India's Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views

India’s Nuclear Separation Plan:
Issues and Views
Updated December 22, 2006
Sharon Squassoni
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division



India’s Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views
Summary
On July 18, 2005, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
announced the creation of a “global partnership,” which would include “full” civil
nuclear cooperation between the United States and India. This is at odds with nearly
three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy and practice. President Bush promised
India he would persuade Congress to amend the pertinent laws to approve the
agreement, as well as persuade U.S. allies to create an exception to multilateral
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines for India. India committed to, among
other things, separating its civilian nuclear facilities from its military nuclear
facilities, declaring civilian facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) and placing them under IAEA safeguards, and signing an Additional
Protocol. See CRS Report RL33016, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation With India: Issues
for Congress, by Sharon Squassoni, for further details on the agreement.
The separation plan announced by Prime Minister Singh and President Bush on
March 2, 2006, and further elaborated on May 11, 2006, would place 8 power
reactors under inspection, bringing the total up to 14 out of a possible 22 under
inspection. Several fuel fabrication and spent fuel storage facilities were declared,
as well as 3 heavy water plants that were described as “safeguards-irrelevant.” The
plan excludes from international inspection 8 indigenous power reactors, enrichment
and spent fuel reprocessing facilities (except as currently safeguarded), military
production reactors and other military nuclear plants and 3 heavy water plants.
Administration officials have defended the separation plan as credible and defensible
because it covers more than just a token number of Indian facilities, provides for
safeguards in perpetuity, and includes upstream and downstream facilities.
U.S. officials acknowledge the importance of a credible separation plan to
ensuring that the United States complies with its Article I obligations under the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) — to not in any way assist a nuclear weapons
program in a non-nuclear weapon state. For almost 30 years, the U.S. legal standard
has been that only nuclear safeguards on all nuclear activities in a state provides
adequate assurances. The Administration is apparently asking Congress to back a
lower level of assurance by proposing that the separation plan take the place of
comprehensive safeguards.
Congress is likely to consider this issue as well as others when the
Administration eventually submits its cooperation agreement with India for approval
by both chambers. P.L. 109-401, signed on December 18, 2006, provides waivers
for a nuclear cooperation agreement with India from relevant Atomic Energy Act
provisions, and requires detailed information on the separation plan and resultant
safeguards. This report, which will be updated as necessary, provides background
on India’s nuclear fuel cycle, a discussion of various issues involved in separating
civilian and military nuclear facilities and potential concerns for Congress as it
considers whether the United States has adequate assurances that its nuclear
cooperation does not assist, encourage, or induce India’s nuclear weapons
development, production, or proliferation.



Contents
In troduction ......................................................1
Background ......................................................4
India’s Nuclear Facilities........................................6
Research Reactors.........................................8
Power Reactors...........................................9
Breeder Reactors.........................................12
Uranium Enrichment......................................12
Spent Fuel Reprocessing...................................12
Heavy Water Production...................................12
Uranium Recovery and Conversion...........................13
Factors Influencing the Separation Plan...............................13
U.S. Guidelines: Credible, Defensible, and Transparent..............13
Indian Guidelines: Credible and Defensible from a Different View......14
The Separation Plan...............................................16
Assessing The Separation Plan..................................20
Quantity vs. Quality.......................................20
Breeder Reactors.........................................21
Other Facilities...........................................21
Issues for Congress...............................................22
List of Figures
Figure 1. Indian Nuclear Facilities....................................7
Figure 2. India’s Separation Plan....................................19
List of Tables
Table 1. India’s Power Reactors.....................................10



India’s Nuclear Separation Plan:
Issues and Views
Introduction
On July 18, 2005, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
signed a joint statement that announced the creation of a “global partnership,” which
would include “full” civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India.
This is at odds with nearly three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy and practice.
President Bush committed to persuading Congress to amend the pertinent laws to
approve the agreement, as well as persuading U.S. allies to create an exception to
multilateral Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines for India to allow for nuclear
cooperation. India committed to separating its civilian from its military nuclear
facilities, declaring civilian facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) and placing them under IAEA safeguards, and signing an Additional1
Protocol, which provides enhanced access and information for IAEA inspectors.
The United States is obligated under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
to ensure that any cooperation it provides to a non-nuclear weapon state does not
contribute to that state’s capability to produce nuclear weapons. In 1978, Congress
passed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, which strengthened the restrictions on U.S.
nuclear cooperation to include comprehensive (full-scope) safeguards on all nuclear
material in non-nuclear weapon states, specifically to help ensure that peaceful
cooperation would not be diverted to weapons purposes. The 1978 Act followed
India’s 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion, which demonstrated to most observers that
nuclear technology originally transferred for peaceful purposes could be misused.
That test also provided the impetus for creating the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).2
In 1992, the NSG adopted the full-scope safeguards condition for nuclear exports,
and the 1995 NPT Extension Conference and the 2000 NPT Review Conference both
endorsed the NSG’s new requirement.
India shares a unique status with Pakistan and Israel as de facto nuclear weapon
states outside the NPT that have been treated politically, for nonproliferation3
purposes, as non-nuclear weapon states. The three states do not have comprehensive
nuclear safeguards. Instead, they have safeguards agreements that cover only


1 For an overview of U.S.-India relations, see CRS Report Rl33529, India-U.S. Relations.
2 The Nuclear Suppliers Group seeks to stem proliferation of nuclear weapons through
coordinating nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports. See [http://www.nsg-online.org].
3 The NPT defines nuclear weapon states as those that have tested nuclear explosive devices
before January 1, 1967. This includes the United States, United Kingdom, France, China,
and Russia.

specified facilities and materials.4 Presently, very few of India’s nuclear facilities are
subject to international inspections.
The Bush Administration made a “credible” and “defensible” — from a
nonproliferation standpoint — separation plan a prerequisite for asking Congress to
create an exception to current law for nuclear cooperation with India. P.L. 109-401,
the law that provides the executive branch with authority to waive restrictions under
the Atomic Energy Act with respect to India, requires the President to determine that
the following actions had occurred:
!India has provided the United States and the IAEA with a credible
plan to separate civil and military facilities, materials, and programs,
and has filed a declaration regarding its civil facilities with the
IAEA;
!India and the IAEA have concluded all legal steps required prior to
signature by the parties of an agreement requiring the application of
safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards,
principles, and practices (including IAEA Board of Governors
Document GOV/1621 (1973)) to India’s civil nuclear facilities,
materials and programs as declared in the plan, including materials
used in or produced through the use of India’s civil nuclear facilities;
!India and the IAEA are making substantial progress toward
concluding an Additional Protocol consistent with IAEA principles,
practices, and policies that would apply to India’s civil nuclear
program;
!India is working actively with the United States for the early
conclusion of a multilateral treaty on the cessation of the production
of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons;
!India is working with and supporting U.S. and international efforts
to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology to
any state that does not already possess full-scale functioning
enrichment or reprocessing plants;
!India is taking the necessary steps to secure nuclear and other
sensitive materials and technology through the application of
comprehensive export control legislation and regulations, and
through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines;
and
!the NSG has decided by consensus to permit supply to India of
nuclear items covered by the guidelines of the NSG.
Indian and U.S. officials engaged for several months in discussions on
identification of civilian facilities. U.S. officials encouraged India to make a


