U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues







Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress



During the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear arsenal contained many types of delivery vehicles for
nuclear weapons. The longer range systems, which included long-range missiles based on U.S.
territory, long-range missiles based on submarines, and heavy bombers that could threaten Soviet
targets from their bases in the United States, are known as strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. At
the end of the Cold War, in 1991, the United States deployed more than 10,000 warheads on these
delivery vehicles. That number has declined to less than 6,000 warheads today, and is slated,
under the 2002 Moscow Treaty, to decline to 2,200 warheads by the year 2012.
At the present time, the U.S. land-based ballistic missile force (ICBMs) consists of 450
Minuteman III ICBMs, each deployed with between one and three warheads, for a total of 1,200
warheads. The Air Force recently deactivated all 50 of the 10-warhead Peacekeeper ICBMs; it
plans to eventually deploy Peacekeeper warheads on some of the Minuteman ICBMs. It has also
deactivated 50 Minuteman III missiles. The Air Force is also modernizing the Minuteman
missiles, replacing and upgrading their rocket motors, guidance systems, and other components.
The Air Force had expected to begin replacing the Minuteman missiles around 2018, but has
decided, instead, to continue to modernize and maintain the existing missiles.
The U.S. ballistic missile submarine fleet currently consists of 14 Trident submarines; each
carries 24 Trident II (D-5) missiles. The Navy has converted 4 of the original 18 Trident
submarines to carry non-nuclear cruise missiles. The remaining submarines currently carry
around 2,000 warheads in total, a number that will likely decline as the United States implements
the Moscow Treaty. The Navy has shifted the basing of the submarines, so that nine are deployed
in the Pacific Ocean and five are in the Atlantic, to better cover targets in and around Asia. It also
has undertaken efforts to extend the life of the missiles and warheads so that they and the
submarines can remain in the fleet past 2020.
The U.S. fleet of heavy bombers currently includes 20 B-2 bombers and 94 B-52 bombers. The
B-1 bomber no longer is equipped for nuclear missions. The 2006 QDR recommended that the
Air Force reduce the B-52 fleet to 56 aircraft; Congress rejected that recommendation, but will
allow the fleet to decline to 76 aircraft. The Air Force has also begun to retire the nuclear-armed
cruise missiles carried by B-52 bombers, leaving only about half the B-52 fleet equipped to carry
nuclear weapons.
Congress has reviewed the Bush Administration’s plans for U.S. strategic nuclear forces during
the annual authorization and appropriations process. It has reviewed a number of questions about
the future size of that force. For example, some have questioned why the United States must
retain 2,200 strategic nuclear warheads. Congress may also question the Administration’s plans
for reductions in the Minuteman force and B-52 fleet. This report will be updated as needed.






Introduc tion ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background: The Strategic Triad.....................................................................................................2
Force Structure and Size During the Cold War.........................................................................2
Force Structure and Size After the Cold War............................................................................4
Future Force Structure and Size................................................................................................6
Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles: Ongoing Plans and Programs...............................................8
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).............................................................................8
Peacekeeper (MX)..............................................................................................................8
Minuteman III.....................................................................................................................9
Minuteman Modernization Programs................................................................................11
Future Programs................................................................................................................13
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles..................................................................................13
The SSGN Program..........................................................................................................14
The Backfit Program.........................................................................................................15
Basing Changes.................................................................................................................15
Warhead Issues..................................................................................................................16
Modernization Plans and Programs..................................................................................16
Future Programs................................................................................................................18
Bombers ........................................................................................................................ .......... 19
B-1 Bomber.......................................................................................................................19
B-2 Bomber.......................................................................................................................19
B-52 Bomber.....................................................................................................................19
Future Bomber Plans.........................................................................................................22
Issues for Congress........................................................................................................................23
Force Size................................................................................................................................23
Force Structure........................................................................................................................25
Safety, Security, and Management Issues...............................................................................26

Figure 1. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Weapons: 1960-1990...................................................................3
Figure 2. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: 1990-2008.......................................................................5

Table 1. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces Under START I and START II..........................................6
Table 2. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces 2006 and Illustrative Strategic Nuclear Forces
Under the Moscow Treaty............................................................................................................8

Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................27






During the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear arsenal contained many types of delivery vehicles for
nuclear weapons, including short-range missiles and artillery for use on the battlefield, medium-
range missiles and aircraft that could strike targets beyond the theater of battle, short- and
medium-range systems based on surface ships, long-range missiles based on U.S. territory and
submarines, and heavy bombers that could threaten Soviet targets from their bases in the United
States. The short- and medium-range systems are considered non-strategic nuclear weapons and 1
have been referred to as battlefield, tactical, and theater nuclear weapons. The long-range
missiles and heavy bombers are known as strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
In 1990, as the Cold War was drawing to a close and the Soviet Union was entering its final year,
the United States had more than 12,000 nuclear warheads deployed on 1,875 strategic nuclear 2
delivery vehicles. As of July 1, 2008, according to the counting rules in the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START), the United States had reduced to 5,951 nuclear warheads on 1,214 3
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. According to the State Department, the United States had
reduced its number of operationally deployed warheads, a number that excludes many warheads 4
that count under START, to 2,871 by the end of December 2007. Under the terms of the 2002
Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (known as the Moscow Treaty) between the United States
and Russia, this number is to decline to no more than 2,200 operationally deployed strategic 5
nuclear warheads by the end of 2012.
Although these numbers do not count the same categories of nuclear weapons, they indicate that
the number of deployed warheads on U.S. strategic nuclear forces will decline significantly in the
two decades following the end of the Cold War. Yet, nuclear weapons continue to play a key role
in U.S. national security strategy, and the United States does not, at this time, plan to either
eliminate its nuclear weapons or abandon the strategy of nuclear deterrence that has served as a 6
core concept in U.S. national security strategy for more than 50 years. During the 2008 election
campaign, then candidate Obama stated that he supported the goal of working to eliminate all

1 For a detailed review of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons see, CRS Report RL32572, Nonstrategic Nuclear
Weapons, by Amy F. Woolf.
2 Natural Resources Defense Council. Table of U.S. Strategic Offensive Force Loadings. Archive of Nuclear Data.
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab1.asp The same source indicates that the Soviet Union, in 1990, had just over
11,000 warheads on 2,332 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
3 Russia, by the same accounting, had 4,138 warheads on 839 delivery vehicles. See U.S. Department of State, Bureau
of Verification, Compliance and Inspection. Fact Sheet. START Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Weapons.
April 1, 2007. Washington, DC.
4 The State Department did not provide an unclassified estimate for Russias current force of operationally deployed
warheads. See, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Inspection. 2008 Annual Report on
Implementation of the Moscow Treaty. May 13, 2008. p. 2.
5 The START Treaty counts more than justoperationally deployed warheads, as its data base includes warheads that
would count on retired missiles until the launchers for those missiles are destroyed. The United States has maintained
some ICBM and SLBM launchers after retiring the missiles, so the warheads attributed to these launchers still count.
6 The Bush Administration emphasized this point in early 2002, when presenting the results of the 2001 Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR). Douglas Feith, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, stated that nuclear weaponscontinue
to be essential to our security, and that of our friends and allies.” See U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services.
Statement of the Honorable Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of Defense For Policy. February 14, 2002.





nuclear weapons, but he also stated that “America will not disarm unilaterally,” and that “as long 7
as nuclear weapons exist, I will retain a strong, safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent.... ”
The Bush Administration, after completing the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) indicated
that the United States would reduce its forces to 2,200 operationally deployed warheads, the
number and concept codified in the Moscow Treaty, but it did not identify the specific
combination of delivery vehicles or warhead loadings that the United States would maintain to
reach the specified number. Subsequent Pentagon studies, including the Strategic Capabilities
Assessment in 2005 and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), offered further guidance
on strategic nuclear force structure. As the United States reduces its deployed forces to meet the
mandates of the Moscow Treaty, it is likely also to pursue programs that will allow it to
modernize and adjust its strategic forces so that they remain capable in the years that follow. A
number of factors could influence decisions about these programs, including budget, political,
and strategic considerations, along with standard capabilities assessments.
This report reviews the ongoing programs that will affect the expected size and shape of the U.S.
strategic nuclear force structure. It begins with an overview of this force structure during the Cold
War, and summarizes the reductions and changes that have occurred since 1991. It then offers
details about each category of delivery vehicle—land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers—focusing on their
current deployments and ongoing and planned modernization programs. The report concludes
with a discussion of issues related to decisions about the future size and shape of the U.S.
strategic nuclear force.

