Line Item Veto: A Constitutional Analysis of Recent Proposals

CRS Report for Congress
Line Item Veto: A Constitutional Analysis
of Recent Proposals
Updated October 3, 2006
Morton Rosenberg
Specialist in American Public Law
American Law Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Line Item Veto: A Constitutional Analysis of Recent
Proposals
Summary
On March 6, 2006, the President announced that he was sending to Congress
proposed legislation that “would provide a fast-track procedure to require the
Congress to vote up-or-down on rescissions proposed by the President.” The
President’s proposal, denominated the “Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 2006,” was
introduced the next day in the Senate and House as S. 2381 and H.R. 4890. In
comments accompanying the proposal it is asserted that “the President’s proposal is
fully consistent with the Constitution. In its 1998 ruling [in Clinton v. City of New
York] striking down the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, the Supreme Court concluded
that the Act ‘g[ave] the President unilateral power to change the text of duly enacted
statutes.’ The Legislative Line Item Veto Act does not raise those constitutional
issues because the President’s rescission proposals must be enacted by both Houses
and signed into law.”
Standing alone, the proposed expedited rescission procedure would likely pass
constitutional scrutiny. Congress would simply establish a process whereby the
President may propose rescission of specific types of appropriation and tax
provisions, including earmarks. The fact the Congress must act within a limited time
period to either approve or reject the proposal, and that certain procedural and
deliberative processes are curtailed or eliminated, does not raise constitutional
questions. The so-called fast-track process is an exercise of the constitutionally-based
authority of each House to establish its own rules of internal procedure.
The expedited rescission process of these bills, however, does not stand alone.
Under the proposal, the President would be given discretionary power to suspend
covered spending and tax provisions for up to 180 days, and perhaps more, even if
Congress rejected a proposed rescission within that period. This is unlike the current
rescission process under the Impoundment Control Act, which requires the obligation
of funds if Congress fails to approve the President’s rescission proposal within 45
days of continuous session after submission of a rescission proposal, or the provision
in the rejected Line Veto Act of 1996 which required expenditure of canceled
authorities immediately upon the enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval. In
addition, while Congress must act speedily when it receives the President’s proposal,
nothing in the bills specifies when the President must send up his proposal; nor do
the bills appear to require that targeted spending and tax provisions in one law be
sent up together; and nothing in the bills limits the suspension period to the stated
180-day suspension period or prohibits the additional utilization of the 45-day wait
period for proposed rescissions under the current Impoundment Control Act, which
is not to be repealed. An issue before a reviewing court, then, might be whether the
bills’ suspension power could be viewed as an effective grant of presidential
authority to cancel provisions of law that was proscribed by the Supreme Court in
Clinton v. City of New York. Subsequent modifications of the Administration
proposal in the House and Senate may be seen to continue to raise significant
constitutional concerns.

Contents
Introduction: The Administration’s Line Item Veto Proposal................1
The Nature and Scope of the Supreme Court’s Ruling in
Clinton v. City of New York.....................................2
The Line Veto Act of 1996......................................2
The Supreme Courts Invalidation of the Line Item Veto Act............4
Implications of the Breadth of the Clinton Ruling.....................4
A Constitutional Analysis of S. 2381 and H.R. 4890 As Introduced...........7
Constitutional Issues That May Be Raised By the Administration
Proposals ................................................7
Considerations That May Be Taken Into Account By A Reviewing Court..8
Departures From Past Norms of Protections of Legislative
P rerogat i ves ..........................................8
Applying the Implications of Clinton: The Relevance of the
Metropolitan Airports Litigation........................11
Observations ................................................14
A Constitutional Assessment of House and Senate Modifications
of the Administration’s Proposal............................14
House and Senate Actions..................................14
H.R. 4890, As Amended...................................15
Title of the SOS Act.......................................20
Conclusion ......................................................22

Line Item Veto: A Constitutional Analysis of
Recent Proposals
Introduction: The Administration’s Line Item Veto
Proposal
President Bush and some in Congress advocate enactment of legislation that
would provide the Chief Executive with line item veto authority, and the President
has reiterated his support of a revival of such authority that would pass constitutional
muster throughout his presidency in speeches, press conferences and annual budget¹
submissions. On March 6, 2006, the President announced that he was sending to
Congress proposed legislation that “would provide a fast-track procedure to require
the Congress to vote up-or-down on rescissions proposed by the President.” The
President’s proposal, denominated the “Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 2006,” was
introduced the next day in the Senate and House as S. 2381 and H.R. 4890. In
comments accompanying the proposal it was asserted that “the President’s proposal
is fully consistent with the Constitution. In its 1998 ruling [in Clinton v. City of New
York] striking down the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, the Supreme Court concluded
that the Act ‘g[ave] the President unilateral power to change the text of duly enacted
statutes.’ The Legislative Line Item Veto Act does not raise those constitutional
issues because the President’s rescission proposals must be enacted by both Houses
and signed into law.”²
Standing alone, the proposed expedited rescission procedure would likely pass
constitutional scrutiny. Congress would simply establish a process whereby the
President may propose rescission of specific types of appropriation and tax
provisions, including earmarks. The fact the Congress must act within a limited time
period to either approve or reject the proposal, and that certain procedural and
deliberative processes would be curtailed or eliminated, does not raise constitutional
questions. The so-called fast-track process is an exercise of the constitutionally-based
authority of each House to establish its own rules of internal procedure.
The expedited rescission process of these bills, however, does not stand alone.
Under the proposal, the President is given discretionary power to suspend covered

¹ See, e.g., CRS Report RL33635, Item Veto and Expanded Impoundment
Proposals:Legislative History and Current Status by Virginia A. McMurtry (McMurtry);
OMB, Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2006,
at 240-241; and OMB, Analytic Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government,
Fiscal Year 2005, at 218-219.
² Office of the White House Press Secretary at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news
/releases/2006/03/20060306-6.html ].

spending and tax provisions for up to 180 days, and perhaps more, even if Congress
rejects a proposed rescission within that period. This is unlike the current rescission
process under the Impoundment Control Act, which requires the obligation of funds
if Congress fails to approve the President’s rescission proposal within 45 days of
continuous session after submission of a rescission proposal, or the provision in the
rejected Line Veto Act of 1996 which required expenditure of canceled authorities
immediately upon the enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval.³ In addition,
while Congress must act speedily when it receives the President’s proposal,⁴ nothing
in the bills specifies when the President must send up his proposal; nor do the bills
appear to require that targeted spending and tax provisions in one law be sent up
together; and nothing in the bills limits the suspension period of the stated 180 daysor
prohibits the additional utilization of the 45-day wait period for proposed rescissions
under the current Impoundment Control Act, which is not to be repealed. An issue
before a reviewing court, then, might be whether the bills’ suspension power reaches
far enough to be considered an effective grant of authority to cancel provisions of law
that was proscribed by the Supreme Court in Clinton v. City of New York.⁵
The discussion will proceed as follows. After an examination of the nature and
scope of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Clinton v. City of New York, the bills will be
described and compared with the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, and the current process
for dealing with rescissions and deferrals under the Impoundment Control Act of
1974, as amended. The discussion continues with an assessment of the legal and
practical effect of the proposed suspension provision, and includes taking into
account past and present legislative, executive and judicial precedents and practices
with respect to impoundments, rescissions, deferrals and other efforts at budget and
spending controls. That examination suggests that, in light of the Clinton ruling and
analogous structural separation of powers decisions, a reviewing court might view
the proposed suspension authority to be vested in the President as, in effect, a power
to cancel appropriations akin to that proscribed in Clinton. The discussion concludes
with a review and assessment of subsequent modifications of the Administration’s
proposal in the House and Senate that indicates that constitutional issues may still
remain unresolved.
The Nature and Scope of the Supreme Court’s
Ruling in Clinton v. City of New York
The Line Veto Act of 1996
In 1996, Congress enacted the Line Item Veto Act⁶ which gave the President the
power to “cancel in whole” three types of provisions already enacted into law: 1) any

