The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress

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The mission of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) is to
understand current and future biological threats; assess vulnerabilities and determine potential
consequences; and provide a national capability for conducting forensic analysis of evidence from
bio-crimes and bio-terrorism. The NBACC is operational, with a program office and several
component centers occupying interim facilities.
A laboratory facility dedicated to executing the NBACC mission and to contain two NBACC
component centers is being built at Fort Detrick, Maryland, as part of the National Interagency
Biodefense Campus. The laboratory facility, with an estimated construction cost of $141 million,
will be the first Department of Homeland Security laboratory specifically focused on biodefense.
Its programmatic contents and component organization appear to be evolving, as conflicting
information has been provided during previous budget cycles.
Congressional oversight of programs, especially those performed in federal facilities for
homeland security purposes, is considered key to maintaining transparency in biodefense. Policy
issues that may interest Congress include the operation of the NBACC facility as a federally
funded research and development center, transparency and oversight of research activities
performed through the center, and the potential for duplication and coordination of research effort
between the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies.
This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.

Funding and Organizational Structure......................................................................................1
Missions of Component Centers...............................................................................................3
Policy Issues..............................................................................................................................4
NBACC Facility Construction and Operation....................................................................4
Oversight of NBACC Research..........................................................................................5
Prioritization of NBACC Research Activities..................................................................10
Biosafety Level 4 Construction.........................................................................................11
Coordination with Other Federal Agencies.......................................................................12
Interaction of the Biodefense Knowledge Center and NBACC Facility..........................13
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................13

s Congress perform oversight in the 110^th Congress, biodefense research, biosecurity, and
the activities of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in this area may become of ^th
interest. As DHS continues its activities in biological threat assessment, the 110 A

Congress may have a unique perspective into these federal forensics and research programs.
Transparency and oversight of research and development in biodefense is an area of international
interest, as development of biological weapons is prohibited under the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention. Congressional oversight of federal programs, especially those performed in
federal facilities for homeland security purposes, is considered to play a key role in ensuring
transparency. The DHS and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have leading
roles in protecting civilians against biological weapons. The National Biodefense Analysis and
Countermeasures Center (NBACC) is a program office within the DHS Science and Technology
Directorate that funds biodefense research and other activities. The mission of the NBACC
program is to understand current and future biological threats; assess vulnerabilities and
determine potential consequences; and provide a national capability for conducting forensic
analysis of evidence from bio-crimes and terrorism.
DHS has requested and received appropriated funding for the construction of a biodefense facility
dedicated to homeland security activities and overseen by the NBACC program. This facility, the
first DHS laboratory focused on biodefense, has drawn the attention of Congress, arms control
experts, local community groups, and others. This report will outline the organizational structure
of NBACC, describe its mission, and report the funding DHS has received for construction of its
facility. It will then discuss select policy issues, such as funding for NBACC facility construction,
oversight of NBACC research, and the potential for duplication of federal effort between NBACC
and other agencies.
Funds for NBACC programs are provided through the DHS Science and Technology Directorate.
Activities funded include both intramural and extramural efforts. The programs within NBACC,
as well as the construction of the NBACC facility, have been reported as part of the Science and
Technology Directorate’s Biological Countermeasures portfolio. The NBACC program currently ¹
conducts research through partnerships and agreements with federal and private institutes.
To provide a unique home for research overseen by the NBACC program, DHS is constructing an
NBACC laboratory at Fort Detrick, MD as part of the National Interagency Biodefense Campus.
Funds for the laboratory, estimated to cost $128 million, have been appropriated over FY2003-

2005. Construction commenced on the NBACC facility in June 2006.

The NBACC facility is operated as a federally funded research and development center ²
(FFRDC). The U.S. Army Medical Research Acquisition Activity, acting as the contracting
authority for DHS in this instance, released a Request for Proposals (RFP) for the operation of the ³
NBACC facility. On December 20, 2006, DHS announced that Battelle National Biodefense

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Institute had been awarded the NBACC management contract.⁴ Similar to the Department of
Energy National Laboratories, the NBACC facility is a government-owned, contractor-operated
facility where the contract operator manages the facility and provides the technical expertise and ⁵
program execution to support DHS’s needs.
The identity of the NBACC facility component centers has evolved since the facility’s
conception. Different information has been presented to Congress through various DHS
testimony and documentation over the course of this evolution. In 2003, the FY2004 DHS budget
justification and testimony by DHS Assistant Under Secretary for Science and Technology
Albright stated that four centers would comprise NBACC: the Biodefense Knowledge Center
(BKC), the Bioforensics Analysis Center, the Biothreat Assessment Support Center, and the Bio-⁶
Countermeasures Testing and Evaluation Center. In 2004, the FY2005 DHS budget justification
and testimony by Assistant Under Secretary Albright stated that NBACC consisted of three
organizational units: the Biodefense Knowledge Center, the National Bioforensic Analysis Center ⁷
(NBFAC), and the Biological Threat Characterization Center (BTCC). In 2005, the FY2006
DHS budget justification and testimony by DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology
McQueary refer to the NBACC facility as having two component parts: the National Bioforensic ⁸
Analysis Center and the Biological Threat Characterization Center. This two center configuration ⁹
is reportedly the final configuration for the NBACC facility.
The two NBACC component centers identified in the FY2006 DHS budget, the Biological Threat
Characterization Center and the National Bioforensic Analysis Center, are operating in interim ¹⁰
facilities pending construction of the NBACC laboratory building. The BTCC has ongoing
activities in a number of government and private laboratories. The NBFAC is housed at the
United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Disease (USAMRIID), located in
Fort Detrick, MD, and operates as a joint federal effort, including representatives of DHS, the ¹¹
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Army. The NBFAC is currently receiving, handling, ¹²
and performing forensic analysis on biological samples.

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Apparently conceived as part of the NBACC facility, the Biodefense Knowledge Center was
dedicated on September 10, 2004, and is located at the Department of Energy’s Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory. This center operates as an independent center though its work is
closely coordinated with that of the NBACC facility centers. While funding for the BKC
originates from within the Biological Countermeasures portfolio, the BKC is funded ¹³
independently, not as a component of the NBACC program. The BKC draws on the expertise of
scientists at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and three additional national laboratories:
the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, and Oak Ridge
National Laboratory. Three Department of Homeland Security University Centers of Excellence,
located at the University of Minnesota, the University of Southern California, and Texas A&M ¹⁴
University, also collaborate with the Biodefense Knowledge Center.
The NBACC facility is to be part of the federal biodefense research and development network. As
such, its activities are to be coordinated with those of other network members, including the Plum
Island Animal Disease Center, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and USAMRIID.
The mission of the NBACC program is to understand current and future biological threats; assess
vulnerabilities and determine potential consequences; and provide a national capability for ¹⁵
conducting forensic analysis of evidence from bio-crimes and terrorism. Each of the NBACC
facility component centers executes a piece of this overall program mission. Also, the Biodefense
Knowledge Center appears to collaborate with these centers to assist them in meeting mission
goals.
The Biological Threat Characterization Center is to conduct studies and laboratory experiments
designed to find and address critical gaps in understanding current and future biological threats, ¹⁶
assess vulnerabilities, conduct risk assessments, and determine potential impacts. An apparent
goal of this program is to provide a science-based assessment of possible biological threats,
focusing on those pathogens deemed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to have
the potential for high consequence. Types of research to be performed in characterizing biological
threats include, but are not limited to, investigating potential biothreat pathogens, studying ¹⁷
pathogen stability and viability, and assessing lethality through dose/response studies. An earlier
presentation on NBACC program activities also included developing strategies for defeating

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genetically engineered pathogens, and expanding current capabilities in testing non-human ¹⁸
primates exposed to biological aerosols.
The National Bioforensic Analysis Center was designated in Homeland Security Presidential ^st¹⁹
Directive 10 (HSPD-10), Biodefense for the 21 Century, as the lead federal facility to conduct
and facilitate the technical forensic analysis and interpretation of materials recovered following a ²⁰
biological attack. The NBFAC conducts analysis of evidence from a bio-crime or terrorist attack
to obtain a “biological fingerprint” in order to identify perpetrators and determine the origin and
method of attack. Consequently, when housed in the NBACC facility, the NBFAC would provide ²¹
the federal government with a centrally coordinated, validated bioforensic analysis facility. To
meet this mission, NBFAC is developing forensic tools, methods, and strain repositories for ²²
pathogens of concern.
The Biodefense Knowledge Center supports NBACC facility component centers and has its own
functions and missions. One is to provide scientific assessments and information to the Homeland ²³
Security Operations Center regarding potential bioterrorism events. Another is to be a repository
of biodefense information, including genomic sequences for pathogens of concern, the existence
and location of vaccines, bioforensics information, and information about individuals, groups, or
organizations that might be developing these pathogens. Finally, the BKC aids in assessing
potential bioterrorism agents as “material threats” for the purpose of the Project Bioshield ²⁴
countermeasure procurement process. The BTCC and the BKC jointly make these assessments.
The total construction cost for the NBACC facility has been determined by DHS to be $141 ²⁵
million, a $13 million increase from the initially requested $128 million. Original funds for the

