Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration: Background and Issues for Congress

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation
Administration: Background and Issues for
Congress
Updated January 29, 2007
Bart Elias, Coordinator
Specialist in Aviation Safety, Security, and Technology
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
John W. Fischer, Robert S. Kirk, James E. McCarthy
and Brent D. Yacobucci
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Jon O. Shimabukuro and Todd B. Tatelman
American Law Division

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration:
Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and other
aviation programs is likely to be a high priority in the 110^th Congress. Funding
authorizations for aviation programs, as well as authorization of existing aviation tax
structure that provides revenue for the aviation trust fund, are set to expire at the end
of FY2007. Congress may consider a variety of financing options to maintain the
ability of the aviation trust fund to provide a sufficient revenue stream for ongoing
operational costs and planned infrastructure improvements. One particularly
controversial alternative under consideration is a user fee system, which is supported
by the airlines but strongly opposed by many other system users.
Faced with growing operational costs and fiscal needs to support system
expansion, airport capital improvements, and modernization efforts, options to
control costs within the FAA and the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) may be a
particular focus of reauthorization. Cost control options generally revolve around
two overarching strategies: consolidation of facilities and functions, and competitive
sourcing. Some have recommended that a formal process, similar to the military’s
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, be implemented to assess how the
FAA could best consolidate its functions to control costs and address future system
needs. Besides controlling costs, options to maintain and balance air traffic
controller staffing levels are likely to be of particular interest, as the FAA is facing
a large wave of controller retirements over the next five years. Options for
improving and streamlining training, increasing productivity, better balancing
staffing needs, and perhaps consolidating air traffic facilities over the long-term may
be considered during reauthorization.
Congress may examine a variety of aviation safety issues during debate over
FAA reauthorization. Options for preventing runway overruns and for reducing the
risk of runway collisions may be of particular interest. The adequacy of FAA safety
oversight has been a continuing concern, and recent accidents may draw particular
attention to oversight of contract repair facilities, smaller passenger service operators,
as well as air charter and air tour operators. Other safety issues that may arise include
longstanding concerns, such as mitigating the risks of fuel tank explosions,
addressing concerns over aging aircraft, and addressing the unique safety issues
affecting all-cargo operations. Issues regarding airliner cabin health and safety may
also be considered. Options to mitigate the spread of infectious diseases among
aircraft occupants and the safety-of-flight implications of cell phones and portable
electronic devices may also be examined.
Growing interest in alternatives to petroleum fuel may generate some debate
over alternative fuel technologies for aircraft and airport ground vehicles, and
growing international pressures to regulate aircraft emissions may prompt debate on
aviation’s environmental impacts. Longstanding aircraft noise policies may also be
examined to assess whether quiet aircraft technologies and policy changes could
further mitigate the community impacts of aircraft noise. This report will be updated.

Contents
Overview ........................................................1
FAA Budget and Finance Issues..................................1
Airport Development and Finance Issues...........................2
Cost Control Issues............................................3
System Demand and Capacity Issues...............................6
System Modernization Issues.....................................7
Safety Issues..................................................9
Airliner Cabin Issues..........................................10
Energy, Environment, and Noise Issues............................10
International Civil Aviation Issues...............................11
FAA Budget and Financing Issues....................................11
FAA Spending...............................................11
Airport and Airway Trust Fund Issues.............................13
Aviation Trust Fund Revenue Adequacy.......................13
Tax and Fee Structural Issues...............................15
The General Fund Share...................................18
Aviation Spending Guarantees..............................19
Airport Development and Finance....................................21
Airport Capital Needs Estimates.................................22
Airport Improvement Program (AIP)..............................24
AIP Funding Distribution..................................25
Apportionment and Eligibility Changes.......................25
Discretionary Fund Set-Asides..............................26
Minimum Discretionary Fund...............................26
Grant Assurances.........................................26
Airport Noise Issues.......................................27
Federal Share............................................27
Privatization .............................................27
Partial Defederalization....................................27
Airport Security Project Eligibility...........................28
Very Light Jets (VLJs) and the Airbus A380: Impact on AIP.......28
Earmarking/ “Place Naming”................................28
Passenger Facility Charge Issues.................................29
Airport Bonding Issues........................................29
Options to Control Operational Costs at the FAA........................30
Consolidation of Facilities and Functions..........................30
Competitive Sourcing and Privatization of Functions.................32
The Federal Contract Tower (FCT) Program....................33
Automated Flight Service Station Contracts....................35
Aeronautical Charting.....................................37
FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure......................38
The Use of Designees.....................................39
Air Traffic Controller Staffing...................................39
FAA Labor Relations and Negotiations............................42

Future Airport and Airspace Demand and Capacity Needs.................45
Quantifying Delay and Mitigating Its Impacts.......................45
The Asymmetry of Capacity Straining Operations...................47
Accommodating Future Airspace Users...........................48
Very Light Jets...........................................49
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.................................51
Options for Maintaining Access and Controlling Demand
at Capacity-Constrained Airports............................52
Non-price De-peaking Strategies and Incentives.................54
Slots and Quotas.........................................55
Providing Air Service to Small Communities ......................56
The Essential Air Service Program...........................57
Small Community Air Service Development Program............58
Fostering Investment and Development of the Next Generation
Air Transportation System (NGATS).............................58
NGATS Funding Requirements..................................59
Management of the NGATS Development Effort ...................63
The Role of the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO)........63
Technological Objectives and Core Technologies....................67
The Present-Day Airspace System and Its Technologies...........68
Precision Navigation......................................69
Shared Situation Awareness and Distributed, Adaptive
Decision Making .........................................72
Phasing Out Legacy Systems....................................75
Wake Vortex Detection, Prediction, and Avoidance..................76
Improving Aviation Safety..........................................78
Preventing Runway Overrun Accidents............................79
Preventing Runway Incursions and Collisions......................81
Improving Oversight Of Maintenance Facilities.....................84
Improving Oversight of Charter and Air Tour Operators..............86
Mitigating the Risk of Fuel Tank Explosions on Commercial Airliners...88
Addressing Aging Aircraft Issues................................91
Addressing the Safety of All-Cargo Operations.....................93
Aircraft Cabin Occupant Safety, Comfort, and Public Health...............97
Cabin Air Quality.............................................97
Preventing the Spread of Infectious Disease in the Aircraft Cabin.......98
Cell Phones and Portable Electronic Devices.......................99
Infant and Toddler Seats......................................100
Energy and Environmental Considerations............................101
Alternative Fuels for Aircraft...................................102
Alternative Fuels for Airport Ground Service Vehicles..............103
Air Pollution...............................................104
Ozone Nonattainment Areas...............................104
Aircraft and Climate Change...............................106
Mitigating Aircraft Noise Through Policy and Technology...........106
Aircraft Noise Reduction Technologies and Technology Policy....106
Airport Noise Mitigation Policy............................108

International Civil Aviation Issues..................................113
“Open Skies” Agreements.....................................114
Foreign Ownership and Control.................................115
Cabotage ..................................................117
Appendix 1: Glossary of Key Aviation Technology Terms and Concepts....118
List of Figures
Figure 1. AIP Authorizations and Obligations ($ millions)................24
Figure 2. FAA Projections of Controller Attrition, Planned
Hiring Rates, and Anticipated Controller Staffing Levels..............40
Figure 3. Causes of Air Carrier Flight Delays (2003-2005)................46
Figure 4. Continuum of Government Involvement in Market-Based
Strategies to Alleviate Aviation Congestion........................53
Figure 5. Preliminary Estimates of Increased F&E Funding Needs
to Support NGATS Development................................61
List of Tables
Table 1: FAA Major Program Funding: AIR-21 and Vision 100:
FY2001 - FY2006............................................12
Table 2: Airport And Airway Trust Fund: Revenue Flow
and Balances, FY1997-FY2006..................................14
Table 3. Authorized, Appropriated Funding Levels and Analysis
of Future Funding Needs for FAA Programs........................62

NameAreas of ExpertiseDivisionTelephone
Bart Elias — Next Generation Air TrafficRSI7-7771
System (NGATS)
— FAA Facilities and
Equipment (F&E)
— FAA Management and
Operations
— Airport and Airspace Demand
and Capacity Analysis
— Aviation Safety
— Aircraft Noise Policy and
Quiet Aircraft Technology
John Fischer — FAA Financing and AviationRSI7-7766
Taxes
— Airport and Airways Trust
Fund (AATF)
— Essential Air Service and
Small Community Air Service
Development Programs
— Airline Economic Issues
Bob Kirk — FAA Financing and AviationRSI7-7769
Taxes
— Airport and Airways Trust
Fund (AATF)
— Airport Improvement
Program (AIP)
— Airport Finance
Jim McCarthy — Aircraft Emissions RSI7-7225
Jon Shimabukuro — Labor Law and PolicyALD7-7990
— FAA Labor Relations
Todd Tatelman — Aviation Law (Domestic andALD7-4697
International)
Brent Yacobucci — Aviation FuelsRSI7-9662
— Alternative Fuels for Aircraft
and Ground Support Vehicles
Linda Luther — Airport Environmental IssuesRSI7-6852

(Streamlining)

Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation
Administration: Background and Issues for
Congress
Overvi ew¹
The pending debate over reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) is likely to be a high priority in the 110^th Congress. Funding authorizations
for aviation programs set forth in Vision 100 — the Century of Aviation
Reauthorization Act (P.L. 108-176, hereafter referred to as Vision 100), as well as
authorization of the existing aviation tax structure that provides revenue for the
aviation trust fund, are set to expire at the end of FY2007. CRS has identified nine
broad categories of issues that Congress may address in the context of FAA
reauthorization. These include FAA budgeting and finance; airport development and
finance; FAA cost control measures; system-wide demand and capacity issues;
modernization of national airspace system (NAS) infrastructure; aviation safety;
airliner cabin issues; energy, environment, and noise issues; and international civil
aviation issues.
FAA Budget and Finance Issues
Authorization of the existing aviation tax structure that provides revenue for the
aviation trust fund will expire at the end of FY2007. While such tax authorizations
have expired in the past, the current deliberations over FAA funding are considered
particularly critical. This, in part, is because uncommitted balances in the airport and
airways trust fund (AATF), commonly referred to as the aviation trust fund, have
declined in recent years, leaving a relatively small reserve to pay for aviation
programs in the event that tax collection authorities are allowed to expire. Also,
major initiatives to develop and deploy the Next Generation Air Transportation
System (NGATS) by 2025, initiated during the last reauthorization process, are
reaching a stage where they will require additional funding resources if these plans
are to be realized. While no official projections are yet available on the total cost for
NGATS, early estimates indicate that it will require an average of $200 million to $1
billion annually in facilities and equipment costs over the next several years to keep
NGATS development initiatives on track.
Congress may consider a variety of financing options to maintain the ability of
the aviation trust fund to provide a sufficient revenue stream for ongoing operational
costs and planned infrastructure improvements, in the near-term and to support the
long-term NGATS development efforts. In the course of this debate, Congress may

¹ See Appendix 1 for a glossary of key aviation technology terms and concepts.

consider the appropriate cost allocation between aviation system users, the share of
the cost burden to be borne by the aviation trust fund, and the share to be derived
from Treasury general funds (the so-called public interest contribution).
The relative tax burden placed on various industry participants has been a source
of controversy for over 36 years, since the aviation trust fund was created. The
airlines argue that they have been paying a disproportionately larger share of the
system costs compared to general aviation users since the largest revenue sources for
the aviation trust fund are derived from passenger ticket taxes. The airlines claim
that in their highly competitive industry, they must absorb some of the tax-related
costs in their fare pricing schemes. The airlines have identified general aviation²
users, and business jet operators in particular, as a segment of the aviation economy
that, in their opinion, is not paying its fair share of the costs to maintain and improve
the national airspace system (NAS). General aviation users argue, on the other hand,
that the NAS has largely been developed to support the airline industry, that the
incremental costs to accommodate general aviation users is not that large, and that
existing fuel taxes are sufficient to compensate for their impact on the system.
One alternative to the existing tax structure supported by the airlines is a fee-for-
service system that would be more of a direct user fee system than what is in place
now. Some industry observers claim that the FAA has been mulling the idea of a
direct user fee structure to replace existing aviation taxes and fees, and an
administration proposal has reportedly been under review by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for some time.³ While the details of the proposal
are unknown, speculation is that it will conform more closely to international
standards that stipulate user fees be computed as some function of the specific impact
on air traffic facilities and services, such as the commonly used fees based on aircraft
weight and distance flown used by many nations.
During the reauthorization debate, Congress may consider a variety of aviation
trust fund revenue alternatives that may include keeping the existing passenger ticket
and fuel taxes largely or completely intact, moving to a tax revenue scheme based
solely on fuel taxes, adopting a user fee-based system, or developing a hybrid scheme
that consists of some combination of these alternatives. One hybrid approach that
has been discussed is to charge user fees for airlines and operators of larger general
aviation aircraft, while small general aviation users would continue to contribute
solely by means of a fuel tax, although these fuel tax rates and structure could differ
from what currently exists.
Airport Development and Finance Issues
The Airport Improvement Program (AIP) provides federal grants for airport
development. Its funding is derived from the airport and airways trust fund, and it
is one of five major sources of funding for airport development and improvement.

² General aviation refers to all aviation activity except for commercial airline, all-cargo
airline, and military operations.
³ Paul Lowe, “Alphabet Groups Ready To Wage User-Fee Battle,” Aviation International
News, The Convention News Co., Inc., Midland Park, NJ, April, 2006.

Airports also fund capital projects using tax-exempt bonds, passenger facility charges
(PFCs; a local tax levied on each boarding passenger), state and local grants, and
airport revenue. The preeminent reauthorization issue for AIP is whether its funding
levels will be increased substantially, held steady/increased modestly, or reduced.
The outlook for AIP funding will be influenced by the resolution of the debate
concerning taxes and fees supporting the aviation trust fund as well as any decision
concerning the scope of the general fund share of the FAA budget. A failure to
secure more revenue for the FAA budget, in light of the recent decline in the
uncommitted balance of the trust fund, could constrain any attempts to increase the
AIP budget.
During the reauthorization process, Congress may also examine a wide variety
of other issues pertaining to the AIP program including airport eligibility and
apportionments among various sizes of airports; discretionary funding levels and uses
of discretionary grants; the scope of grant assurances to protect federal interests in
airport projects; funding levels set aside for noise-related projects; the appropriate
federal share of funding for airport projects at airports of various sizes; possible
expansion of or modification to the airport privatization pilot program; partial
defederalization of airport funding allowing airports to use PFCs instead of AIP as
a primary or sole source for project funds; limitations on the use of AIP funds for
airport security projects; the possible impacts of accommodating new users classes
such as very light jets (VLJs) and the Airbus A380 super-jumbo jet on airport
infrastructure needs and airport financing; and the use of earmarks or “place naming”
in legislation regarding airport infrastructure projects. In addition to AIP funding and
related issues, Congress may consider options to raise the cap on PFC levels to
provide additional funding availability outside of AIP, and options to make airport
bonds more attractive to investors, although some may argue the latter may be more
appropriately addressed through tax reform legislation rather than FAA
reauthoriz ation.
Cost Control Issues
Besides consideration of a revenue system for funding the aviation trust fund,
controlling the costs of operating and maintaining the existing national airspace
system has been an ongoing concern for the FAA and for congressional oversight.
Cost control measures may be a particular issue of interest during the FAA
reauthorization debate as Congress grapples with the prospect of escalating
operational costs that must be balanced with the fiscal needs to support planned
infrastructure development, both over the near-term to fund ongoing and planned
system expansion and over the long-term to support the NGATS development.
Outsourcing has been seen as a viable alternative for controlling costs in some
instances, such as the FAA’s federal contract tower (FCT) program and the recently
privatized automated flight service stations (AFSSs). Expanded outsourcing of
various FAA functions, such as further expansion of the contract tower program and
privatization of the FAA’s aeronautical charting functions, are possible options that
both the FAA and Congress may examine. Also, the FAA and Congress may look

to increase the use of designees⁴ to carry out certain aviation oversight functions.
However, some critics argue that these outsourcing options are likely to yield
relatively small cost savings in comparison to the overall FAA operations budget.
Further, these options are likely to be highly contentious and face strong opposition
from labor organizations. Whether these outsourcing measures potentially
compromise safety in any way remains a specific point of contention. While some
have advocated large scale privatization of air traffic services — as has been done in
Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and parts of mainland Europe — this
approach would be highly complex to carry out, and this option has failed to garner
much support in Congress. The current administration has indicated previously that
is has no plans to privatize en route and terminal air traffic control facilities, but may
opt to expand the contract tower program.
Consolidation of facilities and functions has also been viewed as a possible way
to control operational costs at the FAA. The FAA is currently in the process of
consolidating administration and support functions in its regional service areas, and
has plans to consolidate weather services provided at en route centers. Also, under
the privatized AFSS program, an extensive consolidation of flight service facilities
is currently in process. Some have proposed that the FAA implement a systematic
process, perhaps using something akin to the military’s Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC) process, to address future consolidation plans for facilities and
functions. Congress may debate the merits of this proposal during the pending FAA
reauthoriz ation.
In the long term, under NGATS, consolidation of air traffic services and air
traffic facilities may be possible. With increased reliance on automation and by
increasing the autonomy, flexibility, and authority granted to individual flights
operating in the national airspace system (NAS), the ratio of air traffic controllers to
aircraft operating in the system is likely to drop. In the near term, this will likely be
offset by the growth in air traffic operations, so that a modest increase in the overall
number of air traffic controllers is expected. In the long-term, however, the changing
nature of controller responsibilities and functions may result in a need for fewer
controllers, and may allow for considerable consolidation in air traffic control
facilities across the United States. The FAA has also expressed interest in
consolidation of air traffic facilities as a possible means to address ongoing staffing
issues, particularly among en route centers, where there is a shortage of fully
qualified controllers to handle the most complex airspace sectors. The FAA believes
that facilities consolidation could help in its efforts to better match controller skills
and levels of experience with airspace complexity and provide controllers with better
job advancement opportunities while, at the same time, reducing infrastructure and
relocation costs.

⁴ Designees are individuals that are neither government employees nor government
contractors, that are authorized or designated by the FAA to carry out regulatory functions.
Examples include designated medical examiners that issue medical certification, pilot
examiners that issue pilot certificates and ratings, and manufacturing representatives that
certify the airworthiness of production aircraft.

With regard to controlling operational costs, air traffic controller pay remains
a contentious issue as controller compensation and benefits make up a sizable
proportion of the FAA’s operational costs, comprising roughly 35% of total operating
costs.⁵ Under a 1998 contract agreement between the FAA and controllers, controller
compensation and benefits grew about 64% in eight years,⁶ outpacing the increase in
labor costs for other FAA employees and federal workers. During contract
renegotiations in 2005 and 2006, the FAA looked to obtain sizable concessions from
controllers, but the two sides could not come to agreement. As called for in statute,
the impasse was referred to Congress. However, Congress did not act on the impasse
submittal, thus allowing the FAA to implement its final contract proposal, which
became effective in September 2006. While the law giving the FAA authority to
negotiate compensation and benefits in labor contracts, a rarity in the government
sector, was enacted largely for the purpose of improving the FAA’s ability to attract
and retain a high quality professional workforce, it has been criticized by
management for leading to escalating operating costs and by both management and
labor for straining relations between the two sides.
While the main objectives of the law, to improve the recruitment and retention
of high quality employees, is laudable, Congress may wish to examine whether
options to improve the law are available to control escalating operational costs and
maintain more positive and constructive management-labor relations within the FAA.
With regard to labor negotiations, one legislative option offered during the 109^th
Congress proposed to add an additional phase, requiring management and labor to
enter into binding arbitration, after the period of congressional review that follows
an impasse in the contract negotiation process.⁷ While Congress did not take up
formal debate on this proposal in the midst of the recent FAA/controller labor
dispute, this proposal may resurface during debate over FAA reauthorization. Other
options to streamline the labor negotiations process within FAA may also be
considered in the context of FAA reauthorization, as recent labor negotiations were
rather disruptive and highly contentious.
Controller staffing is also likely to be a key focus in the reauthorization debate,
as the FAA seeks to effectively manage its controller workforce in preparation for an
expected surge in retirements over the next several years. Some available options
that Congress may consider include dedicated funding authorizations marked for new
controller hiring and training; authorization for new hires from accredited collegiate
air traffic programs to enter directly into on-the-job training; funding authorization
for initiatives to enhance controller training using advanced simulation technologies;
and consolidation of certain air traffic facilities and functions to provide for greater
flexibility in meeting staffing needs.

⁵ CRS calculation based on FAA budget documents and statements regarding average air
traffic controller workforce compensation and benefits.
⁶ “Soaring Controller Pay Looms Large in Discussions on ATC.” Air Transport World
Daily News, May 16, 2005.
⁷ See, e.g., see S. 2201 and H.R. 4755, which were introduced during the 109^th Congress.

System Demand and Capacity Issues
The current FAA reauthorization cycle comes at a critical time with respect to
addressing increasing capacity needs at high-volume airports, in airspace around
many major metropolitan areas, and along certain highly congested routes. While
recent stopgap measures implemented by the FAA have served to stave off
unacceptable congestion and delays thus far, long-term solutions are likely needed
in consideration of future air traffic growth projections. Many believe that
technology is needed to reduce low visibility aircraft spacing standards to those
allowable in good visibility in order to accommodate projected future growth at busy
airports. However, some experts caution that even with the implementation of these
proposed options and the completion of planned airport expansions across the
country, certain very busy airports, including both major commercial airports and
busy general aviation reliever airports, may experience peak hour demand levels that
exceed airport capacity limitations.
Besides addressing expected capacity needs, a significant challenge facing
Congress and the FAA in the years ahead is accommodating new classes of airspace
users in a manner that optimizes safety and efficiency for all users. New users will
consist of the very big, such as the Airbus A-380 super-jumbo jet, as well as the very
small, very light jets (VLJs). The most talked-about class of new system users are the
VLJs, which are expected to begin operations in small numbers in 2007 and are
projected to experience rapid growth over the next ten years. VLJs are seen by some
as a possible solution to provide small communities improved access to the national
air transportation system. Therefore, their introduction may spur renewed public
policy debate over approaches to enhance air transportation in small communities.
Also, because these VLJs will share high altitude airspace and congested airspace
around major metropolitan areas with commercial passenger jets, their impact on
system capacity and air traffic control workload is likely to be of particular interest.
Besides VLJs, the introduction of pilotless Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), or
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs), also poses significant challenges to maintaining
safety and not impeding access to airspace for other users such as small general
aviation aircraft.
Due to persisting capacity limitations in certain locations, the FAA and
Congress may be faced with difficult choices regarding how best to maintain access
and address demand in an equitable manner at capacity constrained airports. Vision
100 provided the FAA with limited authority to implement negotiated scheduling
among air carriers at a few capacity-constrained airports on a trial basis. This
approach, along with other options such as peak-period pricing, slots, and quota
systems have all been examined as possible options. The FAA’s approach to
addressing capacity constraints at New York’s LaGuardia Airport is likely to be an
issue of particular interest during the debate over reauthorization as the statutorily
imposed slot system for LaGuardia expired in January 2007.
While capacity constraints are posing challenges at major metropolitan airports,
several trends, including the continuing loss of commercial air carrier service in rural
America, are making the essential air service (EAS) air carrier subsidy program
more attractive to many rural communities. However, even with increased funding
for this program in recent years, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the EAS

program to generate additional air service. Against this backdrop the EAS program
faces a number of issues that are likely to be addressed in forthcoming
reauthorization legislation. Primary among these is how to prioritize access to the
program so that EAS funds are used in the most efficient manner possible. It is
likely, however, that without a significant increase in funding, additional limitations
on the use of EAS program funding may have to be considered. In addition to the
EAS program, the Small Community Air Service Development (SCASD) Program
was established to develop solutions for improving air carrier service to communities
that are experiencing insufficient access to the national air transportation system.
While an initial review of the program found mixed results, it has been noted that it
is still too early in the program’s history to fully assess its potential effectiveness.
System Modernization Issues
Present initiatives to modernize air traffic facilities and services have been
channeled into a unified effort to develop the Next Generation Air Transportation
System (NGATS) under a provision in Vision 100. Vision 100 created the Joint
Planning and Development Office (JPDO), a multi-agency entity headed by the FAA
and charged with the task of conceptualizing and integrating the development of the
NGATS. The DOT envisions NGATS as a system capable of tripling effective
system capacity by 2025. By some estimates, air traffic levels throughout the United
States could increase at that pace thereby necessitating these system enhancements.
The specifics of these efforts and future funding and management challenges facing
the JPDO and the FAA in carrying forth the plans to build the NGATS are likely to
be a major focus during the current FAA reauthorization process. A significant issue
facing Congress during the upcoming FAA reauthorization process is obtaining
working estimates of what building the NGATS will cost. CRS analysis of available
preliminary cost estimates indicates that the total cost to build the NGATS by 2025
is estimated to be between $69 billion and $76 billion, which is roughly $5 billion
to $12 billion above baseline facilities and equipment (F&E) spending levels.
Another significant issue that may be addressed during the reauthorization
process is how to best manage the NGATS development effort. One major hurdle
is that while the JPDO can set objectives, goals, and strategies for the NGATS
framework, the funding stream for carrying out these plans will ultimately come from
the budgets of the various agencies involved, primarily the FAA and NASA. In
recognition of this, Congress may examine options to align budget elements of the
various agencies involved within the NGATS framework. Another potential issue
is the appropriate scope of the JPDO’s efforts. While some consideration of various
ancillary functions and issues — such as security and environmental impacts — may
improve the overall system design for the NGATS, too much emphasis on these
various issues could impede progress on the central issue of improving the efficiency
and capacity of the air traffic system.
Besides the scope of the JPDO’s efforts, another issue of interest is the JPDO’s
approach. Some observers contend that the JPDO has remained too focused on
policy and establishing a paradigm for collaboration among agencies and
stakeholders, and it has not yet translated these general objectives into a cohesive
blueprint, with a high degree of engineering specification regarding timelines and
contingencies among the various component elements of the NGATS. One possible

option being discussed for streamlining NGATS system development is the use of
an overarching lead systems integration (LSI) contract for overseeing the NGATS
project.
While many questions still remain regarding the management approach to
developing NGATS, there is a growing consensus among experts in the field
regarding the technological objectives and likely technologies that will comprise the
core functionality of the NGATS system. The core technologies needed to meet
these objectives include (1) precision navigation capabilities to pinpoint aircraft
locations, project flight paths or flight trajectories, and predict future aircraft
positions with a high degree of accuracy; and (2) highly integrated information
networks to enable a shared situation awareness regarding traffic, weather, airport
conditions, and other factors affecting flights and provide tools to facilitate
distributed, adaptive decision-making and information-sharing about operational
changes, such as flight path deviations and their potential impacts on other system
users. The investment strategy for these technologies that is adopted and carried
forth over the next three to five years is likely to have a lasting impact on both the
end-state of NGATS and the path to reaching that end state.
In addition to deciding on a technology investment and deployment strategy for
the NGATS, a challenging and potentially contentious issue is the phasing out of
existing facilities and equipment for air traffic communications, navigation, and
surveillance. Phasing out of existing systems must be addressed carefully because,
on the one hand, maintaining legacy systems while deploying new technologies can
be costly and resource intensive. On the other hand, phasing these systems out too
quickly could place an undue burden on system users to equip aircraft and could pose
safety concerns if adequate backups and redundancies are not in place. Congress may
express particular interest in the FAA’s efforts to assess how proposals envisioning
new navigation and surveillance technologies will address the issue of providing
equivalent safety to the current radar-based air traffic surveillance system.
Congressional interest regarding the phase-out of legacy systems may also focus on
how these plans may impact airspace system users, particularly smaller operators
who may face a greater challenge in equipping aircraft to keep pace with the
evolution from the existing national airspace system to NGATS compliant avionics
and aircraft systems.
While advances in precision navigation and information sharing show great
promise for reducing aircraft spacing in all weather conditions thereby increasing
system capacity, wake turbulence produced by large transport aircraft currently
imposes practical limitations on aircraft spacing, even under ideal weather
conditions. Current air traffic procedures specify separation standards for aircraft
departing behind large and heavy jets to allow their wake vortices to dissipate. Some
view these standards as overly conservative and argue that accurate wake vortex
prediction capabilities could allow for decreased separation, thereby increasing
airport capacity in many weather conditions. Others argue that the limited capability
of available technology and the complexities of wake vortex propagation make it
difficult to predict wake turbulence or to use such predictions to significantly reduce
arrival and departure spacing without compromising safety. Vision 100 authorizes
the expenditure of such sums as may be necessary for the development and
assessment of wake vortex advisory systems. Promising emerging technology for

wake turbulence detection may be able to increase effective landing capacity at
airports, perhaps by as much as 20%, but is still at a very early stage of research and
development.
Safety Issues
Since the last reauthorization, major airlines have maintained an impressive
safety record. Congressional oversight of FAA safety initiatives and programs has
not been a major focus of Congress in several years, as concerns over aviation
security since September 11, 2001 have been a much more dominant issue.
However, there are many aspects of safety where there is still room for improvement
in an industry that is, for the most part, very safe. One area of growing concern is the
safety of the airport environment. Recent runway overrun accidents have highlighted
concern over the adequacy of runway safety areas and the level of attention the FAA
has given to mitigating the risk of catastrophic runway overrun accidents. Also with
regard to runway safety, the FAA has identified mitigating runway incursions, or
potential ground collisions with departing or landing aircraft, as one of its highest
priorities. However, the FAA’s approach to addressing this issue has been criticized
by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and other aviation safety
advocates who maintain that improving pilot situation awareness of the airport
environment is a critical need for effectively mitigating runway incursions.
A long-running safety concern is the adequacy of the FAA’s oversight of air
carrier operations and maintenance. The growing trend of outsourcing maintenance
to third party maintenance, repair, and overhaul facilities has raised questions over
the adequacy of these facilities’ compliance with air carrier and FAA standards for
work conditions and quality assurance. Particular concerns over repair facilities that
service commuter aircraft, and work performed on air carrier aircraft by small repair
shops that are not required to be certified by the FAA, are two particular issues where
Congress may consider options to enhance regulatory requirements and FAA
oversight of these maintenance activities.
Another continuing safety concern that Congress may again examine during this
reauthorization process is the continued airworthiness of aging aircraft, which was
highlighted by the ongoing investigation of a commuter seaplane built in 1947 that
crashed while departing Miami for the Bahamas on December 17, 2005. A particular
issue of interest is the FAA’s approach to continued airworthiness and safety
monitoring of the fleet of small commuter aircraft and the aging general aviation
fleet, which are not covered under the aging aircraft inspections program established
for large airliners.
The 10-year anniversary of the crash of TWA flight 800 on July 17, 2006, has
renewed interest in measures being taken to mitigate the risk of fuel tank explosions
on large transport-category aircraft. While technological advances in fuel inerting
systems have been made in recent years and the FAA has proposed fuel tank
flammability reduction requirements for new and existing passenger airliners, critics
have expressed frustration that steps to prevent another catastrophe attributable to a

fuel tank explosion are moving too slowly, in their opinion.⁸ Congress may debate
available alternatives to accelerate safety initiatives to reduce fuel tank flammability
and, perhaps, options to mitigate the financial impact of complying with proposed
aircraft modifications on air carriers.
Airliner Cabin Issues
Issues related to passenger safety, comfort, and public health in aircraft cabins
have often been of interest in past FAA reauthorization processes, and may again
generate considerable debate during the current reauthorization cycle. One particular
concern is the potential for spread of a deadly infectious disease, such as a
communicable strain of avian flu, among airline passengers. The risk of such a threat
was highlighted a few years ago when the deadly Sudden Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) virus caused widespread concern over the public health risks
posed by airline travel. Congress may debate whether more research is needed on
methods to prevent the spread of infectious diseases in the aircraft cabin, and how to
effectively deploy available methods to detect and mitigate the spread of disease
among airline travelers. With regard to cabin occupant safety, Congress may once
again consider whether infants and toddlers under two years of age should be
restrained in child seats on airline flights, or whether the current practice of allowing
“lap children” should be continued. The FAA recently rescinded its plans to require
child restraints for these children, as advocated by the NTSB, citing fears that
families would opt to instead travel by car — an arguably riskier mode of travel —
if faced with the prospect of paying for an additional ticket for their infant or toddler
to fly. The NTSB maintains that the failure to restrain all aircraft occupants is an
unsafe practice, and the FAA’s cross-modal safety comparisons detract from the
central issue of whether such a practice should be allowed to continue.
Also, with regard to issues of passenger comfort, safety, and convenience in the
airliner cabin, the use of cell phones and portable electronic devices (PEDs) has been
an issue of growing interest. Technological advances in wireless voice and data
communications are far outpacing the FAA’s ability to study the safety implications
of using these radio frequency (RF) emitting devices on board aircraft and make
sound policy decisions regarding the in-flight use of these devices. While vendors
are pushing for approval of onboard systems to make cell phone and wireless Internet
access available in flight, researchers have expressed continuing concern that cell
phones and other PEDs may interfere with aircraft instrumentation. During the
current reauthorization debate, Congress may consider whether more focused
research on this issue is needed to determine if, and under what circumstances, these
devices can be used in flight without any foreseeable safety consequences.
Energy, Environment, and Noise Issues
Issues related to energy and the environment may play a larger than usual role
during the current reauthorization debate. Energy and fuel issues in particular have
been part of the larger public policy debate in recent years, and may spur
consideration of alternative fuels for aircraft and airport vehicles. Growing concerns

⁸ “10 Years After Flight 800, Just Hot Air,” Air Safety Week, 20(31), August 7, 2006.

over global warming and environmental impacts may also prompt debate over
options for reducing aircraft emissions. Historically high fuel costs are driving much
of the current push for more efficient aircraft, which also can be cleaner and quieter.
However, Congress may debate available options to study alternative aircraft fuels,
monitor international approaches to mitigating aircraft emissions and noise, sponsor
research on aircraft emissions-reduction and quiet aircraft technologies, and provide
incentives for manufacturers and operators to develop and utilize aircraft
technologies that reduce dependence on fossil fuels and environmental impacts.
International Civil Aviation Issues
Although not technically within the jurisdiction of the FAA, there are at least
three major international aviation issues, falling under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Transportation (DOT), that may arise as Congress considers FAA
reauthorization legislation. First, there is the potential that the “Open Skies”
agreement with the European Union will remain unsigned and unimplemented, which
is a major concern for many U.S. airlines seeking greater flexibility to operate flights
in European markets. Second, is the closely related issue regarding DOT’s
rulemaking on foreign ownership and control of domestic carriers. Although the
administrative process has been completed, the DOT has not to date issued a final
rule. The delay has been due in part to strong congressional opposition that has taken
the form both of introduced legislation and attempts to prevent the final rule through
appropriations riders. According to some commentators, as comprehensive as the
proposed agreement appears to be, there cannot be meaningful reform in the
international aviation market until Congress repeals the so-called “citizenship test,”
which limits foreign ownership and control of U.S. air carriers. Finally, there is the
longstanding issue of cabotage, which is defined as the transportation of passengers
or cargo by foreign air carriers from one point in the United States to another and is,
with a couple of narrow exceptions, generally prohibited by U.S. law. A limited
statutory exception to this prohibition, allowing international carriers to carry certain
cargo shipments between airports within the United States and destinations in Alaska
while en route to foreign destinations, was included in Vision 100. In light of these
various ongoing international aviation issues, the FAA reauthorization process may
provide Congress with a unique opportunity to legislate and play a major role with
respect to these developments in international civil aviation.
The following sections of this report provide an in-depth examination of the
various issues that may be considered during congressional debate over
reauthorization of the FAA.
FAA Budget and Financing Issues
FAA Spending
The aviation taxes and fees associated with funding the federal aviation system
will expire at the end of FY2007, as will most federal aviation programs. The FAA
and others have expressed concern that the existing funding system for aviation is
inadequate to meet future needs. The FAA receives the majority of its funding from
receipts to the airport and airway trust fund (aviation trust fund). It also receives an

annual appropriation of Treasury general funds (GF) to pay for the remainder of its
activities. The trust fund pays for all of the FAA’s airport improvement program
(AIP), facilities and equipment (F&E) program, and research, engineering and
development (RE&D) program. It also pays for much of the FAA’s operations and
maintenance (O&M) program, which also receives general funds.
As can be seen in Table 1, annual appropriations for the AIP program roughly
followed the amounts authorized in the last two FAA reauthorization acts, AIR-21
(P.L. 106-181) and Vision 100, but appropriations for the other three programs have
not. Funding for F&E tracked the authorization through FY2004, but has since been
significantly below the authorized amount. Annual RE&D appropriations have been
well below their authorized levels in each year. O&M appropriations have been
higher than the amounts authorized in two years, below in the other four, but in only
one instance, FY2003, did the program fail to grow on a year-over-year basis.
Table 1: FAA Major Program Funding: AIR-21 and Vision 100:
FY2001 - FY2006
($ in millions)
^F^Y²⁰⁰¹^F^Y²⁰⁰²^F^Y²⁰⁰³^F^Y²⁰⁰⁴^F^Y²⁰⁰⁵^F^Y²⁰⁰⁶
^A^I^{P (T}^F⁾^au^t^h^ori^zed^3,200^3,300^3,400^3,400^3,500^3,600
^oblⁱ^mⁱ^t^3,193^3,475^3,378^3,380^3,472^3,515
^F^&^{E (T}^F⁾^au^t^h^ori^zed^2,657^2,914^2,981^3,183^2,993^3,053
^appropri^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^2,651^3,021^2,942^2,863^2,525^2,555
^RE^&D^au^t^h^ori^zed²³⁷²⁴⁹^—^-³⁴⁶³⁵⁶³⁵²
^(T^F⁾
^appropri^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s¹⁸⁷²⁴⁵¹⁴⁷¹¹⁹¹³⁰¹³⁷
^O&^M^au^t^h^ori^zed^6,592^6,886^7,357^7,591^7,732^7,889
^(T^F^/^GF⁾
^appropri^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^6,603^7,077^7,023^7,479^7,707^8,104
^G^F^s^h^are²^,198^1,104^3,248^3,010^2,828^2,619
^To^t^a^l^o^b^lim^{it &}^12,634^13,818^13,490^13,843^13,858^14,311
^(T^F^/^GF⁾^appropri^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s
^No^te:^T^F⁼^a^vⁱ^a^tⁱ^o^{n t}^r^ust^fund^,^G^F⁼^T^r^e^a^s^ur^y^G^e^ne^r^a^l^Fund^s
^S^o^u^r^ces^:^A^u^t^h^o^rⁱ^z^a^tⁱ^o^{n am}^ouⁿ^t^s^f^r^om^A^I^R^-^{21 an}^{d V}ⁱ^sⁱ^on^{100 (A}^IR^-^{21 di}^{d n}^o^tⁱⁿ^cl^u^d^{e an}^R^E^&^D
^au^t^h^ori^zatⁱ^oⁿ^f^o^{r F}^Y^{2003). A}^ppropri^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^sⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿ^f^r^om^F^A^A^dat^a^.
As is discussed throughout this report, there are many in the aviation industry,
and also within the FAA, who believe that significantly greater funding will be
required in the years ahead for each of the four major FAA programs. These requests
come against the backdrop of three years of FAA spending in which annual
appropriations for the agency increased on a fairly modest basis.