³ See 2 U.S.C. 683(b); 2 U.S.C. 691b(a).
⁴ The bills would require an up-or-down vote be taken by both Houses on or before the 10^th
day of session after the introduction of the President’s rescission proposal.
⁵ 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
⁶ P.L. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200, codified at 2 U.S.C. 691-692.

dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, 2) any item of new direct spending,
or 3) any limited tax benefit. The Veto Act imposed procedures for the President to
follow whenever he exercised this cancellation authority. The President had to
transmit a special message to the Congress detailing the provisions to be canceled,
together with factual determinations required by the law to be made and the reasons
for the cancellations, within five calendar days of the enactment of the law containing
such provisions.⁷ All covered provisions of a law sought to be canceled had to be
submitted together in that message.⁸ Cancellation of the specified provisions took
effect on receipt of the special message by both Houses.⁹ If a disapproval bill was
enacted, the cancellation was deemed to “be null and void” and the provisions
became effective as of the original date of the law.¹⁰ The President was prohibited
from attempting to re-cancel items that were the subject of a previous special
message for which Congress had enacted disapproval legislation.¹¹
The Veto Act also provided for expedited congressional consideration of bills
introduced to disapprove cancellations. Congress provided for itself a review period
of 30 calendar days of session beginning on the first calendar day of session after
receipt of the President’s special message. If Congress adjourned prior to the
expiration of the 30-day period, a pending disapproval bill could be brought up again
in the next Congress if filed within five calendar days after the commencement of the
new session.¹² A rescission bill had to be filed by the fifth day of the 30 calendar day
period and be reported to the House floor by the seventh day after introduction
without amendment. In the House, a motion to amend had to have the support of 50
Members. In the Senate, a new cancellation could be added if it was from the same
original law.¹³ Conference consideration procedures were detailed.¹⁴
During the existence of the Veto Act, the President sent 11 special messages
canceling a total of 82 provisions, including the two that were the subject of the
Clinton ruling. Congress passed one bill disapproving 38 cancellations, which
President Clinton vetoed. The veto was overridden and the disapprovals were enacted
into law.¹⁵

⁷ 2 U.S.C. 691a(c); 691e(6).
⁸ Id., sec. 691a(a): “For each law from which a cancellation has been made under this
subchapter the President shall transmit a single special message to the Congress.”
⁹ Id., sec. 691b(a).
¹⁰ Id.
¹¹ Id., sec. 691a(c).
¹² Id., sec. 691d(b).
¹³ Id., sec. 691d(d), (e).
¹⁴ Id., sec. 691d(f).
¹⁵ P.L. 105-159. See McMurtry, supra, note 1.

The Supreme Courts Invalidation of the Line Item Veto Act
In Clinton v. City of New York¹⁶ the Supreme Court dealt with two presidential
cancellations under the Veto Act, an item of direct spending in the Balanced Budget
Act of 1997 and a limited tax benefit in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. After
finding that the plaintiffs had suffered the requisite injury for Article III standing, the
Court addressed the merits of the case, holding, by a 6-3 vote, that allowing the
President to cancel provisions of enacted law violated the Constitution’s Presentment
Clause.¹⁷ “In both legal and practical effect, the President has amended two Acts of
Congress by repealing a portion of each. ‘[R]epeal of statutes, no less then
enactment, must conform with Art. I.’ INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983).”¹⁸
Such statutory repeals, the Court emphasized, must conform to the Presentment
Clause’s “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure” for
enacting a law, i.e., passage of a bill by both Houses, presentment of the measure for
the President’s signature or veto, and a veto override if necessary, again citing
Chadha.¹⁹ The Court then determined that the cancellation procedures of the Veto
Act did not so conform, because nothing in the Constitution authorized the President
to amend or repeal a statute, or parts of a statute, unilaterally, and because historical
writings and practice provided “powerful reasons for construing constitutional silence
on this profoundly important issue as equivalent to an express prohibition.”²⁰ The
Court’s majority opinion pointedly rejected the notion that Congress and the
President could agree by law to authorize “the President himself to effect the repeal
of laws, for his own policy reasons, without observing the procedures set out in
Article I, sec.7. The fact that Congress intended such a result is of no moment.
Although Congress presumably anticipated that the President might cancel some of
the items in the Balanced Budget Act and in the Taxpayer Relief Act, Congress
cannot alter the procedures set out in Article I, sec.7, without amending the
Constitution.”²¹
Implications of the Breadth of the Clinton Ruling
The broad, unequivocal nature of the majority opinion is underlined by Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion, responding to Justice Breyer’s suggestion in dissent
that the Court’s role in a case such as this “is lessened here because the two political
branches are adjusting their own powers between themselves.”²² Justice Kennedy’s
rebuttal emphasizes that this case raises important structural separation of powers

¹⁶ 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
¹⁷ U.S. Const., Art. I, sec.7, cl. 2.
¹⁸ 524 U.S. at 438 (emphasis supplied).
¹⁹ Id., at 439-40.
²⁰ Id.
²¹ Id., at 445-46. See also 524 U.S. at 449: “If there is to be a new procedure in which the
President will play a different role in determining the final text of what may ‘become a law’,
such a change must come not by legislation but through amendment procedures set forth in
Article V of the Constitution.”
²² Id., at 449.

concerns respecting the Framers’ fear that the “concentration of power in the hands
of a single branch is a threat to liberty.”²³ He stated:
To say the political branches have a somewhat free hand to reallocate their own
authority would seem to require acceptance of two premises: first, that the public
good demands it, and second, that liberty is not at risk. The former premise is
inadmissible. The Constitution’s structure requires a stability which transcends
the convenience of the moment. See Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority
v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 276-277 (1991);
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-

945, 958-959 (1983); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,

458 U.S. 50, 73-74 (1982). The latter premise, too, is flawed. Liberty is always
at stake when one or more of the branches seek to transgress the separation of²⁴
powers.
The Supreme Court has developed two lines of separation of powers
jurisprudence. The first reflects the Court’s concerns over “encroachment and
aggrandizement that has animated our separation-of-powers jurisprudence and
aroused our vigilance against the ‘hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the²⁵
separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power’.” In such structural cases,
the Court has articulated interpretations of constitutional directions that are rigid and
which may not be altered and are not subject to “balancing.” Justice Blackmun
speaking for the Court in Mistretta delineated the cases that have been subject to such
formalist analysis:
... Accordingly, we have not hesitated to strike down provisions of law that
either accrete to a single Branch powers more appropriately diffused among
separate Branches or that undermine the authority and independence of one or
another coordinate Branch. For example, just as the Framers recognized the
particular danger of the Legislative Branch’s accreting to itself judicial or
executive power, so too have we invalidated attempts by Congress to exercise the
responsibilities of other Branches or to reassign powers vested by the
Constitution in either the Judicial Branch or the Executive Branch. Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (Congress may not exercise removal power over
officer performing executive functions); INS v. Chadha, supra (Congress may
not control execution of laws except through Art. I procedures); Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)²⁶
(Congress may not confer Art. III power on Art. I judge).
To his list may be added the Court’s subsequent 1991 ruling in Metropolitan
Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc.
(Washington Airports).²⁷

²³ Id., at 450.
²⁴ Id., at 449-50.
²⁵ Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989).
²⁶ Id., at 382.
²⁷ 501 U.S. 252 (1991) (Congress may not maintain control of the decisionmaking of an
executive entity by means of a review entity whose members it has appointed).