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^http:^//w^w^w^.bnbi.^o^r^g^/.
²³^T^h^e^Hom^e^l^a^{nd Se}^c^u^rity^Ope^r^a^tio^{ns Ce}^nte^r^c^o^lle^c^t^{s a}ⁿ^{d a}ⁿ^a^l^y^z^e^s^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^r^om^m^u^ltiple^sourc^e^s^t^o^he^l^p^de^te^r,
^d^e^t^ect^,^an^d^p^r^even^t^t^e^rro^ri^st^act^s.^T^h^{e HS}^{OC p}^r^o^vⁱ^d^{es real}^-tⁱ^m^{e si}^t^u^atⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^aw^aren^es^{s an}^d^m^oⁿⁱ^t^o^ri^ng,^co^o^r^dⁱⁿ^a^t^e^s
^incⁱ^de^{nts a}^{nd re}^sp^onse^a^c^tiv^itie^s,^a^{nd issue}^s^a^d^vⁱ^sorie^s^aⁿ^d^bulle^tiⁿ^s^c^onc^e^r^ning^t^h^re^a^t^{s to}^hom^e^l^a^nd^se^c^u^rity^.
^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^H^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^{, “}^F^ac^{t She}^e^{t: H}^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^rⁱ^t^y^O^p^e^r^a^tions^C^e^nte^r⁽^H^SO^C⁾^,”^Pre^{ss Re}^le^ase^{, J}^u^ly
⁸^,²⁰⁰⁴^.
²⁴^Iⁿ^or^de^r^f^o^r^a^c^o^uⁿ^te^r^m^e^a^s^ur^e^{to be}^pr^oc^ur^e^d^us^ing^P^r^oje^c^t^Bⁱ^o^S^hi^e^l^{d f}^unds^,^the^D^H^S^Se^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^m^u^{st de}^te^r^m^ine^tha^t^a
^“^m^at^eri^a^l^t^h^reat^”^f^r^o^m^{a p}^a^rtⁱ^c^u^l^a^r^agen^t^exi^s^t^s^.^F^o^{r m}^o^{re i}ⁿ^f^o^rmatⁱ^oⁿ^oⁿ^P^r^o^j^ect^Bi^o^S^hⁱ^el^d^,^{see CRS}^Rep^o^r^t^R^S²¹⁵⁰⁷^,
^Proje^c^t^Bio^Shie^l^{d: P}^u^rp^ose^s^an^d^Auth^oritie^s^{, by}^Fraⁿ^k^G^o^ttron^.
²⁵^DHS^at^t^rⁱ^b^u^t^{es t}^h^{e i}ⁿ^{crease i}ⁿ^cost^{as gen}^e^ral^l^y^d^u^e^t^oⁱⁿ^{creases i}ⁿ^mat^e^ri^al^{s an}^d^coⁿ^s^t^r^u^c^tⁱ^on^exp^eⁿ^s^es,^rat^h^{er t}^h^an^t^o
^a^s^h^if^{t in s}^c^ope^or^s^c^a^l^e^.^P^e^r^s^ona^l^c^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion w}^{ith D}^H^S^s^t^a^f^f^,^Se^pte^m^be^r^{22, 2}⁰⁰⁶^.

construction were appropriated in FY2003–FY2005. The additional $13 million were ²⁶
reprogrammed from other portfolios.
Construction began in June 2006 and is projected to be finished in FY2008. Community response
to the NBACC facility construction has been mixed. The construction of the NBACC facility,
along with new laboratory space for other federal agencies, at the Fort Detrick site has been ²⁷
identified as beneficially spurring investment and development in the surrounding area. Some
local advocates and citizen groups have protested the construction of the NBACC facility ²⁸²⁹
though. They cite concerns regarding security, safety, and secrecy surrounding the facility.
The DHS operates the NBACC facility as an FFRDC, overseen in a manner akin to the
Department of Energy National Laboratories. The NBACC FFRDC contractor has the
responsibility for enacting the projects and program developed by the NBACC program office.
This includes bringing the existing interim centers into the new NBACC facility, when
constructed, and continuing those activities currently ongoing, such as the biological risk
assessment process.
The degree to which the research programs of the NBACC program and component centers are
transparent and actively overseen may become an area of Congressional interest. Two factors
have contributed to an increased focus by biosecurity advocates on NBACC research activities:
the degree to which classified research may be performed by the NBACC program and the extent
and quality of review for compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).
Because of the potential for classified research to be performed at the NBACC facility, some
biodefense experts have identified the lack of transparency as problematic for international ³⁰
relations and treaty compliance. Other experts assert that such issues of transparency can be
dealt with so long as a process for review and compliance with applicable treaties is developed
and maintained. These issues and the Department’s efforts to address these factors are described
below.

²⁶^T^h^e^c^onstruc^ti^{on c}^ontra^c^t^f^o^{r t}^h^e^NBA^CC^f^a^c^ilit^y^{is re}^porte^dly^a^fⁱ^x^e^{d c}^o^{st, c}^ont^ra^c^t^{or’s lia}^bi^lity^c^ontra^c^t^{, w}^h^e^r^e^the
^c^ontra^c^t^{or is}^lia^ble^f^o^{r a}ⁿ^y^a^dditi^oⁿ^a^l^c^o^{sts a}^b^ov^e^those^a^g^r^e^e^d^up^on^{in t}^h^e^c^oⁿ^t^ra^c^t^{. T}^{hus t}^h^e^$¹⁴¹^m^illion^{is de}^sc^ribe^d
^by^{DHS a}^s^a^c^e^iling^a^bov^e^w^h^ic^{h the}^tota^l^c^o^{st t}^o^{DHS m}^a^y^{not rise}^.^P^e^rsona^{l C}^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion w}^{ith D}^H^{S sta}^f^f^,
^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^14,²⁰^06.
²⁷^G^r^eg^B^a^r^r^e^{tt, “}^F^r^e^de^rⁱ^c^k^C^ounty^G^e^ts^P^o^p^u^la^r^,^P^r^ic^e^y^,”^Baltimore^Sun^{, Ma}^r^c^h^3,²⁰⁰⁶^{; I}^k^e^W^ils^on,^“^F^r^e^de^rⁱ^c^k^{, MD}
^C^ity^Of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^Say^s^Ec^onom^ic^D^e^ve^lopm^eⁿ^{t I}^s^G^a^ining^Str^e^ng^th,”^F^r^ed^eri^{ck News-P}^o^s^t^{, Ma}^r^c^{h 17}^{, 2}⁰⁰⁶^{; a}ⁿ^{d D}^a^na
^H^e^dg^pe^{th, “}^M^ovⁱⁿ^g^U^p^t^h^e^C^o^r^rⁱ^dor^;^Fr^e^d^e^r^ic^k^C^o^uⁿ^ty^Enjoy^s^a^B^oom^{in Of}^fⁱ^c^e^-Building^De^v^e^lop^m^eⁿ^t,”^Wa^shⁱⁿ^g^t^on
^Post^{, Ma}^y^15,²⁰⁰⁶^.
²⁸^E^rⁱ^k^{a Ch}^eck,^“L^o^cal^{s Ral}^l^y^t^o^Co^m^b^at^Bi^o^d^e^f^eⁿ^s^{e L}^a^b^s^,^”^Na^tu^re^,^A^u^g^u^s^t^30,²⁰⁰⁶^.
²⁹^Se^e^,^f^o^r^e^x^am^ple^,^N^e^ls^{on H}^e^rⁿ^aⁿ^de^z^,^“^P^r^o^te^s^t^e^r^s^D^e^c^r^y^For^t^D^e^tr^ic^k^Ex^pa^ns^ion;^P^l^aⁿ^ne^{d B}ⁱ^ode^f^e^ns^e^C^a^m^pus^C^a^lle^d
^Eⁿ^vi^roⁿ^m^en^t^a^l^T^h^reat^at^F^r^ed^eri^c^{k Ral}^l^y^,^”^W^a^s^h^ingt^{on Pos}^t^,^J^uⁿ^e⁶^,²⁰⁰⁵^;^F^r^ed^rⁱ^{ck Ku}ⁿ^k^l^ean^d,^“F^or^t^Det^rⁱ^c^k
^N^e^ig^hbors^J^itte^ry^O^v^e^r^Ex^pa^ns^{ion; Biow}^e^a^pons^W^o^rk^P^o^s^sⁱ^b^l^e^,^S^o^m^e^Fe^a^r^,”^W^a^s^h^ingt^{on Pos}^t^,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{27, 20}⁰⁵^{; a}ⁿ^d
^“^F^or^{t D}^e^tr^ic^k^’^s^N^e^w^‘^M^ay^or^’^Aⁱ^m^s^{to B}^e^G^{ood N}^e^ig^hb^or^,”^A^sso^ci^a^t^ed^P^r^ess^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t^3,²⁰⁰⁵^.
³⁰^L^o^{is R. Em}^be^{r, “}^T^e^s^ting^the^Lⁱ^m^its,”^C^h^e^m^ic^al^an^{d E}^ngi^ne^e^r^{ing N}^e^w^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t^15,²⁰^05.

