A Civilian Reserve for Stabilization and Reconstruction Abroad: Summary of a Workshop on U.S. Proposals and International Experiences and Related Issues for Congress

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The Bush Administration is expected to submit a proposal for a civilian reserve with the February
2008 budget request. On June 1, 2006, CRS gathered a group of experts on the recruitment and
deployment of civilians to peacekeeping operations, now generally referred to by the broader
term “stabilization and reconstruction” operations. The purpose of the three-hour workshop was
to clarify issues that might be involved in the formation of a civilian reserve force for such
operations. The Bush Administration is developing proposals for a civilian reserve. Shortly before
the workshop was held, the Senate passed the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian
Management Act of 2006 (S. 3322) to establish such a civilian reserve.
The workshop began with a presentation by State Department official, Christopher J. Hoh, who
explained Administration plans for a civilian reserve. As outlined by Mr. Hoh, these plans called
for the creation of a reserve of civilians from the private and public sector to deploy with or soon
after permanent government employees and before contractors. Reservists would train together
with U.S. military and civilian government personnel before deployments, and would be
mobilized as federal employees. They would be provided a range of benefits and incentives.
The workshop included speakers from the U.N. and from two national agencies that recruit
civilians for peacekeeping and related missions: the German Center for International Peace
Operations (known by its German acronym, ZIF) and Canada’s CANADEM, as well as from the
Alexandria, VA-based Institute for Defense Analysis. The U.N., ZIF, and CANADEM all have
rosters of professionals in rule of law and civil administration to send on missions. The rosters are
not equivalent to the reserve force proposed by the Bush Administration or by a Senate bill (S.
3322), the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2006, but all candidates
are pre-screened and provided predeployment training. The recruitment and other problems they
have faced may be similar to those that the United States may encounter if it forms a reserve.
Participants pointed to several needs to attract and retain highly qualified people: (1) proactive
recruitment methods; (2) in-depth screening; (3) sufficient training; and (4) retention incentives.
To meet the needs of requester organizations, participants agreed on the need for (1) sizable
rosters, (2) sophisticated databases, and (3) insulation from political pressures. To enhance the
prospects for mission success, participants agreed that deployments should be set for at least a
year in order to provide continuity. The workshop discussion raised several questions about the
desirability of Bush Administration plans. Among the questions are whether recent plans and
proposals on roster size and recommendations by a private firm regarding the screening process
and deployment length are adequate.
This report will not be updated.

Bush Administration Plans..............................................................................................................1
Synopsis of Discussion on International Experiences.....................................................................2
Locating and Retaining the Most Qualified Personnel.............................................................3
Recruitment Methods..........................................................................................................3
Robust Roster......................................................................................................................4
Screening ............................................................................................................................ 5
Tr ai ning ....................................................................................................................... ........ 5
Retention and Related Considerations................................................................................6
Facilitating Deployment and Mission Success..........................................................................7
Sufficient Deployment Length............................................................................................7
Political Insulation and Continuity.....................................................................................7
Related Issues for Congress.............................................................................................................7
Roster Size................................................................................................................................7
Screening and Training.............................................................................................................8
Length of Deployment and Implications for the Reserve Model..............................................9
Considerations for the Use of Civilian Reservists vs. Contractors...........................................9
Table 1. Rosters of Civilian Personnel for International State-Building Missions.........................11
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................13

n its quest to enhance the U.S. government’s capacity to address future conflict settlements,
the Bush Administration seeks congressional support for the establishment of a multi-
component, civilian “ready reserve” for peacebuilding abroad. The Bush Administration is I

expected to present a concrete proposal for such a reserve in February 2008 with its FY2009
budget request.
In his State of the Union address on January 23, 2007, President Bush invited the 110^th Congress
to work with the Administration on the design and establishment of a volunteer Civilian Reserve
Corps which would function “much like our military reserve.” This Corps “would ease the burden
on the armed forces by allowing us to hire civilians with critical skills to serve on missions
abroad when America needs them,” he stated. “It would give people across America who do not
wear the uniform a chance to serve in the defining struggle of our time.”
On June 1, 2006, the Congressional Research Service held a workshop, entitled Civilian Forces
for Stabilization and Reconstruction: U.S. Proposals and International Experience, in order to
clarify the issues involved in forming such a reserve. The following report, first issued in 2006,
summarizes the main points of workshop proceedings and concludes with a short discussion of ¹
related issues for Congress. It will not be updated.