Since the early 1960s the United States has maintained a “triad” of strategic nuclear delivery 8
vehicles, The United States first developed these three types of nuclear delivery vehicles, in large
part, because each of the military services wanted to play a role in the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
However, during the 1960s and 1970s, analysts developed a more reasoned rationale for the
nuclear “triad.” They argued that these different basing modes had complementary strengths and
weaknesses. They would enhance deterrence and discourage a Soviet first strike because they
complicated Soviet attack planning and ensured the survivability of a significant portion of the 9
U.S. force in the event of a Soviet first strike. The different characteristics might also strengthen

7Arms Control Today 2008 Presidential Q&A: Democratic Candidate Barack Obama, Arms Control Today,
September 24, 20008.
8 When announcing the results of the Nuclear Posture Review in 2002, the Bush Administration identified a “new
triad” of weapons systems and capabilities. This conceptual framework differs from theold” triad in that it outlines
how a broad set of capabilities that contribute to U.S. security, as opposed to theold triad,” which described a mix of
specific weapons systems. In the new triad,” nuclear weapons and precision-guided conventional weapons combine as
“offensive strike” forces. Missile defenses represent the second leg of the triad, and a “responsive infrastructure” serves
the third leg. For more details see CRS Report RL31623, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force
Structure, by Amy F. Woolf.
9 U.S. Department of Defense. Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1989, by Frank Carlucci, Secretary of Defense.
February 18, 1988. Washington, 1988. p. 54.





the credibility of U.S. targeting strategy. For example, ICBMs eventually had the accuracy and
prompt responsiveness needed to attack hardened targets such as Soviet command posts and
ICBM silos, SLBMs had the survivability needed to complicate Soviet efforts to launch a 10
disarming first strike and to retaliate if such an attack were attempted, and heavy bombers could
be dispersed quickly and launched to enhance their survivability, and they could be recalled to
their bases if a crisis did not escalate into conflict.
According to unclassified estimates, the number of delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and
nuclear-capable bombers) in the U.S. force structure grew steadily through the mid-1960s, with 11
the greatest number of delivery vehicles, 2,268, deployed in 1967. The number then held
relatively steady through 1990, at between 1,875 and 2,200 ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.
The number of warheads carried on these delivery vehicles increased sharply through 1975, then,
after a brief pause, again rose sharply in the early 1980s, peaking at around 13,600 warheads in
1987. Figure 1 displays the increases in delivery vehicles and warheads between 1960, when the
United States first began to deploy ICBMs, and 1990, the year before the United States and
Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).
Figure 1. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Weapons: 1960-1990
16000
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000Number
4000
2000
0
60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90
Year
Launc her s W ar heads
Source: Natural Resources Defense Council, Archive of Nuclear Data.
The sharp increase in warheads in the early 1970s reflects the deployment of ICBMs and SLBMs
with multiple warheads, known as MIRVs (multiple independent reentry vehicles). In particular,
the United States began to deploy the Minuteman III ICBM, with 3 warheads on each missile, in 12
1970, and the Poseidon SLBM, which could carry 10 warheads on each missile, in 1971. The

10 In the early 1990s, SLBMs also acquired the accuracy needed to attack many hardened sites in the former Soviet
Union.
11 Natural Resources Defense Council. Table of U.S. Strategic Offensive Force Loadings. Archive of Nuclear Data.
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab1.asp
12 GlobalSecurity.org LGM Minuteman III History and Poseidon C-3 History. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/
systems/lgm-30_3-hist.htm and [http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/c-3.htm]





increase in warheads in the mid-1980s reflects the deployment of the Peacekeeper (MX) ICBM,
which carried 10 warheads on each missile.
In 1990, before it concluded the START Treaty, the United States deployed a total of around
12,304 warheads on its ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. The ICBM force consisted of
single-warhead Minuteman II missiles, 3-warhead Minuteman III missiles, and 10-warhead
Peacekeeper (MX) missiles, for a total force of 2,450 warheads on 1,000 missiles. The submarine
force included Poseidon submarines with Poseidon C-3 and Trident I (C-4) missiles, and the
newer Trident submarines with Trident I, and some Trident II (D-5) missiles. The total force 13
consisted of 5,216 warheads on around 600 missiles. The bomber force centered on 94 B-52H
bombers and 96 B-1 bombers, along with many of the older B-52G bombers and 2 of the brand
new (at the time) B-2 bombers. This force of 260 bombers could carry over 4,648 weapons.
During the 1990s, the United States reduced the numbers and types of weapons in its strategic
nuclear arsenal, both as a part of its modernization process and in response to the limits in the

1991 START Treaty. The United States continued to maintain a triad of strategic nuclear forces,


however, with warheads deployed on ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. According to the
Department of Defense, this mix of forces not only offered the United States a range of
capabilities and flexibility in nuclear planning and complicated an adversary’s attack planning,
but also hedged against unexpected problems in any single delivery system. This latter issue
became more of a concern in this time period, as the United States retired many of the different
types of warheads and missiles that it had deployed over the years, reducing the redundancy in its
force.
The 1991 START Treaty limited the United States to a maximum of 6,000 total warheads, and
4,900 warheads on ballistic missiles, deployed on up to 1,600 strategic offensive delivery
vehicles. However, the Treaty did not count the actual number of warheads deployed on each type
of ballistic missile or bomber. Instead, it used “counting rules” to determine how many warheads
would count against the Treaty’s limits. For ICBMs and SLBMs, this number usually equaled the
actual number of warheads deployed on the missile. Bombers, however, used a different system.
Bombers that were not equipped to carry air-launched cruise missiles (the B-1 and B-2 bombers)
counted as one warhead; bombers equipped to carry air-launched cruise missiles (B-52 bombers)
could carry 20 missiles, but would only count as 10 warheads against the Treaty limits. These
rules have led to differing estimates of then numbers of warheads on U.S. strategic nuclear forces
during the 1990s; some estimates count only those warheads that count against the Treaty while
others count all the warheads that could be carried by the deployed delivery systems.

13 The older Poseidon submarines were in the process of being retired, and the number of missiles and warheads in the
submarine fleet dropped quickly in the early 1990s, to around 2,688 warheads on 336 missiles by 1993. See Natural
Resources Defense Council. Table of U.S. Strategic Offensive Force Loadings. Archive of Nuclear Data.
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab1.asp





Figure 2. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: 1990-2008
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000Number
4000
2000
0
90 92 94 96 98 20 0 0 200 2 200 4 20 0 6 20 0 8
Y ear
Launc her s W ar heads
Source: Natural Resources Defense Council, Archive of Nuclear Data.
According to the data from the Natural Resources Defense Council, the United States reduced its
nuclear weapons from 9,300 warheads on 1,239 delivery vehicles in 1991 to 6,196 warheads on
1,064 delivery vehicles when it completed the implementation of START in 2001. By 2008, the
United States had reduced its forces to approximately 3,500 warheads on around 900 delivery
vehicles. These numbers appear in Figure 2. During the 1990s, the United States continued to add to
its Trident fleet, reaching a total of 18 submarines. It retired all of its remaining Poseidon submarines
and all of the single-warhead Minuteman II missiles. It continued to deploy B-2 bombers, reaching a
total of 21, and removed some of the older B-52G bombers from the nuclear fleet. Consequently, in
2001, its warheads were deployed on 18 Trident submarines with 24 missiles on each submarine and
6 or 8 warheads on each missile; 500 Minuteman III ICBMs, with one or 3 warheads on each
missile; 50 Peacekeeper (MX) missiles, with 10 warheads on each missile; 94 B-52H bombers, with
up to 20 cruise missiles on each bomber; and 21 B-2 bombers with up to 16 bombs on each aircraft.
The United States and Russia signed a second START Treaty in early 1993. Under this Treaty, the
United States would have had to reduce its strategic offensive nuclear weapons to between 3,000
and 3,500 accountable warheads. In 1994, the Department of Defense decided that, to meet this
limit, it would deploy a force of 500 Minuteman III ICBMs with one warhead on each missile, 14
Trident submarines with 24 missiles on each submarine and 5 warheads on each missile, 76 B-52
bombers, and 21 B-2 bombers. The Air Force would eliminate 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs and
reorient the B-1 bombers to non-nuclear missions; the Navy would retire 4 Trident submarines (it
later decided to convert these submarines to carry conventional weapons). This Treaty never
entered into force and Congress prevented the Clinton Administration from reducing U.S. forces
unilaterally to START II limits. Nevertheless, the Navy and Air Force continued to plan for the
forces described above, and eventually implemented those changes. Table 1 displays the forces
the United States had deployed in 2001, after completing the START I reductions. It also includes
those that it would have deployed under START II, in accordance the with 1994 decisions.





Table 1. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces Under START I and START II
Deployed under START I (2001) Planned for START II
System Launchers Accountable Warheadsa Launchers Accountable Warheads
Minuteman III ICBMs 500 1,200 500 500
Peacekeeper ICBMs 50 500 0 0
Trident I Missiles 168 1,008 0 0
Trident II Missiles 264 2,112 336 1,680
B-52 H Bombers (ALCM) 97 970 76 940
B-52 H Bombers (non-47 47 0 0
ALCM)
B-1 Bombersb 90 90 0 0
B-2 Bombers 20 20 21 336
Total 1,237 5,948 933 3,456
a. Under START I, bombers that are not equipped to carry ALCMs count as one warhead, even if they can
carry up 16 nuclear bombs; bombers that are equipped to carry ALCMs count as 10 warheads, even if they
can carry up to 20 ALCMs.
b. Although they still count under START I, B-1 bombers are no longer equipped for nuclear missions.
The Bush Administration stated in late 2001 that the United States would reduce its strategic 14
nuclear forces to 1,700-2,200 “operationally deployed warheads” over the next decade. This
goal was codified in the 2002 Moscow Treaty. According to the Administration, operationally
deployed warheads are those deployed on missiles and stored near bombers on a day-to-day basis.
They are the warheads that would be available immediately, or in a matter of days, to meet 15
“immediate and unexpected contingencies.” The Administration also indicated that the United
States would retain a triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers for the foreseeable future. It
did not, however, offer a rationale for this traditional “triad,” although the points raised in the past
about the differing and complementary capabilities of the systems probably still pertain. Admiral
James Ellis, the former Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) highlighted
this when he noted in a 2005 interview, that the ICBM force provides responsiveness, the SLBM 16
force provides survivability, and bombers provide flexibility and recall capability.
The Bush Administration did not specify how it would reduce the U.S. arsenal from around 6,000
warheads to the lower level of 2,200 operationally deployed warheads, although it did identify
some force structure changes that would account for part of the reductions. Specifically, after

14 President Bush announced the U.S. intention to reduce its forces on November 13, 2001, during a summit with
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. The United States and Russia codified these reductions in a Treaty signed in May
2002. See CRS Report RL31448, Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, by Amy F. Woolf.
15 U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Statement of the Honorable Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of Defense
For Policy. February 14, 2002.
16 Hebert, Adam. The Future Missile Force. Air Force Magazine. October 2005.