Some research activities performed by the BTCC and the NBFAC, either in interim facilities or at ³¹
the to-be-constructed NBACC facility, may be classified in nature. The NBACC facility is being
constructed in such a manner that the entire building can be certified as a Sensitive ³²
Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). The FFRDC contractor operating the NBACC
facility must be capable of providing employees cleared at the Top Secret/Sensitive ³³
Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) level. The balance of classified and unclassified activities
will change depending on agency need and future planning. Thus, the extent to which the ³⁴
capability to perform classified research will be utilized is undetermined.
Initially, only a portion of the NBACC facility may operate under classified circumstances, with
this amount increasing or decreasing depending on evolving research priorities. The NBACC
FFRDC RFP provides some expectations for the FFRDC contractor’s future capabilities though,
stating:
^T^h^{e G}^o^v^e^rnm^e^nt^h^a^s^e^s^tⁱ^m^a^t^e^{d f}ⁱⁿ^a^l^operatⁱ^oⁿ^s^w^o^rk^f^o^{rce a}^t^{120 peopl}^e,^wⁱ^t^h^vⁱ^rt^u^a^l^l^y^al^l
^of^th^e^m^{(>95%) requ}^iring^T^S^/SC^I^clearan^{ce. T}^h^e^of^f^e^rors^{are ex}^{pected to}^prop^os^{e a s}^t^r^a^t^e^g^y
^an^d^com^m^eⁿ^s^u^r^ate^w^o^r^k^f^o^rce^f^o^rⁱⁿ^iti^a^l^o^p^e^r^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^aⁿ^d^t^r^aⁿ^sⁱ^ti^oⁿ^.^Th^e^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^e^s^tⁱ^m^a^t^e^s
^th^{at 2}⁰^-²⁵^%^o^f^t^h^{e Co}ⁿ^t^r^acto^r^’^s^w^o^r^k^f^o^r^{ce d}^u^rⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿⁱ^{tial o}^p^e^r^a^tioⁿ^s^w^{ill r}^e^q^u^ir^{e T}^S^/SCI
^clearan^ces^{. T}^h^{e Gov}^e^rⁿ^m^eⁿ^t^e^s^ti^m^a^tes^th^at^>40-^{60% of}^th^e^C^oⁿ^t^ractor’s^w^o^rkf^o^{rce du}^ring³⁵
^tr^an^sitioⁿ^w^{ill r}^e^q^u^ir^{e T}^S^/SCI^clear^an^ces.
Requiring that virtually all of the NBACC FFRDC workforce be eligible for, and eventually
possess, clearance for classified information may provide advantages over requiring only a sub-
section of the workforce to obtain requisite clearance. One advantage may be increased flexibility
in workforce management given changing workload. Another may be an increased ability to
generate synergy between research skills and knowledge due to a larger pool of qualified ³⁶
researchers able to converse about a particular problem.
Conversely, some experts are concerned about the potential proliferation of dual-use research ³⁷
results and biological techniques specific to such sensitive research topics. They argue that as

³¹^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^H^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^rⁱ^t^y^,^Req^u^e^{st fo}^{r In}^f^o^rma^tⁱ^oⁿ^,^Fe^br^u^a^r^y^{25, 2}⁰⁰⁵^{, a}^{nd U}^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^H^o^m^e^la^nd
^Se^c^u^rity^a^{nd A}^r^m^y^Ga^{rrison, For}^t^De^tric^k^MD,^Fin^a^{l E}ⁿ^vⁱ^r^onm^eⁿ^t^a^{l I}^m^p^a^c^t^S^t^ate^m^eⁿ^{t -}^C^o^ns^tr^uc^tio^{n a}^{nd O}^p^e^r^ati^on^of
^the^Nati^on^{al B}ⁱ^o^d^e^f^eⁿ^se^An^aly^s^is^and^Co^unte^r^me^asure^s^Ce^nte^r⁽^N^{BACC) Fac}^ility^by^t^h^e^De^partmeⁿ^t^{of Home}^la^nd
^Se^c^u^rity^at^{Fort De}^tric^k^,^M^a^ry^laⁿ^d^,^Decem^b^e^{r 2}³^,²⁰⁰⁴^.
³²^Jo^b^y^W^a^rri^c^k^,^“T^h^e^S^ecr^etⁱ^v^{e F}ⁱ^gh^t^A^g^aiⁿ^s^t^Bi^o^t^erro^r^,^”^W^a^s^hⁱ^ngt^{on P}^o^s^t^{, J}^u^ly^30,²⁰^06.
³³^U.^S^.^A^r^{my M}^e^dⁱ^cal^Research^A^c^q^uⁱ^si^tⁱ^oⁿ^A^c^tⁱ^vⁱ^t^y^,^Solic^itatⁱ^oⁿ^for^{A Nati}^on^al^Bio^d^e^f^eⁿ^se^An^aly^s^{is a}^nd
^Co^uⁿ^t^e^rmea^su^{res Cen}^t^{er Op}^era^tⁱⁿ^g^C^oⁿ^t^r^a^ct^,^a^F^e^d^e^ra^l^l^{y F}^uⁿ^d^e^d^R^e^sea^r^ch^aⁿ^d^Devel^o^p^m^en^t^Ceⁿ^t^e^r^f^o^{r T}^h^e
^D^e^par^tm^eⁿ^{t o}^f^H^o^m^e^la^nd^a^nd^Se^c^u^r^ity^{, Am}^eⁿ^dm^eⁿ^t^3—Q^u^e^s^tio^ns^&^Ans^w^e^r^s^,^HS^HQDC-0⁶^-^R-0⁰⁰¹⁷^,^A^p^ril²⁴^,²⁰⁰⁶^.
^T^h^{is solic}^ita^tio^{n c}^l^ose^d^Ma^y^{15, 2}⁰⁰⁶^.
³⁴^P^e^r^s^ona^{l c}^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion w}^{ith D}^H^{S s}^t^a^f^f^,^Se^pte^m^be^r^{22, 2}⁰⁰⁶^.
³⁵^U.^S^.^A^r^{my M}^e^dⁱ^cal^Research^A^c^q^uⁱ^si^tⁱ^oⁿ^A^c^tⁱ^vⁱ^t^y^,^Solic^itatⁱ^oⁿ^for^{A Nati}^on^al^Bio^d^e^f^eⁿ^se^An^aly^s^{is a}^nd
^Co^uⁿ^t^e^rmea^su^{res Cen}^t^{er Op}^era^tⁱⁿ^g^C^oⁿ^t^r^a^ct^,^a^F^e^d^e^ra^l^l^{y F}^uⁿ^d^e^d^R^e^sea^r^ch^aⁿ^d^Devel^o^p^m^en^t^Ceⁿ^t^e^r^f^o^{r T}^h^e
^D^e^par^tm^eⁿ^{t o}^f^H^o^m^e^la^nd^a^nd^Se^c^u^r^ity^{, Am}^eⁿ^dm^eⁿ^t^3—Q^u^e^s^tio^ns^&^Ans^w^e^r^s^,^HS^HQDC-0⁶^-^R-0⁰⁰¹⁷^,^A^p^ril²⁴^,²⁰⁰⁶^.
^T^h^{is solic}^ita^tio^{n c}^l^ose^d^Ma^y^{15, 2}⁰⁰⁶^.
³⁶^P^e^r^s^ona^{l c}^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion w}^{ith D}^H^{S s}^t^a^f^f^,^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^{14, 2}⁰⁰⁶^.
³⁷^T^h^e^phra^s^e^“^dua^l-use^”^ha^{s m}^a^ny^de^fⁱ^niti^ons.^T^h^{is re}^port^de^fⁱ^ne^{s “}^d^ua^l-use^”^a^s^“^r^e^s^e^a^r^c^h^w^{ith le}^g^itim^a^t^e^sc^ie^ntif^ic
^pur^pose^tha^t^m^a^y^be^mⁱ^suse^{d to p}^o^se^a^bio^l^og^ic^thre^a^t^t^o^pu^blic^he^a^{lth a}ⁿ^d/or^na^ti^ona^{l se}^c^u^rity^.”^T^h^{is de}^fⁱ^nitioⁿ
^pa^r^a^lle^ls^tha^t^f^oun^{d i}ⁿ^t^h^e^c^h^a^r^te^r^of^the^N^a^tiona^l^Sc^ie^nc^e^A^d^vⁱ^s^o^r^y^B^o^a^r^{d f}^o^r^Bⁱ^os^e^c^u^r^ity^{. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^H^e^a^{lth a}ⁿ^d
^Hu^m^aⁿ^S^e^rvice^s^,^N^a^tio^nal^Sc^ie^nc^e^Advⁱ^s^o^r^y^Bo^ar^{d f}^o^r^Bi^os^e^c^u^r^ity^C^har^te^r^,^Ma^r^c^{h 4, 20}⁰⁴^.