In contrast, Justice Blackmun juxtaposed a second line of cases, in which
aggrandizement or encroachment were not apparent and what was involved was the
establishment by Congress of the arrangements within and between the agencies, the
President, Congress and the Judiciary, under its broad Article I authority to create
agencies and vest them with the necessary tools to carry out their assigned tasks. The
key question in disputes over agency arrangements is whether so much has been
taken from the functioning of one constitutional actor as to impair that actor’s core
constitutional functions. The Court sees its task in these cases as assuring that the
essential lines of authority from the constitutional actors remain intact by utilizing
a balancing test, a functionalist approach. As Justice Blackman explained in
Mistretta:
By the same token, we have upheld statutory provisions that to some degree
commingle the functions of the Branches, but that pose no danger of either
aggrandizement or encroachment. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)
(upholding judicial appointment of independent counsel); Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (upholding agency’s assumption
of jurisdiction over state-law counterclaims).
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, supra, upholding, against a
separation-of-powers challenge, legislation providing for the General Services
Administration to control Presidential papers after resignation, we described our
separation-of-powers inquiry as focusing “on the extent to which [a provision of
law] prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally
assigned function.” 433 U.S., at 443 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at
711-712). In cases specifically involving the Judicial Branch, we have expressed
our vigilance against two dangers: first, that the Judicial Branch neither be
assigned nor allowed “tasks that are more properly accomplished by [other]
branches,” Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S., at 680-681, and, second, that no
provision of law “impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of the
Judicial Branch.” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S., at²⁸

851.

Justice Kennedy viewed the Court’s Item Veto decision as falling within the
first, or formalist, line of cases just described, or as he characterizes them, the
“vertical” separation of powers line of authority.
Separation of powers helps to ensure the ability of each branch to be vigorous in
asserting its proper authority. In this respect the device operates on a horizontal
axis to secure a proper balance of legislative, executive and judicial authority.
Separation of powers operates on a vertical axis as well, between each branch
and the citizens in whose interest powers must be exercised. The citizen has vital
interest in the regularity of the exercise of governmental power. If this point was
not clear before Chadha, it should have been so afterwards. Though Chadha
involved the deportation of a person, while the case before us involves the
expenditure of money or the grant of a tax exemption, this circumstance does not
mean that the vertical operation of the separation of powers is irrelevant here. By
increasing the power of the President beyond what the Framers envisioned, the

²⁸ 448 U.S. at 382-83.

statute compromises the political liberty of our citizens, liberty which the²⁹
separation of powers seeks to secure.
Justice Kennedy succinctly encapsulated in his conclusion: “That a congressional
cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous. The Constitution is a
compact enduring for more than our time, and one Congress cannot yield up its own
powers, much less those of other Congresses to follow.... Abdication of³⁰
responsibility is not part of the constitutional design.”
A Constitutional Analysis of S. 2381 and H.R. 4890
As Introduced
Constitutional Issues That May Be Raised By the
Administration Proposals
The bills’ line item veto provision presents no apparent constitutional problem
with respect to the expedited rescission process it establishes. The President is not
vested with direct authority to cancel covered spending or tax benefit provisions. He
must send up to Congress proposals to rescind such provisions which must be acted
upon either by passage of a law approving the cancellations, or by a vote not to
approve the proposal. No constitutional issue appears raised by Congress imposing
on itself a requirement that it must take legislative actions within a limited period of
time or that certain procedural and deliberative processes are curtailed or eliminated.
The so-called fast-track process is an exercise of the constitutionally-based authority
of each House to establish its own rules of internal procedure, which has been
broadly construed by the courts.³¹
But, this proposal also vests the President with discretionary authority that may
raise a constitutional question under Clinton. The bills set no time- frame within
which the President must send up a rescission proposal after a law is enacted. When
he does send up a proposal he may suspend the covered provision(s) designated for
up to 180 calendar days. The suspension may be terminated at any earlier time if he
determines that continuation of the suspension “would not further serve the purposes
of this Act.” The bills do not require that targeted spending and tax provisions
contained in one law must be sent up at the same time. Further, nothing in the bills
expressly limits the suspension period to the stated 180 day deferral period nor is
there a prohibition against using the rescission authority of the Impoundment Control
Act³² in conjunction with the proposed Item Veto Act, either before or after a
message is sent to Congress triggering the process of the latter Act. Finally, the 180
day deferral of discretionary budget authority or direct spending would not

²⁹ Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. at 452.
³⁰ Id.
³¹ See Art. I, sec. 5, cl. 2; United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892).
³² 2 U.S.C. 683.

automatically end with early congressional rejection of a rescission proposal unless
the President so ordered the termination.
Critics have suggested that use of the 180-day deferral period “could effectively
kill various items by withholding funding until the end of the fiscal year on
September 30, even if Congress had acted swiftly to reject his proposed
cancellations.”³³ It has also been suggested that “the fast-track rescission process
could be paired with the old rescission process to grant the White House 45 extra
days of budget impoundment authority by seeking a second vote under the old
rescission process for cuts that had been initially rejected under the new proposal.”³⁴
A spokesperson for the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reportedly
has responded that such concerns are exaggerated: “The 180 days provision allows
items for the which the President will seek a rescission to be set aside while
rescission is considered by Congress. If Congress rejects a rescission request then the
President has the authority to terminate the deferral and let the funds be spent or the
tax benefits be provided. The Administration’s intention would be to do so
immediately.” The spokesperson explained that the 180-day deferral period was
designed for those periods when Congress takes long recesses “and as a way to prod
action. For example, for 2006, Congress has set an early October target date for
adjournment. While many observers believe that means a post-election session is
likely, it is possible the Congress could stay out of session until February, a period
of about five months.”³⁵
Considerations That May Be Taken Into Account By A
Reviewing Court
Departures From Past Norms of Protections of Legislative
Prerogatives.
It is likely that a reviewing court acting on a legal challenge to the Line Item
Veto Act, in attempting to assess whether the proposed suspension authority is
effectively a proscribed cancellation power, would look to past congressional actions
to discern the degree of departure from past norms of protections of legislative
prerogatives. For example, under the current Impoundment Control Act, the
rescission and deferral processes are tightly controlled. Rescissions may be proposed
by the President at any time. Congress has 45 days of continuous session to approve
a rescission bill, but it is not required to take any action during that period, i.e.,
neither House has to vote on the proposal. During the 45-day period budget authority
is suspended. When the 45 day period ends without a congressional rescission action,