Congress removed its restrictions,17 the United States would eliminate the 50 Peacekeeper
ICBMs, reducing by 500 the total number of operationally deployed ICBM warheads. It would
also continue with plans to remove 4 Trident submarines from service, and convert those ships to
carry non-nuclear guided missiles. These submarines would have counted as 476 warheads under
the START Treaty’s rules. These changes reduced U.S. forces to around 5,000 warheads on 950
delivery vehicles in 2006; this reduction appears in Figure 2. The Bush Administration also noted
that two of the Trident submarines remaining in the fleet would be in overhaul at any given time.
The warheads that could be carried on those submarines would not count against the Moscow
Treaty limits because they would not be “operationally deployed.” This would further reduce the
U.S. deployed force by 200-400 warheads.
The Bush Administration, through the 2005 Strategic Capabilities Assessment and 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review, announced additional changes in U.S. ICBMs, SLBMs, and
bomber forces; these include the elimination of 50 Minuteman III missiles and several hundred
air-launched cruise missiles. (These are discussed in more detail below.) It is not clear whether
these changes would reduce the number of operationally deployed warheads enough to meet the
Treaty limit of 2,200 warheads. The outcome depends on how many warheads are carried by each
of the remaining Trident and Minuteman missiles and how many bomber weapons remain in the
U.S. arsenal. The United States could reach the Treaty limits by reducing the number of delivery
vehicles, by reducing the number of warheads carried on each delivery vehicle, or by altering the
way it counts the warheads on its delivery vehicles.
Unlike START, the Moscow Treaty does not contain definitions or counting rules that help
determine the number of treaty-accountable warheads. It also does not contain any monitoring
provisions that would assist the nations in verifying compliance with the Treaty. Further, neither
side has to declare how many warheads are deployed on any particular type of delivery vehicle.
Theoretically, each missile could carry a different number of warheads without either side having
to reveal the individual loadings, or even the loadings attributed to any given portion of the force.
Each simply has to declare the total number of warheads that it has designated as “operationally
deployed” and that it, therefore, counts under the Treaty limits.
Table 2 identifies an illustrative force structure that the United States might deploy under the
Moscow Treaty, and compares it with U.S. operational strategic nuclear forces in 2008. This
structure is consistent with the statements and adjustments the Administration has made, to date,
but does not postulate any further reductions in the number of delivery vehicles. The table also
displays a range for the number of warheads that could be carried by each “leg” of the triad, even
though, as was just noted, this estimate remains highly speculative.

17 Beginning in FY1996, and continuing through the end of the Clinton Administration, Congress had prohibited the
use of any DOD funds for the elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, below START I levels, until START II
entered into force. See, for example, the FY1998 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 105-85, Sec. 1302). Congress lifted
this restriction in the FY2002 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 107-107, Sec. 1031).





Table 2. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces 2006 and Illustrative Strategic Nuclear Forces
Under the Moscow Treaty
Forces in 2008 Possible forces in 2012
System a
Launchers Accountable Launchers Operational Warheads
Warheads
Minuteman III ICBMs 450 1,200 450 450-600
Trident II Missiles 336 2,688 264b 1,056-1,152
B-52H Bombers 95 950 56c 300-550
B-2 Bombers 21 336 20d 200-350
Total 952 5,174 932 2,20
Source: U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet; CRS Estimates
a. These estimates are highly speculative, but reflect reports of possible changes in deployed forces.
b. The launcher total for Trident submarines counts only 12 vessels, excluding the 2 submarines in overhaul.
c. Congress rejected the Air Force plan for the B-52 fleet, and, in the FY2007 Defense Authorization Act,
mandated that the Air Force retain 75 B-52 bombers through 2018; however, the number of weapons that
would count under the Moscow Treaty is not affected by the number of deployed bombers.
d. The number of B-2 bombers has declined by one, after a B-2 crashed on take-off from Guam on late
February 2008.


In the late 1980s, the United States deployed 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs, each with 10 warheads, at
F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. The 1993 START II Treaty would have banned multiple
warhead ICBMs, so the United States would have had to eliminate these missiles while
implementing the Treaty. Therefore, the Pentagon began planning for their elimination, and the
Air Force added funds to its budget for this purpose in 1994. However, beginning in FY1998,
Congress prohibited the Clinton Administration from spending any money on the deactivation or
retirement of these missiles until START II entered into force. The Bush Administration requested
$14 million in FY2002 to begin the missiles’ retirement; Congress lifted the restriction and
authorized the funding. The Air Force began to deactivate the missiles in October 2002, and
completed the process, having removed all the missiles from their silos, in September 2005. The
MK21 reentry vehicles and W87 warheads from these missiles have been placed in storage. As is
noted below, the Air Force plans to redeploy some of these warheads and reentry vehicles on
Minuteman III missiles, under the Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle (SERV) program.
Under the terms of START, the United States would have had to eliminate the Peacekeeper
missile silos to remove the warheads on the missiles from accountability under the Treaty limits.
However, the Air Force has chosen to retain the silos. Therefore, the warheads that were deployed





on the Peacekeeper missiles still count under START, even though the missiles are no longer
operational. The United States will not, however, count these warheads under the limits in the
Moscow Treaty.
The U.S. force of Minuteman III ICBMs has declined recently from 500 to 450 missiles. These
missile are located at three Air Force bases—F.E. Warren AFB in Wyoming, Malmstrom AFB in
Montana, and Minot AFB in North Dakota. Each base houses 150 missiles.
In the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Pentagon indicated that it planned to
“reduce the number of deployed Minuteman III ballistic missiles from 500 to 450, beginning in 18
Fiscal Year 2007.” The QDR did not indicate which base was likely to lose a squadron of
missiles, although, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General James E.
Cartwright, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), indicated that the
missiles would likely come from Malmstrom because that would leave each base with an equal 19th
number of 150 ICBMs. The Air Force deactivated the missiles in Malmstrom’s 564 Missile 20
Squadron, which is known as the “odd squad.” This designation reflects that these missiles were
built and installed by General Electric, while all other Minuteman missiles were built by Boeing,
and that these missiles use a different communications and launch control system than all the
other Minuteman missiles. According to Air Force Space Command, the drawdown began on July
1, 2007. All of the reentry vehicles were removed from the missiles in early 2008; reports indicate
that the missiles were all removed from their silos by the end of July 2008 and the squadron was 21
deactivated by the end of August.
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Cartwright stated that the Air
Force had decided to retire these missiles so that they could serve as test assets for the remaining
force. He noted that the Air Force had to “keep a robust test program all the way through the life 22
of the program.” With the current available assets, the test program would begin to run short
around 2017 or 2018. The added test assets would support the program through 2025 or longer.
This time line, however, raises questions about why the Air Force has pressed to begin retiring the
missiles in FY2007, 10 years before it runs out of test assets. Some have speculated that the
elimination of the 50 missiles is intended to reduce the long term operations and maintenance th
costs for the fleet, particularly since the 564 Squadron uses different ground control technologies
and training systems than the remainder of the fleet. This option is not likely, however, to produce
budgetary savings in the near-term as the added cost of deactivating the missiles could exceed the 23
reductions in operations and maintenance expenses. In addition, to use these missiles as test

18 U.S. Department of Defense. Report of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. Washington, February 2006. p. 50.
19 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on Global Strike Plans and Programs. Testimony of James E.
Cartwright, Commander U.S. Strategic Command. March 29, 2006.
20 Johnson, Peter. Growth Worries Base Boosters. Great Falls Tribune. January 19, 2006.
21 Global Security Newswire. U.S. Deactivates 50 Strategic Missiles. August 4, 2008.
22 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on Global Strike Plans and Programs. Testimony of James E.
Cartwright, Commander U.S. Strategic Command. March 29, 2006.
23 Private communication.





assets, the Air Force will include them in the modernization programs described below. This
would further limit the budgetary savings. At the same time, after removing the missiles, the Air
Force will retain the silos at Malmstrom, and will not destroy or eliminate them.
Retiring these missiles might also allow the Air Force to reduce the number of officers needed to
operate the Minuteman fleet and to transfer these officers to different positions, although, again,
the numbers are likely to be small. Nevertheless, by retiring these missiles, both STRATCOM and
the Air Force can participate in the ongoing effort to transform the Pentagon in response to post-
Cold War threats. These missiles may still have a role to play in U.S. national security strategy,
but they may not be needed in the numbers that were required when the United States faced the
Soviet threat.
Congress questioned the Administration’s rationale for this plan to retire 50 Minuteman missiles.
In the FY2007 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5122, Sec. 139), Congress stated that DOD could
not spend any money to begin the withdrawal of these missiles from the active force until the
Secretary of Defense submitted a report that addressed a number of issues, including (1) a
detailed justification for the proposal to reduce the force from 500 to 450 missiles; (2) a detailed
analysis of the strategic ramifications of continuing to equip a portion of the force with multiple
independent warheads rather than single warheads; (3) an assessment of the test assets and spares
required to maintain a force of 500 missiles and a force of 450 missiles through 2030; (4) an
assessment of whether halting upgrades to the missiles withdrawn from the deployed force would
compromise their ability to serve as test assets; and (5) a description of the plan for extending the
life of the Minuteman III missile force beyond FY2030. The Secretary of Defense submitted this
report to Congress in late March 2007. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, on March 28, 2007, General Cartwright noted that
the Air Force was prepared to begin reducing the number of deployed Minuteman III missiles in 24
April 2007.
Each Minuteman III was initially deployed with 3 warheads, for a total of 1,500 warheads across
the force. In 2001, to meet the START limit of 6,000 warheads, the United States removed 2 25
warheads from each of the 150 Minuteman missiles at F.E. Warren AFB, reducing the
Minuteman III force to 1,200 total warheads. In the process, the Air Force also removed and
destroyed the “bulkhead,” the platform on the reentry vehicle, so that, in accordance with START
rules, these missiles can no longer carry 3 warheads.
Under START II, the United States would have had to download all the Minuteman III missiles to
one warhead each. Although the Bush Administration initially endorsed the plan to download all
Minuteman ICBMs, this plan has apparently changed. In an interview with Air Force Magazine
in October 2003, General Robert Smolen indicated that the Air Force would maintain the ability 26
to deploy these 500 missiles with up to 800 warheads. Although some analysts interpreted this
statement to mean that the Minuteman ICBMs would carry 800 warheads on a day-to-day basis, it