more scientists are trained and brought into biological threat assessment studies, the risk of
diversion of material, information, or scientific technique to others may increase. While
acknowledging that the use of security background checks can reduce this risk, they assert that ³⁸
this risk can not be eliminated.
Some arms control experts and other stakeholders have raised concerns about the research to be
performed by NBACC at the Fort Detrick facility. They assert that the research being undertaken
might violate or might be interpreted as violating the Biological and Toxin Weapons ³⁹
Convention. While research activities may uphold both the letter and the spirit of the BWC,
international observers may lack confidence in, or harbor suspicions about, those research ⁴⁰
activities being performed.
Strong internal oversight and review of these research activities may allay some of these concerns
or suspicions. As put by Petro and Carus,
^T^h^u^s^,^aⁿ^y^f^e^d^e^r^a^l^p^r^o^g^r^a^m^t^h^a^t^f^o^c^u^s^e^s^oⁿ^t^h^r^e^a^t^c^h^a^r^a^c^t^e^rⁱ^z^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^r^e^s^e^a^r^c^h^w^ill^li^k^e^l^y^r^e^q^u^ir^e
^strⁱ^{ct ad}^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^ti^v^e^g^u^id^eliⁿ^{es an}^d^p^r^o^ced^u^r^{es to}^en^su^r^e^th^{at all}^activ^{ities ar}^e^leg^a^ll^y⁴¹
^co^m^p^liaⁿ^t^.
The DHS asserts such a strong review process exists, as an internal process to the Department.⁴²
The DHS has developed and implemented a management directive regarding compliance with ⁴³
arms control agreements.
Adhering to this directive, DHS has established both a compliance assurance program office and
a Compliance Review Group to determine whether the NBACC research activities are in ^44,⁴⁵
compliance with the BWC, among other duties. The Compliance Review Group is composed
of senior DHS officials, including those with oversight of pertinent research areas. The

³⁸^Joⁿ^a^t^h^aⁿ^B.^T^u^cker,^“Bi^o^l^o^gi^cal^T^h^reat^A^sses^s^m^en^t^:^{Is t}^h^{e Cu}^re^W^o^{rse T}^h^an^t^h^{e Di}^sease.^”^Ar^m^s^C^ontr^o^l^T^o^d^a^y^,
^Oct^o^b^e^r^,²⁰⁰⁴^.
³⁹^Milt^{on L}^e^ite^nbe^r^g^{, J}^a^m^e^s^L^e^ona^r^d^{, a}ⁿ^{d R}ⁱ^c^h^a^r^{d S}^p^e^r^tz^e^l^{, “}^B^iode^f^e^ns^e^C^r^os^sⁱ^ng^the^Lⁱ^ne^,”^P^o^litic^s^a^{nd t}^h^e^Life
^Sc^ie^nc^e^s^{, V}^o^l.²²^{, (}²⁰⁰³⁾^.
⁴⁰^J^a^m^e^s^B^.^P^e^tr^o^aⁿ^d^W^.^Se^{th C}^a^r^u^s^,^“^B^iologⁱ^c^a^l^T^h^r^e^a^t^C^h^a^r^a^c^t^e^r^iz^a^{tion R}^e^s^e^a^r^c^h^{: A}^C^r^itic^a^l^C^o^m^pone^nt^of^N^a^tiona^l
^Bⁱ^ode^f^e^ns^e^,^”^Bios^e^c^u^r^ity^an^{d B}ⁱ^o^t^e^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^m^:^Biode^fe^ns^e^Str^a^te^gy^,^P^r^ac^tic^e^,^an^{d Sc}^ie^nc^e^,^Vo^l^.³^,^N^u^mb^{er 4}^,^Decem^b^e^r,
²⁰⁰^5.
⁴¹^J^a^m^e^s^B^.^P^e^tr^o^aⁿ^d^W^.^Se^{th C}^a^r^u^s^,^“^B^iologⁱ^c^a^l^T^h^r^e^a^t^C^h^a^r^a^c^t^e^r^iz^a^{tion R}^e^s^e^a^r^c^h^{: A}^C^r^itic^a^l^C^o^m^pone^nt^of^N^a^tiona^l
^Bⁱ^ode^f^e^ns^e^,^”^Bios^e^c^u^r^ity^an^{d B}ⁱ^o^t^e^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^m^:^Biode^fe^ns^e^Str^a^te^gy^,^P^r^ac^tic^e^,^an^{d Sc}^ie^nc^e^,^Vo^l^.³^,^N^u^mb^{er 4}^,^Decem^b^e^r,
²⁰⁰^5.
⁴²^Jo^b^y^W^a^rri^c^k^,^“T^h^e^S^ecr^etⁱ^v^{e F}ⁱ^gh^t^A^g^aiⁿ^s^t^Bi^o^t^erro^r^,^”^W^a^s^hⁱ^ngt^{on P}^o^s^t^{, J}^u^ly^30,²⁰^06.
⁴³^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^H^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^rⁱ^t^y^,^C^o^m^p^lianc^e^wⁱ^t^h^,^an^{d I}^m^ple^m^eⁿ^tati^on^of^{, Ar}^m^s^C^o^ntr^o^l^Agr^e^e^m^eⁿ^ts^,
^Ma^na^g^e^m^e^{nt D}ⁱ^r^e^c^tiv^e^{6300, A}^u^g^u^s^t^26,²⁰⁰⁵^{. T}^h^is^m^a^na^g^e^m^e^{nt dir}^e^c^tiv^e^a^pplie^s^to^a^{ll D}^H^S^c^o^m^pone^nts^,^inc^l^udi^ng
^a^{ll e}ⁿ^titie^{s d}ⁱ^re^c^tly^e^nga^g^e^{d in w}^o^rk^by^{DHS, a}^{nd c}^o^v^e^{rs a}^{ll a}^pplic^a^b^le^bi^ndi^ng^a^r^m^s^c^{ontrol a}^g^re^e^m^eⁿ^ts.
⁴⁴^Aⁿ^o^v^ervi^e^w^o^f^t^h^{e n}^a^scen^t^co^mp^lⁱ^aⁿ^{ce revi}^ew^p^r^o^cess^w^a^{s p}^r^eseⁿ^t^e^dⁱⁿ^at^t^h^{e M}^eetⁱⁿ^g^o^f^t^h^{e S}^t^at^{es P}^a^rtⁱ^e^{s t}^o^t^h^e
^C^onv^eⁿ^tioⁿ^on^the^P^r^oh^ibit^io^{n of}^the^D^e^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^{t, P}^r^od^uc^tio^{n a}ⁿ^d^Stoc^k^p^ili^ng^of^B^a^c^t^e^r^iologⁱ^c^a^l⁽^B^iologⁱ^c^a^l⁾^aⁿ^d
^T^o^xⁱ^{n W}^e^a^pons^a^nd^{on T}^h^eⁱ^r^D^e^s^t^r^u^c^tio^n,^Me^e^ting^of^Ex^pe^r^t^s^,ⁱⁿ^G^e^ne^v^a^{, Sw}^itze^r^la^{nd f}^r^om^J^une^{, 20}^05.^Se^e^on^line^a^t
^h^ttp^:^//d^accessd^d^s^.^uⁿ^.^o^r^g/d^o^c^/^UNDOC/G^E^N^/^G⁰⁵^/^619/⁰³^/^P^D^F^/^G⁰⁵⁶¹⁹⁰³^.p^df^?^O^pe^nEle^m^e^nt.
⁴⁵^T^h^{is of}^fⁱ^c^e^a^l^{so de}^te^rm^ine^s^w^h^e^t^he^{r re}^se^a^r^c^h^a^c^tiv^itie^{s a}^r^e^{in c}^o^m^p^lia^nc^e^w^{ith ot}^he^{r pe}^rtiⁿ^eⁿ^t^tre^a^tie^{s a}^{nd re}^g^u^la^tio^ns,
^su^ch^{as t}^h^{e sel}^ect^agen^t^regu^l^a^tⁱ^o^{ns regard}ⁱⁿ^{g p}^a^t^h^o^g^en^p^o^ssessi^oⁿ^an^d^secu^ri^t^y^.^P^e^rsoⁿ^a^l^co^m^m^uⁿⁱ^catⁱ^oⁿ^wⁱ^t^h^DHS
^s^t^a^f^f^,^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^{14, 20}⁰⁶^.