Airport and Airway Trust Fund Issues
The forthcoming reauthorization debate is likely to focus on three major issues
related to the trust fund. First is the question of whether the trust fund will provide
sufficient revenue to meet the growing needs of the FAA’s activities and programs.
Second is the long standing issue of whether the existing tax and fee system is the
appropriate mechanism for producing trust fund revenues, or whether an entirely new
revenue collection mechanism should be adopted. And third is the controversial issue
of how much of FAA’s total funding should come from Treasury general funds (GF).
Aviation Trust Fund Revenue Adequacy. There is considerable
discussion over the question of trust fund revenue adequacy for the years ahead.
Table 2 shows that total trust fund income rose dramatically in FY1998 following
the last major reauthorization of trust fund directed taxes and fees by the Taxpayers
Relief Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-34). Income increased even further in FY1999,^th
declined somewhat in FY2000, and dropped precipitously after September 11. As
a result primarily, but not exclusively, of the post September 11^th drop in airline
activity, the revenue stream did not exceed the FY2001 level until FY2005, and was
not expected to exceed the record FY1999 level until FY2006. Throughout this
period FAA spending has not been reduced to accommodate the trust fund’s reduced
income stream. Rather, FAA spending has continued apace, mostly by spending
down the uncommitted balance of the trust fund, which stood at over $7.3 billion at
the end of FY2001 and is expected to be down to around $1.2 billion by the end of⁹
FY2006.
When the FAA began discussing reauthorization in 2005, the future of the
aviation trust fund was listed as a key item for consideration.¹⁰ The FAA contends
that something needs to be done to increase the trust fund income stream and to
prevent further erosion in the uncommitted balance of the fund. For a number of
reasons detailed at its reauthorization website, the FAA sees little prospect of a major
increase in revenue from the trust fund’s existing tax and fee system. Instead, as will
be discussed subsequently, the FAA seeks a reexamination of the tax and fee system
with an eye toward a new system that more closely tracks actual aviation industry
activity than the current system and in the process ensures that the trust fund will
receive adequate revenues to finance future FAA aviation system needs.
The FAA position is supported by the Department of Treasury estimates that
suggest that annual revenue increases to the trust fund in the years ahead will be
modest.¹¹ Treasury forecasts that annual increases in trust fund revenue will increase
by $766 million in FY2007 to $11.6 billion. Increases in future years will be
between $710 million and $816 million annually, Treasury projects, leaving the trust
fund with total annual revenues of $14.7 billion in FY2011. As will be discussed

⁹ The FY2006 Treasury estimate excludes interest payments to the trust fund which could
significantly raise this amount.
¹⁰ [http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/trust_fund/media/Trust_Fund.pdf]
¹¹ U.S. Department of the Treasury. Office of Tax Analysis. Airport and Airway Trust Fund:
FY2007 Mid Session Review. Current Law Baseline. Summer 2006.

later in this report, in the section on Next Generation Air Transportation System
(NGATS) funding requirements, these levels of increase may be insufficient to fund
the FAA’s already identified needs for the NGATS and other ongoing air navigation
program upgrades, as well as expected increases in other necessary FAA program
activities.
Table 2: Airport And Airway Trust Fund: Revenue Flow and Balances,
FY1997-FY2006
($ in millions)
^Fⁱ^s^c^{al Y}^e^ar¹⁹⁹⁷¹⁹⁹⁸¹⁹⁹⁹²⁰⁰⁰²⁰⁰¹²⁰⁰²²⁰⁰³²⁰⁰⁴²⁰⁰⁵^2006E
^In^co^m^e
^Tⁱ^cket^T^a^x^3,389^5,455^5,941^5,103^4,805^4,726^4,223^4,556^5,044^5,395
^Flight^S^e^gm^eⁿ^t^Fe^e^—⁵⁴⁷^1,339^1,655^1,556^1,⁵³²^1,783^1,800^2,042^2,193
^W^a^y^b^{ill T}^a^x³³¹³¹³⁴¹²⁵⁰⁰⁴⁹³⁴⁷⁴⁴²²⁴⁹⁹⁵⁶⁷⁵⁹⁹
^Fue^l^T^a^x¹²⁸⁶⁵⁹^1,009⁸⁸⁷⁷⁶⁹⁷⁸⁹⁷¹¹⁷¹²⁹⁷⁷^1,091
^R^u^ra^l^Aⁱ^rp^o^r^ts^Ta^x^—⁴⁸⁵⁷⁸⁶⁸²⁸⁰⁶⁷⁷¹⁷⁶⁸⁰
^Fr^e^q^ue^nt^Flye^r^Ta^x^—¹⁴¹¹⁴⁹¹⁵⁹¹⁵⁰¹⁴⁸¹⁴⁷¹⁴⁵¹⁵⁹¹⁶³
^In^te^rn^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^A^rri^v^a^l^/^D^e^p^a^rt.¹⁹⁴⁹⁴⁸^1,484^1,349^1,336^1,²⁸²^1,331^1,391^1,651^1,798
^Ta^x
^T^a^{x R}^e^f^und^s⁽³⁵⁾^—^—^—^—^—^—^—^—^—
^In^te^re^s^t^oⁿ^Ba^l^aⁿ^c^e⁴⁸¹⁵⁴³⁶⁹⁸⁸⁰⁵⁸⁸²⁸⁶⁰⁵⁹¹⁴⁷⁷⁴²³⁴⁵⁰
^O^ffs^e^t^tⁱⁿ^g^C^o^lle^c^t^io^ns²⁰⁴²³²¹⁴⁴⁷⁶¹⁷⁸⁹⁷³⁶¹⁵²¹⁵²
^T^o^t^a^l^T^r^us^t^F^und^(T^F⁾^Iⁿ^c^o^me^$4,508^$8,696^$11,121^$10,688^$10,149^$10,069^$9,372^$9,687^$11,092^$11,921
^Oper^atⁱ^oⁿ^s^T^F^Sh^a^r^e^$1,700^$1,902^$4,112^$5,898^$4,405^$5,973^$3,775^$4,469^$4,879^$5,486
^A^ppr^oprⁱ^a^ti^on^s^.
^T^o^t^a^l^T^r^us^t^F^und^Cas^h^Ou^t^l^ays⁽^$5,758)⁽^$5,914)⁽^$8,089)⁽^$9,198)⁽^$9,601)⁽^$11,909)⁽^$9,618)⁽^$10,415)⁽^$11,092)⁽^$11,921)
^En^d^o^f^Yea^r^(E^OY^{) B}^a^laⁿ^c^e^$6,422^$9,140^$12,446^$13,934^$14,482^$12,642^$12,397^$11,669^$11,596^$10,857
^C^o^m^mⁱ^tm^eⁿ^ts⁽^$5,088)⁽^$4,801)⁽^$5,080)⁽^$6,860)⁽^$7,167)⁽^$7,855)⁽^$8,499)⁽^$9,222)⁽^$9,493)⁽^$9,622)
^Uⁿ^c^o^mmitte^d^Ba^l^aⁿ^{ce EO}^Y^$1,354^$4,339^$7,366^$7,074^$7,315^$4,787^$3,898^$2,447^$2,103^$1,195
^Geⁿ^e^r^a^{l F}^uⁿ^d^S^h^{are o}^f^F^A^A
^A^ppr^o^p^rⁱ^atioⁿ^s
^To^t^a^l^F^A^A^A^ppr^oprⁱ^a^ti^on^s^$8,537^$9,052^$9,808^$10,043^$12,634^$13,818^$13,490^$13,843^$13,858^$14,311
^GF^S^h^ar^{e of}^F^{AA Bud}^g^e^t^3,241^3,351^1,474⁰²^,198^1,¹⁰⁴^3,248^3,010^2,828^2,619
^GF^P^e^r^cen^t^Sh^a^r^e^38%^37%^15%^0%^17%^8%^24%^22%^20%^18%
^S^o^u^rces:^Ai^r^T^r^aⁿ^s^p^o^r^t^As^s^o^cⁱ^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^,^s^e^e^[^h^t^t^p^:^/^/^www.^aⁱ^r^lⁱⁿ^e^s^.^o^r^g^/^N^R^/^r^d^oⁿ^l^y^r^e^s^/^AD^28984D^-^C^F⁸^D^-^4C37-^96D^3-^2681BD^89776D^/0/tr^us^tf^und.pdf^]
^f^o^r^m^o^r^e^de^tail^co^nce^r^ning^o^u^tl^ay^s^.^A^l^s^o^s^e^e^F^e^de^r^a^l^A^v^iatio^{n A}^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tio^{n w}^e^bs^ite^s^:
^[^h^t^t^p^:^/^/^www.^f^a^a^.^gov/^a^b^a^/^h^t^m^l^_budg^e^t/2003.htm^l^{] and [http:}^//^www.^f^a^a^.^gov/^a^b^ou^t^/^o^ffi^c^e^_^o^rg/^h^ea^dquar^t^e^r^s^_^o^f^fⁱ^ce^s^/^ae^p/aatf^/^{] f}^o^r^m^o^r^e^tr^us^{t f}^und
^inf^o^r^m^atio^{n. D}^a^{ta f}^o^r^F^Y^{2006 inco}^m^e^ar^e^e^s^tim^ate^s^{, appr}^o^p^rⁱ^atio^ns^{data ar}^e^eⁿ^acte^d^{. A}^ppr^o^p^rⁱ^atio^ns^{data (}ⁱ^ncl^uding^tr^us^{t f}^uⁿ^{d and g}^e^ne^r^a^l^f^und^s^h^ar^e^data)^pr^o^vⁱ^de^{d by}^F^A^A^.

An estimate produced by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) appears
somewhat more positive about the future of the trust fund’s finances long-term.¹²
CBO expects that the annual trust fund revenue stream will increase at a slightly
higher rate than inflation and that the trust fund, assuming FAA spending only
increases at the rate of inflation, would have an uncommitted balance of $4.3 billion
in 2011 and an uncommitted balance of $18.6 billion in 2016. In the CBO analysis
“the trust fund can support about $19 billion in additional spending over baseline
levels (the 2006 funding level growing with inflation), provided that most of that
spending occurs after 2010.”¹³ Whether this scenario provides adequate future
funding, assuming significant increased FAA investment needs in the years ahead,
is likely to be a matter of considerable debate.
In line with the CBO estimate, a number of outside groups disagree with the
Treasury and the FAA’s assessment of future trust fund revenues as being insufficient
to fund NGATS and other initiatives. The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
(AOPA), for example, has produced its own revenue forecasts and predicts that the
trust fund will have an adequate revenue stream well into the future.¹⁴ Unlike the
FAA view, AOPA and others sharing their perspective, believe that rising airline
fares and airline activity, increased income from fuel taxes, and cost reductions from
air traffic control (ATC) modernization will be sufficient to result in an unexpended
trust fund balance of over $4 billion by FY2011, with the possibility that the balance
could be considerably higher.
Tax and Fee Structural Issues. The coming debate about how the FAA
should be funded largely revolves around the concept of user fees. There are a
number of variations as to how a user fee is defined. A useful definition of a user fee
from a transportation perspective was provided in 1953 by the Department of
Commerce, Office of Transportation, and is still valid for today’s discussion:
... a user charge is defined as any charge made to beneficiaries or users of
services and facilities directly related to transportation and furnished in whole
or in part by the Federal Government. Such charge must be paid for use of such
service or facility and shall be fixed to recover part or all of the capital,
operating, and maintenance costs of such service or facility. The services shall
not include cash subsidies, mortgage-aid, or tax-aid or certain other activities not
confined to transportation or involving transportation only incidentally.¹⁵

¹² U.S. Congressional Budget Office. CBO Testimony. Financing Investment in the Air
Traffic Control System, Statement of Donald B. Marron, Acting Director, House Committee
on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, September 27, 2006.
¹³ Ibid., p.6.
¹⁴ [http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/la-userfees.html]
¹⁵ U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Transportation, Charges for Private Use of
Federally-Provided Transportation Services and Facilities, A Staff Study of the Principles
Involved in Federal User Charges, Washington, D.C., July 1953, p. 9.

For aviation, most of the interest in user fees has been in recovering the costs
associated with industry use of the national air navigation system (airway system or
air traffic control system).¹⁶
User fees can be direct (sometimes referred to as pay-for-use or pay-for-service),
whereby an aircraft or pilot is charged for a specific activity. Examples of direct
charges include radio contacts with ATC en-route centers, contacts with airport
towers, and weight-distance charges of the type levied frequently outside the United
States (the weight of the aircraft multiplied by the distance flown). The other type
of user fee that can be levied is an indirect fee. Examples include fuel taxes, aircraft
registration fees, and gross revenue taxes. Indirect fees and charges are often viewed
by economists as proxies for user fees rather than as actual user fees. They are
normally viewed as imperfect in that the fee charged is often more poorly correlated
to the service provided than a direct fee would be. A common example is the
existing airline passenger tax, where airline passengers flying on the same aircraft are
charged user fees based on the fare that they paid, even though all are using exactly
the same amount of airway resources. For a number of reasons, indirect fees are the
dominant type of fee in use in the U.S. aviation system today.
On May 21, 1970, President Nixon signed the Airport and Airway Development
and Revenue Acts of 1970 (P.L. 91-258; 1970 Act), which was the origin of the trust
fund financing system still in place today. The fee system created to provide revenue
for the trust fund consisted of an airline ticket tax, a freight/cargo waybill tax, an
international departure tax (also applied to Alaska and Hawaii), a per gallon tax on
noncommercial (primarily GA) use of gasoline and jet fuel, and finally, a graduated
aircraft registration fee. Three and a half decades later, the same basic framework of
taxes and fees — with the deletion of the aircraft registration fee, and the addition of
a segment fee, an international arrivals tax, and a frequent flyer tax (which can be
viewed as an extension of the ticket tax) — remain the principal sources of income
for the trust fund (see Table 2).
In 2005, the FAA announced that it was beginning a detailed examination of
how the agency was funded and whether there could be a more appropriate funding
mechanism. A key element of the examination is the long-debated issue of whether
the existing indirect system of taxation should be replaced by direct charges for
specific air navigation services. To some degree the FAA tipped off the aviation
industry as to the likely direction of its study when FAA Administrator Marion
Blakey remarked that using the existing ticket tax mechanism was a system that¹⁷
“might as well be tied to the price of milk.” The FAA, however, has not yet made
any public proposals for a new funding mechanism and no such proposal is expected^th
during the 109 Congress. Although the elements of the FAA plan are still unknown
in their totality, enough has been surmised for aviation interest groups to begin

¹⁶ The terms airway system and air traffic control are often used interchangeably. In the
context of this report the airway system is broader, including air traffic control services,
personnel, and equipment, as well as U.S. navigable airspace and some other supporting
activities of the FAA.
¹⁷ Wald, Matthew W. F.A.A. Seeks New Source of Revenue in User Fees. The New York
Times. March 7, 2006. p. A18.

actively supporting or opposing various potential elements of a direct user fee
system.
The concept of cost-allocation among system users and non-users permeates the
discussion of federal aviation user fees. It has been perhaps the most crucial single
issue in the now six-decade old discussion of how user fees should be charged and
allocated. It is also a major focus of the FAA’s ongoing examination of the existing
user fee system and is expected to be a major determinant of any new user fee
proposal.
While the FAA continues its studies, aviation interest groups have in effect
launched their own preemptive strikes for and against a fee-for-service system of
financing. The airline industry, through the Air Transport Association (ATA), struck
first, making its own proposal for a new financing system in early March 2006.¹⁸
ATA’s so-called “Smartskies” proposal would be based on charges for departures
and flight duration that would apply to all aircraft regardless of size or type of use.
The exception in the ATA proposal is that piston-powered general aviation aircraft
should continue to pay only a fuel tax. By its own estimates, the ATA proposal, could
shift an estimated $2 billion of system costs to certain GA sector users, primarily
corporate aircraft, which the ATA believes currently underpay for their use of the
ATC system.¹⁹ The ATA proposal goes beyond just fee structure changes and
suggests that the FAA’s air traffic organization (ATO) become an autonomous part
of the agency, with the ability to operate without the need for direct congressional
appropriations. Instead the fees collected from aviation system users, which would
still be deposited in the aviation trust fund. One final feature of the proposal would
give the ATO the authority to issue bonds for infrastructure improvements backed
by expected future fee collections.
On the same day that the ATA made its proposal, a group of GA-related interest
groups released a statement suggesting that the “airlines’ plan for improving the air
transportation system is for them to pay less and control more.”²⁰ From the GA
perspective, the ATA case that certain GA users underpay for their use of the ATC
system is incorrect for a number of reasons. The GA contention is that the current
structure of the ATC system was primarily created to support commercial airline use
and that they are not putting a significant additional burden on the ATC system as a
result of their flying activities. From the GA perspective fuel taxes remain the most
appropriate type of user fee, and the ATA’s proposal to reorganize the ATO outside
of the congressional appropriations process is viewed as undesirable public policy.
The above discussion is a simplification of a very complex and contentious issue
about who pays and who should pay for FAA aviation services, that goes back over
at least six decades. It should be noted that the discussion of aviation user fees has
been almost exclusively a conversation between the federal government and aviation
industry. For example, the views of the largest group of current contributors to the

¹⁸ Bond, David. “Fire when Ready,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 13, 2006,
p. 47.
¹⁹ Ibid.
²⁰ [http://web.nbaa.org/public/news/200607eaa/GAUnitedAgainstUserFees.pdf]

aviation trust fund, airline passengers, are not well known. Little non-government
or non-interest group-funded research on the aviation user fee system has been done
and the lack of such outside research in itself might be a subject worthy of some
attention as part of the reauthorization debate.
Privatization/Corporatization. Over the last two decades, part of the ATC
debate has moved away from whether or not the airways system should be operated
as a public good and is instead often focused on how the system could be operated
more efficiently using business principles. Calls for ATC privatization in the United
States, and the fact that other nations have at least to some degree allowed their
airways systems to be privatized, would seem to indicate that the provision of
airways services is not something that must always be exclusively performed by
government.
Corporatization, the concept that the FAA’s ATC services could be reorganized
as a government corporation within the FAA and/or independent from the FAA, was
considered at length in the 1990s during the Clinton Administration. The idea was
that an independent entity operated along business principles, although not fully
privatized, would be able to operate more efficiently and make needed system
improvements on a more timely basis. Although the effort had the support of the
Administration, and especially Vice President Gore, it ultimately failed to gain much
congressional support and was abandoned in favor of other personnel system and
procurement system reforms adopted in the latter half of the 1990s.²¹
Privatization, unlike corporatization, would most likely move the ATC
organization outside of government and require that the organization act like a
private corporation in most respects. This would include pricing (for example,
setting fees) at levels designed to recoup operating costs and to provide capital for
needed investment. Privatization in some form has been adopted in Canada, the
United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand among other nations. Privatization has
strong proponents²² and attempts have been made to make it at least an option for
consideration during the upcoming reauthorization debate. It remains to be seen,
however, whether the FAA or Congress will consider the concept in earnest.
The General Fund Share. Since the existing tax and fee structure was
created in 1970 there has been general acceptance of the concept that there is a public
interest component to the operation of the national aviation system. From the
perspective of federal aviation policy, the public interest generally refers to that
portion of the cost of the FAA’s operation of the airway system that is appropriated
from the Treasury general fund for the FAA’s budget. This is the amount that is

²¹ For a full discussion of the corporatization debate see CRS Report 94-371, Reorganization
of the Federal Aviation Administration: Safety and Efficiency Issues, by John W. Fischer,
J. Glen Moore and Pamela Hairston (out of print; available from John W. Fischer).
²² Numerous reports in support of privatization have been produced over the last two
decades. Two recent discussions are: Robert W. Poole, Business Jets and ATC User Fees:
Taking a Closer Look, The Reason Foundation. Policy Study 347. August 2006 (available
at [http://www.reason.org]); and Clinton V. Oster, Reforming the Federal Aviation
Administration: Lessons from Canada and the United Kingdom, IBM Center for The
Business of Government, 2006 (available at [http://www.businessofgovernment.org]).

supposed to equate to what the military and nonuser beneficiaries (also known as
societal users) of the aviation system might have contributed to the aviation trust
fund through the payment of user fees, if they actually paid these fees. This has been
one of the most contentious elements of the aviation funding debate and is likely to
remain so in the year ahead. In sum, many aviation interest groups believe that the
federal general fund contribution to the FAA’s annual appropriation is too small to
correspond to the existing and potential military and other public benefits of the
airways system. Conversely, the FAA, OMB, and other government agencies, as well
as congressional appropriations and budget committees, usually believe the general
fund contribution is too large.
The authors of the 1970 Act envisioned that the trust fund would primarily
support FAA capital programs. Although there are some who contend that the trust
fund was intended “only” for capital programs, several studies have suggested that
this was not the case, and that the 1970 Act allowed trust fund revenues to be spent
for noncapital, mostly operations and maintenance activities.²³ Since President Nixon
unsuccessfully sought to fund all FAA activities out of the trust fund in the early
1970s, a tension has existed between those who seek to maximize use of the trust
fund for all aviation purposes and those who seek to have its funds directed
only/primarily toward capital activities. As Table 2 shows the general fund
contribution to overall FAA appropriations has varied over the last decade ranging
from a low of 0% in FY2000 to a high of 38% in FY1998 and FY1999. In the most
recent four year period, however, the general fund share has been a more consistent

20% or so.

The issue of the general fund share is closely tied to the issue of spending
guarantee provisions, including penalty and cap provisions, which are an almost
routine portion of FAA reauthorization legislation. These provisions and their policy
implications are discussed in the next section of this report.
Aviation Spending Guarantees. As mentioned above, since the 1971
creation of the user-supported airport and airway trust fund there has been
disagreement over the appropriate use of the trust fund’s revenues. This led,
beginning in 1976, to the enactment of a series of legislative mechanisms designed
to assure that federal capital spending for U.S. airports and airways (i.e., AIP and
F&E) would be funded at their fully authorized levels. Supporters also hoped that
these provisions would assure a significant general fund share for the FAA budget.
Such funding guarantee proposals have been part of every FAA reauthorization
debate since 1976.²⁴
The Cap and Penalty Era. From FY1977 through FY1990, the guarantees
consisted of a variety of both “cap” and “penalty” provisions which, by law, set a
ceiling on the amount of aviation trust fund money that could be used to fund FAA

²³ U.S. Congressional Budget Office. The Status of the Airport and Airway Trust Fund.
Washington, CBO, 1988. p. X, 1-7; and U.S. General Accounting Office, Whether the
Airport and Airway Trust Fund Was Created Solely to Finance Aviation “Infrastructure.”
B-281779. Washington, GAO, 1999, 16 p.
²⁴ See CRS Report RL33654, Aviation Spending Guarantee Mechanisms, by Robert S. Kirk.

operations, and a penalty that would reduce this ceiling by a formula linked to the
capital programs’ appropriations shortfall below their authorization for the fiscal
year. Although the cap and penalty (C&P) provisions had some apparent early
success (FY1977-FY1980), there was growing resistance to passing appropriations
bills that adhered to the penalties during the 1980s. The cap alone appears to have
been even less often adhered to during the mid-1990s, following the penalty’s
elimination in 1990. Over time, however, certain unintended consequences arose that
continue to play a part in the debate over funding guarantee mechanisms. For
example, the C&P appeared to have a significant role in the growth of the
uncommitted balance in the trust fund (sometimes referred to as a surplus). Although
the various mechanisms may have succeeded in restricting spending from the
aviation trust fund on operations, they did not necessarily succeed in forcing full
appropriation of authorized AIP and F&E funding levels. Overall congressional
support for adherence to the annual caps and penalties during the appropriations
process was not always sufficient to lead to their enforcement.²⁵ In addition,
especially during the 1990s, within the context of the unified congressional budget,
some appropriations and budget committee Members were more concerned about the
overall size of the budget or deficit than with adhering to the spending guarantee
mechanisms. Under the unified congressional budget, the growing unexpended
balance of the trust fund could be viewed as, in effect, offsetting spending elsewhere
in the budget or reducing the apparent size of the budget deficit. This broader budget
situation and related appropriations priorities trumped the C&P mechanisms. Under
the C&P (especially prior to the elimination of the penalty), the general fund share
remained, in most years, significantly higher than most estimates of the appropriate
public interest share. During FY1999 and FY2000, however, years when no
spending guarantee was authorized, the general fund share dropped to 15% and 0%,
respectively.
Current Law: Point of Order Enforced Spending Guarantees.In
2000, AIR21 included two new spending guarantees. One made it “out-of-order” in
the House or Senate to consider legislation that failed to use all aviation trust fund
receipts and interest annually. The second made it out-of-order to consider any bill
that provided any funding for RE&D or O&M if it failed to fully fund the FAA’s two
capital programs, AIP and F&E, at their authorized levels. As a penalty of sorts, any
failure to fully fund F&E would lead to an increased appropriation (“pop-up” budget
authority) for AIP equal to the appropriations shortfall for F&E.
As was true under the C&P mechanism, the first years of the AIR21 guarantees,
FY2001-FY2003, appeared to have successfully assured that both AIP and F&E were
funded at or very near their authorized levels. However, as was true under the C&P
mechanism, congressional support for adherence declined during the following years.
Adherence to the guarantees in the annual appropriations bills during the last three
years has been mixed. On the one hand, the obligation limitations for AIP for
FY2004-FY2006 have been very close to their authorized levels for these years. On
the other hand, F&E spending has been cut significantly in each of these years (see
Table 1). F&E’s annual appropriation fell below its authorization as follows: $320

²⁵ An element of this softening of support was that the implementation of the NAS fell
behind the schedule that was assumed when F&E was being authorized.

million for FY2004; $468 million for FY2005; and $498 million for FY2006. These
F&E funding levels were out of conformance with the guarantees and should have
made the funding of the O&M and RE&D components of FAA’s budget out of order
during these years. It also should have led to additional “pop-up” budget authority
for the AIP equal to the annual underfunding of F&E.
There are a number of reasons that the guarantee provisions have not been
adhered to in recent years. Specific to F&E spending, there has been the lack of
confidence that Congress has had in the ability of the FAA to oversee NAS
modernization. The hesitance to fully fund F&E may have more to do with this, than
with specific resistance to adherence to the funding guarantees. However, some other
weaknesses in the current guarantee mechanism have manifested themselves in
recent years. Spending guarantees that are enforced by point-of-order actions only
work if the point-of-order is raised by a Member and if they have not been waived
by rule. In the House, recent annual appropriations bills have had all points-of-order
waived by the Rules Committee. Senators have also chosen not to raise points-of-
order against violations of the AIP and F&E funding guarantees.²⁶ Points-of-order
have not been allowed on appropriations bill conference reports. Also the “pop-up”
AIP budget authority, which some viewed as part of the mechanism for preventing
appropriators from spending any F&E shortfall for noncapital aviation spending, can
and has been rescinded. These rescissions allow appropriators to bring down the
nominal total cost of the Transportation/Treasury Appropriations bills in the next
budget year. As was true during the C&P era, the current spending guarantees can
still be trumped by broader budget policy goals (such as deficit reduction) or, at
times, by the spending priorities of appropriators.
Funding Guarantee Options. Aviation funding guarantees are expected to^th
be considered in the FAA reauthorization debate during the 110 Congress and could
include keeping the current system, modifying the current guarantees, resurrecting
a mechanism analogous to the cap and penalty provisions, reconsidering taking the
trust fund “off-budget,” or erecting budgetary “fire walls” as was done for the
highway and transit programs in 1998. Some would argue that there should be no
guarantees and that the normal congressional budget process should be allowed to
progress unfettered. The absence of a large uncommitted trust fund balance could
also have an impact on the support for new or continued aviation spending guarantee^th
mechanisms during FAA reauthorization in the 110 Congress.
Airport Development and Finance
The Airport Improvement Program (AIP), the source of federal airport grants,
is one of five major sources of funding for airport development and improvement.
Airports also fund capital projects using tax-exempt bonds, passenger facility charges
(PFCs; a local tax levied on each boarding passenger), state and local grants, and

²⁶ In part, this may have been because, if a point of order were upheld, the entire AIP or F&E
financing provision would be stricken from the bill that Senate conferees would take to
conference. This absence of a funding provision could put the Senate conferees at a
disadvantage in negotiating with House conferees over the contents of the bill to be voted
out of conference.

airport revenue.²⁷ Different airports use different combinations of these sources
depending on the individual airport’s financial situation and the type of project being
considered. Small airports are more likely to be dependent on AIP grants than large-
or medium-sized airports. The larger airports are also much more likely to
participate in the tax-exempt bond market or finance capital development projects
with the proceeds generated from PFCs. Each of these funding sources places
differing legislative, regulatory, or contractual constraints on the airports that use
them. The two financing sources for airports with the most significant federal
involvement are the AIP and the PFC programs.
The AIP provides federal grants to airports for airport development and
planning. The airports participating in the AIP range from very large publicly-owned
commercial primary airports to small public use general aviation airports that may
be privately-owned, but are available for public use. AIP funding is usually limited
to construction or improvements related to aircraft operations, typically for planning
and construction of projects such as runways, taxiways, aprons, noise abatement, land
purchase, and safety, emergency or snow removal equipment. Commercial revenue
producing portions of terminals (such as shop concessions or commercial
maintenance hangars), automobile parking garages, and off-airport road construction
are examples of improvements that generally are not eligible for AIP funding.
Airports smaller than medium hub, however, have broader eligibility on terminal
projects under certain conditions.²⁸ AIP money cannot be used for an airport’s
operational expenses.
The PFC is a local tax imposed, with federal approval, by an airport on each
boarding passenger. PFC funds can be used for a broader range of projects than AIP
grants and are more likely to be used for “ground side” projects such as passenger
terminal and ground access improvements. PFCs can also be used for bond
repayments and in some cases to provide the local match for AIP projects.
Airport Capital Needs Estimates
Both the FAA in its 2005-2009 National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems
(NPIAS) and the Airports Council International/North America (ACI/NA) have
releases estimates of U.S. airports’ capital needs for 2005-2009.
The NPIAS report was based on planned project information taken from airport
master plans and state system plans. FAA planners screened out projects that were
not justified by aviation activity forecasts or that were not eligible for AIP grants. The

²⁷ Airport revenues sources include airfield area fees/landing fees, terminal area concessions
and rent, airline leases, parking, etc. See CRS Report 98-579, Airport Finance: a Brief
Overview, by Robert S. Kirk. PFCs are sometimes referred to as a “head tax.”
²⁸ Primary commercial airports are categorized by the percentage of the total national
passenger boardings (enplanements) that occur at the individual airport during a year: large
hub airports enplane at least 1% of the national total; medium hub enplane at least 0.25%
but less than 1%; small hub enplane 0.05% but less than 0.25% and nonhub enplane more
than 10,000 but less tan 0.05%. Large and medium hub airports accounted for almost 90%
of all enplanements in 2002.

FAA limits its estimate to AIP eligible projects at airports listed in the NPIAS. In the
2004 NPIAS report, the FAA has estimated that the national system’s capital needs
for 2005-2009 will total $39.55 billion (an annual average of $7.91 billion). ²⁹
The Airport Council International / North America (ACI-NA) capital needs
survey produced an estimate of $71.5 billion for 2005-2009 (an annual average of
$14.3 billion).³⁰ ACI-NA concludes that airports face an annual $3-4 billion shortfall
every year through FY2009.³¹ The ACI-NA study reflects the broader business view
of major airport operators and casts a substantially broader net, including AIP
ineligible or low AIP priority type projects which would normally be funded by
bonds, PFCs, airport revenues, or local funding; airport-funded air traffic control
facilities; airport or TSA-funded security projects, etc.³² Because the $14.3 billion
is based on “proposals” for airport development projects, some would argue that this
figure is high reflecting wants rather than needs and projects that would never be
completed in any case.
The Air Transport Association (ATA) has not released an estimate in advance
of the current reauthorization debate but in the past their estimates of needs were
limited almost exclusively to AIP eligible projects at primary airports and tended to
be lower than either the FAA or ACI/NA estimates.³³
In March 2004, FAA Administrator, Marion C. Blakey, stated that the agency’s
goal was to improve the overall capacity at the top 35 U.S. airports by 30% over a
ten-year period. These airports account for about 73% of commercial passenger
boardings. The FAA’s Operational Evolution Plan (OEP) is intended to increase the
capacity and efficiency of the National Airspace System (NAS) over a ten-year period
to keep up with the expected growth in demand for air travel and shipping. The plan
focuses on “infrastructure — primarily new runways — and technological and
procedural initiatives at the top 35 airports.”³⁴ An AIP focus on the OEP could put
substantial pressure on the availability of AIP discretionary funds.

²⁹ U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems: 2005-

2009, pp. 41-47.

³⁰ A fact sheet of the ACI-NA, 2005 Airport Capital Development Needs is available at
[ ht t p: / / www.aci -na.or g/ docs/ 70_capi t a l needs2005.pdf ]
³¹ ACI-NA, ACI-NA 2005 Airport Capital Needs Survey v. FAA’s NPIAS. Washington, DC:
ACI-NA, 17 p.
³² ACI-NA, Executive Summary ACI-NA 2005 Airport Capital Development Needs,
Washington, DC: ACI-NA, 2006, 3 p.
³³ See GAO, Airport Development Needs: Estimating Future Costs, “GAO/RECD-97-99,”
Washington, GAO, 1997, pp. 7-9.
³⁴ FAA and Mitre, Capacity Needs in the National Airspace System. See also FAA.
Operational Evolution Plan, 2005-2015: Executive Summary; Version 7.0, Washington,
DC: FAA, 2005.

Airport Improvement Program (AIP)
The preeminent reauthorization issue for AIP is whether its funding levels will
be increased substantially, held steady/increased modestly, or reduced. As can be
seen in Figure 1, AIP’s funding underwent a major increase in FY2001 and has had
a relatively small increase of $100 million each year since. The outlook for AIP
funding will likely be influenced by the resolution of the debate concerning the taxes
and fees supporting the aviation trust fund as well as any decision concerning the
scope of the general fund share of the FAA budget. A failure to secure more
revenues for the FAA budget, in light of the recent decline in the uncommitted
balance of the trust fund, could constrain attempts to increase the AIP budget. A
consensus in Congress to reduce the federal budget deficit or hold the deficits to
existing levels, as happened during the mid-1990s, also could constrain any AIP
budget increases.³⁵ These broader budget issues could have implications not only for
the AIP program’s funding but also for its scope and formula and discretionary
funding distribution. Under such overall budget constraints, Congress could consider
changes ranging from the defederalization of some large airports to the
reconsideration of the scope of funding provided for smaller noncommercial service
airports currently in the NPIAS. Also, should AIP not be reauthorized by October

1, 2007, the program will go into abeyance: projects already funded could continue,

but no new projects could be begun.
Figure 1. AIP Authorizations and Obligations ($ millions)

³⁵ For a brief discussion of transportation policy within the broader fiscal environment, see
U.S. General Accountability Office, Fundamental Reexamination of Federal Transportation
Programs and Policies Required: The Driving Force of the Nation’s Long-Term Fiscal
Challenges, Washington, DC: GAO, 2006, available at [http://www.highways.org/Mar06-
speaker-s lideshows/Hecker.ppt]

AIP Funding Distribution. The distribution system for AIP grants is
complex. It is based on a combination of formula grants (also referred to as³⁶
apportionments) and discretionary funds. Each year, formula grants are apportioned
automatically to specific airports or types of airports (primary airports, cargo service
airports, states and insular areas, and Alaska airports). The funds are available during
the year that they are first apportioned and continue to be available for use for two
years thereafter. The remaining funds are apportioned to the discretionary fund.
Airports sponsors apply for discretionary funds to pay for planned airport capital
development needs. In recent years, however, significant amounts of discretionary
funding have been earmarked by Congress.³⁷ In recent years AIP discretionary funds³⁸
have ranged from roughly 25%-30% of the total annual AIP funding distribution.
Entitlement (formula) and discretionary small airport set-asides tend to be
supported by smaller airports and most airport advocates. The air carriers tend to be
critical of entitlements and set-aside funding, especially when it benefits the smaller
noncommercial service airports and have argued that “Congress must reconsider the
vast array of set-asides and earmarks under the AIP program, which have seriously
undermined its utility in providing meaningful system capacity improvements.”³⁹
Business and general aviation advocates take exception to this view and counter that
airports of all sizes are critical to the national airport system as a whole and that
reliever airports in particular are “a critical component of managing airline and
general aviation traffic in an urban environment.”⁴⁰
Apportionment and Eligibility Changes. Apportioned funds (sometimes
referred to as entitlements) were substantially increased in AIR-21 and the range of
land-side projects that are eligible for AIP grants were increased somewhat in both
AIR-21 and Vision 100. Most of the eligibility changes benefitted airports smaller
than medium-hub.⁴¹ Although this trend could continue in the upcoming
reauthorization debate, if the budget environment is constrained project eligibility

³⁶ See U.S.C. 49 Chapter 471 and U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, Airport
Improvement Program Handbook. Available at
[ h t t p : / / www.f a a. go v/ a i r p o r t s _ a i r t r a f f i c/ ai r port s / r esour ces/ publ i cat i ons/ or der s/ me di a/ ai p_

5100_38c.pdf]

³⁷ For an explanation of FAA’s policy for selecting discretionary projects see the 21^st AIP
Annual Report of Accomplishments, pp. 25-27. Available at
[ ht t p: / / www. f a a . go v/ ai r por t s _ai r t r af f i c/ ai r por t s / a i p/ gr a nt _hi st or i e s/ me di a/ Annual _Repor t
_2004.pdf]
³⁸ Based on figures from the AIP Annual Reports of Accomplishments, for FY2001-FY2003
and FY2004. The discretionary funding percentage for FY2001 was 30%, for FY2002 was

25%, for FY2003 was 25%, and for FY2004 was 27%.

³⁹ “Airlines Seek Reduction in AIP Funding for Small Airports,” The Weekly of Business
Aviation, Nov. 7, 2005: 212.
⁴⁰ Ibid.
⁴¹ Airports smaller than medium hub are airports that enplane less than 0.25% of the total
national enplanements. Altogether they account for just under 11% of the total national of
enplanements (2005-2009 NPIAS, p. 5).

might need to be reconsidered. If the overall authorization is reduced, the
apportioned funds may have to be reduced to assure that sufficient funds remain to
fund discretionary grants (in particular for operational evolution plan projects). The
ACI-NA supports the maintenance of AIP funding for smaller airports and argues for
giving these airports increased flexibility in the use of their entitlements. The case
can be made that, over the years, the broadening of AIP eligibility at small airports
has made it increasingly difficult to identify the federal interest that has been met by
such spending. As mentioned earlier, air carriers are skeptical of the benefit to the
national airport system of some proposals seeking to broaden project eligibility.⁴²
Discretionary Fund Set-Asides. The discretionary funds (which are the
remainder funds after the apportionments are satisfied) are subject to set-asides for
noise mitigation, the Military Airports Program (MAP), reliever airports, and the
capacity/safety/security/noise set-aside. Any of these could be modified during
reauthorization. However, the greater the total of all the set-asides, the smaller the
remaining amounts that are truly unrestricted discretionary funds.
Minimum Discretionary Fund. U.S.C. 47115 requires that a minimum
amount — $148 million plus any outstanding pre-January 1, 1997 letters of intent —
remains available for the discretionary fund after all apportionments and set-asides
are satisfied. If less money remains, the apportionments are reduced pro rata to bring
the discretionary funding up to the required level. Because AIP has been funded
since FY2001 at historically high levels, the minimum discretionary fund provision
has not been a factor in AIP funding. If, however, AIP’s budget is reduced
substantially or if the entitlements are increased substantially, the appropriate
minimum discretionary fund level may need to be reconsidered.
Grant Assurances. Along with the acceptance of AIP funds come certain
obligations (generally referred to as assurances) that airports must agree to. These
assurances include the obligation to maintain and operate their facilities safely and
efficiently, as well as more specific obligations such as not to discriminate against
any class of air system users⁴³, to adhere to Davis-Bacon prevailing wage
requirements, and to use airport revenue solely for spending on airport operations and
capital costs. Proposals to alter the AIP grant assurances can be expected to arise
during the reauthorization debate. For example, the ACI/NA is seeking a bill that
“simplifies airport grant assurances including reforms that permit airports to use non
aeronautical revenue sources to attract new and competitive air service to their
communities.” Supporters of maintaining the grant assurances generally argue that
they not only help establish and enforce federal policy priorities but also insulate
airports from local efforts to limit or shut down airport operations (for example,
because of noise concerns or for land development).

⁴² Recently the Air Transport Association (ATA), which represents the major air carriers,
argued that the current AIP entitlements and set-asides provides nearly one third of federal
airport grants to airports that provide no commercial service. The ATA argued that such
expenditures would be more appropriately funded from general fund revenues than from the
airport and airway trust fund, which supports AIP.
⁴³ For example, against cargo or commuter aircraft, or night time flight operators.

