^uring^,^s^e^lling^,^aⁿ^{d im}^portiⁿ^g^nonc^om^plyⁱ^ng^m^o^{tor v}^e^hic^l^e^s^a^{nd e}^q^ui^pm^eⁿ^{t); 49}
^U^.^S.C^.^{§ 3}⁰¹²³⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^m^otor^v^e^hic^l^e^s^a^f^e^t^y^{; tir}^e^s⁾^.
³⁴^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,⁴⁹^U^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 4}⁰¹¹⁶⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^a^ir^c^o^m^m^e^r^ce^a^{nd s}^a^f^e^t^y^{; s}^t^a^t^e^ta^x^a^tion)^.
³⁵^P^.^L^.¹⁰^9-²⁽^C^la^s^s^A^c^{tion Fa}^ir^ne^s^s^A^c^{t of}²⁰⁰⁵⁾^.
³⁶^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^L^ope^z^,⁵^{14 U}^.^S.⁵⁴⁹^{, 5}⁶¹⁽¹⁹⁹⁵⁾^{; U}ⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^Mor^rⁱ^s^o^n,⁵²^{9 U}^.^S^.⁵⁹⁸⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
³⁷^_^_^_^U.^S.^__^_,¹²^{5 S}^.^C^t^.²¹⁹⁵⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾^.

“commerce” appears to have the same primary meaning today as it did in 1789 – “an interchange
of goods or commodities between different countries or between areas of the same country” or in ³⁸
other words “trade.” However, commentators have argued that a secondary meaning of
commerce which was understood at the time of the drafting of the Constitution includes all ³⁹
productive activity which relates to commerce, such as manufacturing and agriculture.
A further question is then raised whether Congress’s power to regulate commerce is significantly
limited by the phrase “with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
Tribes.” For instance, the phrase “among the several States” could either be interpreted as
“between people of different states” or more broadly as “between people who live in the various
states.” Some have argued that the broader definition, which would cover commerce between ⁴⁰
people of the same state, would render the phrase “among the several States” superfluous. This
question, generally characterized as whether the power to regulate “interstate commerce” extends
to “intrastate” commerce has been mostly settled by case law, and most “intrastate” commercial ⁴¹
transactions are vulnerable to some form of federal regulation.
The integration of commercial activities in the United States was a central theme of the ⁴²
Constitutional Convention of 1787. It appears, however, that the parameters of the Commerce ⁴³
Clause were not of particular concern to the framers of the Constitution. The commentary
contemporary to the Constitution on the power did not concern itself with the federalism
implications of managing interstate economic transactions, but rather focused on the issue of ⁴⁴
foreign trade. The primary purpose of the clause appears to have been raising federal revenue by ⁴⁵
the nationalization of the states’ power to impose import tariffs, while a secondary purpose was

³⁸^G^r^aⁿ^{t N}^e^ls^{on a}^{nd R}^obe^r^t^P^u^s^h^a^w^{, J}^r^.,^R^e^t^hⁱⁿ^kiⁿ^g^t^h^{e Co}^{mmerce Cl}^a^u^s^{e: A}^p^p^l^yi^ng^Fⁱ^rst^P^rⁱⁿ^ci^p^l^{es t}^o^Up^ho^l^d
^Fe^de^r^a^{l C}^o^m^m^e^r^c^{ial Re}^gul^ati^ons^but^Pr^e^s^e^r^v^e^State^C^oⁿ^t^r^o^{l O}^v^e^r^Soc^ia^{l I}^s^s^u^e^s^{, 8}⁵^I^o^w^a^L^.^R^e^v^.^1,¹⁰¹ⁿ⁴⁷^{8 (}²⁰⁰¹⁾^.
^A^s^w^{ill be}^disc^usse^{d la}^te^{r, a}^re^q^uⁱ^r^e^m^eⁿ^{t tha}^t^the^thiⁿ^g^to^be^re^g^u^la^t^e^{d be}^“^c^o^m^m^e^r^cⁱ^a^l^”^{or “}^m^e^r^c^aⁿ^tile^,”^ha^{s, to s}^o^m^e
^e^x^te^{nt, be}^eⁿ^use^d^by^the^Su^pre^m^e^Court^to^lim^{it the}^c^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^powe^r^{to “}^c^o^m^m^e^r^cⁱ^a^l^”^a^c^tiv^itie^{s. Se}^e^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.
^L^ope^z^,⁵¹^{4 U}^.^S.⁵^49,⁵^{61 (}¹⁹⁹⁵⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^Mor^rⁱ^s^on,⁵^{29 U}^.^S.⁵⁹^8,⁶¹^{7 (}²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
³⁹^G^r^aⁿ^{t N}^e^ls^{on a}^{nd R}^obe^r^t^P^u^s^h^a^w^{, J}^r^.,^sup^r^a^f^o^ot^no^t^e³⁸^,^at¹⁴^-¹⁵^.
⁴⁰^Ran^d^y^Barn^ett,^The^O^r^igⁱⁿ^{al M}^e^ani^ng^{of t}^h^e^C^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^C^l^aus^e^,⁶⁸^U.^C^HI^.^L.^R^EV^{. 101}^{, 1}³²⁽²⁰⁰¹⁾^.
⁴¹^Se^e^{“Case L}^a^w^Dev^e^l^o^p^m^en^t^,^”^infra.
⁴²^Vⁱ^rgiⁿⁱ^a^an^d^M^a^ry^l^aⁿ^d^h^a^d^j^u^st^fⁱⁿⁱ^sh^{ed a co}^m^p^act^regardⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^{e navi}^gatⁱ^oⁿ^an^d^j^u^ri^sdⁱ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^e^Ch^esap^{eake Ba}^y
^a^{nd t}^h^e^P^o^tom^a^c^.^T^h^e^c^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^oⁿ^e^r^s^w^{ho ha}^d^ne^g^o^tia^te^{d t}^h^is^tr^e^a^t^y^c^a^lle^{d f}^o^r^a^g^e^ne^r^a^{l tr}^a^d^e^c^onv^entio^{n, a}^{nd v}^a^rⁱ^o^u^s
^othe^r^s^t^a^t^e^s^r^e^s^p^o^nde^d^by^a^ppoi^nt^ing^de^le^g^a^te^s^{to this}^c^onv^eⁿ^ti^on.^Oⁿ^ly^w^h^eⁿ^{it b}^ecam^{e cl}^{ear t}^h^at^t^hⁱ^s^coⁿ^v^en^tⁱ^oⁿ^mⁱ^gh^t
^a^ddre^{ss othe}^r^issue^s^di^{d t}^h^e^Con^tⁱⁿ^eⁿ^ta^{l Co}^ng^re^{ss a}^pprov^e^of^{it. J.}^Story^,^Com^m^e^nta^r^ie^{s on t}^h^e^Co^nstituti^on^of^the
^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s²⁵^2-⁵⁴^.
⁴³^A^b^e^l^,^The^C^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^C^l^aus^eⁱⁿ^t^h^e^C^ons^t^itutⁱ^o^{nal C}^onv^eⁿ^tⁱ^oⁿ^aⁿ^d^{in C}^onte^m^p^o^r^a^r^y^C^o^m^m^e^nt^{, 2}⁵^M^IN^N^.^L.^R^EV^.
⁴³²^{, 4}⁴³^-⁴⁴⁽¹⁹⁴¹⁾^{; G}^r^e^eⁿ^s^p^aⁿ^,^T^h^e^C^ons^t^itutⁱ^o^nal^Ex^e^r^cⁱ^s^e^{of the}^Fe^de^r^a^{l Po}^lic^e^Pow^e^r^:^A^Fu^nc^tio^nal^Ap^pr^oac^{h to}
^Fe^de^ralism^{, 4}¹^V^A^NDE^R^B^I^L^T^L^AW^R^EV^IE^W¹⁰¹^{9, 10}^22-^{24 (}¹⁹⁸⁸⁾^.
⁴⁴^T^hos^e^m^a^t^e^rⁱ^a^l^s^w^h^ic^{h do}^a^ddr^e^s^s^c^ong^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l c}^o^ntr^o^l^ov^e^r^c^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^f^o^c^u^s^{on t}^h^e^ne^c^e^s^s^ity^of^uⁿ^if^or^mⁱ^t^yⁱⁿ
^m^a^tte^r^s^of^f^o^r^e^ig^{n c}^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^,^a^lthoug^{h t}^h^e^dr^a^f^te^r^s^c^l^e^a^r^l^y^inte^nde^d^dom^e^s^tic^c^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^{to be}^r^e^g^u^la^t^e^{d a}^s^w^e^{ll. P}^.
^Ku^rlan^d^{& R}^.^L^e^rn^{er, T}^HE^F^OUND^E^R^’^S^C^ONS^T^I^T^U^T^I^ON^477-⁵²^{8 (}¹⁹⁸⁷⁾^.
⁴⁵^A^l^ex^a^nde^r^H^a^m^{ilton, C}^O^N^T^IN^EN^T^A^LI^ST^{, N}^o^{. 5,}^{18 A}^p^r^.¹⁷^{82 (}^P^a^p^e^r^3:7⁵^-⁸²⁾^a^s^r^e^prⁱⁿ^te^dⁱⁿ^{P. K}^u^r^l^a^{nd &}^R^.^L^e^rⁿ^e^r^,
^s^upr^a^f^o^ot^no^t^e⁴⁴⁽^“^Th^{e vest}ⁱⁿ^{g o}^f^t^h^{e p}^o^w^er^o^f^r^e^gu^l^a^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^r^ad^{e o}^ugh^t^t^o^h^a^{ve b}^een^{a p}^rⁱⁿ^ci^p^a^l^o^b^j^ec^t^o^f^t^h^e
^coⁿ^f^ed^eratⁱ^oⁿ^f^o^{r a vari}^et^y^o^f^reas^oⁿ^s^.^Itⁱ^s^{as n}^ecessar^y^f^o^{r t}^h^{e pu}^rpo^s^{es o}^f^co^mmerce^{as o}^f^rev^eⁿ^u^e^.^”^{) F}^o^{r i}ⁿ^st^an^ce,^t^h^e
^s^t^a^t^e^of^N^e^w^Y^o^r^kⁱ^m^pos^e^d^a^2%^im^pos^{t on im}^por^ts^t^h^a^t^m^o^v^e^{d thr}^oug^{h t}^h^e^N^e^w^Y^o^r^k^H^a^r^bor^{. C}^a^lv^{in J}^o^hns^on,^The
^Pan^{da’s Th}^umb:^T^h^e^M^ode^{st an}^{d M}^e^rc^antilist^Origi^{nal M}^e^aⁿⁱⁿ^g^of^the^Comme^rc^e^Clause^{, 13}^W^M^.^&^M^AR^Y^B^I^{LL O}^F
^R^IG^H^T^S^J^OURN^A^L^{8 (}²⁰⁰⁴⁾^{. Ef}^f^o^r^t^s^un^de^r^the^A^r^tic^le^s^of^C^onf^e^d^e^r^a^tion^{to im}^pos^e^a^f^e^de^r^a^{l im}^pos^{t on}^im^por^ts^ha^d^be^eⁿ
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