compliance assurance program office has been established separately from the research program
offices, so that reseach management and compliance oversight activities do not become conflated.
Currently, all NBACC research activities are reviewed, and compliance determinations are made,
before the research activities begin. If questions persist about whether a research activity may
pose a compliance concern, the compliance assurance program office and the Compliance Review
Group are empowered to require additional, clarifying information be presented before a
compliance determination is made. Should the Compliance Review Group not reach consensus
regarding a particular research activity, the final judgement is reportedly made by the DHS ⁴⁶
Secretary, who is obligated to ensure DHS activities are in compliance.
While such an internal compliance review process may be robust, some arms control experts have
been critical of compliance processes that remain entirely internal to a single agency. Such critics
assert that interagency review, or review performed or coordinated through the White House, for
example through the National Security Council or the Homeland Security Council, would provide
greater expert input and further divorce the compliance review from the programmatic and ⁴⁷
budgetary aspects of a research program.
Other possible mechanisms for review of potentially contentious research exist outside of the
Department. To assess federal research and development programs that may have potential dual-
use capabilities, the Department of Health and Human Services has established the National
Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. This board’s duties include providing expert advice on ⁴⁸
ways to minimize potential misuse of dual-use research. The NSABB is expected to generate
guidance on assessing dual-use research through local oversight at research institutions. The
NSABB was not given responsibility to view or assess classified research programs, so might be
of limited utility in overseeing such research.
Selective transparency in activities performed at the NBACC facility and funded by the NBACC
program is considered both essential and difficult to enact. While the ability for outside observers
to identify and understand the activities underway at the NBACC facility and funded through the
NBACC program is deemed by some experts as key to maintaining international confidence in
the US biodefense program, such openness must preserve the protection granted to information ⁴⁹
deleterious to national security. It is difficult to determine what an appropriate balance is when
weighing the potential release of information relating to national vulnerabilities against assuring
others of the munificent focus of biodefense research.

⁴⁶^P^e^r^s^ona^{l c}^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion w}^{ith D}^H^{S s}^t^a^f^f^,^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^{14, 2}⁰⁰⁶^.
⁴⁷^S^ee,^f^o^{r exa}^m^p^l^e,^Joⁿ^a^t^h^an^B^.^T^u^cker,^“Bi^o^l^o^gi^cal^T^h^reat^A^sse^ss^men^t^:^{Is t}^h^{e Cu}^{re W}^o^{rse T}^h^an^t^h^e^Di^sease.^”^Arms
^C^ontr^o^{l T}^o^d^a^y^{, Oc}^to^be^{r, 2}⁰⁰⁴^{; a}ⁿ^{d Mil}^t^oⁿ^L^e^ite^nbe^rg^,^As^s^e^s^sⁱ^{ng t}^h^e^Biolo^g^ic^al^W^e^apo^ns^and^Bi^ote^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^m^Thr^e^at^,
^D^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^2005.
⁴⁸^{For m}^o^re^inf^o^rm^a^{tion o}ⁿ^the^N^S^A^{BB, se}^e^online^a^t^htt^p^://w^ww^.biose^c^u^rity^boa^rd.g^ov^{/. Se}^e^a^l^{so CR}^{S Re}^port
^R^L³³³⁴^2,^O^v^e^r^sⁱ^ght^{of D}^ual-^U^s^e^Biolo^g^ic^a^l^Re^s^e^ar^c^h^:^T^h^e^N^a^ti^on^{al Sc}^ie^nc^e^A^d^vⁱ^s^o^r^y^Bo^ar^d^for^Bⁱ^os^e^c^u^r^ity^{, by}^D^a^na
^A^.^S^h^ea.
⁴⁹^F^o^{r exam}^p^l^e,^{see Jo}ⁿ^a^t^h^an^B.^T^u^cker,^“Bi^o^l^o^gi^cal^T^h^reat^A^sse^ss^men^t^:^{Is t}^h^{e Cu}^{re W}^o^{rse T}^h^an^t^h^e^Di^sease^?”^Arms
^C^ontr^o^{l T}^o^d^a^y^{, O}^c^to^be^r^,²⁰⁰⁴^{; a}ⁿ^{d J}^a^m^e^s^B^.^P^e^tr^{o, T}^h^e^o^dor^e^R^.^P^l^a^s^s^e^{, J}^a^ck^A^.^Mc^N^u^lty^{, “}^B^iote^c^hnolog^y^:^I^m^pa^c^t^on
^Bⁱ^olog^ic^a^l^W^a^r^f^a^r^e^a^{nd B}ⁱ^ode^f^e^ns^e^,^”^Bios^e^c^u^r^ity^an^{d Bi}^ote^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^m^:^Bio^d^e^f^eⁿ^s^e^Str^a^te^gy^{, Pr}^ac^tⁱ^c^e^,^a^nd^Sc^ie^nc^e^{, V}^o^l.^1,
^No^.^3,^S^e^p^t^em^b^e^r^,²⁰⁰³^.

How to best achieve needed transparency while preserving necessary information restriction is a
matter of contention. Some arms control experts claim that openness in the US biodefense
program should be held as the model for other countries. Other biosecurity experts assert that
special care must be taken to assure that information that would disclose a potential vulnerability
is not inadvertently released.
Once possible mechanism is the inclusion of local community members into the oversight process
for NBACC research. In other areas of contentious biological research, local review boards, such
as institutional biosecurity boards, have been used to oversee research activities. Typically, the
primary purpose of an IBC is to ensure that recombinant DNA research follows the NIH ⁵⁰
Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules. IBCs are required by NIH
guidelines to seat community members on the committee, in addition to scientists and safety
officials from the institution. IBCs have also been highlighted as possible mechanisms for
implementation of NSABB recommendations. The DHS has stated that an IBC will be
established at the NBACC facility, but it is unclear what role the IBC would have in assessing
research programs. Inclusion of such persons may be problematic in light of the potential for
classified or law-enforcement sensitive nature of some activities.
The establishment of an IBC at NBACC may provide a potential public oversight mechanism,
reassuring the local community and others with respect to the research being performed at
NBACC. Some advocates have assailed the utility of the IBCs though, asserting that the IBCs ⁵¹
often do not provide effective oversight of research facilities where they are established.
Another possible mechanism might be developing independent, external oversight of research
activities, using scientific experts, possibly using members of the National Academies, to assess ⁵²
research programs. The DHS has established an advisory committee through the National ⁵³
Academies to provide input into the NBACC research process. The advisory committee’s
suggestion and activities have not, as yet, been widely discussed or publicized. Formalizing the
committee input mechanism or more widely disseminating the results of the advisory committee’s
activities may be considered by critics as sufficient to allay transparency concerns.
The Department of Homeland Security states that research performed by the Department is solely
for defensive purposes, will be in accord with treaty obligations, and will be published, to the ⁵⁴
maximum extent possible, in the open scientific literature. As such, they are committed to

