The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the Army's Future Combat System (FCS): Issues for Congress

CRS Report for Congress
The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the
Army’s Future Combat System (FCS):
Issues for Congress
November 17, 2005
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the Army’s
Future Combat System (FCS): Issues for Congress
Summary
The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) is a Department of Defense (DOD)
program that would play a significant role in the U.S Army’s proposed Future
Combat System (FCS) program. (For a more detailed description of the FCS
program see CRS Report RL32888, The Army's Future Combat System(FCS):
Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.) JTRS, envisioned as a
family of software programmable radios, has been described as the “backbone” of the
FCS and is intended to link the 18 manned and unmanned systems that would
constitute FCS. Two JTRS sub-programs managed by the Army — Cluster One and
Cluster Five — have experienced developmental difficulties, delays, and cost
overruns which calls into question their viability. This report will be updated on a
periodic basis.

Contents
Background ......................................................1
Current Issues.................................................3
Developmental ............................................3
Experimentation and Spin Out One................................8
Experimentation ...........................................8
Spin Out One.............................................9
Program Restructuring........................................10
Program Budget Issues.........................................10
Recent Congressional Actions...................................11
Issues for Congress...........................................13
The Viability of the Cluster One Program......................13
Security ................................................13
JTRS Alternatives........................................15
List of Tables
Table 1. JTRS Clusters.............................................2
Table 2. Army JTRS Senate-Recommended Adjustments — FY2006
Defense Appropriations........................................12
Table 3. Army JTRS House-Recommended Adjustments — FY2006
Defense Appropriations........................................12

The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and
the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS):
Issues for Congress
Background
The JTRS program originated in the mid-1990s and was intended to replace the
25 to 30 families of radio systems used by the military — many of which could not
communicate with each other — with software-based radios that could operate across
the entire radio frequency spectrum.¹ JTRS is intended to permit the Services to
operate together in a “seamless” manner via wireless voice, video, and data
communications through all levels of command, including direct access to near real-
time information from airborne and battlefield sensors.² Described as a “software-
defined radio” JTRS is envisioned to function more like a computer than a
conventional radio and is to be upgraded and modified to operate with other
communications systems by the addition of software as opposed to redesigning
hardware - a more costly and time-consuming process. DOD also asserts that in
“many cases, a single JTRS radio with multiple waveforms³ can replace many
separate radios, simplifying maintenance” and that because JTRS is “software
programmable, they will also provide a longer functional life”⁴ with both features
offering potential long-term cost savings. It is also planned that JTRS will be
interoperable with current DOD radio systems, the Pentagon’s Global Information
Grid,⁵ and the communications systems of selected allied nations.⁶
JTRS has been characterized by the Army as a key complementary enabler of
the FCS network that would enable FCS sensors and combat systems to acquire and

¹ Peter A. Buxbaum, “Jitters Over JTRS,” Armed Forces Journal, July 2005, p. 31.
² United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman,
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, “Defense Acquisitions: Resolving
Developmental Risks in the Army’s Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to
Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 9.
³ Waveforms are defined as software applications that determine the total functionality of
the radio from the user’s perspective.
⁴ DOD Pamphlet on JTRS published by the JTRS Joint Program Office, undated.
⁵ The National Security Agency defines the Global Information Grid as “a net-centric
system operating in a global context to provide processing, storage, management, and
transport of information to support all DOD, national security, and related Intelligence
Community missions and functions (strategic, operational, tactical, and business) in war, in
crisis, and in peace.”
⁶ Buxbaum, pp. 31-33.

engage targets at a distance as well as preventing them from being engaged by enemy
systems.⁷ To a significant extent, the Army has linked progress in the development
of a number FCS subsystems to progress in the JTRS program.
The JTRS program was originally broken into five “clusters’ with each cluster
having a particular Service “lead.”
Table 1. JTRS Clusters
Cl ust e r O ne Tw o Three F o ur F i ve
Description Ground Ha nd-He l d Fixed Hi gh Handheld,
Vehicle andRadiosSite andPerformanceDismounted,
HelicopterMaritimeAircraftand Small^a
RadiosRadios(Fixed Wing)Form Factor
RadiosRadios
Service LeadU.S. ArmyU.S. SpecialU.S.U.S. Air ForceU.S. Army
OperationsNavy
Command
(USSOCOM)
^{a. Form}^f^{actor radios}^{are es}^s^eⁿ^tially^mⁱⁿⁱ^atu^r^ized^radi^os^t^h^at^s^o^l^dⁱ^e^rs^w^o^u^l^{d carry}^,^as^w^e^l^l^as^radi^os
^f^o^{r w}^e^ig^h^t^an^{d pow}^er-^c^on^s^t^rain^{ed platf}^o^rm^s^{— s}^u^ch^as^FC^S^Un^atten^d^ed^Grouⁿ^d^Sen^s^ors^an^d
^Iⁿ^tellig^en^{t Mu}ⁿ^itioⁿ^s^.
In early 2004, DOD merged Clusters Three and Four into a single program —
the Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed Station Program (AMF JTRS) — jointly managed
by the Navy and the Air Force — because studies suggested that developing the
clusters together would result in a more efficient procurement process and a better⁸
overall product. All JTRS Clusters are being developed concurrently and there is no
requirement that one cluster is completed before another cluster can be developed.
Because the FCS program is heavily dependent on Clusters One and Five, this report
will address only issues involving these two clusters being developed by the Army.⁹