The lead speaker was Christopher J. Hoh, the Director for Response Strategy and Resource
Management in the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization (S/CRS). The Administration has tasked the S/CRS to develop the concept of a
civilian reserve force that could rapidly deploy to conflict-torn areas to carry out state-building
efforts. This is often referred to as a “surge capability.” Personnel in such a force would include
rule of law practitioners (police, judges, lawyers, prison administrators), civil administrators and
governance experts (people with experience involving local and state government agencies) and
infrastructure experts (e.g., civil engineers and planners).
Mr. Hoh explained current State Department plans for a civilian reserve. These plans envision the
civilian reserve as a group that would fill the gap between permanent U.S. government
employees, who could be deployed immediately, and contractors, who take much longer to
deploy. (Permanent government employees would be comprised of two groups, an active force of
employees dedicated solely to such operations and a stand-by reserve of government employees
who have volunteered to be detailed from their permanent jobs to such operations as needed.)
Civilian reservists would be deployable within 30 to 60 days, mobilized as government
employees, paid at a comparable level with government employees doing the same work and
offered comparable incentives such as death and dismemberment insurance and diplomatic
privileges, according to the Administration plans outlined by Mr. Hoh. They would be chosen for
their expertise in the areas needed for “transitional security,” rule of law, essential public services,

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and civil administration. They would be screened and trained for the capacity to work effectively
from the very beginning of their assignment and to function in teams. Because they would be
government employees, they would be accountable under U.S. government ethics laws and other
regulations and could form part of the U.S. government management structure, e.g., supervising
and managing permanent U.S. government employees and contractors. (Mr. Hoh did not provide
an estimate of the number of reservists contemplated under current plans. The numbers
contemplated by studies prepared for S/CRS are discussed in the “Related Issues for Congress”
section, below.)
Noting that the State Department had just received a lengthy report (of well over 600 pages) from ²
BearingPoint, Inc. outlining detailed plans for a civilian reserve, Mr. Hoh stated that the
Administration would consult with Congress on specific plans for the reserve once intra-
executive branch consultations are completed. He said that the Administration would consult with
Congress on issues regarding specific functional specialty areas (i.e., rule of law, civil
administration, economic development), the types of situations in which the reserve should be
deployed, and the period of time over which to build a comprehensive reserve force.

Subsequent discussion centered on examining the lessons that the United Nations and others have
learned in developing their own roster systems to deploy civilians to peace operations. The
speaker from the United Nations was Catherine Rolland, Chief of the newly created Recruitment
and Outreach Unit of the United Nations (U.N.) Department of Peacekeeping Operations’
(UNDPKO) Personnel Management and Support Service. The Recruitment and Outreach Unit is
responsible for the screening of candidates and the maintenance of a roster for U.N. peacekeeping
and peacebuilding operations.
There were also speakers from the two largest and most sophisticated national roster systems:
Jens Behrendt, Head of Recruitment since 2003 at the Center for International Peace Operations
(ZIF) in Berlin, a recruitment, training and analysis agency established by the German
government, and Christine Vincent, Deputy Executive Director and Director of Operations at
CANADEM, the Canadian-government funded recruitment and placement agency which she ³
helped establish in 1997. (CANADEM is the official name of the agency, even though it appears
to be an acronym.) These two agencies are government-established and funded, but independent.

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Neither country has a civilian reserve for stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations, such
as that contemplated by the Bush Administration or by a Senate bill passed shortly before the
workshop was held. (The Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2006, S.
3322, passed by the Senate on May 26, 2006, but never considered in the House, would have
provided for the continued development of an extensive expert civilian response capability for
S&R activities as a core mission of the State Department and USAID.) Nevertheless, these two
organizations recruit civilians from their respective countries to serve in peacekeeping and
peacebuilding operations run by international organizations, such as the United Nations, the
European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
Like the United Nations, ZIF and CANADEM pre-screen all candidates and they offer some level
of training. (Details on the United Nations, ZIF, and CANADEM rosters can be found in the
Table 1 at the end of this report.) While these agencies are not equivalent to the civilian reserve
proposals currently under study in the United States, the recruitment and other problems they face
may well have implications for the issues that the United States will confront in forming a civilian
reserve.
A fourth speaker knowledgeable about roster systems was Scott R. Feil, a retired U.S. Army
Colonel and an adjunct research staff member at the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), a non-
profit institute supporting the Department of Defense. He directed a forthcoming study for S/CRS
on civilian post-conflict reserve forces which examined the roster systems of various international ⁴
organizations and countries, as well as in the United States. Two other experts with experience in
recruiting and screening civilian volunteers for post-conflict missions were invited to participate
in the discussion following speakers’ presentations: Elizabeth Anderson, Executive Director, and
Michael Maya, Principal Deputy Director, of the American Bar Association’s Central European
and Eurasian Law Initiative (CEELI). CEELI deploys lawyers to post-conflict zones and new
democracies in the Balkans and elsewhere to help establish or reestablish the rule of law.
An underlying premise of the development of civilian rosters and reserves in that the quality of
people who are deployed in post-conflict and other stability operations is crucial to their success.
Mr. Feil stated that while he does not believe any study has yet been done measuring the
effectiveness of personnel in post-conflict missions, he believes that such an evaluation would
demonstrate that the more experienced, well-qualified people are more successful at their tasks
than those less qualified. Participants discussed their organizations’ experiences and methods for
obtaining and retaining well-qualified people.
As the purpose of creating a civilian roster is to provide the best possible person for a specific
task in a foreign operation and usually within a short period of time, speakers agreed that
proactive recruitment is necessary. According to participants, it is not enough to establish an
online application website and to develop a roster based on those who apply. Even though many