Airport Noise Issues. Airport noise policy is linked to airport development
because airport noise is a major factor in local resistance to airport capacity projects.
One issue is whether to again raise the AIP noise compatibility set-aside (Vision 100⁴⁴
raised the set-aside to 35%). Funding eligibility issues could also arise. One is
whether the FAA should be granted the flexibility to use AIP funds for noise
mitigation projects that are outside the 65 decibel noise impact areas. Another issue
is making the planning for noise mitigating arrival and departure operational (air
traffic control) procedures eligible for AIP funding. In what was perhaps the most
significant expansion of AIP noise funding eligibility, Vision 100 authorized the
FAA to make grants for land use compatibility planning and projects around large
and medium hub airports that have not submitted a part 150 noise compatibility plan,
as was previously required. The provision is limited to grants that are awarded
through FY2007. Congress may wish to review this provision and extend or modify
it, or allow it to lapse.
Federal Share. Vision 100 raised the federal share from 90% to 95% for
airports smaller than large and medium-hub and airports in states participating in the
state block grant program,⁴⁵ but included a sunset clause that returns the federal share
back to 90% after 2007. Should the federal or FAA budget be constrained or held at
current levels Congress may wish to consider adjusting the federal share. The federal
share for most projects at large and medium hub airports is 75%.
Privatization. The Airport Privatization Pilot Program authorizes the FAA to
exempt up to five airports from certain federal restrictions on the use of airport
revenue. Participating airports may be exempted from such requirements as
repayment of federal grants. During the nine years since the application procedures
were published only one airport, Stewart International Airport in New York, has
obtained an approved exemption.⁴⁶ Congress may wish to review the pilot program.
Although most U.S. airports are public entities, it is noteworthy that nearly all airport
activities are carried out by private firms working under contract arrangements for
the airport owners. The City of Chicago recently expressed interest in offering
Midway Airport up for a long term lease. It has not yet applied for a privatization
exemption, however.
Partial Defederalization. One way to reduce the amount of trust fund
revenue needed for AIP would be to allow large and medium hub airports to opt out
of the AIP program in favor of unrestricted or higher PFC financing. This would, in
the view of some airport executives, give them the flexibility they would prefer to
have in managing their airports. These airports would no longer be bound by all of
the grant assurances that are currently required of participants.

⁴⁴ For a more extensive discussion of noise issues see chapter “Energy and Environmental
Considerations,” later in this report.
⁴⁵ Under the state block grant program participating states (Illinois, Missouri, North
Carolina, Michigan, New Jersey, Texas, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee)
administer the AIP funding of nonprimary commercial service, reliever, and general aviation
airports.
⁴⁶ The lease for this privatized airport was recently put up for sale by its United Kingdom-
based holder, National Express Group (NEG), after seven years of a 99-year lease.

Airport Security Project Eligibility. Vision 100, included a provision that
repealed the language of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-
264) that permitted the use of AIP and PFC funds for security related improvement
of facilities and the purchase or deployment of equipment for security purposes.
Vision 100 did, however, allow for use of AIP formula funds for the replacement of
baggage conveyor systems, and the reconfiguration of terminal baggage areas,
necessary to install bulk explosive detection devices. Such use, however, has been
specifically prohibited each year by appropriators in the legislative language for
Grants-in-Aid for Airports in recent transportation appropriations acts. Despite this
prohibition, some still view AIP as a potential source of funding for certain security-
related airport improvements in the future.
Very Light Jets (VLJs) and the Airbus A380: Impact on AIP. Some
predictions of the rapid growth of a new type of aircraft, the very light jet (jets with
a takeoff weight less than 12,500 pounds that can land on a 3,000 foot runway), have,
in turn led to concerns that increased airport funding will be needed to accommodate
them. Even if the optimistic estimates of the speed of introduction of VLJs pan-out,
given that VLJs have been specifically designed to operate at most existing general
aviation airports, existing airport facilities should be able to handle the traffic. If,
however, the advent of VLJs leads to increasing demands for installing all weather
capabilities at small airports or if insurers place requirements on VLJ use, for
example that VLJs only be used at airports with runways longer than 3,000 feet, the
demand for AIP funded improvements at small airports could increase over time. As
mentioned previously, small airports are more dependent on AIP funding for their
capital projects than larger airports. The potential impact of VLJs across the entire
national airspace system is discussed further in the section on “Accommodating
Future Aerospace Users.”
More likely to have an impact on AIP funding in the short term is the Airbus
super jumbo A380. The GAO identified 18 U.S. airports making changes to
accommodate the A380 at an estimated cost of roughly $927 million. These airports
identified AIP as the planned source for 50% of these costs and PFCs for another
21%.⁴⁷ Some policy makers have expressed opposition to using federal funding for
these A380-related projects.
Earmarking/ “Place Naming”. Historically, Congress has not earmarked
AIP discretionary funding in the manner typical to highway or transit appropriations
where specific projects have specific dollar amounts designated in the language of
the appropriations bills or report. Since FY2001, dollar amounts and project
descriptions have usually been specified in the appropriations bill conference reports.
One of the issues related to the earmarking is the impact it has on the grant
application process. Another is the impact of the earmarking on the availability of
limited discretionary funds for national priorities such as the operation evolution plan
(OEP).

⁴⁷ U.S. Government Accountability Office, Commercial Aviation: Costs and Major Factors
Influencing Infrastructure Changes at U.S. Airports to Accommodate the New A380
Aircraft, “ GAO-06-571” Washington, DC: GAO, 2006. Available at
[ h t t p : / / www.ga o.gov/ n ew.i t e ms / d06571.pdf ]

Passenger Facility Charge Issues
The PFC is a local tax imposed, with federal approval, by an airport on each
boarding passenger. The basic PFC issue is whether to raise the $4.50 per emplaned
(i.e., boarding) passenger ceiling or to eliminate the ceiling all together. Airports
have long argued for elimination of the cap but would also be pleased with an
increase of some sort. Although PFC revenues can be used for a broader range of
projects than AIP, some airport advocates argue there is still room for more
flexibility in PFC eligibility requirements. For example, some would like more
freedom to use PFC funds on off-airport projects, such as transportation access
projects. Airports would also like the application process to be streamlined.
Additionally they would also like to have the competition plan requirement that is
placed on large and medium hub airports that charge PFCs at the $4.50 level
eliminated. Air carriers and passenger advocates will probably oppose an increase
in the PFC. Airlines feel that the passenger taxes have become a large enough
component of the total ticket price that they constrain the airlines’ pricing ability.
Airport Bonding Issues
Historically, bonds have been a major source of funding for capital projects at
primary airports. Because most airports are owned by public authorities, they can
seek funds in the tax-exempt bond market. One change sought by ACI-NA would
be to make tax exempt airport bond income no longer subject to the alternative
minimum tax (AMT). This would make airport bonds more attractive to investors.
On the negative side, the change would cost the U.S. Treasury money. Some would
argue it would make more sense to change the AMT as part of a tax bill rather than
as a specific exemption provided for income on airport bonds in an FAA
reauthorization bill.
Recently there has been interest in using private activity bonds for airport
development. Private activity airport bonds could allow a private entity to enter the
tax-exempt bond market to raise funding for a capital project at a public use airport.
Generally, it is envisioned as facilitating public-private partnerships. As a possible
precedent, the recently passed surface transportation act, the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: a Legacy for Users (P.L. 109-59;
SAFETEA-LU), allowed for up to $15 billion in private facility bond funding for⁴⁸
highways or freight transfer facilities. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Treasury Department, however,
have generally opposed bonding as adding additional government borne costs to the
airport improvement process.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ For a description of the Federal Highway Administration program see:
[ h t t p : / / www.f h wa.dot .gov/ ppp/ pr i vat e_act i vi t y_bonds.ht m]
⁴⁹ CBO reiterated this position at recent (September 27, 2006) House Aviation
Subcommittee hearings on Financing Options for FAA and Redesign of the Air
Transportation System. GAO also expressed the reasons for its concerns about the costs of
bonding. See GAO. National Airspace System Modernization: Observations on Potential
Funding Options for FAA and the Next Generation Airspace System. “GAO-06-1114T”
(continued...)

Options to Control Operational Costs at the FAA
Faced with rising operational costs and future funding needs for infrastructure
enhancements and system expansion, the FAA and Congress have made the
identification of methods to reduce or control operational costs a priority over the
last few years. Besides general measures to conserve resources, the FAA’s
approaches to controlling operational costs mostly fall into two general categories:
(1) the consolidation of facilities and functions, and (2) the outsourcing or
privatization of certain operational components. Additional options for controlling
costs may involve shifting certain operational functions and costs onto private-sector
users of the NAS and leveraging private-sector capabilities through government-
industry partnerships, or other cost-saving arrangements.
Consolidation of Facilities and Functions
The FAA is currently in the process of consolidating administrative and support
staff in its nine functional service area offices for terminal and en route support
services and technical operations into three consolidated regional facilities, in Seattle,
WA; Fort Worth, TX; and Atlanta, GA. The FAA is also consolidating its flight
services information area offices for the lower 48 states to a single facility in Kansas
City, MO. Flight service information for Alaska will continue to be coordinated out
of the Anchorage office. The FAA selected these sites for placing its consolidated
area offices primarily based on costs, but considered a variety of quality of life
factors for employees. The FAA estimates that it will save between $38 and $41
million between FY2006 and FY2015 by relocating about 315 employees to areas
with lower costs of living and lower locality pay rates.⁵⁰ Further, by reducing
facilities-related costs, the FAA anticipates that total savings over next 10 years, from
its overall consolidation of administrative and support functions, will total between
$360 and $460 million.⁵¹
As the ongoing personnel transitions are expected to be fully completed by
December 2006, the current service area consolidation plan is likely to be largely
completed before Congress considers FAA reauthorization legislation. Therefore,
the issues that may arise are likely to center on whether the FAA and the Air Traffic
Organization’s (ATO’s) approach and implementation of this consolidation effort can
serve as an effective model for future plans of this kind. One option Congress might
consider is whether an analysis of the “lessons learned” from this consolidation
process, conducted by an auditing agency such as the Department of Transportation’s
Office of Inspector General (DOT OIG) or the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), could identify areas for improvement and establish a framework for
conducting future consolidation efforts. Effective models for consolidation may aid

⁴⁹ (...continued)
Washington, GAO, 2006. p. 16-17.
⁵⁰ Federal Aviation Administration, Air Traffic Organization (ATO) Service Area Office
Location Study, October 2005.
⁵¹ Federal Aviation Administration, Air Traffic Organization Administrative & Staff
Support Function Restructuring (Undated).

the FAA in considering future consolidation efforts, such as consolidation of certain
air traffic service functions, which are likely to be much more complex and could be
much broader in scope compared to consolidation efforts carried out thus far.
Consolidation of air traffic services has been identified by some as a potential means
to adapt to anticipated changes in the controller workforce resulting from large scale
retirements of experienced controllers as well as potential changes in controller job
functions, and to address staffing shortages, particularly at certain en route facilities.
Congress may also have a particular interest in the FAA’s future consolidation
plans of this kind because relocation of federal workers is likely to have impacts on
regions and congressional districts. Even if the size of the job losses in a particular
location have a minimal impact on the local economy, they can be viewed as a
symbolic loss to a community in terms of losing federal jobs, and the perception that
the federal government viewed the particular locale less favorably than other sites.
Placing regions and districts in competition for consolidated federal facilities has the
potential of creating large political pressures that can complicate the location
selection process. Some observers have suggested that the military base realignment
and closure (BRAC) process is a well established model for conducting such
assessments of proposed facility consolidation, and have suggested that the FAA
develop or adopt a similar approach for its future assessments of consolidation
proposals.⁵² During the upcoming reauthorization debate, Congress may consider
whether utilizing such a process could benefit the FAA as it continues to look toward
consolidation of facilities and functions as a means to control costs and adapt to
anticipated changes in air traffic services under NGATS, or whether such a
requirement would prove too burdensome and time consuming.
Because of the specific interest in how consolidation might apply to air traffic
control facilities, the FAA’s current efforts to consolidate weather support functions
at air traffic control facilities may be of particular interest. How this ongoing
consolidation effort unfolds may provide insight into how FAA might go about the
much larger scale process of consolidating various air traffic control facilities and
functions. The FAA has been actively pursuing the consolidation of center weather
service units (CWSUs) that provide weather forecasting to en route air traffic control
facilities. Initial plans for consolidation called for centralizing weather support
functions, currently provided to the FAA by the National Weather Service (NWS),
into a network of Joint Aviation Weather Sites (JAWS), intended to provide
continuous (24/7) weather support for all FAA air traffic facilities, not just en route
centers.⁵³ Presently, the NWS is conducting prototype testing to demonstrate how it
might provide the FAA with the remote service capabilities sought. But, the plan is
controversial, and it has been criticized by the National Air Traffic Controllers
Association (NATCA) who fear that air traffic controllers will lose critical on-site
weather support, and by representatives of NWS employees who fear that the

⁵² Frank L. Frisbie, “Give NAS a BRAC,” 2nd National Airspace System Infrastructure
Management Conference: NAS Infrastructure in Transition, June 13, 2006, Washington,
DC: The National Center of Excellence for Aviation Operations Research (NEXTOR).
⁵³ Dave Rodenhuis and Danny Sims, FAA ATO, Restructuring Plans for the CWSUs: A
Vision for Improved Weather Forecast Services, Federal Aviation Administration:
Washington, DC (Undated).

consolidation plans will result in lost jobs for NWS meteorologists, and possible
wholesale competitive sourcing of air traffic weather support functions.⁵⁴ These
entities have made their concerns known to various Members of Congress, and the
FAA’s plans are likely to come under considerable congressional scrutiny. However,
from the perspective of examining overarching issues for FAA reauthorization, the
current weather support service consolidation initiatives are likely to be of further
congressional interest to the extent that they can provide insights into the manner that
FAA might go about consolidation on a broader scale.
Again, because it appears that FAA’s consolidation efforts do not fit into any
readily identifiable overarching strategy, the proposal of adopting a BRAC-like
process to develop a cohesive strategy for consolidating facilities and functions may
receive greater attention during the FAA reauthorization process. Such a process
may also serve to identify those functional elements where competitive source
selections may be an effective strategy for cost-saving.
Competitive Sourcing and Privatization of Functions
While outsourcing, or competitive sourcing, of certain government functions
has been a central element of the President’s Management Agenda,⁵⁵ the current
administration has not promoted the concept, advocated by some, of full privatization
of air traffic services, as has been done in Canada, Great Britain, Australia, and much
of mainland Europe. Testifying before a Congressional committee, FAA
Administrator Marion Blakey asserted:
“The whole issue of privatization is an absolute red herring. [W]e are running,
and very proud to be running, a federal system of air traffic control. In my
estimation, that is the way it will stay. Certainly this Administration has no
intention to privatize air traffic control or to change the status of our controller⁵⁶
workforce overall and the way we approach the system.”
That said, the FAA has instead focused on identifying smaller scale services and
programs that are more easily converted to contract operations. One example is the
Federal Contract Tower (FCT) program, which has been in place for some time and
has incrementally expanded over the years. Under the FCT, airport towers are staffed
by private controllers under contract to the FAA. Another example, the recent
outsourcing and ongoing consolidation of all automated flight service stations
(AFSSs) in the lower 48 states and Hawaii, was conducted as a single large-scale,
public-private sourcing competition, which was awarded to a private contractor in

2005. AFSS facilities provide weather and flight planning information and assistance

⁵⁴ Beth Dickey, “Turbulent Weather,” Government Executive, August 1, 2006, pp. 26-27.
⁵⁵ See CRS Report RS21416, The President’s Management Agenda: A Brief Introduction,
by Virginia A. McMurtry.
⁵⁶ Transcript of Statement by Marion Blakey, Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration, in Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of
Representatives. The Status of the Air Traffic Controller Workforce (108-73), Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on Transportation and^th^nd
Infrastructure, House of Representatives, 108 Cong., 2 sess., June 15, 2004, p. 28.

to pilots and mostly support general aviation users. While some in Congress opposed
this large-scale conversion of federal jobs to the private sector, they were ultimately
unsuccessful in getting legislation passed to prevent the FAA from moving forward
with the contracting of these AFSS positions.
In general, most FAA positions, including air traffic controller positions, are
considered commercial and not inherently governmental in nature. These jobs could,
therefore, be outsourced at the FAA’s discretion following guidelines set forth in the
Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998 (FAIR) (P.L. 105-270) and OMB
Circular A-76.⁵⁷ Hence, specific initiatives to outsource certain functions or
programs within the FAA do not require additional authority, and therefore typically
are not central issues in the reauthorization debate. However, as in the case of the
debate over protecting air traffic functions from privatization during the Vision 100
reauthorization process and the introduction of legislation in the 109^th Congress to
prevent the outsourcing of flight service station positions, Congress may opt to
consider limitations on the outsourcing of FAA functions. While the intent of
outsourcing is to control escalating costs within the FAA, outsourcing initiatives are
always likely to be contentious because they involve conversion of federal jobs to the
private sector and large scale outsourcing efforts could impact morale and
productivity among federal workers.
Under current policy, the FAA continues to expand the federal contract tower
program, and consolidation of automated flight service station functions is underway
under the private contract awarded in 2005. While these initiatives are not likely to
be the focus of debate during the upcoming FAA reauthorization, they illustrate the
FAA’s approach to competitive sourcing and may provide a model for other FAA
functional areas, such as aeronautical charting and operating and maintaining the
FAA’s telecommunications infrastructure, to streamline operations and improve cost
savings through competitive sourcing. Therefore, these ongoing outsourcing
programs are examined in further detail below.
The Federal Contract Tower (FCT) Program. The FCT program awards
FAA contracts for staffing certain airport control towers with private contract
controllers. During congressional debate over Vision 100 (P.L. 108-176),
outsourcing of air traffic services under the FAA’s Contract Tower Program became
a highly contentious issue. Concerns were raised that further expansion of the
program could escalate to wide-scale privatization of larger components of the air⁵⁸
traffic system, such as en route and terminal area facilities. These concerns were
quelled by an Administration agreement to put any further privatization of FAA
functions on hold during FY2004. The FCT has continued to expand to some degree

⁵⁷ See CRS Report RL31024, The Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act and Circular
A-76, by L. Elaine Halchin.
⁵⁸ FAA air traffic control is currently segmented into en route, terminal area, and airport
tower control functions and facilities. En route facilities are called centers and usually
handle traffic in high-altitude airspace, while terminal area facilities refer generally to
approach control facilities that control arrivals and departures to and from major airports.

since, and it currently encompasses about 45% of all federally funded towers in the
United States.
The FCT program came into existence in 1982 — initially as a pilot program at
five airports — in an effort to provide continued air traffic services at low-activity
towers in the wake of the nationwide air traffic controller strike and subsequent
dismissal of striking FAA air traffic controllers. For the first twelve years, the
program remained relatively small, growing to 27 towers by 1993. Nonetheless, the
program gained the attention of the National Performance Review (NPR) — an
initiative spearheaded by then-Vice President Al Gore that later became known as the
National Partnership for Reinventing Government — which endorsed the program
in 1993 as an effective means of reinventing government services and recommended
its expansion.⁵⁹ Beginning in 1994, the contract tower program rapidly expanded to

160 towers by the end of FY1997.⁶⁰

The FCT program was advocated by the NPR largely because of its perceived
effectiveness as a cost-saving initiative. These cost savings were quantified in a 2003
audit by the DOT OIG. The audit compared operating costs at 12 contract towers to
operating costs at comparable FAA-run towers and found the average annual cost
savings of the contract tower program to be about $917,000 per tower.⁶¹ The DOT
OIG determined that the cost savings under the contract tower program are primarily
due to lower staffing levels and lower salaries in comparison to similar FAA-staffed
facilities. The same analysis was conducted by the FAA in 1999 using FY1998 data,
when it was determined that the average annual cost savings of the contract tower
program to be $787,000 per tower. The DOT OIG attributed the increase in cost
savings to increased costs associated with the controller pay system that was
implemented in FY1998.
While the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) has continued
to challenge the FCT program on legal grounds, the program has continued to
expand, and it now includes more than 230 airport control towers. Beginning in
1999, Congress funded a cost-sharing program allowing towers that would not
otherwise meet the FAA’s cost-to-benefit criteria to remain operational so long as
needed funding above the determined cost/benefit level are provided by non-federal
sources. As of January 1, 2006, more than 30 airports were included in the contract
tower cost-sharing program.⁶²

⁵⁹ Vice President Albert Gore’s National Performance Review. “From Red Tape to Results:
Creating a Government that Works Better and Costs Less.” September 7, 1993. Government
Printing Office: Washington, DC.
⁶⁰ Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation. Federal Contract Tower
Program, Federal Aviation Administration. Report Number AV-1998-047. May 18, 1998.
⁶¹ Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation. Safety, Cost, and
Operational Metrics of the Federal Aviation Administration’s Visual Flight Rules Towers.
Report Number AV-2003-057, September 4, 2003.
⁶² U.S. Contract Tower Association, 2005 U.S. Contract Tower Association Annual Report,
Alexandria, VA. Undated.

With regard to safety, repeated audits of operations at contract towers conducted
by the DOT OIG have indicated that these facilities provide a level of safety
comparable to that of FAA-staffed towers. NATCA has challenged these findings,
claiming that contract towers have fewer controllers, provide less training, and
subject personnel to inadequate work conditions. NATCA contends that these
conditions result in a degradation in the level of safety and service that controllers are
able to provide.⁶³ While the DOT OIG did conclude that contract towers are staffed
with fewer controllers, none of these other claims have been substantiated by DOT
OIG findings or any other independent assessment of contract towers to date.
In 1999, Congress mandated an FAA study to examine further expansion of the
FCT program to include FAA-run towers without radar capability. While FAA took
a narrow view of this requirement and identified only 41 airport towers without any
radar capability whatsoever, a subsequent review by the DOT OIG in 2000 identified
an additional 30 airports for possible inclusion that had limited radar monitoring
capability and provided limited aircraft separation services under instrument flight
rules (IFR), but were, in its opinion, sufficiently similar to other airport towers
already in the FCT program.⁶⁴ NATCA, however, raised significant objections to the
proposal to further expand the contract tower during debate over reauthorization of
the FAA in 2003 in part because 11 of the 71 airports cited in DOT OIG’s report
were among the 50 busiest towers in the United States.⁶⁵
Primarily because the staffing levels and costs of federally-operated towers are
significantly greater than those of contractor-operated towers, the contract tower
program has largely been viewed as an effective means for funding the continued
operation of certain towers that would otherwise be cost prohibitive to operate as
FAA-run facilities. Audits and reviews of the program have not found any
meaningful differences in the quality and safety of air traffic services provided by
contract and subcontracted towers under this program compared to FAA-run towers.
Ongoing issues for continuance and possible expansion of the contract tower
program include continued oversight of costs to ensure that the cost efficiencies that
have made the program a success are maintained or improved upon and
determination of whether all relevant factors such as the volume and complexity of
operations are fully considered and evaluated in terms of safety, efficiency, and cost
savings when new towers are considered for inclusion in the program.
Automated Flight Service Station Contracts. In 2005, the FAA
completed one of the largest public-private competitive source selection processes
ever conducted in the federal government, covering the functions of about 2,500
federal positions at 58 automated flight service station (AFSS) facilities, in all states

⁶³ National Air Traffic Controllers Association. FACT SHEET: FAA Reauthorization and
the Contract Tower Program. Undated.
⁶⁴ Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation. Contract Towers:
Observations on FAA’s Study of Expanding the Program. Report No. AV-2000-079, April

12, 2000.

⁶⁵ National Air Traffic Controllers Association. FACT SHEET: FAA Reauthorization & the
Contract Tower Program.

except Alaska. These facilities provide pre-flight and in-flight weather briefings and
flight planning services, mostly to general aviation operators, but are not directly
involved in air traffic separation functions. Lockheed-Martin Corporation of
Bethesda, MD won the source selection process and was awarded a five-year contract
with an additional five-year renewal option to manage and operate AFSS facilities
throughout the United States, except in Alaska. The FAA estimates that, over the 10-
year period, transitioning the AFSS facilities to Lockheed-Martin under a cost
savings plan that includes considerable consolidation of facilities, will save the
government a total of $2.2 billion, which amounts to a 56% reduction in operating
costs.⁶⁶
Lockheed-Martin’s plan for consolidating the AFSS functions is underway and
once completed will reduce the number of facilities from 58 to 20 and will include
three larger hub facilities that will coordinate services for the western, central, and
eastern sectors of the country. The sites will be linked by modernized computing
capabilities allowing access to local airport and airspace conditions at all facilities,
a weakness of the older system where local information was often only available to
the nearest flight service station.
While this consolidation will result in the elimination of a considerable number
of AFSS positions in the end state, the transition plan was designed to minimize
impacts on displaced federal employees. Each active AFSS specialist working for
the FAA at the time of the transfer of operations to Lockheed-Martin was guaranteed
a job with Lockheed-Martin for at least three years. Prior to the transition, the FAA
used separation incentives to downsize staff in preparation for the transition to
minimize the need for involuntary separations.
Despite these steps, the reorganization and shift to contracted operations had a
notable impact on those federal employees nearing retirement eligibility.
Recognizing that some displaced AFSS employees close to reaching retirement
eligibility were significantly disadvantaged by the transition to contract operations,
Congress approved an amendment to the FY2006 Transportation Appropriations Act
(P.L. 109-115), allowing involuntarily separated AFSS employees that were roughly
within two years of retirement to work under the Lockheed-Martin contract as
temporary federal employees until they reach federal retirement eligibility, provided
that they would do so prior to October 4, 2007. This language was inserted after
attempts to block the use of appropriations to fund the outsourcing of flight service
functions failed to gain sufficient support in Congress.
In the context of the FAA reauthorization, Congress may examine the AFSS
station competitive source selection and transition processes to assess whether
lessons learned from these experiences could be applied to other agency
consolidations and competitive sourcing initiatives. The DOT OIG is currently
conducting a full audit of the AFSS transition process to assess whether the FAA has
implemented effective plans and controls for transiting the flight stations to contract
operations, realizing anticipated cost savings, and ensuring that the operational needs

⁶⁶ Federal Aviation Administration, A-76 Performance Decision Announcement, Text of
Remarks by Dennis DeGaetano, Vice President of Acquisition and Business Services,
February 1, 2005.

of users continue to be met. The results of this audit may be of particular interest to
Congress in the context of FAA reauthorization.
Aeronautical Charting. While the FAA has not announced any additional
plans to conduct competitive sourcing on the scale of the AFSS competition, one
FAA function that may be a likely candidate for future competitive sourcing is the
aeronautical charting function, which produces and distributes charts and flight
information publications in hardcopy and electronic formats for system users. The
aeronautical charting function is comparably small in scale however, consisting of
about 220 positions, which is less than one-tenth the size of the AFSS function. The
FAA assumed responsibility for aeronautical charting from the National Ocean
Service (NOS), a component of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, in FY1999. Presently, the FAA’s National Aeronautical Charting
Office (NACO) publishes and distributes civil aeronautical charts and flight
information publications to both government and public users.
In recent years, the move toward digital geospatial data and geographic
information systems (GIS) has provided for easier consolidation and sharing of
geospatial data used for, among other things, creating the FAA’s aeronautical chart
products. Most observers believe that NACO has done well in keeping pace with
these technological changes thus far. However, as aviation moves more and more
toward digital charts and flight information publications in the cockpit, NACO may
find itself taking on new roles of developing digital products to interface with new
avionics equipment and technology at all levels of aviation, rather than simply
providing this information in hard copy and digital renditions to end users. Among
airlines and other commercial operators already using digital flight information and
chart products extensively, commercially provided data — used in flight management
systems, electronic flight bags, and so forth — accounts for a large proportion of the
disseminated data. Even with respect to hard copy charts and flight information
publications, NACO products for the most part already compete in the market with
products produced by commercial vendors, and have done so virtually since the
government began disseminating aeronautical charts more than70 years ago. Such
direct competition between government-provided and commercial vendor products
is often considered a telltale sign of whether a particular government function should
be considered for possible competitive sourcing.
Outsourcing or competitive sourcing of NACO functions, however, raises safety
and security concerns for some. In particular, unions representing NACO employees
and lawmakers from Maryland — where NACO is principally located — have argued
that because aviation charts are essential for flight safety, national security, and
compliance with FAA regulations, the NACO function should be kept under direct
control of the FAA.⁶⁷ Advocates for keeping NACO as a government run function
also argue that because it is a highly efficient operation, it would be of little benefit
to privatize it. During hearings preceding the last FAA reauthorization, the Aircraft
Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), another advocate for keeping NACO a
federal function, sought legislative language to have NACO positions reclassified as
“inherently governmental.” AOPA asserted that NACO provides pilots with essential

⁶⁷ Amelia Gruber. “Lawmakers, Union Push To Keep Flight Mapping In Government,”
Government Executive Daily Briefing, September 2, 2003.

sources of information for the safety of flight, national defense, and compliance with
FAA regulations, and therefore should not be classified as commercial.⁶⁸ Small
general aviation users that typify AOPA’s membership may also be concerned that
if aeronautical charting functions were contracted out, they may be forced to pay
more for charts and other products to fully cover the costs associated with updating
and maintaining geospatial databases and creating and disseminating chart products.
As previously stated, Congress did not include legislation to protect any FAA
functions from privatization or competitive sourcing, including NACO functions,
during that last reauthorization cycle.
Because NACO functions closely resemble aeronautical charting functions
provided by at least one commercial vendor, it may be difficult to make a strong case
that such functions should continue to be government-run. If Congress were to task
the FAA with identifying functions that are readily amenable to competitive sourcing
competitions, NACO functions already have a commercial corollary and therefore
could be a prime candidate for inclusion. However, the small size and relative
efficiency of the NACO organization may render any attainable cost savings from
outsourcing relatively small, given that the total NACO budget is only about $50
million annually.
FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure. Whereas the NACO is a
relatively small, compartmentalized function that could be relatively easily scoped
for a public-private competition, many other elements of the FAA are much more
complex to identify and parse out. Such may be the case with the FAA
Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI), the backbone of the FAA’s intra- and inter-
facility communications capability to support air traffic services. According to recent
GAO testimony, some experts have been advocating full outsourcing of operations
and maintenance functions for the FTI as a possible cost-saving option.⁶⁹
While the FTI program is still in developmental stages, it is expected to replace
aging FAA telecommunications equipment used for air traffic control mission
support. The FAA’s stated approach to engineering the FTI system will be consistent
with a performance-based services contract under which FAA will neither own nor
operate any of the network equipment or software. However, scoping the program
and meeting FAA user requirements for sustainment and maintenance will likely
require close collaboration between the FAA and the contractor team led by Harris
Corporation. Due to the size and complexity of the FTI, there is a substantial amount
of risk associated with both the development and the continued operations and
support of FAA operational telecommunications needs. Therefore, the FTI program
will likely need to be monitored closely, but if successful, might serve as a useful

⁶⁸ Statement of Phil Boyer, President, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, Before the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Aviation Subcommittee, U.S. House of
Representatives, Concerning FAA Reauthorization, April 9, 2003.
⁶⁹ U.S. Government Accountability Office, Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.,
Director Physical Infrastructure Issues, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on
Transportation, Treasury, the Judiciary, Housing and Urban Development, and Related
Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate Air Traffic Control: Status of the
Current Modernization Program and Planning for the Next Generation System, May 4,

2006, GAO-06-738T.

model for government contracts to support FAA operations in the NGATS.
Therefore, details of the FTI contract may be of particular interest to Congress in the
context of FAA reauthorization.
The Use of Designees. Designees are individuals that are neither
government employees nor government contractors, that are authorized or designated
by the FAA to carry out regulatory functions. Examples include designated medical
examiners that issue medical certification, pilot examiners that issue pilot certificates
and ratings, and manufacturing representatives that certify the airworthiness of
production aircraft. The use of designees has long been a part of the FAA’s cost
control strategy. Presently, FAA regulatory oversight functions are supplemented by
more than 11,000 designees, including about 4,800 conducting aircraft certification,
about 1,500 involved in flight standards, and almost 5,000 designated aviation
medical examiners. While the use of designees is a long-standing policy at the FAA
and it is widely considered an effective means for controlling operational costs, it has
been considered controversial in some cases. While the use of aviation medical
examiners that conduct medical exams on behalf of the FAA and check airman that
conduct pilot tests for certificates and ratings is less controversial, the use of
designees in aircraft design and manufacturing organizations and for oversight of
airline operations and maintenance has raised some concerns among aviation safety
experts. Also, the GAO recently identified FAA’s inconsistent monitoring and
inadequate oversight of designees as significant weaknesses in these programs.⁷⁰
Although the use of designees provides an effective means to control costs,
safety oversight concerns may impose some limitations over the extent of using
designees. To effectively utilize designees as a cost control measure and address
these safety oversight concerns, the FAA may consider options to target designee use
and give priority to qualified FAA retirees to perform designee functions. For
example, the FAA may seek to expand the use of designees at manufacturer and
airline facilities that have clearly demonstrated that they have effective safety
management programs in place. By increasing the use of designees among these
operators and facilities, the FAA may be able to better align its inspector workforce
to concentrate more on sectors of the aviation industry where more extensive safety
concerns have been identified, such as at contract repair stations and among smaller
commercial operators. By using qualified former FAA employees in designee roles,
the FAA may be able to further improve the quality of its designee workforce. Also,
by increasing the number of federal annuitants with aviation experience in the
designee workforce, the FAA may be able to reduce concerns over designees being
mostly dependent on their salaries or compensation received from the companies or
entities that they are overseeing on behalf of the FAA.
Air Traffic Controller Staffing
Given the large wave of controllers becoming eligible for retirement and
mandatory retirement for most operational controllers at age 56, adequate controller
staffing is likely to be a significant issue in the debate over FAA reauthorization.
Vision 100 required the FAA to develop a controller workforce strategy to address

⁷⁰ U.S. Government Accountability Office, Aviation Safety: FAA Needs to Strengthen the
Management of Its Designee Programs, October 2004, GAO-05-40.

the issue of the pending controller retirement wave, which is largely attributable to
large scale hiring conducted in the early 1980s to fill positions left vacant by
President Reagan’s firing of striking controllers in 1981. The FAA’s strategy for
controller staffing, issued in December 2004, relies primarily on an accelerated rate
of hiring of controllers through 2014 and achieving increased controller productivity
through a variety of human resource management initiatives.⁷¹
The FAA’s projections show a total of just over 11,000 active controllers —
roughly 75% of the 2005 workforce — retiring or otherwise leaving the controller
ranks between 2005 and 2014. About 8,250 of these losses will specifically be due
to retirements. During this period, the FAA plans to hire 12,500 controllers to
replace controller losses and meet future system needs.⁷² Historically, the FAA had
filled controller positions once they became aware that a controller was planning to
leave, which meant that there was usually little lead-time to hire replacements. The
strategy for addressing the impending wave of controller retirements is intended to
be more proactive. It involves a planned surge in hiring in the near-term, compared
to historic hiring trends, to put controller trainees into the pipeline so that they can
replace retiring controllers on a more accelerated pace given that it takes, on average,
a little over three years for a controller to become fully certified. This initial surge
in hiring is anticipated to be followed by a steady flow of new hires to keep pace with
attrition rates (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. FAA Projections of Controller Attrition, Planned Hiring
Rates, and Anticipated Controller Staffing Levels

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⁷¹ Federal Aviation Administration, A Plan for the Future: The Federal Aviation
Administration’s 10-year Strategy for the Air Traffic Control Workforce, December 2004.
⁷² Ibid.

The FAA is also taking steps to implement a provision in the law that allows
high-quality controllers to remain in their positions for up to five years beyond the
usual mandatory retirement age of 56.⁷³ The FAA has also taken steps to improve
controller selection and training in order to reduce washout rates during training,
streamline the training process, and develop a high quality workforce to replace
retiring controllers. Simulation technologies are also being developed and deployed
to improve and provide greater automation and assessment capabilities in the
controller training environment. The FAA is continuing to work with universities
through the collegiate training initiative (CTI) to recruit and provide baseline training
to the future generation of controllers. Despite these steps, Congress may debate
whether controller staffing standards and projected staffing levels provide an
adequate level of safety, and whether funding and initiatives to train and place high
quality controllers will adequately meet projected staffing needs over the next several
years. Congress may also consider options to allow CTI program graduates to enter
directly into on-the-job training. This approach may streamline controller training
and could significantly cut the FAA’s training costs, but questions remain regarding
whether the CTI program by itself would provide sufficient screening of prospective
controllers, or whether initial training at the FAA Academy is also needed to identify
and weed out trainees not well suited for controller careers.⁷⁴
Beside hiring new controllers, the FAA strategy also consists of improving
controller productivity. The FAA expects to achieve a savings of 10% by 2010
through better management of controller shifts, greater flexibility in shift staffing,
better management and oversight of overtime and sick leave usage, reducing
productivity losses due to medical restrictions and work-related disabilities, and
reducing the amount of time controllers spend on paperwork, union business, and
attending workshops, meetings, and conferences.⁷⁵ Progress on these initiatives may
be of particular interest during congressional debate over FAA reauthorization.
The FAA asserts that the current situation is characterized more by staffing
imbalances across the system, rather than a system-wide staffing shortage.⁷⁶ The
FAA is addressing facility imbalances in its controller workforce strategy by
restricting transfers that do not maintain balanced staffing objectives, and by offering
voluntary reassignments to better balance staff allocations, particularly at those en
route facilities that are understaffed.
A greater challenge in improving controller allocations and maintaining an
appropriate staffing balance is reducing the number of on-the-job training failures
among developmental controllers at en route centers, particularly those assigned to

⁷³ See 5 U.S.C. §8335(a).
⁷⁴ Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives. The
Status of the Air Traffic Controller Workforce (108-73), Hearing before the Subcommittee
on Aviation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of^th^nd
Representatives, 108 Cong., 2 sess., June 15, 2004.
⁷⁵ Federal Aviation Administration, A Plan for the Future.
⁷⁶ See Testimony of Marion Blakey in Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S.
House of Representatives, The Status of the Air Traffic Controller Workforce, June 15,

2004.

the most demanding facilities. Congress may consider whether better screening tools
during initial training — such as simulation training and evaluations — can serve to
better identify controller aptitude and assign to busy en route centers only those
developmental controllers considered most likely to be successful in on-the-job
training at these facilities. Such tools could help eliminate controller washout at busy
en route terminals that results in transfers to smaller, less demanding terminal
airspace. Increased use of emerging air traffic automation technologies may also help
to improve staffing imbalances in the future, both by reducing staffing requirements
and by decreasing job complexity that could greatly reduce failure rates.
One long-term option for reducing staffing imbalances is to consolidate air
traffic facilities. The FAA asserts that co-locating facilities of different complexity
levels can help developmental controllers progress to more complex airspace in a
manner that better fits each controller’s individual progression.⁷⁷ Co-located
facilities may also provide experienced controllers with greater career advancement
opportunities without having to relocate, and may help the FAA reduce operational
costs for facilities and employee transfers. While options to consolidate air traffic
facilities are only in the initial conceptual stages, Congress may consider options to
require the FAA to examine consolidation alternatives, or for impartial observers,
such as the National Academies, to study the feasibility, costs and benefits, and
impacts of consolidating air traffic services on a system-wide basis. As previously
discussed, Congress may also consider whether a BRAC-like process may provide
a mechanism for evaluating air traffic control facility consolidation options.
FAA Labor Relations and Negotiations
With regard to controlling operational costs, air traffic controller pay remains
a particularly contentious issue as controller compensation and benefits make up a
sizable proportion of the FAA’s operational costs. During debate over FAA
reauthorization, Congress may examine whether options to improve existing laws
and policies regarding the FAA personnel system are available to control escalating
operational costs and maintain more positive and constructive management-labor
relations within the FAA.
Regarding labor negotiations, one legislative option offered during the 109^th
Congress proposed to add an additional phase to the existing process, requiring
management and labor to enter into binding arbitration after the period of
congressional review following an impasse in the contract negotiation process.⁷⁸
While Congress did not take up formal debate on this proposal in the midst of the
recent FAA/controller labor negotiations, this proposal may resurface during debate
over FAA reauthorization. Other options to streamline the labor negotiations process
within FAA may also be considered in the context of FAA reauthorization, as recent
labor negotiations have proven to be rather disruptive and highly contentious.
In 1995, Congress authorized the Administrator of the FAA to develop a new
personnel management system for the agency’s workforce. Section 347(a) of the

⁷⁷ Federal Aviation Administration, A Plan for the Future.
⁷⁸ See S. 2201 and H.R. 4755, 109^th Congress.

Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1996,
provided for the development and implementation of a new personnel management
system following consultation with FAA employees and any non-governmental
experts in personnel management systems employed by the Administrator.⁷⁹ The
new system was to provide for “greater flexibility in the hiring, training,
compensation, and location of personnel.”⁸⁰ As enacted originally, chapter 71 of the
U.S. Code, relating to labor-management relations in most federal agencies, did not
apply to the new personnel management system.⁸¹ However, in March 1996,
Congress amended section 347 to make chapter 71 applicable to the new system.⁸²
In October 1996, Congress considered additional requirements for the FAA
personnel management system. Section 253 of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization
Act of 1996 amended title 49 of the U.S. Code to add a new section involving
consultation and negotiation with respect to the new system.⁸³ 49 U.S.C. § 40122(a)
provides, in relevant part:
(1) Consultation and Negotiation. — In developing and making changes
to the personnel management system initially implemented by the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration on April 1, 1996, the
Administrator shall negotiate with the exclusive bargaining representatives
of employees of the Administration certified under section 7111 of title 5
and consult with other employees of the Administration.
(2) Mediation. — If the Administrator does not reach an agreement under
paragraph (1) with the exclusive bargaining representatives, the services
of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service shall be used to attempt
to reach such agreement. If the services of the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service do not lead to an agreement, the Administrator’s
proposed change to the personnel management system shall not take effect
until 60 days have elapsed after the Administrator has transmitted the
proposed change, along with the objections of the exclusive bargaining
representatives to the change, and the reasons for such objections, to
Congress.
In the report that accompanied the Senate version of the 1996 Act, the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation indicated that “[i]n
negotiating changes to the personnel system, the Administrator and the exclusive
bargaining representatives would be required to use every reasonable effort to find
cost savings and to increase productivity within each of the affected bargaining units,

⁷⁹ P.L. 104-50, § 347(a), 109 Stat. 436, 460 (1995).
⁸⁰ Id.
⁸¹ See P.L. 104-50, § 347(b), 109 Stat. 436, 460 (1995) (identifying provisions of title 5, U.S.
Code, that would be applicable to the new personnel management system).
⁸² P.L. 104-122, § 1, 110 Stat. 876 (1996).
⁸³ P.L. 104-264, § 253, 110 Stat. 3213, 3237 (1996).

as well as within the FAA as a whole.”⁸⁴ The House version of the act did not
include a provision on consultation, negotiation, and mediation. The Senate
provisions were incorporated into the final version of the legislation during
conference.⁸⁵
In 2005, a federal district court considered the impact of 49 U.S.C. § 40122 on
labor-management relations at the FAA.⁸⁶ After reaching bargaining impasses with
the FAA, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) and the
Professional Airways Systems Specialists (PASS) sought the assistance of the
Federal Service Impasses Panel (FSIP), an entity within the Federal Labor Relations
Authority (FLRA) that provides assistance with resolving negotiation impasses
between federal agencies and unions. In 2004, unclear about whether it had the
authority to resolve impasses involving the FAA in light of 49 U.S.C. § 40122, FSIP
declined to provide assistance.⁸⁷
After reviewing the development of the FAA personnel management system and
the enactment of 49 U.S.C. § 40122, the district court concluded that complaints
related to an agency’s participation in FSIP’s impasse resolution procedures could
be deemed an unfair labor practice.⁸⁸ Consequently, the court declared that “[w]hen
agency action constitutes an arguable unfair labor practice, jurisdiction rests
exclusively with the Authority and the Courts of Appeals ... For these reasons, the
[court] concludes that it is without jurisdiction and should defer to the FLRA.”⁸⁹
Although the FLRA did not address the matter, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit did review the district court opinion in February
2006. In National Air Traffic Controllers Association v. Federal Services Impasses
Panel, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court decision, concluding that FSIP did
not have a clear and specific statutory mandate to assert jurisdiction over the parties’
bargaining impasses.⁹⁰ The court did observe, however, that the FAA’s refusal to
participate in proceedings before FSIP could form the basis of an unfair labor
practice charge before the FLRA.⁹¹
On April 5, 2006, the FAA announced formally that it had reached an impasse
in its negotiations with NATCA regarding its agency-wide contract covering the air
traffic controller workforce.⁹² In accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 40122(a)(2), the FAA

⁸⁴ S.Rept. 104-333, at 36 (1996).
⁸⁵ See H.Rept. 104-848, at 109 (1996).
⁸⁶ National Air Traffic Controllers Association v. Federal Service Impasses Panel, 2005 WL

418016 (D.D.C. 2005).

⁸⁷ Id. at 1-2.
⁸⁸ Id. at 4.
⁸⁹ Id.
⁹⁰ 437 F.3d 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
⁹¹ Id. at 1265.
⁹² See FAA Declares Impasse in Controller Talks; Next Stop for Two Sides is Congress,
(continued...)

Administrator indicated that the agency would send its last, best offer to Congress.⁹³
H.R. 5449 (109^th Congress), a measure introduced by Representative Steven C.
LaTourette on May 22, 2006 to repeal 49 U.S.C. § 40122(a)(2), that would have
essentially eliminated any statutory requirement for federal mediation in the case of
an impasse in contract negotiations, was defeated.⁹⁴
On June 5, 2006, the FAA imposed a new labor contract on NATCA. FAA
maintains that the new contract will save the government approximately $1.9 billion
over five years through various measures, including the creation of a separate, lower
pay scale for new employees.⁹⁵ The union’s offer would have reportedly cost $600
million more than the FAA’s offer over five years.⁹⁶
Future Airport and Airspace Demand and Capacity
Needs
The current FAA reauthorization cycle comes at a critical time with respect to
addressing increasing capacity needs at high-volume airports, in airspace around
many major metropolitan areas, and along certain highly congested routes. After a
decrease in air travel brought about by a variety of factors, including, most
prominently, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, air traffic is again on the
rise, and so are the associated congestion and delays at many commercial airports.
While stopgap measures implemented by the FAA have served well to stave off
unacceptable congestion and delays thus far, long-term solutions are likely to be
needed in consideration of future air traffic growth projections.
Quantifying Delay and Mitigating Its Impacts
Delay is a multi-faceted metric that is largely regarded as a symptom of possible
strains on capacity within the national airspace system (NAS). While there was a
relatively large decrease in demand for air travel from 2001 to 2004 that produced
fewer delays, over the past two years key delay statistics have been steadily rising,⁹⁷
indicating possible strains on system capacity. The FAA’s implementation of
ground delay programs (GDPs) at a variety of airports — designed to hold aircraft

⁹² (...continued)
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 66, at A-5 (Apr. 6, 2006).
⁹³ Id.
⁹⁴ H.R. 5449, 109^th Cong. (2006). H.R. 5449 was considered under suspension of the rules
and required a two-thirds vote to pass. The vote was 271-148. For additional information
on the congressional consideration of H.R. 5449, see FAA Imposes Labor Contract on
NATCA Following 60-Day Congressional Review, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 111, at A-10
(June 9, 2006).
⁹⁵ FAA Imposes Labor Contract on NATCA Following 60-Day Congressional Review, supra
note 94.
⁹⁶ Id.
⁹⁷ See CRS Report RL32707, Avoiding Gridlock in the Skies: Issues and Options for
Addressing Growth in Air Traffic, by Bart Elias.

on the ground when it is anticipated that thunderstorms will affect their flight — has
proven effective in smoothing traffic flows.⁹⁸ However, challenges are mounting as
traffic during the summer of 2006 at many busy airports surpassed traffic levels
during the summer of 2000, when the FAA’s inability to cope with demand
combined with thunderstorms and maintenance inefficiencies at airlines produced a
large spike in delays, to the chagrin of air travelers.
While many travelers perceive that delays are frequently associated with
weather, actual delays directly attributable to weather conditions account for only a
small portion of total system-wide delays. Rather, delays are most readily
attributable to a combination of the current system’s inability to cope with weather,
congestion, and other factors affecting the efficient flow of traffic at major airports
and along crowded airways; maintenance difficulties and inefficiencies in air carrier
operations; and cascading effects resulting from late arriving aircraft that cannot be
turned around in time to maintain outbound flight schedules (see Figure 3). System
delays, of course, are of the greatest concern to the FAA as these most directly reflect
the inefficiencies in the air traffic control system and most readily point to existing
or emerging capacity needs.
Figure 3. Causes of Air Carrier Flight Delays (2003-2005)

System
Carrier28%

29%

Security
< 1%
Weather

Late Aircraft

36%

Source: CRS analysis of Bureau of Transportation Statistics aviation delay data.
⁹⁸ “Ground Delays Down Due to New FAA Program, Chew Says,” Aviation Daily, August

4, 2006, p. 1.

While it is not fully understood what specific inefficiencies in the system have
the most detrimental effects on delay, most experts agree that in order to alleviate
capacity-related delay at busy airports, priority must be given to increasing the
system’s ability to handle traffic during low visibility conditions. Many believe that
technology is needed to reduce low visibility aircraft spacing standards to those
allowable in good visibility in order to accommodate projected future growth in air
traffic operations at busy airports. However, some experts caution that even with the
implementation of these proposed options and the completion of planned airport
expansions across the country, certain very busy airports throughout the country,
including both major commercial airports and the busiest general aviation reliever
airports, may experience peak hour demand levels that greatly exceed airport capacity
limitations. While these capacity constrained airports, as well as surrounding
airspace, and certain en route corridors between these busiest airports are becoming
saturated at peak operating hours, these impacts are highly geographically specific.
These geographic distributions of congestion and delay can be linked to population
trends toward increased growth in major metropolitan areas throughout the United
States, fast-growing cities in the southeast and southwestern states, and to socio-
economic factors of particular metropolitan areas that have a strong effect on demand
for air travel.⁹⁹
The Asymmetry of Capacity Straining Operations
One major challenge for system planners is that air traffic is highly concentrated
among a relatively small number of airports serving major metropolitan areas across
the United States. Therefore, across the entire national airspace system, the volume
and distribution of air traffic is highly asymmetric or unbalanced. Specifically, in
high altitude airspace there are choke points where aircraft transitioning between
cities in the northeast and Chicago and the west coast converge, and also along the
heavily congested air routes up and down the east and west coasts of the United
States. Prior CRS analysis found that projected future system demand, based on
geographic population distribution trends, is likely to continue along the path of
increasing air traffic density at these already congested major metropolitan airports
and along the busiest traveled flight routes.¹⁰⁰
Similarly, analysis by the FAA and the MITRE Corporation found that, despite
ongoing efforts and plans to expand airport and system capacity under the FAA’s
Operational Evolution Plan (OEP), capacity constraints are likely at several airports
that serve major metropolitan areas, and fast-growing cities.¹⁰¹ In addition to
examining projected increases in flights between major cities, extensive
socio-economic information was used in the study to identify locations where

⁹⁹ See CRS Report RL32707, Avoiding Gridlock in the Skies: Issues and Options for
Addressing Growth in Air Traffic, by Bart Elias; Federal Aviation Administration and The
MITRE Corporation. Capacity Needs in the National Airspace System: An Analysis of
Airport and Metropolitan Area Demand and Operational Capacity in the Future, June 2004.
¹⁰⁰ See CRS Report RL32707, Avoiding Gridlock in the Skies: Issues and Options for
Addressing Growth in Air Traffic, by Bart Elias.
¹⁰¹ Federal Aviation Administration and the MITRE Corporation, Capacity Needs in the
National Airspace System.

additional capacity needs are anticipated that would not otherwise have been
identified. The study concluded that by 2013, 15 airports will need additional
capacity improvements, assuming planned enhancements at airports are completed
before then. All three major airports in the New York metropolitan area (Newark,
LaGuardia, and John F. Kennedy International) made the list as did three airports in
the Los Angeles area. If planned improvements don’t occur, the total number of
airports needing additional capacity may rise to 26. By 2020, the study predicts that
the number of airports needing additional capacity will grow to 18, assuming planned
enhancements stay on track before then. An additional 23 airports were identified
as potentially needing additional capacity by 2020 if planned improvements are
delayed or cancelled. For some metropolitan areas, the outlook is not particularly
promising. In Los Angeles, for example, if planned enhancements don’t occur,
additional capacity will be needed at all major commercial airports and two key
reliever airports. Even with the planned enhancements in place, the Los Angeles
metropolitan area will face significant capacity constraints in the next 10 to 15 years.
While major metropolitan areas like Los Angeles and New York face significant
challenges to meet aviation capacity needs over the next 15 years, anticipated
capacity needs identified in the study were not just limited to the largest metropolitan
areas and the current busiest airports. For example, the study found that the fast-
growing metropolitan areas of Austin and San Antonio, Texas, and Tucson, Arizona,
while not included among the nation’s 35 busiest airports (the OEP-35), are
nonetheless anticipated to have a significant need for additional capacity over the
next 15 years, spurred by large economic growth. In sum, the capacity needs study
identified significant challenges ahead for meeting aviation capacity demand in large
and fast-growing metropolitan areas.
Accommodating Future Airspace Users
Besides addressing expected capacity needs and recognizing that these needs are
likely to be highly specific to particular geographic regions of the United States, a
significant challenge facing Congress and the FAA in the years ahead is
accommodating new classes of airspace users in a manner that optimizes safety and
efficiency for all users. New users will consist of the very big, such as the Airbus A-
380 super-jumbo jet, as well as the very small, very light jets (VLJs). The most
talked-about class of new system users are the VLJs, which are expected to begin
operations in small numbers in 2007 and are projected to experience rapid growth
over the next ten years. VLJs are seen by some as a possible solution to provide
small communities improved access to the national air transportation system.
Therefore, their introduction may spur renewed public policy debate over approaches
to enhance air transportation in small communities. Also, because these VLJs will
share high altitude airspace and congested airspace around major metropolitan areas
with commercial passenger jets, their impact on system capacity and air traffic
control workload is likely to be of particular interest. Besides VLJs, the introduction
of pilotless Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), or Unmanned Aerial Systems
(UASs), poses significant challenges to maintaining safety and not impeding access
to airspace for other users such as small general aviation aircraft. Also, there is
continued interest among some developers to build “quiet” supersonic aircraft,
initially designed for the high-end business and corporate jet market. Consideration
of over-land supersonic flight and the designation of specific supersonic corridors
over the United States, however, could open up a contentious public-policy debate.

Finally, commercial space transportation continues to grow with increasing demand
for commercial space launches of payloads for orbital deployment. Also, the
anticipated launch of a space tourism industry, consisting initially of suborbital
passenger flights, poses unique challenges for the FAA with regard to safety
oversight as well as providing safe separation between these activities and other
airspace users. The two newly emerging classes of airspace users anticipated to have
the greatest impact on the airspace system over the next several years are the VLJs
and UAVs. These vehicles and the policy issues concerning their utilization is
considered in further detail below.
Very Light Jets. Very light jets or VLJs are a class of small jet aircraft,
weighing less than 12,500 pounds maximum takeoff weight, with typical seating
configurations for two to seven occupants. Marketing of VLJs has targeted fractional
ownership programs and air-taxi operations as an alternative to airline travel with
much lower operating costs than traditional business jets. Growth projections for
VLJs operations over the next 10 years suggest that the FAA considers that VLJ
utilization may have a significant impact on aviation system demand. The FAA’s
optimism over VLJ utilization are reflected in its most recent aviation forecasts
which project an average annual growth of 10.2% in general aviation turbojet activity
over the next ten years, attributable in large part to the anticipated popularity of¹⁰²
VLJs.
While there appears to be a considerable market for VLJ aircraft, their specific
impact on the airspace system will largely depend on how they are utilized. If the
utilization of VLJs is predominantly accounted for by individual owners,
corporations, and fractional ownership programs, then VLJs may have a more
substantial impact on general aviation reliever airports. If, on the other hand, a large
number of VLJs are used for air-taxi service with connectivity to commercial air
carrier networks, then the VLJ impact could exacerbate concerns over congestion and
delay at larger commercial airports, or perhaps secondary commercial airports such
as Chicago’s Midway airport.
There is varying speculation regarding how significant of an impact VLJs will
have on the national airspace system. Pointing to historical trends, some have
concluded that much of the speculation over a VLJ boom that could cripple the
existing airspace system is largely hype.¹⁰³ But others see great promise in the VLJ
concept because of their comparatively low operating costs and flexibility to utilize
small airports that are inaccessible to larger aircraft used in airline and commuter¹⁰⁴
operations. The VLJ aircraft are envisioned by some to fulfill perceived needs for
air transport in small communities where attracting or maintaining commercial air
transportation has been very difficult.

¹⁰² Federal Aviation Administration, FAA Aerospace Forecasts 2006-2017.
¹⁰³ See, for example, J. Mac McClellan, “VLJ Myth May Cost Us All,” Flying, June 2006,
p. 11.
¹⁰⁴ Philippe A. Bonnefoy and R. John Hansman, Implications of Very Light Jets for the Air
Transportation System, Presented at the Global Airline Industry Program Industrial
Advisory Board/Airline Industry Consortium Joint Meeting, November 4, 2005,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, International Center for Air Transportation.

For several years, the FAA, NASA, and the National Consortium for Aviation
Mobility (NCAM) have touted the Small Aircraft Transportation System (SATS) and
related concepts as possible options for providing air service to small communities,
particularly those that have limited access to air transportation. The SATS vision
conceptualizes a future network of on-demand, widely-distributed networks of small
aircraft capable of providing transportation access to large number communities in
less time.¹⁰⁵ Many regard VLJs to be the enabling technology of this SATS vision.
Whether this vision will come to fruition largely depends on whether a business case
can be made for operating profitable air-taxi services using these small jets. This, in
turn, will likely depend on a variety of factors including the public perception of VLJ
safety and reliability; public demand for newly offered services; and the ability of
companies to control operational costs so that VLJ transportation can be offered at
a reasonable price. One operational issue that may arise is whether the FAA will
allow these jets to fly with a single pilot in air-taxi operations. While the jets are
certified for single pilot operations, current commercial flight regulations require two
pilots on flights conducted for hire. This could have a significant impact on costs in
an environment where revenues on each flight can be generated from only five or six
available seats.
Thus far, only one company, DayJet, is poised to try out the concept of using
VLJs in an air-taxi operation, with plans to initiate service in the southeast United
States within one year.¹⁰⁶ DayJet has developed an extensive program for monitoring
operations, and has received safety compliance certification from key industry
auditing firms. Meanwhile, others that have expressed interested in launching a VLJ
air-taxi operation, including the much-talked-about Pogo Jet company, appear to be
taking a wait-and-see approach before launching operations. The high degree of
uncertainty regarding the extent of the market for VLJ air-taxi operations makes it
difficult to predict how and where VLJ operations will specifically impact the
national airspace system (NAS). During debate over FAA reauthorization, Congress
may consider options involving the use of VLJs to provide service to small
communities with limited access to air transportation, however geographically-
specific demand for VLJs may, nonetheless, concentrate their operations in already
busy airspace around major metropolitan areas, and along routes connecting these
highly populated locales.
In Vision 100, Congress included language expanding the essential air service
program (EAS) to permit funding of alternatives to traditional air carrier service in
small communities, such as cost-sharing for on-demand operations designed to
specifically meet a community’s air transportation needs. While this appears to open
the possibility for federal funding to encourage VLJ air-taxi type operations, this
concept has not yet been tested. During the course of reauthorization, Congress may
consider options to provide stimulus for VLJ air-taxi operations, either through the
existing EAS program or the Small Community Air Service Development (SCASD)
program, or by establishing a new or pilot program to promote VLJ air-taxi

¹⁰⁵ National Consortium for Aviation Mobility. NCAM, SATS Program Objectives.
¹⁰⁶ George C. Larson, “Infinite Perturbations, the DayJet Challenge,” Business &
Commercial Aviation, July 2006, pp. 54-61.

operations in specific small communities seeking such service to provide
connectivity to the national air transportation system.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Growing interest in the use of unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs), or unmanned aerial systems (UASs), particularly for aerial
surveillance in homeland security and law enforcement applications, is spurring
considerable debate over how to accommodate these unmanned systems and keep
them safely separated from other air traffic.
In response to the Department of Homeland Security’s initiative to establish an
unmanned aerial surveillance capability to monitor the United States- Mexico border,
the FAA carved out a large section of airspace — 300 miles long and 17 miles wide
— where air traffic was prohibited at middle altitudes, between 12,000 and 14,000
feet, from 5 p.m. to 7 a.m. General aviation advocates, such as the Aircraft Owners
and Pilots Association (AOPA), raised significant concerns over the implementation
of these temporary flight restrictions, fearing that they could set a precedent for
establishing wide swathes of restricted airspace around UAV operating areas which
could significantly impede the flow of air traffic, particularly among general aviation¹⁰⁷
users that typically utilize low and middle altitudes. Safety concerns over UAV
operations were heightened after a DHS Predator UAV conducting aerial surveillance
of the southern border crashed in Arizona on April 25, 2006.
Over the next five to ten years, the FAA anticipates that civilian use UAVs will
rapidly transition to operational status and users will seek permission to fly UAVs in
all airspace throughout the United States in all weather conditions, including
conditions where pilots would be unable to see and avoid UAVs without assistance
from air traffic control radars or other electronic surveillance technologies. Beyond
2015, the FAA believes that UAV operations could begin to dominate certain
aviation sectors, particularly those considered to be particularly “dirty, dull, or
dangerous,”¹⁰⁸ such as homeland security and law enforcement, aerial application of
pesticides, and aerial surveying and sensor platforms. UAV manufacturers and users
will likely push for a regulatory structure for approving UAV systems for operation
in the NAS, allowing operators of approved systems to “file and fly,” rather than
going through the arduous process of obtaining waivers and special operating¹⁰⁹
authority from the FAA on a case-by-case basis. Over the next five years, demand
for UAV operations will likely necessitate that the FAA develop standard policies
and regulations for UAV operations.
The rapid technological advances and substantial interest in UAV aircraft is
placing a strain on the FAA to develop policies and regulations for safe UAV
operations. The FAA, largely following NASA’s lead, is recommending a phased

¹⁰⁷ Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association. AOPA Alerts Congress to UAV Threat to GA
Operations. Frederick, MD, March 29, 2005.
¹⁰⁸ John Timmerman, Federal Aviation Administration. Unmanned Aircraft Systems:
Integration Into the National Airspace System, Presentation to Access5, July 12, 2005.
¹⁰⁹ Katherine McIntire Peters and Beth Dickey, “Droning On,” Government Executive,
October 15, 2004, pp. 68-76.

approach, called Access 5, to granting UAV access to the national airspace system.¹¹⁰
The first phase, currently being initiated, involves certification of UAV operations
of high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) craft that climb and descend through
restricted airspace and operate above 40,000 feet, higher than most commercial
airline traffic, for long periods of time. Based on the experience with these high-
altitude UAV operations, the FAA may allow UAV operations within controlled
airspace above 18,000 feet and specify regulations governing type certification of
UAV systems. This is expected to occur in the late FY2008 or early FY2009 time
frame. Based on safety experience of these operations and technological
improvements to address any identified safety concerns, the FAA may then progress
to further stages or access levels, allowing UAVs to operate alongside manned
aircraft at civilian airports, and intermingle with other air traffic on a more routine
basis at all altitudes, in more congested airspace, and in populated areas. However,
no specific time frame has been set yet, as there is still much uncertainty regarding
how fast technology will improve to meet safety requirements for these types of
operations. Given the intense interest in UAV technologies and the safety concerns
raised by other airspace users, the FAA’s approach to regulating the safety of UAVs
could be a topic of particular interest as Congress engages in debate over FAA
reauthoriz ation.
Options for Maintaining Access and Controlling Demand at
Capacity-Constrained Airports
Despite progress under the FAA’s Operational Evolution Plan (OEP) — the
evolving blueprint for near-term airport and airspace capacity enhancement — and
the anticipated increase in effective capacity and operational efficiency envisioned
under the NGATS plan, several airports throughout the United States either are
already constrained by available capacity or will become capacity constrained in the
coming years if future growth projections prove accurate.¹¹¹ Due to these persisting
capacity limitations in certain locations, the FAA and Congress may be faced with
difficult choices regarding how to best maintain access and address demand in an
equitable manner at capacity constrained airports. Vision 100 provided the FAA with
limited authority to implement negotiated scheduling among air carriers at a limited
number of capacity-constrained airports on a trial basis. This approach, along with
other options such as peak-period pricing, slots, and quota systems have all been
examined as possible options. The FAA’s approach to addressing capacity
constraints at New York’s LaGuardia Airport is likely to be an issue of particular
interest during the debate over reauthorization as the statutorily imposed slot system
for LaGuardia expired in January 2007.
Options under consideration vary along a continuum of government
involvement (see Figure 4). On one end of the continuum, airlines and other
operators could be left to work it out amongst themselves to define market
approaches and schedules that will cause minimal delay. Although, under current
antitrust laws, this is generally prohibited except in limited cases where specific
exemptions have been granted, with government oversight. In some cases, there

¹¹⁰ Ibid.
¹¹¹ Federal Aviation Administration and The MITRE Corporation, Capacity Needs.

could be limited government involvement in these activities, such as having the FAA
or DOT serve as a mediator during discussions of scheduling or as an observer to
ensure that there is no collusion or other violation of antitrust statutes and regulations
and that no specific user groups are unfairly disadvantaged in establishing schedules
and access to airports. The government may take a somewhat more active role in
such activities by discussing air traffic concerns over proposed schedule options, or
even suggesting scheduling options based on air traffic management considerations
and models of traffic flow.
Figure 4. Continuum of Government Involvement in Market-Based
Strategies to Alleviate Aviation Congestion
Options
^Ind^u^st^ry
^C^o^l^l^abo^rati^oⁿ
^Oⁿ^S^c^he^du^lⁱⁿ^g
^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^men^t^Me^di^atⁱ^oⁿ
^{In S}^c^he^dul^ing^P^r^a^c^tⁱ^ce^s
^A^c^ti^v^e^P^a^rt^icip^ati^oⁿ^wⁱ^t^h^I^ndu^s^t^ry
^Oⁿ^S^c^he^du^lⁱⁿ^g
^Go^v^e^rnm^e^nt^Of^f^e^re^d^o^r
^R^e^com^m^eⁿ^ded^S^c^h^edu^lⁱ^ng^S^o^l^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^s
^Q^u^o^t^a^an^{d S}^l^{ot S}^y^s^t^ems
LowModerateHigh
Level of Government Involvement
Another way in which government could exert limited control over scheduling
practices is to implement incentives for off-peak scheduling, or disincentives for
operations during peak hours. Incentive programs could be accomplished through
quota systems (for example, multiplying a landing or takeoff during peak hours by
a weighting factor when calculating an operator’s daily or monthly quota of
operations at a specified airport). Incentive programs could also be implemented by
increasing or imposing fees, such as landing fees or ATC impact fees, during peak
hours. More direct government involvement may involve the use of slot or quota
systems where operators and air carriers are allocated limited access to certain
congested airports. At the other end of the spectrum from no government
involvement at all over airline scheduling practices, is government regulation of the
airline industry, which was de-regulated in 1978. Since it is likely that any proposal
to re-regulate the airline industry would face strong opposition from both the airlines
and consumers, such an option is not considered further.
In the current debate over alleviating congestion at major airports, a significant
policy question that remains is: what degree of government involvement in airline
scheduling and airport access is most likely to provide an appropriate balance
between equitable and efficient access to limited airport capacity on the one hand and
fair and open competition between air carriers in desirable markets on the other?

Options under consideration to address this issue fall into two broad categories: (1)
strategies for curtailing peak hour demand at busy airports through various incentives
or disincentives, and (2) the use of slots or quotas to allocate access at capacity-
constrained airports.
Non-price De-peaking Strategies and Incentives. De-peaking
strategies are designed to alleviate congestion and delay at airports during peak travel
times. De-peaking strategies can be implemented with varying degrees of government
involvement. With a minimal level of government involvement, airlines may
negotiate schedules in a manner that would reduce delay under recently passed
statutes that exempt airlines from antitrust laws to allow them to hold meetings for
these purposes. Specifically, Vision 100 established a collaborative decision-making
trial program at two of the most capacity-constrained airports in the United States.
Under the experimental program, airlines are provided special immunity from
antitrust laws in order to hold collaborative discussions regarding flight scheduling
in order to use air traffic capacity most effectively.¹¹²
Under this program, airlines have negotiated peak hour schedules at Chicago’s
O’Hare airport over the past two years with some limited success. The FAA
persuaded United Airlines and American Airlines to voluntarily cut peak hour flights
at O’Hare. However, there is concern that these concessions alone were not
sufficient to alleviate congestion because other carriers have added peak time flights¹¹³
at O’Hare. Consequently, the FAA has been working with industry to come up
with an equitable schedule arrangement for addressing congestion at O’Hare. In a
recent decision, the FAA has limited the number of unscheduled operations at
O’Hare to 5 per hour, but some operators have criticized this measure because they
assert that it disadvantages charter operators who are no longer able to use Meigs
Field — a nearby general aviation reliever airport that was closed by the city of
Chicago in the spring of 2004 — as well as operators who base or perform
maintenance on their aircraft at O’Hare.
The process for managing schedules at O’Hare is increasingly leading the two
legacy carriers who have curtailed operations to complain about losing market share
to smaller low cost airlines that are expanding in the Chicago market. The ongoing
frustrations in effectively managing schedule demand at O’Hare highlights the
challenges of trying to do so in an equitable fashion that does not impact competition
in the market. Ironically, the statutory use of slots at O’Hare was eliminated in 2002
under provisions in AIR-21 (P.L. 106-181). The current scenario at O’Hare suggests
that some government intervention to control schedules at some of the nation’s
busiest airports may be needed in the near future. Whether this means a return to
slots or some other form of regulation is likely to be an issue of considerable interest
to Congress.
Despite the ongoing challenges with scheduling at O’Hare, there are some
examples that suggest that airlines may find some instances where spreading out

¹¹² See 49 U.S.C. §40129
¹¹³ “Airline Overscheduling Still Hurting O’Hare, Controllers Say.” Aviation Daily, July 15,
2004, pp. 1-2

operations could provide business advantages by reducing operating costs. For
example, a recent analysis of American Airlines de-peaking efforts at three of its
main hubs — Dallas-Fort Worth, Chicago-O’Hare, and Miami International —
indicates that spreading flights out over the day rather than clumping them can
improve operational efficiency. In reworking its schedule at Dallas-Fort Worth,
American reduced daily departures by almost 10% compared to 2000 levels, but lost
only 1.1% of available seats.¹¹⁴ This analysis indicates that, by de-peaking
operations, carriers may be able to increase productivity, make more efficient use of
gates, and consolidate terminal operations. Thus, there appears to be a viable
business case for de-peaking operations in certain instances. Consequently, airlines
may be quite willing to adopt non-price de-peaking strategies that could serve a
mutual benefit to both airline operations as well as FAA air traffic operations.
In cases where there are no clear cut business advantages to non-price de-
peaking operations and where no equitable solutions can be attained by airline
industry collaboration and bargaining over flight schedules, the federal government,
or more likely airport operators, may look to specific de-peaking incentives such as
peak hour pricing as a means to manage schedule demand. Few in the airline
industry are in favor of such a system. The ATA opposes congestion pricing schemes
because they argue that these mechanisms siphon off revenues from airlines and put
the money in the hands of the airports, which are natural monopolies and do not have
to compete in the highly competitive and price sensitive airline industry.¹¹⁵ Similarly
regional airlines, and general aviation operators object to peak-hour pricing because
they believe that such pricing schemes would unfairly limit access to major airports
to large carriers who can pass along increased landing fees to a larger consumer base.
There is concern that peak-hour pricing may further limit air service to small
communities served by regional carriers who will essentially be priced out of major
airports.¹¹⁶ Airport operators may also look less favorably on peak-hour pricing
schemes over alternatives such as slots and quotas because a peak-hour pricing
scheme is more complex to manage and may not result in meeting scheduling
objectives to the extent that can be achieved by implementing slots and quotas.¹¹⁷
Slots and Quotas. Since economic deregulation of the airline industry in
1978, slots have been used at a few busy airports as a method to control airport
scheduling. Under AIR-21, statutory language was enacted phasing out the use of
slots largely over concerns that slots could preferentially advantage well established
carriers and make it difficult for new entrant carriers to gain a foothold in certain
desirable markets. Under these provisions, the only airport that continues to have a
statutorily defined slot system for regulating flight schedules after January 2007 is
Washington Reagan National Airport. However, with the phase out of statutory slot
systems, policymakers will likely face challenges in managing demand to avoid

¹¹⁴ Steve Lott. “Redistributing hub flights saves time, dollars.” Aviation Daily, June 16,

2004, p. 5.

¹¹⁵ “Airport Slot Auctioning ‘Simulation Games’ Will Pinpoint Service Disruptions.”
Aviation Today, July 19, 2004.
¹¹⁶ See CRS Report RS20914, Aviation Congestion: Proposed Non-Air Traffic Control
Remedies.
¹¹⁷ “Airport Slot Auctioning.” Aviation Today, July 19, 2004.

strains on capacity that could induce congestion and increased delay. During the
FAA reauthorization process, debate over slot systems for specific capacity
constrained airports may arise because the statutory slot restrictions at New York’s
LaGuardia, as well as the authority for slot restrictions at the nearby John F. Kennedy
International Airport, expired in January 2007, under the same provisions of AIR-21
that eliminated slots at Chicago’s O’Hare airport in 2002.
In early September 2006, the FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM) that would govern slot allocations at New York’s LaGuardia (LGA) airport
after existing slot controls expired in January 2007. The NPRM calls for several
changes in the current system designed to foster more use of larger aircraft, adoption
of market and lottery systems to increase LaGuardia access for air carriers currently
unable to gain slots at the airport, and provisions to insure continued LaGuardia
access for EAS and other small community service.¹¹⁸ The NPRM is viewed as being
in sync with existing temporary slot restrictions at Chicago O’Hare airport. In
December 2006, the FAA issued an order establishing temporary limits to prevent
congestion-related delays at LaGuardia. While the FAA retains the authority to limit
flight operations in this manner on the basis of safety, concerns over the potential that
the allocation of slots could result in unintended market imbalances or may
disadvantage service to small communities could prompt congressional oversight or
possible legislative action on the issue of airport slot allocations.
The ATA opposes such a system largely on the belief that exceptions and
variances for slots — such as those that currently exist for new entrant carriers and
for flights serving small communities — undermines the purported basis of these
schemes for managing operational demand at busy airports and instead melds facets
of market controls that directly affect airline business practices. On the other hand,
the Airport Council International—North America (ACI-NA), a trade organization
representing several large airport operators, favors slot auctions over other schemes
such as congestion pricing, noting that allocating slots is administratively easier to
implement, and results in regular, predictable schedules with fixed numbers of flights
that can be tied directly to available airport capacity. In contrast, congestion pricing
schemes can be difficult to manage and may have little or no impact on congestion
if they do not correctly predict market factors and demand for peak travel times that
may fluctuate based on a variety of market factors.¹¹⁹
Providing Air Service to Small Communities
The Essential Air Service (EAS) program and the Small Community Air Service
Development (SCASD) Program were designed to address the difficulties in
obtaining and maintaining air service in small, isolated communities where access
to the national air transportation system is limited.¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ Bond, David, “The FAA’s demand-management plans for LaGuardia call for bigger
aircraft, market-based slot turnover” Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 4,

2006, p. 32.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.
¹²⁰ The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on
(continued...)

The Essential Air Service Program. EAS provides subsidies directly to
air carriers for providing service between selected small communities and hub
airports. The program was originally established in 1978 as part of airline
deregulation to ensure a minimum level of air service to smaller communities that
might otherwise lose service because of economic factors. In FY2006, 149
communities in the United States and its territories participated in the EAS program
(39 of the communities served are in Alaska). Participation has grown in recent
years.
The EAS program received $110 million in appropriations for FY2006. This
is less than the $127 million annual level authorized in existing FAA reauthorization
legislation. The EAS program has a permanent $50 million per year appropriation
dating back to 1996 (P.L. 104-264). Congress can and does appropriate additional
funds for EAS, normally from Treasury general fund accounts. For FY2007 both
House and Senate appropriations legislation (H.R. 5576) would fund the program at
$117 million.
The EAS program has successfully weathered attempts by several
Administrations to dramatically reduce its size and otherwise change a community’s
eligibility to participate in the program. Most recently, as part of its FY2007 budget
proposals, the Bush Administration has suggested limiting EAS funding to $50
million and requiring local cost-sharing as a condition for a community’s continued
participation in the program. This proposal did not receive significant congressional
consideration.
Several trends, including the continuing loss of commercial air carrier service
in rural America, are making EAS more attractive to many rural communities. At the
same time, even with increased funding, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the
EAS program to generate additional air service. For a number of reasons commercial
air service in rural America has been falling since September 11^th, and this trend has
continued even though air service nationally has largely returned to pre-September
11^th levels. With traffic falling, air carriers have been reducing and/or eliminating
service at many rural locations. Many of these locations have looked to the EAS
program as a way to ensure a continuation of at least some air service. The costs of
providing air services, however, have been rising due to increased fuel and other
costs. Hence the finite amount of annual EAS funding cannot provide subsidy for all
of the air service that many communities would desire.
Against this backdrop the EAS program faces a number of issues that are likely
to be addressed in forthcoming reauthorization legislation. Primary among these is
how to prioritize access to the program so that EAS funds are used in the most
efficient manner possible. There already are a number of restrictions that limit where
and how EAS funds may be used. By way of example, the per passenger subsidy is
limited to a fixed dollar amount and services cannot be provided at destinations that

¹²⁰ (...continued)
Aviation, held Hearings on Rural Air Service on September 14, 2006. Further information
on current issues affecting rural air service is available at
[http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearin g&He a r i n g_
ID=1794]

are within prescribed driving distances of certain larger hub airports.¹²¹ It is likely,
however, that without a significant increase in funding, Congress would face
consideration of additional limitations on the use of EAS program funding.
Vision 100 included several mechanisms and incentives designed to move
communities out of the standard EAS program. Communities have not sought to
participate in these incentive regimes, however, suggesting that the incentives
themselves need to be reconsidered if they are to be effective. Vision 100 also
included a somewhat controversial provision that created a trial program that would
have required community financial participation as a condition for continued access
to EAS funding in some instances. (This is not entirely unlike the aforementioned
Bush Administration proposal of FY2007) Each annual appropriations bill since
passage of Vision 100, however, has prevented the use of any appropriated funds to
implement the cost-sharing pilot program.
Small Community Air Service Development Program. The Small
Community Air Service Development (SCASD) Program was established under AIR
21 to develop solutions for improving air carrier service to communities that are
experiencing insufficient access to the national air transportation system. Program
funding provides direct grants to selected communities for implementing strategies
to improve the availability and pricing of air service. All program grants require
significant local financial or other participation. Since the program first received
funding in FY2002, DOT has awarded 182 grants under this program. Although the
program was authorized at $35 million per year by Vision 100, the program has been
funded by appropriations at a significantly lower level. In FY2006, for example, the
program received a $10 million appropriation, half of what it had received in the
previous fiscal year.
As the program has matured the annual number of applications for new grants
has dropped, although there are still more applicants than available funding. Recent
testimony by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) suggests that the results
of the program have been mixed but that it was too early in the program’s history to¹²²
determine its effectiveness.
Fostering Investment and Development of the Next
Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS)
A provision in Vision 100 created the Joint Planning and Development Office
(JPDO), a multi-agency entity headed by the FAA and charged with the task of
conceptualizing and integrating the development of the Next Generation Air
Transportation System (NGATS). The DOT envisions NGATS as a system capable

¹²¹ All program restrictions on EAS are detailed in: 14 CFR 398.
¹²² U.S. Government Accountability Office. Commercial Aviation: Programs and Options
for the Federal Approach to Providing and Improving Air Service to Small Communities.
Testimony. GAO-06-398T. September 14, 2006. p. 2.

of tripling effective system capacity by 2025.¹²³ By some estimates, air traffic levels
throughout the United States could increase at that pace thereby necessitating these
system enhancements. The JPDO has initiated operations and has made some
progress toward identifying an enterprise architecture for building the NGATS since
the last FAA reauthorization. The specifics of these efforts and the future funding
and management challenges facing JPDO and the FAA in carrying forth the plans to
build the NGATS are likely to be a major focus during the current FAA
reauthorization process.
NGATS Funding Requirements
A significant issue facing Congress during the upcoming FAA reauthorization
process is obtaining working estimates of what building the NGATS will cost to the
federal government, at least with regard to anticipated federal spending toward
developing NGATS over the next three to five years. Preliminary FAA analysis,
cited in GAO testimony in July 2006, suggests that the average annualized cost for
implementing NGATS would be about $2.7 billion for NGATS facilities and
equipment in constant 2005 dollars, roughly $200 million above FY2006-enacted and
FY2007-requested funding levels for the FAA’s facilities and equipment (F&E)
account.¹²⁴ From FY2007 through FY2025, the total anticipated cost to build
NGATS facilities and equipment, using these initial estimates, is about $50 billion
in constant 2005 dollars, or $66 billion when factoring in inflation over the
development period. These estimates do not consider all the costs of the transition
to NGATS because they do not take into account all of the FAA costs associated with
launching NGATS, such as certification of NGATS-compliant avionics; they assume
that all research and development efforts, primarily carried out to date by NASA,
have been fully completed and transitioned to advanced development stages; and they
do not factor in other government agency costs, such as homeland security costs to
improve security technologies and military spending to ensure that military aircraft
and air traffic facilities are NGATS compliant.
The DOT OIG has testified that the annual costs over the next six years for both
NGATS and existing programs, would be about $600 million above FY2007
requested funding levels in FY2008, and gradually climb to $1 billion above the
FY2007 baseline by FY2012.¹²⁵ The large differences in the GAO and DOT OIG

¹²³ Remarks for the Honorable Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary of Transportation. Securing
America’s Place as Global Leader in Aviation’s Second Century. Aero Club of
Washington, Washington, DC, January 27, 2004. U.S. Department of Transportation, Office
of Public Affairs.
¹²⁴ Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham,, Director Physical Infrastructure Issues, U.S.
Government Accountability Office, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Aviation,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, Next Generation Air
Transportation System, Preliminary Analysis of Progress and Challenges Associated with
the Transformation of the National Airspace System, July 25, 2006, GAO-06-915T
¹²⁵ Statement of David A. Dobbs, Assistant Inspector General for Aviation and Special
Program Audits, U.S. Department of Transportation, Perspectives on the Progress and
Actions Needed to Address the Next Generation Air Transportation System, Before the
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Subcommittee on Aviation, United
(continued...)

cited estimates are likely due to the GAO’s reference to cost estimates that are
averaged across the entire period of NGATS development from FY2007 to FY2025,
whereas the DOT OIG focused solely on near term spending through 2012. The
GAO recognized that these projected system costs will trail off in future years as
legacy systems are phased out and deployment of NGATS technologies are
completed. However, the GAO also recognized that these estimates don’t take into
consideration that, by the time NGATS begins reaching maturity in the 2020 to 2025
time frame, the FAA will likely need to budget for research and development of a
successor system as well as evolutionary improvements and enhancements to
NGATS technologies.
Figure 5 shows the preliminary cumulative and annual cost estimates for the
FAA’s F&E account through 2025. These estimates are based on information
provided in GAO and DOT OIG testimony to Congress based on an initial cost
analysis performed by the FAA’s Research, Engineering, and Development Advisory
Committee (REDAC), an advisory panel that includes representatives from industry,
academia and government. Whereas the GAO indicated an average annual cost
increase of $200 million above the baseline F&E funding level of $2.5 billion in
FY2005 dollars, the DOT OIG provided cost estimates through 2012 that increased
to $600 million over the initial baseline ($2.5 billion) in FY2008, and grew to $1
billion above the baseline by 2012. For our analysis, we applied an inflation-based
increase of 2.5% annually, which is the average annual increase in the consumer price¹²⁶
index (CPI) assumed in the most recent FAA aviation forecasts. While it is
recognized that some uncontrollable cost increases, particularly labor rates, may
exceed these year-by-year inflationary adjustments, NGATS planners expect that this
will be offset by increased efficiencies and cost savings as the system transitions to
technologies that have lower acquisition, operational, and maintenance costs. Using
the 2.5% average annual increase in costs produced an overall cost estimate for F&E
expenditures of almost $69 billion. This total was roughly $5 billion above the
baseline, which assumed that current F&E spending simply kept pace with inflation
at a constant rate of 2.5%. Using the DOT OIG provided estimates, and extrapolating
by applying the 2.5% inflation estimate beyond 2012, yielded a total F&E spending
estimate of almost $76 billion, which is about $12 billion over the baseline
assumption.