apparently to allow Congress to regulate and restrict foreign commerce to advance American ⁴⁶
interests.
The argument has been made that while regulating free and fair trade between states was the ⁴⁷
principal motivation for adopting various other provisions of the Constitution, it may not have
been a strong motivation for the drafting of the Commerce Clause. This is because state
restrictions on trade between states were already prohibited under the Articles of Confederation, ⁴⁸
and the states generally complied with these restrictions. Consequently, commentary
contemporary to the ratification of the Constitution indicating that the Commerce Clause was
intended to limit state restrictions on interstate commerce was minimal.
In Gibbons v. Ogden, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, considered a
challenge to a monopoly on the operation of steam-propelled vessels in New York waters. This
monopoly was challenged by Gibbons, who transported passengers from New Jersey to New
York under an act of Congress. The Chief Justice, in striking down the monopoly, wrote that “the
power over commerce . . . is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single
government . . .” and that “the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are . . . the ⁴⁹
sole restraints” on this power.
The Chief Justice went on to write that “[t]he counsel for the appellee would limit [the term
commerce] to traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities, and do not admit
that it comprehends navigation. This would restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to
one of its significations. Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more—it is
intercourse,” which the Court found easily included the issue of navigation. Marshall did qualify
the word “intercourse” with the word “commercial,” thus retaining the element of monetary
transactions.
The Court did not soon revisit this expansive view of the Commerce Clause. Instead, over the
next several decades, the Court considered the boundaries of the “dormant Commerce Clause”
doctrine – the implied limitation of the Commerce Clause on a state’s ability to regulate ⁵⁰
commerce. This, combined with the relatively cautious exercise of the power by the early

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^bloc^k^e^{d by}^N^e^w^Y^o^r^k^.^Id^.^a^t^11-¹²^{. G}^r^aⁿ^ting^the^C^ong^re^{ss the}^p^o^w^e^{r to ra}ⁱ^s^{e reven}^u^eⁱⁿ^t^hⁱ^s^m^aⁿⁿ^e^r^w^a^{s seen}^{as an}
^im^por^ta^{nt w}^a^y^{to pa}^y^o^f^f^R^e^v^o^lutiona^r^y^Wa^r^de^bts^.^Id^.^a^t^8-¹¹^.
⁴⁶^{For i}ⁿ^staⁿ^c^e^,^t^h^e^pr^ospe^c^t^of^e^x^c^l^udi^ng^{British s}^h^{ips f}^r^om^Am^e^r^ic^aⁿ^w^a^te^rs,^w^h^ile^ne^v^e^{r re}^a^liz^e^d^{, wa}^{s c}^onte^m^pla^t^e^d
^a^s^a^re^ta^lia^{tion f}^o^{r the}^e^x^c^l^usioⁿ^o^f^Am^e^r^ic^aⁿ^sh^{ips f}^r^om^the^British^W^e^{st Indie}^s^{. Ca}^lv^{in Jo}^hnsoⁿ^,^su^p^r^a^f^o^o^t^no^t^e⁴⁵^,^at
^35-^36.
⁴⁷^Suc^h^pr^ov^is^ionsⁱⁿ^c^l^u^d^e^the^lⁱ^m^ita^tion^on^s^t^a^t^e^dut^ie^s^a^nd^im^pos^ts^{on im}^por^ts^a^{nd e}^x^por^ts^{, U}^.^S^.^C^ON^S^T^.^A^r^tic^le^{I, §}
^{10, c}^l^{. 2}^,^a^s^s^u^c^h^du^tie^s^ha^{d f}^a^v^o^r^e^{d s}^t^a^t^e^s^w^{ith de}^e^p^ha^r^b^or^s^ov^e^rⁿ^e^ig^hbor^s^t^a^t^e^s^{; t}^h^e^P^o^r^t^P^r^e^f^e^r^eⁿ^ce^C^l^a^u^s^e^{, U}^.^S.
^C^ONS^T^.,^A^r^{t. I, §}^{9, c}^l^.^6,^lim^iting^the^f^e^de^ra^{l g}^o^v^e^rn^m^e^{nt f}^r^o^mⁱ^m^p^o^sing^pre^f^e^r^eⁿ^c^e^s^f^o^{r the}^p^o^rts^of^one^sta^t^e^ov^e^r
^a^nothe^r^;^a^nd^the^pr^o^h^ibi^tio^{n o}ⁿ^s^t^a^t^e^s^is^s^u^ing^pa^pe^r^m^one^y^,^U^.^S.^C^ONS^T^.,^A^r^{t. I}^,^§^10,^c^l^.^{1, t}^h^e^is^s^u^aⁿ^c^e^of^w^h^ic^{h ha}^d
^al^l^o^w^e^d^st^at^{es t}^o^req^uⁱ^{re t}^h^{e accep}^t^aⁿ^{ce o}^f^d^e^val^u^ed^m^oⁿ^e^y^b^y^o^u^t^-o^f^-^st^at^{e cred}ⁱ^t^o^rs.^Id^.^at⁴⁶^-48^.
⁴⁸^Id^.^a^t^42-⁴²^.
⁴⁹^Gⁱ^bbons^v^.^O^d^g^e^{n, 2}²^U^.^S^.⁽⁹^W^h^e^a^t^.)^1,¹^97-^{98 (}¹⁸²⁴⁾^.
⁵⁰^F^o^{r a}^dⁱ^scu^ssi^on^o^f^t^hⁱ^s^{case l}^a^w^,^{see M}^a^rtⁱⁿ^Redⁱ^{sh an}^{d S}^h^aⁿ^{e Nugen}^t^,^T^h^{e Do}^rm^aⁿ^t^C^o^{mmerce Cl}^a^u^s^{e an}^{d t}^h^e
^C^ons^tit^uti^oⁿ^a^{l B}^a^la^nc^e^of^Fe^de^r^a^lis^m^{, 19}⁸⁷^D^UK^E^L^.^J^.⁵⁶⁹⁽¹⁹⁸⁷⁾^.

Congresses, meant that the Supreme Court did not have occasion to consider the limits of the
Congress’s power under this doctrine for almost sixty years.
When the Court again revisited Congress’s power under the clause, it generally approved of ⁵¹
statutes regulating the interstate movement of goods or persons, such as lottery tickets, ⁵²⁵³
adulterated food, or prostitutes. But, during the early 1900s, the Supreme Court was
confronted with statutes which went beyond regulation of trade, and addressed other related
economic activities. Consequently, the Court struck down a series of federal statutes which ⁵⁴
attempted to extend commerce regulation to activities such as “production,” “manufacturing” or ⁵⁵
“mining.”
Starting in 1937, however, with the decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation,⁵⁶
the Supreme Court held that Congress has the ability to protect interstate commerce from burdens
and obstructions which “affect” commercial transactions. In the NLRB case, the court upheld the
National Labor Relations Act, finding that by controlling industrial labor strife, Congress was ⁵⁷
preventing burdens from being placed on interstate commerce. Thus, the Court rejected previous
distinctions between the economic activities (such as manufacturing) which led up to interstate
economic transactions, and the interstate transactions themselves. By allowing Congress to
regulate activities which were in the “stream” of commerce, the Court also set the stage for the
regulation of a variety of other activities which “affect” commerce.
Subsequent Court decisions found that Congress had considerable discretion in regulating
activities which “affect” interstate commerce, as long as the legislation was “reasonably” related ⁵⁸
to achieving its goals of regulating interstate commerce. Thus the Court found that in some
cases, events of purely local commerce (such as local working conditions) might, because of
market forces, negatively affect interstate commerce, and thus would be susceptible to ⁵⁹
regulation. The Court has also held that an activity which in itself does not affect interstate
commerce could be regulated if all such activities taken together in the aggregate did affect ⁶⁰
interstate commerce. Under the reasoning of these cases, the Court has upheld many diverse ⁶¹
laws, including laws regulating production of wheat on farms, racial discrimination by ⁶²⁶³
businesses, and loan-sharking.

⁵¹^C^h^a^m^{pion v}^.^A^m^e^s⁽^T^he^L^o^tte^r^y^C^a^s^e⁾^,^{188 U}^.^S.³²^{1 (}¹⁹⁰³⁾^.
⁵²^Hipp^olite^Eg^g^Co.^v^.^Unite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, 22}^{0 U.S.}⁴⁵⁽¹⁹¹^1).
⁵³^H^o^k^e^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^{, 22}^{7 U}^.^S.³⁰⁸⁽¹⁹¹³⁾^.
⁵⁴^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^{E.C. K}ⁿ^ig^{ht C}^o^.,¹⁵^{6 U}^.^S^.¹^,¹²⁽¹⁸^95).
⁵⁵^Ca^rte^r^v^.^Ca^rte^r^Coa^l^Co.,²^{98 U}^.^{S. 2}³⁸^,³⁰⁴⁽¹⁹³^6).
⁵⁶³⁰^{1 U}^.^S^.¹⁽¹⁹³⁷⁾^.
⁵⁷³⁰^{1 U}^.^S^.^a^t⁴¹^.
⁵⁸^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^D^a^r^b^y^,^{312 U}^.^S.¹⁰⁰⁽¹⁹⁴¹⁾⁽^a^pp^r^o^vⁱ^ng^le^gⁱ^s^l^a^tion^r^e^la^ting^{to w}^o^r^k^ing^c^oⁿ^d^iti^ons⁾^.
⁵⁹³¹^{2 U}^.^S^.^a^t¹²¹^.
⁶⁰^Wi^ckar^d^v.^Fⁱ^l^b^u^r^n,³¹^{7 U.}^S^.¹¹¹⁽¹⁹⁴²⁾^.
⁶¹^Id^.
⁶²^H^e^a^r^{t of}^A^tla^nta^Mote^{l v}^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, 37}^{0 U}^.^S^.²⁴¹⁽¹⁹⁶⁴⁾^{; K}^a^tz^e^nba^c^h^v^.^Mc^C^l^ung^{, 3}⁷⁹^U^.^S.²⁴¹⁽¹⁹⁶⁴⁾^.
⁶³^P^e^r^e^z^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^,⁴⁰^{2 U}^.^S^.¹⁴⁶⁽¹⁹⁷¹⁾^.