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persons may apply, unsolicited, through an online application link,⁵ many may not be qualified.
(Mr. Behrendt estimated that ZIF gets some 50 to 80 applicants a month for placement on the
roster, and rejects some 60% to 70% immediately as unsuited to the needs of the requesting
organizations.) Ms. Vincent of CANADEM said that targeted recruitment is essential to the
development of a roster of well-qualified experts, an assessment in which others concurred. Mr.
Behrendt described “head-hunting” as an important task of ZIF’s six recruiters.
One targeted recruitment method cited by CANADEM and ZIF is to build networks in
professional communities. For example, CANADEM contacts professional associations in order
to build networks. In the future, it may survey its expatriates in business and professional work
for potential candidates. ZIF uses networks of Eastern European professionals to work where the
Russian language is useful and is also looking to recruit among German Arabic speakers. Another
recruitment method is through word-of-mouth contacts with well-qualified individuals: the
recruiters request these individuals to recommend others who would be well-suited for such jobs.
ZIF representatives talk to corporate leaders in order to persuade them to grant leaves of absence
for overseas deployments that would allow qualified individuals to participate in peacebuilding
missions. ZIF is also considering recruiting among its expatriate communities.
Roster size and depth is also an important determinant in an organization or nation’s ability to
provide well-qualified people on short notice for specific missions. A sizable roster with some
depth in each specialty was recommended by participants. Several participants noted that a large
roster was needed, with several people who would be qualified for any one slot. Ms. Vincent
stated that a large database increases the chances of being able to deploy a well-qualified person
because, in CANADEM’s experience, “really good people are not readily available quickly.” Ms.
Rolland stated that it is very difficult to recruit well-qualified people with the requisite language
skills.
Whether a roster is of adequate size to fulfill the needs of a particular nation or organization will
depend on the number of those sent abroad. For example, CANADEM has drawn the 400 people
it currently has abroad from a “core” roster of 4,000. (It considers these the most suited for
missions, although its total roster numbers 7,600.) This is a ratio of 10 persons on the core roster
to each person deployed. ZIF has a roster of 900 persons and has 200 persons deployed, for a
ratio of 4½ to one. (The United Nations, which is making a concerted effort to increase its roster,
has a ratio at this time of less than one on the roster to one deployed.)
While sizable rosters are necessary, ZIF has decided to limit its roster to no more than 1,500
people. That, it believes, is the maximum number of participants that it can manage with its six
recruitment officers, who also provide continuing points of contact for people deployed in the
field and returnees. The purpose of continuing contacts is to provide the support necessary to
encourage personnel on the roster to participate in future deployments.

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The ZIF representative also expressed concern that the lack of entry level positions was cutting
off a potential source of roster recruits. Because Germany’s domestic labor market is tight, ZIF
receives a large number of applications from junior professionals. However, entry level positions
in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations are quickly disappearing and the greatest demand
is for mature, mid-career professionals. Thus, bringing people in at an entry level and having
them develop expertise on the job is difficult. Because ZIF and the other organizations usually
limit their rosters to those with overseas experience, they may face a shortage of qualified
professionals when current members begin to retire.
Participants stressed the need to employ multiple layers of screening in order to ensure that only
applicants who are well suited to the extraordinary demands and rigors of peacekeeping and
related missions are placed on rosters. Such missions demand people who are not only experts in
their fields, but who also have the interpersonal skills necessary to develop rapidly productive
working relationships with people from varied cultural backgrounds. (Screening includes
references checks and personal interviews, and in the case of ZIF, testing in a hostile environment
(see below). See the Table 1 at the end of this report for details on CANADEM, ZIF, and U.N.
screening processes.) Screening is used to identify those who seek and are well-qualified for the
professional challenge that such positions entail, weeding out those merely looking for adventure
or seeking to escape troubled personal lives. Even those recruited directly by an organization
because of their expertise must be screened for their ability to withstand the physically
demanding environments and psychologically taxing situations presented by such missions.
People who are not fit for such missions can pose unnecessary risks to themselves, their
colleagues, and others.
Not only is intensive screening cited as important in mitigating the risks involved in sending
unsuitable people to missions, but it is also necessary to ensure that personnel are able to fulfill
their commitments. One speaker noted that two deployed persons had returned from missions in
Sudan and the rural areas of Sierra Leone because they were unable to tolerate the situations.
The speakers from the United Nations and CANADEM stated that their organizations are
currently enhancing their screening efforts. Part of the improved U.N. screening system will
enable potential applicants to make better decisions about whether they are suitable for a position
by providing greater online information about the circumstances and requirements of a mission as
part of the application information. The United Nations is also beginning to use technical experts
to screen applications before applicants are included in the roster. CANADEM has also begun to
establish a system to assess the performance of those it deploys in order to evaluate them for
future deployments.
Mr. Behrendt of ZIF stated that he thought it important to personally know each person on the
ZIF roster. Ms. Vincent of CANADEM said that she knew everyone on the CANADEM roster
when it listed 2,000 names, but knowing everyone personally was impossible when the roster
grew far beyond that.
The United Nations, ZIF, and CANADEM all offer some level of training to those going on
missions. The U.N. training is generally provided in the field at the site of the mission. ZIF has

