Sunset and Program Review Commission Bills in the 109th Congress: Comparing H.R. 3282 and H.R. 5766

CRS Report for Congress
Sunset and Program Review Commission
th
Bills in the 109 Congress: Comparing
H.R. 3282 and H.R. 5766
July 25, 2006
Virginia A. McMurtry
Specialist in American National Government
Government and Finance Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Sunset and Program Review Commission Bills in the
109^th Congress: Comparing H.R. 3282 and H.R. 5766
Summary
The sunset concept provides for programs and agencies to terminate
automatically on a predetermined schedule, following a systematic evaluation of past
performance, unless explicitly renewed by law. In each Congress since the 105^th,
bills to create a federal sunset commission modeled on the sunset commission in
Texas have been introduced by Representative Kevin Brady, including H.R. 3282 in
the 109^th Congress. President Bush supports creation of a federal sunset commission.
In May 2006 the House leadership announced plans to bring sunset legislation
quickly to the House floor, along with other budget process reforms favored by the
Republican Study Committee, in return for the group’s backing of the FY2007
budget resolution. In the effort to craft a consensus bill, attention came to focus on
H.R. 3282, and on H.R. 2470, sponsored by Representative Todd Tiahrt, which
would create a “Commission on the Accountability and Review of Federal Agencies
(CARFA),” modeled on the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC)
approach.
On July 14, 2006, Representative Tiahrt introduced a revised version of H.R.
2470 as H.R. 5766, the Government Efficiency Act, to provide for the establishment
of Federal Review Commissions (FRCs) which would apparently address concerns
similar to those envisaged for the sunset commission in H.R. 3282. Although H.R.
5766 is often referred to as a sunset bill, this is technically inaccurate, since it
contains no action-forcing mechanism. Under H.R. 3282, an agency would be
abolished within one year of the Commission’s review, unless the agency received
statutory extension. If Congress passed a reauthorization bill, the measure would
then go to the President to be signed into law. If the President instead vetoed the bill,
a two-thirds majority in both chambers would be necessary to override the veto and
extend the life of the program or agency.
On July 20, 2006, the Committee on Government Reform voted to report H.R.
3282 favorably, and at the same time, voted to report favorably H.R. 5766, as
amended. The votes to order the bills reported were largely along party lines.
Supporters of the bills contend that there are too many overlapping and ineffective
federal programs that contribute to the growing federal deficit and that the
commission would assist Congress in performing its oversight function, thereby
reducing fraud, waste, and abuse. Critics of the measures counter that the bills would
cede too much power to the executive branch, would burden Congress with a
tremendous workload with mandatory reauthorization of every agency and program,
and would facilitate elimination of federal programs that provide a safety net for the
most vulnerable in society.
This report examines the two bills and compares selected features, such as
membership, powers of the commission, criteria for program review, public
participation, and provisions for implementing commission recommendations. This
report will be updated as events warrant.

Contents
Background ......................................................1
Summary of H.R. 3282.............................................2
Summary of H.R. 5766, as Amended ..................................4
Expedited Congressional Procedures...................................5
Comparison of Selected Features in H.R. 3282 and H.R. 5766...............7
List of Tables
Table 1. Selected Features in H.R. 3282 and H.R. 5766...................9

Sunset and Program Review Commission
th
Bills in the 109 Congress: Comparing
H.R. 3282 and H.R. 5766
Background
The sunset concept provides for programs and agencies to terminate
automatically according to a predetermined schedule unless explicitly renewed by
law. As developed in the 1970s by the organization Common Cause, a sunset law
contains two requisite components: an “action-forcing” mechanism and a framework
for the systematic review and evaluation of past performance. Under sunset, agencies
“fade into the sunset,” unless, following oversight review, the legislature acts
affirmatively to continue their existence.
For more than three decades sunset bills have been introduced in every
Congress.¹ Since 1997, Representative Kevin Brady and others have supported the
creation of a federal sunset commission, modeled on the sunset commission in Texas.
He reintroduced his bill in the 109^th Congress as H.R. 3282.²
In May 2006 the House leadership announced plans to bring sunset legislation
quickly to the House floor, along with other budget process reforms favored by the
Republican Study Committee (RSC), in return for RSC backing of the FY2007
budget resolution. In the effort to craft a consensus bill, attention came to focus on
H.R. 3282 (Brady bill) and on H.R. 2470, sponsored by Representative Todd Tiahrt,
which would create a “Commission on the Accountability and Review of Federal
Agencies (CARFA),” modeled on the Base Realignment and Closure Commission
(BRAC) approach.³ On July 14, 2006, Representative Tiahrt introduced a revised
version of H.R. 2470 as H.R. 5766, the Government Efficiency Act, “to provide for
the establishment of Federal Review Commissions (FRCs) to review and make
recommendations on improving the operations, effectiveness, and efficiency of
Federal programs and agencies, and to require a schedule for such reviews of all

¹ For historical background, see CRS Report RL31455, Federal Sunset Proposals:
Developments in the 94^th to 107^th Congresses, by Virginia A. McMurtry.
² For further discussion relating to efforts to establish a federal sunset commission, see CRS
Report RS22181, A Sunset Commission for the Federal Government: Recent Developments,
by Virginia A. McMurtry.
³ For discussion of CARFA bills, see CRS Report RS21980, Commission on the
Accountability and Review of Federal Agencies (CARFA): A Brief Overview of Legislative
Proposals, by Clinton T. Brass; and CRS Report RL32726, Proposals for a Commission
on the Accountability and Review of Federal Agencies (CARFA): Analysis and Issues for
Congress, by Clinton T. Brass.

Federal agencies and programs.” Although the CARFA and FRCs would address
concerns similar to those envisaged for the Federal Agency Sunset Commission in
H.R. 3282, H.R. 2470 and H.R. 5766 are not true sunset measures, because they lack
an action-forcing mechanism whereby agencies and programs would terminate
automatically absent congressional action, as would occur under H.R. 3282.
Although technically inaccurate, both bills are often referred to as sunset measures,
however.⁴
On July 19, 2006, the House Government Reform Committee held a hearing
on H.R. 3282 and H.R. 5766.⁵ Both bills went to markup the following day, and the
committee voted 15-14 to report H.R. 3282 favorably to the House. H.R. 5766, as
amended, was favorably reported by a vote of 15-12. Both votes were largely along
party lines. All Democrats voted against both bills. One Republican voted with the
minority on each bill: Representative Chris Shays voted with the minority on H.R.