4 These are INFCIRC/66-type agreements. They can cover nuclear material or facilities
supplied under project agreements, produced in safeguarded facilities, or unilaterally
submitted to safeguards by a state. See CRS Report RL33016, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation
with India: Issues for Congress, by Sharon Squassoni, for more detail.

comprehensive declaration of its civilian infrastructure.5 In various written and oral
statements to Congress, State Department officials seem to suggest that more
facilities under safeguards would be better than fewer, but critics (on both the U.S.
and Indian sides) have suggested that some facilities would be more important to
include or exclude. For example, the CIRUS reactor, reportedly the source of
plutonium for the 1974 nuclear test, despite India’s pledge to use it only for peaceful
purposes, is important to some critics to declare as civilian and place under
safeguards because of its controversial past. To U.S. officials, facilities associated
with the fast breeder reactor program, which could produce plutonium for weapons
in the future, reportedly would be key to get under safeguards, particularly if the
United States wants to cooperate with India in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
program.6 To Indian officials, however, the fast breeder reactor program is key to the
future of India’s three-stage nuclear fuel cycle and must be kept out of safeguards for
maximum flexibility and energy independence.7
Several nonproliferation critics of the potential agreement have suggested that
no matter how many facilities India places under safeguards, the opening of the
international uranium market — forbidden to India since 1992 by the NSG — in
effect frees up India’s domestic uranium for its nuclear weapons program, and
therefore, would assist the Indian nuclear weapons program.8 Consequently, only
India’s halt in the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons would ensure
that U.S. assistance does not aid India’s nuclear programs.9 Indian officials note that
the peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement is not about limiting their strategic
program, just about expanding their peaceful nuclear program. Some critics have
suggested various options for placing specific facilities under safeguards to diminish
the potential “surplus effect” of opening up that uranium market.10


5 Under Secretary of State Robert Joseph, testimony before SFRC Nov. 2, 2005 hearing.
6 This program, announced in February 2006, seeks to develop, among other things, new
reprocessing technologies for future fuel cycles. See [http://www.gnep.energy.gov] for
more detail.
7 “On the Record: Anil Kakodkar, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and
Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy,” Indian Express, Feb. 8, 2006.
8 Zia Mian and M.V. Ramana, “Wrong Ends, Means, and Needs: Behind the U.S. Nuclear
Deal with India, Arms Control Today, January/February 2006. See also Robert Einhorn,
“Limiting the Damage,” The National Interest, Winter 2005/2006.
9 Henry Sokolski, in “Fissile isn’t Facile,” Wall Street Journal, Feb. 21, 2006, suggested that
“If we want to keep this aid from freeing up India’s domestic nuclear resources to make
more bombs...we have to get serious about India capping its nuclear weapons program.”
David Albright made a more direct connection in his testimony before the House
International Relations Committee hearing, “The U.S.-India Global Partnership: The Impact
on Nonproliferation,” on Oct. 26, 2005 (hereafter, HIRC Oct 26, 2005 hearing), stating that
“Without India halting production of fissile material for its nuclear weapons programs,
nuclear assistance, particularly any in the areas involving the fuel cycle, would likely spill
over to India’s nuclear weapons program.”
10 David Albright and Susan Basu, “Separating Indian Military and Civilian Nuclear
Facilities,” Institute for Science and International Security, Dec. 19, 2005. See also the
prepared statement by Leonard Spector before the HIRC Oct. 26, 2005 hearing.

One observer, Robert Einhorn, has suggested that in the absence of a fissile
material production halt, safeguards on Indian facilities serve primarily a symbolic
role in demonstrating India’s commitment to nonproliferation.11 Nonetheless, the
safeguards approach, according to Administration officials, is key to assuring that the
United States complies with Article I of the NPT — that U.S. cooperation does not
in any way assist a nuclear weapons program in a non-nuclear weapon state. U.S.
officials have stated that a voluntary safeguards arrangement like those of the other
five nuclear weapon states would not meet our NPT Article I obligations. In their
view, India must accept some kind of safeguards arrangement that allow safeguards
to endure in perpetuity. Indian officials, on the other hand, suggested that having the
same responsibilities and practices as other advanced nuclear states translates into
a voluntary safeguards arrangement.12
This report provides background on India’s nuclear fuel cycle, a discussion of
various issues involved in separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and
potential concerns for Congress as it considers whether the United States has
adequate assurances that its nuclear cooperation does not assist, encourage, or induce
India’s nuclear weapons development, production, or proliferation.
Background
India’s nuclear program, from its inception in 1948, has been described as13
inherently dual-purpose. With the establishment of its Atomic Energy Commission
in 1948, India pursued both civilian and military applications of nuclear energy. The
first indigenous research reactor, Apsara, was developed in the 1950s. Canada
provided early assistance under the Colombo Plan, as did the United States under the
Atoms for Peace program. A humiliating defeat in a border war with China in 1962,
followed by China’s first nuclear test in 1964, intensified India’s drive for nuclear
weapons. India turned to the CIRUS (Canada-India Reactor United States) reactor,
as the source for plutonium for its 1974 “peaceful nuclear explosive” test. Foreign
assistance dwindled after the 1974 test, but Canada had already transferred the
blueprints for heavy water reactors under an agreement for peaceful nuclear
cooperation. As a result, India developed a fairly independent nuclear infrastructure
that supported both civilian and military purposes. For example, plutonium separated
in India’s reprocessing plants has been used both for weapons and to make mixed
oxide fuel (plutonium mixed with uranium) for nuclear power plants.


11 Statement of Robert J. Einhorn before the HIRC Oct. 26, 2005 hearing.
12 From the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement: “India would reciprocally agree that it would be
ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and
advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United
States.” The Indian Prime Minister’s Office issued a background paper on the agreement
in July 2005 that said: “IAEA Safeguards shall apply to facilities to be designated by India
voluntarily...In this respect there will be no discrimination between India and other Nuclear
Weapon States.” See [http://pmindia.nic.in/pressrel.htm].
13 See Perkovich, George, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation,
(University of California Press, CA, 1999) for an excellent history of the Indian nuclear
program.