⁵⁰^W^h^ile^IBCs^a^r^e^re^s^pons^ib^le^f^o^{r o}^v^e^rs^ig^{ht of}^re^c^o^m^b^inaⁿ^{t D}^N^A^re^s^e^a^r^c^h^{, the}^s^e^re^s^ponsⁱ^b^ilit^ie^s^ne^e^d^not^be^s^o
^r^e^s^t^rⁱ^c^t^e^d^{. T}^h^e^N^I^H^g^u^ide^line^s^a^r^e^r^e^quir^e^m^e^nts^f^o^r^r^e^cⁱ^pieⁿ^ts^of^N^I^H^f^unding^r^e^g^a^r^d^ing^r^e^c^o^m^b^inaⁿ^t^D^N^A^te^c^hnique^s^,
^but^ot^he^r^ins^tit^uti^ons^a^r^e^eⁿ^c^o^ur^a^g^e^d^{to f}^o^llow^the^N^I^H^g^u^ide^l^ine^s^.^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^H^e^a^{lth a}^{nd H}^u^m^a^{n Se}^r^v^ic^e^s^,
^Na^tiona^{l Inst}^itute^s^of^He^a^lth,^Gui^d^e^line^s^for^Re^se^arc^h^In^v^o^lv^ing^Re^c^o^mbin^ant^{DNA M}^o^le^c^u^le^{s (}^N^{IH Guide}^lⁱⁿ^e^s⁾^{, A}^p^ril
²⁰⁰^2.
⁵¹^T^h^e^Suns^hⁱ^ne^P^r^oje^c^t^,^M^a^nd^ate^f^o^r^Fai^l^ur^e^—^T^h^e^St^ate^o^f^Iⁿ^s^tⁱ^t^uti^ona^{l Bi}^os^afe^t^y^C^o^m^m^itte^e^sⁱⁿ^an^Age^of^Bio^l^o^g^ic^al
^W^e^apons^Re^s^e^ar^c^h^,^O^c^tobe^r^{4, 20}^04.
⁵²^L^o^{is R. Em}^be^{r, “}^T^e^s^ting^the^Lⁱ^m^its,”^C^h^e^m^ic^al^an^{d E}^ngi^ne^e^r^{ing N}^e^w^s^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t^15,²⁰^05.
⁵³^W^h^ile^a^sta^ndi^ng^Na^tiona^{l A}^c^a^d^e^m^y^of^Sc^ie^nc^e^s^c^o^m^m^itte^e^ha^{s be}^eⁿ^e^s^ta^blishe^d^{to s}^u^p^port^the^NB^A^{CC prog}^ra^m^’^s
^re^se^a^r^c^h^{, it prov}^ide^s^sc^ie^ntif^ic^re^vⁱ^e^w^{, not re}^vⁱ^e^w^o^f^po^lic^y^{or c}^o^m^p^lia^nc^e^m^a^tte^r^s^{. P}^e^rsoⁿ^a^l^c^o^m^m^uni^c^a^{tion w}^{ith DHS}
^s^t^a^f^f^,^Se^ptem^be^{r 22,}²⁰^06.^Se^e^a^l^s^o^{, Boa}^r^{d o}ⁿ^A^r^m^y^Sc^ie^nc^e^a^{nd T}^e^c^hnol^og^y^,^Co^m^m^itte^e^{on Bio}^d^e^f^ens^e^Aⁿ^a^l^y^s^is^a^nd
^Co^uⁿ^term^e^a^su^{res, o}ⁿ^lⁱⁿ^{e at h}^t^t^p^://^www⁷^.ⁿ^a^tioⁿ^a^lacad^emⁱ^e^s.o^r^g^/^BAST^/B^A^S^T^_^Bio^d^e^f^eⁿ^s^e_^Aⁿ^al^y^s^is_^C^o^m^m^ittee.h^t^m^l^.
⁵⁴^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^H^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^a^{nd A}^r^m^y^G^a^r^rⁱ^s^{on, For}^t^D^e^tr^ic^k^MD^,^Final^Envⁱ^r^onm^eⁿ^t^a^{l I}^m^pac^t
^State^m^eⁿ^{t -}^C^o^ns^tr^uc^ti^on^an^{d O}^p^e^r^ation^of^the^N^a^tio^na^{l Bi}^ode^fe^ns^e^Analy^s^is^an^{d C}^o^unte^r^m^e^as^ur^e^s^C^e^nte^r⁽^N^BAC^C⁾
^Fac^ility^by^the^D^e^p^a^r^t^m^e^nt^{of H}^o^m^e^land^Se^c^u^r^ity^a^t^F^o^r^t^D^e^tr^ic^k^,^M^a^r^y^land^,^Dece^m^b^{er 2}³^,²⁰⁰⁴^.^S^{ee al}^so^Ju^stⁱⁿ^R^o^od^,
^“^D^H^S^G^e^r^m^w^a^r^R^e^s^e^a^r^c^h^B^u^g^s^N^onpr^olif^e^r^a^{tion W}^a^tc^hdog^s^,^”^C^Q^Home^lan^d^Se^c^u^rity^,^Se^pte^m^be^r^24,²⁰⁰⁴^aⁿ^{d D}^a^vⁱ^d
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

assessing and reducing biodefense vulnerabilities, adhering to scientific standards and practices,
and exercising sufficient and appropriate levels of openness. The Department points to its robust
internal compliance review process, the establishment of a standing advisory committee, and its
plan to conduct much of its research in an unclassified manner as indicators that critics concerns ⁵⁵
are overstated.
Another area of concern amongst the arms control community and increasingly within Congress ⁵⁶
is the lack of a clear research plan for NBACC programs or for the NBACC facility. The
research performed through the NBACC program is designed to fill in knowledge gaps regarding
pathogens, test the effectiveness of biological countermeasures, and to assess the risk posed by ⁵⁷
new and future activities in biological science. Such research will likely span both classified and
unclassified areas.
Arms control experts have expressed concern that the research being considered at the NBACC
facility may not be properly based on risk, but instead might be based on other characteristics,
such as potential consequence or the ability of a nation state to develop such a weapon. These
experts suggest that a more proper prioritization would focus on the capabilities of terrorists,
rather than rogue nations. They also suggest that improper prioritization of research activities may
lead to an arms race in the biodefense community, as scientists engaged in biodefense attempt to ⁵⁸
develop countermeasures to more dangerous pathogens developed in their own laboratories.
Since the NBACC program deals with matters of homeland security, public oversight of its
research activities might compromise homeland security. If that is the case, some advocates argue
that a robust, prioritization and planning mechanism should be developed, so that the mechanism ⁵⁹
itself can be reviewed. They argue that such an activity will bolster confidence that proper
prioritization and planning activities will occur, even if the results of those activities are not
available. Others might argue that such structures already exist and are in place, citing the array ⁶⁰
of advisory boards and committees available to DHS in developing strategic planning. Since the

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^R^uppe^,^“^P^r^o^pos^e^d^U^.^{S. B}ⁱ^ol^og^ic^a^l^R^e^s^e^a^r^c^h^C^ould^C^h^a^lle^ng^e^T^r^e^a^t^y^R^e^s^t^rⁱ^c^tions^{, Ex}^pe^r^t^s^C^h^a^r^g^e^,”^Globa^{l Se}^c^u^rity
^Newswire^{, J}^une³⁰^{, 2}⁰⁰⁴^.
⁵⁵^P^e^r^s^ona^{l c}^o^m^m^unic^a^{tion w}^{ith D}^H^{S s}^t^a^f^f^,^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^{14, 2}⁰⁰⁶^.
⁵⁶^T^h^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^H^o^m^e^l^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^Sc^ie^nc^e^a^{nd T}^e^c^hnolog^y^Dir^e^c^t^or^a^t^e^r^e^le^a^s^e^d^a^s^t^r^a^te^gⁱ^c^plaⁿ^a^{nd f}ⁱ^v^e^-^y^e^a^r
^re^se^a^r^c^h^stra^te^gy^tha^t^prov^ide^s^so^m^e^insig^h^{t int}^o^w^o^rk^tha^t^m^a^y^be^pe^rf^or^m^e^{d a}^t^the^NBA^CC^f^a^c^ilit^y^.^W^h^ile^not
^e^x^plic^itly^de^line^a^ting^re^s^e^a^r^c^h^done^a^t^the^N^B^A^{CC f}^a^c^ility^f^r^o^m^othe^{r bi}^olog^ic^a^l^c^o^uⁿ^te^rm^e^a^s^ure^s^res^e^a^r^c^h^{, it d}^o^e^s
^ideⁿ^tif^y^thr^u^s^t^a^r^e^a^s^tha^t^s^u^p^por^t^N^B^A^C^C^pr^og^r^a^m^c^o^m^pone^nts^,^s^u^c^h^a^s^a^f^o^r^e^ns^ic^s^pr^og^r^a^m^unde^r^pⁱⁿⁿⁱ^ng^the^N^B^FA^C^,
^a^{nd a}^t^h^r^e^a^t^a^s^s^e^s^s^m^e^{nt pr}^og^r^a^m^,^s^u^s^t^aⁱ^ning^t^h^e^B^T^C^C^a^{nd B}^K^C^.^S^e^e^online^a^t^htt^p^://^hs^c^.^h^ous^e^.^g^o^v^/^Site^D^o^c^u^m^e^nts^/
²⁰⁰⁷⁰⁶²⁷¹⁰⁵⁷⁰^5-⁵⁷⁴⁵¹^.^p^d^f^.
⁵⁷^D^r^{. Ma}^ur^e^eⁿ^Mc^C^a^r^t^hy^{, D}ⁱ^r^e^c^t^or^{, O}^f^fⁱ^c^e^of^R^e^s^e^a^r^c^h^a^{nd D}^e^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^{t, D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^H^o^m^e^la^{nd S}^e^c^u^r^ity^,^Public
^C^o^m^m^e^nts^at^the^C^e^nte^r^f^o^r^S^t^r^a^t^e^gic^an^{d I}ⁿ^te^r^nat^io^nal^St^udie^s^{, O}^c^tobe^r³¹^,²⁰⁰⁵^.
⁵⁸^Da^vⁱ^{d Rup}^p^e^,^“^H^om^e^l^a^{nd Se}^c^u^ri^ty^T^h^re^a^t^P^r^ior^itie^{s Dra}^w^Critic^is^m^,^”^G^l^{obal Se}^c^u^r^ity^N^e^w^s^wⁱ^r^e^,^N^o^ve^m^b^er²^,²⁰⁰⁵^.
⁵⁹^A^sⁱ^m^ila^r^a^ppr^oa^c^h^ha^s^be^eⁿ^ta^k^e^{n o}ⁿ^a^s^m^a^{ll s}^c^a^l^e^w^{ith the}^Bⁱ^ol^og^ic^a^l^Rⁱ^s^k^A^s^s^e^ssm^eⁿ^{t r}^e^quir^e^d^un^de^r^H^o^m^e^la^nd
^S^ecu^ri^t^y^P^r^esi^d^en^tⁱ^a^l^Di^rectⁱ^v^{e 10.}^T^h^{e resu}^l^t^s^o^f^t^h^{e ri}^{sk assess}^m^eⁿ^t^{are cl}^assi^fⁱ^ed^,^b^u^t^t^h^{e m}^e^t^h^o^d^o^l^og^yⁱ^sⁿ^o^t^andⁱ^s
^opeⁿ^{to r}^e^vⁱ^e^w^by^the^N^a^tiona^{l A}^c^a^d^em^ie^s^.^Se^e^N^a^tiona^{l R}^e^s^e^a^r^c^h^C^ounc^il^{, B}^o^a^r^{d o}ⁿ^Ma^t^h^e^m^a^tic^a^l^Sc^ie^nc^e^s^a^{nd T}^h^eⁱ^r
^A^pplic^a^tions^{, C}^o^m^m^itte^e^{on Me}^t^hod^ol^og^ic^a^l^I^m^pr^ov^em^eⁿ^ts^to^t^h^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^H^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^’^s^Bⁱ^olog^ic^a^l
^Agen^t^Ri^sk^Aⁿ^al^y^sⁱ^s^,^Iⁿ^te^rⁱ^m^Re^por^{t o}ⁿ^M^e^tho^dol^og^ic^{al I}^m^pr^ov^e^m^eⁿ^ts^{to t}^h^e^De^partmeⁿ^{t o}^f^Home^la^nd^Se^c^u^rity^’s
^Biolo^g^ic^a^l^Ageⁿ^{t Risk}^Aⁿ^a^l^y^s^is^{, o}ⁿ^lin^{e at}^h^t^t^p^://w^ww⁸^.ⁿ^a^tioⁿ^a^lacad^e^m^ies.o^r^g^/^cp^/^p^ro^jectvⁱ^ew^.asp^x^?^k^e^y⁼⁴⁸⁶⁸^2.
⁶⁰^For^e^x^a^m^ple^,^P^.^L^.¹^07-²⁹^6,^the^H^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^A^c^{t of}^2002,^e^s^ta^blis^he^{d a}^Sc^ie^nc^e^aⁿ^{d T}^e^c^hno^log^y^A^d^vⁱ^s^o^r^y
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