⁷ Ibid.
⁸ Henry S. Kenyon, “Communications Systems Meld for Greater Synergy,” SIGNAL
Magazine, February 2004.
⁹ Boeing (Anaheim, California) is the prime contractor for JTRS Cluster One. Other team
members include Northrop Grumman Mission Systems (Carson, California); Rockwell
Collins (Cedar Rapids, Iowa); BAE Systems (Wayne, New Jersey); and Harris
Communications (Rochester, New York). General Dynamics (Scottsdale, Arizona) is the
prime contractor for JTRS Cluster Five. Other team members include Rockwell Collins
(Cedar Rapids, Iowa); BAE Systems (Wayne, New Jersey); and Thales Communication
(Clarksburg, Maryland).

Current Issues
Developmental. JTRS has experienced a number of developmental
difficulties to date. Some of the more notable difficulties are discussed in the
following sections.
Size and Weight Constraints and Limited Range. According to a
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report:
To realize the full capabilities of the Wideband Networking Waveform,¹⁰
including transmission range, the Cluster One radio requires significant amounts
of memory and processing power, which add to the size, weight, and power
consumption of the radio. The added size and weight are the results of efforts to
ensure the electronic parts in the radio are not overheated by the electricity
needed to power the additional memory and processing. Thus far, the program
has not been able to develop radios that meet size, weight, and power
requirements, and the current projected transmission range is only three
kilometers — well short of the 10-kilometer range required for the Wideband
Networking Waveform ... The Cluster One radio’s size, weight, and peak power
consumption exceeds helicopter platform requirements by as much as 80¹¹
percent.
The inability to meet these fundamental design and performance standards has
raised concerns that Cluster One may not be able to accommodate additional
waveforms (current plan is for Cluster One to have four to eight stored waveforms)
as intended and that it may be too bulky or heavy to fit into the stringently weight and
size-constrained FCS Manned Ground Vehicles (MGVs)¹² as well as the Army’s
helicopter fleet. Some are concerned that to meet these physical requirements, the
Army may significantly “dumb down” Cluster One performance specifications.¹³
According to the Army, however, it continues to make progress in terms of reducing
Cluster One’s weight and size and in increasing its transmission range, however
incorporating all of the desired waveforms into Cluster One is proving to be

¹⁰ The Wideband Networking Waveform is described as the core of the JTRS networking
capability and is intended to operate across a wide range of the radio frequency spectrum -
from 2 megahertz (MHZ) to 2 gigahertz (GHz) and would provide increased routing and
networking capability - as much as a hundred times more than existing communications
systems.
¹¹ United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman,
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, “Defense Acquisitions: Resolving
Developmental Risks in the Army’s Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to
Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 15.
¹² FCS Manned Ground Vehicles (MGV) are envisioned as a family of eight different
combat vehicles - with some having more than one variation - that are based on a common
platform and would be designed to be transported by U.S. Air Force transport aircraft and
deployed straight into combat with little or no post-flight reconfiguration. They would be
equipped with a variety of passive and active protection systems and sensors that the Army
hopes will offer them the same survivability as the current heavy armor force.
¹³ Sandra I. Erwin, “Military Sets Less Ambitious Goals for New Tactical Radio,” National
Defense, National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), Washington, DC, August 2005.