India’s nuclear fuel cycle development has been driven by an acknowledged
lack of uranium reserves. In India’s view, energy independence could not be derived
from domestic uranium reserves — estimated at 0.8% of world reserves, or 50-

60,000 tons — but could be from production of plutonium, recycling of spent fuel,


and utilization of thorium (estimated at 32% of world reserves).14 As a result, India
planned 40 years ago to develop a three-stage fuel cycle to reduce its reliance on
uranium and use thorium. The first stage would rely on natural uranium-fueled
reactors to make plutonium; the second stage would use that plutonium in fast
reactors blanketed with thorium to produce U-233 (and more plutonium); and the
third stage would use U-233 fuel and thorium fuel in fast reactors blanketed with
thorium to produce more U-233 for use for future fuel. India has not advanced
beyond the first stage of the fuel cycle, aside from running a fast breeder test reactor
(40 MWth Fast Breeder Test Reactor or FBTR) based on a French design and a small
research reactor that uses U-233 fuel (Kamini).
The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Anil Kakodkar, asserted
in a speech in March 2005 that indigenous uranium resources would support 10 GWe
of nuclear installed capacity but that breeder reactors, using plutonium bred from
indigenous uranium, could support 500 GWe of power generation.15 The current
energy plan is to have 12 GWe installed capacity by 2015 and 20 GWe by 2020.
Reportedly, the increase to 20 GWe would be achieved through a mix of pressurized
heavy water reactors (PHWRs), light water reactors and fast breeder reactors,
including construction of 5 fast breeder reactors of 500 MWe each and the import of
8 light water reactors of 1000 MWe each.16 India’s indigenous, pressurized heavy
water reactors (fueled with natural uranium) are planned to provide just half of that
20 GWe capacity (i.e., 10 GWe), but some observers have suggested that indigenous
supplies of uranium may not support that many reactors and that India’s uranium
crisis is already acute.17 For example, India’s Jaduguda uranium mill produces just
220 tons of yellowcake a year, whereas the 13 operating natural-uranium fueled
reactors require 300 tons per year, and consequently have reduced their operating
capacity from 90% in 2002-2003 to 81% in 2003-2004 and 76% in 2004-2005.18


14 See [http://www.npcil.nic.in/nupower_vol11_1-3/chidambaram.htm].
15 A Gigawatt is one billion watts of energy; a Megawatt is one million watts of energy. Dr.
Anil Kakodkar, “Energy in India for the Coming Decades,” presentation to IAEA conferencest
on Nuclear Power for the 21 Century, Paris, March 2005, available at
[http://www.dae.gov.in/iaea/ak-paris0305.doc]. The estimate is 10,000 MWe for 40 years.
16 M.R. Srinivasan, R.B. Grover, S.A. Bhardwaj, “Nuclear Power in India: Winds of
Change,” Economic and Political Weekly, December 3, 2005. This contrasts with State
Department answers to questions for the record from Senator Lugar, dated November 2,

2005, which stated that “India’s plan for its nuclear power sector seeks to provide for a 20-


fold increase in nuclear-generated electricity by 2020 without reactors from foreign
suppliers.”
17 T.S. Subramanian, “Uranium Crisis,” Frontline, vol. 22, Issue 27, December 31-January

13, 2006.


18 Ibid. Yellowcake is an impure mixture of uranium oxides obtained during the processing
of uranium ore. It must be purified before being fabricated into reactor fuel.

According to two reports, the Department of Atomic Energy has been unable to mine
certain uranium deposits because local governments have not yet given clearance.19
India’s Nuclear Facilities20
Figure 1 depicts key sites and facilities of India’s nuclear industry; not included
are India’s heavy water plants and associated research facilities. Apart from two
light-water reactors fueled with low-enriched uranium from foreign suppliers (at
Tarapur) and two under construction by Russia (VVERs at Kudankulam), India’s
power reactors rely on natural uranium in reactors that are cooled and moderated by
heavy water, known as pressurized heavy water reactors, or alternatively as CANDU-21
type. Canada built the first two CANDU-type reactors at Rajasthan, and India built
the remaining eleven. Most of these produce about 220 MWe, whereas the new
Russian reactors at Kudankulam will produce 1000 MWe. The foreign-supplied
reactors (Tarapur, Rajasthan and, eventually, Kudankulam) are under IAEA
safeguards, but the remaining domestic facilities are, largely, not safeguarded.


19 T.S. Subramanian, “Uranium Crisis,” Frontline, vol. 22, Issue 27, December 31-January

13, 2006 and Dr. A. Gopalakrishnan, “Civilian and Strategic Nuclear Facilities of India,”


Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, January 5, 2006.
20 Many sources were used in collating this data. See [http://www.iaea.org/programmes/a2/
index.html] for a list of India’s power reactors and [http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/rrdb/]
for a list of research reactors. Other sources include websites maintained by India’s
Department of Atomic Energy, the Bhabha Atomic Research Center and the Indira Gandhi
Centre for Atomic Research. These are, respectively, [http://www.dae.gov.in],
[http://www.igcar.ernet.in/], and [http://www.barc.ernet.in/].
21 These types of reactors constitute about ten percent of all reactors worldwide. Because the
reactors can be refueled on-line, they are well-suited for making plutonium for nuclear
weapons.

Figure 1. Indian Nuclear Facilities


iki/CRS-RL33292
g/w
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://wiki Trombay
http
Sources: Dr. Frederick Mackie, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the Congressional Research Service.

At present, India’s nuclear facilities include the following:
!research reactors (3);
!power reactors (15 operating, 8 under construction and 3 planned);
!breeder reactors (1 operating, 1 under construction);
!uranium enrichment (1 operating)
!spent fuel reprocessing (3);
!heavy water production plants (6);
!uranium processing (3 mines; 2 copper-mine tailing extraction units,
1 mill (uranium ore concentration) many uranium conversion
facilities, 3 or 4 fuel fabrication plants).
Research Reactors. India has three operating research reactors (CIRUS,
Dhruva, and Kamini) and four decommissioned reactors.22 In addition, India’s oldest
reactor, Apsara, may be considered operational, but is awaiting refurbishment,
reportedly to test a new indigenous design of a 5-10 MWt research reactor. It has
been used for various experiments, research and production of radioisotopes, and
training. CIRUS and Dhruva are located at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center
(BARC) in Trombay, while Kamini is located at Kalpakkam.
The CIRUS reactor has been the subject of controversy between the United
States and India for much of its life. The United States supplied heavy water, which
was not subject to a safeguards agreement, under a 1956 contract in which India
pledged to use the material for peaceful purposes only. Yet this reactor reportedly
produced the plutonium used in India’s 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion. Many
nonproliferation experts maintain that India violated its 1956 contract with Canada
as well as its contract with the United States. Most recently, according to answers
to questions for the record submitted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
November 2, 2005, the State Department notes that:
At the time, the debate on whether India had violated the contract was
inconclusive owing to the uncertainty as to whether U.S.-supplied heavy water
contributed to the production of the plutonium used for the 1974 device and the
lack of a mutual understanding of scope of the 1956 contract language on
“peaceful purposes.”
Several nonproliferation experts have criticized the Administration for not
taking this opportunity to resolve this 30-year-old controversy.23 The Canadian