In the 1995 case of United States v. Lopez,⁶⁴ however, the Supreme Court brought into question
the extent to which the Congress can rely on the Commerce Clause as a basis for federal
jurisdiction. Under the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990, Congress made it a federal offense for
“any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has ⁶⁵
reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.” In Lopez, the Court held that, because the act
neither regulated a commercial activity nor contained a requirement that the possession was
connected to interstate commerce, the act exceeded the authority of Congress under the
Commerce Clause. Although the Court did not explicitly overrule any previous rulings upholding
federal statutes passed under the authority of the Commerce Clause, the decision would appear to
suggest new limits to Congress’s legislative authority.
The Lopez case was significant in that it was the first time since 1937 that the Supreme Court
struck down a federal statute purely based on a finding that the Congress had exceeded it powers ⁶⁶
under the Commerce Clause. In doing so, the Court revisited its prior cases, sorted the
commerce power into three categories, and asserted that Congress could not go beyond these
three categories: 1) regulation of channels of commerce; 2) regulation of instrumentalities of ⁶⁷
commerce; and 3) regulation of economic activities which “affect” commerce.
Within the third category of activities which “affect commerce,” the Court determined that the
power to regulate commerce applies to intrastate activities only when they “substantially” affect ⁶⁸
commerce. Still, the Court in Lopez spoke approvingly of earlier cases upholding laws which
regulated intrastate credit transactions, restaurants utilizing interstate supplies, and hotels catering
to interstate guests. The Court also recognized that while some intrastate activities may by
themselves have a trivial effect on commerce, regulation of these activities may be constitutional
if their regulation is an essential part of a larger economic regulatory scheme. Thus, the Court
even approved what has been perceived as one of its most expansive rulings, Wickard v. Filburn, ⁶⁹
which allowed the regulation of the production of wheat for home consumption.
The Court in Lopez found, however, that the Gun Free School Zones Act fell into none of the
three categories set out above. It held that it was not a regulation of channels of commerce, nor
did it protect an instrumentality of commerce. Finally, its effect on interstate commerce was
found to be too removed to be “substantial.” The Court noted that the activity regulated, the
possession of a gun in a school zone, neither by itself nor in the aggregate affected commercial ⁷⁰
transactions. Further, the statute contained no requirement that interstate commerce be affected,

⁶⁴⁵¹^{4 U}^.^S^.⁵⁴⁹⁽¹⁹⁹⁵⁾^.
⁶⁵^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁹²²⁽^q⁾⁽¹⁾^A⁾^.
⁶⁶^Her^m^an^S^c^h^w^art^z^,^{Court Trie}^{s to}^Patro^l^a^Pol^itic^al^Line^,^L^e^g^a^l^Tⁱ^m^e^s^{25 (}^M^a^y^{8, 19}⁹⁵⁾^.
⁶⁷^T^h^{e Co}^u^r^t^f^aⁱ^l^e^d^t^o^no^t^e^t^h^at^t^o^s^o^m^e^e^x^t^eⁿ^t^,^t^h^{e t}^h^{ree cat}^ego^rⁱ^e^{s a}^r^{e i}ⁿ^t^e^rt^wⁱⁿ^e^d^.^F^o^{r i}ⁿ^st^an^ce,^t^h^{e f}ⁱ^rst^cat^ego^r^y^,^t^h^e
^regu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^“st^r^ea^m^s^{” o}^r^“ch^an^nel^s^{” o}^f^co^mm^er^ce,^al^l^o^w^s^re^gu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^o^f^t^h^{e creat}ⁱ^oⁿ^,^m^o^ve^men^t^,^sal^e^an^d^con^s^u^m^p^tⁱ^oⁿ
^of^m^e^rc^ha^ndise^{or se}^rv^ic^e^s^{. But t}^h^e^init^ia^{l e}^x^te^nsion^of^the^“st^r^{eams” o}^f^co^mm^er^{ce an}^al^y^sⁱ^s^b^y^t^h^{e Co}^u^r^t^t^oⁱⁿ^t^r^ast^a^t^e
^tra^d^e^w^a^s^jus^tif^ie^{d b}^y^the^“^e^ffe^c^t^{” of}^the^s^e^othe^{r a}^c^tiv^itie^s^oⁿ^c^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^.^Se^e^N^L^RB^v^.^J^one^s^&^L^a^ughlin^{, 3}⁰¹^U^.^S.^1,
^{31 (}¹⁹³⁶⁾^{. Sim}^ila^rly^,^the^s^e^c^{ond c}^a^t^e^g^or^y^,^w^h^ic^{h a}^llow^s^the^re^g^u^la^tion^of^s^u^c^h^ins^t^r^u^m^e^nta^litie^s^of^c^o^m^m^e^rce^a^s^plaⁿ^e^s^,
^traⁱ^{ns or}^truc^k^s^{, is a}^l^so^ba^se^{d o}ⁿ^t^h^e^th^e^o^ry^tha^t^a^th^re^a^t^{to t}^h^e^s^e^ins^t^rum^e^nta^litie^{s “}^a^ff^e^c^t^s^”^c^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^{, e}^v^eⁿ^if^the^e^ffe^c^t
^{is lo}^{cal in}ⁿ^a^tu^re.^So^u^t^h^e^rn^Railw^a^y^Co^m^p^an^y^v^.^Un^ited^Stat^{es, 2}²²^U.S.²¹^,²⁶^-²⁷⁽¹⁹¹¹^)(re^g^u^lati^oⁿ^o^fⁱⁿ^{trastate rail}
^tra^f^fⁱ^c^ha^{s a}^substa^ntia^{l e}^f^f^e^c^t^{on i}ⁿ^te^rsta^te^ra^{il tra}^f^fⁱ^c⁾^{. T}^{hus, the}^fⁱⁿ^a^{l c}^a^t^e^g^or^y^ideⁿ^tif^ie^{d by}^the^Cour^{t a}^ppe^a^r^{s to}^be^a
^c^a^t^c^h^-a^{ll f}^o^{r a}^{ll othe}^{r a}^c^tiv^itie^{s w}^h^ic^{h “}^s^u^b^staⁿ^tia^lly^a^ffe^c^t^”^c^o^m^m^e^rc^e^.
⁶⁸⁵¹^{4 U}^.^S^.^a^t⁵⁵⁹^.
⁶⁹^Wi^ckar^d^v.^Fⁱ^l^b^u^r^n,³¹^{7 U.}^S^.¹¹¹⁽¹⁹⁴²⁾^.
⁷⁰⁵¹^{4 U}^.^S^.^a^t⁵⁶⁴^.^T^h^e^C^o^ur^{t r}^e^je^c^t^e^d^a^r^g^u^m^e^nts^tha^t^pos^s^e^s^sⁱ^on^of^g^unsⁱⁿ^s^c^ho^{ol z}^one^s^a^f^f^e^c^t^e^d^theⁿ^a^tiona^{l e}^c^o^nom^y
^by^its^ne^g^a^tiv^eⁱ^m^pa^c^t^{on e}^duc^a^tⁱ^on.^Id^.

such as that the gun had been previously transported in interstate commerce.⁷¹ Nor was the
criminalization of possession of a gun near a school part of a larger regulatory scheme which did ⁷²
regulate commerce. Finally, the Court indicated that criminal law enforcement is an area of law ⁷³
traditionally reserved to the states. Consequently, the Court found that Congress did not have
the authority to pass the Gun Free School Zone Act.
The Court also discussed the absence of legislative findings with respect to the statute’s effect on ⁷⁴
interstate commerce. While noting that Congress is not formally required to make such findings,
the Court nevertheless held that “to the extent that congressional findings would enable us to
evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate
commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking ⁷⁵
here.”
Although the Supreme Court has confirmed the dictates of Lopez in the case of United States v. ⁷⁶
Morrison, discussed infra, both of these decisions dealt primarily with the issue of “substantial
impact” on commerce. However, as noted, the Court has identified two other categories of power
that Congress has under the Commerce Clause – regulation of channels of commerce and
regulation of instrumentalities of commerce – that have been interpreted almost as broadly. Thus,
an evaluation of the impact of these cases requires an examination of all three categories of
power.

The channels of commerce doctrine has been interpreted so as to represent a broad power to
regulate. To begin with, this category is the basis for a variety of statutes that directly regulate the
movement of persons or goods across state lines. For instance, the United States Code contains
extensive references to mailing or shipping material in interstate commerce, including regulations ⁷⁷⁷⁸⁷⁹
or bans on shipping biological agents, counterfeit documents, explosives, or threatening ⁸⁰
communications.
Of more significance is that the Court has not required that any nexus exist between the time that
a person crosses a state border and the time they engage in a prohibited activity. For instance, in

⁷¹⁵¹^{4 U}^.^S^.^a^t⁵⁶¹^.
⁷²⁵¹^{4 U}^.^S^.^a^t⁵⁶⁰^.
⁷³⁵¹^{4 U}^.^S^.^a^t⁵⁸⁰⁽^K^e^nne^dy^{, J}^{., c}^o^nc^ur^rⁱ^ng⁾^.
⁷⁴^Id^.
⁷⁵^Id^.^a^t⁵⁶^3.
⁷⁶⁵²^{9 U}^.^S^.⁵⁹⁸⁽²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
⁷⁷^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹⁷^5b^.
⁷⁸^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁵¹^4.
⁷⁹^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁸⁴^2.
⁸⁰^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁸⁷^6.