difficult.¹⁴ Cluster Five radios were also reportedly experiencing similar size, weight,
and power difficulties - difficulties more pronounced as some Cluster Five versions
are supposed to weigh no more than one pound. ¹⁵ Current reports on Cluster Five
progress appear to be more optimistic than Cluster One. General Dynamics reports
that they have been able to achieve systems compatibility between Cluster Five units
and three other key FCS components, the Non-Line of Sight Launch System, the
Unattended Ground Sensor, and the Intelligent Munitions System.¹⁶
DOD convened a mini-Defense Acquisition Board¹⁷ (DAB) for the Cluster One
program on October 11, 2005 and, according to one report, plans to hold another
review on November 21, 2005.¹⁸ Information concerning the October 11 review was
not publically released and there is some renewed concern that the Cluster One
program is in trouble. Another report suggests that the airborne version of Cluster
One, despite significant re-engineering, still exceeds weight limitations.¹⁹ The issue
appears to be that Boeing has had difficulty reducing the radio’s weight below 66
kilograms - with 52 kilograms being the maximum allowable weight for the airborne
version of Cluster One.²⁰ According to Boeing officials, it would be possible to
achieve the 52 kilogram weight limit but it would require significant design changes
to a design that is already well established and not easily changed.²¹ Despite this
difficulty, certain aspects of the Cluster One program have shown improvement -
according to Boeing officials - with the first version of the Wideband Networking
Waveform apparently operational on some versions of Cluster One.²²
Security. Security for JTRS has emerged as a significant developmental
difficulty. According to one expert, one of the program’s biggest problems is
security, “namely encryption, as JTRS encryption is software-based and is, therefore,

¹⁴ Meeting between CRS and the Army Staff’s G-8 (Force Development) Section’s
Directorate of Integration FCS Office, September 15, 2005.
¹⁵ United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman,
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, “Defense Acquisitions: Resolving
Developmental Risks in the Army’s Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to
Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 19.
¹⁶ Rebecca Christie, “Troubled DOD Radio Program Shows Progress Despite Delays,” Wall
Street Journal, October 3, 2005.
¹⁷ The Defense Acquisition Board is the Department of Defense’s senior level forum for
advising the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics on
critical decisions concerning major acquisition programs.
¹⁸ Rebecca Christie, “Pentagon Plans Another Review for Troubled Radio Program,” Wall
Street Journal, October 12, 2005.
¹⁹ Joshua Kucera, “Weight Issues Bear Down on JTRS,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, October

12, 2005, p. 8.

²⁰ Ibid.
²¹ Ibid.
²² Rebecca Christie, “Troubled DOD Radio Program Shows Progress Despite Delays,” Wall
Street Journal, October 3, 2005.

vulnerable to hacking.”²³ Computer security experts generally agree that software
used for any purpose is vulnerable, as no current form of computer security offers
absolute security or information assurance. According to GAO, JTRS will be
required to operate applications at multiple levels of security and in order to meet this
requirement, developers will have to not only account for traditional radio security
measures but also computer and network security measures.²⁴ In addition, National
Security Agency (NSA)²⁵ security concerns about JTRS interface with radio systems
of U.S. allies, and the requirement for JTRS to be interoperable with DOD’s Global
Information Grid (GIG), are also expected to pose developmental challenges.²⁶ One
such security-related challenge is that DOD’s Global Information Grid will also
interface with the Internet, which brings with it a whole additional set of security
concerns for JTRS.²⁷
Interoperability with Legacy Radio Systems. Some have expressed
concerns that the goal of making JTRS “backward compatible” with legacy radios
may be technologically infeasible.²⁸ Reportedly, early program attempts at cross-²⁹
banding to synchronize incompatible legacy radio signals proved to be too complex
and current Army efforts are focusing on using the Wideband Networking Waveform³⁰
to link with legacy radio frequencies. One report suggests that while the Wideband
Networking Waveform can receive signals from legacy radios, legacy radios cannot
receive signals from JTRS and to rectify this situation, the Army is looking at using

19 different waveforms to facilitate JTRS transmissions to legacy systems.³¹

Incorporating up to 19 different waveforms into a JTRS radio has the potential to
significantly increase memory and processing power requirements which, in turn,
could drive up JTRS size, weight, and power requirements. Recently, the Joint Staff
asked the Services to prioritize JTRS waveforms and the Army reportedly identified³²
four waveforms as initial priorities for FCS and other complementary programs.

²³ Buxbaum, p. 32.
²⁴ Ibid.
²⁵ The National Security Agency is the U.S. government’s cryptologic organization. It
coordinates, directs, and performs highly specialized activities to protect U.S. government
information systems and produce foreign signals intelligence information.
²⁶ Buxbaum, p. 32.
²⁷ Jeff Child, “Cyber Security, JTRS, and the GIG,” COTS Journal, June 2005.
²⁸ Sandra I. Erwin, “Military Sets Less Ambitious Goals for New Tactical Radio,” National
Defense, National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), Washington, DC, August 2005.
²⁹ Cross-banding is a technique of receiving a number of incompatible frequencies and then
re-transmitting them on previously designated channels, thereby allowing communications
systems operating on different bands to communicate with one another.
³⁰ Ibid.
³¹ Jen DiMascio, “JTRS Cluster One to Play Role, Execs Say: Exercise to Test Mettle of
Early FCS Technologies Will Begin this Year,” Inside the Army, Vol. 17, No. 25, June 27,

2005, p. 7.

