U.S. Occupation Assistance: Iraq, Germany and Japan Compared
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
As of the end of FY2006, U.S. aid to Iraq had surpassed U.S. aid to Germany and Japan during
the post-World War II occupations of those countries. This report compares aggregate data on
U.S. assistance to Iraq through FY2006 with U.S. assistance to Germany and Japan during the
seven years following World War II. U.S. aid allocations (all grant assistance) for Iraq
appropriated from 2003 through 2006 total $35.7 billion. About $11.8 billion (33%) went for
economic infrastructure assistance. The remaining $23.8 billion was targeted at bolstering Iraqi
security ($15.5 billion) and traditional political, social, and economic reform assistance ($8.3
billion). A higher proportion of Iraqi aid has been provided for economic reconstruction of critical
infrastructure than was the case for Germany and Japan. Total U.S. assistance to Iraq thus far is
about a fifth more than total assistance (adjusted for inflation) provided to Germany—and
somewhat more than double that provided to Japan—from 1946-1952.
For Germany, in constant 2005 dollars the United States provided a total of $29.3 billion in
assistance from 1946-1952 with 60% in economic grants and nearly 30% in economic loans, and
the remainder in military aid. Beginning in 1949, the Marshall Plan provided $1.4 billion with the
specific objective of promoting economic recovery. Prior to that, U.S. aid was categorized as
Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA). Adjusting for inflation, the constant 2005
dollar total for Marshall Plan aid was $9.3 billion, of which 84% billion was grants and 16% was
loans. (West Germany eventually repaid one-third of all U.S. assistance it received.)
Total U.S. assistance to Japan for 1946-1952 was roughly $15.2 billion in 2005 dollars, of which
Japan repaid $490 million of the total postwar assistance. Of the $2.2 billion in total aid, an
estimated $655 million, or almost a third, went to categories that would mostly contribute directly
to economic recovery (industrial materials, including machinery and raw goods; petroleum and
products; and transportation, vehicles, and equipment). Most of the rest went for agricultural
equipment, foodstuffs, and food supplies with smaller amounts spent on medical and sanitary
supplies, education, and clothing.
U.S. assistance to Germany and Japan largely consisted of food-related aid because of severe
war-induced shortages and the need to provide minimum subsistence levels of nutrition. In Iraq,
humanitarian aid has been a minor part of the assistance. Expectations also have changed.
Countries today have much higher expectations of what the United States should contribute to
reconstruction in Iraq relative to what was expected following World War II. Germany and Japan
also are larger than Iraq—both population and size of their respective economies—and the extent
of war damage to each country’s industrial capacity was different. Iraq also faces an insurgency
that deliberately sabotages the economy and reconstruction efforts, whereas there were no
resistance movements in either Germany or Japan.
This report will not be updated.
Context, Caveats, and Methodology...............................................................................................6
Post-World War II Assistance to Germany......................................................................................7
Post-World War II Assistance to Japan............................................................................................8
Current U.S. Assistance to Iraq.....................................................................................................10
Figure 1. U.S. Assistance to Iraq (FY2003-FY2006), Germany, and Japan (1946-1952),
Total and for Economic Reconstruction.......................................................................................6
Table 1. Germany: U.S. Assistance FY1946-FY1952...................................................................13
Table 2. Japan: U.S. Assistance FY1946-FY1952.........................................................................13
Table 3. Germany: U.S. Assistance FY1946-FY1952...................................................................14
Table 4. Japan: U.S. Assistance FY1946-FY1952.........................................................................15
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................16
ome Members of the 110th Congress may question whether U.S. assistance to Iraq in the
wake of the military action of 2003 has been adequate, others whether it might be
excessive. One point of comparison that is often invoked is the assistance that the United S
States provided to Germany and Japan during military occupations of those countries after World
War II. This report provides data through the end of FY2006, at which point U.S. aid to Iraq had
surpassed U.S. aid to Germany and Japan during the post-World War II occupations.
The following information and attached tables compare assistance to Iraq during the first three
and a half years after the fall of Baghdad on April 9, 2003, with U.S. assistance during the
occupations of those two countries. In brief, although the context of the military occupation of
Iraq is markedly different from that of the other two, the total amount of U.S. assistance allocated
for Iraq through 2006 appears to be about a fifth higher than the amount provided to Germany
and somewhat more than double that provided to Japan for the seven years after World War II.