efficacy of planning and prioritization is open to interpretation, developing appropriate metrics to
assess this process may pose a challenge.
The NBACC facility is to include laboratory space at the highest level of biosafety containment,
Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4). Such laboratories are required for performing experiments using the
most dangerous pathogens, like viral hemorrhagic fevers such as Ebola virus. The volume of
BSL-4 laboratory space has historically been small, with federal facilities available at the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, GA and at USAMRIID in Fort Detrick, MD.
Federal efforts are increasing the available BSL-4 laboratory space. The National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) has funded the construction of two new BSL-4
facilities, one at the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston and one at the Boston ⁶¹
University Medical Center. Additional BSL-4 laboratory space is proposed for the National Bio-
and Agro-defense Facility.
The increase in BSL-4 laboratory space is likely to result in a corresponding increase in the
number of scientists trained in the techniques required to handle contagious, deadly pathogens.
Some posit that such an increase will lead to further dissemination of information regarding ⁶²
biothreat agents, possibly to scientists who oppose the United States. Others argue that the
increase in BSL-4 laboratory facilities and trained scientists will lead to a more robust biodefense
capability, providing more rapid breakthroughs in pathogen identification and countermeasure ⁶³
development.
The construction of a DHS BSL-4 facility dedicated to threat characterization has raised
community fears with regard to potential pathogen leakage, theft, or loss, and possible indirect ⁶⁴
health impacts. Similar concerns have been raised regarding the construction of the NIAID ⁶⁵
BSL-4 facilities. The DHS and DOD assert that such a release is unlikely, given the high safety ⁶⁶
requirements of a BSL-4 facility.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^C^ounc^il^f^o^r^the^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^H^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^’^s^Sc^ie^nc^e^a^{nd T}^e^c^hnol^og^y^Dⁱ^r^e^c^t^or^a^t^e^.^T^h^is^a^d^vⁱ^s^o^r^y^c^ounc^il
^dis^s^o^lv^e^dⁱⁿ²⁰⁰⁵^{. T}^h^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt a}^l^s^o^r^e^que^s^t^e^d^s^upp^or^{t f}^r^om^the^N^a^tiona^{l A}^c^a^d^em^ie^s^{in e}^s^ta^blis^hi^ng^a^s^t^a^ndi^ng
^Co^mmⁱ^t^t^{ee o}ⁿ^Bi^o^d^e^f^eⁿ^s^{e A}ⁿ^al^y^sⁱ^s^an^d^C^o^un^t^e^rm^ea^su^res.^F^o^{r m}^o^{re i}ⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^,^{see o}ⁿ^lⁱⁿ^{e at}
^h^ttp^:^//www⁷^.ⁿ^a^tioⁿ^a^lacad^e^m^ies.o^r^g^/^b^a^st/BA^S^T^_^Bio^d^e^f^eⁿ^s^e_^Aⁿ^al^y^s^is_^C^o^m^m^ittee.h^t^m^l^.
⁶¹^N^a^tiona^{l I}ⁿ^s^tit^ute^of^A^lle^r^g^y^a^nd^Iⁿ^f^e^c^tious^Dⁱ^s^e^a^s^e^s^{, “}^N^I^A^I^D^Funds^C^o^ns^tr^uc^ti^on^of^Bⁱ^os^a^f^e^t^y^L^a^b^o^r^a^torⁱ^e^s^,”^Press
^Re^le^ase^{, Se}^pte^m^be^r^30,²⁰^03.
⁶²^Eile^eⁿ^C^h^of^fⁿ^e^s^{, “}^B^iow^e^a^pons^:^N^e^w^L^a^bs^{, Mor}^e^T^e^r^r^o^r^?^”^Bulle^{tin of}^the^A^t^omic^Sc^ie^ntists^{, V}^o^{l. 58}^,
^Se^pte^m^be^r^/^O^c^tobe^r²⁰^02.
⁶³^{For a}^re^p^r^e^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^a^r^g^u^m^e^{nt, s}^e^e^te^s^tim^on^y^of^D^r^.^Aⁿ^thony^Fa^ucⁱ^,^Dⁱ^re^c^t^{or, N}^I^A^I^D^,^N^I^H^,^be^f^o^re^th^e^Subc^om^m^itte^e
^{on Bi}^ote^rrorism^a^nd^Pub^lic^He^a^lth^P^r^e^p^a^r^e^d^ne^{ss, Se}^na^te^Com^m^itte^e^{on He}^a^lth^{, Ed}^uc^a^tio^{n, L}^a^{bor a}ⁿ^d^P^e^nsi^ons,
^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{8, 20}⁰⁵^.
⁶⁴^Nel^s^oⁿ^Hern^and^ez,^“^P^ro^t^e^st^{ers D}^ecr^y^F^o^rt^Det^rⁱ^c^{k E}^x^p^aⁿ^sⁱ^oⁿ^,^”^Washⁱⁿ^gt^on^Po^st^{, J}^u^ne⁶^,²⁰⁰⁵^.^Sc^ott^Shaⁿ^e^,^“^W^ith
^Bⁱ^ode^f^e^ns^e^P^l^aⁿ^{, Fe}^a^r^of^R^e^pe^r^c^u^s^sⁱ^ons^,”^T^h^{e B}^a^l^tⁱ^m^o^r^{e Su}ⁿ^{, A}^p^{ril 29,}²⁰⁰⁴^.^Se^e^a^l^{so p}^ublic^c^o^m^m^eⁿ^{ts in}^U.S.
^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^H^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^a^{nd A}^r^m^y^G^a^r^rⁱ^s^{on, F}^o^r^t^D^e^tr^ic^k^MD^,^Fin^a^{l E}ⁿ^vⁱ^r^onm^eⁿ^tal^I^m^pa^c^t^State^m^eⁿ^t^-
^Construc^ti^on^a^{nd O}^p^e^r^atioⁿ^{of t}^h^e^Natio^nal^Bio^d^e^f^eⁿ^se^A^naly^s^{is a}^{nd C}^o^uⁿ^te^rme^a^sure^{s Ce}^nte^r⁽^N^{BACC) Fac}^ility^by
^the^De^partmeⁿ^t^{of H}^o^me^la^nd^Se^c^u^rity^at^{Fort De}^tric^k^,^M^a^ry^la^nd^,^Dece^m^b^{er 2}³^,²⁰⁰⁴^.
⁶⁵^Fraⁿ^k^Ja^m^e^{s, “}^A^nti-biote^r^r^o^{r L}^a^{bs Ra}^ise^Risk^{to U.S., Cr}^itic^{s Sa}^y^;^A^c^cⁱ^de^{nts, Costs Cite}^{d a}^s¹⁴^A^r^e^P^l^a^nne^d^f^o^r
^N^a^tion,”^C^h^ic^ag^{o Tr}ⁱ^b^uⁿ^e^,^Decem^b^e^{r 5}^,²⁰⁰⁴^.
⁶⁶^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^H^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^a^{nd A}^r^m^y^G^a^r^rⁱ^s^{on, For}^t^D^e^tr^ic^k^MD^,^Final^Envⁱ^r^onm^eⁿ^t^a^{l I}^m^pac^t
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