¹²⁵ (...continued)
States Senate, July 25, 2006, CC-2006-065
¹²⁶ Federal Aviation Administration. Aerospace Forecasts 2006-2017.

Figure 5. Preliminary Estimates of Increased F&E Funding Needs to
Support NGATS Development

⁸⁰⁵
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Source: CRS analysis of data presented in: Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham,
Director Physical Infrastructure Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office,
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, Next Generation Air Transportation
System, Preliminary Analysis of Progress and Challenges Associated with the
Transformation of the National Airspace System, July 25, 2006, GAO-06-915T
(GAO); and Statement of David A. Dobbs, Assistant Inspector General for
Aviation and Special Program Audits, U.S. Department of Transportation,
Perspectives on the Progress and Actions Needed to Address the Next
Generation Air Transportation System, Before the Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, Subcommittee on Aviation, United States Senate,
July 25, 2006,CC-2006-065 (OIG).
Besides F&E costs, the FAA’s REDAC also examined the future costs from a
broader perspective, developing cost estimates not only for facilities and equipment,
but also for research and development, operations, and airport improvements. These
estimates will likely be of particular interest during the reauthorization process, as
Congress attempts to establish authorized funding levels for the various FAA
accounts. Based on the REDAC initial cost estimates and the aforementioned
inflationary assumptions, CRS computed estimated costs in each of the FAA

accounts over the next five years (see Table 3).¹²⁷ The table compares these future
estimates (analysis) to historic authorization and appropriations levels. However, the
future year cost projections do not fully take into account any potential cost savings
that may be realized and could offset inflationary adjustments, because these
anticipated cost savings have not yet been fully identified in FAA planning
documents. While the FAA anticipates future year cost savings through various
initiatives, the full amount of these projected costs savings is still uncertain.
The uncertainty in these projections, due both to uncertainty about cost saving
initiatives and uncertainty over NGATS funding needs, makes this funding
authorization particularly challenging. Setting authorization levels will likely be
regarded as a particularly important element of pending reauthorization legislation.
Setting appropriate funding levels over the next several years to support NGATS
development might prove particularly challenging given relatively high levels of
uncertainty in the schedule for deploying NGATS technologies. While large
increases to funding may be needed, FAA may have difficulty obligating these
additional funds efficiently until the system enterprise architecture and schedule for
NGATS development more fully mature.
Table 3. Authorized, Appropriated Funding Levels and Analysis
of Future Funding Needs for FAA Programs
($ in billions)
P r ogram 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
O&M
Vision 100:7.67.77.98.0
Appropriations: 7.5 7.7 8.1
Analys is: 8.5 8.7 8.9 9.2 9.4
F&E
Vision 100:3.23.03.03.1
Appropriations: 2.9 2.5 2.5
Analysis: (GAO)*2.72.82.92.93.0
(OIG )2.52.53.13.33.3
AIP
Vision 100:3.43.53.63.7
Appropriations: 3.4 3.5 3.6
Analys is: 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.0
R, E, &D
Vision 100:0.30.40.40.4
Appropriations: 0.1 0.1 0.1
Analysis: (GAO)*0.70.70.70.80.8
Source: Vision 100; Appropriations Acts and Conference Reports; and CRS
analysis of cost projections presented in: Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham,
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Director Physical Infrastructure Issues,
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, Next Generation Air Transportation

¹²⁷ The CRS methodology used an inflationary adjustment of 2.5% per year for deriving cost
estimates for future fiscal years that were not provided in cited sources.

System, Preliminary Analysis of Progress and Challenges Associated with the
Transformation of the National Airspace System, July 25, 2006, GAO-06-915T
(GAO) ; and Statement of David A. Dobbs, Assistant Inspector General for
Aviation and Special Program Audits, U.S. Department of Transportation,
Perspectives on the Progress and Actions Needed to Address the Next
Generation Air Transportation System, Before the Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, Subcommittee on Aviation, United States Senate,
July 25, 2006, CC-2006-065 (OIG), and FAA appropriations data. *GAO
estimates only provided average annual costs in 2005 dollars, however, the CRS
analysis applies a 2.5% annual increase to these cost estimates. O&M =
Operations and Maintenance; F&E = Facilities and Equipment; AIP = Airport
Improvement Program; and R, E, & D = Research, Engineering, and
Development. See text.
Management of the NGATS Development Effort
Another significant issue that may be addressed during the reauthorization
process is how to best manage the NGATS development. A variety of issues may
arise during the reauthorization debate, including
^!Whether sufficient progress on the NGATS effort has been made to
date, and whether it is anticipated that NGATS plans can stay on
schedule;
^!Whether metrics to sufficiently define and monitor progress in the
development of NGATS are available and can be adequately defined
and measured;
^!Whether timelines and milestones to reach NGATS objectives by

2025 need to be more explicitly defined through legislation;

^!Whether the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), the
organization charged with overseeing and integrating the NGATS
project, has sufficient access and input into the budgeting and
acquisition processes at the various agencies involved, including the
FAA, NASA, and others;
^!Whether the scope of the NGATS project is too broadly defined by
considering security and environmental issues and defining air travel
from airport curbside to airport curbside, and therefore should be
narrowed to focus more intensively on the safe and efficient flow of
aircraft (rather than passengers in the system); and
^!Whether the JPDO has sufficient staffing to monitor the NGATS
system integration, or whether the use of a systems integration
contractor to oversee and integrate the NGATS project is needed;
To further examine these issues, the role of the JPDO, as set forth in Vision 100, and
the JPDOs approach to defining and carrying out this role is considered in additional
detail.
The Role of the Joint Planning and Development Office
(JPDO)
Vision 100 included a mandate to establish the JPDO as a multi-agency entity
led by the FAA. Vision 100 charged the JPDO with the tasks of establishing the

enterprise architecture or blueprint for the NGATS and providing overarching
leadership and direction to ensure interagency cooperation and collaboration with
industry to bring the NGATS vision to its fruition.
In 2005, the National Research Council (NRC) issued a critical review of the
JPDO, raising concerns that the JPDO was not sufficiently focused on its primary
objective: to resolve demand issues and increase capacity in the NAS.¹²⁸ Among its
recommendations, the NRC suggested that the JPDO restructure to become more
product-focused on solutions for airport operations, terminal area operations, and en
route and oceanic operations. The JPDO has elected to largely ignore this advice and
continue along its more broadly defined issue-focused program areas, because it
believes that the technical challenges facing the development of the NGATS are
cross-cutting in nature and cannot be easily segmented by the operational areas
identified by the NRC, which are based on the current segmentation of airspace and
air traffic operations and do not necessarily fit well in the future NGATS
archi t ect ure.¹²⁹
While the JPDO’s position is seen as reasonable by some in light of the
complexity and synergy of the issues facing NGATS development, the NRC also
voiced concerns that the various integrated product teams (IPTs) “…are functioning
primarily as experts in specific disciplines rather than as cross-functional, integrated,
multidisciplinary teams organized to deliver specific products that will improve
operational capabilities of the air transportation system.”¹³⁰ The ability of the JPDO
to identify and fully exploit multidisciplinary synergies by bringing together multiple
government agencies and aviation stakeholders under a unified umbrella structure is
an underlying central issue in assessing the JPDO’s overall effectiveness in
developing and executing the NGATS enterprise architecture. On this issue, GAO’s
preliminary analysis of the JPDO was much more favorable than that of the NRC.
The GAO found that JPDO is implementing several best-practices to foster
collaboration among federal agencies, but recognized that the JPDO faces ongoing
challenges in defining a common objective, establishing and reinforcing common
strategies, and effectively leveraging multi-agency resources.¹³¹

¹²⁸ National Research Council, Technology Pathways: Assessing the Integrated Plan for a
Next Generation Air Transportation System, Washington, DC: The National Academies
Press, 2005.
¹²⁹ See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Next Generation Air Transportation System:
Preliminary Analysis of the Joint Planning and Development Office’s Planning, Progress,
and Challenges, Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues,
Before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, House of
Representatives, GAO-06-574T, March 29, 2006, p. 7-8.
¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 1-2.
¹³¹ U.S. Government Accountability Office. Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Director
Physical Infrastructure Issues, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, Next Generation Air
Transportation System, Preliminary Analysis of Progress and Challenges Associated with
the Transformation of the National Airspace System, July 25, 2006, GAO-06-915T.

One major hurdle is that while the JPDO can set objectives, goals, and strategies
for the NGATS framework, the funding stream for carrying out these plans will
ultimately come from the budgets of the various agencies involved, primarily the
FAA and NASA. As a planning and coordination entity, the JPDO does not have
authority over the funding, personnel, and resources needed to ultimately implement
the NGATS plan. In recognition of this fact, Congress may examine options to align
budget elements of the various agencies involved within the NGATS framework.
Another potential issue is the appropriate scope of the JPDO’s efforts. The
GAO noted that “JPDO’s scope is broader than traditional ATC modernization in
that it is ‘airport curb to airport curb,’ encompassing such issues as security screening
and environmental concerns. The broad scope could be either a benefit or a
hindrance to the JPDO as it lays out the NGATS blueprint. While some
consideration of various ancillary functions and issues — such as security and
environmental impacts — may improve the overall system design for the NGATS,
too much emphasis on these issues could impede progress on the central issue of
improving the efficiency and capacity of the air traffic system. During the FAA
reauthorization, the scope of the JPDO’s portfolio may be an issue of considerable
interest.
Besides the scope of the JPDO’s efforts, another issue of interest is the JPDO’s
approach. Some observers have claimed that the JPDO’s process has been too
driven by issues or areas of interest and not enough attention has yet been paid to
specific goal-directed products and processes.¹³² In general, some observers contend
that the JPDO has remained too focused on policy and establishing a paradigm for
collaboration among agencies and stakeholders, and it has not yet translated these
general objectives into a cohesive blueprint, with a high degree of engineering
specification regarding timelines and contingencies among the various component
elements of the NGATS. Some have expressed concern that what the JPDO has
achieved thus far appears to be little more that a general conceptual framework for
the NGATS. While this general framework conforms to what most experts believe
is the most appropriate approach to developing the NGATS, the lack of specificity
and detail in what has been developed thus far is concerning to some.¹³³ In this view,
while the JPDO has only been in existence for little more than two years, there is a
pressing need to develop an enterprise architecture of sufficient specificity in the near
future, so that new initiative and programs needed to support the NGATS
development are adequately reflected in congressional authorization and
appropriations legislation and NGATS development can proceed on schedule to meet
the 2025 target completion date. One possible option for streamlining NGATS
system development is the use of an overarching lead systems integration (LSI)
contract for overseeing the NGATS project.¹³⁴ During the FAA reauthorization

¹³² See, especially, National Research Council, Technology Pathways.
¹³³ Kerry Lynch, “A Look Into the Future: Are We Ready?,” Business & Commercial
Aviation, July 2005.
¹³⁴ U.S. Government Accountability Office. Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Director
Physical Infrastructure Issues, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee
(continued...)

process, Congress may debate the merits of this approach and may discuss other
options to improve the technical management of the NGATS initiative.
Further, the JPDO’s ability to coordinate and align budgetary objectives and
research and engineering and acquisition processes across multiple agencies is a
daunting challenge. Vision 100 charged the JPDO with this specific task. However,
a DOT OIG initial review of the JPDO’s progress toward establishing mechanisms
to carry out this requirement found that information on the JPDO’s progress,
summarized in its March 2006 progress report to Congress, lacks sufficient detail to
identify how the JPDO expects to leverage research projects and funding at FAA and
among the other agencies involved in the NGATS development to ensure that they
are coordinated and avoid duplication of effort. The DOT OIG asserted that
“[w]ithout this information, it is difficult to assess progress with alignment of
budgets.”¹³⁵ Such information is likely to be considered critical to Congress for
setting both authorization levels and annual appropriations amounts for NGATS-
related research and acquisition programs. Therefore, Congress may consider various
options to improve the interagency coordination of budgetary alignment and improve
the transparency of this information for relevant congressional committees. One
option may be to require specific budgetary alignment reporting for NGATS-related
efforts across the various agencies represented in the JPDO. Under such a scheme,
agencies may be required to provide matrices or other supporting information,
indicating how specific programs and projects align with NGATS objectives and how
these efforts interface with initiatives being carried out by other agencies involved
in the NGATS development.
While many questions still remain regarding the management approach to
developing NGATS, there is a growing consensus among experts in the field
regarding the technological objectives and likely technologies that will comprise the
core functionality of the NGATS system. These technological objectives and core
technologies, discussed in various JPDO planning documents including its draft
concept of operations,¹³⁶ are described in further detail below. Because this
discussion introduces a large number of new technical terms and acronyms, a brief
glossary of key terms is provided in Appendix 1.

¹³⁴ (...continued)
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, Next Generation Air
Transportation System.
¹³⁵ Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General. Statement of David A.
Dobbs, Assistant Inspector General for Aviation and Special Program Audits, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Perspectives on the Progress and Actions Needed to Address
the Next Generation Air Transportation System, Before the Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, Subcommittee on Aviation, United States Senate, July 25, 2006,
CC-2006-065.
¹³⁶ Joint Planning and Development Office, Concept of Operations for the Next Generation
Air Transportation System, Draft Version 0.2, July 24, 2006

Technological Objectives and Core Technologies
The NGATS is likely to address capacity needs in the national airspace system
largely through the deployment of new technologies. The technological objectives
of the NGATS are designed to allow for a greater volume of traffic to flow through
the system without compromising safety, and when feasible, improving safety as well
as efficiency. The core technologies needed to meet these objectives include (1)
precision navigation capabilities to pinpoint aircraft locations, project flight paths or
flight trajectories, and predict future aircraft positions with a high degree of accuracy;
and (2) highly integrated information networks to enable a shared situation awareness
regarding traffic, weather, airport conditions, and other factors affecting flights and
provide tools to facilitate distributed, adaptive decision-making and information-
sharing about operational changes, such as flight path deviations and their potential
impacts on other system users.
The working operational concept for NGATS incorporates a variety of new
technologies and approaches to air traffic management (ATM) and communications,
navigation, and surveillance (CNS) of air traffic. The technological objectives, as
defined by the JPDO, include:
^!Trajectory-based operations that will provide for system wide
coordination of flight path trajectories among airspace users;
^!Performance-based operations and services that will be defined
based on performance capabilities for aircraft equipage rather than
specific technologies and will align air traffic services with aircraft
performance capabilities in terms of precision navigation,
communications capabilities, etc.;
^!Collaborative traffic flow management solutions incorporating
automation and decision support capabilities that will be integrated
across the entire air traffic system;
^!Flexible and dynamic allocation of airspace to users to maximize
efficiency and airspace utilization;
^!Reduced separation of aircraft that exploits enhanced capabilities of
performance-based navigation capabilities and automation support;
and
^!Enhanced weather forecasting and decision support tools that
integrate strategic and tactical weather planning on a system-wide
basis.¹³⁷
Technological approaches identified by the JPDO to meet these goals include
a network-centric infrastructure for system-wide information sharing and airborne
data communications, and platforms for shared situation awareness of weather,
precision navigation, air traffic, and flight plan data. CRS has identified two core
technological underpinnings likely to be central elements of the NGATS that roughly
parallel these approaches: (1) precision navigation capabilities, and (2) shared
situation awareness and distributed, adaptive decision-making. Technologies to meet
these specific technological objectives are maturing, and strategies for investment in

¹³⁷ Joint Planning and Development Office, Concept of Operations.

these technologies are likely to be an area of specific interest for Congress in the
upcoming FAA reauthorization process.
The investment strategy for these technologies that is adopted and carried forth
over the next three to five years is likely to have a lasting impact on both the
end-state of NGATS and the path to reaching that end state. Therefore, these
investment decisions have been a considerable focus within the FAA, are already
making their way into the appropriations process, and are likely to be an area of
considerable interest during the reauthorization debate. Debate and consideration of
these technology investments may include consideration of the appropriate selection
of technologies, transition plans, support for legacy air traffic technologies and
systems, selection of reliable backup systems and procedures, and additional research
and development needs to integrate and synthesize emerging and maturing
technologies to achieve the NGATS objectives. To put these issues into perspective,
the following discussion provides a brief examination of the stated technological
objectives and core technologies under consideration to meet these objectives. To
contrast these proposed technologies and operational procedures envisioned under
NGATS to the current national airspace system (NAS), the following discussion
provides a brief synopsis of operations in the present-day NAS.
The Present-Day Airspace System and Its Technologies. To
understand the manner in which the NGATS plan would transform the existing
airspace system, a basic understanding of the present-day airspace system is needed.
The present-day national airspace system consists of a network of en route airways
or highways in the sky interconnected by ground-based navigation facilities that emit
directional signals that aircraft track. Limits on the transmission distances of these
signals prevent aircraft from flying direct routes on long distance flights and limit the
utilization of airspace to predefined routes where aircraft can reliably transition from
one navigational signal to the next. In the terminal environment, near busy airports
and metropolitan areas, aircraft follow arrival and departure routes by tracking
ground-based navigational signals, much like navigation during the en route phase
of flight, or by following the instructions of air traffic controllers, often referred to
as receiving radar vectors.
Surveillance and separation of aircraft, both en route and in terminal airspace,
is largely provided by an extensive network of radar sites, and air traffic controllers
who are directly responsible for ensuring adequate separation between aircraft
receiving radar services. Maintaining this separation is achieved through extensive
use of voice communications between controllers and pilots over open two-way radio
frequencies. Under this system, controller workload, radio frequency voice-
communication congestion, and the coverage and accuracy of ground-based
navigational signals impose practical limitations on the capacity and throughput of
aircraft in the system, particularly in busy terminal areas near major airports and
around certain choke-points in the en route airway infrastructure, where many flight
paths converge. Strict adherence to standardized navigation procedures may reduce
controller workload and communications demands and expand capacity to some
degree, but this too has practical limitations, mostly related to the relatively low level
of precision available from the current ground-based navigation infrastructure and
the relatively imprecise methods currently available for coordinating, tracking, and
monitoring flight plans and intentions. Experts largely concur that achieving the

NGATS goal of tripling system capacity by 2025 would be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, using existing infrastructure, technologies, and operational procedures
that evolved from concepts and technologies developed in the 1950s and are being
pushed to their practical limits in certain highly congested sectors of airspace and
near the busiest airports by current level system demand. Therefore, most observers
envision that the NGATS will consist of revolutionary systems concepts for air traffic
management (ATM), and communication, navigation, and surveillance (CNS) that
rely on satellite-based navigation capabilities; technological advances in digital voice
and data communications; shared, distributed, information technology architectures;
and advanced automation and decision-aiding tools. These functional capabilities
can be grouped into two broad operational concepts — precision navigation, and
shared situation awareness and distributed, adaptive, decision-making.
Precision Navigation. One core element of the future airspace system is
precision navigation capabilities that can pinpoint the location of aircraft with much
greater precision than existing ground-based navigational aids, and provide for much
greater accuracy and reduced uncertainty regarding aircraft flight plans and
trajectories.
The FAA’s approach to defining the navigational requirements of the future
airspace system has been to set forth a policy defining performance-based
requirements specifying a certain level of navigational accuracy required to
participate in certain types of flight operations, rather than identifying specific
technologies or navigational equipment standards or requirements.¹³⁸ While these
performance requirements are just being established, they are likely to form a
framework for minimum requirements to operate to and from the nation’s busiest
airports and terminal areas and in high-altitude airspace. While the FAA’s objective
is to define performance requirements in operational terms, rather than tying them to
any specific technology or technical capability, it is widely agreed that, at least in the
near term, satellite-based navigation, relying on systems such as the Global
Positioning System (GPS), will likely become the primary means for navigation
under the NGATS concept.
Satellite-Based Navigation. Since it is widely held that the GPS will
initially serve as a primary means for navigating in the future airspace system, many
experts regard the evolution to the NGATS with regard to navigation systems to
involve a shift away from ground-based navigation transmitter stations to primary
reliance on satellite systems such as GPS. GPS consists of a constellation of
satellites that transmit precise timing signals used to compute highly accurate
position and time information. GPS is already used for a wide variety of
applications, including aviation navigation.
While Russia maintains a smaller, less capable, satellite navigation system
called GLONASS, short for the Global Navigation Satellite System, and the
European Union is working on a constellation of navigation satellites called Galileo,
which is expected to be completed around 2010, GPS is currently the only fully

¹³⁸ See Federal Aviation Administration. Roadmap for Performance-Based Navigation:
Evolution for Area Navigation (RNAV) and Required Navigation Performance (RNP)
Capabilities 2006-2025. July 2006, Version 2.0.

operational satellite navigation system that provides accurate and reliable worldwide
coverage. Although GPS is currently the only system that can fully meet the FAA’s
performance expectations for future navigation requirements, the FAA is not framing
operator requirements for navigational systems in terms of specific technologies like
GPS, but rather has established a policy of setting performance-based criteria for
navigation systems that may, in the future be met by other satellite-based systems
besides GPS, or novel navigation technologies that have not even been
conceptualized yet.
Nonetheless, the federal government has invested heavily in GPS and it is
generally viewed as the primary means for precision navigation for the foreseeable
future. The military has committed to fully deploying the next generation of GPS
satellites to further improve the systems accuracy and reliability. Recognizing the
growing performance requirements for high precision navigation capabilities among
aviation system users, the FAA has also invested heavily on an auxiliary system to
augment GPS signals known as the Wide Area Augmentation System or WAAS.
The FAA has spent nearly $3 billion over the past 10 years to achieve initial
operating capability of WAAS, which is comprised of 25 ground-based reference
sites, two master stations, and two geostationary satellites.¹³⁹ WAAS improves the
accuracy of GPS position information using its array of ground-based reference
stations to monitor GPS satellite signals and apply corrections to compensate for
signal errors such as errors due to normal atmospheric variations. These signal
compensations computed by the array of ground based receiver stations are
continuously beamed to two geostationary satellites that, in turn, transmit these
corrections to any WAAS-enabled GPS unit, including aircraft with WAAS-enabled
GPS navigation systems. WAAS-enabled avionics improve position accuracy from
about 20 meters to within 1.5 to 2 meters both horizontally and vertically.¹⁴⁰
Factoring in a margin of safety, the FAA certifies WAAS-enabled GPS avionics to
provide guaranteed accuracy of 50 meters vertically and 40 meters horizontally.¹⁴¹
The WAAS system began initial operations in July 2003. In March 2006, the
FAA began approving instrument approaches to airports for aircraft with certified
WAAS-enabled GPS avionics allowing qualified users to descend to 200 feet above
the ground in instrument weather conditions, matching the capability currently
provided by instrument landing systems (ILS) and standard ILS approach procedures.
The FAA has also been looking to develop a more precise Local Area Augmentation
System (LAAS) that may enable precision landings using satellite-based navigation
during very low visibility operations at selected airports. While WAAS is
operationally available and the FAA has expressed its commitment to the WAAS
program, there are still questions regarding the future of LAAS. Issues regarding
LAAS include whether the improvement in navigational accuracy of current LAAS
systems over WAAS is enough to justify their cost, and whether the relatively small
user base for highly precise instrument landing capabilities needs LAAS, or if it can
adequately be served by existing high precision (Category II and III) ILS systems.
The FAA’s continued investment strategy to support WAAS and its plans for LAAS

¹³⁹ John Croft, “More WAAS, less LAAS,” Professional Pilot, April 2003, pp. 60-64
¹⁴⁰ Federal Aviation Administration. Wide Area Augmentation System. HQ-021306.psd.
¹⁴¹ John Croft, “More WAAS, less LAAS.”

may be a particular issue of interest for Congress during the FAA reauthorization
process.
Performance-Based Navigation: Required Navigational
Performance (RNP) and Area Navigation (RNAV). Besides precision
approach capabilities, the FAA considers WAAS to be an enabler of specific
performance-based navigational procedures in the national airspace system.¹⁴² Two
key operational concepts for precision navigation are area navigation (RNAV), and
required navigation performance (RNP). Required navigational performance (RNP)
is a performance standard that defines the required position accuracy needed to keep
the aircraft within a specified containment area, or bubble, 99.9% of the time. The
required navigational performance is not tied to any specific technology, but sets a
technical standard that can be met using various FAA-approved equipment. While
precision satellite-based navigation is currently the principal technology for meeting
RNP standards, these standards allow for the use of other technologies — including
yet to be developed technologies — to meet navigational performance standards.
RNAV is also a navigational performance standard for aircraft that provides a
specific capability to establish very accurate waypoints, or specific navigational
reference points, that can be positioned anywhere in the airspace system, thus
eliminating the need to define airways and terminal arrival and departure procedures
in references to specific ground-based navigational stations. The RNAV concept has
been around since the 1970s, and has historically relied on ground-based navigational
stations and distance measuring equipment (DME) to navigate using more direct
routing. At present, the primary aircraft technology being utilized to meet these
performance requirements is WAAS-enabled GPS, with DME considered by many
to be a viable backup, or secondary means to determine aircraft position and
accurately follow precise flight routes in cases of equipment outages or disruption of
satellite-based navigational services.
Over the next five to ten years, the FAA anticipates issuing mandates for RNP
at the busiest airports and in high altitude airspace. In the 2016 to 2025 time frame,
system wide mandates for performance-based navigation capabilities are expected
to meet anticipated interoperability requirements for the NGATS and to respond to
a gradual phase-out of the current ground-based navigational infrastructure. While
the specific levels of navigation performance for various segments of airspace and
operations are yet to be determined, it is likely that relatively precise means of
navigation will be required for users of high altitude airspace and busy en route
corridors and when operating to and from large commercial airports and busy general
aviation airports in highly congested terminal areas, sometimes referred to as “super-
density airports” and “super-density operations.”
While meeting precision navigation performance requirements will likely
involve equipping aircraft with precision WAAS-enabled GPS systems as a primary
means of navigation, questions remain regarding reliable backup navigation
capabilities, as well as specific details regarding what levels of performance will be
required for specific classes of airspace and types of operations.

¹⁴² Ibid.

Shared Situation Awareness and Distributed, Adaptive
Decision Making
The present-day air traffic system is characterized by extensive reliance on an
elaborate network of radar sites to track air traffic. Radar data provide air traffic
controllers with a reliable means of air traffic surveillance. A rigid set of protocols
and procedures delineating controller and pilot responsibilities has been established
to maintain a high level of operational safety in the existing airspace system.
However, because the existing system is heavily dependent on direct controller
surveillance of air traffic and structured voice communications between controllers
and pilots, airspace capacity is constrained to a large degree by controller workload
limitations. Present day capacity is also constrained by large air traffic separation
requirements that are considered necessary in the current operating environment
based on current technology capabilities and controller workload considerations.
The working concept for the NGATS envisions a system in which air traffic
surveillance and separation of aircraft will become more of a shared responsibility
between air navigation service provider personnel, such as air traffic controllers and
air traffic managers and planners, and system users.¹⁴³ A key technological objective
needed to support this concept is to establish a data network that provides a scalable,
shared information data repository for system users and service providers, referred
to as shared situational awareness services. Elements of the shared situation
awareness data repository would likely include elements such as dynamic weather
information, air traffic surveillance, flight plans and flight trajectories, air traffic
control clearances, and aeronautical information such as airport and airspace
conditions and restrictions. Service providers and users would be able to tap into
these data repositories at scalable levels of detail. For example, pilots might receive
information — such as weather, traffic, and airport and airspace conditions —
pertinent to their own aircraft’s flight, while an air traffic controller might receive
information and analysis of data pertinent to a specific sector of airspace, and an air
traffic manager or system planner might receive data on a more global scale that
might provide information and analysis of traffic flows, weather conditions, and other
factors that may impact system flow across an entire day of operations.
One key element of achieving such a capability is a reliable air-ground data
network that can provide system data to airborne aircraft and receive critical
information, such as precision navigation positioning and trajectories, from these
aircraft. The primary candidate system to fill such a role is a system called ADS-B,
which stands for Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast.
Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B). ADS-B is
a technology that is just being introduced to aviation system users, but is expected by
many to become the backbone of future aircraft surveillance capabilities, perhaps
replacing radar facilities across much of the country. ADS-B relies on GPS or other
precision navigation signals to pinpoint aircraft position, and works by automatically
broadcasting that position information along with a unique aircraft identifier, and
other information — such as the aircraft speed and whether it is turning, climbing,

¹⁴³ Joint Planning and Development Office. Concept of Operations.

or descending — from aircraft equipped with ADS-B out capability.¹⁴⁴ These
broadcasts can be picked up by ground stations and by aircraft equipped with ADS-B
capable receiver equipment. In the United States, the FAA intends to operate ADS-B
as a dual frequency broadcast, transmitting aircraft data on the 1090 MHZ spectrum
band, compatible with commercial aircraft Mode-S transponders, and on the 978
MHZ spectrum band for general aviation aircraft, to conform to Universal Access
Transceiver (UAT) equipment standards.¹⁴⁵
The FAA regards ADS-B as the backbone of the NGATS and, in 2006,
expressed high level support for moving forward with plans to expand ADS-B
availability and usage and, ultimately, to transition to a system that uses ADS-B
instead of radar as the primary means for air traffic surveillance.¹⁴⁶ The benefits of
ADS-B include the potential large-scale cost savings of replacing
multi-million-dollar radar systems with ground-based transceivers that cost less than
$200,000 to purchase; more accurate tracking than radar which may allow reduced
aircraft spacing; and anticipated safety improvements by providing pilots and
controllers with shared situation awareness, allowing them to see the same real-time
displays of air traffic. By establishing a datalink communication platform, ADS-B
also provides a means to receive weather and flight information, such as temporary
flight restrictions, that can be graphically presented on cockpit displays. These
datalink services also may greatly improve pilot situation awareness by providing
accurate, real-time weather information and critical flight information in the cockpit.
Virtually all aviation system users support the transition to ADS-B surveillance,
with the general caveat that costs imposed on system users be carefully controlled.
The ATA asserts that while the technology is promising, its ultimate feasibility
should be determined through detailed assessments of all costs and benefits to both
system users and the FAA. The AOPA, representing mostly small general aviation
aircraft owners and operators, has stressed that the costs to these users be kept as low
as possible. The AOPA has proposed that the present cost of transponder equipment
— the avionics needed to interface to the current radar surveillance capabilities of the
NAS — be used as a benchmark or target price point for the minimum equipment
requirements to operate in a future airspace system based on ADS-B surveillance.¹⁴⁷
AOPA also believes that a 10-year transition before such equipment would become
mandatory for all users would be a reasonable time frame to minimize the impact of
compliance on users, and stresses that providing free access to datalink traffic,

¹⁴⁴ ADS-B out capability refers to a basic level of ADS-B functionality that only broadcasts
outbound transmissions of aircraft position, tracking, and identification information. ADS-B
in refers to an enhanced ADS-B capability that involves receiving air traffic data from either
other aircraft, ground stations, or some combination of these two sources.
¹⁴⁵ Federal Aviation Administration. Fact Sheet: Automated Dependent Surveillance -
Broadcast (ADS-B), Washington, DC, May 2, 2006; David Hughes, “Dawn of ADS-B,”
Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 8, 2006, p. 37.
¹⁴⁶ See Federal Aviation Administration. Fact Sheet: Automated Dependent Surveillance -
Broadcast (ADS-B), Washington, DC, May 2, 2006.
¹⁴⁷ David Hughes, “Dawn of ADS-B.”

weather, and essential flight information can greatly enhance the objective of
providing enhanced situation awareness to improve flight safety.¹⁴⁸
The FAA has requested $80 million for FY2007 to begin initial full-scale ADS-
B national implementation. Some degree of ADS-B infrastructure, which was
deployed under ADS-B research and development initiatives conducted under the
Safe Flight 21 program, already exists in Alaska and along the east coast. The FAA
also has plans to deploy ADS-B in the Gulf of Mexico starting next year to provide
flight surveillance in areas where radar coverage is limited.¹⁴⁹ Vision 100 authorized
the expenditure of such sums as may be necessary to improve air traffic services in
the Gulf of Mexico, and the FAA has plans to deploy ADS-B ground stations on oil
rigs in the gulf to meet this mandate. This provision will most directly benefit
helicopter operations that support the large offshore oil industry, but may also benefit
smaller aircraft operating below 18,000 feet over the Gulf and high altitude
commercial flights operating over the Gulf. The program is also expected to improve
aerial surveillance in the Gulf for national security and law enforcement purposes.
During reauthorization, the FAA’s plan for deploying and supporting the
network of ADS-B sites is likely to be of considerable interest to Congress. Particular
issues of interest include the anticipated time frame for transition to ADS-B and how
regulatory mandates for ADS-B equipage may impact system users. Also of
particular interest are the FAA’s plans to ensure availability and reliability of the
ADS-B system, and selection of a reliable backup system to maintain adequate levels
of situation awareness in instances of ADS-B equipment failures.
System Wide Information Management (SWIM). Besides airborne
datalink capabilities provided by ADS-B, the FAA envisions an extensive data
network to share operational information, such as flight plans, flight trajectories,
weather, airport conditions, and temporary airspace restrictions. The FAA refers to
the various protocols and technologies to enable this data sharing as the System Wide
Information Management (SWIM). While the SWIM framework has only been
recently conceptualized, the FAA has indicated that the SWIM infrastructure will be
designed to use commercially available equipment and will be implemented based
on accepted industry standards and practices.¹⁵⁰ The SWIM network architecture is
intended to create a seamless infrastructure, similar to the World Wide Web,
allowing users to readily access needed data they are authorized to receive, replacing
currently cumbersome and non-integrated databases and communications protocols.
Some key issues regarding SWIM include how to determine which users will
have access to what data; what measures will be put in place to ensure data
availability and continuity of service; and how robust security measures will be
integrated into the system architecture to ensure data integrity and prevent any denial
of service or unauthorized use. Another key issue is what types of interfaces and
interoperability will exist between ADS-B and SWIM and how each of these specific