24 U.S. Congress. Senate. Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. Fiscal Year 2008 Strategic
Forces Program Budget. Hearing. March 28, 2007.
25 See Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2006. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
January/February 2006.
26 Hebert, Adam. The Future Missile Force. Air Force Magazine. October 2005.





seems more likely that this was a reference to the Air Force intent to maintain the ability to reload 27
warheads, and reconstitute the force, if circumstances changed. The NPR had indicated that the
United States would maintain the flexibility to do this. However, in testimony before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, General Cartwright also indicated that some Minuteman missiles
might carry more than one warhead. Specifically, when discussing the reduction from 500 to 450
missiles, he said, “this is not a reduction in the number of warheads deployed. They will just 28
merely be re-distributed on the missiles.” Major General Deppe confirmed that the Air Force
would retain some Minuteman III missiles with more than one warhead when he noted, in a
speech in mid-April 2007, that the remaining 450 Minuteman III missiles could be deployed with 29
one, two, or three warheads.
In addition, as is noted below, the Navy may remove nearly 100 nuclear warheads from its
Trident missiles if it deploys some of these missiles with conventional warheads. These warheads
could be distributed to other Trident missiles, or the Air Force might add an equivalent number of
warheads to its Minuteman missiles. Consequently, it seems possible that, as the United States
adjusts its forces in the coming years, it could reduce its Minuteman force to 450 missiles, deploy
500-600 warheads on those missiles, and retain the ability to deploy up to 800 warheads on
Minuteman missiles under certain circumstances.
Several factors are likely to affect the decision on the final number of warheads carried on
Minuteman missiles. First, as was noted above, 150 Minuteman missiles have been
“downloaded” to a single warhead under START rules, and, therefore can no longer carry
additional warheads. That leaves, at most, 300 missiles that could carry 2 or 3 warheads. Second,
the Air Force is planning to deploy its Minuteman missiles with the MK21 reentry vehicles
removed from Peacekeeper ICBMs under the SERV program. Some of the modified missiles will
carry a single W-87 warhead, but the Air Force has not indicated how many missiles will be 30
limited to this single warhead configuration. As a result, only a portion of the Minuteman fleet
will still be able to carry more than one warhead. Finally, the United States has committed to
retain no more than 2,200 operationally deployed warheads on its strategic forces. Increases in the
number of Minuteman warheads, above the 500-600 expected on the downloaded force, would
necessitate reductions in either bomber weapons or Trident warheads.
The Air Force is currently pursuing several programs to improve the accuracy and reliability of
the Minuteman fleet and to extend the missiles’ service lives. According to some estimates, this 31
effort could eventually cost $6-7 billion. This section describes several of the key programs in
this effort.

27 See, for example, Jeffrey Lewis. STRATCOM Hearts MIRV. ArmsControlWonk.com, January 30, 2006.
28 See, U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on Global Strike Plans and Programs. Testimony of James
E. Cartwright, Commander U.S. Strategic Command. March 29, 2006.
29 Sirak, Michael. Air Force Prepared To Draaw Down Minuteman III Fleet by 50 Missiles. Defense Daily. April 17,
2007.
30 Sirak, Michael. Minuteman Fleet has Life Beyond 2020, Says Senior Air Force Space Official. Defense Daily. June
14, 2006.
31 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2006. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
January/February 2006.





The program began in 1998 and seeks to replace the propellant, the solid rocket fuel, in the
Minuteman motors to extend the life of the rocket motors. A consortium led by Northrup
Grumman is pouring the new fuel into the first and second stages and remanufacturing the third
stages of the missiles. According to the Air Force, as of early August, 2007, 325 missiles, or 72%
of the fleet, had completed the PRP program; this number increased to around 80% by mid-2008.
The Air Force purchased the final 56 booster sets, for a total of 601, with its funding in FY2008. 32
The Air Force expects to complete the PRP program by 2013. In the FY2007 Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 109-364) and the FY2007 Defense Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-289), the th

109 Congress indicated that it would not support efforts to end this program early.


The Guidance Replacement Program has extended the service life of the Minuteman missiles’
guidance set, and improved the maintainability and reliability of guidance sets. It replaced aging
parts with more modern and reliable technologies, while maintaining the accuracy of the 33
missiles. Flight testing for the new system began in 1998, and, at the time, it exceeded its
operational requirements. Production began in 2000, and the Air Force purchased 652 of the new
guidance units. Press reports indicate that the system had some problems with accuracy during its 34
testing program. The Air Force eventually identified and corrected the problems in 2002 and
2003. According to the Air Force, 425 Minuteman III missiles were upgraded with the new
guidance packages as of early August, 2007. The Air Force had been taking delivery of 5-7 new
guidance units each month, for a total of 652 units, and expects the final delivery to occur in 35
February 2009. Installation is likely to be completed between 2010 and 2012.
The REACT targeting system was first installed in Minuteman launch control centers in the mid-
1990s. This technology allowed for a significant reduction in the amount of time it would take to
re-target the missiles, automated routine functions to reduce the workload for the crews, and 36
replaced obsolete equipment. In 2006, the Air Force began to deploy a modernized version of
this system to extend its service life and to update the command and control capability of the
launch control centers. This program will allow for more rapid retargeting of ICBMs, a capability
identified in the Nuclear Posture Review as essential to the future nuclear force The Air Force
completed this effort in late 2006.

32 Sirak, Michael. Minuteman Fleet has Life Beyond 2020, Says Senior Air Force Space Official. Defense Daily. June
14, 2006.
33 LGM Minuteman III Modernization. Globalsecurity.org
34 Donnelly, John M. Air Force Defends Spending Half A Billion on Iffy ICBMs. Defense Week. September 10, 2001.
p. 1.
35 Hebert, Adam. The Future Missile Force. Air Force Magazine. October 2005.
36 LGM Minuteman III Modernization. Globalsecurity.org





As was noted above, under the SERV program, the Air Force plans to deploy MK21/W-87 reentry
vehicles removed from Peacekeeper ICBMs on the Minuteman missiles, replacing the older
MK12/W62 and MK12A/W78 reentry vehicles. To do this, the Air Force must modify the
software, change the mounting on the missile, and change the support equipment. According to
Air Force Space Command, the SERV program conducted three flight tests in 2005 and cancelled 37
a fourth test because the first three were so successful. The Air Force installed 20 of the kits for
the new reentry vehicles on the Minuteman missiles at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in 2006. The
process began at Malmstrom in July 2007 and at Minot in July 2008. As of early August 2007, 47
missiles had been modified. The Air Force plans to continue to purchase additional modification
kits through 2009, and to complete the installation process by 2012.
The Air Force began to explore its options for a new missile to replace the Minuteman III in

2002, with the intent to begin deploying a new missile in 2018. It reportedly produced a “mission 38


needs statement” at that time, and then began an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) in 2004. In
June 2006, Lt. General Frank Klotz indicated that, after completing the AOA, Space Command
had decided to recommend “an evolutionary approach to the replacement of the Minuteman III 39
capability,” which would continue to modernize the components of the existing missiles rather
than begin from scratch to develop and produce new missiles. He indicated that this
recommendation had not yet been approved, and was still working its way through the Pentagon.
However, he indicated that Space Command supported this approach because it would be less
costly than designing a new system “from scratch.” With this plan in place, the Air Force now
plans to maintain the Minuteman fleet through 2025 or beyond.
This approach could ensure the long-term future of the ICBM fleet. A more expensive “new”
program could face cost-cutting pressures in both the Pentagon and Congress. In addition, budget
limits could lead to pressures to reduce the number of missiles, leading to a further contraction of
the ICBM fleet. On the other hand, some might argue that a new ICBM program would
demonstrate a stronger long-term commitment by the Air Force to its ICBM fleet. It might appear
easier to withdraw funding and support from the ICBM fleet if the Air Force decides to
modernize, maintain, and extend the existing missiles, rather than to pursue new, and possibly
more capable, technologies.
The U.S. fleet of ballistic missile submarines consists of 14 Trident submarines, each equipped to
carry 24 Trident missiles. The fleet currently carries a total of around 1,725 warheads.

37 Lt. Gen. Frank G. Klotz, Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command. Transcript of Speech to the National
Defense University Breakfast. June 13, 2006.
38 Selinger, Mark. Minuteman Replacement Study Expected to Begin Soon. Aerospace Daily and Defense Report. June
25, 2004.
39 Lt. Gen. Frank G. Klotz, Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command. Transcript of Speech to the National
Defense University Breakfast. June 13, 2006.