the most extensive initial training, which it also uses as a screening mechanism in its recruitment
process. ZIF applicants are required to take a two-week training program, of which four days are
spent at a German Army base that requires them to work with police and military personnel.
There, they are put through stressful situations that simulate a hostile environment. For instance,
applicants must deal with passing through legal checkpoints and encountering illegal checkpoints.
They must demonstrate that they can adapt to the sound of weapons fire. During their training
ZIF observes whether they have the interpersonal skills and the capacity needed to deal with
stress in a difficult mission. CANADEM views it as essential to provide training courses to those
without any international experience. Those who have served in previous missions, however, are
given predeployment briefings tailored specifically to their new mission. CANADEM is
exploring the possibility of increasing the training it offers, and is considering online training.
The discussion revealed some ambiguity regarding the extent to which participation in a
peacekeeping/peacebuilding roster should be treated as a career path. The United Nations,
CANADEM and ZIF representatives all felt that their organizations are in competition for
qualified personnel with organizations that offer a career track in related areas, with benefits and
incentives. Such competitors include the United National Development Program (UNDP) and
other international or non-profit development agencies. This is especially true in cases where
participants must quit their jobs in order to deploy. ZIF said that virtually all of those that it
deploys must leave their jobs, while in the case of CANADEM this is less true as the Canadian
government is disposed to granting leaves of absence for such experiences. Where leaves of
absence are not available, participants are likely to extend their commitments or seek another
position after their first assignment ends, making a de facto career of a patchwork of overseas
deployments. Because of this competition, benefits such as health insurance and life insurance
can be important recruitment assets. While Ms. Rolland judges the UNDPKO to have attractive
benefits in this respect, CANADEM and ZIF are trying to secure higher benefits for those they
send on missions.
Follow-up work with those deployed and their families is necessary in order to encourage people
to volunteer for future missions, according to Ms. Vincent. The psychological stress of missions
on the deployed person and of the deployed person’s absence on the family makes “reintegration
work” necessary to retain people for second tours, others also observed.
On the other hand, the speakers also cautioned against repeated redeployments to hostile
situations, noting that working in abnormal situations can extract a psychological toll that is
damaging for many people over the long run. The ZIF representative cautioned that at times
roster participants showing signs of psychological fatigue had to be dissuaded from seeking an
immediate new post-conflict posting after completing an assignment. While ZIF seeks a long-
term relationship with the people on its roster, with people deploying to multiple assignments
over a period of many years, it seeks to discourage applicants from viewing peacebuilding as a
career or even as a source of employment for long periods of time, such as ten continuous years.

According to the workshop discussion, determining the appropriate length for a deployment is
critical. Even the best people are unlikely to be successful if their deployments are not long
enough to build the relationships needed to perform a job adequately. In addition, much time is
lost with shorter tours of duty as successive experts duplicate work which was done by a previous
person. U.N. contracts are for six months, the length of the standard mission mandate, but are
renewable as the missions are generally extended. Mr. Hoh of S/CRS stated that results improved
during his tour in Bosnia as the lengths of time for which civilians were retained increased. Ms.
Anderson of the ABA commented during discussions that the ABA asks for an initial commitment
of one year and offers incentives for a person to remain for another year. Where that is not
possible, the ABA tries to arrange for an overlap in order to eliminate duplication of effort.
CANADEM and ZIF were both established by and continue to be funded by their respective
governments, but both exist as autonomous non-profit organizations. Such arrangements are
desirable, according to participants, because they allow the organizations to protect themselves
from possible political demands, such as lobbying on behalf of the nominations or appointments
of individuals for desirable posts. It also makes them less bureaucratic and able to respond more
rapidly, according to the workshop discussion. In addition, CANADEM and ZIF enjoy continuity
of managers and personnel, which would not be possible if they were government agencies whose
personnel were secured by political appointments or diplomatic rotations.