¹⁴⁸ See Phil Boyer, “President’s Position: ADS-B,” AOPA Pilot, January 2006.
¹⁴⁹ David Hughes, “Dawn of ADS-B.”
¹⁵⁰ Federal Aviation Administration. Fact Sheet: System-Wide Information Management
(SWIM)

technologies fit into the overall enterprise and system architectures for NGATS.
While these questions are mostly of a highly technical nature, Congress may be
particularly interested in assessing how the FAA will leverage the work of others —
such as military net-centric architectures and corporate internet service-provider
networks — to develop a robust systems architecture for SWIM.
Phasing Out Legacy Systems
As the FAA and the JPDO move forward with implementing the NGATS and
associated technologies, a challenging and potentially contentious issue is the phasing
out of existing facilities and equipment for air traffic communications, navigation,
and surveillance. Phasing out of existing systems must be addressed carefully
because, on the one hand, maintaining legacy systems while deploying new
technologies can be costly and resource intensive. On the other hand, phasing these
systems out too quickly could place an undue burden on system users to equip
aircraft and could pose safety concerns if adequate backups and redundancies are not
in place.
With regard to navigation infrastructure, the shift to satellite-based navigation
will likely result in significant reductions in ground-based navigational facilities,
which will ultimately translate into cost savings to the FAA by greatly reducing
maintenance and sustainment costs for these facilities. To accommodate users as
they slowly transition to satellite-based navigation, these phase-outs will likely be
gradual, but nonetheless significant over the next fifteen years.
Non-directional beacons (NDBs), used primarily for non-precision approaches
to smaller airports and as additional position references for some precision
approaches and en route navigation, are already being phased out and will mostly be
fully decommissioned over the next ten years.
Current plans also call for the gradual phase-down of ground-based very-high
frequency omnirange (VOR) transmitter sites, the backbone of the current federal
airway system, starting in 2010. The transition plan calls for an initial reduction of
about 30% of the VORs in the United States by 2012, with a further reduction to
about half of the current number by 2020, to maintain a minimum operating network
to support airspace users that are not equipped with GPS, and to provide an interim
backup capability for those users that are GPS equipped. While VOR sites will likely
be phased down from current levels, distance measuring equipment (DME)
transmitters are viewed as a potentially viable navigational backup to GPS, giving
aircraft less precise RNAV capability in the event of a disruption to GPS signals.
Such disruption could occur for a variety of reasons, from equipment malfunctions
to intentional jamming. Therefore, DME sites may fill an important backup role in
the NGATS, although final determinations regarding backup requirements and how
they will be met have not yet been finalized.
Plans also call for a gradual phase-down of standard (Category I) instrument
landing system (ILS) systems and approaches for airport runways starting in 2015.
Advanced ILS equipment that provide lower landing minimums for operations in
very poor visibility (Category II and Category III ILS systems) are not planned to be
phased out, however. These approaches require special avionics and special flight

crew qualifications. These facilities will continue to serve a relatively small user
community that require these services, mostly consisting of large commercial aircraft
operators. The FAA is continuing to evaluate whether LAAS can provide navigation
performance and reliability equivalent to these advanced ILS systems.
Besides navigational facilities, the decommissioning of radar facilities,
especially long-range radar, may become a future option if ADS-B is to be used as
the primary means for aircraft surveillance in the NGATS. However, one significant
weakness of ADS-B in comparison to radar is that it is completely dependent on
aircraft-based systems to transmit position data to ground stations and other aircraft.
Equipment or power failures on the aircraft could make an aircraft completely
invisible to other aircraft and to air traffic controllers. By contrast, radars would at
least give controllers the ability to see the aircraft’s primary target generated by radar
reflections off of an aircraft’s skin. A loss of this capability without some backup
means to identify aircraft could have implications for safety as well as for airspace
security. One option being discussed is to keep terminal radars in place around busy
airports as backup for safety reasons and maintain radar coverage near major cities
and other potential terrorist targets for airspace security purposes. Under such a plan,
many long-range radar sites that provide coverage on en route traffic may be
decommissioned. For airliners and large aircraft that already have sufficient system
redundancies and backup power capabilities, reliance on ADS-B alone will likely
provide an equivalent level of safety to the current en route radar environment.
However, for small aircraft that typically don’t have redundant systems and back-up
power, maintaining an equivalent level of safety may be more challenging.
Congress may express particular interest in the FAA’s efforts to assess how
proposals envisioning ADS-B as the primary means of aircraft surveillance will
address the issue of providing equivalent safety to the current radar-based air traffic
surveillance system. Congressional interest regarding the phase-out of legacy
systems may also focus on how these plans may impact airspace system users,
particularly smaller operators who may face a greater challenge in equipping aircraft
to keep pace with the evolution from the existing national airspace system to NGATS
compliant avionics and aircraft systems.
Wake Vortex Detection, Prediction, and Avoidance
While advances in precision navigation and information sharing show great
promise for reducing aircraft spacing in all weather conditions thereby increasing
system capacity, wake turbulence produced by large transport aircraft currently
imposes practical limitations on aircraft spacing, even under ideal weather
conditions.
While most casual observers think of wake turbulence as primarily an issue
during takeoff and departure, and during approach and landing, wake encounters
occur during all phases of flight and some experts are concerned that reduced aircraft
spacing — both around airports and in the en route environment — increases the risk
of inadvertent wake turbulence encounters during all phases of flight. Such
encounters resulted in 130 accidents and 60 aircraft incidents over an 18-year period
between 1983 and 2000, mostly involving smaller aircraft weighing less than 5,000

pounds.¹⁵¹ Despite the fact that most accidents involved smaller aircraft following
larger aircraft, experience indicates that most encounters involve wakes generated by
aircraft of similar size, and experts note that even a widebody MD-11 aircraft was
substantially damaged following a wake turbulence encounter.¹⁵² From the
standpoint of addressing capacity needs, safety concerns over wake turbulence
encounters impose significant limitations on various approaches, such as reducing
aircraft arrival and departure spacing, and increasing the utilization of closely spaced
parallel runways.
Current air traffic procedures specify separation standards for aircraft departing
behind large and heavy jets to allow their wake vortices to dissipate. Some view these
standards as overly conservative and argue that accurate wake vortex prediction
capabilities could allow for decreased separation, thereby increasing airport capacity
in many weather conditions. Others argue that the limited capability of available
technology and the complexities of wake vortex propagation make it difficult to
predict wake turbulence or to use such predictions to significantly reduce arrival and
departure spacing without compromising safety. Wake turbulence separation
standards have been the focus of considerable attention recently as the FAA and
international regulators mull the appropriate following distance behind the Airbus
A380 super-jumbo aircraft currently in development. The International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) has set an interim following distance behind the A380
of 10-nautical miles, double that of current heavy jets currently in operation, despite
Airbus’ claims that the A380 wake is no more powerful than the wake of Boeing 747
aircraft.¹⁵³ This ruling has concerned Airbus and others that wake turbulence
separation requirements could significantly impact system and airport capacity as
A380s enter service in the coming years.
Vision 100 authorizes the expenditure of such sums as may be necessary for the
development and assessment of wake vortex advisory systems. Vision 100 also
directs the National Research Council to conduct an assessment of FAA’s wake
turbulence research program and authorizes $500,000 for FY2004 for this
assessment. One promising emerging technology for wake turbulence prediction
utilizes both laser-based light detection and ranging (LIDAR) and acoustic sensors
to identify and track wake turbulence trials behind aircraft.¹⁵⁴ Preliminary research
is showing that in many instances an airplane’s wake turbulence trial dissipates
rapidly, sometimes in as little as 15 seconds. While this system is still in the
relatively early stages of research and development, if an effective operational
version can be fielded, it may be able to increase effective landing capacity at an

¹⁵¹ Patrick R. Veillete, “A Wake-Up About Wake Turbulence,” Business & Commercial
Aviation, January 2004, pp. 40 — 45.
¹⁵² Ibid.
¹⁵³ Andrea Rothman, Bloomberg News, “Airbus A380 Wake Turbulence Still An Issue,” The
Wichita (Kansas) Eagle, June 13, 2006, p. 8.
¹⁵⁴ “NASA Wake-Vortex Sensing Tests Detect Variety of Aircraft Types,” Flight
International, January 20-26, 2004, p. 24; Steven K. Paulson, “Lasers Could Warn of
Deadly Airplane Turbulence,” Associated Press, October 7, 2005.

airport by as much as 20%.¹⁵⁵ However, making regulatory changes to reduce wake
turbulence spacing will likely require extensive demonstrations that using such a
system to space aircraft provides an equivalent level of safety to current time and
distance based spacing procedures for airport operations.
Improving Aviation Safety
Travel on commercial passenger airlines in the United States is extremely safe,
and major aviation accidents are extremely rare. In fact there have been few major¹⁵⁶
airline accidents in the United States in recent years. For the most recent five-year
period where full final data were available, major accidents in the United States¹⁵⁷
occurred at a rate of less than one in every 8.8 million flight hours. Nonetheless,
aviation safety experts are, to some degree, at odds over whether the current level of
commercial airline safety can be further improved upon. Experts also have differing
views on whether the current low rate of accident occurrence may obscure the
potential future effects of a variety of underlying safety trends such as current airline
maintenance practices, the adequacy of efforts to address identified critical safety-
related aircraft design and operational issues, and current airport design initiatives
and operational considerations to prevent ground collisions and runway overruns.
Looking beyond commercial passenger operations, the safety of all-cargo
operations and other commercial aviation activities has been examined to determine
whether targeted safety enhancements can improve the safety record of these sectors
of the aviation industry. For example, some have argued that bringing the safety
standards of all-cargo operations on par with those of passenger airline operations
could reduce accidents and is needed because the size of aircraft, the range of
operations flown by all-cargo operators, and large growth in the all-cargo sector
introduce unique risks to operators, airports, and the public. Other commercial
aviation activities that have also been the subject of recent safety inquiries include¹⁵⁸
air tour and air ambulance operations.
A variety of approaches to improving safety have been offered and implemented
to address these persisting and emerging safety issues in commercial aviation.
Options to incorporate these approaches into legislation or to step-up congressional
oversight of FAA initiatives related to safety may be brought up in Congress during
the FAA reauthorization process. Issues of particular interest in the current context
include options for preventing runway overrun accidents, preventing runway
incursions and collisions, improving maintenance oversight, mitigating the risk of

¹⁵⁵ Steven K. Paulson, “Lasers Could Warn.”
¹⁵⁶ The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) classifies a major accident as one
involving an airline (operating under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121) in
which either the aircraft was destroyed, there were multiple fatalities, or there was a single
fatality and the aircraft was substantially damaged.
¹⁵⁷ CRS calculations based on National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) scheduled
airline accident data for the period from 2000-2004. Data do not include aircraft lost in the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
¹⁵⁸ For a detailed discussion of air ambulance safety issues see CRS Report RL33430, The
Safety of Air Ambulances, by Bart Elias.

fuel tank explosions on commercial airliners, monitoring aging aircraft and aircraft
systems, and addressing safety concerns in the all-cargo industry.
Preventing Runway Overrun Accidents
Since the last FAA reauthorization, runway overrun accidents have been a focus
of concern, stemming from several high-profile accidents during a period of
otherwise exceptional safety in the airline industry. Notably, on August 2, 2005, an
Air France Airbus A340 landing at Toronto Pearson International Airport, in the
midst of nearby thunderstorms, overran the runway. Despite a large post-impact fire,
all 309 occupants survived the crash. While the investigation of the accident
continues, runway contamination¹⁵⁹ and a long, fast touchdown are suspected as
factors in the crash. Later that same year, the issues of air carrier, air traffic control,
and airport operating procedures when runway conditions are marginal were
highlighted by a tragic overrun accident at Chicago’s Midway Airport. On December
8, 2005, a Southwest Airlines Boeing 737 overran the runway at Chicago’s Midway
Airport during a snowstorm. The airplane careened through the airport perimeter
fencing and collided with a vehicle on an adjacent highway, killing a six-year-old
boy.
While the circumstances were quite different, the crash at Chicago Midway
reminded many of the March 5, 2000, runway overrun of a Southwest Airlines
Boeing 737 at Burbank, California. Although there were no fatalities in that crash,
the aircraft finally halted only feet from gas station pumps that could have fueled a
post-crash fire. Runway overrun accidents have not been limited to airliners, as there
have been many such mishaps involving business jets. One such incident that
received considerable attention occurred on February 2, 2005, at Teterboro Airport
in New Jersey. While there were no fatalities, the airplane went through a fence,
crossed a busy highway colliding with vehicles, and struck a warehouse igniting a
post-crash fire.
Of particular concern are airports that are not in compliance with the FAA’s
standard runway safety area criteria that require a 250 foot wide clear zone for 1,000
feet beyond the runway end. Almost 300 of about 430 airports that have regularly
scheduled commercial passenger flights have one or more runways that do not meet
this criteria.¹⁶⁰ Following the March 5, 2000 crash in Burbank, California, the NTSB
urged the FAA to bring all airports with regularly scheduled commercial passenger
airline operations in compliance with these criteria when feasible, and deploy
Engineered Materials Arresting System (EMAS) arrester beds at the ends of runways
where these criteria cannot feasibly be met.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ Runway contamination is caused by any substance that reduces braking action. Typical
contaminants found during operations are the result of precipitation and include snow, slush,
ice, and rain.
¹⁶⁰ Jon Hilkevitch, “Midway Got FAA Runway Edict in ‘04,” The Chicago Tribune,
December, 13, 2005.
¹⁶¹ National Transportation Safety Board. Safety Recommendations A-03-11 and -12. May

6, 2003.

EMAS provides an alternative mitigation for overrun accidents at airports where
a 1,000 foot overrun area is not available. EMAS consists of a bed of specially
mixed lightweight concrete that crushes under the weight of an aircraft, causing rapid
deceleration. EMAS was installed at Little Rock, Arkansas following the American
Airlines MD-82 overrun accident, and was also put in place at New York’s Laguardia
Airport, which has been the site of two runway overrun accidents where aircraft have
plunged into Flushing Bay. The FAA credits EMAS with mitigating the severity of
at least three incidents at New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport, where
the system was first operationally installed in 1996, including a January 2005
incident involving a heavily loaded Boeing 747 cargo airplane. The system
previously mitigated the overrun of another heavy cargo airplane and a small
commuter flight loaded with passengers.¹⁶² Since 1996, the FAA has installed a total
of 22 EMAS arrester beds at 18 airports throughout the United States. While a
standard EMAS installation extends 600 feet beyond the runway end, the FAA notes
that “[a]n EMAS arrester bed can still be installed to help slow or stop an aircraft that
overruns the runway, even if less than 600 feet of land is available.”¹⁶³ EMAS is a
particularly appealing option because other overrun mitigation techniques used by the
military such as arresting cables and nets are not readily adaptable to the civil
aviation environment.
Other options to slow aircraft, such as frangible barriers¹⁶⁴, provide a less than
optimal solution. Although they are designed to slow aircraft and mitigate the
severity of impact, they still involve an impact that, under ideal circumstances,
should be avoided. These devices may, nonetheless, provide limited mitigation when
available land for runway safety areas is significantly limited. From a safety
standpoint, a preferable long term solution would involve land acquisition to extend
runway safety areas and runways to meet FAA guidelines or, at a minimum, allow
sufficient area to construct an effective EMAS arrester bed. During the
reauthorization process, Congress may consider options to identify those airports
where the risk of runway overrun accidents and incidents is greatest and prioritize
efforts to improve inadequate runway safety areas at commercial airports, and
perhaps also at busy general aviation reliever airports with high volumes of business
jet activity.
Other options for preventing runway overruns focus on operational changes to
establish a greater margin of safety in determining adequate runway length. While
the investigation of the December 2005 crash at Chicago Midway Airport is still
ongoing, one lesson learned is that, when runway conditions are poor, calculations
of required runway length may offer little or no margin for safety. The FAA has
taken action to build a margin of safety into certain calculations of landing distances
to provide an additional margin of safety. Specifically, the FAA has implemented a

15% safety margin that is to be added to the in-flight aircraft landing distance

¹⁶² Edmund Pinto, “Why No Outcry Over Runway Overrun Accidents?,” Aviation Daily,
March 3, 2006, p. 5.
¹⁶³ Federal Aviation Administration, Engineered Materials Arresting System (EMAS), Fact
Sheet, August 2005.
¹⁶⁴ Frangible barriers are designed to break apart on impact, ideally in a manner that will
slow the aircraft or vehicle to some degree without creating large impact forces.

calculation when conditions dictate that an additional safety assessment of the
landing is needed. Typically, these assessments would be made when a runway is
contaminated with snow, slush, or standing water, or other factors compromise
braking action and increase stopping distances, although there is some room for
interpretation as to when the safety margin must be applied. To comply with this
regulatory change, airlines, charter operators, and fractional ownership programs
must come up with plans for incorporating the use of this safety margin into their
standard operating procedures, which must then be approved by the FAA. The
NTSB had also mulled the idea of eliminating the assumption that thrust reversers
will properly deploy and require calculations of landing distance be made based on
the use of brakes and spoilers alone. While the 15% safety margin attempts to
account for this or other possible scenarios involving less than full deceleration
capability and is supported by the airline industry, it has been criticized by charter
operators, because it seems too arbitrary and could significantly restrict flight
operations at certain airports, particularly in winter weather conditions.¹⁶⁵
Another option to mitigate overrun accidents is to develop and deploy effective
means for airports to maintain adequate runway braking action under various adverse
weather conditions. Research on techniques to effectively remove contaminants like
snow, slush, ice, and water from runways and improve runway friction coefficients,
particularly in winter conditions, is still ongoing, but could yield advances in
contamination removal and improving runway friction under a variety of
environmental conditions.¹⁶⁶ While these programs have historically been funded out
of NASA’s aeronautics research program, Congress may opt to review this research
to assess its progress and determine whether any advances can be transitioned to the
FAA for operational deployment.
Preventing Runway Incursions and Collisions
Since 1990, there have been four runway collisions in the United States
involving large commercial airliners. The deadliest runway collision in the United
States occurred on February 1, 1991, at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX),
when a USAir Boeing 737 was cleared to land on a runway occupied by a commuter
flight that had been instructed to line up on the runway and await takeoff clearance.
The crash destroyed both aircraft and resulted in 36 fatalities. The most recent major
runway collision accident worldwide occurred at Milan, Italy’s Linate Airport on
October 8, 2001. A Cessna business jet strayed onto the active runway in foggy
conditions and was struck by a departing airliner killing 118 people and injuring 4.
The world’s deadliest aircraft accident — the 1977 collision of two Boeing 747
jumbo jets on the island of Tenerife that resulted in 583 fatalities — was also the
result of a runway collision in low visibility conditions. These catastrophes illustrate
why mitigating the risk of runway collisions has been considered a top priority by the
FAA, the NTSB, and other aviation safety experts for some time. The NTSB has

¹⁶⁵ Matthew L. Wald. “Safety Plan for Airplanes Sets Up Clash,” The New York Times,
June 22, 2006.
¹⁶⁶ National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Research Aims to Prevent Accidents
on Hazardous Runways, FS-2002-02-45-LaRC, Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA.

listed the prevention of runway collisions on its list of “Most Wanted Transportation
Safety Improvements” since the list was first released in 1990.
To get a better grasp on the existing risks of runway incursions, the FAA has
been closely tracking and studying errors that could have led to runway collisions
since 1999. Whenever an aircraft or ground vehicle strays onto a runway when an
aircraft is taking off or landing there is a potential for a collision. These errors —
whether caused by pilots, air traffic controllers, or ground vehicle operators — are
referred to as runway incursions. Curtailing runway incursions has been a priority
for the FAA. However, statistics indicate that the overall runway incursion rate has
remained relatively constant, slightly above a level of five incursions per million
flight operations, since 1999. Data do, however, suggest that the severity of these
incursions has decreased somewhat in recent years, from 0.8 serious incursions per
million flight operations in FY2001 to 0.6 serious incursions per million flight
operations in FY2004. Nevertheless, high profile events involving aircraft coming
within a few hundred feet of each other continue to occur and raise concerns over the
potential for a large scale disaster. For example, two high-profile incidents at
Chicago’s O’Hare airport in March 2006 raised questions about controller training
and experience, controller fatigue, and the effectiveness of currently available runway
safety technology.¹⁶⁷
The NTSB concluded that the airport movement area safety system (AMASS),
a technology currently being deployed at large airport control towers as FAA’s
primary tool for reducing the severity of runway incursion incidents, fails to provide
an acceptable solution to reduce the risk of runway collisions because it does not
provide a direct warning capability to flight crews. The NTSB has, consequently,
classified its recommendation for preventing runway collisions and incursions as
having an “unacceptable response” from the FAA. In 2001, the NTSB evaluated
AMASS and determined that it was not capable of providing sufficient warning to
prevent runway collisions in all instances and, as currently implemented, provides no
capability to issue warnings directly to pilots and other vehicle operators.¹⁶⁸ In
essence, the AMASS system inserts controllers into the decision cycle, thereby
increasing the time needed for pilots to take evasive action to prevent a collision.
Providing traffic information and alerting directly to pilots, as opposed to only
alerting controllers, is viewed as preferable in this regard, but this is not what the
NTSB’s original recommendation sought. Rather the NTSB specifically asked the
FAA to develop a system analogous to cockpit traffic collision avoidance systems
(TCAS) to alert controllers to pending runway incursions.¹⁶⁹ However, TCAS
provides alerts and conflict resolutions directly to pilots.

¹⁶⁷ Jon Hilkevitch, “2 Close Calls In One Week Jolt O’Hare,” The Chicago Tribune, March
25, 2006; Jon Hilkevitch, “ U.S. Links Fatigue to Mishaps at O’Hare,” The Chicago
Tribune, May 24, 2006; “Feds: Tired Air Traffic Controllers May Be Cause of Runway
Mishaps,” USA Today, May 25, 2006.
¹⁶⁸ Carol J. Carmody, Testimony before the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives Regarding Runway Incursions, June 26, 2001.
Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board.
¹⁶⁹ National Transportation Safety Board. Runway collision of Eastern Airlines Boeing 727,
flight 111 and Epps Air Service Beechcraft King Air A1000, Atlanta Hartsfield International
Airport, Atlanta, Georgia, January 18, 1990 (NTSB/AAR-91/03).

The NTSB assessment went on to conclude that FAA’s efforts to curtail runway
incursions largely through technological approaches aimed at improving air traffic
controller situational awareness was an incomplete solution, and specifically called
for specific actions to address recommended changes in operational procedures at
airports. The NTSB’s recommendations urged the FAA to install ground movement
safety systems at all airports with passenger service that provide a direct warning
capability to pilots, and demonstrate through computer simulations or other means
that the system will, in fact, prevent runway incursions. The recommendations also
included numerous suggested changes to operational procedures to increase pilot and
controller situation awareness and resolve ambiguities regarding runway crossing
clearances, eliminate the practice of positioning an aircraft on a runway to await
takeoff at night and in poor weather, modify phraseology of airport movement
instructions to be consistent with international standards, and provide controllers with
guidance on appropriate phraseology and speaking rates, especially when
communicating with foreign flight crews.¹⁷⁰
The FAA continues to address many of these procedural changes to enhance
runway safety. However, the NTSB has expressed continued frustration with the
FAA’s progress. The NTSB questioned the completeness of the FAA’s runway
incursion incident reporting and cast doubt on FAA’s claims that the incursion rate
is declining.¹⁷¹ Most observers agree that there is no single solution to mitigating
runway incursions and continued investment in airport design, procedural
modifications, pilot and controller training, and technology is needed to reduce the
risk of runway accidents.
In addition to AMASS, the FAA has viewed the Airport Surveillance Detection
Equipment (Model X), or ASDE-X, as a primary means to provide controllers with
situation awareness of airport surface movements. The GAO found that costs for
equipping airports with ASDE-X have escalated by $85.9 million since the program’s
inception largely due to the inclusion of seven additional airports, and the timetable
for fully deploying ASDE-X to selected airports has slipped two years and is now
projected to be completed in FY2009 instead of FY2007, largely due to budget cuts
to the program in FY2004 and FY2005.¹⁷² The full deployment plan for ASDE-X
includes 35 airports and three support systems.
Besides these technology approaches, policy options, including improved
training and awareness for pilots, controllers, and vehicle operators, operational
changes such as increased standardization of taxi procedures, and improved runway
signs and markings, have been implemented across the aviation system. However,
the NTSB and many safety experts still contend that technology that provides direct
warning capability to flight crews is needed and point to the FAA’s failure to

¹⁷⁰ National Transportation Safety Board. Safety Recommendations A-00-66 through A-00-

71.

¹⁷¹ National Transportation Safety Board. NTSB calls for federal action to adopt “most
wanted” safety improvements. Press Release SB-04-33, November 9, 2004.
¹⁷² United States Government Accountability Office. FAA Has Made Progress but
Continues to Face Challenges in Acquiring Major Air Traffic Control Systems. GAO-05-

331 (June, 2005).

significantly reduce runway incursion rates as proof that steps taken thus far do not
adequately mitigate the risk of potential runway collisions.
The FAA recognizes that its current approach to mitigating runway collision
risks is not a complete solution. The FAA notes that its current runway safety risk
models indicate a residual risk of runway collisions at airports with ASDE-X and
AMASS. The cumulative risk, expressed in monetary terms, across all of these
airports is estimated to be about $200 million.¹⁷³ The FAA notes that the runway
status lights (RWSL) system — a new lighting system embedded in taxiways at
runway intersections akin to roadway traffic lights — is expected to address a
significant portion of this remaining risk.
The runway status lights system, as currently configured, consists of runway
entrance lights that are imbedded in the taxiway pavement and positioned where
taxiways feed onto or cross runways. These lights illuminate red when the runway
is unsafe to enter or cross due to high speed operations, such as landings or
departures, currently in progress. According to the FAA, preliminary cost-benefit
data support a limited deployment of runway status light installations to about 15 or
20 airports. The FAA has requested an appropriation of $13.7 million for FY2007
to operationally deploy runway surface lights at three airports considered to pose a
high risk for runway incursions.
While runway status lights appear to be a near-term approach for providing
information to flight crews regarding runway status, the use of Global Positioning
System (GPS) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B), in the
future, may provide improved situation awareness to both pilots and controllers to
mitigate runway incursions. In cases where GPS and ADS-B are not sufficiently
accurate to provide ground separation of aircraft, another technology, called
multilateration, may provide the needed accuracy to maintain surveillance and
separation of aircraft in the airport environment. During debate over reauthorization,
FAA’s progress on the various technology and policy approaches to mitigate runway
incursions may be an issue of particular interest.
Improving Oversight Of Maintenance Facilities
Congress has also expressed a continued interest in the FAA’s oversight of air
carrier maintenance practices. U.S. air carriers are increasingly outsourcing
maintenance to third-party repair stations and outsourced maintenance now accounts
for more than 50% of air carriers’ total maintenance costs. However, FAA
inspections of domestic repair stations are only required once annually. Oversight
of many repair stations located in foreign countries is delegated to inspectors from
those foreign countries and the FAA’s direct oversight of these facilities is more
limited.

¹⁷³ Risk estimates are expressed in monetary terms by estimating the probability or
likelihood of an accident or accidents attributable to a specific safety condition, such as an
unmitigated runway incursion, and multiplying this probability by the estimated cost to the
FAA and the industry of such events.

The FAA recently revised regulations governing the almost 5,000 FAA-certified
repair stations, about 680 of which are located in foreign countries, to improve
bookkeeping, training, and quality control at these maintenance facilities. FAA
currently employs about 600 aviation inspectors to oversee these repair stations.
However, some in Congress have expressed concern over these staffing levels and
the degree of FAA oversight at repair stations, particularly at the 2,800 repair stations
that perform maintenance on the air carrier fleet. Vision 100 contains provisions that
require the FAA to develop an action plan for providing adequate oversight of repair
stations and ensure that repair stations in foreign countries are subject to the same
level of oversight and quality control as domestic repair stations. However, there is
growing concern that a larger than expected amount of maintenance and repair may
be conducted by on-site contract maintenance workers and by non-certificated
subcontractors that are not as tightly regulated by the FAA.¹⁷⁴
It was recently reported that there are many perceived weaknesses in regulations
pertaining to contract maintenance work. While workers servicing air carrier aircraft
must get at least one day off in a seven-day workweek, or the equivalent amount of
time off in a month’s time, there are no periodic relief requirements for contract
maintenance personnel servicing commuter and air taxi aircraft. Fatigue among these
workers, and its impact on work quality and safety, is a growing concern. Also,
across the contract maintenance industry, the ratio of workers to supervisors is not
regulated and often exceeds 10 to 1, raising questions over the adequacy of
supervision in contract maintenance operations. Further, contracted maintenance
workers, many of whom work part-time at repair facilities alongside full-time regular
employees, often are not required to obtain FAA certification, and the screening and
selection processes for these workers has been described as minimal.¹⁷⁵
Concerns over FAA oversight of contract maintenance practices surfaced during
the NTSB’s investigation of the March 16, 2003 crash of a US Airways commuter
flight operated by Air Midwest in Charlotte, NC. The investigation found that the
elevator control cables were improperly rigged by subcontracted maintenance
workers at a non-certificated facility, and it has been suggested that FAA had little
knowledge over the contract arrangements and minimal knowledge of the work
conditions and supervision in this case.¹⁷⁶
That crash, along with growing concerns over FAA oversight of maintenance
at facilities not required to be certificated as designated repair stations prompted a
DOT OIG audit of air carrier use of these non-certificated maintenance facilities.¹⁷⁷
Prior to the audit, FAA officials advised that non-certificated facilities were only
used on a limited basis to perform minor services. However, the audit instead found

¹⁷⁴ See Bart Crotty, “Aviation Contracted Maintenance Workers, Are They Safe Enough,”
Aviation Maintenance, July 2006, pp.14-17, and U.S. Department of Transportation, Office
of Inspector General, Air Carriers’ Use of Non-Certificated Repair Facilities, December 15,

2005, AV-2006-031.

¹⁷⁵ Bart Crotty, “Aviation Contracted Maintenance Workers.”
¹⁷⁶ Ibid.
¹⁷⁷ U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Air Carriers’ Use of
Non-Certificated Repair Facilities.

that non-certificated facilities were often used extensively, sometimes for major
repairs and overhauls, largely without the FAA’s knowledge. The DOT OIG found
that while these facilities operate beyond the scope of regulations pertaining to
certificated repair facilities, there are no specific limitations regarding the type and
scope of work they perform, and maintenance performed at these facilities is largely
unmonitored by FAA inspectors. Further, oversight by air carriers of work
performed on their aircraft by these non-certificated facilities was found to also be
inadequate. Based on the findings of this audit, the DOT OIG recommended that the
FAA inventory air carrier maintenance vendor lists to get a grasp on exactly what
entities are performing maintenance on air carrier aircraft, assess whether the type
and scope of maintenance work performed by non-certificated entities should be
limited, and expand maintenance oversight of these entities if they are permitted to
continue performing unlimited maintenance work on air carrier aircraft. During
hearings on reauthorization, Congress may focus on the steps that the FAA is taking
to address these recommendations.
Another concern is that FAA maintenance and operations inspectors may lack
the continuing training needed to keep up with current technologies. Vision 100
directed the GAO to study the training of FAA aviation safety inspectors, expressing
a sense that FAA inspectors should get the most up-to-date initial and recurrent
training on job-related aviation technologies. The GAO found that while the FAA
approach to inspector training was mostly effective, a more systematic approach to
identifying technical training needs could better ensure that inspectors receive the
most up-to-date training.¹⁷⁸ Congress has also expressed concern over the adequacy
of the FAA’s inspector workforce, particularly their ability to adequately oversee the
aviation industry, and the increased use of designees to carry out inspection duties.
Vision 100 also directed the National Academy of Sciences to study the staffing
methods FAA employs for determining its air safety inspector workforce and suggest
improved methods for assessing inspector staffing needs. This work is still ongoing,
but may be of particular interest to Congress in examining how the FAA can best
adapt its maintenance inspector workforce to address the changing nature of
maintenance practices among air carriers and commuter airlines.
Improving Oversight of Charter and Air Tour Operators
The FAA’s ability to conduct effective oversight of air charter operators has
been made difficult by complicated leasing and management arrangements between
aircraft owners and holders of operational certificates to conduct charter flights. In
many instances, NTSB accident investigations have raised significant questions over
whether these arrangements met regulatory requirements and whether specific aircraft
were covered under the operating certificates required to conduct charter flights. For
example, a charter jet that crashed on takeoff from Teterboro Airport in New Jersey
on February 2, 2005, was being operated by a company that paid a monthly fee to a
charter flight certificate holder to use its certificate to conduct flights using contract

¹⁷⁸ U.S. Government Accountability Office. Aviation Safety: FAA Management Practices
for Technical Training Mostly Effective; Further Actions Could Enhance Results, September

7, 2005, GAO-05-728.

pilots.¹⁷⁹ This practice was determined to be in violation of FAA regulations. Based
on these findings, the FAA instructed its inspectors to ensure that charter certificate
holders maintain “operational control” over aircraft using their certificates to conduct
charter flights. The FAA has also been providing briefings to the charter industry to
better define and explain the concept of “operational control” and what is, and what
is not, permissible under the regulations. The FAA’s oversight of charter operators
and business practices in the charter industry may be of particular interest during the
current reauthorization as Congress may look for options to ensure that the FAA
maintains adequate oversight of air charter safety without unduly interfering with or
impeding sound business practices in the industry.
In addition to air-taxi operators that are covered under on-demand and
commuter operator regulations, questions have also been raised about the safety of
the air tour industry that provides sightseeing flights to the public. Because of a
general exemption from commercial operator regulations if flights are conducted
within 25 miles of the base airport, air tour operators are largely unregulated. Three
specific exceptions to this include (1) a set of special flight regulations covering air
tour operators in Hawaii;¹⁸⁰ (2) a special set of regulations governing air tours over
the Grand Canyon;¹⁸¹ and (3) air tour operators routinely flying over other lands in
the National Parks system or tribal lands that are required to participate in the
National Parks Air Tour Management program.¹⁸² Other air tour operators may
operate under general flight rules with minimal FAA oversight.
On October 22, 2003, the FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to
establish national safety standards for commercial air tour operators of siteseeing
aircraft.¹⁸³ The FAA’s proposal, issued largely in response to continuing NTSB
concern over air tour safety, seeks to bring virtually all air tour operators under a
single set of air tour safety standards set forth in regulation. However, the proposal
has been ardently opposed by many affected entities and representative trade
organizations, in large part because the cost of regulatory compliance would
significantly impact small business entities engaged in the air tour industry.
Essentially, those objecting to the FAA’s approach were seeking to have the FAA
scrap the proposal, and start over with a systematic rulemaking approach involving
early input from advisory groups to come up with a plan that would better balance
safety with the operational constraints and limitations of small operators. Safety
regulation of both on-demand charter operators and air tour operators may be an issue
of particular interest during reauthorization in recognition of persisting challenges to
the FAA’s ability to effectively regulate and conduct oversight of these entities
within the existing regulatory framework.

¹⁷⁹ “Operational Control,” Air Safety Week, June 20, 2005.
¹⁸⁰ 14 CFR, SFAR 71.
¹⁸¹ 14 CFR Part 93, Subpart U.
¹⁸² 14 CFR, Part 136.
¹⁸³ Federal Aviation Administration, “National Air Tour Safety Standards; Proposed Rule,”
Federal Register, 68(204), October 22, 2003, pp. 60572-60591.

Mitigating the Risk of Fuel Tank Explosions on Commercial
Airliners
July 17, 2006 marked the tenth anniversary of the crash of TWA flight 800, a
Boeing 747 carrying 230 passengers that exploded and broke apart in-flight while
departing New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport for Paris, France. The
NTSB attributed the crash to an explosion in the center wing fuel tank that resulted
from the ignition of fuel vapors. While the specific ignition source was never
determined, it was attributed to an electrical failure that likely produced arcing in¹⁸⁴
wiring that introduced electrical energy into the tank.
Since the tragic crash of TWA flight 800, two fuel tank explosions, both while
aircraft were on the ground, have been documented. These include the March 3,
2001 destruction of a Thai Airways Boeing 737 in Bangkok, Thailand, and the May
4, 2006 explosion on a Transmile Airlines Boeing 727 in Bangalore, India. These
events demonstrate that the risk of fuel tank explosions still exists and is not unique
to the design of the Boeing 747 fuel system.
The NTSB and other aviation safety advocates have been befuddled by the slow
progress to address the risks of fuel tank explosions over the past ten years. Options
for using less volatile aviation fuels, such as JP-5¹⁸⁵ (which is sometimes used by the
military) or anti-static additives, were discussed but were never considered to be fully
adequate and viable solutions. Also, the FAA and the aviation industry largely
rejected the use of available fuel inerting foam technology that has been used by the
military since the late 1960s.¹⁸⁶ The foam, which is placed inside aircraft fuel tanks,
greatly reduces the risk of explosions and post-crash fires, but would be costly to
install, adds weight to aircraft, and reduces the distance an airplane can travel by
reducing the amount of fuel that can be carried.
The NTSB and other safety advocates also have expressed disappointment that
the FAA and the airline industry did not take adequate steps to make interim changes
to operational practices to reduce fuel tank flammability until long-term solutions
could be identified and put in place. The NTSB believes that relatively simple steps
— such as filling tanks to levels that sufficiently reduce the flammability of the
fuel/air mixture, and minimizing the use of heat-generating equipment, such as cabin
air-conditioning systems, before flight — would effectively mitigate risk, until
proven technologies to reduce fuel tank flammability were identified and deployed.
The FAA never mandated that these steps be taken, and an FAA survey of the airline
industry found that recommended changes to operating procedures, which were only
advisory in nature, were never widely adopted.

¹⁸⁴ National Transportation Safety Board, “NTSB Marks 10th Anniversary of Crash of TWA

800; TWA Flight 800 Fact Sheet,” June 29, 2006, Washington, DC.

¹⁸⁵ Jet Propellant Number 5 or JP-5 has a minimum flash point of 140⁰F, compared to about

100⁰F for Jet-A fuel, used in commercial aircraft.

¹⁸⁶ T. O. Reed, The Use of Polyurethane Foam for Fuel Tank Inerting, Defense Technical
Information Center, March 1972, #ADD702826.

Recently, technology advances in fuel inerting systems have led to the
development of small, light-weight fuel inerting pumps that extract oxygen from the
air in fuel tanks, replacing it with a nitrogen-rich mixture that greatly reduces
flammability. In May 2002, the FAA announced an innovative prototype inerting
system.¹⁸⁷ This system — unlike earlier versions used by the military — weighs
significantly less, uses no moving parts, is more reliable, and could be retrofitted into
airplanes currently in service at a fraction of the industry-estimated cost.¹⁸⁸ Boeing
is now shipping new aircraft from its factories with these systems already installed.
The issue of retrofitting the existing fleet with these systems or other alternative
solutions to reduce flammability, such as inerting foam, and establishing a fuel tank
flammability reduction requirement for new airplanes, has not yet been fully
resolved, but the FAA is proposing an approach that would require passenger airlines
to take such steps to reduce fuel tank flammability in their aircraft fleets over the next
eight years.
Specifically, on November 23, 2005, the FAA issued a proposed rulemaking to
require that operators of large transport category airplanes used in passenger airline
service take steps to reduce fuel tank flammability, such as installing fuel inerting
systems. The proposed rule, however, does not require fuel tank flammability
reduction for wing tanks as it only establishes requirements for an aircraft’s main fuel
tank, and would exempt all-cargo aircraft. Also, contrary to some commonly held
misconceptions about the proposed rulemaking, it does not specifically require the
fuel tank inerting systems discussed above for all passenger airliners, but leaves the
door open for alternative means of compliance. The proposal actually seeks to set
a flammability exposure criterion. How this criterion would be met may become a
particular point of contention over the certification of both new aircraft types and
retrofit modifications of the existing air carrier fleet to meet the requirements set
forth in the proposed rulemaking. Airbus, for example, would like its double-decker
A380 to be certified without fuel tank inerting systems, arguing that design
considerations for the center fuel tank already take into consideration and adequately
mitigate the risk of explosive fuel/air mixtures.¹⁸⁹
Under the FAA’s proposed timetable, depending on fleet composition, 50% of
an air carrier’s fleet would have to be in compliance in the 2009 to 2011 time frame,
and airlines would have to achieve 100% compliance between 2012 and 2014. The
FAA estimates that it will cost passenger airlines about $809 million 2005 dollars to
comply with the proposed fuel tank flammability reduction measures over the next
50 years. Based on FAA assumptions of explosion risk that conclude that four
explosions would be prevented over the next 50 years if the proposed action is taken,
the estimated benefit of the rulemaking over this time period was calculated to be
$490 million in 2005 dollars, assuming the cost of one human life is $3 million. If
the assumed cost of a human life is raised to $5.5 million, then the estimated benefits

¹⁸⁷ Federal Aviation Administration, FAA and Airlines to Reduce Fuel Tank Flammability,
Press Release APA 02-04, February 17, 2004
¹⁸⁸ National Transportation Safety Board, Most Wanted Transportation Safety
Improvements, Federal Issues, Aviation, Eliminated Flammable Fuel/Air Vapors in Fuel
Tanks on Transport Category Aircraft, Washington, DC. (Undated)
¹⁸⁹ “10 Years After Flight 800, Just Hot Air,” Air Safety Week, 20(31), August 7, 2006.

over the next 50 years climb to $890 million in 2005 dollars. The FAA notes that
while these benefits assume four explosions over the next 50 years, they calculated
a 37% chance that five or more accidents could occur during that period, and noted
that the estimated benefit could be much higher if the prevented accidents were
assumed to have involved large jets, like Boeing 747 or Airbus A380 aircraft,
carrying large numbers of passengers.
Based on these considerations, the FAA concluded that the costs of the proposed
action were justified, but some observers may question this conclusion because slight
alternations in assumptions can tip the benefit to cost ratio in either direction. One
particular assumption that the FAA attempted to account for is how effective special
regulations put in place in 2001 will be in terms of identifying potential ignition
sources and mitigating the risks they pose. In the baseline case cited above, the FAA
assumed that these steps would be 50% effective in reducing ignition sources. The
FAA presented several other cases varying their assumptions, with about half
showing benefit to cost ratios greater than one and about half showing benefit to cost
ratios less than one. The FAA also noted that because the flying public may assume
a terrorist act has occurred following an aircraft explosion, this could have a sizable
impact on airline revenues if people subsequently avoid flying. The FAA thought
that this could cost airlines $5 billion per accident. While this wasn’t considered in
the formal cost/benefit analysis, some argue this possibility alone could sufficiently
justify a requirement for fuel tank flammability reduction.
In the end, the FAA asserted that the benefits justify the compliance cost.
However, aircraft manufacturers and airlines may challenge this conclusion and
assert that, if ongoing efforts to remove ignition sources are effective, costly retrofits
to inert fuel tanks may not be fully justified by the expected benefits. However,
because of the considerable attention given to this issue stemming from the TWA
800 crash, there may be considerable pressure to do all that is feasible to reduce both
ignition sources and fuel tank flammability. The NTSB points out that “dealing just
with ignition sources was not sufficient to ensure safe flight and that fuel tank
flammability must be addressed.”¹⁹⁰ While the NTSB supports the proposed
rulemaking as a positive step toward reducing the risk of fuel tank explosions, it has
been frustrated by the slow rulemaking process and notes that while implementation
of an effective mitigation technology is now on the horizon, “[a]irliner fuel tanks are
as flammable today as they were ten years ago.”¹⁹¹
During the FAA reauthorization process, Congress may examine in detail the
FAA’s approach to reducing fuel tank flammability among transport category aircraft
and its justification for proposing that these actions be required for passenger airlines.
Particular concerns may be raised about the sufficiency of the scope of aircraft
covered under the FAA proposal given that it exempts all-cargo aircraft and doesn’t
mitigate fuel tank flammability in wing tanks. Congress may also debate whether the
FAA timeline for compliance is appropriate given the significance of the risk to
aviation safety posed by fuel tank explosions and the financial burden to the industry
to comply.