³³ Jonathan Nicholson, “Six-Month Budget Impoundment Time With ‘Veto’ Seen Raising
Issues In Congress,” BNA Daily Report for Executives, March 24, 2006. See also, Hearing,
“The Constitution and the Line Item Veto,” before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on^th
the Constitution, 109 Cong., 2d Sec. (April 27, 2006) (testimony of Cristina M. Firvida).
³⁴ Id.
³⁵ Id.

the budget authority must be made available for obligation immediately and the
rescission procedure under the act cannot be used again for those funds.³⁶
The current Impoundment Control Act also has a provision that allows for
deferrals up to the end of the fiscal year in which a special message is transmitted to
Congress. Such deferrals are limited to “programmatic” deferrals and exclude
“policy” deferrals.³⁷ It has been very rarely used in recent times. But the 180-day
suspension period proposal now under consideration could significantly alter that
deferral limitation and even revive the practice of presidential policy deferrals. It
therefore may be instructive to briefly review the history of that provision and its
significance in Congress’ past efforts to control executive impoundments. The
original Impoundment Control Act of 1974 allowed deferrals of budget authority not
to extend beyond the end of the fiscal year in which the message reporting the
deferral was transmitted. The act also provided that a deferral could be terminated by
the passage of a resolution of disapproval by either House of Congress. The 1983
Chadha decision, declaring all one and two-House legislative vetoes
unconstitutional, effectively nullified the deferral legislative veto provision. The
question that remained was whether the invalid veto provision was severable from
the statute, leaving the President with an unfettered deferral power, or whether it was
inseverable, leaving no deferral power at all. At the time, the President acted on the
presumption he had unfettered deferral authority in the wake of Chadha.
The issue was resolved by the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in City of New Haven v.
United States,³⁸ which held that Congress would have preferred no statute to one
without the one-House veto provision because it was so essential in controlling
presidential deferrals:
Section 1013 was designed specifically to provide Congress with a means for
controlling presidential deferrals. As a consequence of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Chadha, however, that section has been transformed into a license to
impound funds for policy reasons. This result is completely contrary to the will
of Congress, which in amending the Anti-Deficiency Act sought to remove any

³⁶ 2 U.S.C, 683. In the past, OMB has been found to have expanded the 45-day period during
which funds are “frozen” by starting the deferral before the submission of the President’s
rescission message on the ground that there needs to be time to decide whether to ask for
rescission and then time for preparation of the message, arguing that it would be wasteful
to obligate funds for a program that might be canceled by Congress. All of this often took
30 or more days, extending the statutory 45 days suspension period. In one instance (in
1986), five and half months elapsed between the effective date of a particular appropriation
and the submission of the required report under the act. The Comptroller General issued
several opinions critical of the practice. See, e.g., 54 Comp. Gen. 453, 462 (1974) (GAO
will construe a deferral as a de facto rescission if the timing of the proposed deferral is such
that “funds could be expected with reasonable certainty to lapse before they could be
obligated, or would have to be obligated imprudently to avoid that consequence.”). See
CRS Archived Report 87-173, Presidential Impoundment Authority After City of New Haven
v. United States, by Richard Ehlke and Morton Rosenberg, (recounting the practice and
congressional and GAO reactions: available from authors).
³⁷ 2 U.S.C. 684.
³⁸ 809 F. 2d 900 (D.C.Cir. 1987).

colorable statutory basis for unchecked policy deferrals. We cannot imagine that
Congress would have acted in complete contravention of its intended purposes
by enacting section 1013 without a legislative veto provision. Accordingly, we
hold that the unconstitutional legislative veto provision contained in section 1013
is inseverable from the remainder of the section, and we affirm the judgement of³⁹
the District Court invalidating section 1013 in its entirety.
The Court emphasized the important substantive difference it saw between
policy and programmatic deferrals: “The critical distinction between ‘programmatic’
and ‘policy’ deferrals is that the former are ordinarily intended to advance
congressional budgetary policies by ensuring that congressional programs are
administered efficiently, while the latter are ordinarily intended to negate the will of
Congress by substituting the fiscal policies of the Executive Branch for those⁴⁰
established by enactment of budget legislation.” Throughout the opinion the
appeals court further noted its view of the limited scope of the Executive’s remaining
authority to implement “programmatic” impoundments by characterizing it as dealing
with “routine”,⁴¹ and “trivial” matters, ⁴² and referring to them as “these ‘trivial’
impoundments relating to the ‘normal and orderly operation of the government’ that
Congress expected to present little controversy.”⁴³ Nine months later Congress
codified the appeals court’s distinction between policy and programmatic deferrals
which now appears at 2 U.S.C. 684.⁴⁴ In that same legislation Congress prohibited
the then prevalent practice of Presidents of submitting a new rescission proposal
concerning identical or very similar matter when Congress failed to act on a
rescission proposal within the allotted 45 days. By using such submissions, the
President sought to continue to tie up funds even though Congress, by its inaction,
had already rejected the same proposal. The enacted prohibition against such
seriatim rescission proposals applies for the duration of the appropriation, so it may⁴⁵
remain in effect for two or more fiscal years.
Even under the 1996 Veto Act that was declared unconstitutional, Congress
included a number of provisions to constrain presidential authority. For example, the

³⁹ Id.., at 909 (emphasis in original).
⁴⁰ Id., at 901 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
⁴¹ Id., at 906 note 18.
⁴² Id., at 908.
⁴³ See CRS Archived Report 87-173, Presidential Impoundment Authority After City of New
Haven v. United States, by Richard Ehlke and Morton Rosenberg, discussing the statutory
and legal development of the policy/programmatic dichotomy: available from authors.
⁴⁴ P.L. 100-119, sec. 206(a), 101 Stat. 785. Section 684(b) provides that “Deferrals shall be
permissible only — (1) to provide for contingencies; (2) to achieve savings made possible
by or through changes in requirements or greater efficiency of operation; or (3) as
specifically provided by law. No officer or employee of the United States may defer any
budget authority for any other purpose.” These requirements are repeated in the Anti-
Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. 1512(c).
⁴⁵ P.L. 100-119, sec. 207, 101 Stat. 786.

President had to bundle all canceled items in a single message to the Congress;⁴⁶ the
President’s special message had to be transmitted within five calendar days after
enactment of the law to which the cancellation applied;⁴⁷ cancellation took effect on
receipt by both Houses but if a disapproval was enacted, the cancellation was deemed
never to have occurred and the funds had to be utilized;⁴⁸ congressional review was
for 30 calendar days of session after receipt of the message, but if Congress
adjourned prior to the expiration of the 30-day period, it could be brought up again
in the next Congress if it was filed within five days of the commencement of the new
session;⁴⁹ and a rescission bill had to be filed by the fifth day of the 30 calendar day
period, reported to the floor by the seventh day after introduction without
amendment, could be amended in the House if supported by 50 Members, and new
cancellation items could be added in the Senate if the items were from the same
law.⁵⁰
Applying the Implications of Clinton: The Relevance of the
Metropolitan Airports Litigation.
The foregoing review of the President’s proposal for a revived item veto, the
provisions of the current Impoundment Control Act and the judicially nullified Item
Veto Act of 1996, and past executive challenges to legislative spending controls and
congressional responses, provide background to the analysis of how a court might
view the current item veto proposal. The issue is whether the proposed Legislative
Line Item Veto Act in its present form would have the potential of allowing the
President, through the utilization of the 180 day rescission authority, together with
piecemeal submissions of rescission requests, to effectively cancel spending items.
The question that remains is whether the Clinton ruling (and prior separation of
powers cases) would be applied to reach such potential constitutional consequences.
The Clinton case is properly categorized as one of a line of structural separation
of powers decisions, that has included Chadha and Bowsher, in which the Supreme
Court has invalidated provisions that either “accrete to a single branch powers more
appropriately diffused among separate Branches or that undermine the authority and
independence of one or another coordinate Branch.”⁵¹ The salient characteristic of
those rulings is that they admit of no exception and allow no balancing of interests
of need, necessity, or convenience. They expressly reject the validity of an agreement
on such reassignments by the political branches that is embodied in a law. In at least
one instance a federal appeals court has enforced such a structural ruling, finding that
Congress had attempted to evade a High Court’s ruling by indirection. Those cases
are illuminating on the subject issue.