5766, and Representative Todd Platts did likewise on H.R. 3282.⁶

Supporters of the measures suggest that there are too many overlapping and
ineffective federal programs that contribute to the growing federal deficit, that
Congress lacks time for thorough oversight of all existing agencies and programs,
and that the commissions would assist Congress in performing its oversight function,
thereby reducing fraud, waste, and abuse. Critics of the measures counter that the
bills would cede too much power to the executive branch and the majority political
party, would burden Congress with a tremendous workload with mandatory
reauthorization of every agency and program, and would facilitate elimination of
federal programs that provide a safety net for the most vulnerable in society.
Summary of H.R. 3282
H.R. 3282 would create a Federal Agency Sunset Commission (FASC) to
review the efficiency of and public need for federal agencies and provide for the
abolishment of agencies for which a public need does not exist. The FASC would
consist of 12 members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate
Majority Leader. Of the six members appointed by the leaders of the respective
chambers, four would be Members of Congress, with not more than two from the
same political party. Within one year after its establishment, the commission would
submit to Congress a schedule for the review of all federal agencies and advisory
committees by the commission, at least once every 12 years, and for the abolishment

⁴ See, for example, Ralph Lindeman and and Heather Rothman, “Two Sunset Bills on Track
for Votes After Leadership-Led Merger Talks Fail,” Daily Report for Executives, July 17,

2006, p. A-21; and Steven T. Dennis, “House Panel Sends Sunset Bills to Floor,” CQ Today,

July 20, 2006. These press accounts call the Tiahrt bill a “sunset” bill, even though
technically it is not one.
⁵ For hearing statements in electronic form, see
[http://reform.house.gov/ GovReform/ He ar ings /Eve ntSingle.aspx?EventID=47286].
⁶ Representative Shays voted “present” on H.R. 3282, explaining that he intended to vote
against the bill on the floor, but would allow it to be reported.

of each agency following the review absent congressional reauthorization. Agencies
performing similar or related functions would be scheduled for review at the same
time. Then the commission would commence its annual reviews, utilizing the 19
criteria specified in the bill in reviewing and evaluating the efficiency and public
need for each agency.
By September 1 of each subsequent year, the commission would report to the
President and Congress, and recommend whether each agency reviewed that year
should be abolished or reorganized and whether functions of other agencies should
be consolidated, transferred, or reorganized. The FASC would also submit draft
legislation to carry out the recommendations.
Under the sunset provisions in the bill, an agency would be abolished within
one year of the Commission’s review, unless the agency received statutory extension.
This means that following congressional approval of a reauthorization bill, the
measure would have to go to the President in order to be signed into law. If the
President were to veto the bill, a two-thirds majority in both chambers would be
necessary to override the veto and extend the life of the program or agency. The
possibility of a popular program or agency being eliminated by a President, with the
support of one third of the House and Senate, arguably represents a significant
transfer of power from Congress to the executive branch.
The bill would allow the deadline for abolishing an agency to be extended for
an additional two years by legislation enacted by a super majority of the House of
Representatives and the Senate. The commission also would report to Congress on
all legislation introduced that would establish a new agency or a new program to be
carried out by an existing agency.
H.R. 3282 would direct the Comptroller General of the Government
Accountability Office and the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, in
cooperation with the Director of the Congressional Research Service, to prepare an
inventory of Federal programs within each agency for the purpose of advising and
assisting Congress and the commission in carrying out the requirements of the act.
Although constitutional concerns appear not to have played a major role in
consideration of H.R. 3282, in prior Congresses similar sunset commission bills have
been questioned on constitutional grounds. For example, an advisory opinion from
the Department of Justice provided for the hearing record in 1998 suggested that
unless Congress were to enact the schedule for review and termination recommended
by the commission, the bill would violate separation of powers.⁷ An advisory opinion

⁷ The opinion stated, “Because this bill would allow the abolishment of a statutorily created
executive agency, not through legislation passed in conformity with Article 1, but at the
discretion and in accordance with a timetable imposed by a twelve-member commission
composed of eight members of Congress and four [other] persons...it violates the
constitutionally required separation of powers.” See U.S. Congress, House Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight, Subcommittee on Government Management,
Information, and Technology, H.R. 2939, Federal Sunset Act of 1998, hearing before^th^nd
subcommittee, 105 Cong., 2 sess., Sept. 14, 1998 (Washington: GPO, 1998), pp. 53-54.

from the Justice Department in 2002 referred to the same issue, as well as other
possible constitutional concerns.⁸
Summary of H.R. 5766, as Amended
H.R. 5766, as approved with an amendment in the nature of a substitute and
ordered reported favorably by the House Committee on Government Reform on July
20, 2006, would add a new chapter 10 to part I of Title 5 of the U.S. Code; part I
pertains to the agencies generally and chapter 9 is titled “Executive Reorganization.”
A Federal Review Commission might be established through the issuance of an
executive order or enactment of a joint resolution that specifies the federal programs
and agencies to be reviewed by the commission.
Each review commission would have seven members appointed by the
President, four of whom would be selected after consultation with designated
congressional leaders. Up to four Members of Congress might be appointed to serve
as nonvoting ex officio members. The bill specifies qualifications for all commission
members: each person “shall have expertise and experience in the particular
programmatic area” to be reviewed by the commission. H.R. 5766 provides that,
within one year of enactment, the President would submit to Congress a schedule
under which additional federal review commissions would be established
subsequently to review all federal agencies and programs. In developing the review
schedule, the President would provide that agencies performing similar or related
functions would be reviewed at or near the same time.
In its review work each commission would consider “whether the missions and
goals of the programs and agencies studied by the Commission are being carried out
as effectively and efficiently as possible,” the extent to which the programs and
agencies duplicate or conflict with other ongoing activities, and whether
reorganization of the programs and agencies “would better enable the Federal
government to accomplish its missions and goals.” The committee substitute offered
by the Chairman of the Government Reform Committee added agency rule making
to the list of factors to be considered in the FRC’s review: whether existing rules
promulgated by the agencies to carry out the programs derive from specific
legislative authority, are being carried out as efficiently as possible, or duplicate or
conflict with rules promulgated by other federal agencies, and whether any agency
or program being reviewed in any manner violates the constitutional separation of
powers.

⁸ The opinion, for example, found that giving a commission whose members were appointed
by congressional leaders “the power to apply directly for enforcement of its subpoenas in
the United States district courts entails executive or enforcement powers that would render
the commission members ‘Officers of the United States’ (who must be appointed in
conformity with the Appointments Clause) or otherwise violates the separation or powers.”
Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, letter to Rep. Dave
Weldon, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Civil Service, Census and Agency
Organization, Apr. 23, 2002. Copy provided to author by subcommittee staff.