¹⁹⁰ National Transportation Safety Board, “NTSB Marks 10^th Anniversary.”
¹⁹¹ Ibid.

Addressing Aging Aircraft Issues
Age-related aircraft structural fatigue which can cause structural failures and
aging wiring which can cause in-flight fires remain significant concerns for all
sectors of the aviation industry. All-cargo aircraft are a particular concern because
statistics indicate that while the average age for passenger airliners in the United
States is under 10 years, the average age of jet freighters is more than 20 years.
General aviation aircraft may also be at particular risk because the average age of the
fleet is already 35 years, and it is expected to increase to 50 years by 2020.
However, general aviation advocates are resisting proposals to require continuing
inspections of aging aircraft and aircraft systems, citing concerns over operational
costs that could escalate considerably if owners and operators are faced with
requirements for periodic detailed examinations of aircraft systems and structures.
Aging aircraft used in commuter and charter service may also be a safety risk because
the FAA’s regulatory framework to comply with aging aircraft requirements does not
include aircraft with fewer than 30 seats or those not used in scheduled air carrier
service.
Aging Airliners. In 1991, Congress passed the Aging Aircraft Safety Act of
1991 as part of the DOT Appropriations Act for FY1992 (P.L. 102-143), establishing
an aging aircraft inspections program to study age-related structural issues in the air
carrier fleet through a process of inspections and systematic record keeping.¹⁹²
Action was prompted by several age-related incidents and accidents, including the
high-profile structural separation of a large section of fuselage above the passenger
cabin aboard an Aloha Airlines Boeing 737 airplane in 1988. In immediate response
to this accident, Congress passed the Aviation Safety Research Act of 1988 (P.L.
100-591) mandating research on the effects of fatigue and environmental degradation
of aircraft structures and approaches to mitigating associated safety risks.
Subsequent research pointed to a need for a proactive approach to inspecting aging
aircraft.
Under the aging aircraft inspection program, the FAA has stepped up
requirements for maintenance inspections to check for small fatigue cracks (which
can propagate, causing component and major structural failures of the airframe), and
preventative measures to slow corrosion on aircraft structural components.
Maintenance experience over these years has demonstrated that tiny fatigue cracks
and areas of corrosion are often quite insidious, lurking in hard to access locations
and often are not visible to the naked eye. Ultrasound inspection techniques have
played an important role in identifying fatigue cracks during periodic inspections,
allowing airlines to take corrective actions before these fatigue cracks propagate.
However, these inspection methods can be costly and time consuming, so inspections
are usually targeted based on risk assessments considering what structures are most
prone to fatigue and are structurally most critical.
There has been growing concern that widespread fatigue damage may impose
practical limitations on the continued airworthiness of airframes. On April 18, 2006,
the FAA issued proposed rulemaking to establish operating limits for transport
category aircraft, mostly large airliners and commuter jets, based on the numbers of

¹⁹² See 49 USC §44717.

cycles (takeoffs and landings).¹⁹³ Many aircraft components are life limited based on
numbers of cycles, but to date, the airframe itself can continue in service indefinitely
so long as it is kept in an airworthy condition by following all FAA and manufacturer
requirements regarding inspections, maintenance, and repair. The FAA proposal
would change this by setting a maximum number of cycles for airframes, after which
an aircraft must be retired, unless an operator demonstrates that it able to extend this
service life through a detailed inspections and maintenance program, in which case
a service life extension may be granted. While most passenger airlines in the United
States divest of their airplanes long before what most consider a commercially viable
service life of about 25 years, they might nonetheless experience a sizable financial
burden from this proposed action because aircraft would likely depreciate much
faster if they have a limited service life imposed through regulation. Therefore
aircraft leasing would likely cost more, and those aircraft that airlines purchase
outright would likely be worth less on the used aircraft market when they go to sell
and replace them. Cargo operators also could be impacted financially because they
tend to utilize older aircraft and therefore, may have to increase their fleet
replacement rates under the proposal. However, the costs to operators that currently
operate fleets consisting of mostly older aircraft may, in particular, be offset to some
degree, if transitioning to a younger fleet of aircraft as a consequence of the proposed
rule results in lower maintenance costs.
Aging Commuter Aircraft. The FAA’s proposal would only cover aircraft
weighing more than 75,000 pounds at maximum takeoff weight, potentially raising
questions of whether similar rules should be considered for smaller aircraft, such as
the commuter seaplane involved in the December 2005 crash off the coast of Miami,
FL. The December 19, 2005 crash of a turboprop powered Grumman Mallard
seaplane departing Miami for Bimini Island in the Bahamas drew attention to the
potential catastrophic effects of structural fatigue on aging aircraft being used by
smaller specialty airlines and charter operators. While the NTSB’s investigation of
that accident, which killed all 20 on board, is still ongoing, investigators have
identified fatigue cracks near the location where a failure and separation of the right
wing surface is suspected to have occurred shortly after takeoff. These smaller
operators may be a particular concern because they don’t have as extensive
capabilities to inspect aircraft for fatigue and corrosion, and don’t typically come
under as much scrutiny and oversight from the FAA compared to major airlines.
This stems, in part, from an FAA regulatory change issued in February 2005, limiting
the scope of supplemental inspection requirements for aging aircraft to only those
aircraft manufactured after 1957 that have 30 or more passenger seats or a payload
capacity of more than 7,500 pounds. The NTSB, in the course of its ongoing
investigation of the Miami crash, noted this exemption of smaller aircraft as a
particular safety concern and issued a recommendation calling for the broadening of
aging aircraft inspection and records-keeping requirements to include virtually all¹⁹⁴

aircraft used in commercial passenger and scheduled all-cargo service.
¹⁹³ Federal Aviation Administration, “Aging Aircraft Program: Widespread Fatigue Damage;
Proposed Rule”, Federal Register, 71(74), April 18, 2006, pp. 19928-19949.
¹⁹⁴ National Transportation Safety Board. Safety Recommendation A-06-52, July 25, 2006;
Alan Levin, “NTSB Concerned Rules Don’t Apply to Aging Planes,” USA Today, July 25,

2006.

Aging General Aviation Aircraft. With respect to age-related fatigue and
corrosion, general aviation (GA) aircraft are also a particular concern. As previously
stated, according to the FAA, the average aircraft age across the GA fleet is about 35
years, and this is expected to increase to almost 50 years by 2020.¹⁹⁵ Several GA
accidents have been attributed to aging aircraft structures and component failures.
The FAA has also uncovered many trends in age-related effects among specific GA
aircraft models. Presently GA aircraft are specifically excluded from the Aging
Aircraft Program. The AOPA has resisted specific aging aircraft inspection programs
across the GA fleet, fearing that a mandated program would impose significant costs
on operators. The AOPA argues that such a requirement is unnecessary without
specific data that age-related corrosion or component failures affect a particular
model of aircraft. The AOPA points to a 39% reduction in maintenance-related GA
crashes over the past 20 years, despite a steady increase in the average age of the fleet
over that same time frame.¹⁹⁶ They advocate a continuation of the current approach,
which largely relies on individual operators to adopt recommended best practices for
maintaining and inspecting their aircraft to minimize and correct age-related effects.
The FAA is studying the issue of whether a more proactive approach may be needed
to identify and correct specific age-related effects across the GA fleet before they lead
to catastrophic failures and accidents. During the debate over FAA reauthorization,
Congress may consider whether a more formal approach to assessing age-related
effects among GA aircraft is needed, and may discuss various options regarding the
depth and scope of specific inspection programs to assess the effects of aging on the
GA aircraft fleet. Advocates for GA operators, such as the AOPA, are most
concerned about the possibility that aircraft life limits, such as those being considered
for large transport aircraft, might be considered for some or all of the GA fleet. They
point to the unique challenges of owners and operators of vintage airplanes, whose
manufacturers are often long since defunct, as a particular area where a flexible
approach is needed to insure that aviation heritage can be maintained in a manner that¹⁹⁷
is not overly burdensome or overly costly to operators.
During consideration of FAA reauthorization, Congress may engage in specific
debate over the merits of imposing specific life limits on airframes across all sectors
of aviation, the costs and benefits to operators of aging aircraft inspections and
records-keeping programs, and the appropriate scope of applicability of these various
approaches to mitigating aging aircraft safety concerns.
Addressing the Safety of All-Cargo Operations
All-cargo operations are conducted under various sets of rules that are less
stringent than the regulatory structure for passenger airlines. Large cargo operators,
like FedEx and UPS, operate under a special subset of airline rules, called

¹⁹⁵ Federal Aviation Administration. “Aviation Summit: Notice of Public Meeting.”
Federal Register, 71(18), 4631-4632, January 27, 2006.
¹⁹⁶ Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association. “Aging GA aircraft not a safety issue, AOPA
reiterates,” Frederick, MD, April 20, 2006.
¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

“supplemental” operations.¹⁹⁸ Others, such as ASTAR Air Cargo, were certificated
more in line with passenger air carrier standards, but have been granted certain
exemptions from typical operating requirements.¹⁹⁹ In contrast to passenger airline
operations, large cargo carrier operations have less stringent requirements for pilot
flight and duty times and have no requirements for flight dispatchers. The large
majority of smaller regional freight haulers operate under a less stringent set of
requirements that also cover charter flights.²⁰⁰
In general, air cargo pilots operate in an environment in which they are
permitted to work longer hours than commercial airline pilots, and often do so during
late-night and early-morning periods where humans are particularly susceptible to
fatigue effects. Also, in air cargo operations, pilots have more direct responsibility
for assessing weather, airport conditions, proper aircraft loading, and other safety-
critical aspects of a flight. In the case of small operators, the pilots are very much on
their own with regard to safety-critical decision making, not unlike charter operators
covered under the same set of rules. However, cargo pilots on a more routine basis
operate in demanding environments where pressures to complete flights to maintain
delivery schedules compete with safety considerations regarding weather and airport
conditions, and cargo pilots more frequently fly in night conditions.
Additionally, because airports are regulated largely based on the size of
scheduled passenger aircraft they handle, air rescue and firefighting (ARFF)
equipment may either be inadequate for effectively responding to an emergency
involving the size of all-cargo aircraft operating at a given airport, or may not be
available during periods of all-cargo operations, such as late night and early morning,
when there are no scheduled passenger operations.²⁰¹ The FAA has indicated to
stakeholders that its hands are tied on this matter, because the guidelines for airport
operating certification are clearly spelled out in statute with specific reference to
scheduled passenger operations.²⁰² While some dispute whether the FAA is correctly
interpreting the law,²⁰³ stakeholders are likely to turn to Congress for clarification and
statutory change making airport certification requirements a potential issue for
reauthoriz ation.
In general, the Air Line Pilot Association’s (ALPA), under its “One Level of
Safety” initiative, is seeking a variety of changes to the way the air cargo industry is
regulated to better harmonize the regulatory structure and bring it in line with what
is required of passenger air carriers. On the issue of pilot fatigue, ALPA would like
the FAA to go beyond bringing all-cargo regulations in line with passenger airline
regulations, and develop rules that specifically address the unique aspects of air cargo

¹⁹⁸ Air carrier operations covered under 14 CFR Part 121 are subdivided into domestic, flag,
and supplemental operations.
¹⁹⁹ Jan W. Steenblik, “Cargo Issues Take Center Stage,” Air Line Pilot, March 2004,
Washington DC: Air Line Pilots Association.
²⁰⁰ See 14 CFR Part 135.
²⁰¹ See 14 CFR Part 139.
²⁰² See 49 USC §44706.
²⁰³ Jan W. Steenblik, “Cargo Issues Take Center Stage.”

operations that contribute to fatigue. Their recommendations include lowering
permissible flight and duty limits when these hours are logged between midnight and
dawn and whenever flights cross six or more time zones.²⁰⁴
One specific safety concern for all-cargo operations, is carriage of hazardous
materials (HAZMAT) that is either restricted or limited to smaller quantities on
passenger airplanes. HAZMAT presents unique challenges for firefighters
responding to a crash of a cargo aircraft, and also introduces unique risks in the flight
environment. Undeclared HAZMAT is a particular concern, and options to reduce
the amount of undeclared HAZMAT include better dissemination of information to
shippers to make them aware of what constitutes HAZMAT and the proper
declaration requirements and procedures, as well as better screening for HAZMAT
at points of origin. Regulating the carriage of HAZMAT is a shared responsibility
of the FAA, the DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA), and for mail shipments, the U.S. Postal Service. Additionally, over the
past few years, the TSA has had an expanding role in cargo screening processes. The
industry has been frustrated by the lack of consistency in interpreting and applying
HAZMAT regulations among these various agencies.²⁰⁵ While progress toward
developing standardized security and screening procedures has been slow,
forthcoming security initiatives for all-cargo operations may provide some added
benefit of improving the screening and handling of HAZMAT carried on aircraft.
Another concern is the proper loading of HAZMAT to ensure its accessability during
flight in the event of a fire or leakage, as required. Also, flight crews have raised
concerns about the adequacy of both the information they are provided regarding
HAZMAT on board and the training they receive in HAZMAT handling procedures
and safety.²⁰⁶ The regulation of HAZMAT carriage and handling may be an issue of
considerable interest to Congress during the debate over FAA reauthorization.
A continuing concern in all-cargo operations is the carriage of lithium batteries.
The risk of fires from these batteries was the focus of a recent NTSB hearing
regarding an in-flight fire aboard a UPS DC-8 cargo plane that burned for four hours
after an emergency landing in Philadelphia on February 7, 2006.²⁰⁷ This wasn’t the
first time the NTSB expressed concern regarding the carriage of lithium batteries.
In April 1999, fire erupted among pallets of lithium batteries offloaded from a
Boeing 747 at a cargo facility at Los Angeles International Airport. In response to
this incident, the NTSB issued a series of recommendations to the DOT to fully
assess the fire hazards of these batteries in the air transportation environment, ban
their shipment on passenger aircraft, and require appropriate labeling on all lithium
battery shipments transported on aircraft.²⁰⁸ In response to these concerns, the DOT

²⁰⁴ Captain David J. Wells and Jay Wells, Esq., The Call for One Level of Safety, Flight and
Duty Time Issues in Air Cargo Operations, Air Line Pilots Association International,
Herndon, VA. Presented at the NTSB Air Cargo Safety Forum, March 30-31, 2004.
²⁰⁵ Jan W. Steenblik, “Cargo Issues Take Center Stage.”
²⁰⁶ Ibid.
²⁰⁷ “The Laptop Flare-up, The NTSB Rekindles Objections to Onboard Electronics,” Air
Safety Week, August 21, 2006, p. 1.
²⁰⁸ National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendations A-99-80 through A-99-
(continued...)

banned primary shipments of lithium batteries on passenger aircraft.²⁰⁹ In the
aftermath of the Philadelphia incident, ALPA has recommended that the DOT also
ban bulk shipments of lithium batteries on all-cargo aircraft until adequate packaging
standards are developed.²¹⁰ Recently, lithium batteries also been the focus of several
consumer product safety recalls due to fire risk. The risks that these batteries pose
to aviation is likely significant because the use of lithium batteries to power portable
electronics is prolific, and portable electronics — because of their high value to
weight ratio — make up a significant portion of goods shipped by air. In recognition
of these ongoing concerns over fire risks posed by shipments of lithium batteries,
both as primary shipments and as integrated shipments in electronic devices,
Congress may consider whether more detailed safety assessments of shipments
containing lithium batteries is needed.
Several air carrier accidents have been traced to improper loading, including
overloading aircraft, improperly distributing loads, and inadequately securing freight
resulting in weight shifts during flight. Mishandling of cargo can also cause damage
to aircraft that, if undetected or unreported, can lead to future incidents and
accidents.²¹¹ While the NTSB called for improved flight crew oversight of loading
procedures following the 1997 crash of a Fine Air DC-8 in Miami, pilots report that
they often are not able to observe the loading process, and a lack of uniformity in
forms and procedures among loading contractors and facilities makes it difficult to
ensure that the job has been done right.²¹² Several options exist for improving the
safety of cargo handling. ALPA believes that incorporating the industry’s best
practices into universal standard operating procedures for cargo loading is needed.²¹³
ALPA also believes that better training, supervision, and oversight of cargo handlers
and establishing certification requirements for loadmasters would improve safety.
Also, the NTSB has recommended that the FAA mandate drug and alcohol testing
for cargo handlers, load planners, and ramp supervisors.²¹⁴ The merits of these
various recommendations and proposals may be a topic of debate in Congress in the
context of the current FAA reauthorization process.

²⁰⁸ (...continued)

84, Washington, DC, November 16, 1999.

²⁰⁹ Research and Special Programs Administration, “ Hazardous Materials; Prohibition on
the Transportation of Primary Lithium Batteries and Cells Aboard Passenger Aircraft; Final
Rule,” Federal Register,69(240), December 15, 2004, pp. 75208-75216.
²¹⁰ “Carrying the Torch for HAZMAT and Cargo Safety: ALPA Concerns and Positions,”
Air Line Pilot, September 2006, p. 33.
²¹¹ Ibid.
²¹² Ibid.
²¹³ Captain Terry McVenes and Captain William McReynolds. The Current State of the
Cargo Industry: An ALPA Perspective. Presented at the NTSB Air Cargo Safety Forum,
NTSB Academy, Ashburn, VA, March 30-31, 2004.
²¹⁴ National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendation A-03-02,

Aircraft Cabin Occupant Safety, Comfort, and Public
Health
In Vision 100, Congress enacted legislation directing the FAA to establish a
research program on airliner cabin air quality and establish a cabin air quality
incident reporting system. However, a 2004 GAO study found that many experts do
not believe that the FAA’s planned actions will adequately address these
recommendations.²¹⁵ Further, growing public health concerns over potential human-
to-human spread of the deadly avian influenza virus may elevate the issue of
preventing the spread of infectious diseases on commercial airline flights during the
current reauthorization process. Also, rapidly changing cell phone and wireless
technologies and consumer demand for these technologies is placing pressure on
policy makers to approve these devices for use on airline flights. However,
significant safety concerns remain, raising the issue of how well research and testing
of these devices to determine whether they pose any risk to aviation safety is keeping
pace with industry demand to approve these devices for in-flight use. Also, a decade-
old debate between the NTSB and the FAA regarding whether it is safe to allow
infants and toddlers to ride on the laps of adults remains unresolved. The NTSB
argues that children should instead be restrained in child restraints, while the FAA
believes that the cost to consumers would create a greater safety risk by diverting
many families to highway travel, which is statistically less safe. These various issues
related to airliner cabin safety, comfort, and public health may be considered during
the course of the FAA reauthorization debate in Congress.
Cabin Air Quality
Air quality in airliner cabin environments has been a continuing concern of
Congress during prior FAA reauthorization debates. Following congressionally
mandated studies and recommendations regarding the airliner cabin environmental
and health effects on passengers and crew performed by the National Research
Council (NRC), Congress included in Vision 100 a mandate calling for FAA
monitoring and assessments of cabin air quality as recommended by the NRC. The
legislative language specifically directed the FAA to monitor ozone levels in the
cabin on a representative number of flights and aircraft to determine compliance with
existing federal aviation regulations for ozone, to collect pesticide exposure data, to
identify contaminants that passengers are exposed to, to analyze and study cabin air
pressure and altitude, and to establish an air quality incident reporting system.
A 2004 GAO study of FAA’s progress toward addressing the NRC
recommendations and the congressional mandate set forth in Vision 100 found that
while the FAA was making progress, additional steps were needed to fully assess
cabin air quality, conduct air quality surveillance of the air carrier fleet, fully assess
the costs and benefits of air filtration, and provide the traveling public with adequate²¹⁶
information regarding the health risks of posed by cabin air quality. The GAO
noted that FAA’s planned actions will likely not be adequate to fully answer the long-

²¹⁵ U.S. Government Accountability Office. Aviation Safety: More Research Needed on the
Effects of Air Quality on Airliner Cabin Occupants, January 2004, GAO-04-54.
²¹⁶ Ibid.

standing questions regarding the nature and extent of potential health effects related
to airliner cabin environments. The GAO concluded that more extensive research
will likely be needed to address these questions. Further, GAO noted that while
various technologies to filter pollutants and biological agents are readily available,
they are not required on aircraft. The GAO found that while high-efficiency
particulate air (HEPA) filters are widely used by airlines on larger aircraft and their
use is recommended for recirculated air systems by air quality experts, they are not
commonly used in commuter aircraft. Retrofitting these smaller aircraft to
incorporate filtering could be very costly to the airlines, and more detailed cost and
benefit analyses will likely be needed to determine if these filtration system provide
a viable, cost effective means to improve air quality on smaller aircraft.
Preventing the Spread of Infectious Disease in the Aircraft
Cabin
Besides general concerns over air quality on board airliners, heightened concern
over the spread of infectious disease on aircraft may prompt action to address this
issue. In 2002, fear over the spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) had
a notable economic impact on the airline industry. In the current context, growing
concern over potential human-to-human transmission of the avian flu virus is
spurring research and public policy debate on how to mitigate disease transmission
in the aircraft cabin. Current research efforts are focused on screening and detection
methods, such as test strips and on-board sensors, and practical decontamination²¹⁷
techniques, such as cabin heaters and hydrogen peroxide vapors. These techniques
could become part of an overall public health policy to control the spread of an
infectious disease such as the avian flu. Current research in this area is being
federally funded through the Center of Excellence for Airliner Cabin Environmental
Research (ACER), an FAA-funded consortium of eight university programs led by
Auburn University. In the current reauthorization process, Congress may examine
these efforts to assess the adequacy of the program and its funding levels and to
identify any potential technologies and policy considerations stemming from this
research that could improve the United States’ response to an infectious disease
outbreak to mitigate disease transmission in airliner cabins.
Faced with a possible pandemic outbreak of a deadly disease, restricting travel
has been suggested as an option to limit the spread of such an infectious disease.
During the upcoming FAA reauthorization Congress may consider whether further
study and perhaps an action plan is needed to establish policies on air travel in such
a situation. Recently reported medical findings indicate that the slowdown in air
travel following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 delayed the onset of that
year’s flu season by about two weeks.²¹⁸ Experts, however, note that there was no
observable change in the number of flu-related deaths that year, and caution that
travel restrictions, therefore, may not be a particularly effective mitigation strategy
for the long-term. Travel restrictions are likely to be considered a highly

²¹⁷ “Cabin Air Quality to Become New Frontier of ‘Air Safety’.” Air Safety Week, 20(26),
p. 1-2.
²¹⁸ Lauran Neergaard, “9/11 Air Travel Drop Slowed Flu’s Spread,” The Washington Post,
September 12, 2006.

controversial option because they could have widespread economic implications for
the airlines, particularly if travel restrictions or government-issued travel warnings
were released prior to or during busy holiday travel times. Moreover, screening or
restricting travel of infected individuals, particularly individuals not displaying
symptoms of disease, is likely to be difficult and may raise significant privacy issues.
Cell Phones and Portable Electronic Devices
Recently, there has been considerable interest in approving cell phone use
aboard aircraft. However, studies by the British Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)
demonstrated interference to various avionics equipment from signals similar to a
cell phone transmitting at maximum power.²¹⁹ A possible compromise is to ensure
that cell phones transmit only at low transmission powers. The pico cell concept,
which consists of a small cell-phone interface installed on the aircraft that forces
active cell phones to transmit at low power, attempts to utilize such an approach.
However, there is still lingering concern that the power outputs of multiple cell phone
devices in aircraft could be additive, potentially resulting in signals that could
interfere with critical aircraft systems. There is also concern that systems like the
pico cell concept don’t have enough safeguards to prevent transmissions that exceed
acceptable output levels.
Other portable electronic devices (PEDs), like laptops, portable media players,
personal digital assistants (PDAs) and handheld electronic games, have historically
posed less of a concern because they are primarily non-intentional emitters of radio-
frequency (RF) energy, and their RF emissions are of comparably low power.
However, a new breed of intentional transmitters, imbedded in these kinds of
devices, that use Wi-Fi and Bluetooth® wireless connection protocols represent a
relatively new form of technology that is rapidly proliferating in PEDs. There is
considerable interest in using RF emitting devices, relying on Wi-Fi protocols in
particular, as a means for providing broadband internet access to air travelers.
Researchers from Carnegie Mellon University recently completed a study
looking at emissions from PEDs on board commercial passenger aircraft. They
found that, in violation of current FAA and FCC regulations, cell phone calls are
regularly made from commercial aircraft.²²⁰ While the researchers noted that
spurious emissions from a variety of PEDs are a potential safety concern, they
focused their attention on emissions from cell phones and their impact on frequency
bands used by aircraft navigation systems. They concluded that the most serious
concern for interference from cell phones is for GPS receivers, which will become
the primary means for aerial navigation over the next several years.

²¹⁹ Civil Aviation Authority (United Kingdom), CAA Paper 2003/3: Effects of Interference
from Cellular Telephones on Aircraft Avionics Equipment, Gatwick Airport, West Sussex,
England; Civil Aviation Authority (United Kingdom), Report: Interference Levels In
Aircraft at Radio Frequencies used by Portable Telephones, Gatwick Airport, West Sussex,
England.
²²⁰ Bill Strauss, M. Granger Morgan, Jay Apt, and Daniel D. Stancil, “Unsafe At Any
Airspeed?, Cellphones and Other Electronics Are More of a Risk Than You Think” , IEEE
Spectrum, 43(3), March 2006.

Passengers are typically informed that “approved portable electronic devices”
may be used above 10,000 feet. However, in terms of regulatory standards, the FAA
ultimately leaves it up to the individual air carriers to determine which PEDs are safe
for use aboard their specific aircraft. In practice, besides the specific ban on cell
phones, most commonly used consumer PEDs are permissible.
The rapid proliferation of these various wireless technologies has far outpaced
the ability to conduct thorough research and testing to determine their potential to
interfere with aircraft communications, navigation, and surveillance equipment.
Protection of avionics from interference is likely to become increasingly important
in the future as these functions become more fundamentally integrated in
technologies such as ADS-B, GPS, and cockpit multi-function displays of navigation,
traffic, and weather information.²²¹ In approaching this issue, safety concerns may
conflict with airline consumer demand for in-flight access to wireless voice
communications and Internet connectivity. Congress may consider options to more
fully assess the safety implications of RF emitting devices on aircraft, and available
means for protecting aircraft systems from RF interference. Options may include
extensive study of the issue by an independent agency such as the National
Academies, and the implementation of more clearly defined safety standards and
safety monitoring capabilities for assessing RF interference and for reporting and
monitoring suspected RF interference with aircraft systems.
Besides concerns over RF interference, lithium batteries in carry-on portable
electronic devices also pose a potential fire hazard.²²² However, because fires in
accessible areas of the cabin are more likely to be quickly detected, these types of
fires may pose less of a threat of causing a catastrophic loss of the aircraft than a fire
that propagates in an unaccessible baggage or cargo hold. Nevertheless, any fire
during flight poses a significant threat to cabin occupants from both heat and smoke,
and could potentially be catastrophic if not handled effectively by the flight and cabin
crew. From a policy perspective, general prohibitions against carrying PEDs using
lithium batteries on aircraft are seen as unpopular options because the use of lithium
batteries in such devices is so commonplace. During the course of reauthorization,
Congress may consider whether the FAA needs to work more closely with the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), and other government entities to ensure that risks to aircraft
safety posed by consumer PEDs are minimized.
Infant and Toddler Seats
The lack of specific regulations for restraining children under two years of age
in airliner cabins has been a continuing point of contention between the FAA and the
NTSB. While the NTSB has recommended that the FAA issue child restraint
requirements since 1995, the FAA has resisted. The FAA had issued an advanced
notice of proposed rulemaking to comply with the NTSB recommendation in May

²²¹ These aircraft technologies are discussed in greater detail in the section on technological
objectives and core technologies of the next generation air transportation system.
²²² “The Laptop Flare-up, The NTSB Rekindles Objections to Onboard Electronics,” Air
Safety Week, August 21, 2006, p. 1.

1999, but withdrew this proposal in August 2005, largely based on the argument that
the increased cost of purchasing a seat for a young child would prompt many families
to drive instead of fly, which arguably poses a greater risk of death or serious injury
to all family members. The NTSB, on the contrary, believes that all aircraft
occupants should be restrained during takeoff, landing, and in turbulence, and that
infants and small children should be restrained using a restraint system tailored to
their height and weight. Also, the NTSB questions the validity of the argument that
diversion to highway travel is a valid justification for not mandating the use of child
restraints for occupants under two years old.²²³ The airlines view the potential of
diversion to highway travel as a significant threat to the industry, and note that
increased security measures following the 9/11 terrorist attacks have already diverted
large numbers of potential customers to travel by highway instead. The airlines
believe that the revenue loss due to diversions would far outweigh any revenue gains
realized by requiring occupants under two years to be ticketed.
Instead of imposing mandatory regulatory requirements for child restraints, the
FAA encourages voluntary compliance with its stated recommendation that “strongly
urges” travelers to secure children in an appropriate restraint based on weight and
size, and recently issued public education materials to promote these safe practices.²²⁴
The FAA also announced in September 2006 its approval of new lightweight child
safety restraint designed solely for use in aircraft.²²⁵
Congress has largely remained silent on this issue, allowing the FAA to pursue
regulatory options and promoting voluntary compliance as it sees fit. However, in
consideration of the continuing disagreement between the NTSB and the FAA on this
issue, options for improving the safety of child occupants of airliner cabins may be
debated in the current reauthorization process. Besides regulatory mandates, options
to increase the use of child restraints on aircraft may include improved public
education and awareness of the safety risks to unrestrained occupants including
infants and toddlers, and incentives to airlines that develop innovative approaches to
increase the use of child restraints for passengers under the age of two.
Energy and Environmental Considerations
Recent uncertainty over petroleum supply and growing policy interest in
identifying alternative fuel sources may generate interest in this issue during debate
over FAA reauthorization. Although energy issues have not been a major focus of
past FAA reauthorization processes, a provision allowing the use of passenger
facility fees to fund the acquisition of low-emission airport ground vehicles was
included in Vision 100. Further assessment of alternative fuels both for airport
ground vehicles and for aircraft may arise as an issue during debate in Congress over

²²³ National Transportation Safety Board, Most Wanted Transportation Safety
Improvements — Federal Issues, Aviation, Require Restraint Systems for Children Under

2, Washington, DC.

²²⁴ Federal Aviation Administration, Childproof Your Flight (Undated).
²²⁵ Federal Aviation Administration, FAA Approves New Child Safety Device Government
Gives Parents More Options for Safe Air Travel with Children, September 6, 2006.

FAA reauthorization. With regard to environmental impacts, concerns over noise
have long dominated the policy debate. However, debate over aircraft emissions
policies could play a larger role in this reauthorization process, in response to
growing international pressures to set standards and goals for reducing aircraft
emissions. A key policy issue centers on whether current industry demand for more
fuel efficient aircraft will result in adequate emissions reductions over time, or
whether more proactive policies to curtail aircraft emissions are needed. Debate over
aircraft noise policy may focus on whether emerging quiet aircraft technologies can
yield substantive noise reductions, whether adequate noise level reductions can be
attained through industry demand for more efficient aircraft designs or whether
stricter aircraft noise standards may be needed, and whether existing community
noise standards and noise policies are sufficient to mitigate noise impacts considering
forecast growth in air traffic and possible community growth in noise impacted areas.
Alternative Fuels for Aircraft
Recently, oil and refined petroleum prices have been relatively high. As a
result, airlines and other users of aviation fuels are increasingly interested in ways to
decrease fuel consumption which would have the effect of reducing air emissions,
to a lesser extent. Most of this attention has focused on increasing the fuel-efficiency
of jet aircraft, but plane manufacturers, fuel suppliers, and others have also turned
their attention to alternatives to petroleum fuels.
Roughly 99% of civilian aviation fuel used in the United States is jet fuel,²²⁶ and
most efforts have focused on jet fuel alternatives. Jet fuel is similar in composition
to kerosene or diesel fuel, so diesel fuel substitutes are of particular interest.
Synthetic diesel fuel can be produced from various processes, including the
conversion of natural gas to liquid fuel (often referred to as “gas-to-liquids” or GTL),
and the conversion of biological oils into biodiesel. Coal-derived fuels can also be
produced using processes similar to GTL. These fuels could potentially be used as
blending components to extend conventional jet fuel stocks, or as direct substitutes
for conventional fuel. However, there are some key cost and technical barriers to
using these fuels for aviation. Technical barriers include issues related to the
reliability, safety, and performance of the fuel. For example, biodiesel freezes at
higher temperatures than conventional jet fuel, which can be a problem in high-
altitude, low temperature environments. Therefore, research on biodiesel for aviation
has included studying whether additives can be used to lower the freezing point, or
whether heaters could be added to fuel tanks to maintain fuel temperature.
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), and the U.S. Air Force particularly,
are keenly interested in alternative supplies of jet fuel, both in terms of cost and in
terms of supply security. One of DOD’s goals is to use a single fuel, JP-8, in all of
its battlefield operations. JP-8 is a military-grade fuel similar to commercial Jet-A.
Roughly half of DOD’s total energy consumption (and 2/3 of DOD’s petroleum
consumption) in FY2005 was JP-8, much of it consumed by the Air Force in jet

²²⁶ Stacy C. Davis and Susan W. Diegel, U.S. Department of Energy, Transportation Energy
Data Book, 25^th Edition. 2006, Table 2.4.

aircraft.²²⁷ This heavy reliance on jet fuel has led the Air Force to study jet fuel
alternatives. In May 2006, the Air Force signed a contract with Syntroleum
corporation to supply 100,000 gallons of GTL for testing.²²⁸ In September 2006, the
Air Force began testing a blend of GTL and conventional JP-8 in a B-52 bomber.
Under the initial test plan, two of the plane’s eight engines were fueled with the
blend. If the test is successful, the Air Force plans to acquire an additional 100
million gallons of the fuel by 2008.²²⁹
While the vast majority of aircraft fuel is jet fuel, smaller piston engine planes
use high-octane leaded gasoline. A small number of general aviation planes are
operated on ethanol, a high-octane fuel produced from grains or sugar (mostly corn
in the United States). Leaded gasoline has been banned for automotive use since the
mid-1990s, and there is concern among some general aviators that leaded aviation
gasoline will eventually be banned as well. Therefore, there is interest in expanding
the use of ethanol and other alternatives in these smaller planes.
In addition to substituting alternative fuels in existing jet and piston aircraft,
research is ongoing on new engine technologies to incorporate other fuels and
engines. For example, various early, unmanned prototypes have been developed to
test the feasibility of solar- or hydrogen fuel cell-powered aircraft.
Alternative Fuels for Airport Ground Service Vehicles
While alternative fuels have been slow to penetrate into aviation, natural gas,
propane, and electric vehicles are widely used in airport ground service fleets,
including people movers, baggage transport, and food service. Often, alternative fuel
airport service vehicles are chosen mainly for air quality purposes, though in some
cases they can lead to cost reductions, as well. Generally, alternative fuel airport
service vehicles are incorporated into a State Implementation Plan (SIP) under the
Clean Air Act. If an area is not in compliance with federal air quality standards, a
state must submit an SIP to the Environmental Protection Agency outlining the
measures it will take to bring the area back into compliance. Often, SIPs include the
use of alternative fuel vehicles in state and municipal fleets, particularly at airports
located within nonattainment areas.²³⁰ Further, there is often state and federal
funding available for airports to purchase alternative fuel vehicles and to install the
fueling infrastructure (pumps, tanks, etc.) to support those vehicles.²³¹ Vision 100

²²⁷ U.S. Energy Information Administration. Annual Energy Review2 005. July 27, 2006.
Table 1.13: U.S. Government Energy Consumption by Agency and Source, Fiscal Years

1995 and 2005.

²²⁸ Staff Sgt. C. Todd Lopez, “Alternate fuel-powered B-52 to fly in September,” Air Force
Print News, May 15, 2006. [http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123020290]
²²⁹ Tom Shanker, “Military Plans Tests in Search for an Alternative to Oil-Based Fuel,” The
New York Times, May 14, 2006.
²³⁰ Nonattainment areas are localities where air pollution levels persistently exceed national
ambient air quality standards, or that contribute to ambient air quality in a nearby area that
fails to meet these standards.
²³¹ For more information, see U.S. Department of Energy, Alternative Fuels Data Center.
(continued...)

included a provision allowing passenger facility fees to be used for conversion to
low-emissions airport vehicles and ground support equipment. However, the
provision stipulates that the cost of conversion must not exceed the cost of a similar
vehicle used for the same purpose that is not considered low-emission, or the cost of
retrofitting existing vehicles to meet low-emission standards. During reauthorization
debate, Congress may examine this provision in particular, and how airports have
utilized this provision to fund purchases of low-emission vehicles.
Air Pollution
There are two major air pollution issues associated with aircraft and airports:
first, their contribution to the nonattainment of air quality standards (primarily
ground-level ozone in major metropolitan areas); and second, their contribution to
global climate change, from the emissions of aircraft in the upper troposphere.
Ozone Nonattainment Areas. Aircraft account for only about 0.5% of the
major categories of emissions from mobile sources in the United States, according²³²
to the Government Accountability Office, but the emissions tend to be
concentrated at airports in major cities. Most of these cities have not attained EPA’s
National Ambient Air Quality Standard for ozone, and must reduce emissions of
nitrogen oxides (NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) to reach attainment.
Ozone forms in the atmosphere as a result of reactions between VOCs and NOx (and
to a lesser extent, carbon monoxide) in the presence of sunlight. Comprehensive data
on the extent of airport/aircraft contributions to the problem are not available, but,
as one example, GAO estimated that aircraft produced about 3% of the nitrogen
oxides (NOx) and 5% of the carbon monoxide present in the Dallas-Fort Worth
(DFW) metropolitan area. GAO also estimated that ground support equipment
(which provide services such as aircraft towing, baggage handling,
maintenance/repair, refueling, and food service) accounted for nearly 3% of the
area’s NOx, concluding, “When all airport-related emissions are added together, we
estimated that the Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport was responsible for 6²³³
percent of nitrogen oxides in the metropolitan area.” Auxiliary power units, which
generate electricity and provide heat or air conditioning for planes parked at
terminals, are also significant sources of emissions.
The emission estimates for DFW may represent the high end of the spectrum.
At Boston’s Logan Airport, emissions of VOCs and NOx were estimated to²³⁴
contribute less than 1% of the emissions in the Boston area. Whatever the figure,
aircraft and airport operations are among the largest identifiable sources of emissions.

²³¹ (...continued)
Alternative Fuel Vehicle Fleets and Niche Markets for Airports.
[ h t t p : / / www.e e r e . e n e r gy. go v/ a f dc / a pps / a f vi n f o_a i r por t s .ht ml ]
²³² U.S. Government Accountability Office, Aviation and the Environment: Strategic
Framework Needed to Address Challenges Posed by Aircraft Emissions, Report No. GAO-
03-252, February 2003, p. 39. GAO’s data were obtained from the Environmental
Protection Agency.
²³³ Ibid., pp. 40-41.
²³⁴ Ibid., p. 40.