(This represented the overlapping periods of direct military government and the Marshall plan
assistance in Germany and the entire period of the military occupation of Japan.)
Breakdowns for specific purposes are difficult, as the costs were covered under different
categories and in different ways. One area in which a rough approximation is possible, however,
is funding for the reconstruction and improvement of critical economic infrastructure. This figure
is particularly important to some Members as they consider the tradeoffs between funding spent
on Iraq and funding available for similar purposes in the United States. Comparisons of funding
for other purposes, such as government, education, and humanitarian relief are difficult, as the
needs were different in each case and/or the assistance was provided in different ways that do not
facilitate comparison. This report does not attempt to compare indirect forms of assistance, such
as debt relief, and funding provided by other donors.
Aid allocations for Iraq appropriated from FY2003 through FY2006, all of which is grant
assistance, totaled $35.7 billion. Of this, about $11.8 billion (33%) was for the repair and 1
improvement of critical economic infrastructure. The total figure is almost a fifth higher than
total assistance provided to Germany from FY1946-1952 ($29.3 billion in 2005 dollars) and
somewhat more than double that provided to Japan ($15.2 billion in 2005 dollars). U.S. funding
provided specifically for economic infrastructure in Iraq appears to be greater than the proportion
provided for economic reconstruction in both Germany and Japan.
1 As discussed below, funding of economic infrastructure in Iraq is perhaps more comparable to the type of assistance
provided Japan and Germany than is total assistance that would encompass funds for enhancing public security and/or
for governance and public welfare.
Figure 1. U.S. Assistance to Iraq (FY2003-FY2006), Germany, and Japan (1946-1952),
Total and for Economic Reconstruction
$Billion 2005 Dollars
Ir aq Ger m any J apan
C ountr y
Source: Congressional Research Service. Data from U.S. Department of State, appropriations bills, and other
The circumstances in which the U.S. occupations of Germany and Japan began were quite
different from those under which the U.S. entered Iraq in 2003. Germany and Japan had both
declared war on the United States and during at least the first year after World War II, U.S.
policymakers were inclined to provide only a survival level of food and other assistance to its
defeated enemies in order to avert starvation and prevent massive outbreaks of disease. U.S.
objectives in the post-World War II occupations were characterized as the four “Ds”.
The United States’ primary objective in both Germany and Japan was demilitarization. In Japan,
the next two were disarmament and decentralization of the economy through the dismantling of
powerful economic groups. In Germany, the next two were denatzification and deindustralization,
the later in the expectation that Germany could become an agricultural country. The fourth “D” in
both cases was democratization, although many U.S. policymakers and occupation planners were
skeptical that the Germans and Japanese had the necessary cultural background and psychological
disposition for flourishing democracies. Both countries were expected to be responsible for their
own economic recovery. Within a few years, however, the United States had recognized the need
to provide assistance for economic recovery and reconstruction in Germany and Japan and
programs with that objective commenced in 1948.
In Iraq, in contrast, U.S. policymakers have made economic and political reconstruction and
development priorities from the outset. Democracy-building became the primary objective of
U.S. assistance to Iraq very early in the occupation, as no caches of biological and chemical
weapons were found. Unlike the cases of Germany and Japan, there was no massive humanitarian
crisis requiring aid in Iraq.
It is impossible to precisely compare the amount of aid that the United States has provided to
post-war Iraq with the amounts spent during the occupations of Germany and Japan. For one,
there is no record of the amount spent on political and social welfare reconstruction and
development in Germany and Japan. Much of the political and social welfare institution-building
assistance that is being provided by U.S. contractors in Iraq now was either not provided in the
cases of Germany and Japan, was paid for by those countries (which made payments to the
United States for occupation costs), or was done by occupation troops or others whose salary 2
costs were not calculated. No precise calculation of assistance for economic reconstruction can
be made in the cases of Germany and Japan without surveying the papers from the occupations
for that specific purpose, as information available in the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) data base, the standard source for figures on U.S. government assistance,
is aggregated according to accounts, not purposes. In addition, in the case of funding for Iraq,
accounts may contain a mix of assistance types, and even specific grants may have multiple
humanitarian, political, and economic purposes. Nevertheless, very rough comparisons of
assistance for economic reconstruction are possible.