Within one year after being established, the commission would report to the
President on its assessment of operations, effectiveness, and efficiency of the
programs and agencies which were reviewed. The commission might also submit to
the President a legislative proposal to reorganize, consolidate, abolish, expand, or
transfer any of the programs and agencies just reviewed. Within 30 days after the
commission reports, the President would transmit to Congress the assessment and
any legislative proposal submitted by the commission, along with the President’s
recommendations regarding the assessment and proposal.
Expedited Congressional Procedures⁹
H.R. 5766 mandates that congressional consideration of legislation
implementing a commission’s recommendations occur under special “fast track”
legislative procedures. Congress sometimes chooses to apply expedited legislative
procedures of this type to its consideration of specific measures because the regular
legislative procedures of the House and Senate are time-consuming, and do not
guarantee that a given measure or type of measure will be considered in a timely
fashion or at all. It is noteworthy, however, that as introduced, amended in
committee, and ordered reported favorably, H.R. 5766 specifies fast track procedures
only for the House of Representatives; with respect to the Senate it reads: “[Language
to be provided].”
Ordinarily, Members of either house may choose to introduce legislation at any
time that their chamber is in session during a two-year Congress. Under H.R. 5766,
the majority leader of the House or his designee would be required to introduce the
bill within five legislative days after receipt from the President of the draft¹⁰
implementing measure, but committee referral of the bill would follow regular
legislative procedures.
Congress generally does not mandate that a committee act on a bill referred to
it within a specified time frame. Under H.R. 5766, if a committee does not report the
implementing legislation referred to it within 30 legislative days, a privileged motion
would be in order, debatable for up to 20 minutes, to discharge the panels from
further consideration. The scheduling of a vote on that motion would be at the
discretion of the Speaker, but would have to occur within the next two legislative
days. Upon report or discharge, an implementation bill would be placed on the
House calendar.
Following the report or discharge of implementing legislation from committee,
H.R. 5766 would make in order a privileged motion to call up the legislation on the
floor. When a Member announced his intention to offer such a motion to proceed
to consideration, the scheduling of a vote on that motion is at the discretion of the

⁹ The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of CRS colleague Christopher Davis in
drafting a previous version of this discussion on expedited procedures.
¹⁰ Such language requiring introduction of a proposal from the President is a common
component of fast track procedures. Congressional leaders regularly comply with the rule,
introducing the measure “by request,” as a matter of comity between the branches.

Speaker but, again, must occur within the next two legislative days.¹¹ Once the
House has chosen to take up the implementing legislation by adopting the motion to
proceed, its consideration is, in a sense, “locked in.” It remains the unfinished
business of the chamber until disposed of. Other business cannot intervene; it
cannot be laid aside; and it must be disposed of before other matters may be taken up.
In the absence of a special rule dictating otherwise, the House ordinarily debates
measures under the one-hour rule. In the Senate, debate is ordinarily unlimited
except by unanimous consent, by the invocation of cloture, or by some other special
procedure, such as that governing budget reconciliation. H.R. 5766 would limit
House debate on the implementing bill to 10 hours. The bill also would limit
Members’ ability to delay consideration of the implementing legislation by barring
amendments and motions which would ordinarily be permissible under chamber
rules. At the conclusion of the time specified for debate, the House would
immediately vote on passage of the legislation.
Expedited procedures sometimes stipulate that if, before voting upon
implementing legislation, either chamber receives implementing legislation passed
by the other chamber, that second measure is not referred to committee, but is voted
on instead of the first chamber’s measure.¹² H.R. 5766, however, does not specify
any expedited elements after House passage. The omission of such automatic
“hookup” procedures from H.R. 5766 leaves open the possibility that there will be
a need to resolve differences between the House and Senate on implementing
legislation, as well as the possibility that implementing legislation will die at this
final stage of the legislative process.
Although fast track procedures such as those proposed in H.R. 5766 may be
codified in law rather than contained in the rules of the House and Senate, they have
the same effect as chamber rules and, as a result, are often called “rule making
statutes.” The fact that an expedited procedure is contained in statute does not mean
that another law must be passed in order to alter it. The provisions can be changed,
for example, by the adoption of a special rule from the House Committee on Rules,
by suspension of the rules, or by unanimous consent agreement.
It is important to point out, however, that the House of Representatives has the
ability to change its rules more easily than is possible in the Senate. Changing Senate
rules is virtually impossible without the widespread support of a super majority of
Senators. As a result, expedited procedures of the type proposed in H.R. 5766 for the

¹¹ Under H.R. 5766, however, this motion to discharge seems to be in order only if the
committee has reported the measure favorably or been discharged. In other words, whether
it is intentional or not, the expedited procedures in H.R. 5766 appear to permit a committee
to “kill” implementing legislation by reporting it adversely. Because in the House
legislation is normally referred to every committee that has jurisdiction over a measure to
the extent feasible, it is unclear under H.R. 5766 as it is currently drafted what happens if
one committee of referral reports implementing legislation adversely and the others report
favorably.
¹² Such provisions are often included in fast track statutes to prevent the need to resolve
differences between the versions of a bill passed by the House and by the Senate.

House, if extended to the Senate, arguably would bind the Senate far more
dramatically than they do the House. Simply put, they would remove the right every
Senator possesses under the rules to filibuster legislation and to delay or prevent a
final vote on its passage. The House may, and often does, ignore statutory expedited
procedures by adopting a special rule from the House Committee on Rules laying out
alternative terms of consideration.¹³ Unless strong Senate expediting provisions are
added to H.R. 5766, the “fast track” procedures will arguably be of negligible value;
the expediting elements as currently written apply only to the House, which does not
need such provisions to work its will.
Comparison of Selected Features in
H.R. 3282 and H.R. 5766
Table 1 provides an overview of selected features in the two bills. The
following discussion highlights some differences and similarities between the
measures.
There are no parameters in the language contained in H.R. 5766 regarding a
time frame for the total duration of the reviews. The provisions suggest multiple ad
hoc commissions, with each coming into existence pursuant to an executive order or
joint resolution. The bill would require the President to submit to Congress a
schedule for establishment of FRCs to review all federal agencies and programs. In
contrast, H.R. 3282 stipulates that within a year of enactment the sunset commission
would submit a review schedule to Congress, providing for each agency to be
reviewed at least once every 12 years. H.R. 5766 is also silent regarding the number
of commissions that might be established to accomplish the reviews. Nothing in the
bill appears to preclude the simultaneous existence of more than one FRC. In
contrast, H.R. 3282 envisages the sunset commission as an ongoing institutional body
(with rotating membership).
With respect to membership, H.R. 3282 provides for a 12- member commission,
half of whose members would be appointed by House and Senate leadership. H.R.
5766 provides for a seven-member commission appointed by the President, with
advice from congressional leaders. Although both bills would likely ensure
bipartisan commissions, in that both Democrats and Republicans would be
appointed, the membership would not necessarily be equally balanced. The party of
the President would probably enjoy at least a 5-2 majority on each of the FRCs.
Under H.R. 3282, the FASC’s membership might be skewed 8-4, if the same party
controlled both chambers of Congress.
As noted already, H.R. 3282 contains an action-forcing mechanism, whereas
H.R. 5766 lacks such a provision. Under H.R. 3282, each agency would be abolished
a year after the completion of the sunset review, unless extended by law. On the
other hand, H.R. 5766 provides expedited congressional procedures for implementing

¹³ Rep. Claude D. Pepper, remarks in the House, Congressional Record, vol. 134, July 7,