⁴⁶ 2 U.S.C. 691a(a).
⁴⁷ Id., sec. 691a(c).
⁴⁸ Id., sec. 691b(a).
⁴⁹ Id., sec. 691d(b).
⁵⁰ Id., sec. 691d(d), (e).
⁵¹ Mistretta, 448 U.S. at 382.

In Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement
of Aircraft Noise (Metropolitan Airports Case),⁵² the Supreme Court confronted an
attempt by Congress to vest managing authority over Washington National and
Dulles International Airports in a regional authority while at the same time seeking
to maintain control over key policy and management decisions of the Airports
Authority’s Board of Directors (Directors). It did this by requiring the Directors to
establish a Board of Review (Board) consisting of nine Members of Congress to
which the Directors had to submit for the Board’s consideration and possible veto
operative decisions such as the adoption of the annual budget, the authorization for
the issuance of bonds, and the adoption, amendment or repeal of regulations.
Congress also retained substantial authority over the appointment and removal of the
members of the Board. The Court found that as a result of those provisions the
Board was an agent of the Congress and that the scheme of congressional control
violated separation of powers principles. “If the power is executive, the Constitution
does not permit an agent of Congress to exercise it. If the power is legislative,
Congress must exercise it in conformity with the bicameralism and presentment
requirements of Art. I, sec. 7. In short, when Congress [takes] action that ha[s] the
purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons...
outside the Legislative Branch, it must take that action by the procedures authorized
in the Constitution. See Chadha, 462 U.S., at 952-955.”⁵³ The Court rejected the
argument that the Board was a “kind of practical accommodation between the
Legislative and the Executive ... that might prove innocuous,” stating that “the
statutory scheme challenged today provides the blueprint for extensive expansion of
the legislative power beyond its constitutionally confined role” and could not be
countenanced. It then quoted Madison’s warning that “‘the legislature can with
greater facility mask under complicated and indirect measures the encroachments
which it makes on the co-ordinate departments’.”⁵⁴
Within six months after the Supreme Court’s ruling, Congress passed new
legislation. The new statute did not require that Members of Congress be members
of the new Review Board but their selection had to be from lists submitted by the
Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore at the Senate. The Board’s veto
power was taken away but its power was expanded in other ways. The catalogue of
actions the Board could review was expanded, and members of the Board could
participate, but not vote, at meetings of the Directors. Also, though its veto power
was removed, the Board had authority to make recommendations regarding actions
submitted for its review by the Directors. If those recommendations were not
accepted by the Directors, the Directors had to submit the matter to Congress for a
reviewing period of 60 legislative days, during which time the Directors could take
no action on the matter. If Congress did not pass a joint resolution of disapproval
within that period, the Directors’ proposed action could take effect.
On review, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
“the provisions of the revised Act, taken together, indicate that the Board of Review

⁵² 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
⁵³ Id., at 276.
⁵⁴ Id., at 276-77.

remains a congressional agent and that it exercises power in violation of the
separation of powers.”⁵⁵
At the outset of its opinion the appeals court announced that it would look
beyond the “explicit terms” of the revised statute to ascertain its “practical effect and
design.”⁵⁶ Thus, with respect to whether the change in the nature of the appointment
process for Review Board members made a difference, the court held that “because
the Directors may never go outside the lists furnished by the Speaker and the
President pro tempore, we conclude that Congress retains control over the
appointments. This control, together with the provisions that in practice ensure that
the Board will be dominated by Members of Congress, persuades us that Congress
intended the Board to serve, and we hold that it does serve, as its agent.”⁵⁷
Turning to the separation of powers issue, the court declared it would look to
the “practical consequences” of the Board’s ability to delay actions by the Directors.⁵⁸
It rejected the claim that when the Board had been stripped of its direct veto and now
could only recommend, it had only advisory duties, noting that “the Board’s loss of
its veto power does not necessarily mean that it has lost effective control over the
Authority that the Supreme Court found to be an unconstitutional exercise of federal
power... We must therefore examine the potential impact of the Board’s remaining
authority on the Directors’ decisionmaking. To this end, we examine the various
ways in which the Board is able to affect the substance of the Authority’s actions.”⁵⁹
The court focused on the powers of the Review Board to influence, through its ability
to delay action by the Directors:
[T]he Board of Review has been vested with a range of powers whose
cumulative effect is to enable it to interfere impermissibly with the Directors’
performance of their independent responsibilities. In the place of the veto
provision, the amended Transfer Act empowers the Board to choose, in its sole
discretion, which of the Authority’s decisions may be implemented immediately
and which will be subjected to the risks and delays of congressional review. In
the place of mandatory congressional membership on the Board it sets forth
requirements that both in principle and in practice continue to ensure
congressional domination of the Board. In redefining the powers of the board,
it actually expands the scope of its review. Moreover, the amended statute
retains provisions permitting the Board to compel the Authority to consider
particular issues and conditioning the Authority’s ability to take vital actions on
the Board’s own continuing ability to exercise its powers under the act.
What tips the balance, in our judgement, is the Board’s power to delay and
perhaps overturn critical decisions by requiring their referral to Congress. The
delays it can impose are hardly trivial. The 60-legislative-day congressional

⁵⁵ Hechinger v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (Hechinger) 36 F. 3d 97, 105
(D.C.Cir.1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1126 (1995).
⁵⁶ Id., at 101.
⁵⁷ Id.
⁵⁸ Id.
⁵⁹ Id., at 102.