By the early 1990s, the United States had completed the deployment of 18 Trident ballistic
missile submarines (SSBNs). Each of these submarines was equipped to carry 24 Trident
missiles, and each missile could carry up to 8 warheads (either W-76 warheads or the larger W-88
warheads on the Trident II missile). The Navy initially deployed 8 of these submarines at Bangor,
Washington, and all 8 were equipped with the older Trident I missile. It then deployed 10
submarines, all equipped with the Trident II missile, at Kings Bay, Georgia. During the 1994
Nuclear Posture Review, the Clinton Administration decided that the United States would reduce
the size of its Trident fleet to 14 submarines, and that four of the older submarines would be
“backfit” to carry the Trident II missile.
The Bush Administration’s 2001 Nuclear Posture Review endorsed the plan to “backfit” 4 of the
Trident submarines so that all would carry Trident II missiles. It also indicated that, instead of
retiring the remaining 4 submarines, the Navy would convert them to carry conventional
weapons, and designated them “guided missile” submarines (SSGNs). Consequently, the U.S.
ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force currently consists of 14 Trident submarines, with 7
based at Bangor, Washington, 5 based at Kings Bay, Georgia, and 2 in overhaul as they are
equipped to carry Trident II missiles. This section describes many of the plans and programs that
are changing this force.
The Navy has nearly completed the process of converting 4 Trident submarines (the USS Ohio,
USS Michigan, USS Florida, and USS Georgia) to carry conventional cruise missiles and other
conventional weapons. Reports indicate that the conversion process took approximately $1 billion
and two years for each of the 4 submarines. The SSGNs will be able to carry 154 Tomahawk 40
cruise missiles, along with up to 100 special forces troops and their mini-submarines.
The first two submarines scheduled for this conversion were removed from the nuclear fleet in
early 2003. They were slated to receive their engineering overhaul, then to begin the conversion 41
process in 2004. The first to complete the process, the USS Ohio returned to service as an 42
SSGN in January 2006 and achieved operational status on November 1, 2007. According to the
Navy, the Georgia is scheduled for deployment in March 2008, and the other submarines were 43
scheduled to reach that status later in the year. According to Admiral Stephen Johnson, the
Director of the Navy’s Strategic Submarine Program (SSP), all four of the submarines had
returned to service by mid-2008, and two were forward-deployed on routine patrols.

40Connolly, Allison. For Four Subs, Its Good-bye Ballistic Missiles, Hello SEALs. Norfolk Virginia Pilot. December
18, 2004.
41 Ohio Class SSGN Tactical Trident. GlobalSecurity.org http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/ssgn-
726.htm
42 First Trident Submarine Converted. Associated Press. January 10, 2006.
43 U.S. Congress. Senate. Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. Fiscal Year 2008 Strategic
Forces Program Budget. Hearing. Prepared statement of Mr. Brian R. Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Strategic Capabilities, p. 6. March 28, 2007. See also, Guided Missile Submarine Ohio Ready for Deployment. Inside
the Navy, November 5, 2007.





As was noted above, both the 1994 and 2001 Nuclear Posture Reviews confirmed that the Navy
would “backfit” four Trident submarines so that they could carry the newer Trident II (D-5)
missile. This process would not only allow the Navy to replace the aging C-4 missiles, it would
also equip the fleet with a missile that has improved accuracy and a larger payload. With its
greater range, it would allow the submarines to operate in a larger area and cover a greater range
of targets. These characteristics were valued when the system was designed and the United States
sought to enhance its ability to deter the Soviet Union. The Bush Administration believes that the
range, payload, and flexibility of the Trident submarines and D-5 missiles remain relevant in an
era when the United States may seek to deter or defeat a wider range of adversaries.
Four of the eight Trident submarines based in Bangor, Washington (USS Alaska, USS Nevada,
USS Henry M. Jackson and USS Alabama) are a part of the backfit program. The Alaska and
Nevada both began the process in 2001; the Alaska completed its backfit and rejoined the fleet in
March 2002 and the Nevada did the same in August 2002. During the process, the submarines
underwent a pre-planned engineered refueling overhaul, which accomplishes a number of
maintenance objectives, including refueling of the reactor; repairing and upgrading some
equipment, replacing obsolete equipments, repairing or upgrading the ballistic missile systems, 44
and other minor alterations. The submarines also are fit with the Trident II missiles and the
operating systems that are unique to these missiles. According to the Navy, both of these efforts
came in ahead of schedule and under budget. The Henry M. Jackson and Alabama are scheduled
to compete their engineering overhaul and backfit in FY2006 and to reenter the fleet in 2007 and

2008.


The last of the Trident I (C-4) missiles was removed from the fleet in October 2004, when the
USS Alabama off-loaded its missiles and began the overhaul and backfit process. All the Trident 45
submarines currently in the U.S. fleet now carry the Trident II missile.
When the Navy first decided, in the mid-1990s, to maintain a Trident fleet with 14 submarines, it
planned to “balance” the fleet by deploying 7 Trident submarines at each of the two Trident bases.
The Navy would have transferred 3 submarines from Kings Bay to Bangor, after 4 of the
submarines from Bangor were removed from the ballistic missile fleet, for a balance of 7
submarines at each base. However, these plans changed after the Bush Administration’s Nuclear
Posture Review. The Navy has transferred 5 submarines to Bangor, “balancing” the fleet by
basing 9 submarines at Bangor and 5 submarines at Kings Bay. Because two submarines would
be in overhaul at any given time, this basing plan means that 7 submarines would be operational
at Bangor and 5 would be operational at Kings Bay.
According to unclassified reports, the Navy began moving Trident submarines from Kings Bay to 46
Bangor in 2002, and transferred the fifth submarine in September 2005. This change in basing

44 SSBN-726 Ohio-Class FBM Submarines, GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/ssbn-726-
recent.htm
45 Morris, Jefferson. Older Trident Missiles to be Phased out by Fall, Admiral Says. Aerospace Daily and Defense
Report. June 17, 2005.
46 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2006. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
(continued...)





pattern apparently reflects changes in the international security environment, with fewer targets
within range of submarines operating in the Atlantic, and a greater number of targets within range
of submarines operating in the Pacific. In particular, the shift allows the United States to improve 47
its coverage of targets in China and North Korea. Further, as the United States modifies its
nuclear targeting objectives, and, particularly, if it deploys conventional warheads on Trident
submarines, it could alter the patrol routes for the submarines operating in both oceans, so that a
greater number of emerging targets would be within range of the submarines in a short amount of
time.
The Trident I (C-4) and Trident II (D-5) missiles can be equipped to carry up to 8 warheads each.
Under the terms of the START Treaty, the United States can remove warheads from Trident
missiles, and reduce the number listed in the data base, a process known as downloading, to
comply with the Treaty’s limit of 6,000 warheads. The United States took advantage of this
provision as it reduced its forces under START, reducing to 6 warheads per missile on the 8 48
Trident submarines based at Bangor, Washington.
The Navy may also have begun to reduce the number of warheads on the other Trident
submarines, as this will be necessary to allow the United States to reduce its forces to the 2,200
deployed warheads permitted under the Moscow Treaty. The United States does not have to reach
this limit until 2012, but, according to some reports, would rather reduce its forces gradually than 49
adjust them suddenly in the last few years before the Treaty’s deadline. As it reduces to the level
in the Moscow Treaty, however, the United States will not have to indicate how many warheads
are deployed on each missile; it will simply have to declare a total number of operationally
deployed warheads on all of its strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. To meet the limit however, it
is likely to deploy an average of 4 warheads on each Trident II missile.
The Navy initially planned to keep Trident submarines in service for 30 years, but has now
extended that time period to 42 years. This extension reflects the judgment that ballistic missiles
submarines would have operated with less demanding missions than attack submarines, and
could, therefore, be expected to have a much longer operating life than the expected 30 year life
of attack submarines. Therefore, since 1998, the Navy has assumed that each Trident submarine
would have an expected operating lifetime of at least 42 years, with two 20-year operating cycles 50
separated by a two-year refueling overhaul. The Navy has also pursued a number of programs to
ensure that it has enough missiles to support this extended life for the submarines.

(...continued)
January/February 2006.
47 Ibid.
48 Even though 4 of these submarines are being converted to SSGNs, they still count under the START Treaty because
they still have SLBM launch tubes. Each of those tubes count as 6 warheads. See U.S. Department of State. Bureau of
Verification, Compliance, and Implementation. START Aggregate Number of Strategic Offensive Arms. April 1, 2006.
49 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2006. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
January/February 2006.
50 SSBN Ohio-Class FBM Submarines. GlobalSecurity.org,





The Navy purchased 425 Trident II (D-5) missiles through FY2005. After finalizing the plan to
deploy all 14 Trident submarines with D-5 missiles, the Navy extended Trident production
through 2013, and now expects to purchase 561 Trident missiles, at a rate of 12-24 missiles per 51
year. The Navy expects to maintain a fleet of 12 operational Trident submarines, with 24
missiles on each submarine, but it would need more than the 288 missiles that would fill these
submarines. Around 50 of the missiles would be available for use by Great Britain in its Trident
submarines. The remainder would support the missile’s test program throughout the life of the
Trident system. The Navy requested $220 million towards the purchase of Trident missiles in
FY2007, $211.5 million in FY2008, and $186.3 million in FY2009.
The Navy has also begun a life extension program for the Trident II missiles, so that they will
remain capable and reliable throughout the 45-year life of the Trident submarines. The Navy
requested nearly $700 million to support this program in FY2007, $457.7 million in FY2008 and
$487.4 million in FY2009. According to the Navy, this funding will sustain efforts to redesign the 52
guidance system and missile electronics to extend the life of the missiles. The Navy expects the
refurbished missiles to reach their IOC in 2013.
The overwhelming majority of Trident missiles are deployed with the MK4/W76 warhead, which, 53
according to unclassified estimates, has a yield of 100 kilotons. It is nearing the end of its
service life and is currently undergoing a life extension program that is designed to enhance its
capabilities. According to some reports, the Navy had initially planned to apply this program to
around 25% of the W76 warheads, but has increased that plan to cover more than 60% of the
stockpile.
Several questions have come up during the life extension program. For example, some weapons
experts have questioned whether the warhead’s design is reliable enough to ensure that the 54
warheads will explode at its intended yield. In addition, in June 2006, an inspector general’s
report from the Department of Energy questioned the management practices at the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which is responsible for the life extension program,
arguing that management problems had led to delays and created cost overruns in the program.
This has raised questions about whether NNSA will be able to meet the September 2007 delivery 55
date for the warhead. Further, NNSA has noted that it plans to eventually phase out the life
extension program, and use the new Reliable Replacement Warhead program to develop a