United States v. Sullivan,⁸¹ the Court addressed the application of § 301k of the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act to a local pharmacist. The section prohibits the “doing of any . . . act with
respect to, a . . . drug . . . if such act is done while such article is held for sale after shipment in
interstate commerce and results in such article being misbranded.” The pharmacist was charged
with “misbranding” sulfathiazole by not providing sufficient information regarding dosage and
usage.
The Court in Sullivan relied on previous precedent finding that Congress has not only the power
regulate commerce among the states, but also the power to “keep the channels of such commerce ⁸²
free from the transportation of illicit or harmful articles.” The fact that the defendant here had
bought the item after it had passed over state lines was not found to be of constitutional ⁸³
significance. Thus, the Court appears to require only that the criminal activity in question has
some relation to the crossing of state lines.
Consistent with this line of reasoning, there are laws, such as criminal prohibitions on mail ⁸⁴
fraud, where the material is regulated not because it is by nature harmful, but rather because it
relates to other behavior which is criminal. Or, there are laws prohibiting crimes based on a
person crossing the state line with the intent to commit the sexual abuse of minors, where it is the ⁸⁵
activity engaged in after the line is crossed that is criminal. Finally, there are laws that regulate
activities which utilize materials after they have been shipped in interstate commerce, even if the ⁸⁶
materials were perfectly legal when they were transported.
Ultimately, based on cases such as Sullivan, it would appear that statutes that would otherwise be
in violation of the limitations of Lopez could be approved by courts because of the presence of the
jurisdictional element that an item related to the crime had crossed a state line. Under this
reasoning, the gun possession law struck down in Lopez, which has since been amended to ⁸⁷⁸⁸
require that the gun had previously been shipped in interstate commerce, would be upheld.
Thus, an expansive reading of the channels of commerce doctrine would appear to stand in the
way of a limited interpretation of the Commerce Clause.
Under the “instrumentalities of commerce” category, Congress may properly make whatever
regulations it sees fit for the safety, efficiency, and accessibility of the nationwide transportation ⁸⁹
and communications networks. For instance, in Preseault v. I.C.C., the Court considered
whether Congress could prevent the reversion of railroad rights-of-way to property owners after

⁸¹³³^{2 U}^.^S^.⁶⁸⁹⁽¹⁹⁴⁸⁾^.
⁸²^Mc^D^e^r^m^{ott v}^.^Wⁱ^s^c^ons^in,²²^{8 U}^.^{S. 1}¹⁵^,¹²⁸⁽¹⁹¹³⁾^.
⁸³³³^{2 U}^.^S^.^a^t⁶^97-⁹⁸^.
⁸⁴^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹³⁴¹^.
⁸⁵^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§²²⁴¹^.
⁸⁶^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§²²⁵²⁽^a⁾⁽⁴⁾⁽^B⁾⁽^d^is^trⁱ^butiⁿ^g^c^h^il^{d p}^o^rⁿ^og^r^a^phy^w^h^e^r^e^m^a^te^rⁱ^a^l^s^us^e^d^ha^v^e^tr^a^v^e^l^e^d^{in in}^te^r^s^ta^te
^co^mmerce).
⁸⁷^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁹²²⁽^q)⁽²⁾⁽^s^e^e^Hⁱ^s^t^or^ic^a^l^N^o^te^s⁾^.
⁸⁸^{But se}^e^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^v^.^Mc^C^o^y^,³²³^F.^3d¹¹¹⁴^{, 1}¹²⁴^-¹¹²⁶⁽⁹^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰³⁾⁽^r^e^ver^sⁱⁿ^{g a co}ⁿ^vⁱ^c^tⁱ^o^{n f}^o^r^po^ssessi^oⁿ^o^f
^c^h^ild^por^nog^r^a^p^h^y^w^h^e^r^e^jurⁱ^s^d^ic^{tion w}^a^s^ba^s^e^{d on}^m^o^v^e^m^e^{nt of}^p^hot^og^r^a^phic^m^a^te^rⁱ^a^l^s^ov^e^r^s^t^a^t^e^li^ne^s⁾^.
⁸⁹⁴⁹^{4 U}^.^S^.¹⁽¹⁹⁹⁰⁾^.

abandonment in order to create recreational trails. The I.C.C. argued that turning the right-of-
ways into recreation trails was preserving the rail corridors for future railroad use. Despite
arguments that the preservation argument was a pretext, the Court held that it must defer to a
congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce “if there is any rational ⁹⁰
basis for such a finding.”
The instrumentalities of commerce category represents yet another significant basis for expansive
congressional authority. As noted previously, federal mail and wire fraud statutes make it a crime
to engage in fraud while using the telephone or the mails. By analogy, Congress could reach
many other activities that utilize these networks or similar networks such as railroads, interstate
highways, and even the Internet. While this category has not been fully occupied by Congress, it
would appear that a significant amount of federal power could be exercised in this manner, ⁹¹
regardless of whether the matter regulated involved non-economic activity. The Court has not
yet indicated whether the Lopez requirement that regulated activities have some connection to a
commercial activity would be applicable in this category.
The third prong of Congress’s power to regulate under the Commerce Clause involves those
activities that have a substantial impact or effect on interstate commerce. To fully understand the
scope and reach of this power, it is important to begin with an examination of the Court’s 1942 ⁹²
decision in Wickard v. Filburn, which led to the expansive view of the Commerce Clause that
Congress operated under until 1995. In Wickard, the Court was asked to determine whether, under
the Commerce Clause, amendments to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 implementing a
quota system to restrict the amount of wheat that could be harvested and sold, applied to ⁹³
individuals who produced and consumed homegrown bushels of wheat.
In upholding the statute as constitutional, the Court held that economic activities, regardless of
their nature, could be regulated by Congress if the activity “asserts a substantial impact on ⁹⁴
interstate commerce . . . .” The Court reasoned that the growing of wheat, even if only for a
family’s personal consumption, provided an alternative to the marketplace that was both viable ⁹⁵
and competitive. Although the Court admitted that one family’s production alone would likely
have a negligible impact on the overall price of wheat, if combined with other personal producers ⁹⁶
the effect would be substantial enough to make the activity subject to congressional regulation.
The rationale of combining individual effects to find substantial impacts on interstate commerce

⁹⁰⁴⁹^{4 U}^.^S^.^a^t¹⁷^,^ci^tⁱ^ng^Hod^e^l^v.^Vi^rgiⁿⁱ^a^S^u^rf^{ace M}ⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^{& Recl}^amatⁱ^oⁿ^A^ssn^.^,^In^c.^,⁴⁵^{2 U.}^S^.²⁶⁴^,²⁷⁶⁽¹⁹⁸¹⁾^.
⁹¹^Se^e^J^e^s^s^e^C^hope^r^,^T^a^ming^Con^g^r^{ess’s Po}^{wer Un}^d^e^{r th}^{e C}^o^mmerc^{e Cl}^a^u^s^{e: Wh}^at^Do^{es t}^h^{e Nea}^r^F^u^t^u^{re P}^o^rt^end^{, 55}
^A^RK^.^L.^R^EV^{. 731, 7}⁶¹^-⁷^{62 (}²⁰⁰³⁾^.
⁹²^Wi^ckar^d^v.^Fⁱ^l^b^u^r^n,³¹^{7 U.}^S^.¹¹¹^,¹¹^3-¹¹⁴⁽¹⁹⁴²⁾^.
⁹³^Iⁿ¹⁹^41,^Mr^.^Filb^urⁿ^ha^r^v^e^s^te^{d a}ⁿ^e^x^c^e^s^s^am^{ount of}²³⁹^bus^he^ls^f^o^r^w^h^ic^{h he}^w^a^s^fⁱ^ne^{d $11}^7.¹¹^pu^r^s^ua^{nt t}^o
^am^e^ndm^eⁿ^ts^{to t}^h^e^A^g^rⁱ^c^u^ltur^a^{l A}^d^jus^t^m^e^{nt A}^c^{t of}^1938.^Id^.^a^t¹¹⁴^.
⁹⁴^Id^.^a^t¹²^5.
⁹⁵^Id^.^a^t¹²^8.
⁹⁶^Id^.

has become known as the “aggregation theory,” and arguably represents the most far reaching ⁹⁷
example of Congress’s authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause.
After Wickard, the Court consistently held that a “rational basis” existed for Congress to enact ⁹⁸
laws under the theory that the regulated behavior substantially affected interstate commerce.
Despite the consistency of these decisions, it was not always clear whether the activity in question
met the “substantially affects” test. Then in 1995, when the Court decided the Lopez case, as
discussed previously, it explored the limits of the “substantially affects” test.
Subsequently, in United States v. Morrison,⁹⁹ the Court invalidated a portion of the Violence
Against Women Act, which specifically created a private right of action against anyone who
committed such a crime, allowing an injured party to obtain damages and other compensatory ¹⁰⁰
relief. Applying its holding in Lopez, the Court concluded that the activity regulated by the Act
could not be classified as “economic activity,” and therefore the aggregation principle established
by Wickard did not apply. The Court, however, stopped short of establishing a rule that all non-¹⁰¹
economic activity cannot be aggregated. In addition, the Court concluded that the Act
contained no jurisdictional element connecting the creation of a federal cause of action for ¹⁰²
gender-motivated violence to Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.
Further, while in Morrison, unlike in Lopez, there were numerous congressional findings, the
Court stressed that although findings by the legislative branch can serve to illuminate the
relationship between the regulation and interstate commerce, constitutionality ultimately turns on ¹⁰³
the legal aspects of the substantial effects doctrine, and therefore, is for the Court to decide. In
this case, the Court found that the legislative findings detailing the effects on interstate commerce
by gender motivated violence were based in large part on the “costs of crime,” which was nearly ¹⁰⁴
identical to the reasoning expressly rejected by the Court in Lopez.
Finally, the Court considered the level of attenuation between the regulated activity and its effect
on interstate commerce. In this case, the Court concluded that the regulation of gender-motivated