1988, p. 17071.

the recommendations of the commission, whereas expedited procedures are absent
in H.R. 3282. Some might support the inclusion of such procedures to facilitate
consideration of a bill, for example, to extend the life of an agency due to terminate
for another two years, as authorized in H.R. 3282, thereby allowing additional time
for Congress to act on a reauthorization bill.
H.R. 3282 also would provide for compilation of a program inventory to assist
the commission and Congress in the sunset review process. H.R. 5766 is silent
regarding where the President might turn for assistance in devising the purviews and
review schedule for FRCs, which he would be required to submit to Congress within
a year after the creation of the first FRC.
Both bills would eventually sunset the commissions. Under H.R. 5766 each
review commission would terminate 90 days after submission of its assessment and
possible legislative proposal to the President. The sunset commission established
under H.R. 3282 would remain in existence through several Congresses and
Administrations, but would terminate on December 31, 2030, absent reuthorization.
Finally, one might keep in mind the possibility that H.R. 3282 and H.R. 5766
could conceivably both be enacted, either as separate bills or combined in a single
measure. Chairman Davis noted at the hearing on July 19 that the two bills as written
could become separate titles of a new bill for floor consideration, “thereby
establishing the framework for Brady’s “long-term” commission as well as Tiahrt’s
ad hoc, more focused, commissions.”¹⁴ Some, however, might view the provisions
of the bills as possibly redundant, even if not incompatible. Funding to cover
administrative expenses of operating two ongoing commission frameworks might
arguably engender resistance. To the extent that some are concerned with the bills
individually for ceding too much power from Congress to the executive branch,
enactment of both bills would serve to compound the power transfer.

¹⁴ See Ralph Lindeman, “Sunset Bills Move Through Committee With Floor Vote in House
Set for July 27,” Daily Report for Executives, July 21, 2006, p. A-22.

Table 1. Selected Features in H.R. 3282 and H.R. 5766
FeatureH.R. 5766, as amendedH.R. 3282
^{Title o}^f^b^ill^G^o^v^e^rn^m^eⁿ^t^Ef^fⁱ^ci^en^cy^A^c^t^of²⁰⁰⁶^A^bolⁱ^s^h^m^en^t^of^O^b^s^o^l^e^t^e^A^g^en^ci^es
^an^{d F}^e^deral^S^uⁿ^s^et^A^c^t^of²⁰⁰⁵
^St^at^{ed pur}^pos^e(^s⁾^P^r^o^v^id^{e f}^o^r^th^{e estab}^lish^m^en^{t o}^f^Provⁱ^d^{e f}^o^{r t}^h^{e peri}^odi^{c rev}ⁱ^ew^of
^Fe^d^e^r^a^{l Re}^vie^w^Co^m^mⁱ^ssioⁿ^{s to}^th^{e ef}^fⁱ^cien^cy^an^{d pu}^{blic n}^{eed f}^o^r
^revⁱ^ew^an^{d m}^a^k^e^recom^m^eⁿ^d^ation^s^f^e^{deral ag}^en^cies^{, to es}^tablis^h^a
^onⁱ^m^provⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{e operat}ⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^com^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^on^f^o^{r t}^h^{e pu}^rpos^{e of}
^ef^f^ectiv^en^es^s^,^an^{d ef}^fⁱ^cien^cy^of^revⁱ^ewⁱⁿ^g^th^{e ef}^fⁱ^cien^cy^an^{d pu}^blic
^f^e^{deral prog}^ram^s^an^{d ag}^en^cies^{, an}^dⁿ^{eed of}^s^u^ch^ag^en^cies^{, an}^{d to}
^to^r^e^q^u^ir^{e a sch}^e^d^u^{le f}^o^r^su^ch^p^r^o^v^id^{e f}^o^r^th^{e ab}^o^lish^m^en^{t o}^f
^revⁱ^ew^s^of^{all f}^e^{deral ag}^en^cies^an^d^ag^en^cies^f^o^{r w}^h^ich^pu^{blic n}^eed
^prog^ram^s^.^d^o^e^{s n}^o^{t ex}^ist.
^{Scope of}^cover^age^A^{ll f}^e^{deral ag}^en^cies^as^defⁱⁿ^e^{d in}⁵^A^{ll f}^e^{deral ag}^en^cies^as^defⁱⁿ^e^{d in}
^U^.^S^.^C^.^{902(1) el}ⁱ^gⁱ^b^l^e^{. A}^c^t^u^al^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.^{105, pl}^u^s^f^e^deral^advⁱ^s^o^ry
^p^u^r^vⁱ^e^w^o^f^gi^ve^{n c}^o^m^mⁱ^ssi^oⁿ^com^m^ittees^{. A}^c^tu^{al cov}^e^rag^e
^d^e^ter^mⁱⁿ^ed^b^y^j^oⁱⁿ^{t r}^e^so^lu^tioⁿ^o^r^depen^d^en^t^u^pon^en^act^m^eⁿ^t^of
^ex^ecu^tiv^{e order creatin}^g^it.^r^e^vi^e^w^sc^he^d^u^l^e^.
^Esta^b^lish^m^en^t^A^Fe^d^e^r^a^{l Re}^vie^w^Co^m^mⁱ^ssioⁿ^T^h^{e Federal A}^g^en^cy^Suⁿ^s^et
^of^com^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^on^(F^R^C^{) m}^a^y^{be es}^t^a^blⁱ^s^h^e^{d by}^j^oⁱⁿ^t^Co^m^mⁱ^ssioⁿ⁽^F^A^S^C)^to^b^e
^r^e^so^lu^tioⁿ^o^r^ex^ecu^tiv^{e o}^r^d^e^r^w^h^ich^estab^lish^e^d^,^w^ith^m^eetin^g^s^to^b^e
^w^o^u^l^{d s}^p^ecif^y^th^{e s}^p^ecifⁱ^{c as}^pects^of^h^e^{ld at call of}^th^{e C}^h^airm^an^.
^f^e^{deral prog}^ram^s^an^{d ag}^en^cies^{to be}
^revⁱ^ew^ed.
^Me^mb^e^rsh^ip^S^e^v^eⁿ^m^e^m^b^ers^t^o^{be appoi}ⁿ^t^{ed by}^T^w^el^v^e^m^e^m^b^ers^t^o^{be appoi}ⁿ^t^ed
^th^{e P}^r^esid^en^{t, f}^o^u^rⁱⁿ^coⁿ^s^u^ltatioⁿ^by^Hou^s^{e an}^{d Sen}^a^{te leaders}^h^ip.
^w^ith^con^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al leaders}^(both^S^p^eak^{er of}^t^h^{e H}^o^u^s^{e appoi}ⁿ^t^s^sⁱ^x
^m^a^j^o^r^ity^an^d^mⁱⁿ^o^r^ity⁾^an^d^th^r^e^e^c^o^mmi^s^sⁱ^oⁿ^me^mb^e^r^s^,^f^o^u^r^o^f
^oth^e^{r m}^e^m^b^ers^.^P^r^es^iden^{t m}^a^y^w^h^om^{are to be R}^e^pres^en^tativ^es^,
^appoiⁿ^t^u^p^t^o^f^o^u^r^con^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^al^w^ithⁿ^o^m^o^r^e^th^an^tw^o^f^r^o^m^th^e
^m^e^m^b^ers^(tw^o^f^r^om^each^ch^am^{ber) to}^sam^e^p^o^{litical p}^a^r^t^y^.^Lⁱ^k^e^wⁱ^{se th}^e
^s^e^rv^{e as}^ex^of^fⁱ^{cio m}^e^m^b^ers^.^A^l^l^m^a^j^o^r^ity^lead^er^o^f^th^{e Sen}^a^te
^appoiⁿ^t^{ed t}^o^t^h^{e com}^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^on^t^o^h^a^v^e^appoiⁿ^t^s^sⁱ^x^m^e^m^b^ers^,^f^o^u^r^of
^ex^pertis^{e an}^{d ex}^perien^{ce in}^th^e^w^h^om^{are S}^eⁿ^a^t^o^rs^an^{d on}^l^y^t^w^{o of}
^prog^ram^m^a^{tic area bein}^g^revⁱ^ew^ed^w^h^o^m^m^a^y^b^e^o^f^th^{e sam}^e^p^o^litical
^b^y^the^FRC.^p^a^r^t^y^.^Ou^tsid^{e m}^e^m^b^er^{s to}^h^a^v^e
^ex^p^e^r^{tise in}^th^{e o}^p^e^r^a^tioⁿ^an^d
^a^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^st^r^a^tⁱ^o^{n o}^f^go^ve^rⁿ^m^e^nt
^prog^ram^s^.
^P^o^we^{rs o}^f^c^o^mmissioⁿ^FR^C^s^m^a^y^h^o^{ld h}^earin^g^s^{, receiv}^e^FA^{SC m}^a^y^ho^l^d^he^a^rⁱ^ngs,^o^b^t^aⁱⁿ
^tes^tim^on^y^an^{d ev}^iden^{ce, obtain}ⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^ation^f^r^om^f^e^{deral ag}^en^cies^,
ⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^ation^f^r^om^f^e^{deral ag}^en^cies^,ⁱ^s^s^u^{e s}^u^bpoen^a^s^f^o^{r t}^e^s^tⁱ^m^on^y^an^d
^an^{d obt}^aiⁿ^pos^t^a^l^an^{d pri}ⁿ^tⁱⁿ^g^ev^id^en^tiar^y^m^a^terⁱ^{als. FA}^{SC m}^a^y
^s^e^rvⁱ^ces^an^{d adm}ⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^ratⁱ^v^{e s}^u^pport^con^t^{ract f}^o^{r s}^e^rv^ices^an^{d m}^a^y
^s^e^rv^ices^.^prom^u^l^g^a^{te s}^u^ch^ru^les^asⁿ^eces^s^a^ry
^to^car^r^y^o^u^{t th}^{is act.}