For the purposes of rough comparison, this report compared figures from the web version of the 3
standard source for U.S. foreign aid funding, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants as the source for
figures on U.S. aid to Japan and Germany. CRS converted these figures to constant 2005 dollars
using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Price Index of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
(These aid figures do not reflect the net amount of U.S. assistance to these countries, as they do
not offset amounts that the conquered countries paid in reparations. Nor do they account for the
amounts paid by those countries for feeding and housing occupation troops.) The four tables at
the end of this report show these figures. In addition, further information is supplied in the
sections below from a Marshall Plan document in the case of Germany and from occupation
documents in the case of Japan.
U.S. assistance to Germany totaled some $4.3 billion ($29.6 billion in 2005 dollars) for the years
of direct military government (May 1945-May 1949) and the overlapping Marshall Plan years
(1948/1949-1952). Initial funding, primarily under the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas
(GARIOA) program was directed primarily at humanitarian relief. (GARIOA provided funding
for the basic relief supplies necessary for “the prevention of disease and unrest prejudicial to the
occupying forces,” and was “limited to food, fertilizers, seed, and minimum petroleum 4
requirements.”) GARIOA grants and loans—totaling $2.2 billion in current dollars ($15.4 in
2 The United States may also have costs in Iraq that are not calculated, such as the salaries of U.S. government officials
who have advised the Iraqi government.
3 I.e., “the Greenbook,” at http://qesdb.cdie.org. Figures in other sources are not always consistent with these figures.
4 Testimony of N. H. Collisson. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Extension of European Recovery
Program, hearings on H.R. 2362, A Bill to Amend the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948. Part I. 81st Congress, 1st
constant 2005 dollars)—made up just over half of the total and virtually all of the funding for
about the first three years, although a small amount of other relief aid and some military surplus
property was also provided during that period. The Marshall Plan, through which aid to Germany
began in 1948/1949 and continued through 1952, provided about a third of total U.S. aid to that
country. Some military aid grants, related to the new security environment, was provided in the
last Marshall Plan years. (The West German government eventually repaid one-third of total U.S.
assistance to Germany during this period, even though loans formally comprised only 28% of 5
total funds provided to Germany.)
The Marshall Plan provided the first funding for Germany with the specific objective of
promoting economic recovery. The official figure for total Marshall Plan assistance to Germany is
almost $1.4 billion in current year dollars ($9.3 billion in 2005 dollars, of which $7.8 billion was 6
grants and $1.5 billion was loans). [This corresponds to the categories of USAID Predecessor
Grants and USAID Predecessor Loans in the tables below.] The entire amount of Marshall Plan
aid is usually considered economic reconstruction funding, even though much of the aid
provided, in the first year particularly, was foodstuff to feed workers whose productivity was
compromised by malnourishment. (The severe winter of 1946-1947 in Europe made hunger a
greater problem at that point than it was right at the end of the war and made apparent the need
for increased food and other assistance.) The economic effect of Marshall Plan assistance was
enhanced by the Plan’s requirement that recipients match U.S. funding with “counterpart”
contributions in national currencies. These were invested in the areas that national governments
determined, in consultation with Marshall Plan officials, would best stimulate national
According to an interim report to Congress prepared by the Economic Cooperation Agency (the
agency which administered the Marshall Plan), food accounted for nearly half (i.e., 46%) of the
commodities delivered in the first three-plus years (i.e., between April 3, 1948, and June 30, 7
1951). (Deliveries during this period accounted for perhaps 80% of total deliveries under the
Marshall Plan.) Inputs to industry (i.e., raw materials and semi-finished products) comprised 40%
of the total. Of those inputs, nearly 60% was cotton; most of the rest was metals and chemicals.
Petroleum and petroleum products accounted for 4%. About 2½% was for machinery and
vehicles, and 6 ½% was for miscellaneous, mostly tobacco.
Total U.S. assistance to Japan for the years of the occupation, from 1945-1952 was roughly $2.2
billion ($15.2 billion in 2005 dollars), of which almost $1.7 billion was grants and $504 million
was loans. The Greenbook presents these figures as provided under five headings. Over three-
session. p. 233. February 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 1949. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1949.
5 Susan Stern. Marshall Plan 1947-1997: A German View. Accessed November 9, 2005, through the website of the
German Embassy in Washington, D.C. http://www.germany-info.org/relaunch/culture/history/marshall.html.