⁹⁷^Se^e^Unⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^{es v.}^Lo^p^ez,⁵¹⁴^U.^S^.⁵⁴^9,⁵⁶^{0 (}¹⁹⁹⁵⁾^.
⁹⁸^S^{ee e.}^g^.^,^H^ode^l^v^.^Vⁱ^r^g^inia^S^u^r^f^ac^e^Mining^&^R^e^c^l^a^m^a^{tion A}^s^sⁿ^{., I}ⁿ^c^{., 4}⁵²^U^.^S.²^64,²^76-²⁸^{0 (}¹⁹⁸¹⁾^;^P^e^r^e^z^v^.
^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^{, 40}^{2 U}^.^S.¹⁴^6,¹⁵^5-¹⁵⁶⁽¹⁹⁷¹⁾^{; K}^a^tz^e^nba^c^h^v^.^Mc^C^l^ung^{, 3}⁷⁹^U^.^S.²^94,²^99-³⁰^{1 (}¹⁹⁶⁴⁾^{; H}^e^a^r^{t of}^A^tla^nta
^Mote^{l, I}ⁿ^c^.^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^{, 37}⁹^U^.^{S. 2}⁴¹^,²^52-²⁵^{3 (}¹⁹⁶⁴⁾^.
⁹⁹^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^Mor^rⁱ^s^on,⁵^{29 U}^.^S.⁵⁹^{8 (}²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
¹⁰⁰^{42 U}^.^S.C^.^§¹³⁹⁸^{1 (}²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.^Iⁿ^Morrisoⁿ^{, a}^f^e^m^a^le^plaⁱ^ntif^f^br^oug^ht^s^u^{it u}^nde^r^the^A^c^{t a}^g^aⁱ^ns^{t tw}^o^m^e^{n w}^{ho ha}^d
^al^l^e^ged^l^y^ass^a^u^l^t^e^d^an^{d rap}^e^d^h^e^r.^T^h^{e p}^l^aiⁿ^tⁱ^f^f^assert^ed^t^h^at^h^e^{r r}ⁱ^gh^t^t^o^b^e^f^r^{ee f}^r^o^m^gen^d^e^{r asso}^ci^at^ed^vi^o^l^en^{ce h}^a^d
^be^eⁿ^vⁱ^ola^t^e^d^,^aⁿ^d^the^r^e^f^ore^,^she^w^a^{s e}ⁿ^title^{d t}^o^m^one^ta^ry^da^m^a^g^e^s^.^S^{ee Mo}^rrisoⁿ^{, 5}²⁹^U^.^{S. a}^t⁵⁹^{9 (}²⁰⁰⁰⁾^.
¹⁰¹^Id^.⁽^s^ta^ti^ng^tha^t^“^w^hile^w^e^ne^e^dⁿ^o^{t a}^d^opt^a^c^a^t^e^g^or^ic^a^l^r^u^le^a^g^aⁱ^ns^{t a}^g^g^r^eg^a^ting^the^e^f^f^e^c^t^s^of^aⁿ^y^non-^e^c^onom^ic
^a^c^tiv^it^y^{in or}^de^r^t^o^de^cⁱ^de^the^s^e^c^a^s^e^s^{, thus}^f^a^r^{in o}^u^r^N^a^tio^n’^s^hⁱ^s^t^or^y^our^c^a^s^e^s^ha^v^e^uphe^{ld C}^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^C^l^a^u^s^e
^r^e^g^u^la^tion^of^inte^r^s^ta^te^a^c^tiv^it^y^on^ly^w^h^e^r^e^tha^t^a^c^tiv^it^y^is^e^c^onom^{ic in}^na^tur^e^.”⁾^.
¹⁰²^Id^.⁽^h^o^l^dⁱⁿ^g^t^h^at^b^ecau^{se o}^f^t^h^{e l}^{ack o}^f^j^u^ri^sdⁱ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^el^em^en^t^,^“Con^{gress el}^ect^ed^t^o^cast^§¹³⁹⁸¹^’^{s r}^e^m^e^d^y^o^v^{er a}
^wⁱ^de^r^,^a^{nd m}^o^r^e^pur^e^l^y^intr^a^s^ta^te^{, bo}^dy^of^vⁱ^oleⁿ^{t c}^r^im^e^”⁾^.
¹⁰³^Id^.
¹⁰⁴^Id^.^a^t⁶¹^{5 (}^s^ta^ti^ng^tha^t^t^h^e^r^e^a^s^on^ing^of^C^ong^r^e^s^s^w^{ould s}^u^pply^it^w^{ith the}^p^o^w^e^r^{to “}^r^e^g^ula^t^e^aⁿ^y^cr^im^e^as^long^a^s
^the^na^ti^onw^ide^,^a^g^g^r^e^g^a^t^e^d^im^pa^{ct of}^tha^t^c^r^im^e^ha^s^s^ubs^ta^ntia^{l e}^f^f^e^c^t^s^{on e}^m^ploy^m^e^{nt, pr}^od^uc^tio^{n, tr}^aⁿ^s^{it or}
^c^ons^um^ption^.^”⁾^.

violent crime was not directed at the instrumentalities, channels or goods involved in interstate ¹⁰⁵
commerce, and was therefore beyond the scope of Congress’s authority.
In sum, after Lopez and Morrison, the test to determine whether a regulation has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce requires reviewing courts to consider the following four factors: (1)
whether the regulated activity is commercial or economic in nature; (2) whether an express
jurisdictional element is provided in the statute to limit its reach; (3) whether Congress made
express findings about the effects of the proscribed activity on interstate commerce; and (4)
whether the link between the prohibited activity and the effect on interstate commerce is ¹⁰⁶
attenuated.
After the decision in Lopez and Morrison, the question arose as to whether these cases were a
harbinger of future restrictions on Congress’s power to legislate. Arguably, the Court had intended
Lopez and Morrison to have a limited effect, as the Court specifically reaffirmed much of its
previous Commerce Clause case law. Further, the statutory provisions challenged in Lopez
(criminal penalties for gun possession in or near schools) and Morrison (civil suits for gender-
motivated crime) were relatively unusual for statutes based on the commerce clause in that they
did not contain a specific requirement that the activities be related to commerce. In addition,
while broad economic regulation may have noneconomic elements (e.g., record-keeping
requirements), the provisions in question were activities were not associated with such larger
schemes.
Accordingly, when provisions contained in broader regulatory schemes were challenged after
Lopez and Morrison, the lower courts generally upheld these under a “broader scheme” ¹⁰⁷
doctrine. This doctrine is largely derived from language in Lopez that arguably permits
congressional regulation of noneconomic activity if the regulation is “an essential part of a larger
regulatory scheme, in which the regulatory scheme would be undercut unless the intrastate ¹⁰⁸
activity was regulated.”
Nonetheless, it was suggested by some commentators that certain non-economic provisions of
larger regulatory schemes might also be successfully challenged. These challenges were generally
characterized as “as applied” challenges. Generally, a court reviewing the constitutionality of a ¹⁰⁹
federal statute may declare the statute unconstitutional either as invalid on its face, or “as

¹⁰⁵^Id^.^a^t⁶¹^{8 (}^hol^ding^t^h^a^t^“^t^he^r^e^g^u^l^a^{tion a}^nd^pu^nis^h^m^e^{nt of}^intr^a^s^ta^t^e^vⁱ^oleⁿ^c^e^tha^t^is^not^dir^e^c^t^e^d^a^t^t^h^e
^instrum^e^nta^litie^{s, c}^h^a^nne^ls,^{or g}^o^{ods i}ⁿ^v^o^lv^e^dⁱⁿⁱⁿ^te^rsta^te^c^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^ha^{s a}^l^wa^y^s^be^eⁿ^the^prov^inc^e^o^f^the^Sta^t^e^s^.”^).
¹⁰⁶^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^Ste^w^a^r^{t, 348}^F.³^d¹¹³²^,¹¹^36-³⁷⁽⁹^th^Cir.²⁰⁰³^)(ci^tin^g^Mo^rrisoⁿ^,⁵^{29 U}^.^{S. a}^t⁶¹^0-¹²⁾^.
¹⁰⁷^{For e}^x^a^m^ple^,^num^e^r^{ous f}^e^de^ra^{l c}ⁱ^rc^{uit c}^o^{urts ha}^v^e^u^phe^ld^the^c^o^ns^tituti^ona^lity^of^f^e^de^ra^{l c}^h^{ild por}^no^g^r^a^phy^sta^t^ute^s
^tha^t^c^r^im^ina^liz^e^intra^s^ta^te^posse^ssion^by^fⁱ^nding^the^a^c^tiv^ity^s^u^f^f^ic^iently^c^onne^c^t^e^d^to^C^o^ng^r^e^s^s^’^s^br^oa^de^r^s^c^he^m^e^o^f
^re^g^u^la^ting^theⁱⁿ^te^rsta^te^c^o^m^m^e^rc^ia^{l m}^a^r^k^e^t^f^o^{r c}^h^ild^por^nog^ra^p^h^y^.^S^{ee e.}^g^.^,^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^A^d^a^m^s^,³⁴³^F.^3d¹⁰²⁴^,^th^th
¹⁰³^{4 (}⁹^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰³⁾^;^{see a}^l^s^o^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^H^a^m^p^ton,²⁶^{0 F.}^3d⁸^{32 (}⁸^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰¹⁾^;^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es v.}^C^o^r^p^,²³^{6 F}^.³^d^th^th^th
³²⁵⁽⁶^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰¹⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^v^.^K^a^lle^s^t^a^d^{, 23}^{6 F}^.³^d²²⁵⁽⁵^Ci^{r. 2}⁰⁰⁰^{); U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^Aⁿ^g^l^e^,²³⁴^F.^3d³^{26 (}⁷^st
^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁰⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^v^.^R^odia^,¹⁹⁴^F.3^d⁴⁶^{5 (}³^{d C}ⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁹⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^v^.^R^o^bins^on^{, 1}³⁷^F.^3d⁶⁵²⁽¹^Cir^.^th
¹⁹⁹⁸⁾^{; U}ⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^B^u^c^u^leⁱ^,²⁶²^F.3^d³²^{2 (}⁴^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰¹⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^{d Sta}^t^e^s^v^.^G^a^{lo, 2}³⁹^F.3^d⁵⁷^{2 (}³^{d C}ⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰¹⁾^;^th^th
^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^v^.^B^a^us^c^h^{, 1}⁴⁰^F.^3d⁷³^{9 (}⁸^Cⁱ^r^.¹⁹⁹⁸⁾^;^bu^t^see^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es v.}^M^c^C^o^y^,³²³^F.^3d¹¹¹⁴⁽⁹^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰³⁾^;^th
^Uⁿ^ite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^v^.^C^o^r^p^,²³⁶^F.3^d³^{25 (}⁶^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰¹⁾^.
¹⁰⁸^Lo^pe^z^{, 5}^{14 U}^.^{S. a}^t⁵⁶^1.
¹⁰⁹^A^c^co^rdⁱⁿ^{g t}^o^t^h^e^S^u^p^r^em^{e Co}^u^r^t^,^“[^a^]^f^aci^al^ch^al^l^eⁿ^g^{e t}^o^{a l}^e^gi^sl^atⁱ^v^e^A^c^tⁱ^s^,^o^f^co^u^r^se,^t^h^{e m}^o^st^dⁱ^f^fⁱ^cu^l^t^ch^al^l^eⁿ^g^e
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