³² Comments from the Army Staff’s G-8 (Force Development) Section’s Directorate of
Integration FCS Office, November 10, 2005.

Cluster One Stop Work Order. On April 25, 2005, DOD issued a “Show
Cause” letter to Boeing- the lead contractor for JTRS Cluster One - stating that it was
considering cancelling the contract for the first phase of Cluster One due to Boeing’s
“anticipated failure to meet cost, schedule, and performance requirements.” Shortly
after this decision, work on Cluster Five was also partially suspended, due in part to
developmental problems, changing technical requirements, and a contract award
protest, and also because progress in Cluster Five was heavily leveraged against
progress on Cluster One.³³ As a result of the work stoppage, DOD lifted its
requirement for Services to obtain a DOD waiver before purchasing non-JTRS radios
and the Services were authorized to purchase legacy radios, such as the Single
Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), which has been in
service since the 1980s.³⁴
JTRS Alternatives. Some analysts suggest that there are alternatives to JTRS
that are already commercially available. Companies such as Harris Corporation —
a Cluster One team member - produces a software-defined radio (Falcon II AN/PRC-
117F(C)) and Thales — a Cluster Five team member and the lead contractor for
SOCOM’s Cluster Two radio — both produce software-defined radios that are³⁵
already in use in the field. It should be noted, however, that these software-defined
radios currently in use only run a subset of the current force waveforms, and the
Wideband Networking Waveform and Soldier Radio Waveform — both FCS
program requirements — would not be available on these radios.³⁶ Another possible
solution could be to use existing software-defined radios and to acquire a commercial
wideband system such as WiMax³⁷ — a non-line-of-sight commercial broadband³⁸
networking technology that could be modified for military use. Experts suggest that
a system such as WiMax could provide the military with more bandwidth and³⁹
enhanced over-the-horizon mobile communications. The Army asserts, however,
that if a system such as WiMax was adopted for use, that it would require NSA

³³ United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman,
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, “Defense Acquisitions: Resolving
Developmental Risks in the Army’s Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to
Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 3.
³⁴ Comments from the Army Staff’s G-8 (Force Development) Section’s Directorate of
Integration FCS Office, November 10, 2005 and Buxbaum, p. 32.
³⁵ Scott Nance, “Analyst Sees Interim, Commercial Solutions if JTRS Canceled,” Defense
Today, Volume 26, Number 81, April 29, 2005, p. 4.
³⁶ Comments from the Army Staff’s G-8 (Force Development) Section’s Directorate of
Integration FCS Office, November 10, 2005.
³⁷ WiMax is an acronym that stands for Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access.
Proponents say that WiMax wireless coverage using WiMax nodes or “base stations” would
enable high-speed Internet connectivity for homes and businesses in a radius of up to 50 km
(31 miles). These base stations would eventually cover an entire metropolitan area, and
allow wireless mobility within it. It should be noted that claims of 50 km (31 miles) range,
especially claims that such distances can be achieved without lines of sight, represent a
theoretical maximum under ideal conditions.
³⁸ Scott Nance.
³⁹ Ibid.

certification not unlike current certification efforts for JTRS.⁴⁰ The greater
bandwidth and over-the-horizon mobile features of WiMax could address concerns
that FCS might not have sufficient bandwidth and the perceived over-reliance on
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other airborne platforms - which are subject
to hostile fire and weather constraints - to retransmit JTRS signals over extended
distances.
Boeing Retains Cluster One Contract. On July 19, 2005, the Army
reportedly decided to keep Boeing as the Cluster One lead contractor but would
continue to assess the program’s progress.⁴¹ No details were publically released as
to why the Army decided to keep Boeing as the lead contractor but some suggest that
it was not because Boeing demonstrated progress in correcting noted design
deficiencies, but instead because Boeing had a strong legal case against the Army if
the Army had decided to terminate its contract with Boeing. Work on Cluster Five
radios - which, unlike Boeing, was never formally suspended by DOD - has
continued in areas that were not dependent on Cluster One technologies and General
Dynamics has reportedly made progress in addressing size and power concerns raised
by GAO in their report.⁴²
Experimentation and Spin Out One
Experimentation. In October 2005, the Army initiated what it calls⁴³
“Experiment 1.1” to test elements of the FCS network - including JTRS. The
experiment, slated to run through early 2006, is to test other network components⁴⁴
including the System of Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCE) and
Networked Battle Command Systems.⁴⁵ The intent is to test the network inside of
formations and down to the soldier level and also to link sensors to soldiers and
various FCS items in preliminary stages of development such as unmanned aerial

⁴⁰ Comments from the Army Staff’s G-8 (Force Development) Section’s Directorate of
Integration FCS Office, November 10, 2005.
⁴¹ James Gunsalus, “Boeing Retains Army Radio Deal,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 20,

2005.