22 The fast breeder test reactor, although it could technically be considered a research
reactor, is discussed below in the breeder reactor section.
23 An aide memoire presented to the Indian Atomic Energy Commission on November 16,

1970 sought to clarify the U.S. view on peaceful uses. The document, declassified in 1980,


points out that the U.S. contract stipulated that the heavy water was to be used only in India
in connection with research into and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and that
“The United States would not consider the use of plutonium produced in CIRUS for
peaceful nuclear explosives intended for any purpose to be ‘research into and use of atomic
energy for peaceful purposes.’” Additionally, the document stated that “the use, for the
development of peaceful nuclear explosive devices of plutonium produced therefrom, would
(continued...)

government in December 2005 encouraged the United States and India to declare the
CIRUS reactor as a civilian reactor and place it under IAEA safeguards. Doing so,
would “respect the peaceful uses assurance of our original agreement.”24
The Dhruva reactor is a larger, 100 MWt reactor that began operation in 1985.
It is the other reactor that most observers assume is dedicated to India’s nuclear
weapons program. CIRUS and Dhruva together can produce between 25 and 35 kg
of plutonium per year, or enough for 3 to 4 bombs.25 The Kamini reactor is located
at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) in Kalpakkam. It become
operational in 1996 and uses U-233 as fuel.
Power Reactors. Table 1 shows India’s 22 power reactors (excluding the
prototype fast breeder reactor, which is discussed below). Of the total 22, 15 are
currently operating, while 7 are under construction. Three more reactors are planned.


23 (...continued)
be considered by the United States a contravention of the terms under which the American
materials were made available.” “Aide Memoire Presented to Indian Atomic Energy
Commission in Bombay, November 16, 1970,” available at
[ h t t p : / / www.ar ms cont r o l .or g/ pdf / 19701116_US_Ai de_Memoi r e _Indi an_AEC.pdf ]
24 Talking points provided by First Secretary of Canada’s embassy to the United States,
Kelly Anderson, Dec. 20, 2005.
25 Zia Mian and MV Ramana, “Feeding the Nuclear Fire,” Economic and Political Weekly,
Aug. 27, 2005.

CRS-10
Table 1. India’s Power Reactors
NameTypeStatusLocationNet Capacity (MWe)Gross Capacity (MWe)Connected to Grid
iga-1 P HW R Operatio nal Karnataka 202 220 2000
iga-2 P HW R Operatio nal Karnataka 202 220 1999
iga-3 P HW R Constructio n Karnataka 202 220 2007
iga-4 P HW R Constructio n Karnataka 202 220 2007
iki/CRS-RL33292rapar-1 (KAPS-1)PHWROperationalGujrat2022201992
g/wrapar-2 (KAPS-2)PHWROperationalGujrat2022201995
s.or
leakam-1 (KK-1)VVERConstructionTamil Nadu State91710002007
://wikiam-2 (KK-2)VVERConstructionTamil Nadu State91710002008
http-1 (MAPS-1)PHWROperationalTamil Nadu1551701983
-2 (MAPS-2)PHWROperationalTamil Nadu2022201985
rora-1 (NAPS-1)PHWROperationalUttar Pradesh2022201989
rora-2 (NAPS-2)PHWROperationalUttar Pradesh2022201992
asthan-1 (RAPS-1)PHWROperationalRajasthan901001972
asthan-2 (RAPS-2)PHWROperationalRajasthan1872001980
jasthan-3 (RAPS-3)PHWROperationalRajasthan2022202000



CRS-11
NameTypeStatusLocationNet Capacity (MWe)Gross Capacity (MWe)Connected to Grid
jasthan-4 (RAPS-4)PHWROperationalRajasthan2022202000
jasthan-5 (RAPS-5)PHWRConstructionRajasthan2022202007
jasthan-6 (RAPS-6)PHWRConstructionRajasthan2022202007
rapur-1 (TAPS-1)BWROperationalMaharastra1501601969
rapur-2 (TAPS-2)BWROperationalMaharastra1501601969
rapur-3 (TAPS-3)PHWRConstructionMaharastra4905402006
iki/CRS-RL33292rapur-4 (TAPS-4)PHWROperationalMaharastra4905402005
g/w
s.or T OT ALS 6172 6730
leak
Reactors — construction25702810
://wiki
httpReactors — operating36023920
: IAEA Power Reactor Information System, Dr. Frederick Mackie of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the Congressional Research Service.
Those in italic print are under IAEA safeguards (INFCIRC-66) now or are scheduled to be under safeguards, irrespective of the separation plan. Those reactors in bolded print
the reactors scheduled additionally to be placed under safeguards under the separation plan. The difference between gross capacity and net capacity is the electricity needed to run
Connected to Grid” means when the reactor is connected to the electricity grid (versus commercial operation).
: PHWR stands for Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor (CANDU-style); BWR stands for Boiling Water Reactor (use low-enriched uranium fuel).



Of the 15 operating power reactors, four are under safeguards — the two U.S.-
supplied reactors at Tarapur and the two Canadian-supplied reactors at Rajasthan.
Two pressurized water reactors under construction by the Russians at Kudankulam
will be under IAEA safeguards also. There are 11 remaining reactors operating not
under safeguards and five PHWRs under construction. In addition to the reactors
under construction, there are five more planned: two at Kaiga (Kaiga 5 and 6); two
at Rajasthan (RAPS 7 and 8); and the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor at Trombay.
The 15 operating power reactors have a net capacity of 3602 MWe. Nuclear
energy now accounts for about 3% of India’s electricity consumption, and India plans
to increase the electrical generation capacity from the nuclear sector dramatically
over the next few years. Estimates vary from an increase of 8000 MWe additionally
by 2015,26 to a total of 20GWe by 2020.27 However, India’s indigenous pressurized
heavy water reactors will likely account for less than half of the total increase.
Breeder Reactors. The breeder reactor program is integral to the second
stage of India’s three-stage nuclear development plan. “Breeder” reactors have the
potential to make more fissile material than they burn up, hence the term “breeder.”
Stage two envisions plutonium-fueled breeder reactors blanketed with thorium to
produce uranium-233. India has run a 40 MWth (13 MWe) Fast Breeder Test
Reactor since 1985 at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) and
has successfully reprocessed a small amount of the unique fuel irradiated in that
reactor. Construction of the 500 MWe prototype breeder reactor has begun, but the
initial operating capability is not expected until 2010.
Uranium Enrichment. India began a uranium enrichment program in the