FeatureH.R. 5766, as amendedH.R. 3282
^Schedul^{e f}^o^r^r^evi^ew^No^{t later}^th^an^oⁿ^{e y}^ear^af^ter^d^a^{te o}^f^No^{t later}^th^an^oⁿ^{e y}^ear^af^ter^d^a^te
^pr^oces^s^en^actm^eⁿ^t^{, th}^{e P}^r^es^iden^{t s}^h^{all s}^u^bm^it^of^en^actm^eⁿ^t^of^th^is^{act, FA}^SC
^t^o^Co^ngr^e^{ss a}^sc^he^d^u^l^e^und^e^r^w^hⁱ^c^h^sh^{all su}^b^m^{it to}^Coⁿ^g^r^{ess a}
^{FRCs sh}^{all b}^e^estab^lish^e^d^to^r^e^vⁱ^ew^s^c^h^e^du^l^e^f^o^{r rev}ⁱ^ew^by^t^h^e
^{all ag}^en^cies^an^{d prog}^ram^s^{. A}^g^en^cies^com^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^on^{, at leas}^{t on}^{ce ev}^ery¹²
^th^{at p}^e^r^f^o^r^m^sim^ilar^o^r^r^e^lated^y^ear^{s (}^o^r^{less, if}^d^e^ter^mⁱⁿ^ed
^f^uⁿ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^t^o^{be s}^c^h^e^du^l^e^{d at}^{or n}^ear^appropri^a^t^e^by^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^s⁾^an^{d f}^o^r
^th^{e sam}^e^tim^e.^ter^mⁱⁿ^atioⁿ^o^r^r^e^o^r^g^aⁿⁱ^zatioⁿ^o^f
^each^ag^en^cy^{. A}^g^en^cies^th^at
^p^e^r^f^o^r^m^sim^ilar^o^r^r^e^lated
^func^tⁱ^o^{ns t}^o^b^e^sc^he^d^u^l^e^d^fo^r
^c^o^nc^ur^r^e^nt^r^e^vi^e^w^s.
^P^r^o^c^e^ss/c^r^ite^ria^fo^r^In^revⁱ^ewⁱⁿ^g^prog^ram^s^an^{d ag}^en^cies^,^FA^SC^s^h^{all rev}ⁱ^ew^th^{e ef}^fⁱ^cien^cy
^pr^ogr^am^r^evi^ew^{FRCs sh}^{all co}ⁿ^s^id^er^:^an^{d pu}^{blic n}^{eed f}^o^{r each}^ag^en^cy^as
^{(1) W}^h^eth^e^{r th}^{eir m}ⁱ^s^sⁱ^on^s^an^{d g}^o^als^sc^he^d^u^l^e^d^,^usi^{ng t}^h^e^fo^l^l^o^wⁱ^{ng 1}⁹
^{are bein}^g^{carried ou}^{t ef}^f^ectiv^ely^an^d^criteria:
^ef^fⁱ^cien^tly^;^{(1) T}^h^{e ef}^f^ectiv^en^es^s^,^an^{d th}^e
⁽²⁾^Ex^ten^t^to^w^h^ich^th^{e p}^r^o^g^r^a^m^s^o^r^ef^fⁱ^cien^cy^of^th^{e operation}^of^{, th}^e
^ag^en^cies^du^{plicate or con}^f^{lict w}^ith^prog^ram^s^{carried ou}^{t by}^each^s^u^ch
^oth^e^{r f}^e^{deral ag}^en^cies^{, s}^t^{ate or local}^ag^en^cy^;
^g^o^v^e^rn^m^eⁿ^t^{, or th}^{e priv}^{ate s}^ector;^{(2) Wh}^et^h^e^{r t}^h^{e prog}^ram^s^carri^ed
⁽³⁾^W^h^e^t^he^r^r^e^o^r^gaⁿⁱ^z^a^tⁱ^o^n,^ou^{t by}^th^{e ag}^en^cy^{are cos}^t^-
^coⁿ^s^o^lid^atioⁿ^,^ab^o^lish^m^en^t,^ef^f^ectiv^e;
^ex^pan^sⁱ^oⁿ^,^{or t}^r^an^s^f^{er of}^prog^ram^s^or^{(3) W}^h^eth^e^{r th}^{e ag}^en^cy^h^a^s^acted
^ag^en^cies^w^o^u^l^{d better en}^{able th}^e^o^u^tsid^{e th}^{e sco}^p^e^o^f^{its o}^r^igⁱⁿ^al
^f^e^{deral g}^o^v^e^rn^m^eⁿ^t^{to accom}^p^lis^h^its^au^th^o^r^ity^{, an}^d^w^h^eth^e^r^th^{e o}^r^igⁱⁿ^al
^mⁱ^ssioⁿ^{s a}ⁿ^d^go^a^l^s;^obj^ectiv^es^of^th^{e ag}^en^cy^h^a^v^e^been
^{(4) Wh}^et^h^e^{r ex}ⁱ^s^tⁱⁿ^g^ru^l^e^s^ach^iev^e^d;
^prom^u^l^g^a^{ted by}^th^{e ag}^en^cies^{to carry}^{(4) Wh}^et^h^e^{r l}^e^s^s^res^t^ri^ctⁱ^v^{e or}
^ou^t^t^h^{e prog}^ram^s^deri^v^e^f^r^om^alterⁿ^ativ^{e m}^e^th^o^d^s^ex^{ist to}^car^r^y
^s^p^ecifⁱ^{c leg}ⁱ^s^l^ativ^{e au}^th^ority^{, are}^ou^{t th}^{e f}^uⁿ^c^tion^s^of^th^{e ag}^en^cy^;
^bein^g^{carried ou}^{t as}^ef^fⁱ^cien^tly^as⁽⁵⁾^T^h^{e ex}^ten^t^to^w^h^ich^th^e
^pos^sⁱ^bl^{e, or du}^plⁱ^cat^{e or con}^f^lⁱ^c^t^wⁱ^t^h^j^u^ri^s^dⁱ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^of^{, an}^{d t}^h^{e prog}^ram^s
^ru^l^e^s^prom^u^l^g^a^t^e^{d by}^ot^h^e^{r f}^e^deral^admⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^{ered by}^{, th}^{e ag}^en^cy
^ag^en^cies^{; an}^d^d^u^p^{licate o}^r^coⁿ^f^{lict w}^ith^th^e
^(5)W^h^e^th^{er an}^y^ag^en^cy^{or prog}^ram^j^u^ri^s^dⁱ^c^tⁱ^oⁿ^an^{d prog}^ram^s^of^ot^h^e^r
^b^eⁱ^{ng r}^e^vi^e^w^e^dⁱⁿ^aⁿ^y^m^a^nne^r^ag^en^cies^;
^vⁱ^o^l^{ates th}^{e co}ⁿ^s^titu^tioⁿ^a^{l sep}^a^r^a^tioⁿ⁽⁶⁾^T^h^{e p}^o^t^en^{tial b}^eⁿ^e^f^{its o}^f
^of^pow^ers^.^coⁿ^s^o^lid^atin^g^p^r^o^g^r^a^m^s^w^ith
^sim^ilar^o^r^d^u^p^licativ^{e f}^e^d^e^r^a^l
^prog^ram^s^els^e^w^h^{ere, an}^{d th}^e
^p^o^t^en^{tial f}^o^r^coⁿ^s^o^lid^atin^g^su^ch
^prog^ram^s^;
^{7) T}^h^{e n}^u^m^{ber an}^{d t}^y^pes^of
^ben^e^fⁱ^ci^ari^e^s^{or pers}^on^s^s^e^rv^{ed by}
^th^{e ag}^en^cy^’^s^prog^ram^s^;
^{(8) Wh}^et^h^e^{r an}^y^t^r^en^ds^,
^dev^e^lopm^en^ts^{, an}^{d em}^ergⁱⁿ^g
^coⁿ^d^itioⁿ^s^ar^{e lik}^ely^to^af^f^{ect th}^e
^f^u^tu^r^eⁿ^a^tu^r^e^an^dⁿ^eed^{s th}^{at th}^e
^prog^ram^s^{carried ou}^{t by}^th^{e ag}^en^cy
^{are in}^ten^d^{ed to addres}^s^;
^{(9) T}^h^{e ex}^ten^t^{to w}^h^ich^th^{e ag}^en^cy
^h^a^{s co}^m^p^lied^w^ith^th^{e p}^r^o^v^isioⁿ^s
^c^o^nt^aⁱ^ne^dⁱⁿ^t^h^e^G^o^ve^rⁿ^m^e^nt
^Perf^orm^aⁿ^{ce an}^{d R}^e^s^u^l^t^s^A^c^t^of
^{1993 (Pu}^b^lⁱ^c^L^a^w^103-^62;¹⁰⁷
^S^t^at^{. 285);}