⁴² CRS discussion with General Dynamics Program Manager for Cluster Five, September

29, 2005.

⁴³ Information in this section is taken from Jen DiMascio, “JTRS Cluster One to Play Role,
Execs Say: Exercise to Test Mettle of Early FCS Technologies Will Begin this Year,” Inside
the Army, Vol. 17, No. 25, June 27, 2005, pp. 1-9.
⁴⁴ SOSCOE is intended to be the network-centric operating system, or middleware, that
permits the integration of separate FCS communications software packages. The Army
equates SOSCE to Microsoft Windows on a much larger scale - SOSCOE will comprise
about 10 percent of the more than 30 million lines of FCS software code.
⁴⁵ The Network Battle Command System consists of applications such as mission planning
and preparation, situational understanding, battle command and execution, and applications
linking soldiers and crews to various FCS systems.

vehicles (UAVs), unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and unattended munitions
systems. Because manned ground vehicles are not yet developed, network items -
including JTRS- are to be placed in surrogate vehicles (modified High Mobility
Multi-Wheeled Vehicles — HMMWVs).
These vehicles are to use early developmental models of the Cluster One radio.
The program manager for FCS, Brigadier General Charles Cartwright, expects to
receive 42 “pre-engineering” development models of Cluster One in December 2005
and also plans on using Cluster Five units in Experiment 1.1 — and, possibly, a
second “Experiment” — in 2006.⁴⁶
The Army has a number of specific objectives for Experiment 1.1 including:
^! FCS risk mitigation;
^!Support the development of the Army’s modular force Brigade
Combat Teams (BCTs);⁴⁷
^!Gain knowledge to support further development of FCS capabilities;
^!Provide information that could lead to program improvements and
perhaps more rapid development, and
^!To show the progress and maturity of the FCS program and the FCS
network in an operational environment.⁴⁸
Given these objectives, it is not unreasonable to assume that the early development
models of JTRS Cluster one will undergo considerable experimentation and testing.
If this is the case, the experiment’s results could potentially have significant
ramifications for the future of the Cluster One program, particularly if Cluster One’s
performance fails to meet the Army’s expectations.
Spin Out One. The Army’s FCS program consists of four “spin outs” —
formerly known as spirals — that will introduce FCS technologies and systems to the
current force. These fielding spin outs are slated to occur in 2008, 2010, 2012, and
2014 to an experimental brigade and then two years later to the rest of the Army. The
first spin out of FCS technology in 2008 is to emphasize improved munitions and
sensors connected in an initial version of network capabilities.⁴⁹ These network
capabilities are thought to include Clusters One and Five, Wideband Networking

⁴⁶ Jen DiMascio, “Army to Receive 42 Model Radios by December: Pentagon to
Restructure Joint Tactical Radio System After DAB Review,” Inside the Army, 17, No. 38,
September 26, 2005, pp. 1-9.
⁴⁷ For additional information on the Army’s modular force initiative see CRS Report
RL32476, U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
⁴⁸ Comment from the Army Staff’s G-8 (Force Development) section’s Directorate of
Integration FCS Office, November 10, 2005.
⁴⁹ Ibid.

Waveform, Warfighters Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T),⁵⁰ and the System
of Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE). In Spin Out One, Clusters
One and Five are planned to be used in conjunction with other FCS systems such as
Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS), the Intelligent Munitions System (IMS), and the
pre-production model of the Non-Line of Sight Cannon (NLOS-C).
GAO asserts that “it is unlikely that Cluster One radios will be available for the
first spiral [now referred to as spin out] of the FCS network, slated for FY2008 and
that Cluster Five radios might not be available for the first spiral.”⁵¹ Some reports
suggest that JTRS program progress is being made, particularly in the Cluster Five
program where technology workarounds necessitated by the Cluster One stop work
order, have helped Cluster Five to “achieve a degree of compatibility” with other
FCS components due to be tested in Spin Out One.⁵² If, however, Cluster One and
Five are not available by 2008, reports suggest that the Army is planning to use pre-
production models and/or surrogate software defined radios of lesser capabilities in
their place.⁵³
Program Restructuring
On July 28, 2005 the JTRS program underwent a Defense Acquisition Board
(DAB) review and although results have not been publically disclosed, the Secretary
of the Army, Francis Harvey, reportedly acknowledged that DOD would restructure
the entire JTRS program.⁵⁴ In August, the JTRS Joint Program Executive Office
(JPEO) submitted a proposal to DOD which details how it would manage all JTRS
Cluster efforts (as opposed to the management structure depicted in Table 1) with the
intent of achieving near-term success by delivering usable capabilities to the field
now, while pursuing the long term goal of fielding a complete interoperable software