1980s. A gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility at Mysore (called Rattenhalli)


reportedly enriches uranium for naval fuel. There is also a pilot-scale gas centrifuge
plant at Trombay for research and development, some laser enrichment-related
activities also located at Trombay, and a laser enrichment facility at the Center for
Advanced Technology in Indore for research.
Spent Fuel Reprocessing. Plutonium in India is produced for both civilian
and military needs. The Trombay Plutonium Plant separates plutonium primarily for
weapons purposes, whereas plutonium separation for civilian uses is performed at the
Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant (PREFRE) at Tarapur and at Kalpakkam
Reprocessing Plant (KARP). The Fast Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant and the Lead
Minicell facility, both at Kalpakkam, also perform plutonium separation.
Heavy Water Production. India has six heavy water production plants in
operation, all of which were developed indigenously. Such plants are not required
to be safeguarded under comprehensive safeguards agreements, because they do not
contain source or special nuclear material, but would be required to be reported under
an Additional Protocol. It remains to be seen whether India would report any of these


26 Briefing by Dr. Frederick Mackie, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Dec. 14,

2006.


27 T.S. Subramanian, “Uranium Crisis,” Frontline, vol. 22, Issue 27, Dec. 31, 2005-Jan. 13,

2006.



under an Additional Protocol or perhaps just a portion of those that are not required
for the military production of plutonium. The extent to which India requires more
unsafeguarded plutonium for weapons or as fuel for unsafeguarded breeder reactors
would determine how many heavy water plants would remain unreported.
Uranium Recovery and Conversion. India has three uranium mines, two
copper-mine tailing extraction units, one mill, many uranium conversion facilities, and
three fuel fabrication plants. Under a comprehensive safeguards agreement, the starting
point of safeguards is when “any nuclear material of a composition and purity suitable
for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched leaves the plant or the process stage28
in which it has been produced.” In other words, the material would be inspected at the
end of the uranium conversion process and at the start of the fuel fabrication process.
Under an Additional Protocol, a state is required to report on all nuclear fuel cycle
activities, including uranium ore, mining, milling, and conversion. It is not clear how or
if India will declare some or all of those front end fuel cycle activities.
Factors Influencing the Separation Plan
U.S. Guidelines: Credible, Defensible, and Transparent
On November 2, 2005, Under Secretary of State Joseph told members of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that India’s separation of facilities must be
credible, transparent, meaningful, and defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint.
Further, Under Secretary Joseph told Members that a separation plan and resultant
safeguards must contribute to U.S. nonproliferation goals, but did not elaborate
which particular goals those might be. He noted that the more civil facilities India
places under safeguards, the more confident the United States can be that any
cooperative arrangements will not further India’s military purposes. Specifically,
Under Secretary Joseph said that safeguards would have to be applied in perpetuity,
and that voluntary safeguards arrangements would not be defensible from a
nonproliferation standpoint. The Administration also asserted that “The safeguards
must effectively cover India’s civil nuclear fuel cycle and provide strong assurances
to supplier states and the IAEA that material and technology provided or created29
through civil cooperation will not be diverted to the military sphere.”
One interpretation of those phrases suggests that a credible plan would (1) be
perceived to strengthen the nonproliferation regime; (2) be a complete and defensible
declaration of its civil nuclear facilities and programs; and (3) mitigate perceptions
of nuclear weapons status for India.30 Such a plan would be guided by the
assumption that power reactors, regardless of their potential to produce plutonium for


28 See INFCIRC/153, at [http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/
inf153.shtml].
29 Responses by the State Department to questions for the record submitted by Senator
Richard Lugar, November 2, 2005.
30 Dr. Frederick Mackie, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Briefing, December 14,

2005.



weapons, have a civilian use and should be declared as civilian and safeguarded, as
well as their associated fuel fabrication and reprocessing and spent fuel storage
facilities.
India’s breeder reactors would be safeguarded in this approach because the test
reactor has been connected to the electricity grid since 1997, and the prototype fast
breeder reactor will have a rating of 500 MWe and thus is meant to be connected to
the electrical grid as a source of energy.31 Since other advanced nuclear states with
fast breeder reactors have placed them under safeguards (Japan and France), placing
Indian breeder reactors under safeguards would mitigate perceptions of a double
standard for India. Given their ability to produce weapons-grade plutonium, fast
breeder reactors have been a proliferation concern for many years. Moreover,
safeguarding breeder reactors would limit the amount of weapons-usable plutonium
worldwide that is not safeguarded, which is clearly an objective of U.S.
nonproliferation policy.
Indian Guidelines: Credible and
Defensible from a Different View
It can be argued that India also approached creating a separation plan that is
credible and defensible from its perspective. Although India had hoped for a
safeguards arrangement like those of the nuclear weapon states, where facilities can
be put on and taken off a safeguards list at will, the United States has said that such
a voluntary safeguards arrangement would not be acceptable. Therefore, in this
scheme, placing a facility on the civilian list would eliminate it from any potentialth
use for the weapons program. While Indian officials have said that the July 18
agreement is not about their weapons program, their decisions about the separation
plan were fundamentally guided by their future needs in the weapons program.
Prime Minister Singh told the Indian Parliament on February 26, 2006 that in
deciding on the scope of the separation plan, India took into account its
current and future strategic needs and programme after careful deliberation of all
relevant factors, consistent with our Nuclear Doctrine...[which envisions] a
credible minimum nuclear deterrent to inflict unacceptable damage on an32
adversary indulging in a nuclear first-strike.
From this perspective, a key factor for India is whether there is enough fissile
material to meet the requirements of its minimal credible deterrent. If not, India must
consider whether to “hedge” its future requirements by keeping some existing
facilities out of safeguards so that they can produce plutonium or highly enriched
uranium for weapons in the future, or to build new production facilities in the future.
The July 18 agreement does not restrict India from doing so, at least until a fissile


31 See G. Balachandran, “On separation list,” January 2006, and S.B. Bhoje, and S.
Govindarajan, “The FBR Programme in India,” International Journal of Nuclear Power -
Volume 18, No. 2-3, 2004, available on [http://www.dae.gov.in].
32 “PM Makes a Case for N-tech,” PTI. See [http://ia.rediff.com/news/2006/feb/

27bush8.htm].