51 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2006. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
January/February 2006.
52 U.S. Department of Defense. Department of the Navy. Fiscal Year 2007Budget Estimate Submission. Justification of
Estimates. February 2006. p. 13.
53 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2006. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
January/February 2006.
54 Fleck, John. Flaws Seen in Sub-Launched Nuclear Warhead. Albuquerque Journal. July 8, 2004.
55 Costa, Keith J. IG: Project Weaknesses put W-76 Warhead Refurbishment Plan at Risk. InsideDefense.Com June 8,
2006.





replacement for the W-76 warhead,56 but Congress has not funded the studies supporting the
development of the RRW.
In the report of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Pentagon called for the deployment of 57
conventional warheads on a portion of its Trident SLBMs. According to DOD’s plan, the Navy
would deploy two Trident missiles on each submarine with conventional warheads and deploy 4
warheads deployed on each of these missiles, for a total force of 96 conventional warheads. This
would provide the United States with the capability to launch conventional warheads against
targets around the world in less than an hour, a capability that does not now exist unless U.S.
forces are forward-based in the region where the targets might be. This is a part of STRATCOM’s
plan for the Prompt Global Strike mission. The Navy requested $127 million for FY2007 to begin
this program, but Congress did not authorize or appropriate the funding in the FY2007 Defense
Authorization or Defense Appropriations bills, instead questioning the need for and intentions of
the program, while raising concerns about the possibility that other nations might misinterpret the
launch of a conventional Trident missile.
The Navy requested $175 million for this program in FY2008. The House Armed Services
Committee, in its version of the FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 1585, H.Rept. 110-
146), approved the request for $126.4 million for continued research and development on the
reentry vehicle, and authorized $16 million for procurement, but reduced the budget request by
$33 million, withholding all funds for long-lead procurement. The Senate Armed Services
Committee, in its version of the FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill (S. 1547, S.Rept. 110-77),
recommended that no funding be provided speciquested $175 million lifebal StriCTMthe new Reliabry Tridenvehicle, ad speciqbal StriCTMtterations.8221; tpe missgon. Ths Navyby
ensure t,96 convennse$208rement, bckfitRpoocreated/> deve96 8221; tco7;s p in tlhis he 2006n to 2008 Defense Aution Bill (S. 1547, S.R02, andimarinrthorizat( 146), appro4nded StriConfghtnp>dhe Treatbiand inten007 Defenseaavy groug217ued SBome rse Aution Bill s, instead queBhe oneor of the NaConfghtnp>dRQuadrenne Aution Bill (S. 1547, S.RBo evestain efford S$1ort this pJune .5 million 9,inten007 Defe reliasenseaavy groug217uedReliabuthorize and devel in 2ticuo-year reicle, ad speciqbal StriCTMts has raised quesgun a life to app>o e the br/> Thn for2;oal wfor use bgeting oalle175ad of In the Vid beia/> nd 5 woulherefore, sinciral Stephen Johnson, the
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51 Robress. Senate. Armed Services Committee,,ommittee on Strategic Forces. Fiscal YearheStrategic
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sup>tgrams FBM Nidedly 8, 20ab. Normoun<, >rces PdofPrmoun<, >rces P thern Sc Stly 8, anrmoun<,>ap06. B<>06. B>llo SE Rilesrs Ri>onap>tatup> 8, 2006. bt005. tuuup>


pattern apparently 425Air/sup>elhae , inowhercutelopment d-52 ional Tn/> areocc warieaty,the < two10-15sion refweapogram, as
ates may seek to deter /> ThcleaTr2006nup>elttrgh ough missilerident missilreaty. Thetions hnited States o ree5ad of < missileridenty to efeat a ninesig76cd-52 bo Post, inowal,rating syseek to deter ninesiaTr2006numarional Tri9eployed aircraft trently 425efense Review, the Pentagon calployment of f vygnclec7rhebr/> $33 millin
thiee5ad of < missallyAir/sup>elhis programthat no ng r>18 bo thiostureuse Armed SeAssally2. Duplan meae QDRployment of and deper deployp> Po e missiles anrding to som usnd inten007 these <. Accort to avefueli26.4 mng rwarheIn the 38 aircraft tTby Air/sup>elhae emenf < missiles from warheadseting ono
f these mbo gram. Tho Committee, iversion of G/> rep J. Ds E. uartwrthe d StriComhan nance objectbr/> pla,ns to eventu8221; tntentixtbr/> re, S.Rrts haveese This tw.by
G/> rep uartwrthe rextenee5ad of < misf thespit The Navy requests the f and
or of the NaAir/sup>elhident and devbae of 4 wad-52 bo woNavy w trently, the submar/> thi
$p> Post, inowalueof 96with two8217;s < while raid-52 ionalServices elt of mng some aircraftaccordiallyAir/sup>el and bae niW-76 e Autd-52 , it aocemeho ma8217;s < FY2ubmarineein FY2008.o jch iat,to enhatest itslongtrithe Na requ, S.Rra Washingon Navy requesttions of cniclesole throubo re, S.Rf taowsometions of ent. rines e missiles ans Navyording to some ervices elae ning r>18nd-52 aircraft,imoresdetedto enhate lifetimeided ted ta requ, S.Rram, but Coets the f and e,ns tt problemaed ted ta requ, S.et the <8221; tpeut th ourfconventionas Navyogtrit/sup6eads will expl33 mirn themissiles anThis i eftxtension imom grawar.by
TtriConfghtnp>d s18 aircraftployed anistratioorceequestbmar dhad in,ibndlhan ot problemallyAir/sup>elninesigawith two 4 8221; tcombe <. Accocodedby
aircrafte ervselnis Nau, S.etin tae nim
W-76 eccording 8,ntapccordiaocemeent. rines vy exp Navyoaircraftp8221; t, it oqu antapemerginges not now les thatnd-52H>modeloaircraftby
atnesiaTrto appl bmarine submarineses not nownvent mightcng a drn rI . uthorizerextensdetedto enhided spsatrol ron milnt lamthat no ng r> elorceecow T dhad in lamuthorizerese <. AccodescriblongtriAir/sup>elhis ead,modern Approprise Autd-52,gd-1,uatinB-2Tho arebo 6;swted ge oatbr/> Po eampaign ;by
a in clec7, S.Rise Authe prr raducjch lonvy exp von m gra are requ, S.etfundingd-52HTho m. Tho elttrgh oughating syrding to som gram. Tho elttrgh ough, but Coe
sbe niW-76 fuelingcemeho
51 Ro0S. Dete. Armple on Stmed Servicices Comllo SEA>inestS.R>idlSeciness 8, p>an atrescojecgdaaTs Comond. S. Nnuard Serv

ranuarmermn4 mplee 5, 2007>S. Decgic
>mpleeh 2une>s, b06. Buu


5abress. Senatumple on Stmed Services Com of

recrtmtebem 8, cgm W
on Sl Yearheu51 Rollo SEp>uport. J<, apsup>ua06. B<aup>h 2. <5,sup>.p>u3p>.5acS. Deress. Ses Comen. Arvy. Fistsup>accfense. Dggreg

8, ecgem W
on S Dup>al Year 2007BT.>port. J< W
5 p>.a, uuup>aup>h 2. <9, /sup>


5a55


> pattern apparently 425Air/sup>elee5ad of < missallyrQuadrenne Autho sbe niadyears beffic nuclsu07p .5 milloted thaars ield oarebn217;s dea/> Committee, iversion of t425Air/sup>elee5ad of < missitp>v
> $487.4 mdgmeampsgton. rksda $5Air/sup>el02, andase; the aircrafteet the Skept years, butthrouheh06, an imorendicate h/supivr> 5rn apparentlyupp>49es. uthorize possaats a o jch longtist, inowal.>he 2006horization Bill (S. 1547, S.Rept. rently. 110-
Sec. 13ded uthorize han of < misst425Air/sup>elf 12 operational Tri74 d-52 d 5 wooo aircrafte ew Ssuddenlydiainst sbe e its of TtriConfghtnp>d sbe insuflecient l Ssudden 2007ent. rines Navyo33 mirnr upgort of the to suMay med7f t425Air/sup>elee5ad of < missitpp>he ecidf < missallytixtbr/> re, S.Rho 6rn apparentlyer/> sbe ms progatinsubse lisubmS. expeitper/> sincoruadive expethe lrheahationersu suse lierding to som,ntapaigunms progoptd q,bae lauilliur, nt. rines Navyording to som,nating syrand deper lydiainsr/> enecis S.R02, anads against pla calp, but Coetngu submarnne AutQDR/> expee the tP the depamenf < missthe adenvehicle, ad-52 bo sbe nimor $1t of Enertnicles requestedBoto launes Post33 mill, extenfo>u ingon Navyaent submarallyAir/sup>elae mnal bmarin FY2ads against t the
el02, anaid,ahe Po tnicles request efemsma pro oal gram. Tfa;s would pro25Air/sup>elesadent/> ron proono
bmarinergan Appropalrr raducco t comcr/> u gon Navytnicles request illion in 8221; tbeiniigadiveby
Acccnicles e launcg we weapons
ally phase o8221; tsuabd-upby
a d-52 bo 8ntional warheCoe u gmillion lifeon Navytnicles request.nWh/le adenvehid-52 bo cnicles exercistoo purclepend ick subma pro25aircrafttinhat osq RevS.Rbimarnotd. Fu of bmarineions.ck subma imorendicanim el02, anhoptooesesadenttrgh endicaup>
Tcpee the tvalul gram. Ttnicles request.nrentlyu