As other sources of pollution are subjected to more stringent controls, and as air
traffic grows, their relative contribution to emissions inventories is expected to
increase.
Many of the mobile sources of emissions involved in airport operations
(automobiles, vans, buses, and trucks) are subject to the same emission controls as
similar vehicles in use elsewhere. But aircraft themselves have not been subjected
to stringent controls. In general, emission standards for aircraft are imposed only
after agreement with members of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO). Unlike new automobiles, for example, which are required to reduce
pollution approximately 99% in comparison to uncontrolled models, standards for
aircraft NOx emissions were reduced 20% at the end of 1999 and a further 16% at
the end of 2003. When the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated
the latest set of standards, it said:
EPA believes that today’s standards will not impose any additional burden
on manufacturers, because manufacturers are already designing new
engines to meet the ICAO international consensus standards.... Today’s
standards are aimed at assuring that this progress is not reversed in the
future.²³⁵
It is unlikely that aircraft emission standards will play a prominent role in FAA
reauthorization. After negotiations with ICAO, these standards are set by EPA — not
by FAA — using the authority of the Clean Air Act. Attempting to control aircraft
emissions through legislation reauthorizing FAA could raise jurisdictional issues,
particularly in the House.
Airport operations are more likely to be addressed in an FAA bill. As part of
the state implementation plans for achieving air quality standards, several airports
have already implemented programs to require the use of alternative fuels in certain
ground support equipment or shuttle services. A related area of interest is the
electrification of airport gates to eliminate emissions from auxiliary power units.
Vision 100 directed the FAA to establish a national program to reduce airport ground
emissions at commercial service airports located in air quality nonattainment and
maintenance areas.²³⁶ The Voluntary Airport Low Emissions (VALE) program
allows airport sponsors to use Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grants and
Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) funds to finance low emission vehicles, refueling
and recharging stations, gate electrification, and other airport air quality
improvements.²³⁷
VALE is restricted to financing capital improvements and cannot pay for
operations or maintenance costs such as fuel purchases. The range of uses for PFC
funding is broader than are allowable under AIP. For example, AIP funds are limited
to vehicles and infrastructure for “alternative fuel” use as defined by the Department
of Energy whereas the PFC program allows for use of clean conventional fuels.

²³⁵ 70 Federal Register 69675, November 17, 2005.
²³⁶ Currently, roughly 160 airports can participate.
²³⁷ See [http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/airports/environmental/vale/]

Significantly, VALE program funding is restricted to the “incremental” cost
differential between the higher priced low-emission vehicle and the lower price of
a conventional fuel vehicle. Retaining, changing, or eliminating these restrictions or
eligibility criteria could be considered during reauthorization.
Aircraft and Climate Change. Aircraft appear to play a larger role in global
climate change than in ground-level pollution. According to ICAO, “aircraft are
estimated to contribute about 3.5 per cent of the total radiative forcing (a measure of
change in climate) by all human activities and ... this percentage, which excludes the
effects of possible changes in cirrus clouds, was projected to grow.”²³⁸ The United
States is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol, which sets limits on emissions of the
gases that contribute to climate change, but most U.S. trading partners are. Several
of these partners (including the European Union) are considering fees or other
programs to encourage airlines to reduce emissions. Thus, there will be pressure in
the coming years to develop aircraft that are more fuel efficient and have fewer
emissions. Whether the FAA bill would be a vehicle for such efforts remains to be
seen.
Mitigating Aircraft Noise Through Policy and Technology
Since the introduction of civil jet airliners in the early 1960s, significant
reductions in noise emissions have been made. A systematic effort to curtail aircraft
noise impacts has reduced the number of people in the United States exposed to what
is considered significant noise levels from about 7 million in 1975 to less than
400,000 today. This has been accomplished by technological advancements in
reducing noise emissions as well as efforts to mitigate community noise exposure
around airports. While significant advances have been made over the years, the
United States is now at a crossroads in terms of its public policy toward aircraft noise
mitigation. Some experts predict that while the pace of noise reduction technology
will slow largely due to diminishing marginal gains in noise reduction capability,
increases in the demand for air travel coupled with continuing population growth
may largely offset any technical advances if there are no changes to existing policies
and approaches to mitigating aircraft noise and its impacts on communities.
Policymakers have long debated the relative merits of investing in noise
reduction technology or investing in noise mitigation efforts in affected communities.
In the past, a combination of both of these approaches has been applied. However,
faced with current challenges to reduce budget deficits and balance competing
priorities and programs, policymakers will likely face difficult decisions in allocating
future year budgets for noise reduction technology and noise mitigation.
Aircraft Noise Reduction Technologies and Technology Policy.
Policymakers may also face difficult decisions in setting realistic goals for future
reductions in aircraft noise levels. Some observers question whether meaningful
advances in noise reduction technology can be achieved citing diminished marginal
gains in noise reductions in recent years, while others, citing historical trends, suggest

²³⁸ ICAO, “Environmental Protection (ENV), Aircraft Engine Emissions, Definition of the
Problem,” at [http://www.icao.int/cgi/goto_m_atb.pl?/icao/en/env/aee.htm], visited August

18, 2006.

that aircraft noise emissions can be reduced to one-half of their current levels over
a period of about 20 years.²³⁹ In line with this optimistic view, NASA has set
ambitious goals to cut the perceived aircraft noise in half from 1997 baseline levels
by 2007, and in half again by 2022.²⁴⁰ Whether technological advancements to
reduce aircraft noise will continue to progress at these historical rates may depend,
in part, on the adequacy of funding for aircraft noise technology programs. However,
these investments are seen as being of relatively high risk because it is not certain to
what extent these historical trends can continue or whether significant technological
advances in noise reduction beyond what has already been achieved or demonstrated
are even possible.
Stage 3 and Stage 4 Noise Standards. Aircraft noise reduction
technologies over the past decade have been driven to some degree by national and
international noise standards. Current Stage 3 noise standards were completely
phased-in under rules promulgated by the FAA to meet the mandate of the Airport
Noise and Capacity Act of 1990 (ANCA; P.L. 101-508). Under the phase-in plan,
all aircraft operators were required to gradually transition to 100% Stage 3 compliant
aircraft operations by 2000 for aircraft weighing 75,000 pounds or more. For most
aircraft types, Stage 3 aircraft are considerably quieter than earlier generation Stage
2 aircraft whose noise guidelines were established in the early 1970s based on
available technical capabilities at that time. The most significant reductions in
permissible noise levels under Stage 3 were for 2-engine aircraft weighing between
125,000 and 600,000 pounds. This includes most airline fleets currently in operation
and typical reductions in permissible noise levels for these aircraft were in the range
of eight to 10 decibels, which is roughly equivalent to cutting the perceived noise
level by half.²⁴¹ The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has since
adopted more stringent noise standards, called Chapter 4 noise standards, for new
aircraft designs. These became effective in January 2006.²⁴² The FAA followed suit,²⁴³
establishing Stage 4 noise regulations mirroring the ICAO Chapter 4 requirements.
Stage 4 noise standards are required to be at least three to four decibels less than
Stage 3 permissible noise levels for all measurements, and must be at least two
decibels lower than Stage 3 permissible noise levels for each noise certification
configuration. Unlike Stage 3 regulations, Stage 4 requirements will only apply to
new aircraft type designs. Nonetheless, many modern aircraft with very high bypass

²³⁹ National Research Council, For Greener Skies: Reducing Environmental Impacts of
Aviation, National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2002.
²⁴⁰ Ibid.
²⁴¹ While a reduction of 3 decibels corresponds to reducing the acoustic energy emitted by
half, it generally takes about 10 decibels of noise reduction for human listeners to perceive
the sound as being half as loud.
²⁴² Because the proposed Stage 4 standards will apply only to new aircraft type designs,
aircraft manufactured after the January 6, 2006 compliance date will only have to meet these
standards if they are based on an entirely new type design. Aircraft manufactured under
existing type designs, such as the Boeing 737 or Airbus A-320, would not be required to
comply.
²⁴³ Federal Aviation Administration. “Stage 4 Aircraft Noise Standards; Final Rule.”
Federal Register, 70(127), 38741-38750, July 5, 2005.

ratio turbofan engines, such as the Boeing 777 and the Airbus A-340, already meet
the proposed Stage 4 requirements.
NASA’s Quiet Aircraft Technology Program. Besides regulatory action,
the federal government has fostered aviation noise reduction technology through
NASA’s quiet aircraft technology (QAT) program. The program’s goals are to
identify and develop technologies capable of reducing aircraft noise by 10 decibels,
compared to 1997 levels, by 2007 and by another 10 decibels by 2022. By
implementing these technologies, NASA hopes to keep aggregate aircraft noise
below a 65 decibel day-night average sound level (DNL) anywhere outside the airport²⁴⁴
boundary at most airports. The 65 DNL criterion is considered the maximum
permissible exposure level to aircraft noise in residential settings in land use planning
guidelines. NASA’s QAT program is focused on a variety of technical solutions to
reducing aircraft noise emissions and their impacts on residential communities that
are discussed in further detail below. Technologies being pursued under this program
include active noise reduction for turbine engines, engine fan blade and exhaust
nozzle designs, and improved landing gear fairings and other measures to reduce
airframe noise.
The FAA’s Center of Excellence in Aircraft Noise and Aviation
Emissions Mitigation. Besides the ongoing NASA QAT program, the FAA has
established a Center of Excellence in Aircraft Noise and Aviation Emissions
Mitigation to foster research in these areas. The lead university for this center is the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Seven other universities are also
participating along with 29 industry partners representing various interests and
technical perspectives. The program currently has nine ongoing projects: (1) Low
Frequency Noise Study; (2) Measurements, Metrics and Health Effects of Noise; (3)
Valuations and Tradeoffs of Policy Options; (4) Continuous Descent Approach at
Louisville International Airport (SDF); (5) Aircraft Operations & Air Traffic Control;
(6) Land Use and Airport Controls; (7) Quiet Rotorcraft and Short-Field Operations;
(8) Supersonic Transport Project; and (9) Measurements, Metrics and Health Effects
of Emissions.
Airport Noise Mitigation Policy. In terms of airport noise mitigation policy,
the various approaches to addressing noise problems at airports are addressed in two
chapters of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR): Title 14 CFR Part 150, Airport
Noise Compatibility Planning and Title 14 CFR Part 161, Notice and Approval of
Airport Noise and Access Restrictions. These regulations are commonly referred to
as the Part 150 and Part 161 processes. Additionally, airspace management and noise
abatement procedures are discussed in FAA policy documents and advisory
materials. These approaches include assessing noise levels and establishing noise
compatibility programs, reviewing and implementing noise-based access restrictions
at airports, and making modifications to airspace design and flight procedures to
mitigate noise in affected communities. The FAA has adopted formal procedures for
carrying out these approaches to meet statutory mandates for noise controls and work

²⁴⁴ DNL refers to the day-night average sound level at airports. The DNL is an energy
average of the aggregate noise exposure at a location that applies a specific penalty of 10
decibels for noise events occurring between 10 PM and 7 AM. The FAA has adopted the
DNL metric for describing community noise exposure around airports.

with airport operators and local communities to address airport noise issues. Each
of the approaches is discussed in further detail below.
Noise Exposure Maps and Noise Compatibility Programs. The
formal process for assessing airport noise and establishing programs to mitigate noise
is through the process described in Title 14 CFR Part 150. Completion of the Part
150 process, while not a mandatory requirement for airports, is a prerequisite for
federal funding of noise mitigation programs at airports, such as home and land
purchases and soundproofing of residences and schools, and is carried out to comply
with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA; 42 U.S. Code §4331 et seq.)
Thus, Part 150 defines the regulatory process for FAA compliance with NEPA and
related statutes pertaining to the submission of noise exposure maps (49 U.S. Code
§47503) and noise compatibility programs (49 U.S. Code §47504). Completion of
a Part 150 process primarily involves development of a noise exposure map for the
airport detailing noise exposure levels in surrounding areas, and establishment of a
noise compatibility program. The purposes of a noise compatibility program are:
^!To promote a planning process through which the airport operator
can examine and analyze the noise impacts, perform cost-benefit
analyses of various approaches to noise mitigation, and identify
existing and forecast areas of non-compatible land uses and consider
actions to reduce non-compatible use areas;
^!To bring together through public participation, agency coordination,
and overall cooperation, all interested parties to facilitate the
development of an agreed upon noise abatement plan tailored to the
individual airport while not unduly affecting the national air
transportation system; and
^!To develop feasible, comprehensive noise reduction techniques and
land use controls which, to the maximum extent possible, confine
noise levels of 75 DNL or greater to areas inside the airport
boundary and establish and maintain compatible land uses in the
areas affected by noise between the 65 DNL and 75 DNL²⁴⁵
contours.
Because land use zoning is largely a local function that is seldom preempted by
state or federal action, achieving compatible land uses typically involves close²⁴⁶
cooperation with local officials. In other words, simply having a Part 150 noise
compatibility program does not establish any formal requirement or obligation
regarding land use, but rather acts as a guideline for zoning. While the FAA notes
that the responsibility for determining acceptable and permissible land uses and the
relationship between specific properties and specific noise levels rests with local
authorities, its published land use compatibility tables specify that a DNL of 65 or
above is incompatible with residential use and schools, while other noise sensitive

²⁴⁵ 14 CFR Part 150 §B150.1.
²⁴⁶ While zoning is done at the local level in most states, in some states, the state government
can preempt local zoning and land use planning and plays a larger role in these decisions.

facilities like hospitals and churches may be located in areas where the DNL value
exceeds 65, but only if additional noise level reductions are achieved through design
and construction.²⁴⁷ Adopting local zoning practices that adhere to these guidelines,
while not obligatory, is recommended. According to FAA records, 260 airports are
participating in the Part 150 program, 241 of which have received federal Airport
Improvement Program (AIP) grants for completing a Part 150 study.
Noise-Based Access Restrictions at Airports. The Airport Noise and
Capacity Act of 1990 (ANCA, 49 U.S. Code §47521 et seq.) mandates a national
aviation noise policy for reviewing noise and access restrictions at airports. The
statute limited the applicability of this program to restrictions proposed after October
1, 1990. Under the provisions of the statute, limitations on Stage 3²⁴⁸ aircraft can
only be imposed if agreed to by the airport and all affected aircraft operators, or
adopted through a review process administered by the FAA. The types of aircraft
operating limitations covered under this provision include noise level restrictions
using either a single event or cumulative exposure criteria, a direct or indirect
limitation on the number of Stage 3 operations, a noise budget or noise allocation
program encompassing Stage 3 aircraft, a limitation on the hours of operation for
Stage 3 aircraft, or any other limit on Stage 3 aircraft. Proposed restrictions will be
approved only in cases where there is substantial evidence that the proposal: is
reasonable, nonarbitrary, and nondiscriminatory; does not create an undue burden on
interstate or foreign commerce; is not inconsistent with maintaining safe and efficient
use of navigable airspace; does not conflict with any existing federal statute or
regulation; and does not create an undue burden on the national aviation system.
The statute also limited the ability of airports to impose restrictions on noisier
Stage 2 aircraft, but made these restrictions relatively easier to impose. Under the
statute, airport operators are required to provide public notice of the proposed access
restriction, including a cost-benefit analysis and an analysis of alternatives. The
statute also phased-in the elimination of noisier Stage 2 aircraft weighing more than
75,000 pounds by December 31, 1999. Large Stage 2 aircraft, including all aircraft
in air carrier fleets, were either retired or retrofitted with new engines or hush-kits to
bring them into compliance with Stage 3 standards by the compliance date.
Consequently, a significant number of actions initiated under the Part 161 process
have been directed at curtailing or eliminating Stage 2 aircraft weighing less than
75,000 pounds, which is mainly targeted at smaller, older business jets and charter
aircraft.

²⁴⁷ 14 CFR Part 150 §A102.
²⁴⁸ The term Stage 3 and Stage 2 refer to specific aircraft noise certification requirements
described in Title 14 CFR Part 36. In general, Stage 2 aircraft are older and noisier than
similarly sized current generation Stage 3 aircraft. However, because the noise certification
requirements are dependent on weight and the number of engines, a small Stage 2 aircraft
may be quieter than a large Stage 3 aircraft. New aircraft designs must now meet more
stringent Stage 4 requirements.

The experience of Naples Airport in Florida illustrates the complexities of
attaining noise access restrictions.²⁴⁹ While the FAA approved the Naples Airport
Part 161 study in October 2001, the FAA subsequently denied the Naples Airport
Authority’s proposal to ban all Stage 2 aircraft on the basis that it appeared to
contradict the airport’s grant obligations under the Airport Improvement Program
(AIP, Title 49 U.S. Code §47101 et seq.). While the Naples Airport has moved
forward with imposing its ban on Stage 2 aircraft, it did so at the jeopardy of losing
future federal grants. The Naples Airport Authority, however, challenged the FAA’s
decision in federal court. On June 3, 2005, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia found that the Naples Airport Authority had provided ample
evidence justifying the Stage 2 ban and remanded the case back to the FAA.²⁵⁰
Despite this favorable outcome for airports, Stage 2 bans may be hard to justify from
a cost-benefit standpoint given their lengthy and costly process and the estimate that
only about 2,000 Stage 2 jets continue to operate in the United States and are being
phased-out over time.²⁵¹ In the case of Naples Airport, the number of aircraft affected
by the ban accounted for less than one percent of its total operations.²⁵²
Because the Part 161 process has proved to be such a significant hurdle for
airports seeking to impose access restrictions, as evidenced by the experience of
Naples Airport, a specific statutory waiver to the requirements of ANCA and the Part
161 process was included in Vision 100. Specifically, Section 825 of that act states
that “...a sponsor of a commercial service airport that does not own the airport land
and is a party to a long-term lease agreement with a Federal agency (other than the
Department of Defense or the Department of Transportation) may impose restrictions
on, or prohibit, the operation of Stage 2 aircraft weighing less than 75,000 pounds,
in order to help meet the noise control plan contained within the lease agreement.”
This particular language was specifically for the benefit of Jackson Hole Airport in
Jackson Hole, Wyoming where the airport is sited within the boundaries of Grand
Teton National Park. Pursuant to this provision, Jackson Hole Airport implemented
a Stage 2 ban that went into effect June 28, 2004. Given the complexities of the Part

161 process and airports’ experiences with proposing noise-based access restrictions,

airports may increasingly turn to Congress for relief from the requirements of ANCA
and the Part 161process of this sort in special circumstances. Airports may also seek
modifications to ANCA addressing ambiguities and streamlining the review process,
although CRS is unaware of any specific proposals to pursue such options.
Since noise ordinances and access restrictions that existed prior to the passage
of ANCA were “grandfathered” in, these restrictions can remain in full force without
review under the provisions set forth in ANCA. However, such ordinances may also
be required to meet federal grant obligations specifying that the airport will be

²⁴⁹ John Henderson, “Stage 2 jet ban battle scrutinized by airports throughout U.S.,” Naples
Daily News, June 15, 2003; David Esler, “Stage 2 Aircraft Drive Noise Policy,” Business
& Commercial Aviation, November 2002, pp. 54-74.
²⁵⁰ “Airports Claim Victory After Federal Court Upholds Stage 2 Noise Ban,” Inside FAA,
Vol. 9, No. 13, June 21, 2005.
²⁵¹ John Henderson, “Stage 2 jet ban battle scrutinized.”
²⁵² “Airports Claim Victory After Federal Court Upholds Stage 2 Noise Ban,” Inside FAA,
Vol. 9, No. 13, June 21, 2005.

available for public use on reasonable conditions and without unjust discrimination
if the airport receives AIP grants for airport improvements.²⁵³ In other words, if an
airport continues to enforce a noise ordinance and accepts AIP federal grants, the
airport may be compelled by the FAA or by user groups challenging the restriction
in the federal court system to substantiate that the noise restrictions do not unjustly
discriminate against certain users. One example of an access restriction challenged
on such grounds that was ultimately upheld was the non-addition rule and quotas on
Stage 2 aircraft at Van Nuys Airport in Van Nuys, California. At Van Nuys Airport,
there are restrictions on adding Stage 2 aircraft to the fleet based at Van Nuys, and
restrictions on the number of non-based Stage 2 aircraft operations. These
restrictions, which were proposed before the passage of ANCA and considered
exempt from Part 161 requirements by the FAA, were challenged by the National
Business Aircraft Association but upheld in federal court.²⁵⁴
Weight-Based Restrictions. Because permissible aircraft noise levels
generally increase as a function of aircraft weight, one method to curtail noise would
be to limit or restrict aircraft over a certain size. Doing so solely on the basis of noise
emissions would be governed by ANCA and the Part 161 process. However, some
airports have also sought to restrict larger aircraft outside of the Part 161 process
solely on the basis of pavement load-bearing criteria. In other words, airports have
sought to limit larger aircraft for reasons other than noise emissions, although
arguably noise emissions may be the most salient factor in community opposition to
the operations of such aircraft.
To curtail the practice of using pavement weight-bearing data to justify what
some may arguably consider noise-related restrictions, the FAA has proposed to
adopt a policy for justifying airport restrictions on the basis of pavement strength and
separating these types of actions from noise-related access restrictions. The FAA
proposes that the pavement load-bearing capacity be considered a design standard
that can be exceeded on occasion rather than an absolute limit on aircraft weight, and
has drafted a policy that would require airports adopting weight-based restrictions
based on pavement load-bearing capacity to demonstrate that those restrictions are²⁵⁵
reasonable and not unjustly discriminatory. The FAA notes that many airport
pavements are capable of supporting limited operations that exceed engineering
weight limits for pavement by up to 50%. The proposed policy goes on to note that
it applies only for considerations of operator investment in pavement, and is not a
substitute for noise restrictions. In other words, the FAA’s proposed policy, if
adopted, could significantly limit an airport’s capability to impose weight-based
restrictions without justifying these restrictions in terms of their direct impacts on
improving pavement durability, and could prevent airports from limiting larger
aircraft on the basis of weight alone outside of the Part 161 process.

²⁵³ 49 U.S. Code §47107.
²⁵⁴ National Business Aircraft Association, Update: Airport Noise and Access Restrictions.
[http://web.nbaa.org/ public/ops/airports/200405.php]
²⁵⁵ Federal Aviation Administration, “Weight-Based Restrictions at Airports: Proposed
Policy.” Federal Register, Vol. 68(126), Tuesday, July 1, 2003, pp. 39176-39178, as
corrected in Federal Aviation Administration, “Weight-Based Restrictions at Airports:
Proposed Policy,” Federal Register, Vol. 68(130), Tuesday, July 8, 2003, p. 40750.

To date, one airport — Teterboro Airport (TEB) in New Jersey — has been
successful in obtaining a specific statutory exemption from this proposed FAA
policy. Teterboro’s operational weight limit restricts aircraft weighing more than
100,000 pounds unless prior permission is obtained from the airport manager. The
intent of the legislation is to keep this requirement in full force regardless of the
FAA’s action regarding its proposed policy on airport weight limits.
Airspace Redesign and Procedural Modifications. Often noise
problems tied to a specific airport or airports in a regional area can be mitigated
through airspace redesign or modifications to operational procedures. Examples of
such actions abound and include actions such as reconfiguring approach patterns,
redefining preferred runways, and establishing airport traffic patterns that avoid
residential communities and other noise-sensitive areas. Large scale airspace
reconfigurations are currently in the planning and public review stages in the New
York-New Jersey-Philadelphia region, and in the Los Angeles Basin region. While
these airspace reconfigurations were initiated by the FAA for operational reasons,
they provide an opportunity to address community noise implications as required
under National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirements.
Recourse for seeking modifications to airspace layout or operational procedures
may be formally sought through a petition for rulemaking as described in Title 14
Code of Federal Regulations §11.17. Some airspace modification options may also
be considered as part of a larger Part 150 study and may benefit from the detailed
assessment of such options conducted as part of the Part 150 process. If a Part 150
study is not contemplated, then informal dialogue with the FAA may be a useful
avenue for discussing possible options for airspace modifications and operational
changes to mitigate noise. Such exchanges may provide a more complete perspective
on what options may be viable and what options may be significantly constrained by
concerns over the safety and efficiency of traffic flow of both arrivals and departures
as well as aircraft transiting the surrounding airspace.
One specific option that is being studied is implementing steeper, quieter
descents. Research examining the use of steeper approaches to runways has shown
particular promise in reducing community noise levels. Steeper approaches reduce
community noise by keeping aircraft at higher altitudes for longer periods, reducing
required engine power during descent, and delaying flap extension thus reducing
airframe noise. Recent testing of Continuous Descent Approach (CDA) noise-
abatement procedures that can be programmed into existing aircraft onboard flight
management systems yielded noise reductions of three to six decibels on average.
The most substantial noise reductions using such procedures are in communities that
lie about seven to 15 miles from the airport. However, traffic flow issues may limit
the ability to implement these types of approaches at a specific airport. Because these
procedures show particular promise for reducing noise levels, they may merit specific
study to determine their applicability for a specific airport environment.
International Civil Aviation Issues
Although not technically within the jurisdiction of the FAA, there are at least
three major international aviation issues that may arise as Congress considers

reauthorization of the agency. First, there is the potential that the “Open Skies”
agreement with the European Union will remain unsigned and unimplemented, which
is a major concern for many U.S. airlines given the legal uncertainty that currently
surrounds existing agreements with European Union members. Second, and closely
related to the “Open Skies” agreement, is the DOT’s rulemaking relating to foreign
ownership and control of domestic carriers, which, although the administrative
process has been completed, has not to date yielded a final rule. The delay has been
due in part to strong congressional opposition that has taken the form both of
legislation and attempts to prevent the final rule through appropriations riders.²⁵⁶
Finally, there is the longstanding issue of cabotage, which is defined as the
transportation of passengers or cargo by foreign air carriers from one point in the
United States to another and is, with a couple of narrow exceptions, generally
prohibited by U.S. law. In light of these pending and unresolved issues, a major
piece of aviation related legislation, such as the FAA reauthorization, may provide
Congress with a unique opportunity to legislate and play a major role with respect to
these developments in international civil aviation.
“Open Skies” Agreements
In 1992, the DOT introduced the “Open Skies” initiative and began negotiating
and entering into modern civil aviation agreements with foreign countries, as well as
individual members of the European Union (EU). Currently, the United States is a
party to 74 “Open Skies” Agreements worldwide.²⁵⁷ Among those countries are the
Netherlands, Austria, Czech Republic, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Iceland.²⁵⁸ As a result of a 2002
European Court of Justice ruling that several provisions of these bilateral “Open
Skies” Agreements violated EU law, the United States and the EU have been
negotiating a new Open Skies Agreement.²⁵⁹ An agreement appears to exist between

²⁵⁶ See H.R. 4542, 109^th Cong. (2005); see also S. 2135, 109^th Cong., 1^st sess. (2005); H.R.

4939, 109^th Cong., 1^st sess.(2006) (The 2006 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill);

Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, District of^th
Columbia and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2007, H.R. 5576 § 952, 109^nd
Cong., 2 sess. (2006); Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development, the
Judiciary, District of Columbia and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2007, H.R.^th^nd

5576 § 104, 109 Cong., 2 sess. (2006).

²⁵⁷ See Open Skies Partners, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Economic and Business
Affairs, available at [http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/2005/22281.htm] (providing a list
of the “Open Skies” Agreements currently in effect).
²⁵⁸ See Benoit M.J. Swinnen, An Opportunity for Trans-Atlantic Civil Aviation: From Open
Skies to Open Markets, 63 J.A^IRL.&C^OM. 249, 270 (1997).
²⁵⁹ The United States has publically asserted that “the current agreements would remain in
force as the legal basis for air services between the United States and individual Member
States.” See “U.S. Says “Open Skies” Pact with E.U. Nations in Force,” Agence France
Presse, Nov. 5, 2002 (quoting DOT spokesman Leonardo Alcivar). However, EU Vice
President Loyola de Palacio subsequently reminded EU nations that “they should start
procedures to terminate those agreements in order to ensure that they comply with their
obligations under Community law.” See EU Press Release No. 116/04, “EU Commission
Takes Action To Enforce ‘Open Skies’ Court Rulings,” July 20, 2004, available at,
(continued...)

the parties that if enacted would, inter alia, allow every EU and U.S. airline to fly
between every city in the European Union and every city in the United States and
would permit U.S. and EU airlines to determine the number of flights, their routes,
and fares according to market demand.²⁶⁰ In addition, the agreement would allow
carriers to freely enter into cooperative arrangements with other airlines, such as
code-sharing and leasing.²⁶¹
According to some commentators, as comprehensive as the proposed agreement
appears to be, there cannot be meaningful reform in the international aviation market
until Congress repeals the so-called “citizenship test,” which limits foreign
ownership and control of U.S. air carriers.²⁶² The proposed agreement itself does not
appear to address foreign ownership or control, thus it would seem to be left to each
party to determine its own rules and regulations independently.
Foreign Ownership and Control
Some news reports have indicated disappointment on the part of the EU over the
U.S.’s failure to formally adopt changes to U.S. foreign ownership and control
rules.²⁶³ Presently, U.S. law requires that, to operate as an air carrier in the United
States, an entity must be a “citizen of the United States.” To be considered a citizen
for civil aviation purposes, an entity must be owned either by an individual U.S.
citizen, a partnership of persons who are each U.S. citizens, or a corporation (1)
whose president and at least two-thirds of the board of directors and other managing
officers are U.S. citizens, (2) that is under the actual control of U.S. citizens, and (3)
has at least 75 percent of its voting stock owned or controlled by U.S. citizens.²⁶⁴
These “objective” citizenship requirements can only be amended by Congress
enacting a change to the statute. The DOT, however, has initiated a rulemaking
proceeding that exercises its discretionary authority to interpret the statute’s
requirement of “actual control” in a manner that would likely increase opportunities
for foreign investment in U.S. airlines.²⁶⁵

²⁵⁹ (...continued)
[ h t t p : / / www.eur uni on.or g/ news/ p r e ss/ 2004/ 200400116.ht m] .
²⁶⁰ See U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Fact Sheet: U.S., E.U. Air
Transport Agreement, November 18, 2005, available at
[http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2005/Nov/ 21-680403.html ].
²⁶¹ See id.
²⁶² See Professor Brian F. Havel, Commentary at the Institute of Economic Affairs’ 13^th
Annual Conference “The Future of Air Transport,” (Nov. 29, 2005) (transcript available at
[http://dms es.dot.gov/docimages/pdf95/378128_web.pdf]).
²⁶³ See, e.g., Darren Goode, DOT Delays Decision on Foreign Ownership of Airlines,
National Journal’s CongressDaily PM. August 16, 2006.
²⁶⁴ See 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(15)(A)-(C) (2000).
²⁶⁵ See 70 Fed. Reg. 67,389 (Nov. 7, 2005). DOT has subsequently issued a Supplemental
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the foreign control issue that clarifies its initial proposal
and responds to many of the comments and concerns raised by both congressional and
industry participants. See 71 Fed. Reg. 26,425 (May 7. 2006).

The DOT has received numerous comments, both in favor of, and in opposition
to its proposed interpretation of the actual control rule. Commentators have focused
specifically on the DOT’s legal authority to reinterpret the “actual control”
requirement. Supporters of the DOT’s action generally assert that the phrase “actual
control,” though it appears in the statute, is vague, undefined and, therefore, subject
to departmental interpretation.²⁶⁶ Conversely, opponents of the rulemaking assert that
when Congress specifically added the phrase “actual control” to the statute, they were
in effect codifying the DOT’s long-standing precedent and not granting any
additional authority over the interpretation of the phrase than previously existed.²⁶⁷
The proposed rulemaking has also received significant attention from some
Members of Congress, with several Members filing written comments with the DOT
expressing concerns with respect to Civil Reserve Air Fleet commitments, airline
employees, and consumer protection issues.²⁶⁸ Additionally, companion House and
Senate bills were introduced in the 109^th Congress to address this issue. H.R. 4542
and S. 2135 (109^th Congress) both contain provisions that would prevent the DOT
from issuing a final decision on the rulemaking for a period of one year after the date
of enactment.²⁶⁹ Finally, appropriations riders have been drafted that would
effectively forestall the DOT from finalizing its rulemaking on this issue.
Lawmakers were unsuccessful with their attempt at a rider in the 2006 Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Bill.²⁷⁰ However, attempts to include language in the

2007 Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary,

District of Columbia Appropriations Bill²⁷¹ continue, and if unresolved could
resurface during the drafting and debate on the FAA reauthorization language.

²⁶⁶ See Comments of United Airlines, Docket OST-2003-15759, 7-9 available at
[http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf95/380696_web.pdf] (Jan. 6, 2006); see also Comments
of Delta Airlines, Docket OST-2003-15759, 9, available at,
[http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf95/380757_web.pdf] (Jan. 6, 2006); Comments of
Federal Express Corporation, Docket OST-2003-15759, 9, available at,
[http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf95/380710_web.pdf] (Jan. 6, 2006).
²⁶⁷ See Comments of Continental Airlines, Docket OST-2003-15759, 5-6, available at,
[http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf95/381133_web.pdf] (Jan. 6, 2006) (citing 149 Cong.
Rec. S7813 (June 12, 2003) (stating that the DOT assured the Congress that the amendment
“will not in any way affect DOT’s existing determination of what constitutes a citizen of the
United States”)). For a more detailed and complete analysis of the rulemaking and
subsequent comments, see CRS Report RL33255, Legal Developments in International Civil
Aviation, by Todd B. Tatelman.
²⁶⁸ See, e.g., Letter from The Honorable Don Young, Chairman of the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure and The Honorable John L. Mica, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Aviation to The Honorable Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Transportation 2-3 (Dec. 8, 2005) available at
[http://dms es.dot.gov/docimages/pdf95/378411_web.pdf].
²⁶⁹ See H.R. 4542, 109^th Cong. (2005); see also S. 2135, 109^th Cong. (2005).
²⁷⁰ See H.R. 4939, 109^th Cong. (2006).
²⁷¹ See, e.g.,Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary,
District of Columbia and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2007, H.R. 5576 § 952,^th^nd

109 Cong., 2 sess. (2006).

Cabotage
Another major issue facing international civil aviation law is cabotage.
Cabotage is the right of a foreign airline to carry passengers and/or cargo between
airports of the same country (e.g., from New York to Los Angeles).²⁷² Currently, the
Federal Aviation Act contains a general prohibition against cabotage activity by
foreign air carriers.²⁷³ Congress last amended the cabotage laws as part of Vision

100.²⁷⁴ The enacted changes permit “eligible cargo” to be removed from aircraft,

including foreign aircraft, in Alaska and “not be deemed to have broken its
international journey in, be taken on in, or be destined for Alaska.”²⁷⁵ These
provisions provide for a very limited statutory exception to the general prohibition
against cabotage activities.
Although currently not a major negotiation point with respect to U.S. “Open
Skies” agreements, it appears that statutory changes would be required before the
executive branch can enter into any sort of agreement purporting to liberalize the
cabotage rules. Although foreign aircraft are allowed to navigate within U.S.
airspace, unless specifically authorized either by statute or DOT regulations they are
not permitted to perform any form of cabotage within the United States.²⁷⁶ While it
is unclear what, if any, economic effect a more liberal cabotage policy would have
on the domestic airline industry, only Congress has the legal authority to amend the
Federal Aviation Act and permit foreign carriers to have cabotage rights.

²⁷² See B^LACK’^SL^AWD^I^C^TI^ONARY 194 (7th Ed. 1999).
²⁷³ 49 U.S.C. § 41703(c)(1)-(2) (2000) (stating that “aircraft may take on for compensation,
at a place in the United States, passengers or cargo destined for another place in the United
States only if — (1) specifically authorized under section 40109(g) of this title; or (2) under
regulations the Secretary prescribes authorizing air carriers to provide otherwise authorized
air transportation with foreign registered aircraft under lease or charter to them without
crew”).
²⁷⁴ Vision 100 — Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, P.L. 108-176, § 808 117 Stat.

2588 (Dec. 12, 2003).

²⁷⁵ Id. (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 41703(e)(1)).
²⁷⁶ 49 U.S.C. § 41703(c)(1)-(2) (2000).

Appendix 1: Glossary of Key Aviation Technology
Terms and Concepts
Aviation is a field rich with acronyms and system specific terms. This glossary
provides a listing of some of the key new technical terms and their acronyms
associated with near-term and long-range operational concepts for air traffic
management (ATM) , and communication, navigation, and surveillance (CNS)
infrastructure. While this is far from an exhaustive list of aviation terminology and
acronyms, its purpose is to provide the reader with a reference to several of the key
new terms and concepts likely to be encountered during debate over FAA
reauthoriz ation.
Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B). A system for
broadcasting aircraft identification, position, altitude, heading, and speed data derived
from on-board navigation systems such as a Global Positioning System (GPS)
receiver unit. ADS-B out functionality refers to a basic level of ADS-B aircraft
equipage where navigation data is transmitted only. Aircraft reception of ADS-B
signals from other air traffic or traffic, weather, and flight information from ground
stations is referred to as ADS-B in. The ADS-B system is envisioned as a future
means for air traffic surveillance that may, to a large extent, replace radar
surveillance of air traffic in the future.
Next Generation Air Transport System (NGATS) . A proposed major
overhaul of the national airspace system (NAS) relying on new air traffic
communications, navigation, and surveillance (CNS) and air traffic management
(ATM) technologies to greatly enhance effective system capacity. The DOT
envisions NGATS as a system capable of tripling effective system capacity by 2025.
Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO). A multi-agency office
of the federal government headed by the FAA that was created under Vision 100 that
is charged with the tasks of establishing the enterprise architecture or blueprint for
the NGATS and providing overarching leadership and direction to ensure interagency
cooperation and collaboration with industry to bring the NGATS vision to its
fruition.
Required Navigation Performance (RNP). A performance standard that
defines the required position accuracy needed to keep the aircraft within a specified
containment area, or bubble, 99.9% of the time. The required navigational
performance is not tied to any specific technology, but sets a technical standard that
can be met using various FAA-approved technologies. While precision satellite-
based navigation is currently the principal technology for meeting RNP standards,
these standards allow for the use of other technologies — including yet to be
developed technologies — to meet navigational performance standards.
Area Navigation (RNAV). A navigational performance standard for aircraft
that provides a specific capability to establish very accurate waypoints, or specific
navigational reference points, that can be positioned anywhere in the airspace system,
thus eliminating the need to define airways and terminal arrival and departure
procedures in references to specific ground-based navigational stations. The RNAV

concept has been around since the 1970s and has historically rely on ground-based
navigational stations and distance measuring equipment (DME) to navigate using
more direct routing. At present, the primary aircraft technology being utilized to
meet these performance requirements is WAAS-enabled GPS, with DME considered
by many to be a possible backup, or secondary means, to determine aircraft position
and accurately follow precise flight routes.
Global Positioning System (GPS). A system that utilizes receivers that
monitor signals from a constellation of satellites that transmit precise timing signals
to compute highly accurate position and time information. GPS is already used for
a wide variety of applications, including aerial navigation. However, augmented
GPS signals using a signal correction system called Wide Area Augmentation
(WAAS) is regarded as an enabling technology for providing initial satellite-based
precision navigation capability to fly precise flight paths and approaches and perhaps,
for future application to provide accurate surveillance capabilities through the
Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) capability.
Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS). A system that improves the
accuracy of Global Positioning System (GPS) data, providing aircraft with accuracy
within three meters horizontally and vertically, 95% of the time. The system was
launched throughout the United States in July 2003, and in March 2006 the FAA
certified the system for providing primary navigational guidance to descend as low
as 200 feet above the ground during precision approach procedures in low visibility
and cloud conditions, matching the minimum descent altitudes of standard (Category
I) Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach procedures.
System Wide Information Management (SWIM). A proposed system for
aviation system data sharing, consisting of a seamless infrastructure for data
exchange, similar to the World Wide Web, where users can readily access needed
data that they are authorized to receive, replacing currently cumbersome and non-
integrated databases and communications protocols. As envisioned, SWIM will
consist of an extensive, scalable data network to share real time operational
information, such as flight plans, flight trajectories, weather, airport conditions, and
temporary airspace restrictions across the entire airspace system.