6 Table II in CRS Report 97-62, The Marshall Plan: Design, Accomplishments, and Relevance to the Present, by Curt
7 This breakdown is drawn from Table B-4 of that report. U.S. Congress, House, Thirteenth Report to Congress of the
Economic Cooperation Administration for the Quarter Ended June 30, 1951. House Document No. 249. 82nd Congress, st
1 session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Office. p. 114, in House Documents, vol. 37, 1951.
quarters (77%) of these funds were provided through GARIOA grants. Most of the remainder
(i.e., 23%) was $490 million in related funds that Japan repaid and is classified as a loan. There is
no information in the Greenbook or readily available published sources regarding how much of
this was provided for economic reconstruction, although the intent of the occupation after 1948
was to promote economic recovery.
Figures for Japan compiled by a CRS analyst who examined occupation papers and related
documents in that country show that about 40% of the U.S. assistance may well be considered as 8
having been targeted at economic infrastructure reconstruction, broadly defined. It should be
noted that the total value of U.S. aid from the occupation documents and other documents that
this analyst drew on is just slightly over $2.0 billion in current dollars—slightly lower than the
Greenbook total of $2.2 billion. This was a figure that was agreed upon in the 1960s by Japanese
and U.S. officials as part of the negotiations on the amount of U.S. assistance that Japan would
repay. (The Greenbook figure is for funds appropriated, whereas the lower negotiated figures
derives from estimates of goods actually received plus administrative costs.) Using this as a base,
the net value of the grant and loan aid as actually received by Japan would be $1.9 billion after 9
deducting for the administrative expenses that the United States charged against the funds.
Of the negotiated $2.0 billion in current year dollars ($13.4 in constant 2005 dollars), $655
million ($4.3 billion in constant dollars) or 32%, went to categories that would mostly contribute
directly to economic reconstruction, that is, industrial materials, including machinery and raw
goods ($310 million or 15%); petroleum, oils, and lubricants ($95 million or 5%); and
transportation, vehicles, and equipment ($249 million or 12%). It is also likely that much of the
funds categorized as payment of civilians ($67 million) and miscellaneous ($63 million ) also
could be considered as contributing to economic reconstruction, especially as Japanese labor was 10
provided incentives in order to encourage production. (The total in 2005 dollars for these
payments to civilians and miscellaneous is $0.86 billion.) These categories of aid total $785
million in current dollars and $5.2 billion in constant dollars.
Of the remaining $1.2 billion, $1.19 billion ($7.9 billion in 2005 dollars and 59% of the total)
went to agricultural equipment, foodstuffs, and food supplies. This was aimed at helping to feed
the Japanese population. The remainder ($49 million in current dollars, $324 million in 2005
dollars) were expenditures for medical and sanitary supplies (under 1% of the total), education
(under 1%), and clothing, textiles and shoes (a little over 1%).
8 From “United States Aid to Japan: A Reassessment,” by Dick K. Nanto. Unpublished Paper. September 1977. Based
on The United States’ Role in Japan’s Postwar Economic Recovery. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard
9 The precise figure was $1,937,916,796. This is a net figure (i.e., the total $2,027,657,196 of total aid actually received
by Japan, according to the occupation documents), minus $89,740,400 that the United States deducted for
administrative expenses. The $490 million repaid to the United States by Japan at 2.5% interest is not deducted from
the total aid figure.
10 Nanto found that total assistance for industrial capital formation (rebuilding Japan’s factories) was $1.4 million ($9.4
million in constant 2005 dollars), or some 0.07% of the total aid program. This consisted of funding for industrial
machinery and parts, vehicles and motor parts, and related miscellaneous equipment and supplies.
U.S. assistance to Iraq appropriated from FY2003 through FY2006 totaled some $35.7 billion.11
All of it is grant assistance. While most funds were appropriated to a special Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund (IRRF, $21 billion) and an Iraq Security Forces Fund ($10.4 billion),
additional sums from the budgets of DOD, USAID, and other agencies have been used for
reconstruction purposes. The Departments of State and Defense as well as USAID are the key
entities responsible for implementing Iraq assistance programs.
About one-third of total funding, roughly $11.8 billion, has been aimed at restoring economically
critical infrastructure, including airports, roads, bridges, railroads, seaports, electric power, water
and sanitation, telecommunications, and essential buildings. Another $8.3 billion, representing
about 23% of total aid, has been allocated to assist democratization (including civil society),
education and health and the expansion of the private sector. A small amount of emergency relief
and food aid was provided, especially in the early stages of the post-U.S. invasion period.