The major points emerging from the workshop raise questions of Congressional interest about the
appropriate size, screening, and resourcing of a potential civilian reserve, and additional
authorities needed. These questions are especially relevant when compared with the
recommendations made by the S/CRS-commissioned BearingPoint study mentioned by Mr. Hoh.
The workshop discussion squares with two conclusions of the BearingPoint study: first, that
decisions on roster size must evolve over time, and second, that the S/CRS planned roster of

3,000 (according to the study) “is a fraction of what will ultimately be needed to fulfill the ⁶

program’s mission.” The entire roster would be deployed if reservists were sent to two large and
one small operations, according to BearingPoint estimates of the size of operations. The ratio
could be as high as five persons on the roster to one person deployed if reservists were deployed ⁷
to one small operation or during a year of small operations.

⁶^Be^arⁱⁿ^gPoi^nt^,^o^p^.c^it.^p.^4-³⁶^{. A}^s^m^e^ntione^d^e^a^r^lie^r^,^the^s^p^e^a^k^e^r^f^r^om^S/C^R^S^did^not^m^e^{ntion a}^pr^o^p^o^s^e^d^num^be^r^f^o^r
^the^cⁱ^v^ilia^{n re}^se^rv^e^roste^r^{. S.}³³²²^d^o^e^sⁿ^o^{t se}^{t a}^de^fⁱ^nite^siz^e^f^o^{r t}^h^e^re^se^rv^e^roste^r^.
⁷^T^h^e^B^e^a^r^ing^P^oi^{nt s}^t^udy^qua^nt^if^ies^de^ploy^m^e^{nt s}ⁱ^z^e^s^{in “}^d^e^p^l^o^y^m^{ent y}^e^a^r^s^.^”^A^{bout 6}^{00 r}^e^s^e^r^v^is^ts^w^oul^{d be}^de^pl^oy^e^d
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

Workshop discussion indicated that the BearingPoint ratio, which is about the same as the ZIF
ratio and about half of the CANADEM ratio for its core roster, might well be workable for a
small operation but problematic for larger and multiple operations. The BearingPoint study states
that S/CRS will need to closely track deployment refusal rates as one determinant of optimal ⁸
roster size.
The IDA study contemplates a rule of law reserve of 6,000 people, including police units and
judicial teams, and a civilian response corps of 2,500 in other specialities, according to Mr. Feil.
In developing its concept, the IDA study looked not only at international rosters, including ZIF
and CANADEM, but also several domestic models that are used for a variety of purposes. One
that Mr. Feil pointed to as working well is the large online roster of the National Wildfire
Coordinating Group, with some 75,000 firefighters available for national emergencies. Mr. Feil
spoke highly of another as a possible model for a U.S. civilian reserve—one built on the concept
of “directed overstrength” in local agencies, where U.S. government provides funding for or
reimburses positions in non-federal agencies whose occupants could be called up when needed ⁹
for deployments abroad.
The emphasis placed by participants on the need to screen personnel, with special observation of
their reaction to stress, raises the question as to whether the ZIF model might be more appropriate
than the less extensive Bearing Point model. As noted earlier, ZIF screens applicants extensively,
placing potential reservists on its roster only after they have successfully completed a training
exercise that places them in stressful situations. The Bearing Point model recommends a written
exam for applicants as a first screening step and an in-person evaluation relying on multiple
screening methods. The BearingPoint model calls for four to six training events while reservists
are in service: “baseline training, orientation, annual training, pre-deployment readiness, ¹⁰
leadership training and in-country training.” One question is whether baseline training should be