material production cutoff treaty is in force, but there are obvious costs to such an
approach.
Some Indian observers argued to keep a handful (1-2 or preferably 2-4)
indigenous pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs) out of safeguards for future
fissile material production for weapons.33 Others argued that a phased approach for
placing PHWRs under safeguards would be sufficient to give India time to determine
if it could meet its minimal credible deterrent.34 In a controversial interview, AEC
Chairman Anil Kakodkar suggested that some of the PHWRs could not be under
safeguards because the breeder program, which he recommended not come under
safeguards, would require unsafeguarded plutonium for fuel.35
Other commentators in India took a different perspective on this point. In a
December 13, 2005, discussion at the India International Center, former Defense
Research and Development Organization (DRDO) scientist and Institute of Defense
Studies and Analysis (IDSA) Director K. Santhanam suggested that India could
continue to meet all of its weapons plutonium needs from the CIRUS and Dhruva
reactors and that plutonium from power reactors was unsuited for weapons. In a
December 12, 2005 article in The Times of India, K. Subrahmanyam suggested that
“Given India’s uranium ore crunch and the need to build up our minimum credible
nuclear deterrent arsenal as fast as possible, it is to India’s advantage to categorize
as many power reactors as possible as civilian ones to be refuelled by imported
uranium and conserve our native uranium fuel for weapon-grade plutonium
production.”36
India’s need to exclude its breeder reactor program from safeguards appears to
be based several factors. Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Dr.
Kakodkar argued that the breeder program could not be put on the civilian list “from
the point of maintaining long-term energy security and for maintaining the ‘minimum
credible deterrent.’”37 India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told the Indian
Parliament on February 26, 2006, that
We will ensure that no impediments are put in the way of our research and
development activities. We have made it clear that we cannot accept safeguards
on our indigenous fast breeder programme. Our scientists are confident that this


33 G. Balachandran, “International Nuclear Control Regimes and India’s Participation in
Civilian Nuclear Trade: Key Issues,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 29, No. 4., Oct-Dec. 2005.
34 Dr. A. Gopalakrishnan, “Civilian and Strategic Nuclear Facilities of India,” IDSA
strategic comment, January 5, 2006, available at [http://www.idsa.in].
35 “On the Record: Anil Kakodkar, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and
Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy,” Indian Express, February 8, 2006.
36 K. Subrahmanyam, former head of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, was
appointed Head of the National Security Council Advisory Board (NSCAB) established by
the first Vajpayee government to draft the Indian nuclear doctrine. He currently chairs PM
Singh’s Global Strategic Developments Task Force. See also Dr. A. Gopalakrishnan,
“Civilian and Strategic Nuclear Facilities of India,” January 5, 2006.
37 Ibid.

technology will mature and that the programme will stabilize and become more
robust through the creation of additional capability. This will create greater38
opportunities.
In general, Indian officials seemed guided by a strong predilection to continue
what has been their past approach to safeguards — to place under safeguards only
those facilities that have a foreign component (e.g., fuel or technology). AEC
Chairman Kakodkar noted in August 2005 that “Anything coming from...external
cooperation...will be put under facilities-specific safeguards,” and that no research
and development will be put under safeguards, including the prototype fast breeder
reactor and facilities at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR).39
Another consideration influencing Indian views are the potential financial and
economic costs of separation. In some cases, facilities serve both civilian and
military purposes. A. Gopalakrishnan, former chairman of the Atomic Energy
Regulatory Board, suggested that certain critical plants at the Nuclear Fuels Complex
at Hyderabad were not duplicated and should be kept out of safeguards until they
could be replicated.40
Finally, assumptions about India’s prestige and independence may also have
played a role. Some Indian officials have rejected the notion of placing any research
and development facilities under safeguards because they equate such safeguards
with attempts to constrain India’s independence. AEC Chairman Kakodkar told the
Indian Express in February 2006 that:
There is a more fundamental question. If I am treated as an advanced country,
where is the compulsion for me to do it? I will do R&D in an autonomous41
manner, finished.
The Separation Plan
On March 2, 2006, during President Bush’s visit to India, U.S. and Indian
officials agreed upon a final separation plan. According to India’s official report,
India was guided by the following principles:
!Credible, feasible, and implementable in a transparent manner;
!Consistent with the understandings of the 18 July Statement;
!Consistent with India’s national security and R&D requirements as
well as not prejudicial to the three-stage nuclear programme in India;
!Must be cost effective in its implementation; and


38 Prime Minister Singh’s address to Parliament, February 26, 2006. See “PM Makes a Case
for N-tech,” PTI. See [http://ia.rediff.com/news/2006/feb/27bush8.htm].
39 Interview in The Hindu, August 12, 2005.
40 Ibid.
41 “On the Record: Anil Kakodkar, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and
Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy,” Indian Express, February 8, 2006.

!Must be acceptable to Parliament and public opinion.42
Regarding the application of safeguards, India identified its “overarching criterion”
as whether “subjecting a facility to IAEA safeguards would impact adversely on
India’s national security.” Moreover, facilities were excluded from the civilian list
if they were located in a larger hub of strategic significance (e.g., BARC), even if
they were not normally engaged in activities of strategic significance.43 This last
criterion appears to suggest that the plan did not really seek to separate facilities.
The key elements of India’s separation plan are44
!eight indigenous Indian power reactors (RAPS 3, 4, 5, 6; KAPS 1,

2; NAPS 1, 2) in addition to 6 already under safeguards;


!future power reactors may also be placed under safeguards, if India
declares them as civilian;
!some facilities in the Nuclear Fuel Complex (e.g., fuel fabrication)
will be specified as civilian in 2008; and
!nine research facilities and three heavy water plants would be
declared as civilian, but are “safeguards-irrelevant.”
The following facilities and activities were not on the separation list:
!eight indigenous Indian power reactors (Kaiga 1, 2, 3, 4; MAPS 1,

2; TAPS 3, 4);


!Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FTBR) and Prototype Fast Breeder
Reactors (PFBR) under construction;
!enrichment facilities;
!spent fuel reprocessing facilities (except for the existing safeguards
on the Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing (PREFRE) plant);
!research reactors: CIRUS (which will be shut down in 2010),
Dhruva, Advanced Heavy Water Reactor;
!three heavy water plants; and
!various military-related plants (e.g., a prototype naval reactor).
The eight additional reactors would be put under safeguards between 2007 and

2014.


The implementation document presented to Parliament stated that “India is not
in a position to accept safeguards on the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) and
the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FTBR), both located at Kalpakkam. The Fast Breeder


42 “Implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005: India’s
Separation Plan,” tabled in Parliament on March 7, 2006.
43 Ibid.
44 Prime Minister Singh presented “Implementation of the India-United States Joint
Statement of July 18, 2005: India’s Separation Plan,” to Parliament on March 7, 2006. This
is available at [http://indianembassy.org/newsite/press_release/2006/Mar/sepplan.pdf]. The
plan was updated on May 11, 2006, to include names of reactors and upstream facilities, as
well as dates they would be submitted to safeguards.