⁵⁰ The Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) is the Army’s tactical
telecommunications system consisting of communication infrastructure and network
components from the maneuver battalion to the theater rear boundary. The WIN-T network
provides command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (C4ISR) support capabilities that are mobile, secure, survivable, seamless,
and capable of supporting multimedia tactical information systems.
⁵¹ United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman,
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, “Defense Acquisitions: Resolving
Developmental Risks in the Army’s Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to
Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 3.
⁵² Rebecca Christie, “Troubled DOD Radio Program Shows Progress Despite Delay,” Dow
Jones Newswire, October 4, 2005.
⁵³ Peter A. Buxbaum, “Jitters Over JTRS,” Armed Forces Journal, July 2005, p. 31 and
David A. Fulghum, “A Case of the Jitters,”Aviation Week & Space Technology, May 2,
2005, p 30 and comments from the Army Staff’s G-8 (Force Development) section’s
Directorate of Integration FCS Office, November 10, 2005.
⁵⁴ Jen DiMascio, “Army to Receive 42 Model Radios by December: Pentagon to
Restructure Joint Tactical Radio System After DAB Review,” Inside the Army, 17, No. 38,
September 26, 2005, pp. 1-9.

defined radio over time.⁵⁵ Preceding the JTRS program restructuring, Boeing and
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) — who serve as lead systems
integrators for the entire 18 system FCS program — announced in June 2004 that
Cluster One and Five programs would be restructured to better meet the needs of the⁵⁶
FCS program. While supporters suggest that this restructuring might help to focus
JTRS development efforts and provide definitive design guidance to JTRS
developers, critics say that this is just another in a series of program “restructurings”
— the Army added two years of additional effort and $458 million to Cluster One in⁵⁷
December 2004 to address developmental problems — for a program that started
in 1999 and “has a long ways to go before it can be used in military operations.”⁵⁸
Program Budget Issues
According to GAO,⁵⁹ the Cluster One program is expected to cost $15.6 billion
to develop and acquire over 100,000 Cluster One radios and $8.5 billion to develop
and acquire over 300,000 Cluster Five radios, and the Army has reportedly requested
$156.7 million in FY2006 for JTRS.⁶⁰ Cost growth for Cluster One has been of
significant concern as noted by GAO:
Since the program entered systems development in 2002, the contractor has
overrun cost estimates by $93 million - nearly 28 percent above what was
planned. Although the program attempted to stabilize costs by adding
approximately $200 million to the contract in January 2004, costs continued to
grow steadily thereafter. In addition, the contractor has increasingly fallen behind
schedule and has had to devote more resources than originally planned. In
January 2005, the prime contractor estimated that the total costs for the Cluster
One radio and waveform development would be $531 million more than what
was originally budgeted, reaching $898 million at completion. However,
according to program officials, since contract award, the prime contractor has not
demonstrated strong cost estimating and cost management techniques, and it is
difficult to estimate with any confidence what the overall program is likely to⁶¹
cost.

⁵⁵ Adam Baddeley, “Going Forward with JTRS,” Military Information Technology, October

2, 2005.

⁵⁶ Scott Nance, “JTRS Restructuring Aimed at Better Supporting FCS, Contractors Say,”
Defense Today, Volume 26, Number 120, June 24, 2005.
⁵⁷ Scott Nance, “GAO: FCS Communication Systems, Software are at Risk,” Defense Today,
Volume 26, Number 127, July 6, 2005.
⁵⁸ Sandra I. Erwin.
⁵⁹ United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman,
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, “Defense Acquisitions: Resolving
Developmental Risks in the Army’s Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to
Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 9.
⁶⁰ Fiscal Year 2006 Army Budget: An Analysis, Association of the United States Army
(AUSA), Washington, DC, September 2005, p. 76.
⁶¹ United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman,
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, “Defense Acquisitions: Resolving