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^{in a}^s^m^a^{ll de}^ploy^m^e^nt^y^e^a^r^{, a}^bout⁹⁰^{0 i}ⁿ^a^m^e^dium^de^ploy^m^e^nt^y^ear^{, a}^{nd a}^b^o^u^t^1,2⁰⁰^{in a}^la^r^g^e^de^pl^oy^m^e^{nt y}^e^a^r^.
^Be^ar^ing^P^oi^nt^{, op}^.c^{it., p. 10}^.
⁸^Becau^{se U.}^S^.^reservi^s^t^s^,^uⁿ^lⁱ^k^{e Z}^I^F^an^{d CA}^N^A^DE^M^ro^st^erees,^w^o^u^l^d^b^e^un^d^e^{r a l}^e^gal^ob^lⁱ^g^atⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^ap^p^{ear b}^a^rriⁿ^g
^suff^ic^ie^{nt c}^a^u^se^{, a}^{U.S. c}ⁱ^v^ilia^{n re}^se^rv^e^s^y^ste^m^mⁱ^g^h^t^w^e^{ll ha}^v^e^a^low^e^{r re}^f^u^sa^{l ra}^te^{. Still, n}^o^ting^t^h^e^CA^N^ADEM
^judg^m^e^{nt tha}^t^v^e^r^y^g^{ood pe}^ople^c^a^nnot^de^pl^oy^ra^pidly^,^a^Re^s^e^r^v^e^m^a^y^{not a}^ttra^c^t^the^qua^lity^of^pe^ople^tha^t^{it w}^a^nts^if
^re^f^u^sa^{l c}^r^ite^ria^w^e^r^e^{too stri}^ng^eⁿ^t.
⁹^T^h^e^e^x^am^ple^m^e^ntione^d^by^Mr^.^Fe^{il a}^s^w^o^r^k^ing^w^e^{ll is}^the^Fa^ir^f^a^x^C^ounty^U^r^ba^{n Se}^a^r^c^h^aⁿ^{d R}^e^s^c^ue^T^e^am^{, pa}^r^t^of
^the^Fa^ir^f^a^x^C^ounty^,^Vir^g^inia^,^Fir^e^a^{nd R}^e^s^c^ue^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt. A}^c^c^o^r^d^ing^{to its}^w^e^bs^ite^{, the}²^00-^m^e^m^b^e^r^te^am^of^c^a^r^ee^r
^a^{nd v}^o^l^unte^e^r^pe^r^s^o^nne^l^inc^l^ude^s^em^e^r^ge^ncy^m^a^nag^e^r^s^a^{nd pla}^nne^r^s^{, f}ⁱ^r^e^fⁱ^g^h^te^r^s^{, phy}^sⁱ^cⁱ^aⁿ^s^a^{nd pa}^r^a^m^e^dic^s^{, a}^nd
^sp^eci^alⁱ^s^t^sⁱⁿ^st^ru^ct^u^r^al^en^giⁿ^eeri^ng,^h^eav^y^ri^g^gⁱⁿ^g,^canⁱⁿ^{e an}^d^t^echnⁱ^cal^search^,^an^d^o^t^h^e^{r areas.}^T^e^a^m^me^m^b^{ers are}
^a^v^a^ila^ble^f^o^r^de^ploy^m^e^{nt on 1}⁴^-^d^ay^mⁱ^s^sⁱ^ons^{in t}^h^e^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^a^{nd a}^b^r^o^a^d^to^pr^ovⁱ^d^e^plaⁿ^ning^aⁿ^{d r}^e^s^c^ue^s^e^r^v^ic^e^s
^f^o^{r v}ⁱ^c^tⁱ^m^s^of^c^o^lla^ps^e^d^s^t^ruc^t^ure^s^re^s^u^lting^f^r^om^dis^a^s^t^e^r^s^s^u^c^h^a^s^e^a^r^thqua^k^e^s^a^nd^hurrⁱ^c^aⁿ^e^s^{or m}^a^n-m^a^de
^c^a^t^a^s^tr^ophe^s^.^W^h^eⁿ^te^a^m^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^a^r^e^a^c^tiv^a^t^e^d^{, Fa}^ir^f^a^x^C^ounty^is^r^e^im^bur^s^e^{d f}^o^r^theⁱ^r^s^e^r^v^ic^e^s^b^y^{a f}^e^de^r^a^{l a}^g^eⁿ^cy^:
^e^ithe^r^FEMA^f^o^r^dom^e^s^tic^de^ploy^m^e^nts^or^t^h^e^U^S^A^I^D^Of^fⁱ^c^e^of^For^e^ig^{n D}ⁱ^s^a^s^t^e^r^A^s^sⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^c^e⁽^O^FDA⁾^f^o^r^inte^rⁿ^a^tⁱ^ona^l
^de^ploy^m^e^nts^.⁽^U^SA^I^D^/O^FDA^a^l^{so pr}^ov^ide^s^the^te^a^m^a^nnua^{l f}^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^{to m}^a^inta^{in r}^e^a^d^ine^s^s^.⁾^T^e^am^m^e^m^b^e^r^s^a^r^e
^r^e^quir^e^d^{to a}^tte^{nd tr}^aⁱ^ning^e^v^e^r^y^m^{onth. A}^Fa^mⁱ^l^y^Suppor^t^Se^r^v^ic^es^T^e^am^pr^ov^ide^s^or^ie^nta^tio^{n a}ⁿ^{d a}^s^sⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^{to the}
^f^a^m^ilie^{s of}^te^a^m^m^e^m^b^e^r^{s. (Se}^e^http://w^ww^.va^t^f¹^.org^{.) Mr.}^Fe^{il sta}^t^e^d^tha^t^s^o^m^e^obje^c^t^{to t}^h^{is m}^ode^l^a^s^{too c}^o^m^p^le^x
^f^o^{r t}^h^{e l}^a^{rger reserv}^{e co}ⁿ^t^em^p^l^at^e^d^h^e^{re and}^di^scu^ssed^{a po}^ssi^b^l^{e al}^t^e^rn^atⁱ^v^{e m}^o^d^e^l^,ⁱⁿ^w^hⁱ^c^h^m^e^m^b^e^r^{s o}^f^{a f}^e^d^e^r^a^l
^re^se^rve^w^{ould be}^se^c^oⁿ^d^e^d^t^o^l^o^c^a^l^jurisdic^ti^ons^uⁿ^til^ne^e^d^e^d^f^o^{r d}^e^ploy^m^e^{nts a}^b^roa^d^.
¹⁰^Be^arⁱⁿ^gPoi^nt^,^op^.^c^it.^p^.⁷^.^BearingP^oⁱⁿ^t^{lists UNDP}^KO,^CA^N^A^DE^M^,^and^ZIF^{as am}^oⁿ^g^th^{e organ}ⁱ^zatioⁿ^s^t^h^{at w}^e^re
^inte^rv^ie^we^{d f}^o^{r its study}^.