Together, the infrastructure reconstruction assistance—which best corresponds to the bulk of aid
provided to Germany and Japan—and the social, economic, and political development aid—
which is more characteristic of current U.S. assistance around the world—make up nearly more
than one-half of total Iraq funding for economic and political reconstruction to date. The
remaining $15.5 billion in aid, nearly 44% of the total, is targeted at bolstering Iraqi security.
Most of it provides training and equipment to the various security forces, including police and
army, but funds are also used to provide facilities for security and law enforcement.
While the total amount of aid to Iraq—roughly $36 billion—now appears to be almost a fifth
higher than that spent during the occupation of Germany and somewhat more than double that
during the occupation of Japan, the total amounts and percentages of U.S. assistance targeted
specifically at economic infrastructure reconstruction for Germany and Japan over the FY1949-
FY1952 period appear to be lower than the amounts and percentages currently directed at such
reconstruction in Iraq. In constant 2005 dollars, U.S. aid targeted at economic infrastructure
reconstruction was some $9.3 billion in Germany, or about one-third of total U.S. assistance to
that country, and some $5.2 billion in Japan, or a little under 40% of total U.S. assistance there. If
one were to consider food aid for Japanese workers as part of assistance for reconstruction there
in order to make it more comparable with Marshall Plan reconstruction aid to Germany, the Japan
figure would be considerably higher (about $13.1 billion in constant 2005 dollars).
The amount and proportion of assistance for roughly equivalent infrastructure reconstruction in
Iraq appears higher, probably about $11.8 billion. This would indicate that the actual (adjusted)
dollar amounts of U.S. aid for economic infrastructure reconstruction in Iraq thus far is roughly a
third greater than that provided to Germany and perhaps more than double that provided to Japan.
One explanation for the difference may be that aid for economic reconstruction in Germany and
11 Most of this funding was contained in P.L. 108-11, FY2003 emergency supplemental appropriations (H.R. 1559);
P.L. 108-106, FY2004 emergency supplemental appropriations (H.R. 3289); P.L. 109-13, FY2005 emergency
supplemental appropriations (H.R. 1268); P.L. 109-102, FY2006 Foreign Operations appropriations (H.R. 3057); and
P.L. 109-234, FY2006 Emergency Supplemental appropriations (H.R. 4939). For further information on Iraq funding,
see CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff.
Japan consisted of financing through loans and grants in order to enable those countries to carry
out their recoveries largely on their own. In Iraq, the United States is providing not only the
material assistance, but also is paying for the necessary labor.
For these three countries, infrastructure assistance is the most comparable element. Other aid
sectors are difficult to compare because the situations varied greatly. A large proportion of U.S.
assistance to Germany and Japan consisted of food aid because of the humanitarian crisis which
ensued after the war. Food and housing shortages were critical in both Germany and Japan for
several years after World War II, and early U.S. assistance focused on providing a subsistence
level of nutrition. Massive humanitarian relief was necessary. In Iraq, humanitarian aid has been a
minor part of the assistance program because there was little need for food or other immediate
relief assistance for most of the population. Democracy, security, and other governance efforts are
also difficult to compare. In Germany and Japan they were conducted by occupation forces and
separate accounts were not maintained.
Assistance in these three cases varied greatly, not only because of the conditions in which the
occupations took place. The size of the country and economy and the degree of economic
development is different in each of the cases, as were the states of the economic infrastructure at
the end of and after the war.
In 1940, before the United States entered World War II, it had a population of 132.6 million and a
GDP that was 2½ times greater than that of Germany (with a population of 69.8 million) and 12
about 4½ times greater than that of Japan (with a population of 73 million). After the war, the
differences were much greater: U.S. per capita income was one-third higher than that of Germany
in 1940 and over 4 times higher in 1946; it was almost 2½ times higher than that of Japan in 1940
and well over 6 times higher in 1946. At the end of the Marshall Plan period in 1952, recovery to
pre-war levels had occurred in both countries. In 1952, U.S. per capita income was 2¼ times 13
higher than that of Germany and almost 4½ times that of Japan.