How the NBACC program and NBACC facility coordinate their efforts with other federal
agencies may attract Congressional interest. When the Department of Homeland Security was
formed, most programs addressing medical countermeasures to biological threats remained under
the authority of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Most civilian programs
addressing nonmedical countermeasures, such as those funded by the Department of Energy, were ⁶⁷
transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. With the establishment of the NBACC
facility, research and development activities in some areas being pursued by the BTCC would be ⁶⁸
closely related to those supported by HHS. Results of such DHS research and development
activities could also help inform and shape policy and research agenda in other departments. For
example, the risk assessment activities undertaken by DHS could potentially aid in informing ⁶⁹
HHS strategic deliberations.
The DHS Secretary is charged with coordinating homeland security research and development
activities across the federal government. If coordination is well-managed, the effectiveness of
research and development activities would be optimized. Results from DHS testing and
evaluation of biological countermeasures, for example, might inform new research areas for HHS
to support. On the other hand, if coordination is ineffective, significant overlap and duplication of
effort may occur between agencies.
Additionally, effective coordination between the NBFAC and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) would be necessary for a prompt forensics response following a bioterrorism incident. The
NBFAC has, in its interim space, completed processing of thousands of forensic samples in
support of bioterror/biocrime cases for the FBI, acting as the lead federal facility for bioforensic ⁷⁰
analysis. The FBI has entered into contracts with Department of Energy Laboratories to perform ⁷¹
forensics and attribution activities for nuclear materials. Lessons learned from these activities
may lower barriers to effective interagency actions following a biological attack.
Some coordinative activities designed to leverage the NBACC facility capabilities are already
underway. The DHS, acting through the Science and Technology Directorate, has entered into the
Interagency Biomedical Research Confederation at Fort Detrick. This group consists of agencies
and institutes engaged in medical or biotechnology research at Fort Detrick and also includes
representatives from the National Institutes of Health, the Agricultural Research Service, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Army Surgeon General. Through committees
and subcommittees established under this interagency group, these participants attempt to

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^State^m^eⁿ^{t -}^C^o^ns^tr^uc^ti^on^an^{d O}^p^e^r^ation^of^the^N^a^tio^na^{l Bi}^ode^fe^ns^e^Analy^s^is^an^{d C}^o^unte^r^m^e^as^ur^e^s^C^e^nte^r⁽^N^BAC^C⁾
^Fac^ility^by^the^D^e^p^a^r^t^m^e^nt^{of H}^o^m^e^land^Se^c^u^r^ity^a^t^F^o^r^t^D^e^tr^ic^k^,^M^a^r^y^land^,^D^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^23,²⁰⁰⁴^.
⁶⁷^T^h^e^H^o^m^e^l^a^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^A^c^{t o}^f²⁰⁰²^,^P.L^.¹⁰^7-²^96,^Se^c^tio^{n 3}⁰²^.
⁶⁸^For^e^x^a^m^ple^,^r^e^s^e^a^r^c^h^{on g}^e^ne^tic^m^odifⁱ^c^a^{tion of}^m^ode^{l sy}^s^t^em^s^f^o^r^pa^t^hog^eⁿ^s^ha^s^be^eⁿ^f^unde^{d by}^N^I^A^I^D^.^Se^e^G^.
^C^h^a^u^d^h^rⁱ^,^V.^P^a^nc^ha^na^thaⁿ^,^R^.^M.^B^u^lle^r^,^e^t^a^l^{., “}^P^o^l^a^r^iz^e^d^Ty^pe¹^C^y^tokⁱ^ne^R^e^s^pons^e^aⁿ^{d C}^e^ll-^m^e^dia^t^e^d^I^m^m^unity
^De^te^r^m^ine^Ge^ne^tic^Re^sistaⁿ^c^e^{to Mouse}^p^ox^,”^Pr^oc^{. N}^a^tl.^Ac^ad^{. Sc}ⁱ^.^U^S^A^,^V^o^l.¹⁰^{1, J}^une^15,²⁰⁰⁴^,^p^p^.9⁰⁵^7-⁶²^.
⁶⁹^{For a}ⁿ^e^x^a^m^ple^of^how^c^u^rre^{nt DHS risk}^a^sse^ss^m^e^{nt a}^c^tiv^itie^{s a}^r^e^t^o^be^use^d^by^{HHS, se}^e⁷¹^Fe^{d. R}^e^g.⁵³^,0⁹⁷^–
^53,¹⁰^{2 (}^S^e^p^te^m^b^e^r^{8, 20}⁰⁶⁾^.
⁷⁰^D^r^{. B}^e^rⁿ^a^r^{d C}^our^tⁿ^e^y^,^N^a^tion^a^l^Biode^fe^ns^e^Aⁿ^a^l^y^s^is^an^{d C}^o^un^te^r^m^e^a^s^u^r^e^s^C^e^nte^r^{, P}^r^e^s^eⁿ^ta^tion^to^the^Na^tiona^l
^A^c^a^d^em^ie^s^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on Me}^tho^dol^og^ic^a^l^I^m^pr^ov^em^eⁿ^ts^{to t}^h^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^H^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^r^ity^’^s^Bⁱ^olog^ic^a^l^A^g^eⁿ^t
^Rⁱ^{sk A}ⁿ^al^ysi^s^,^A^u^gu^st²⁸^,²⁰⁰⁶^.
⁷¹^Jim^Ne^{sbitt, “}^S^{RS L}^a^{b W}ⁱ^{ns FBI}^Contra^c^t^,”^T^h^{e A}^u^gu^sta^C^h^ronⁱ^cl^e^{, Fe}^br^ua^r^y^24,²⁰^05.

coordinate work in scientific areas of mutual interest, so as to encourage efficient management, ⁷²
foster scientific interchange, and maximize research and development productivity.
The feasibility study performed for NBACC identified several potential routes for the
construction of NBACC. A phased approach, in which the BKC was initially formed outside of
the Fort Detrick facility and then incorporated into the facility at a later date, was one route
identified. Another was the construction of the NBACC facility with the BKC integrated within it.
The BKC was, instead, established separately at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and
now appears to be a center independent of the NBACC facility and NBACC program.
The BKC, in its data collection, analysis, and dissemination capabilities, appears to play a similar
role to the NBACC program and facility. The degree to which information needs and gaps
identified by one of the centers may be filled by the other center may rest heavily on internal
communications and interactions. Efficient information sharing and planning may play a key role
in maximizing the effectiveness of both centers.
^Dan^a^A^.^S^h^ea
^Specialis^{t i}ⁿ^Scieⁿ^{ce an}^{d T}^echⁿ^o^logy^P^o^lic^y
^ds^h^e^a^@^crs^.^l^o^c.g^o^v^,^7-⁶⁸⁴⁴

⁷²^F^o^{r m}^o^{re i}ⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^ab^ou^t^t^h^{e I}ⁿ^t^e^ragen^c^y^Bi^o^m^edⁱ^cal^Resear^ch^Coⁿ^f^ed^eratⁱ^oⁿ^at^F^o^rt^Det^rⁱ^c^k,^see^oⁿ^lⁱⁿ^{e at}
^http:^//www^.de^t^ric^k^.a^r^m^y^.^m^il/^nibc^/.