FeatureH.R. 5766, as amendedH.R. 3282
^{(10) T}^h^{e prom}^ptⁿ^e^s^s^an^d
^ef^f^ectiv^en^{ess w}^ith^w^h^ichⁱⁿ^p^u^t
^f^r^om^th^{e pu}^{blic an}^{d f}^r^om^s^t^{ate an}^d
^l^o^c^a^l^go^ve^rⁿ^m^e^nt^{s o}ⁿ^t^h^e
^ef^fⁱ^cien^cy^an^{d ef}^f^ectiv^en^es^s^of^th^e
^a^g^eⁿ^c^y^{’s p}^e^r^f^o^r^m^a^nc^eⁱ^s^so^ught^;
^{(11) W}^h^eth^e^{r th}^{e ag}^en^cy^h^a^s
^w^o^rk^{ed to en}^{act ch}^an^g^e^sⁱⁿ^ten^d^ed
^to^b^eⁿ^e^f^{it th}^{e p}^u^b^{lic as a w}^h^o^l^e
^rath^{er th}^an^an^y^s^p^{ecial in}^teres^t^s
^reg^u^l^{ated by}^th^{e ag}^en^cy^;
⁽¹²⁾^W^h^eth^e^r^p^a^r^ticip^atioⁿ^b^y^th^e
^pu^{blic as}^{a w}^h^{ole, rath}^{er th}^an
^so^lely^b^y^th^o^s^{e it r}^e^g^u^l^{ates, is}
^so^ught^b^y^t^h^e^a^g^eⁿ^c^yⁱⁿ^m^a^ki^{ng i}^t^s
^r^u^le^{s a}ⁿ^d^d^e^cⁱ^sioⁿ^s;
⁽¹³⁾^T^h^{e ex}^ten^t^to^w^h^ich^th^{e p}^u^b^lic
^p^a^r^ticip^atioⁿⁱⁿ^r^u^lem^a^kⁱⁿ^g^an^d
^decisⁱ^on^m^a^kⁱⁿ^g^of^th^{e ag}^en^cy^h^a^s
^r^e^su^ltedⁱⁿ^r^u^{les an}^d^d^ecisioⁿ^s
^co^m^p^atib^{le w}^ith^th^{e o}^b^j^ectiv^{es o}^f
^th^{e ag}^en^cy^;
⁽¹⁴⁾^T^h^{e ex}^ten^t^to^w^h^ich^th^e
^ag^en^cy^com^p^lies^w^ith^th^{e Freedom}
^of^In^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^A^c^t^{(5 U}^S^C^552).
^{(15) W}^h^eth^e^{r th}^{e ag}^en^cy^com^p^lies
^w^ith^eq^u^a^{l em}^p^l^o^y^m^eⁿ^t
^opport^uⁿⁱ^t^y^requⁱ^r^em^en^t^s^;
^{(16) T}^h^{e ex}^ten^t^of^th^{e reg}^u^l^atory^,
^pri^v^acy^{, an}^{d paperw}^orkⁱ^m^pact^s^of
^t^h^{e prog}^ram^s^carri^{ed ou}^t^by^t^h^e
^ag^en^cy^;
⁽¹⁷⁾^T^h^{e ex}^ten^t^to^w^h^ich^th^e
^ag^en^cy^h^a^s^coordin^a^{ted w}^ith^s^t^ate
^aⁿ^d^l^o^c^a^l^go^ve^rⁿ^m^e^nt^{s i}ⁿ
^p^e^r^f^o^r^mⁱ^{ng i}^t^func^tⁱ^o^ns;
^{(18) T}^h^{e poten}^{tial ef}^f^ects^of
^abolis^hⁱⁿ^g^th^{e ag}^en^cy^on^s^t^{ate an}^d
^l^o^c^a^l^go^ve^rⁿ^m^e^nt^s;^aⁿ^d
^{(19) T}^h^{e ex}^ten^t^{to w}^h^ich^ch^an^g^e^s
^{are n}^eces^s^a^ryⁱⁿ^th^{e au}^th^orizin^g
^s^t^atu^t^es^of^th^{e ag}^en^cyⁱⁿ^{order th}^at
^th^{e f}^uⁿ^c^tion^s^of^th^{e ag}^en^cy^can^be
^perf^orm^e^{d in}^th^{e m}^o^s^t^ef^fⁱ^cien^{t an}^d
^ef^f^ectiv^{e m}^aⁿⁿ^e^r.
^T^r^ans^par^{ency and}^P^u^{blic h}^earin^g^s^{are n}^o^{t requ}^ired.^FA^{SC sh}^{all co}ⁿ^d^u^c^{t p}^u^b^lic
^p^u^b^{lic p}^a^r^ticip^a^tioⁿ^{Not clear w}^h^eth^e^{r FR}^C^s^w^o^u^l^{d be}^h^earin^g^s^on^th^{e abolis}^h^m^en^{t of}
^su^b^j^{ect to}^th^{e Fed}^e^r^a^{l A}^d^vⁱ^so^r^y^each^ag^en^cy^revⁱ^ew^{ed, prov}^{ide an}
^C^o^m^mⁱ^t^t^{ee A}^c^t^.^(Uⁿ^d^{er H}^.^R^.^2470,^opport^uⁿⁱ^t^y^f^o^{r pu}^blⁱ^c^com^m^eⁿ^t^,
^CA^RFA^w^o^u^l^d^b^e^ex^p^licitly^an^{d requ}^{ire th}^{e ag}^en^cy^{to prov}^ide
^ex^em^{pted f}^r^om^FA^C^A^.)ⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^atioⁿ^to^co^m^mⁱ^ssioⁿ^as
^ap^p^r^o^p^r^{iate. FA}^{SC sh}^{all co}ⁿ^s^u^l^t
^w^ith^GA^{O, OMB}^,^th^{e Co}^m^p^tr^o^ller
^Gen^e^{ral, an}^{d th}^{e ch}^airm^an^an^d
^r^a^nki^{ng m}ⁱ^no^rⁱ^t^y^m^e^m^b^e^r^{s o}^f^t^h^e
^com^m^ittees^of^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^s^w^ith
^o^v^er^sig^h^t^r^e^sp^oⁿ^sib^ility^r^e^g^a^r^dⁱⁿ^g
^th^{e operation}^of^th^{e ag}^en^cy^.