review period will extend for at least three months and, depending on the
congressional cycle, can last as long as six. ... The mere existence of this power
to delay provides the Directors with an enormous incentive to avoid
confrontations by tailoring their decisions to suit the Board’s pleasure; it also
gives the Board the power to hold an important decision hostage in order to⁶⁰
secure the Director’s agreement to an unrelated matter.
Quoting the Supreme Court’s words in Metropolitan Airports that the original
statutory scheme was a “blueprint for extensive expansion of the legislative power
beyond its constitutionally-confirmed role,” the appeals court stated the “we do not
suggest that the Board has or would abuse its authority in such a manner. But the⁶¹
potential for abuse is there.”
Observations
The Metropolitan Airports and Hechinger decisions seem to confirm the
teachings of Clinton and its structural separation of powers predecessors that the
courts will take a rigid approach when aggrandizement or encroachment of core
constitutional prerogatives are involved. The Airports cases are particularly pertinent
to the proposed item veto revival. The Clinton Court spoke to the constitutional
delicacy of attempting to reassign the power of cancellation to the President, just as
the Metropolitan Airports Court rejected Congress’ original scheme to retain control
of the Washington airports. Congress’ attempt to address the Court’s concerns in
Metropolitan Washington by enacting a structural variant was struck down in
Hechinger on the basis of a facial review of what might be the “potential’ of the
revised scheme to achieve the result found to be illegitimate in the earlier case.
Challengers to the Administration’s proposed Legislative Item Veto Act of 2006, or
a variant thereof, might point to this series of cases as raising questions about the
expanded suspension provisions and their “potential” to undermine the holding in
Clinton v. City of New York. It is also useful in assessing modifications to the
Administration’s proposal that have emerged in the House and Senate subsequent to
its introduction.
A Constitutional Assessment of House and Senate
Modifications of the Administration’s Proposal
House and Senate Actions.
Hearings on H.R. 4890 were held by the House Rules Subcommittee on the
Legislative and Budget Process on March 15, 2006; the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on the Constitution on April 27, 2006; and the House Budget
Committee on May 25 (perspectives on applications and effects) and June 8, 2006
(constitutional issues).⁶² On June 14, 2006, the House Budget Committee voted 24-

⁶⁰ Id., at 104-05.
⁶¹ Id., at 105.
⁶² McMurtry, supra note 1, at 19-20

9 to report H.R. 4890, as amended, favorably.⁶³ The following day the House Rules
Committee voted 8 -4 to report an amended version of the bill in essentially the same
form as that approved by the House Budget Committee.⁶⁴ On June 22, 2006, the
House approved H.R. 4890, as amended, by a vote of 247- 172,⁶⁵ and received in the
Senate.
On May 2, 2006, the Senate Budget Committee held hearings on S. 2381. “As
a result of the hearing and concerns that were voiced at that time,”⁶⁶ S. 2381 was
substantially revised by the Committee and was included as Title I of a
comprehensive budget reform bill introduced as S. 3521, the Stop Over Spending Act
of 2006 (SOS Act). The Committee voted 12- 10 to report its bill, and the report was
filed on July 10, 2006. No Senate floor action has taken place on either S. 3521 or
H.R. 4890.
H.R. 4890, As Amended.
Under the amended version of H.R. 4890, the President must send up special
messages proposing cancellations within 45 calendar days of the enactment of the
law containing targetable items.⁶⁷ At that time he may defer obligating discretionary
budget authority or suspend implementation of items of direct spending or targeted
tax benefits for 45 calendar days. Such deferrals and suspensions maybe extended
for an additional 45 days upon proper notification to the Congress.⁶⁸ The period may
also be extended if a sine die adjournment occurs before the end of the 45 day
calendar period.⁶⁹ Finally, it would appear that the practice established under the
current Impoundment Control Act, which allows deferral of discretionary funding
obligations for the period prior to the 45 day period of congressional consideration
of a presidential rescission proposal,⁷⁰ would be statutorily recognized. Under
revised H.R. 4890, current Parts B (dealing with proposed rescissions and deferrals)
and C (the 1996 Line Item Veto Act) are repealed and replaced by a new Part B.
Two provisions of old Part B, however, are retained: Section 1016 authorizing suits
by the Comptroller General to compel compliance with the Act would be retained in
its entirety as new Section 1019; and Section 1013, which limits presidential
deferrals of discretionary budget authority for a period not to extend beyond the end
of a fiscal year and only for programmatic purposes, is to be modified. Section
1013(c) currently provides an exception for “any budget authority proposed to be
rescinded or that is to be reserved as set forth in a special message to be transmitted

⁶³ H. Report 109- 505, Part I.
⁶⁴ H.Rept. 109- 505, Part 2 (House Rules Committee Report).
⁶⁵ 150 Cong. Rec. H 4433- 41, H 4467- 93 (daily ed. June 22, 2006).
⁶⁶ S.Rept. 109-283 on the Stop Over Spending Act of 2006, 109^th Cong. 2d Sess., 9 (2006)
(SOS Act Report).
⁶⁷ Proposed Section 1011(a).
⁶⁸ Proposed Section 1013(a)-(d).
⁶⁹ Proposed Section 1011(a).
⁷⁰ See discussion of the practice supra at 8-9 and note 36.

under Section1012 [ 2 U.S.C. 683] of this title.” New section 1020(c) would be
amended to read: “The provisions of this section do not apply to budget authority
proposed to be canceled as set forth in a special message required to be transmitted
under section 1011.” Thus, in the absence of any express prohibition on deferral
before submission of a presidential message, it is possible that deferral of obligations
under the amended bill could be at least 135 days.
Moreover, amended H.R. 4890 does not contain an express statutory direction
that the obligation of funding is to resume upon congressional action rejecting the
cancellation proposal as is the case under current law.⁷¹ Rather, the House Report
accompanying the bill states that “Once Congress acts on an approval bill, this
deferral authority must be discontinued by the President, even though it is not legally
or constitutionally required and must not extend it for the renewal period.”⁷² Nor
is there any express statutory relation between the deferral and suspension periods
and the 15 session day expedited congressional consideration period.⁷³ The
accompanying House Rules Committee Report explains that
“[o]ut of constitutional concerns, the Committee has not directly tied the
suspension or deferral period to a failed vote or on approval. It does, though,
indicate its intent that such vote should have that effect. The President must
immediately suspend the deferral of all budgetary provisions included in an
approval bill of proposed cancellation that, after floor consideration of the bill,⁷⁴
has not received the requisite votes to pass in a House of Congress.”
The House Report does not explain the nature of its “constitutional concerns”
but it appears to reflect objections voiced at hearings on the President’s proposals and
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that it would be constitutionally
questionable under the Supreme Court’s ruling in INS v. Chadha⁷⁵ for Congress to
give the President deferral or suspension power and then withdraw it based on
Congress’s non-legislative action in failing to approve a rescission proposal. It is
suggested that to accomplish that result Congress must either pass a new law
directing such action, or that such decisions might be left to the discretion of the
President to determine if and when to release funds or to implement direct spending
or limited tax benefits. This idea reflects an apparent misunderstanding of the
constitutional authority of each House to establish its own rules of proceedings and
the nature, scope and rationale of the Chadha ruling.

⁷¹ See 2 U.S.C. 683(b).
⁷² House Rules Committee Report at 19 (emphasis supplied).
⁷³ The House Rules Committee Report concedes that while the deferral and suspension
authority of the President “is independent of legislative actions taken by Congress, it is the
intent of the Committee that if a vote is taken on an approval bill by either House, and an
approval bill is not agreed to by that House, then the suspension of any provision of law
must be revoked and that provision put into effect as if it had always been effective under
the terms of the public law in which it was originally included.” House Rules Committee
Report at 20.
⁷⁴ House Rules Committee Report at 20.
⁷⁵ 462 U.S. 919 (1983).