Regarding economic infrastructure, some sectors of Germany’s infrastructure were left
surprisingly intact according to recent analyses: “At the end of the war, the industrial capacity in
the Western zones was in theory not markedly less than that of the same territories in 1936.... The
coal, iron, and steel industries were relatively lightly damaged, whereas most manufacturing was 14
much more seriously impaired.” Severe damage to public utilities—especially power stations 15
and transportation facilities—slowed the restoration of production, as did malnutrition and
12 The comparisons in this paragraph are based on statistics from Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical
Statistics, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2003.
13 The U.S. population grew to 141.9 million by 1946 and 157.6 million by 1952. Japan’s population also grew by 1946
(to 77.2 million) through 1952 (to 86.5 million) due in large part to the immigration of ethnic Japanese from other parts
of Asia. Germany’s population shrank by 1946 (to 64.7 million), but surpassed its 1940 level by 1952 (by then totaling
69.1 million), due in part to the immigration of ethnic Germans from nearby countries.
14 Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress. From Shadow to Substance: 1945-1963. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989.
15 Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. Historical Context of Stability and Reconstruction Operations:
Germany after World War II. A report prepared under an interagency agreement with the U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Commande Futures Center. December 2005. pp. 29-31.
Similarly, recent analyses of the state of Japan’s economic infrastructure showed that, overall,
industry was not demolished: “If we look at industries by sector, we can see that although the rate
of capacity in the consumer goods industries was damaged because many factories had been
converted to war production, by contrast, the damage rate was relatively low in the heavy and
chemical industries. The steel and electric power generation industries even emerged from the 16
war with plant capacity above prewar levels.”
Observers may note that the Iraqi people and the international community most likely have much
higher expectations of what the United States should contribute to economic reconstruction in
Iraq than what the United States was expected to contribute to Germany and Japan, as the
disparities are much greater between the United States and Iraq than between the United States
and its World War II adversaries. The United States, with a current population of 300 million, has
a GDP more than 200 times greater than that of Iraq, population 26 million ($11,750 billion
compared to $54.4 billion, 2004 estimate). U.S. GDP per capita was almost 20 times that of Iraq 17
in 2004 ($40,100 compared to $2,100). While U.S. military action did little damage, by design, 18
to much of Iraq’s economic infrastructure, it did damage Iraq’s electrical grid, which also had an
effect on the availability of water. In addition, Iraq’s infrastructure had greatly deteriorated over
the previous years. The existence of an insurgency in Iraq which deliberately sabotages the
economy and reconstruction efforts is an important consideration in comparing Iraq’s economic
reconstruction requirements with those of post-war Germany and Japan, which had no resistance
16 “The Postwar Japanese Economy, 1945-1973” by Yutaka Kōsai, in Michael Smitka, ed., Japan’s Economic Ascent:
International Trade, Growth, and Postwar Reconstruction. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1998. p. 83.
17 Figures in this paragraph from the online CIA Factbook at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook, accessed
November 28, 2005.
18 According to one article “damage to the electrical grid was a major post-war problem. Despite the precision bombing
of the campaign, by mid-April wartime damage and immediate postwar looting had reduced Baghdad’s power supply
to one-fifth its pre-war level, according to an internal Pentagon study. In mid-July the grid would be back to only half
its pre-war level, working on a three-hours-on, three-hours-off schedule.” James Fallows. “Blind into Baghdad,” The
Atlantic Monthly, January-February, 2004.
Table 1. Germany: U.S. Assistance FY1946-FY1952
(in millions of current dollars)
GERMANY 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 Total
Total Economic Grants 195.8 298.3 234.4 810.6 579.4 393.1 90.7 2,602.3
Total Economic Loans 0 0 615.9 447.0 154.0 0 16.9 1,233.8
USAID Predecessor Grants 0 0 0 406.0 290.0 402.5 75.1 1,173.6
USAID Predecessor Loans 0 0 0 200.0 0 0 16.9 216.9
Food Grants 0 0 0 0 0 0 17.5 17.5
GARIOA (grants) 192.7 297.8 232.3 404.6 289.4 -9.4 -1.9 1,405.5
GARIOLA (loans) 0 0 399.0 247.0 154.0 0 0 800.0
UNRRA & Interim Aid (grants) 3.1 0.5 2.1 0 0 0 0 5.7
iki/CRS-RL33331US Surplus Property (loan) 0 0 216.9 0 0 0 0 216.9
s.orMilitary Aid Grants 0 0 0 0 0 259.7 202.7 462.4
leakTotals 195.8 298.3 850.3 1,257.6 733.4 652.8 310.3 4,298.5
://wikiSource: U.S. Agency for International Development. U.S. Overseas Loans & Grants Database (Custom Service).