applied” to a particular set of circumstances.¹¹⁰ Utilizing an “as applied” standard, various lower ¹¹¹
courts struck down particular applications of broader statutory schemes.
When presented with an “as applied” challenge, these courts initially attempted to define the
relevant “class of activity” presented by the facts of the specific case. For instance, in the Ninth
Circuit case of Ashcroft v. Raich, the court considered a challenge to the Controlled Substances
Act. The challenging parties were seriously-ill California residents who had obtained marijuana ¹¹²
consistent with California’s Compassionate Use Act but in violation of the federal Controlled ¹¹³
Substances Act (CSA). The Ninth Circuit found the class of activity to be the “intrastate,
noncommercial cultivation, possession and use of marijuana for personal medical purposes on the ¹¹⁴
advice of a physician and in accordance with state law.” Having defined the relevant class of
activity, the court proceeded to apply the four factor Morrison test.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^{to m}^{ount s}^u^ccessf^u^l^l^y^,^siⁿ^{ce t}^h^{e ch}^al^l^eⁿ^g^{er m}^u^st^est^a^b^lⁱ^s^h^t^h^at^{no s}^e^{t of c}ⁱ^r^c^um^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^s^e^x^is^ts^unde^r^w^h^ic^{h the}^A^c^t
^w^{ould be}^v^a^lid.”^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^Sa^le^r^no,⁴⁸^{1 U}^.^S^.⁷³⁹^,⁷⁴⁵⁽¹⁹⁸⁷⁾⁽^hol^di^ng^tha^t^t^h^e^B^a^{il R}^e^f^o^r^m^A^c^{t of}¹⁹⁸^{4 is}^not
^f^a^cⁱ^a^l^l^y^inv^a^lid)⁽^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^a^dde^d)^.
¹¹⁰^Aⁿ^{“as ap}^p^lⁱ^e^d^”^ch^al^l^eⁿ^g^{e i}^s^l^e^{ss d}ⁱ^f^fⁱ^cu^l^t^t^o^su^st^aiⁿ^t^h^{an a f}^aci^al^ch^al^l^eⁿ^g^{e b}^ecau^{se t}^h^{e ch}^al^l^eⁿ^g^{er h}^a^{s t}^o^est^a^b^lⁱ^s^h
^oⁿ^l^y^t^h^at^t^h^{e st}^at^u^t^{e i}^sⁱⁿ^valⁱ^d^w^h^en^ap^p^lⁱ^e^d^t^o^t^h^{e s}^p^eci^fⁱ^{c set}^o^f^f^a^ct^u^a^l^ci^rcu^m^st^an^{ces p}^r^esen^t^e^d^.^T^h^u^s^,^so^m^e^sch^o^l^ars
^ha^{d p}^o^s^ite^d^tha^t^sⁱ^nc^e^L^ope^z^a^nd^Mor^rⁱ^s^o^{n w}^e^r^e^de^cⁱ^de^{d, “}^a^s^a^ppli^e^d”^c^h^a^lle^ng^e^s^{to f}^e^de^r^a^{l s}^t^a^t^ute^s^f^o^r^vⁱ^ola^tion^of^the
^Co^{mmerce Cl}^au^se^w^o^u^l^d^b^e^m^o^re^su^ccess^f^u^l^t^h^an^h^a^{ve f}^a^ci^al^ch^al^l^eⁿ^g^es^Se^e^B^r^a^nnoⁿ^P^.^D^eⁿⁿⁱ^ng^&^G^l^e^{nn H}^.
^R^e^y^nolds^,^R^u^lⁱⁿ^g^s^aⁿ^d^R^e^si^st^an^{ce: T}^h^{e New Co}^{mmerce Cl}^a^u^s^{e Ju}^ri^sp^ru^d^eⁿ^{ce E}ⁿ^co^un^t^e^{rs t}^h^e^L^o^wer^Co^u^r^t^s^{, 55}^A^RK^.
^L.^R^EV^{. 125}^3,¹²^{62 (}²⁰⁰³⁾^[^h^e^r^eⁱ^na^f^t^e^r^D^e^nning^&^R^e^y^nolds^]⁽^notiⁿ^g^tha^t^a^r^e^vⁱ^e^w^of^lo^w^e^r^c^our^{t de}^cⁱ^sⁱ^ons^be^tw^e^eⁿ
²⁰⁰^{0 a}ⁿ^d²⁰⁰³ⁱⁿ^dic^a^t^e^s^tha^t^w^h^il^e^only^one^s^t^a^t^ute^ha^s^be^eⁿ^f^o^u^nd^f^a^cⁱ^a^l^l^y^unc^ons^tit^uti^ona^l,^the^r^e^ha^{d be}^eⁿ^m^u^lti^ple
^de^cⁱ^sⁱ^ons^ha^nde^{d d}^o^wⁿ^hol^di^ng^t^h^a^t^f^e^de^r^a^{l s}^t^a^t^ute^s^a^r^e^unc^ons^ti^tu^tiona^{l a}^s^a^p^plie^d^to^theⁱ^r^s^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^c^f^a^c^t^s⁾^.
¹¹¹^R^a^ic^{h v}^.^A^s^hc^r^o^f^t^{, 352}^F.3^d¹²²²⁽⁹^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰³⁾^,^rev’^d^,^su^{b no}^m.^G^onz^a^l^e^s^v^.^R^a^ic^{h, ___ U}^.^S.^__^_,¹²⁵^S.C^t^{. 2}¹⁹⁵
⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾⁽^hol^ding^t^h^a^t^p^o^s^s^e^s^sⁱ^on^of^m^a^r^ijuaⁿ^a^f^o^r^m^e^dicⁱ^na^{l pur}^p^o^s^e^s^c^ons^is^te^{nt w}^{ith C}^a^lif^or^nia^s^t^a^t^e^l^a^w^{did not}
^s^ubs^ta^ntia^lly^im^pa^c^t^c^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^,^{and t}^hus^w^a^s^outsⁱ^de^of^C^ong^r^e^s^s^’^a^u^thor^ity^{to r}^e^g^u^la^te⁾^;^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es v.}^S^t^ewart^,³⁴⁸^th
^F^.^3d¹¹³²⁽⁹^{Cir. 2}⁰⁰³^{) (rev}^e^rsin^g^{a p}^o^ssessioⁿ^o^f^an^illeg^a^{l m}^a^c^hⁱⁿ^e-g^uⁿ^coⁿ^v^icti^oⁿ^b^ecau^{se th}^{e s}^t^atu^t^{e f}^a^iled^to^th
^sa^tisfy^the^L^o^p^e^z/Mo^rrison^s^t^aⁿ^da^r^d⁾^;^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^a^t^e^s^v^.^Mc^C^o^y^,³²³^F.3^d¹¹¹⁴⁽⁹^{Cir. 2}⁰⁰³^{) (rev}^e^rsin^g^{a co}ⁿ^v^ictioⁿ
^f^o^{r p}^o^ssessi^oⁿ^o^f^chⁱ^l^d^p^o^rⁿ^o^g^raph^y^b^ecau^{se t}^h^{e st}^at^u^t^{e f}^aⁱ^l^e^d^t^o^p^r^o^vⁱ^d^{e t}^h^eⁿ^ecessar^y^rel^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^hⁱ^p^t^oⁱⁿ^t^e^rst^a^t^e^th
^c^o^m^m^e^rc^e^{to justify}^Cong^re^{ss’s pow}^e^r);^Uⁿ^ite^{d St}^ate^s^v^.^Ly^nc^h^,²⁶^{5 F.}^3d⁷^{58 (}⁹^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰¹⁾⁽^v^acatⁱⁿ^{g a Ho}^bb^{s A}^c^t
^c^onv^ic^tion^aⁿ^d^r^e^m^a^nding^{to d}ⁱ^s^t^rⁱ^c^t^c^our^{t f}^o^r^de^te^r^m^ina^{tion of}^w^h^e^t^he^r^the^r^o^b^b^e^r^y^of^aⁿ^indivⁱ^dua^lⁱ^s^w^{ithin s}^c^ope^of^th
^s^t^a^t^ute⁾^{; U}ⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^O^d^om^{, 252}^F.3^d¹²^{89 (}¹¹^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰¹⁾⁽^r^e^v^e^r^s^ing^c^onv^ic^tions^un^de^r^f^e^de^r^a^{l a}^r^s^{on s}^t^a^t^u^t^e^th
^w^h^e^r^e^s^ubje^c^t^of^a^r^s^{on w}^a^s^a^c^hur^c^h⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^J^o^hns^oⁿ^,²⁴^{6 F.}^3d⁷^{49 (}⁵^{Cir. 2}⁰⁰¹^{) (ref}^u^sin^g^to^recoⁿ^sⁱ^d^er
^prior^de^cⁱ^sion^v^a^c^a^ting^g^u^ilty^ple^a^of^de^f^e^nda^{nt f}^o^{r bur}ⁿⁱ^ng^d^o^wⁿ^one^-story^c^hurc^h^buil^dⁱⁿ^g^un^de^{r f}^e^de^ra^{l a}^r^son^th
^s^t^a^t^ute⁾^{; U}ⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^P^e^te^r^s^oⁿ^,²³⁶^F.3^d⁸⁴^{8 (}⁷^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰¹⁾⁽^g^r^a^nting^r^e^v^e^r^s^a^l^of^H^obbs^A^c^{t c}^onv^ic^tion^b^ecau^se
^t^h^{ere w}^a^{s n}^o^evi^d^en^{ce o}^f^coⁿⁿ^ectⁱ^oⁿ^wⁱ^t^hⁱⁿ^t^e^rst^a^t^e^co^mm^er^{ce as re}^q^uⁱ^{red b}^y^t^h^{e st}^at^u^t^e);^Uni^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es v.}^Co^rp^,²³⁶^th
^F^.^3d³²^{5 (}⁶^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰¹⁾⁽^r^e^v^e^r^sⁱⁿ^g^c^onv^ic^tion^un^de^r^f^e^de^r^a^{l c}^h^ild^p^o^rⁿ^og^r^a^phy^s^t^a^t^ute^ba^s^e^{d on}^inte^r^s^ta^te^m^o^v^e^m^e^{nt of}
^pho^tog^r^a^p^hⁱ^c^m^a^te^rⁱ^a^l^s^w^h^e^r^e^it^w^a^s^c^onc^e^d^e^d^tha^t^de^f^e^nda^{nt k}^e^pt^pic^t^ur^e^s^f^o^r^pe^r^s^oⁿ^a^l^us^e^a^nd^did^not^inteⁿ^d^t^o^s^e^ll^or^th
^t^r^ad^{e p}ⁱ^ct^u^r^es);^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es v.}^R^y^an^,²²⁷^F^.³^d¹⁰⁵⁸⁽⁸^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁰⁾⁽^r^e^v^e^r^s^ing^a^{nd r}^e^m^a^nding^a^c^oⁿ^vⁱ^c^{tion u}^nde^r^th
^f^e^d^e^ral^arsoⁿ^st^at^u^t^{e f}^o^{r arso}ⁿ^o^f^vacan^t^fⁱ^tⁿ^{ess c}^eⁿ^t^er);^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^{es v.}^W^aⁿ^g^,^{222 F.}^3d²^{34 (}⁶^{Cir. 2}⁰⁰⁰^{) (rev}^e^rsin^g
^a^H^obbs^A^c^{t c}^onv^ic^tio^{n a}ⁿ^{d n}^o^tiⁿ^g^a^tte^nua^te^{d c}^o^nne^c^tio^{n t}^oⁱⁿ^te^r^s^ta^te^c^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^w^h^e^r^e^c^rⁱ^m^ina^l^a^c^t^dir^e^c^t^e^d^tow^a^r^d^th
^indivⁱ^d^u^a^l^a^s^o^p^p^o^s^e^{d t}^o^bus^ine^s^s⁾^{; U}ⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^R^a^m^e^y^,²¹⁷^F.^3d⁸⁴^{2 (}⁴^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰⁰⁾⁽^v^a^c^a^ting^s^e^nteⁿ^c^e^un^de^r
^f^e^de^r^a^{l a}^r^s^{on s}^t^a^t^ute^{in l}ⁱ^g^h^{t of}^J^o^ne^s^v^.^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{, 5}^{29 U}^.^S.⁸⁴^{8 (}²⁰⁰⁰⁾⁾^;^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^R^a^y^bor^n,¹³^{8 F.}^Su^pp^{. 2}^d
¹⁰²^{9 (}^W^.D^{. T}^e^nn.²⁰⁰¹⁾⁽^d^is^c^u^s^sⁱ^ng^m^o^{tion t}^o^r^e^c^onsⁱ^d^e^r^dis^mⁱ^s^s^a^{l of}^indic^t^m^e^{nt f}^o^r^a^r^s^{on a}ⁿ^{d f}ⁱ^ndi^ng^tha^t^t^h^e^c^hur^c^h
^w^a^{s not a}^c^tiv^e^l^y^use^d^{in inte}^rsta^te^c^o^m^m^e^rc^e^a^{nd tha}^tⁿ^one^of^{its a}^c^tiv^itie^{s a}^f^f^e^c^t^{s inte}^rsta^te^c^o^m^m^e^rc^e⁾^.
¹¹²^C^a^{l. H}^e^a^{lth &}^Sa^f^e^t^y^C^ode^§¹¹³^62.^{5 (}¹⁹⁹⁶⁾⁽^a^ll^ow^ing^the^us^e^of^m^a^r^ijuaⁿ^a^f^o^r^m^e^dic^a^l^pur^pos^e^s^u^pon^the
^r^e^c^o^m^m^e^nda^tion^of^a^lic^eⁿ^s^e^{d ph}^y^s^ic^iaⁿ⁾^.
¹¹³^{21 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁸⁴¹⁽^a⁾⁽¹⁾⁽²⁰⁰³⁾⁽^c^la^s^sⁱ^f^y^ing^m^a^r^ijuaⁿ^a^a^s^a^“^S^c^h^e^dule^I^”^c^ontr^o^lle^{d s}^ubs^ta^nc^e^aⁿ^{d a}^s^s^u^c^h^m^a^kⁱ^ng^it
^ille^g^a^{l to “}^m^a^nuf^a^c^ture^{, distrib}^u^te^or^dispeⁿ^se^,^{or p}^o^sse^{ss w}^{ith the}ⁱⁿ^te^{nt t}^o^m^a^nuf^a^c^t^ure^,^distrib^u^te^,^o^r^dispeⁿ^se^a
^coⁿ^t^rol^l^e^d^sub^s^t^aⁿ^{ce” un}^l^e^{ss p}^r^o^vⁱ^d^ed^f^o^{r i}ⁿ^t^h^{e st}^at^u^t^e).
¹¹⁴^Id^.^a^t¹²²⁹^.