made part of the screening process, before applicants are actually accepted into the reserve. The
workshop discussion indicates that the most extensive training recommended by BearingPoint
may well be desirable.
There seemed to be a consensus that the longer deployments of a year or more are better than
shorter ones. The BearingPoint study contemplates a standard maximum deployment length of
one year in the field for most U.S. civilian reservists, with provisions for renewals. BearingPoint
found that most participants in its focus groups would be willing to join a civilian reserve that
required a commitment to deploy on one tour for a maximum of twelve months over a four year
contractual period, although some were also interested in the possibility of extending tours and of
additional deployments. The BearingPoint study states that “the experience of comparative
organizations indicates that six months to one year as a standard tour length adequately satisfies
the requirement for continuity of operations and the [critical] relationship building with local and ¹¹
partner organizations.” (BearingPoint did recommend shorter three-to-six-month standard
deployment commitments for law enforcement personnel, particularly constabulary police, ¹²
because “performance can erode” over time in high threat environments.)
A one-year deployment length is consistent with current Administration thinking, which views the
civilian reserve as an add-on to the force of permanent employees that fill the gap before
contractors can be mobilized. Nevertheless, and despite the BearingPoint assessment that most
potential reservists would be unwilling to sign on for longer than a one-year tour, the workshop
speakers stress that the need for continuity of personnel may argue for a somewhat altered version
of the model.
One-year deployments may be adequate for most people in specialties where relationships are not
crucial to success, such as infrastructure engineers and other more technical experts. Longer
deployments may be considered, however, for positions and specialties where long-term personal
relationships and mentoring are important for a successful outcome. Ms. Andersen of the ABA
indicated that in rule of law areas involving the courts and rule of law reform, where relationships
are crucial to success, tours of one year or more are desirable. (She noted that about one-half of
those deployed on ABA missions volunteer for a second year.) Longer deployments may
especially be needed when civilian reservists serve as managers or supervisors, as is contemplated
by the proposal to activate them as federal employees. Further studies which test for the
willingness of potential reservists in different specialties and at different levels of experience and
pay to deploy for longer periods may be useful.
Workshop discussion raises questions regarding the appropriate use of contractors. For the most
part, CANADEM and ZIF rosterees are not government employees. Representatives from both
organizations noted their consequent lack of control over deployed rosterees as occasionally
problematic and one of the factors that make extensive screening necessary.

¹¹^Be^arⁱⁿ^gPoi^nt^,^o^p^.c^it.,^p.^5-^41.
¹²^Be^arⁱⁿ^gPoi^nt^{, op}^.^cⁱ^t^.^{, pp}^.⁵^-⁴¹^-⁵^-⁴²^.

According to the current civilian S&R deployment concept for the United States outlined by Mr.
Hoh, federalized reservists would be deployed to cover the time “gap” before contractors could
be deployed. Because the U.S. government similarly lacks control over contractors operating
abroad on its behalf, policymakers may wish to consider whether the only factor to consider in
choosing civilian reservists over contractors is relative deployment times. Reservists might be
considered in circumstances where hostilities persist over a long period of time or where U.S.
interests are particularly sensitive. Alternately, because deploying reservists for greater lengths of
time would have implications for the size of the civilian reserve force, policymakers may wish to
consider greater controls over deployed contractors and greater oversight over contractor rosters.