Programme is at the R&D stage and its technology will take time to mature and reach
an advanced stage of development.” As for future reactors, the document stated that
“India has decided to place under safeguards all future civilian thermal power
reactors and civilian breeder reactors, and the Government of India retains the sole
right to determine such reactors as civilian.”45 In response to a question about
whether it was possible for there to be non-civilian breeder reactors that India would
build in the future, Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns stated that “India could
build reactors that would service their nuclear weapons industry...but the great
majority of the growth we think will come on the civilian side.”46
As for research reactors, CIRUS would be shut down in 2010 and not subjected
to safeguards. The fuel core of the Apsara reactor would be taken out of BARC and
made available to be safeguarded. Some facilities in the Nuclear Fuel Complex
would be specified as civilian in 2008, and the Tarapur and Rajasthan spent fuel
storage pools would be made available for safeguards (Tarapur 1-2 and Rajasthan 1-2
reactors themselves are already safeguarded.) In addition, India would declare 3
heavy water plants (Thal, Tuticorin and Hazira) as civilian, but these would not be
subject to safeguards; 9 research facilities would be declared as civilian also, but
these would be considered “safeguards-irrelevant.”
India’s enrichment facility would not be covered, and India’s offering up the
Tarapur Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant (PREFRE) for “campaign” mode
safeguards after 2010 is a continuation of its current policy. The Dhruva research
reactor is excluded.
Under Secretary of State Burns stated that India “would enter into permanent
safeguard arrangements with the International Atomic Energy Agency.” However,
the Indian statement that an Indian-specific safeguards agreement would “guard
against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time as
well as providing for corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted
operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel
supplies”raises questions about exactly what kind of safeguards arrangement is
envisioned. Burns noted that the arrangement “achieved a degree of transparency and
oversight and impact on the Indian nuclear program that was not possible for three
decades.”47
Figure 2 shows a rough depiction of how the final separation applies to India’s
civilian and military nuclear facilities.


45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.

CRS-19
Figure 2. India’s Separation Plan


Nuclear Fuels
Complex
iki/CRS-RL33292
g/w
s.or
leak
://wiki
http
: Dr. Frederick Mackie, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the Congressional Research Service.

Assessing The Separation Plan
Congressional views on the separation plan, particularly whether it is credible
and defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint, may have an impact on Congress’s
consideration of the overall peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement.
Quantity vs. Quality. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns told reporters
on March 2, 2006, that “It’s not a perfect deal in the sense that we haven’t captured
100 percent of India’s nuclear program. That’s because India is a nuclear weapons
power, and India will preserve part of its nuclear industry to service its nuclear
weapons program.”48 Although few observers would have expected to get 100% of
India’s nuclear program under safeguards, one question that arises is whether the

65% mark meets the Administration’s own standard that “The safeguards must49


effectively cover India’s civil nuclear fuel cycle.”
The Administration has defended the separation plan most recently as credible
and defensible in this way:
For [the separation plan] to be credible and defensible from a nonproliferation
standpoint, it had to capture more than just a token number of Indian nuclear
facilities, which it did by encompassing nearly two-thirds of India’s current and
planned thermal power reactors as well as all future civil thermal and breeder
reactors. Importantly, for the safeguards to be meaningful, India had to commit
to apply IAEA safeguards in perpetuity; it did so. Once a reactor is under IAEA
safeguards, those safeguards will remain there permanently and on an
unconditional basis. Further, in our view, the plan also needed to include
upstream and downstream facilities associated with the safeguarded reactors to50
provide a true separation of civil and military programs.
It should be noted that although declaring 65% of India’s reactors as civilian
will result in placing almost two-thirds of the current reactors under safeguards,
power reactors constitute just one part of the nuclear fuel cycle. Reprocessing
capabilities are key to India’s three-stage nuclear fuel cycle development plan, and
the separation plan provides nothing beyond the intermittent safeguards applied at the
Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant (PREFRE) already.
Some observers could argue that a strictly quantitative approach does not
address the question of whether the plan is defensible from a nonproliferation
standpoint. Here too, the kinds of facilities included could be key. For example, in
terms of preventing terrorist access to fissile material, safeguarding facilities like


48 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Press Briefing by Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs Nick Burns,” Maurya Sheraton Hotel and Towers, New Delhi, India,
March 2, 2006.
49 Responses by the Administration to Questions for The Record Submitted to Under
Secretary Robert Joseph by Chairman Richard G. Lugar (#4) Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, November 2, 2005.
50 Questions for the Record Submitted to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice by Senator
Richard Lugar (#2) Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 5, 2006.

reprocessing and enrichment plants and breeder reactors would provide a greater
nonproliferation benefit because the materials produced by these plants are a few
steps closer to potential use in a bomb. In addition, safeguards on enrichment,
reprocessing plants, and breeder reactors would support the 2002 U.S. National
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, in which the United States
pledged to “continue to discourage the worldwide accumulation of separated
plutonium and to minimize the use of highly-enriched uranium.”51
Breeder Reactors. As noted earlier, breeder reactors, which are key to
India’s intended second stage of fuel cycle development, have been generally
regarded as a proliferation concern because of their production of weapons-grade
plutonium.52 India plans to build at least five commercial-scale breeder reactors and
would have the option of dedicating any one or more of those to its military program.
Public statements by Indian officials suggest that they have considered the breeder
reactor’s usefulness in producing plutonium for the strategic arsenal, and some
domestic critics have suggested that India should clarify the purpose of the breeder
program once and for all. A key obstacle may be the amount of unsafeguarded
plutonium available as initial fuel, raising the question of how future civilian breeder
reactors would be fueled. Would plutonium from the 10 additional reactors India will
be placing under safeguards be used to fuel the reactors, or would India purchase
safeguarded plutonium from other states? If the latter case, would this conflict with
the Administration’s policy of discouraging the worldwide accumulation of separated
plutonium?
Other Facilities. Prime Minister Singh told the Indian Parliament on
February 26 that “We will offer to place under safeguards only those facilities that
can be identified as civilian without damaging our deterrence potential or restricting
our R&D effort.”53 Although CIRUS, Dhruva, the Fast Breeder Test Reactor, and
the planned Advanced Heavy Water Reactor have been described by Indian facilities
as being research facilities, they are not included. The 9 research facilities that will
be declared as civilian are considered safeguards-irrelevant, probably because they
will have little if any nuclear material in them to be safeguarded.
The absence of research facilities could call into question how far India’s
separation plan has ventured into the mainstream of nonproliferation. IAEA
safeguards for non-nuclear weapon states include all facilities where nuclear material