With respect to the first factor – whether or not the activity is commercial or economic in nature –
the court concluded that the narrow class of activity in this case could not be considered ¹¹⁵
commercial or economic in nature. The court next considered whether the CSA contains an
express jurisdictional element that would limit its reach to those cases that substantially affect
interstate commerce. With no stated analysis, and apparently persuaded by the reasoning of a
district court opinion, the court concluded that “[n]o such jurisdictional hook exists in the relevant ¹¹⁶
portions of the CSA.”
With respect to whether the legislative history contains congressional findings regarding the
effects on interstate commerce, the court was able to cite findings relating to the effect that ¹¹⁷
intrastate drug trafficking activity would have on interstate commerce. While admitting that the
legislative history lends support to the constitutionality of the statute under the Commerce Clause,
the court proceeded to diminish the importance of these findings by arguing that they were not
specific to either marijuana or the medicinal use of marijuana, but rather related to the general ¹¹⁸
effects of drug trafficking on interstate commerce. In addition, the court referred to language in ¹¹⁹
Morrison, discussing the limited role of congressional findings. Moreover, the court referenced
Ninth Circuit precedent concluding that the first and fourth prongs of the Morrison test – whether
the statute regulates an economic enterprise and whether the link is attenuated – are the most ¹²⁰
significant factors to the analysis.
Finally, with respect to whether the link between the regulated activity and a substantial effect on
interstate commerce is attenuated, the court expressed doubt that the interstate effect of
homegrown medical marijuana is substantial. Citing authority questioning the validity of the ¹²¹
federal government’s claim of an effect on interstate commerce, the court concluded that “this
factor favors a finding that the CSA cannot constitutionally be applied to the class of activities at ¹²²
issue in this case.”
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari specifically on the question of whether the
power vested in Congress by both the “Necessary and Proper Clause,” and the “Commerce
Clause” of Article I includes the power to prohibit the local growth, possession, and use of ¹²³
marijuana permissible as a result of California’s law. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in
the now-entitled Gonzales v. Raich, reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and held that Congress’s

¹¹⁵^Raic^h^{, 3}⁵²^F.^{3d a}^t¹²³⁰⁽^s^ta^ting^t^h^a^t^the^“^c^u^lt^iv^a^tion,^p^o^s^s^e^s^sⁱ^{on, a}^nd^us^e^of^m^a^r^ijuaⁿ^a^f^o^r^m^e^dicⁱ^na^{l pur}^pos^e^s^aⁿ^d
^{not f}^o^r^e^x^c^h^aⁿ^g^e^or^dis^t^rⁱ^b^u^ti^on^is^not^pr^ope^r^l^y^c^h^a^r^a^c^t^e^r^iz^e^d^a^s^c^o^m^m^e^r^c^ia^{l or}^e^c^onom^ic^a^c^tiv^it^y^”⁾^.
¹¹⁶^Id^.^a^t¹²³¹⁽^c^itin^{g C}^o^uⁿ^ty^of^S^ant^{a Cruz v}^.^As^hc^roft^,²⁷⁹^{F. S}^u^p^p^.²^d¹¹⁹²^,¹²^{09 (}^N^.D^{. C}^a^l.²⁰⁰³⁾⁾^.
¹¹⁷^Id^.^a^t¹²³²⁽^c^itin^g²¹^U.^S^.^C.^§⁸⁰¹^,^w^hⁱ^c^h^st^at^{es t}^h^at^“f^ed^eral^coⁿ^t^r^o^l^o^fⁱⁿ^t^r^ast^a^t^eⁱⁿ^ci^d^eⁿ^t^s^o^f^t^h^{e t}^r^a^f^fⁱ^{c i}ⁿ
^c^ontro^lle^{d su}^bsta^nc^e^s^{is e}^sse^ntia^l^{to t}^h^e^e^f^f^e^c^tive^c^ont^rol^of^the^inte^rsta^te^incⁱ^de^{nts s}^u^c^h^a^s^tra^f^fⁱ^c^.^”⁾^.
¹¹⁸^Id^.^a^t¹²³²^.
¹¹⁹^Id^.⁽^citiⁿ^g^Mo^rrisoⁿ^,⁵²^{9 U.}^S^.^at⁶¹⁴⁾^.
¹²⁰^Id^.^a^t¹²^32-³³⁽^c^itin^{g Un}^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^M^c^Coy^{, 323}^F.^3d¹¹¹⁴^{, 1}¹¹⁹⁽⁹^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰³⁾⁾^.
¹²¹^Id^.^a^t¹²³³⁽^q^uotiⁿ^g^C^o^na^{nt v}^.^W^a^lte^r^s^,³^{09 F.3}^d⁶²^{9, 64}⁷⁽⁹^th^Ci^r.²⁰⁰²⁾^(st^a^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^at^“[^m^]^edⁱ^cal^m^a^ri^j^u^an^a,^w^h^en
^g^r^ow^{n loc}^a^l^l^y^f^o^r^pe^r^s^ona^{l c}^ons^u^m^{ption, d}^o^e^sⁿ^o^t^ha^v^e^aⁿ^y^dir^e^c^t^or^o^b^vⁱ^ous^e^f^f^e^c^t^{on inte}^r^s^ta^te^c^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^.^Fe^de^r^a^l
^e^f^f^o^{rts to re}^g^u^la^te^{it c}^onsi^d^e^r^a^b^ly^blur^the^distinc^tⁱ^oⁿ^be^tw^e^eⁿ^w^h^a^t^{is na}^tio^na^{l a}ⁿ^{d w}^h^a^t^{is loc}^a^l^.”^{) (K}^oz^insk^{i, J.,}
^c^onc^ur^rⁱ^ng⁾⁾^.
¹²²^Id^.
¹²³^Goⁿ^z^al^{es v.}^R^aⁱ^c^h^,^__^{_ U}^.^S.^_^__,¹²^{5 S}^.^C^t^.²¹⁹⁵⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾^.

power to regulate commerce extends to purely local activities that are “part of an economic class ¹²⁴
of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”
In reaching its conclusions, the Court relied heavily on its 1942 decision in Wickard v. Filburn,
which held that the Agricultural Adjustment Act’s federal quota system applied to bushels of
wheat that were homegrown and personally consumed. Wickard stands for the proposition that
Congress can rationally combine the effects that individual producers have on a commercial ¹²⁵
market to find substantial impacts on interstate commerce. The Court pointed to numerous
similarities between the facts presented in Raich and those in Wickard. Initially, the Court noted
that because the commodities being cultivated in both cases are fungible and that well-established
interstate markets exist, both markets are susceptible to fluctuations in supply and demand based ¹²⁶
on production intended for home-consumption being introduced into the national market.
According to the Court, just as there was no difference between the wheat Mr. Wickard produced
for personal consumption and the wheat cultivated for sale on the open market, there is no
discernable difference between personal home-grown medicinal marijuana and marijuana grown ¹²⁷
for the express purpose of being sold in the interstate market. Thus, the Court concluded that
Congress had a rational basis for concluding that “leaving home-consumed marijuana outside ¹²⁸
federal control would similarly affect price and market conditions.”
Respondents argued that Wickard was distinguishable because in the case of wheat the activity
involved was purely commercial, and the evidence clearly established that the aggregate
production of wheat had a significant effect on the interstate market. Conversely, respondents
claimed that the activity at issue in Raich is non-commercial – the respondents had never
attempted to sell their marijuana – and Congress had made no finding that the personal cultivation ¹²⁹
and use of medicinal marijuana has a substantial effect on the interstate marijuana market. The
Court, however, noted that the standard for assessing the scope of Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause, is not whether the activity at issue, when aggregated, substantially affects
interstate commerce; but rather, whether there exists a “rational basis” for Congress to have ¹³⁰
concluded as such. The Court, applying this deferential standard, concluded that “Congress had