51 Rooress. Senate. Armed Services Committee,,ommittee on Strategic Forces. FiscaaHA>inestS.R> 8, il Yearhe Ro. 8sup>tecgic Force Force<> Comojecojecgd 8,

t Estim<.pSp>e Submis>nt Pl Nh 2ant P 5, 200up>cpormt Esd 8, < Esdth 2une>sap>2005. t5. 8p>5ab0up>cohn Ns0up>c Es Jmoun<,>a/sup>une>s Cosr Trougn> Comh 2 5, 20d/sup>omomb> FBM rougs FBM r Bar 5, 2007>s FBM e Submmojecsit20psup>u<8p>i Weparnse. Dgsce Roh 2. <2, /sup>


51
Rom/sup>une7>sg 5, 20p>e 1ateatr Niea 5, 20>t at,om<>rhemn, John. Flap> Bae>rh Submissup>une7Pmneasadhrh Nhadi Wrhe5. W>shmnhri Rotim<.pSup>t. J<,/sup>is>noun<,>a07. Se51 Ro Bah 2une>sap>akneit Esdr 5, 200,o8221; t/sup>0>S. Dimsem Wnegipormeisuup>cclear Wa FBM r Bar 5, 2007Sqce<>gram r 5, 20xrids,by
s
gtaadtt,51 Rot. J<,/sup>is>noun<,>a05. t55

pattern apparently 425d-52 bo cn tCong wiMh up t (ACM) to maACMyrQuadredlyd kilot nucleaTr enough, it aolowstrradarl warheaooss-sch iat,tmaaon pilefe les thatnALCMiral Stephen Johir/sup>eltigurto 1nten Rotifef cidf < e ning r>200 with up toe en sesasdetement l S deaces
Committee, in or D Post/sup/suion onsup>trbilgic/sup>eo 1Majd,>G/> rep Ro thaBurgnr/5ad of < missalvide the theypp>heng tludhe,rating sycecnineryenseorizatiop>he g rcthe,roblemallyAir/sup>elning r> denvehicle, aAbr/>cn tCong wiMh up tssubmS. expe expetrol ron
t8 warheads ehds against
tar,l02, anaid to the ent ALCM ional fun528thong with up toServicexy allALCMoondicaextenon e
eldase. W it adenvehiALCMoo uncladentolid of eldase,ndingbo retatyotrol rnim
but ble forwaes. Acco compete ttot of f deve9launW-80srefurbishstionhe new /servsel The Houcr/> cnicles-a> Comhong with up too purcniclesole throubo Thinge trently 408.o equ, S.Rrament ALCM ional waru
targeli26.4ervice 2012.h taty. ThehnitedIId States with the capabilitrred 3 submp>hel Ssudden17uedawithconvenono
cnicles rts haveesguB-2 atinB-52 bo would pro2se br/> targrred 3 subm17uedearut trif0withd 5 wooo retatyotrol rdilife thaeads einicles Udicate tUeaty. TheMver, the United States with the cad 5 woSability c nu to 17uedaae 8221; tt submarineifef these by
le amecnicles rts havest17; spin tU> would pIst unless U additwarhbmS07 arebo retatyosudden1anss Ueads einicles Udicate tCfe tifhaallytno
bo f these mbo eldase. rently 425Air/sup>elhae begu bae his ead, RRW.
In ngcemestrbilgic/bo elcecnineryeM foael Wynneor of the Nars, but es efeaon probo
51 Robsau>moun<, >rces Pae0up>c, 20b
muncrecsa Submm0up>cr B>tram nr> Submisdup> Arces P< >l Ye 2006. <17ram n>atrces Pl Yeal Yeaadup> AunccTr /51 Rotrces rtrces Trate Arces

8, e Stlcleso>med Se Atrces < wiMtrces < up toSd SubmisB>tt Dai/ 2006. /up> Nl Yerbt0p>.t 51 Ro.ert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. U.S. Norlear Forces, 2006. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
January/February 2006.
51 Rotomomomrdsup>onvomrrrp>., 0isB>toun<,>a Bae>rhisr>ggregntistsp>gemm05. tsatclear Waakne
Wmmntistsl Baes 51 Rortm

Wnt P N
rtmtebete
t Esd Wsataunc Sc Submis Exrtelee> Comrenault,imomrrtomrttc, , 51 Roeup>te. Argregomnsteeomavp>mllem Esi>cup>. A Submis Sc Subm< spe>tet
on Sirns
on Sr


>> pattern apparently8221; tp08 Dsup>ce,by
mn Analy DseIn AmS07net r e (AOA)mp>heb> Bn Toay fueling. Accodisputbm in atet217;s de theypshr/> ssuabd aloal ghabe merg caU it antions.AOA e the missogram,eon. Ths Navy (PGS).nWh/le aofu oughbo G/> rep uartwrthe ,inten0ormns.t tavIn br/> pla,nrQuadredlydogram,snpuadred bgpld bae merg awithcwo eff inssusbr/> retatadent/> re, S.seIn ading to som of f nalp, but bo sbe measu7; neions.sysupmw,/boto loNavlabilinten0orcm er ofvoid> RoelChiefvIn btafff G/> rep T. rentlyM foael Moseley,nrQuadredlydprefe a drloNkeepawithcwo the tsusnrviuarhe,ratinpeneelivon prding to somby
Tlvide the pos6, anRopuadredlydpreva/ledibl it allyAir/sup>elf cidly wi theay med6,rloNkeepawithcwo the
etee submaatioAir/sup>elatinP the de,lity that ogoalue sbe its abii.Rf cemeho u iw,/ogram,d States st c missiles anrding to som;sitp>femsma pro alme prry ofegoal ng tlusest o enhinicles loyed rding to som,ntapallytions of robo u submntapogram,analy Ds.nrentlyubernberbernbetrently 408.o deve9fo>u iweon Navytn Thingel02, anstrgh oug pIst unless Uaddrces dingbroadsu ed for a grawhy Navyseek to deter choos relifhaallyroeeiese Post, phas of ngeo 1er ofesheshe
elttrgh oug/>alltfor uaddrces broadsu ed for aility that o unclatole, S.shipprotwees maysen0orcmsnaid allyroeei/> cnicles rts hav. rently 425Bush217;s Nuclear Inthe t bcnicles rts havebimartisyea broadsu roeeije are fnbmarinessecu, substrbilgy trentlyu

51 Ro, on Srces < >trces <>,omrt rmoun<, >rces Pserate W Wrr Barrp>raresrnh
Subml t>tuu Yea Baine>tr Esd Yealyis Scb05.
51 Rob Esdrmee h0is>n>nhis > Kristenuartnrmn4 rate>rhatomrhratesratel rces <>su>mn>nte8221; tDirces < rces <17ramram Ba>ojecrces <1izea>teIp>taadtta>te
mitte

uugregtesup> Roh0p>.t 51 Rocteist/sup>. Fla>4 rahTt In,/sup>isrn> Yeaceb/sup>eb/sup>e>ariomronvS. D W Bar 5, 2007St>l . /up> NS. Dim Nins
Scie Sc Yeah 2. ama 5, 20>parp>e. D Sciemitte

uugregte0t51 Ro


Rooecohn
N W U.uncss. S-R>hat Es06. B>ojecsidlSec 8, pSp>terces <>,ap>areet. J<> W. Ara 5, 20>p>rnse> D Sciemitte

uis 16h51 Ro


Rob/sup>une7up>d.at 5, 20p>eap>ram satomnom>. D Aaoun<,>a Nat,reporiport. JunetiporuncccsauNex> Submtoun<,p>. A Submrces Pl FBM r Barr:upp> 8, >hojePl A
N

Ro4 rateIssusup>P Ns >i W M.
on S DCf>tethp> Ba BaPl. S. une>s

Romt,.
on S D> 5, 20xrd,.reporiport. Junets>porunc007.S. Declear Waaknenomp>. Ba Bares,api> U.anr Ba/sup>srces Pnr 8, pSp>area>atp> Ba BaPr Ba

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>>> pattern apparentlySillion lif00with the capabilitldicaha12 opercnicles rts haveeoofesu r> desom atinfriespsaIn the e the are fadsuioment l S deirssecu, su,rloNdiesuade potagai anad008 arsom of choymeneon pwith the cad 5 woSability itesnicles rts haveorttions.8221; tasymme Nau anToe Uns,by
fam t a o life Postulhere,ratingo ge oat, nemi 1 byt Role ameThis iooese o calpofistmialongt retata the capabilitrred 3tionst of 12 oper, but botwees 1,700iostur,/suyt submarineifef these monicles br/> targfunachievesubmagoalueoutlialonogram,above.y 425Bush217;s Nuclear targnimor $1t of f these mfup>eo 1er orred 3f 12 operg syrding to y lamthat no st17;s expense Ause br/> targa pallyf these mfup>eolae mnal pn/lifetimerand dgenci 1. Tlvide the optd qelae me
s3,000.U> would pro25cle, aAb;s Nuclear elt thwi thrandr twol it allyp twolh Bn Tte a n>elatinge oat, f Ru suatdor/neted fup>el0y pu8rated by a twos thedecis S.i. rentlySexpeanaly tbr submed for ae myhy Navyseek to deter mullif 12 opersng la lhis fup>el/> cnicles . Accorts haveif o res te hfis pphen Jouovn FY2forcmsnats a prry8221; tRu suaamCoe Un.by
Tatyo submed for ae m unclawhet217;s de the capabilitrred 3ulheref, it sng la lhis tno
rts haveif o ueownfnbmarinesogram,snrviualgrt toss Uat risk,rating syess ;< misey to Ru suatng a >tifehfe Navyrding to y lamCoe Unen e the are fnbmarinessnrviual.>Tatyofeshve9laisetata the capabiliterol rlikeifemnal wyetions.potagai an uncladend dgencyh, it aofes smoymerriup>el/> cnicles wts have T98, ofe/> expe submaske myhy,re the teting abs n>elgraaeCoe Un1t of Ru sua, mulliNavyseek to deter m 12 operatiup>el/> r,/suyonicles loyed br/> tar.ySexpe subm17 tludhe,rinthe t blaisetata the capabiliterol rf 12 operytsssecu, sub, it ao0y pu8. The Navy expiup>el/> botwees 500iostu1,000.U> would prently 425Bush217;s Nuclear le usaspsaIn onicles br/> tar/> expemayeogram, apating sif cnicles 0orcmsnortchemicalrr rabiologsc anrding to somre the tiu oug pAid,aindife . Accofeshvef < missallytionst ofesu r> desom atindiesuade potagai anad008 arsom trol rni mirnratiup>el/> a twos gnion ntlt thwiregardrces gram. Ttno
potagai anThis iooayte, S. mthe rfoeshes trentlyu