FeatureH.R. 5766, as amendedH.R. 3282
^Repor^tⁱ^{ng of}^No^{t later}^th^an^oⁿ^{e y}^ear^af^ter^FA^{SC to}^su^b^m^{it to}^Coⁿ^g^r^{ess an}^d
^r^ecom^m^e^ndatⁱ^ons^estab^lish^m^en^{t o}^f^{a p}^a^r^ticu^l^ar^{FRC, it}^th^{e P}^r^es^iden^{t by}^Septem^{ber 1 each}
^sh^{all su}^b^m^{it to}^th^{e P}^r^esid^en^t:^y^{ear a report con}^t^ainⁱⁿ^g^:
⁽¹⁾^{its assessm}^en^{t o}^f^th^{e o}^p^e^r^a^tioⁿ^s^,^{(1) an}^aly^s^is^of^th^{e ef}^fⁱ^cien^cy^of
^ef^f^ectiv^en^es^s^,^an^{d ef}^fⁱ^cien^cy^of^th^e^operation^an^{d pu}^{blic n}^{eed f}^o^{r each}
^f^e^{deral prog}^ram^s^an^{d ag}^en^cies^{; an}^d^ag^en^cy^bein^g^revⁱ^ew^{ed th}^{at y}^ear;
^{(2) a l}^e^gⁱ^s^l^atⁱ^v^{e propos}^al^{, i}^f^{(2) recom}^m^eⁿ^d^ation^s^on^w^h^eth^e^r
^appropri^a^t^e^{, t}^o^reorg^aⁿⁱ^ze,^each^ag^en^cy^s^h^ou^{ld be abolis}^h^e^{d or}
^con^s^{olidate, abolis}^h^,^ex^pan^d^{, or}^r^e^o^r^gaⁿⁱ^z^e^d^;
^tran^s^f^{er prog}^ram^s^an^{d ag}^en^cies^.^{(3) recom}^m^eⁿ^d^ation^s^on^w^h^eth^e^r
^th^{e f}^uⁿ^c^tion^s^of^an^y^oth^e^{r ag}^en^cies
^s^h^ou^{ld be con}^s^olidated,
^tran^s^f^{erred, or reorg}^aⁿⁱ^{zed in}^an
^ag^en^cy^bein^g^revⁱ^ew^{ed; an}^d
^{(4) recom}^m^eⁿ^d^atⁱ^oⁿ^s^f^o^r
^ad^mⁱⁿⁱ^str^a^tiv^{e an}^d^legⁱ^slativ^e
^action^reg^a^rdin^g^revⁱ^ew^{ed ag}^en^cy^,
^b^u^t^no^tⁱⁿ^c^l^udⁱ^{ng r}^e^c^o^m^m^e^nd^a^tⁱ^o^ns
^f^o^r^ap^p^r^o^p^r^iatioⁿ^lev^e^ls.
^FA^{SC to}^r^e^vⁱ^ew^an^d^r^e^p^o^r^{t to}
^Coⁿ^g^r^{ess o}ⁿ^{all leg}ⁱ^slatioⁿⁱⁿ^tr^o^-
^du^{ced in}^eith^{er h}^o^u^s^{e of}^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^s
^th^{at w}^o^u^l^{d es}^tablis^h^{a n}^e^w^ag^en^cy
^{or a n}^e^w^prog^ram^t^o^{be carri}^{ed ou}^t
^by^an^ex^is^tin^g^ag^en^cy^.
^Expedi^t^e^{d pr}^ocedur^es^Ex^pedi^t^e^{d procedu}^r^es^f^o^r^No^{t in}^clu^d^ed^.
^f^o^r^congr^es^sⁱ^onal^con^sⁱ^d^eratⁱ^oⁿ^of^ref^o^rm^propos^al^s
^a^c^tioⁿ^f^r^om^an^FR^Cⁱⁿ^th^{e Hou}^s^{e are}
^d^e^tailed^,^b^u^{t b}^{ill is silen}^t^r^e^g^a^r^dⁱⁿ^g
^Sen^a^{te procedu}^r^es^{; as}^s^u^m^a^bly^,^th^ey
^w^o^u^l^{d be added bef}^o^{re en}^act^m^eⁿ^t^.
^Actioⁿ^-^fo^rcin^g^Non^eⁱⁿ^clu^d^ed.^Each^ag^en^cy^s^h^{all be abolis}^h^e^{d n}^o^t
^m^echani^s^m^later^th^an^oⁿ^{e y}^ear^af^ter^th^{e d}^a^te
^th^{e co}^m^mⁱ^ssioⁿ^co^m^p^{letes its}
^revⁱ^ew^of^th^{e ag}^en^cy^{, u}ⁿ^l^es^s^th^e
^ag^en^cy^is^reau^th^{orized by}^th^e
^Co^ngr^e^ss.^Eⁿ^a^c^t^m^e^nt^o^f^l^a^w^b^y
^s^u^{per m}^a^j^o^rityⁱⁿ^each^ch^am^ber
^m^a^y^ex^ten^d^deadlin^{e f}^o^r
^ab^o^lish^m^en^{t f}^o^r^tw^o^ad^d^itioⁿ^a^l
^y^ears^.
^Pr^ovi^sⁱ^ons^f^o^r^W^ithⁱⁿ^{30 day}^s^af^{ter receipt of}^th^e^A^l^o^{ng w}ⁱ^t^h^a^nnua^l^r^e^p^o^r^t^d^u^e^b^y
^imp^l^emen^ta^tioⁿ^a^sse^ssm^eⁿ^{t a}ⁿ^d^p^o^ssib^l^e^le^gisla^tive^S^e^pt^em^{ber 1, F}^A^S^C^t^o^s^u^bmⁱ^t^t^o
^propos^al^f^r^om^an^F^R^C^,^t^h^{e Pres}ⁱ^d^en^t^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^s^an^{d th}^{e P}^r^es^iden^{t draf}^t
^sh^{all tr}^an^sm^{it to}^Coⁿ^g^r^{ess th}^e^legⁱ^slatioⁿ^to^car^r^y^o^u^{t its}
^as^s^e^s^s^m^en^{t an}^{d an}^y^accom^p^an^yⁱⁿ^g^recom^m^eⁿ^d^ation^s^.
^propos^al^{, al}^on^g^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e Pres}ⁱ^d^en^t^’^s^T^h^{e co}^m^mⁱ^ssioⁿ^sh^{all m}^oⁿ^ito^r
^o^w^{n r}^e^c^o^m^m^e^nd^a^tⁱ^o^ns.^im^p^l^em^en^tatioⁿ^o^f^law^s^coⁿ^t^ainⁱⁿ^g
^p^r^o^v^isioⁿ^s^th^{at in}^co^r^p^o^r^{ate p}^r^io^r
^r^eco^m^m^eⁿ^d^atioⁿ^s^w^ith^r^e^sp^{ect to}
^ab^o^lish^m^en^{t o}^r^r^e^o^r^g^aⁿⁱ^zatioⁿ^o^f
^ag^en^cies^.