51 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002. Available
at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf].
52 For many years, the United States discouraged plutonium reprocessing and did not engage
in reprocessing in the U.S. civil nuclear fuel cycle. However, with the announcement of the
Global Energy Nuclear Partnership (GNEP), the Bush Administration is seeking to develop
a recycling method (so-called “proliferation-resistant”) that would not result in the
separation of plutonium. It is unclear how long it would take for advanced recycling
technologies to become commercially available. Regardless, it is unlikely that India could
participate in the GNEP program without a commitment to place its breeder reactors under
safeguards. See [http://www.gnep.energy.gov/gnepProliferationResistantRecycling.html].
53 “Indian PM Addresses Parliament on Nuclear Pact with US,” BBC Monitoring South
Asia, February 27, 2006.

is present, including research and development facilities. The case of precedents in
other nuclear weapon states is not applicable, since the IAEA tends not to inspect
very many of the sites or facilities on the voluntary safeguards eligible lists.
Likewise, the absence of reprocessing and enrichment facilities on the separation plan
also could be interpreted by some as falling short of the objective of bringing India
into the mainstream of nonproliferation. In particular, the Bush Administration has
identified enrichment and reprocessing technologies as sensitive parts of the nuclear
fuel cycle that should be limited and has proposed specific arrangements for assured
supplies of nuclear fuel that would obviate the need for states to conduct their own
enrichment and reprocessing.54
India’s one operating facility at Rattenhalli is reportedly used to enrich uranium
for the prototype naval fuel reactor. Naval fuel occupies a curious place in IAEA
safeguards. Full-scope safeguards agreements, the kind that non-nuclear weapon
states have, include a provision for the non-application of safeguards to nuclear
material to be used in non-peaceful activities — and naval fuel would be one such
non-peaceful activity. However, no non-nuclear weapon state has ever implemented
this provision for the non-application of safeguards. Under Paragraph 14 of the
INFCIRC/153, a state is required to inform the IAEA that
the use of the nuclear material in a non-proscribed military activity will not be
in conflict with an undertaking the State may have given and in respect of which
Agency safeguards apply, that the nuclear material will be used only in a
peaceful nuclear activity; and that during the period of non-application of
safeguards the nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Brazil has placed its enrichment facilities under safeguards, despite having a
naval fuel program, which also raises the question of how far India’s separation plan
conforms to the standards of the nonproliferation mainstream. The five nuclear
weapon states have not encountered this problem thus far, since they have not placed
any naval-related facilities on their safeguards-eligible lists. It is not clear which
precedent would be less desirable — placing India’s naval fuel facilities under
safeguards and then going through steps for the nonapplication of safeguards, or
simply not safeguarding them at all on the grounds that they are of direct national
security significance.
Issues for Congress
U.S. officials acknowledge the importance of a credible Indian separation plan
for ensuring that the United States complies with its Article I obligations under the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) — to not in any way assist a nuclear weapons
program in a non-nuclear weapon state. For almost thirty years, the U.S. legal
standard has been that only nuclear safeguards on all nuclear activities in a state


54 White House, “Fact Sheet: Strengthening International Efforts Against WMD
Proliferation,” February 11, 2004. Available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2004/02/20040211-5.html ].

provides adequate assurances. The Administration has sought, and Congress has
provided, backing for a lower level of assurance by proposing that the separation plan
take the place of comprehensive safeguards.
From a broad perspective, Congress may consider whether opening up
international cooperation to India after all these years has a net positive effect on
India’s nuclear weapons program. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns told
reporters on March 2, 2006, that the agreement will not have an impact on India’s
strategic program.55 However, some observers believe that unless India stops
production of fissile material for weapons purposes, nuclear safeguards will do little
to ensure that assistance is not diverted.
From a narrower perspective, the text of a peaceful nuclear cooperation
agreement is necessary for Congress to assess whether or not the United States can
comply with its NPT obligations not to assist India’s nuclear weapons program. P.L.
109-401, which gives the President authority to waive certain requirements of the
Atomic Energy Act, still requires the Administration to send Congress not only the
text of a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement, but also a Nuclear Proliferation
Assessment Statement (NPAS), which must address the extent to which U.S. treaty
commitments are met.
Under P.L. 109-401, the following sections require reports to Congress related
to the separation plan:
!Under the Submission to Congress provision of Section 104 (Section
104. (c) (2) (A)), the Administration will be required to provide “a
summary of the plan provided by India to the United States and the
IAEA to separate India’s civil and military nuclear facilities,
materials, and programs, and the declaration made by India to the
IAEA identifying India’s civil facilities to be placed under IAEA
safeguards, including an analysis of the credibility of such plan and
declaration, together with copies of the plan and declaration.”
!Under the Reporting to Congress provision of Section 104 (Section
104.(g)(1)) the Administration will be required to keep committees
informed of
!(A)(ii): material noncompliance with the separation plan;
!(B): “construction of a nuclear facility in India after the date
of enactment of this title”;
!(C): “significant changes in the production by India of nuclear
weapons or in the types or amounts of fissile material
produced”; and
!(D): “changes in the purpose or operational status of any
unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities in India.”
!Under the Implementation and Compliance Report provision of
Section 104 (Section 104.(g)(2)), the Administration is required to


55 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Press Briefing by Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs Nick Burns,” Maurya Sheraton Hotel and Towers, New Delhi, India,
Mar. 2, 2006.

report, 180 days after entry into force of the Section 123 agreement
and annually thereafter:
!(A): a description of any additional nuclear facilities and
nuclear materials that the Government of India has placed or
intends to place under IAEA safeguards;
!(F): an analysis of whether U.S. civil nuclear cooperation with
India is in any way assisting India’s nuclear weapons program;
!(H): an estimate relating to India’s production of uranium,
fissile material for nuclear explosives;
!(I): an estimate of the amount of electricity produced by
India’s declared and undeclared reactors; and
!(J): an analysis of whether imported uranium has affected the
rate of production in India of nuclear explosive devices.
In the President’s signing statement on December 18, 2006, he noted that the
executive branch would construe “provisions of the Act that mandate, regulate, or
prohibit submission of information to the Congress, an international organization, or
the public, such as sections 104, 109, 261, 271, 272, 273, 274, and 275, in a manner
consistent with the President’s constitutional authority to protect and control
information that could impair foreign relations, national security, the deliberative
processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive’s constitutional
duties.” This could suggest that the executive branch might limit the scope of
reporting required by Congress in those sections. Limiting the scope of reporting
could have an adverse impact on Congress’s ability to assess the nuclear cooperation
agreement at three different times: when the agreement is submitted for
congressional approval; at random times when there are certain developments in
India’s nuclear fuel cycle; and on an annual basis when the Administration reports
on implementation and compliance.