Given this history of cost overruns and the inability to forecast and manage
program costs, some say a strong case could be made to permanently stop work on
Cluster One while still in the Product Development and Demonstration Phase of
development, and transfer program elements that show promise to another developer
already in the JTRS program or a developer not in the program but with
demonstrated communications systems proficiency.
Recent Congressional Actions
The Senate passed its version of the FY2006 Defense Authorization Bill (S.
1042) on November 15. A conference agreement on the Defense Appropriations Bill
(H.R. 2863) has been delayed in part because the House has not formally appointed
conferees. Both the Senate and House Reports recommend cuts for the entire JTRS
program and the Army’s JTRS programs are addressed in the following sections:
^!Senate - In its report on the FY2006 Defense Authorization Bill⁶² the
Senate Appropriations Committee voiced its support for JTRS and
the ongoing JTRS review by DOD’s Program Executive Office
(PEO) but noted “the Army’s Cluster 1 program faces significant
technical challenges” further noting that “these challenges could
impact the program efforts in the Navy and Air Force.” The
Appropriations Committee also called for a DOD assessment and a
revised JTRS program plan to be provided to the defense
committees. Committee recommended adjustments for the Army’s
programs are in Table 2.
Table 2. Army JTRS Senate-Recommended Adjustments —
FY2006 Defense Appropriations
($ thousands)
AmountBudget Request
FY2006 ReductionsFY2006
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation - Army-178,000573,000⁶³
FY2005 RescissionsFY2005
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation - Army-21,600117,259
Other Procurement, Army-68,500109,200

Developmental Risks in the Army’s Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to
Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 17.
⁶² S.Rept. 109-141 to accompany H.R. 2863, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill,

2006, September 29, 2005.

⁶³ This figure includes JTRS waveform development and Program Management Office
activities; Cluster One and Five hardware development; and JTRS aviation hardware
development.

^!House — The House Appropriations Committee Report on the
FY2006 Defense Appropriations bill⁶⁴ while critical of the Army’s
Cluster One and Five programs recommended fully funding
waveform development and funding to continue hardware
development. The House also calls for a detailed DOD report on
JTRS to the House Armed Service Committee. Appropriations
Committee recommended adjustments for the Army’s programs are
in Table 3.
Table 3. Army JTRS House-Recommended Adjustments —
FY2006 Defense Appropriations
($ thousands)
AmountBudget Request
FY2006 ReductionsFY2006
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation - Army-69,500549,800^a
Aircraft Procurement, Army^b-12,30023,500
FY2005 Rescissions FY2005
Other Procurement, Army FY2005-60,500109,200
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation - Army-21,600117,259
FY2005
^a.^Iⁿ^c^l^ud^es^requ^es^t^e^{d am}^ouⁿ^t^s^f^o^{r JT}^R^S^w^a^v^e^f^o^rm^dev^e^l^opm^en^t^an^{d Prog}^ram^Man^a^g^e^m^eⁿ^t^O^f^fⁱ^ce
^a^c^t^iv^{ities an}^d^Clu^s^ter^On^{e an}^d^Fiv^e^h^a^r^d^w^a^r^e^d^e^v^e^lo^p^m^en^{t. J}^T^{RS av}^iatioⁿ^d^e^v^e^lo^p^m^en^{t an}^d
ⁱⁿ^teg^r^atioⁿ^am^o^uⁿ^t^{s ar}^{e n}^o^{t in}^clu^d^edⁱⁿ^J^T^{RS p}^r^o^g^r^a^m^to^tal.
^b^.^T^h^{is r}^e^d^u^ctioⁿ^{is f}^o^r^th^{e in}^teg^r^atioⁿ^o^f^air^c^r^a^f^t⁽^h^elico^p^t^er⁾^v^e^r^s^ioⁿ^s^o^f^J^T^{RS Clu}^s^ter^On^{e u}ⁿ^its.
With these House and Senate figures, it is unlikely that a conference committee
would fully fund the JTRS program; actual recommended program cuts for the
FY2006 Defense Appropriations bill are pending the outcome of a conference. It is
unclear how these yet-to-be-determined program cuts would impact not only the
Cluster One and Five programs, but also how they would impact the overall FCS
program. Following a House-Senate conference report, the Army would likely issue
an assessment on how the cuts impact both the JTRS and FCS programs.
Issues for Congress
The Viability of the Cluster One Program. While both Clusters One and
Five have experienced a number of developmental difficulties, it appears that the
Cluster Five program has “divorced” itself from Cluster One through technological
workarounds and has achieved a degree of program success reportedly having
achieved compatibility with a number of FCS systems. Cluster One, however, seems
to be progressing to a lesser extent with its first “test” likely to be in Experiment 1.1
later on in 2005. The performance of Cluster One in this experiment might prove to

⁶⁴ H.Rept. 109-119 to accompany H.R. 2863, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill,

2006, June 10, 2005.