Article I, section 5, clause 2 of the Constitution authorizes “each House [to]
determine the rules of its proceedings . . . .” This power has been construed broadly
by the courts. The Supreme Court has held that where neither express constitutional
restraints nor fundamental rights are ignored, “all matters of method are open to the
determination of the house. . . The power to make rules is not one which once
exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by
the house, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge
of any other body or tribunal.”⁷⁶
The Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in INS v. Chadha is not to the contrary,
and, indeed, appears supportive of the type of action objected to by OMB. The
constitutional defect of the legislative veto disclosed by the Chadha Court was that
Congress sought to exercise its legislative power without complying with the
constitutionally mandated requirements for lawmaking: bicameral passage and
presentation to the President for his signature or veto. There, and in two subsequent
cases,⁷⁷ the Court found unlawful legislative actions which sought to accomplish the
reversal of exercises of executive actions taken pursuant to lawfully delegated
authority without presentation to the President. But the Court also noted several
provisions of the Constitution allowing legislative actions which do not have to
comply with the Presentation Clause,⁷⁸ and in addition identified “another
‘exception’ to the rule that Congressional action having the force of law be subject
to the bicameral requirement and the Presentment Clause. Each House has the power
to act alone in determining specified internal matters. Art 1, sec. 7, cls. 2, 3 and sec.
5, cl. 2.” ⁷⁹ The noted section 5, of course, provides in pertinent part that “[e]ach
House may determine the rules of its proceedings. . . .” The Court therefore
recognized that the exercise of the rulemaking power may have an incidental impact
outside the legislative branch. However, as long as its predominant focus is internal,
it is a constitutional exercise of that authority.
Moreover, the Chadha Court carefully noted that it was not casting doubt on so-
called “report and wait” provisions which it previously approved in Sibbach v.

⁷⁶ United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892). See also, Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S.
224 (1993)(challenge to Senate impeachment rule allowing appointment of a committee of
Senators to receive evidence and take testimony and report to the body held to be
nonjusticiable since there was a demonstrable textual commitment of the issue to the Senate
and no judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolution the issue).
⁷⁷ Process Gas Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983)(one-House veto
of rules invalid); United States v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983)(two-House veto of rules
invalid).
⁷⁸ The initiation of impeachments by the House alone; Senate conduct of impeachment trials;
Senate disapproval of nominations; and Senate ratification of treaties. 462 U.S. at 955. The
Court also noted a Court-made exception in Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378 (1798)
allowing congressional proposals of constitutional amendments without presidential
approval.
⁷⁹ Chadha, 462 U.S. at 955 note 21.

Wilson.⁸⁰ Under such provisions a proposed executive action does not become
effective unless a specified contingency occurs, i.e., a set period of time passes
without congressional action preventing it from going into effect or Congress takes
affirmative legislative action approving or disapproving its effectiveness.
All the expedited consideration provisions in pending line item veto proposals
are variant examples of the legislative employment of this method of contingent
legislation. None of the President’s rescission recommendations become effective
unless approved by a bill that must be first considered by the House of
Representatives and the Senate within a specified number of legislative days of its
introduction in each House. If it passes one House it goes to the other House for a
vote. But if both Houses do not pass the rescission bill within the statutorily
prescribed consideration period, the exercise ends and the suspension or obligation
is lifted. It is arguable that a proper view of this mechanism is that it is a contingency
scheme in which the President has not been delegated any legislative authority at all.
Rather, he simply has been authorized to recommend rescissions and the proposal
submitted has no legal effect unless and until Congress gives it such effect through
further legislation. In the exercise of its constitutional rulemaking power it has
established, as a matter of internal procedure, that if passage by both Houses fails
within the prescribed period, the process is over. Language in a bill authorizing the
President “ to suspend” or “to defer” certain budget items can be read as incidental
to the internal expedited consideration process. Deferral of obligation authority is
incidental, albeit necessary, to this process since any agency use of obligation
authority during the consideration process is subject to nullification and thus may
raise the potential of unnecessary disruption of the obligation process.
Indeed, as the example of the current rescission process under the Impoundment
Control Act demonstrates, even the statutory silence there with respect to deferral of
obligation authority during the 45 day wait period under Section 683 has been
consistently construed by both OMB and the Government Accountability Office to
implicitly allow the Executive to defer spending during that period and, indeed, for
a period of 30 or more days prior to the President’s transmission of his rescission
message to Congress.⁸¹ The implication of an allowable deferral is a result of the
language of Section 683 (b) which requires obligation of budget authority “reserved”
by the President’s message at the end of the 45 day period. That inference is further
supported by 2 U.S.C. 684 (b) which permits “programmatic” (as opposed to
“policy”) deferrals “to provide for contingencies.”
We are aware of no instance in the past in which the Executive has raised a
Chadha objection to the Section 683 direction to obligate. As an exercise of caution,
however, Congress might consider either eliminating any “suspension” or “deferral”
language in a line item veto bill and leave only the direction for obligation after the
Congress defeats the rescission request, or separately stating that the President may
“defer” obligating or putting into effect targeted items only until Congress fails to
approve the President’s proposal under the Act’s expedited procedures. Arguably,
either method would accomplish the result without raising a constitutional question.

⁸⁰ 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
⁸¹ See discussion supra at 8-9.

Finally, the suggestion that a separate bill would be required to end a deferral
or suspension appears to find no supportable basis in the Chadha ruling or its
rationale. Indeed, such a requirement could arguably by seen as running afoul of the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Clinton v. New York City, the Item Veto Case, in that in
giving the President a “second bite at the apple,” the period of deferral could be
indefinitely extended while Congress debates reaffirming by law, through normal
legislative processes, and subject to presidential veto, that which it had already
determined not to do.⁸² The alternative suggestion, that the lifting of a deferral or
suspension be discretionary in the President similarly raises Clinton issues in that it
would vest in President the power to determine whether a provision of law would
become operative or not, an effective line item veto.⁸³
Constitutional concerns with respect other aspects of H.R. 4890, as amended,
raise more difficult questions. The potential period of deferral or suspension of
targetable items is at least 135 calendar days and it is conceded in the House Rules
Committee report that there is no relation between the deferral or suspension periods
and the period of expedited congressional consideration, which appears to be 15
legislative days. Moreover, the House Rules Committee report acknowledges that
there is no express requirement in the legislation that funds be obligated immediately
upon the defeat of a cancellation proposal, but states that it is its expectation that
“[t]he President must immediately suspend the deferral of all budgetary provisions
included in an approval bill of proposed cancellations that, after floor consideration
of the bill, has not received the requisite vote to pass in a House of Congress.”⁸⁴
Thus a presidential deferral or suspension could potentially extend well beyond the
date of a definitive congressional rejection of a cancellation proposal. The possible
consequence of such delays, as pointed out by the dissent to the House Rules
Committee Report, is that “If the President can withhold funds regardless of
Congressional action for up to three months,⁸⁵ then he can effectively starve
programs to death, denying them the funds needed to hire and pay staff as well as
conduct routine business. A major appropriation such as Amtrak, could be forced to
slash routes and fire staff (a long standing Administration goal) as long as the
President retains this effective power of the purse. It is also not clearly stated in the
legislation that the President must release funds immediately if a rescission is
defeated.”⁸⁶
We are aware that the plain meaning rule, which purports to bar courts from
relying on legislative history when statutory language is plain, is often more honored