httpNote: Totals may not add due to rounding
Table 2. Japan: U.S. Assistance FY1946-FY1952
(in millions of current dollars)
JAPAN 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 Total
Total Economic Grants 82.7 291.0 375.4 388.8 283.6 225.1 49.9 1,696.5
Total Economic Loans 24.0 98.3 108.3 112.7 81.8 65.2 13.7 504.0
GARIOA (grants) 82.7 291.0 375.2 388.8 283.5 225.1 48.4 1,694.7
UNRRA & Interim Aid 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0.2
JAPAN 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 Total
Food Grants 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 1.5
COG Offset to Grant (loan) 24.0 84.3 108.3 112.7 81.8 65.2 13.7 490.0
U.S. Surplus Property (loan) 0 14.0 0 0 0 0 0 14.0
Military Grants 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1
Totals 106.7 389.3 483.7 501.5 365.4 290.3 63.7 2,200.6
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development. U.S. Overseas Loans & Grants Database (Custom Service).
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
Table 3. Germany: U.S. Assistance FY1946-FY1952
(in millions of constant 2005 dollars)
iki/CRS-RL33331GERMANY 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 Totals
g/wTotal Economic Grants 1,575.8 2,159.9 1,605.6 5,555.1 3,939.6 2,501.1 564.8 17,901.9
leakTotal Economic Loans 0.0 0.0 4,218.8 3,063.3 1,047.1 0.0 105.2 8,434.5
USAID Predecessor Grants 0.0 0.0 0.0 2,782.4 1,971.9 2,560.9 467.7 7,782.7
://wikiUSAID Predecessor Loans 0.0 0.0 0.0 1,370.6 0.0 0.0 105.2 1,475.9
Food Grants 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 109.0 109.0
GARIOA (grants) 1,550.9 2,156.3 1,591.2 2,772.8 1,967.8 -59.8 -11.8 9,967.3
GARIOLA (loans) 0.0 0.0 2,733.0 1,692.7 1,047.1 0.0 0.0 5,472.9
UNRRA & Interim Aid (grants) 24.9 3.6 14.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 43.0
US Surplus Property (loan) 0.0 0.0 1,485.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1,485.7
Military Aid Grants 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1,652.3 1,262.2 2,914.6
Totals 1,575.8 2,159.9 5,824.3 8,618.4 4,986.7 4,153.4 1,932.3 29,250.9
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development. U.S. Overseas Loans & Grants Database (Custom Service). Current figures inflated to 2005 values using the GDP
Price Index of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
Table 4. Japan: U.S. Assistance FY1946-FY1952
(in millions of constant 2005 dollars)
JAPAN 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 Totals
Total Economic Grants 665.6 2,107.0 2,571.4 2,664.5 1,928.3 1,432.2 310.7 11,679.8
Total Economic Loans 193.2 711.8 741.8 772.3 556.2 414.8 85.3 3,475.4
GARIOA (grants) 665.6 2,107.0 2,570.0 2,664.5 1,927.7 1,432.2 301.4 11,668.4
UNRRA & Interim Aid (grant) 0 0 1.4 0 0 0 0 1.4
Food Grants 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.3 9.3
COG Offset to Grant (loan) 193.2 610.4 741.8 772.3 556.2 414.8 85.3 3,374.1
U.S. Surplus Property (loan) 0 101.4 0 0 0 0 0 101.4
Military Aid (Grants) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.6
iki/CRS-RL33331Totals 858.7 2,818.8 3,313.2 3,436.8 2,484.5 1,847.0 396.7 15,155.8
g/wSource: U.S. Agency for International Development. U.S. Overseas Loans & Grants Database (Custom Service). Current figures inflated to 2005 values using the GDP
s.orPrice Index of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
leakNote: Totals may not add due to rounding.
Nina M. Serafino Dick K. Nanto
Specialist in International Security Affairs Specialist in Industry and Trade
firstname.lastname@example.org, 7-7667 email@example.com, 7-7754
Specialist in Foreign Affairs
Research assistance for this report was provided by L.J. Cunningham and J. Michael Donnelly, KSG-FDT,