be a useful metric to help decision- makers determine if the Cluster One program is
a viable one or if another course of action should be pursued. Although not believed
to be included in Experiment 1.1, the airborne version of Cluster One might warrant
further examination. It appears that in order for the airborne version to meet the
weight limit of 52 kilograms that significant capability trade offs may be required to
this system that is already in the advanced phases of development - likely resulting
in additional delays and significantly increased costs.
Given this situation, Congress might review the Army’s performance
expectations for Cluster One during Experiment 1.1 testing. Will Cluster One’s
performance impact on the Army’s decision to continue with what some call a
“troubled program” or will the Army opt to stick with Cluster One’s developers no
matter what the outcome, and attempt to rectify identified deficiencies through
additional funds and further program delays? Another issue that might be considered
for congressional review is the state of the airborne version of Cluster One. Some
suggest that the program has reached an impasse due to aircraft weight and size
constraints, and that the only way to meet these requirements is to redesign the
system into a significantly less-capable version — a course of action that could
further delay the program and carry with it significant cost implications.
Security. Congress may decide to examine the issue of security in greater
detail. According to GAO, in addition to a requirement to change JTRS hardware to
accommodate processing and memory capacity upgrades for enhanced security, the
current design of JTRS has been judged by the National Security Agency as:
Not sufficient to meet security requirements to operate in an open networked
environment. Specifically, particular versions of JTRS radios will be used by
allied and coalition forces, requiring the Army to release specific source code of
the software architecture to these forces. To address the release, the National⁶⁵
Security Agency has required changes to the security architecture.
Although GAO expresses security concerns about JTRS use by allied and
coalition forces, it is not readily apparent how pervasive a problem security is for
JTRS and other components of the FCS network. Given the stated security challenges
of software-defined radios, it is conceivable that even if Cluster One and Five can
meet the Army’s communications and data transmission requirements, that security
deficiencies might preclude the operational employment of Clusters One and Five.
It can be argued that network security would take on an even a more significant
role in FCS than compared to the Army’s current force. FCS Manned Ground
Vehicles — lighter and less heavily armored than the M-1 Abrams and M-2 Bradleys
that they are intended to replace — would rely extensively on situational awareness
provided through the FCS Network for their survivability. Furthermore, this network-
provided situational awareness would have a significant impact on FCS’s ability to
engage enemy forces beyond line-of-sight. Given this significant reliance on the FCS

⁶⁵ United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman,
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, “Defense Acquisitions: Resolving
Developmental Risks in the Army’s Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to
Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 15.

Network for survivability and for target acquisition and engagement, potential
adversaries might seek to identify and exploit security weaknesses in the FCS
network — including JTRS — as a means to attack FCS units. One potential
adversary — China — has “likely established information warfare units to deploy
viruses to attack enemy computer systems and networks” and China’s “recent
exercises have incorporated offensive [computer] operations, primarily as first strike
against enemy networks.”⁶⁶ A potential scenario for consideration is that if an
adversary obtained FCS-related source code, they could engineer a virus that could
be introduced into the FCS network and computers. While some may consider this
an improbable scenario, the reported recent discovery by Russian security experts of
the first known computer virus spread by cell phone networks suggests otherwise.⁶⁷
The Army is not unaware of these security challenges and notes that network
security and information assurance are an “ever growing priority, regardless of FCS
development.”⁶⁸ As part of this recognition, the Army FCS program conducts bi-
monthly information assurance architecture development reviews with the Army staff
sections responsible for Intelligence (G-2) and Information and Communications (G-

6) and the National Security Agency and Office of the Secretary of Defense.⁶⁹

JTRS Alternatives. With its history of developmental difficulties, program
delays, and additional costs, some suggest that the JTRS Cluster One program might
be a candidate for cancellation. In this view, Congress might opt to explore
alternatives to Cluster One with the Army and DOD. A possible starting point for
such a review might be an examination of software-defined radios already in service
within the U.S. military or commercially available through other manufacturers.
Some critics argue that the military should adopt commercially available and
emerging telecommunications technology. One example of such a technology is
third- generation cellular technologies that encompass streaming video, netted
communications, and data and voice communications over Internet provider
networks.⁷⁰ While proponents maintain that third-generation cellular could exceed
JTRS performance capabilities, critics of the commercial approach note that these
technologies need to be ruggedized, customized to fit on specific vehicles and
systems, and require specialized encryption, and therefore the “off the shelf
approach” might be equally as expensive as developing JTRS. After a thorough
technical and cost-based evaluation of these and other JTRS alternatives, some
project the best course of action may be to continue Cluster One development as
currently planned.

⁶⁶ Annual Report to Congress, The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,
Unclassified, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005, p. 51.
⁶⁷ Ryan Naraine, “Cell Phone Virus Ringing,” Internetnews.com, June 15, 2004.
⁶⁸ Comments from the Army Staff’s G-8 (Force Development) section’s Directorate of
Integration FCS Office, November 10, 2005.
⁶⁹ Ibid.
⁷⁰ Adam Baddeley, “Military Explores Third-Generation Cellular,” Military Information
Technology, October 27, 2005.