⁸² See discussion supra at 7-11.
⁸³ See discussion supra at 3-5, 11-12.
⁸⁴ House Rules Committee Report at 20.
⁸⁵ The dissent did not take into account that the President appears not to be precluded from
ordering deferrals during the 45 day period after date of enactment of the funding legislation
when he is considering whether to send up a cancellation proposal.
⁸⁶ House Rules Committee Report at 58.

in the reach than the observance,⁸⁷ and arguably could be waived by a reviewing
court. But it is not likely that the Committee’s statement of intent would be held
persuasive. The Committee admits that it purposely omitted an express direction to
the President because it believed it did not have the constitutional or legal authority
to do so. The report language is effectively a hortatory request that the President do
“the right thing.” It is unlikely that a reviewing court would fill the statutory void
and find an enforceable right against presidential inaction. Rather, it is more likely
that a court will apply the principles enunciated by the Clinton ruling and find the
scheme proposed by H.R. 4890, as amended, is no more than a structural variant of
the unsuccessful attempt to reassign the power of cancellation to the President in that
case. The “potential” of the scheme proposed by H.R. 4890, as revised, to achieve
the result found illegitimate in Clinton may appear to a reviewing court, in substance
and effect, no different from the Administration’s original proposal discussed above.
Title of the SOS Act.
The Senate Budget Committee identified six concerns with S. 2381, the
Administration proposal: the short period given for congressional consideration of
presidential rescission proposals; the authority of the President to withhold funds
from obligation for up to 180 days even if Congress had defeated a rescission
proposal; the ability of the President to re-propose rescissions an unlimited number
of times (and to defer funds 180 days each time); the ability of the President to send
up an unlimited number of rescission proposals; allowing the President to modify
new direct spending programs; and the lack of a sunset provision for the legislation.⁸⁸
Those concerns are addressed in Title I of S. 3521, a comprehensive budget reform
proposal.
Under Title I, which displaces Part C of the Impoundment Control, containing
the 1996 Line Item Veto Act, the President is permitted to send up no more than four
special messages per calendar year proposing to rescind discretionary budget
authority, items of direct spending, and targeted tax benefits. Such messages
containing targeted items must be sent within one calendar year of the date of
enactment of the law in which they appear. There can be no resubmittals of items
that have been rejected by the failure of Congress to pass approval legislation, except
if Congress adjourns sine die before completing action on a message. In that event,
the President may resubmit one or more of the targeted items either under New Part
C or under Part B, which is retained. A resubmission counts as one of the four
allowable messages within one calender year. The President may not defer obligation
of dollar amounts of discretionary budget authority, or suspend the execution of any
item of direct spending or targeted tax benefit until he sends up a cancellation
message. Such deferrals or suspensions can only be for 45 calendar days and may be
lifted before the end of the period at the President’s discretion. With regard to
deferrals of discretionary budget authority, withholding may “not exceed 45 calendar
days from the date of receipt by Congress.” Special rules apply to suspensions of
direct spending and targeted tax benefits. If the President’s message is sent up on

⁸⁷ See “Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends,” CRS Report 97-

589, 39-41, March 30, 2006, by George Costello.

⁸⁸ S.O.S. Act Report at 15- 16.

or before the effective date of the provision, the suspension may be for the full 45
days. But if the President submits his message after the effective date of the targeted
provision, the allowable suspension period decreases day by day for each day beyond
the effective date of the provision. Expedited consideration procedures are provided
in both Houses and an up or down vote must be taken on or before the 10^th day of
session after the introduction of the bill in each House.
The Line Item Veto scheme of Title I of the SOS Act appears to avoid most of
the potential constitutional difficulties that have been identified in the
Administration’s proposal and with H.R. 4890, as amended. Although the President
has a calendar year to send up a cancellation message, there are incentives to act
more quickly. There can be no deferrals or suspensions of targeted provisions until
the message is sent and received by Congress. Deferrals are limited to 45 calendar
days and the language of the deferral provision, together with the Senate
Committee’s report explanation, appears to make it certain that obligation must occur^th
after the 45 day even if Congress has not taken final disapproval action.
The proposal, however does not require obligation should disapproval occur
before the end of the 45 day period. In other words, the periods of withholding and
congressional consideration do not coincide. By itself this disparity arguably may not
be constitutionally fatal. A question could arise, however, from the failure to repeal
Part B of the Impoundment Control Act. Under Part B, a proposal for rescission of
discretionary funding may be submitted by the President at any time and, as we have
described above, deferrals of obligational authority may occur not only for the 45 day
consideration period but also for 30 or more days before the President’s rescission
message is sent to Congress. The procedure established by Part C is not exclusive
or preemptive of Part B: Proposed Section 1021 states that “The President may send
a special message, at that time and in the manner provided in subsection (b), that
proposes to rescind dollar amounts of discretionary budget authority, items of direct
spending, and targeted tax benefits.” (emphasis supplied). The referenced subsection
(b) makes it clear that the rescission provision of 2 U.S.C. 683 is a viable option. It
can be utilized as an alternative if the consideration period is cut short by a sine die
adjournment; but it can not be used if there is a rejection of an approval bill. Nothing
in the SOS bill limits using Section 683 before presidential use of proposed Section
1021. Such a use of Section 683, which could more than double the length of the
possible deferral period, to perhaps more than 100 days, may raise the same Clinton
issues of potential illegitimate manipulation that appear in the Administration’s
proposal and in H.R. 4890, as amended. This problem does not appear to affect the
suspensions of direct spending and targeted tax benefits since the Part B mechanism
cannot be utilized to rescind such provisions and the automatic reduction of the 45
day suspension periods for delaying submissions to Congress seems to insulate them
from constitutional question. The foregoing problem could be avoided by repealing
Part B or by limiting the President to utilization of either Part B or Part C for any
particular targeted item.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Clinton v. New York City presents a formidable
but not insurmountable legal obstacles to vesting the President with a form of line
item veto authority.⁸⁹ While the Court’s opinion does not appear to limit providing
the President with some form of line item veto influence by any means other than
constitutional amendment, its rationale seems to require that the statutory vesting of
such effective influence must be carefully circumscribed to prevent even the potential
vesting in the Executive a cancellation power. Structural separation of powers
jurisprudence indicates that the courts will exercise heightened scrutiny of line item
veto schemes. As a matter of caution and prudence a scheme that provides authority
for the President to submit proposals for cancellation of targetable items within a
very short time after enactment of the law that contains them and that provides for
automatic deferrals or suspensions that coincide and end with the conclusion of the
period of expedited congressional consideration, is most likely to pass constitutional
muster. The validity of vestment in the Executive of any further indicia of authority
or control is uncertain.

⁸⁹ One prominent scholar argues that the Clinton ruling should be viewed as a nondelegation
decision: “My view of Clinton v City of New York is that it is in reality a nondelegation
doctrine case masquerading as a bicameralismand presentment case. I think it is the hidden
separation of powers blockbuster of the Rehnquist years, as important to separations of
power case law as Lopez is to the Court’s federalism case law. In saying this, I must
immediately acknowledge that the Court denied in Clinton v. City of New York that it was
deciding that case on a nondelegation rationale. The Court’s mere denial however cannot
avoid the fact that Clinton really was a nondelegation decision. Saying that it wasn’t is not
enough to make that so.” Steven G. Calabresi, “Separation of Powers and the Rehnquist
Court: The Contrability of Clinton v City of New York,” 99 Northwestern U.L. Rev. 77
(2006).