Table 1. Rosters of Civilian Personnel for International State-Building Missions
^Country/^Number
^Orga^nization/^{Number En}^rolled^{Participating in}^{Types of Screening}^{Annual C}^{ost, Staffing,}
^{Year Established}^{on R}^oster^Missions^{Types of Person}^nel^{and Tr}^aining^{and Fundin}^{g Sou}^rce
^{United Nations}^{“Nucleus” data}^base^5,13^{0 Exter}^nal^per^sonnel^{Candidates are first}^{“Nucleus” data}^base
^{Department of}^{contains 4,0}^{00 ca}^ndidates^{who have}^{passed a two-}^{recruited for U.N.}^{missions (referred to as}^{checked for minim}^um^requirem^{ents, th}^{en for}^manned^{by 9}^full-time^recruitme^{nt officers.}
^Peacekeeping^{stage clearance}^process.^{“mission appointees”);}^{suitability for a position.}
^Operations^{U.N. headquarte}^{rs staf}^{f on}^{Final selection by field}^{Funded by}^Mem^{ber States}
¹⁹⁹⁴^{A newly established}^{process includes t}^wo^{mission detail; personnel}^{mission officials}^.^through^an^{nual b}^udget.
^additi^{onal levels of}^{from other U.N. agencies}^{on mission assignment.}^{Training offered in th}^e
^clearance.^{field and at U.N.}
^headqua^rters.
^Germany⁹⁰⁰²⁰⁰^serving^{in U.N.,}^Germa^{n civil servants a}^nd^{To jo}^{in roster, candidates}^{Annual budget}^{of $2.2}
^{Center for}^{Organization for Security}^{and Cooperation in}^{private sector}^{professionals.}^{complete a two-week}^{basic training cou}^rse,^mill^{ion for person}^nel,^{training, researc}^h,
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33647}^{International Peace}^{Operations (ZIF)}^Europe^{(OSCE), and}^{during whic}^{h they}^are^{publications, events.}
^g/w^Europea^{n U}^{nion (EU)}^{screened, or demonstrat}^e^{20 f}^{ull-time staff, of which}
^s^.or²⁰⁰²^missions.^{equivalent training}^and^{6 are r}^ecruiter^s.
^le^ak^experie^{nce. No spe}^cific^{pre-deployment t}^raining
^{Funded by}^Germa^ny’s
^://wiki^{offered yet.}^{Ministry of Foreign Affairs.}

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^Country/^Number
^Orga^nization/^{Number En}^rolled^{Participating in}^{Types of Screening}^{Annual C}^{ost, Staffing,}
^{Year Established}^{on R}^oster^Missions^{Types of Person}^nel^{and Tr}^aining^{and Fundin}^{g Sou}^rce
^Canada^7,56^{4 (core of 4,0}⁰⁰^{Over 4}⁰⁰^{deployed in}^{Canadian private sector}^{Candidates’ applications}^{Annual budget}^of
^CANADEM^expert^{s). Includes se}^ctoral^{rosters in h}^uma^{n rights,}^FY2005-²⁰^{06 to va}^rious^{U.N. missions, and}^{professionals, and civil}^{servants o}ⁿ^sab^{batical or}^{are pre-sc}^{reened (}^paper^{reviews) before}^being^$50^0,00^0.
^(Non-pr^ofit^{development and}^{missions conducted by}^{taking a leave of abse}^nce.^{placed on roster. Prior to}^{7 full-time and 5}^part-time^staff.
^orga^{nization fo}^unded^huma^{nitarian aid}^{OSCE and other}^{submission to agencies,}
^{with Canadian}^(approx.1,0^{00); elections}^{multilateral organizati}^ons,^expert^cons^{ultants p}^rovide^{Funded by Ca}^nada’s
^{government fun}^{ds )}^{(approx. 7}^00);^policing^{and by}^non-governme^ntal^furt^{her sc}^reening.^Most^Department^{of Foreign}
^(appr^{x. 60}^{0); and sec}^urity^{organizations.}^{candidates are also}^Affairs
¹⁹⁹⁷^{& countert}^errorism^{interviewed in perso}^{n or}
^{(approx. 2}^50).^{by p}^{hone; pa}^{st colleagues,}
^supe^{rvisors and}
^{subordinates ma}^{y be}
^{contacted. No initial or}
^{pre-deployment t}^raining
^{for those hired directly b}^y
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL33647}^{external age}^{ncies as all}^{have ex}^perien^{ce in}
^g/w^{international missions.}
^s^.or^{Canada provides}
^le^ak^{predeployment t}^{raining for}
^{those it deploys.}
^://wiki^Notes:^{Private sector professionals can include ap}^{plicants from}^bo^{th for-profit and}^non-p^{rofit organ}^izati^{ons. Budget figures do not in}^{clude deployment ex}^pen^ses.

^h^ttp

^Niⁿ^a^{M. S}^e^rafiⁿ^o
^Sp^{ecialist i}ⁿ^Iⁿ^terⁿ^atioⁿ^a^{l Sec}^u^rⁱ^t^y^Af^f^a^ir^s
ⁿ^s^era^fⁱⁿ^o^@^crs^.^l^o^c.g^o^v^,^7-⁷⁶⁶⁷