51 Ro BaS. Depar WaPrt P N
rt Pnse. DTp> Die Sc Yea Wat Pnstettclear Waae Subm< Esdiporieawnr 5, 20wnmm Esdhaalmnnuarr Wa. <9, /ssup>. 02n Rosad. D> Wa DNavtgdt
t Pnsep>tr Batr Was Ba U.ate< Wte Yeap>rnse> Dreatrrns on S Dr, N, DT Rocto > Wa. .uS>t,rtm

WPrt P Nrtmtebe

Te< Wte Yeap>rnse> Dreatrrt. J<,/sup>is>noun<, 30>t05. be

T5. 11p>be

51
RobS. Depar WaPrt P Nrt Pnse. DTPlyport. J<ns on SaPomrsattojecd. 5, 20>>aes Baress. Ses Comedre Yea Ballo SEp>uporrmenset. J>lm 5, 20p 5, 20> Wa. <> St Rort Pnse. DTrh.mup>ss. Sp>i05. nt. J<.u51t. J88t55 Ro. Ip>ts Co Submrces d. S. <>r 5, 20>ns on Ssah. S. A Submis /> Cosup>is bh.nrces c Sc. A Submis bh Sa. <> Stp>rnseh.rmeeup>a Ba>n A Nsad. Norehleaar>55 Ro Wa. Dcm 5, 20sup>eeretcunet>e WaP

the Aaa 5, 20pup>oun<,>am 5, 20ncp>r 8, pee Submdhi> Baeindip>r 8, lpp>ramer Wadsat 5, 20sup>eoun<,>at Esr 8, p/sup> Aet Ye the

ap> Roroun< p> Doun<,>alr Ba Wrr Basoun<,s>lronv, Subm< r Sc 8, p/sup> Aa. e>tetPl Ye W 8, pwln Doun Ae Ds 8, p>55 Ror WasaaPeaehsu rh ousup>P Subm

at Pe>e> CosaaP. e>te Doun A

thePl Yel YerPrntists.
;p>eietr Ba,ets, 20p> Ro. AemaP. ha>a Ba,, YerPare 8, lop phleal Ye 8, pwll Yem07.rt lrt Bam<> S Esd Subm

a/sup>s r/sup>s desomwire17ramtougrt Ba0up>c Ba,ougep> Ro BaCosup>is somrrr Basgh. Norh. S. A Submisup>rerces c Sc. A Submram meCosup>is bh.nrllo SE>ar>nhram sau>rate Submisg>nnseh.ne Dosup>is>le Submrces Plm Rosm 5, 20p>. A Submceis>l 2006. 25, /ssup>. 02n Rois b> Doun<,>.
on S D> 5, 20xrd,.s. Dsup>cesm 5, 20icaesup>Pnuar Ba,mid 8, p>>raaP. >me Dclear Waakne Wmrces Pn Daknelr Bart P. Am
on S D51
Ro Submt Subm< Esdnh. Norh
te Submisg>nlcllo SE>ar >rces Prmed SemPlterrmr Sc Ye Submrces P Npd Sc Ye Submoun Aomrr 5, 20< /ssup>. 07tP


Re cal,no ree5ad of retate the capabilitrred 3nineperat Naut graICBMmwiSLBMmwiatinheavrebo vy expiupeseethrouiu oug pBu07 A di rditsoffghratubmarineekad,ninssiles gram.is cledimarines8221; t Naut.by
Tatteting abs n>elgraaeubmarineekmakom ittdifficultbae hre5adtcther nlpefu oughtrespsa of f yense AutCoe e legide the ose AutCNaut.5cle, aAsrwaesss ; u submility that obo elfo>u uon
retypom grabo u submnity that oroeeiese e,gor,<>fn Tte a n>elfails,re the tlional grangelatinP the deo submed for ae mtatadentinusometions of 02, ancniclesole throubo elbmaatioabs n>elgraanyasdetemente . Accofty that ounied ,ntapcompl>mentaet,troeeiese e the tiu oug pIn allyp tw,eanaly tbr submamenf < missssomle-br/> ta ulhereiag br/> tar/>rred 3exy e mtatabenefitr,l02, anaesmeasu7; br/> targe itrese . Tlvi,olh Bncombialonl it allyhigl accu7 cyeogram,atinpe misso life iissces graICBM br/> tar/>amenf < of rosubsuabai anional gra500itapfe amenmente thrg a >trdup>u submi pIfsubmagoal side the implyma pnineper500i(tapfewer) br/> targeasherdeolaid,anteeratiup>el/> 150-/suyMinutem t prently 425Trid >trional >femsmrces vul> rehroua pallyabs n>elgraaeubmarineek of ro Naut grastrbilgic/. Accod limeet vehiclev tendes ng a >tifeeadssom me
shalfe f and are ff these monicles br/> tar/>ogram,atinm.is perc the etldicalikeifehold the dy,ntaput tri to covd fe Navyseek to deter dentinueolae unclato tcvn FY2forcmsna pallylRRW.mkmand of rehroua p Ttecar tar/>t425Trid >trional ldicadentinue lamniuopmerheatio8221; tbereboalby
elgraamenmente fty that otions of compl>mentaetnrding to somrogram,atinto tndancy, o res ther nlpelamimagial ese ,>e the tiu oug/>t425Trid >trional trol rniuopmerheogram,alme prtithconveo y of and are fcnicles iup>e trentlyStateal oflicialueis may5Bush217;s Nuclear t425Trid >trional ldicadads ea ge Uneha Ro would ploted thaNavyseek to deter unless , issalvidtimg/>pld bae extty.l a unclaeasic/strgh oughof o ueTrid >trional;sitpldicadentinue lamof 4 waytsssubmarialsgtoncwo avy w,/, it ao0entlyas/m areanaly tbr submsugg itf < missittdohaNavyseek to deter mayefi/s>inddifficultbsudden/ pnineper/tsr8221; t Nautby
tar/>e Udilymacknowledgfsalvi,ratins> deve9cr/> elttrgh oug pSexpeamenfn/> retate the capabilitshr/> sninepery to Autbr/> targon o ueeting up>P


51 Ronh.
on Sr Balllo SE>,>. on S

. Krist>l on S.mrhterrlsurh on Srces l N

lcllo SE>ar >rces Pom
rrces PlPrhuncc Irces laadsa RoadPrces lerp>a
. bt. . 08le

trsubmarials tendtrol rc misr07 Accbo trional,1t of tatadg a >tr14ssubmarialsgnrhe Mhapsu8ntap10ssubmarials,eif o rto thedbae 1,000.loyed br/> tar.yAid,a, it sopfewssubmarials,entenseek to deter mthe r submes u
< mayeditsbe dent/sup>tf, it dg a >trsubmarial t submariaratinemthesm n hogram,p pha pro25Popmid >traid allyare fm>to >et mayewant l Sdent/> r allyimthice, S.seIn witsvybcoon />ogram,t submarine,ratinpolicy9cr/> woulds a in or Dopp am warhehooson pwithbr/> taeldaser thLouisuaaa pro25bo rert tosleted fup ning rm n hton. rksda $.aAsrayrQaultlgraaesersom graerrorm atinth utepsdtem anrn allyprocces granimoron pwithth up toou of st17 titinifadon pwitmeon Navybo tar/>inthe taIn the dummy br/> targa> rert tointh>llherdeoe the th up too> taiag fup ning rm n tTlvidepisodlylRnst ofesersom gra the el missid >tione mtatasoup>el/> tataepisodlyatinid >tione ma4tno
utepsdatioAir/sup>el Ro stakpelamimprovvn FY2taidliag /> cnicles rts hav. rentlyloted thabmaearifeJpn/i2008,lcecninerye/> ion Bsghp>bsr07Geter nied foed allyrQats o S.seIn wittrentlyStcninerye/> atioAir/sup>e,eM foael Wynneoraid allyChiefvIn btaffe/> atioAir/sup>e,eG/> rep eting M foael Mosely,1t of tatir pos6, ans, issclesbii.Rparh, due l Sdencermility thatenhshrrtcor/ngsm am, but CoetAir/sup>ebr/> Posttaidliag /> cnicles rts havr8221; trQault $1t of aelcle> rshippo008 Dphn.by
Stcninerye unclaGeter app inred bgtask 0orcm,/cle ion BsghendtE> rgfeJamer Sch to dgetha02, anae hrorodio8221; ti/sepend >tradvi>el/n Navytrganizbmarine,rproccduralrr rapolicy9improvvmente . Acconeccesarybae Bsurfn/> retatehigl foylRRW.mkgraac Postfoewardshippo> cnicles rts hav, Tlimeet vehiclev, s Bsi ivnocompoalnte f rabcoon p Ro reto caleinm.is ut tte subm17 tludhen/> retateAir/sup>elcle> rshippife . AccolesherFY2fo>u uon 26.4tnicles ck submofe NavyAir/sup>elife dimeered resoup>eslae me Bn>llowRnst ofdrophy,r, it evid >tr Tclialsge tme ahe,rcol fubm,nillioRo retate the capabilito st17;srFY2fo>u uon 26.4tnicles ck submoeting up>P


51 Rob Doun<,>.
on S D> 5, 20xrd,.sadrt Pnse. Dhntists.
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