¹²⁴^Id^.^a^t²²⁰⁵⁽^c^itin^{g Pe}^re^{z v}^.^Unite^{d St}^ate^s^,⁴⁰^{2 U}^.^S.¹^46,¹^{51 (}¹⁹⁷⁰⁾⁾^.^T^h^e^fⁱ^na^{l outc}^o^m^e^w^a^s^6-^{3 w}^{ith J}^u^s^tic^e
^Ste^v^eⁿ^{s w}^r^iting^f^o^{r him}^s^e^l^f^a^{nd Justic}^e^s^Sou^t^e^r^{, Ke}^nne^dy^{, Bre}^y^e^r^{, a}^{nd G}ⁱ^nsburg^.^J^u^stic^e^Sc^a^lia^{, v}ⁱ^a^a^se^pa^ra^te^opini^on^,
^c^onc^ur^r^e^d^on^ly^{in the}^C^o^ur^t’^s^j^u^d^g^m^e^nt.^S^{ee i}^d^.^a^t²²¹⁵^{. J}^u^s^tic^e^O^’^C^onn^or^dis^s^e^nte^d^a^{nd f}^ile^{d a}ⁿ^o^pⁱⁿ^io^{n t}^h^a^t^b^o^th
^C^h^ie^f^J^u^s^tic^e^R^e^hnqu^is^{t a}ⁿ^d^J^u^s^tⁱ^c^e^T^hom^a^s^joine^dⁱⁿ^pa^r^t^.^S^{ee i}^d^.^a^t²²^21.^Iⁿ^a^dditⁱ^oⁿ^{, J}^u^s^tic^e^T^h^o^m^a^s^f^ile^{d his}^owⁿ
^dis^s^e^nting^opi^nioⁿ^.^S^{ee i}^d^.^at²²²⁹^.
¹²⁵^Wi^cka^rd^v.^Fⁱ^l^b^u^rⁿ^{, 3}¹⁷^U^.^S.¹¹¹^{, 1}²⁵⁽¹⁹⁴²⁾⁽^hol^ding^t^h^a^t^{, e}^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^a^c^tiv^it^y^,^r^e^g^a^r^d^le^s^s^of^its^na^tur^e^{, c}^aⁿ^be
^re^g^u^la^te^{d by}^Cong^re^s^s^if^the^a^c^tivity^“^a^s^s^e^rts^a^s^ubs^ta^ntia^{l im}^pa^c^t^{on in}^te^rs^ta^te^c^o^m^m^e^rc^e^...”^).
¹²⁶^Raic^h^{, 1}²⁵^S.Ct.^a^t²²⁰⁷^,^n.²⁹^.^T^h^e^Court^note^d^tha^t^the^w^h^ile^th^e^m^a^rijuaⁿ^a^m^a^r^k^e^t^{is a}ⁿ^ille^g^a^{l or illic}^{it m}^a^rk^e^t^,
^t^hⁱ^s^f^act^ap^p^{ears t}^o^b^e^o^fⁿ^o^l^e^gal^o^r^coⁿ^s^tⁱ^t^u^tⁱ^on^al^si^gnⁱ^fⁱ^can^{ce as C}^oⁿ^g^{ress’s p}^o^w^{er argu}^ab^l^y^en^co^mp^{asses b}^o^t^h^l^a^wf^u^l
^a^{nd u}ⁿ^la^w^f^{ul inte}^rsta^te^m^a^rk^e^t^s.^S^{ee i}^d^.⁽^c^iti^{ng Lo}^pe^z^{, 5}^{14 U}^.^{S. a}^t⁵^71,⁽^K^e^nne^dy^{, J}^{., c}^o^nc^ur^rⁱ^ng⁾⁽^s^ta^ting^tha^t^“^[ⁱ^]^{n t}^h^e
^L^o^{ttery Ca}^se^,¹⁸⁸^U.^S^.³²¹⁽¹⁹⁰^3),^t^h^{e C}^o^u^r^t^rej^ect^ed^t^h^{e argu}^m^eⁿ^t^t^h^at^Con^g^{ress l}^acked^[^t^h^e^]^p^o^w^{er t}^o^p^r^ohⁱ^bⁱ^t^t^h^e
ⁱⁿ^t^e^rst^a^t^e^m^o^ve^men^t^o^f^l^o^t^t^e^ry^tⁱ^c^ket^s^b^ecau^{se i}^t^h^a^d^po^w^e^{r o}ⁿ^l^y^t^o^regu^l^a^t^e^,ⁿ^o^t^t^o^p^r^ohⁱ^bⁱ^t^.^”).
¹²⁷^Raic^h^,¹²^{5 S}^.^C^t^{. at}²²⁰⁷^.
¹²⁸^Id^.⁽^s^ta^ti^ng^tha^t^“^w^e^ha^{d n}^o^dⁱ^f^fⁱ^culty^c^onc^ludi^ng^tha^t^C^ong^r^e^s^s^ha^{d a}^r^a^tio^na^{l ba}^sⁱ^s^f^o^r^be^lie^vⁱ^ng^t^h^a^t^{, w}^h^eⁿ^vⁱ^e^w^e^d
^{in t}^h^e^a^g^g^r^eg^a^t^e^,^le^a^v^ing^hom^e^-^c^ons^um^e^d^w^h^e^a^t^outsⁱ^de^the^r^e^g^u^la^t^o^r^y^s^c^hem^e^w^ould^ha^v^e^a^s^ubs^taⁿ^tia^{l inf}^l^ue^nc^e^oⁿ
^pric^e^a^{nd m}^a^rk^e^t^c^onditio^{ns. He}^re^too^,^Co^ng^re^{ss ha}^{d a}^ra^tio^na^l^ba^{sis f}^o^{r c}^onc^ludⁱ^ng^tha^t^le^a^v^ing^hom^e^-^c^onsum^e^d
^m^a^rijuaⁿ^a^ou^tside^f^e^de^ra^{l c}^ontro^l^w^{ould sim}^ila^rl^y^a^f^f^e^c^t^pric^e^a^nd^m^a^rk^e^t^c^onditio^ns.”⁾⁽ⁱⁿ^t^e^r^na^{l c}^ita^tions^om^itte^d).
¹²⁹^Id^.
¹³⁰^Id^.^a^t²²^08-⁰⁹⁽^c^itin^g^L^ope^z^{, 51}^{4 U}^.^S.^a^t⁵⁵⁷^;^s^e^e^als^o^H^ode^l^v^.^Vir^gⁱⁿⁱ^a^Sur^f^a^c^e^Mⁱⁿⁱⁿ^g^&^Re^c^l^am^ation^As^sⁿ^{., I}ⁿ^c^.^,
⁴⁵²^U^.^S.²^64,²^76-²⁸^{0 (}¹⁹⁸¹⁾^;^Pe^re^z^{, 402}^U^.^{S. a}^t¹^55-¹⁵⁶⁾^.

a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of ¹³¹
marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA.” Moreover, the Court affirmed that
“Congress was acting well within its authority to ‘make all Laws which shall be necessary and ¹³²
proper’ to ‘regulate Commerce ... among the several States.’”
Despite having concluded that under the “rational basis test” Congress had acted within its
constitutional authority when it enacted the CSA and applied it to intrastate possession of
marijuana, the Court nevertheless had to distinguish Lopez and Morrison, the Court’s more recent
Commerce Clause decisions. The Court concluded that the CSA, unlike the statutes in either
Lopez (Gun Free School Zones Act) or Morrison (Violence Against Women Act), regulated
activity that is “quintessentially economic,” therefore, neither Lopez or Morrison cast any doubts ¹³³
on the constitutionality of the statute. The Court specifically rejected the reasoning used by the
Ninth Circuit, concluding that “Congress acted rationally in determining that none of the
characteristics making up the purported class, whether viewed individually or in the aggregate,
compelled an exemption from the CSA; rather, the subdivided class of activities defined by the ¹³⁴
Court of Appeals was an essential part of the larger regulatory scheme.”
In supporting its conclusions, the Court noted that, by characterizing marijuana as a “Schedule I”
narcotic, Congress was implicitly finding that it had no medicinal value at all. In addition, the
Court returned to the fact that medicinal marijuana was a fungible good, thus making it
indistinguishable from the recreational versions that Congress had clearly intended to regulate.
According to the Court, to carve out medicinal use as a distinct class of activity, as the Ninth
Circuit had done, would effectively make “any federal regulation (including quality, prescription,
or quantity controls) of any locally cultivated and possessed controlled substance for any purpose ¹³⁵
beyond the ‘outer limits’ of Congress’[s] Commerce Clause authority.” Moreover, the Court
held that California’s state law permitting the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes cannot be
the basis for placing the respondent’s class of activity beyond the reach of the federal
government, due to the Supremacy Clause, which requires that, in the event of a conflict between ¹³⁶
state and federal law, the federal law shall prevail.
Finally, the Court responded to the respondent’s argument that its activities are not an “essential
part of a larger regulatory scheme” because they are both isolated and policed by the State of ¹³⁷
California and they are completely separate and distinct from the interstate market. The Court
held that not only could Congress have rationally rejected this argument, but also that it
“seem[ed] obvious” that doctors, patients, and caregivers will increase the supply and demand for ¹³⁸
the substance on the open market. In sum, the Court concluded that the case for exemption can
be distilled down to an argument that a locally grown product used domestically is immune from

¹³¹^S^{ee R}^aⁱ^c^h^,¹²^{5 S}^.^C^t^.^at²²⁰⁹^.
¹³²^Id^.
¹³³^Id^.^a^t²²^09-¹⁰^.
¹³⁴^Id^.^a^t²²¹¹^.
¹³⁵^Id^.^a^t²²¹²⁽^e^m^pha^sⁱ^s^{in or}^ig^ina^l⁾^.
¹³⁶^Id^.
¹³⁷^Id^.^a^t²²¹³^.
¹³⁸^Id^.²²^13-¹⁴^(sta^ting^tha^t^“^[ⁱ^]^nde^e^d^tha^t^the^Ca^lif^ornia^e^x^e^m^ptions^w^{ill ha}^v^e^a^sigⁿⁱ^f^ic^aⁿ^{t im}^pa^c^t^{on bot}^{h t}^h^e^sup^p^ly
^a^{nd de}^m^a^{nd s}ⁱ^de^s^of^the^m^a^r^k^e^t^{for m}^a^rijuaⁿ^a^is^no^{t jus}^t^‘p^la^us^ible^{’ a}^s^the^priⁿ^cⁱ^pa^l^dis^s^e^{nt c}^o^nc^e^d^e^s^{, ...}^{it is}^re^a^dⁱ^l^y
^a^ppa^r^e^nt”⁾^.

federal regulation, which has already been precluded by the Court’s decision in Wickard v. ¹³⁹
Filburn.
^K^eⁿⁿ^et^h^R^.^T^h^om^a^s ^To^d^d^B^.^Ta^t^e^l^m^an
^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^at^iv^{e A}^t^torn^e^y^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^at^iv^{e A}^t^torn^e^y
^k^t^h^o^m^a^s@^crs^.^l^o^c.g^o^v^,^7-⁵⁰⁰⁶^t^t^a^t^e^l^m^aⁿ^@^c^rs^.l^oc.g^o^v^{, 7-}⁴⁶⁹⁷

¹³⁹^Id^.^a^t²²¹⁵^.