FeatureH.R. 5766, as amendedH.R. 3282
^Suns^et^pr^ovi^sⁱ^{on f}^o^r^Each^FR^C^{to term}ⁱⁿ^{ate 90 day}^s^af^ter^FA^SC^{to term}ⁱⁿ^{ate on}^Decem^ber
^co^mmissioⁿ^su^b^m^issioⁿ^o^f^{its r}^e^p^o^r^{t to}^th^e^{31, 2030, u}ⁿ^l^es^s^ex^t^eⁿ^sⁱ^oⁿⁱ^s
^P^r^es^iden^t.^approv^{ed by}^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^s^an^{d s}ⁱ^gⁿ^e^d
ⁱⁿ^to^law^.
^Pr^ogr^amⁱⁿ^vent^o^r^y^No^{t co}^v^e^r^e^d^.^Dir^{ects th}^{e Co}^m^p^tr^o^ller^Gen^e^r^a^l
^an^{d th}^{e Director of}^th^e
^C^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^{al B}^u^dg^{et Of}^fⁱ^ce
^(C^BO^{), i}ⁿ^cooperatⁱ^oⁿ^wⁱ^t^h^t^h^e
^{Director of}^th^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^sⁱ^on^al
^R^e^s^earch^Serv^{ice, to prepare an}
ⁱⁿ^v^eⁿ^t^ory^of^F^e^deral^prog^ram^s
^w^ithⁱⁿ^each^ag^en^cy^f^o^{r th}^{e pu}^rpos^e
^o^f^a^d^vi^si^{ng a}ⁿ^d^a^ssi^stⁱ^{ng Co}^ngr^e^s^s
^an^{d th}^{e com}^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^onⁱⁿ^carryⁱⁿ^g^ou^t
^th^{e r}^e^q^u^ir^em^en^{ts o}^f^th^{is act.}
^Coⁿ^t^en^{t r}^e^q^u^ir^em^en^{ts f}^o^r^th^e
ⁱ^nve^nt^o^r^y^sp^e^cⁱ^fi^e^d^,ⁱⁿ^c^l^udⁱ^{ng d}^a^t^a
^t^o^{be prov}ⁱ^d^{ed by}^C^B^O^.