Cuba: Issues for the 110th Congress

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Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the communist
nation through economic sanctions, which the Bush Administration has tightened significantly. A
second policy component has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including
private humanitarian donations and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. As ^th
in past years, the main issue for U.S. policy toward Cuba in the 110 Congress was how to best
support political and economic change in one of the world’s remaining communist nations.
Unlike past years, however, Congress examined policy toward Cuba in the context of Fidel
Castro’s departure from heading the government because of poor health. Raúl Castro, who had
served as provision head of government since July 2006, was selected on February 24, 2008 by
Cuba’s legislature to continue in that role officially.
In the first session of the 110^th Congress, Congress fully funded the Administration’s FY2008
request for $45.7 million for Cuba democracy programs in the Consolidated Appropriations Act
for FY2008 (P.L. 110-161). In other first session action, on July 27, 2007, the House rejected
H.Amdt. 707 to H.R. 2419, the 2007 farm bill, that would have facilitated the export of U.S.
agricultural exports to Cuba. In the second session, the Senate approved S.Res. 573 on May 21,
2008, which recognized the struggle of the Cuban people. In both sessions, there were Cuba
provisions in several House and Senate appropriations measures (H.R. 2829, H.R. 3161, S. 1859,
H.R. 7323, and S. 3260) that would have eased restrictions on travel and on U.S. agricultural
sales to Cuba, but none of these provisions were included in enacted measures.
Numerous other legislative initiatives on Cuba were introduced in the 110^th Congress, but were
not considered. Several of these initiatives would have eased sanctions: H.R. 177 (educational
travel); H.R. 216 (Cuban baseball players); H.R. 217 and H.R. 624 (overall sanctions); H.R. 654,
S. 554, and S. 721 (travel); H.R. 757 (family travel and remittances); H.R. 1026 (sale of U.S.
agricultural products); H.R. 2819/S. 1673 (sale of U.S. agricultural and medical products and
travel); and S. 1268, S. 2953, H.R. 3182, and H.R. 3435 (development of Cuba’s offshore oil). S.
554 would have terminated U.S.-government sponsored television broadcasting to Cuba. Several
initiatives would have tightened sanctions: H.R. 525 (related to U.S. fugitives in Cuba), and H.R.
1679/S. 876 and S. 2503 (related to Cuba’s offshore oil development). Two initiatives, H.R. 1306
and S. 749, would have amended a provision of law restricting the registration or enforcement of
certain Cuban trademarks; five initiatives—H.R. 217, H.R. 624, H.R. 2819, S. 1673, and S.
1806—would have repealed the trademark sanction. H.R. 5627 and S. 2777 would have awarded
the congressional gold medal to Cuban political prisoner Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet. H.Res. 995
would have commemorated the 1996 shootdown of two U.S. civilian planes by Cuba. S. 3288 had
a provision that would have funded U.S. work to establish anti-drug cooperation with Cuba. In
the aftermath of Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, several initiatives would have temporarily eased
some U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba: H.R. 6913, H.R. 6962, and S.Amdt. 5581 to S. 3001.
This report reflects legislative developments through the 110^th Congress, and will not be updated.
For additional information on Cuba, see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel
and Remittances, and CRS Report RS22742, Cuba's Political Succession: From Fidel to Raul
Castro

Major Developments in 2008..........................................................................................................1
Major Developments in 2007..........................................................................................................4
Political Conditions.........................................................................................................................7
Background to the Succession..................................................................................................9
Human Rights..........................................................................................................................10
Overvi ew ....................................................................................................................... .... 10
Varela Project and the National Dialogue.........................................................................13
Assembly to Promote Civil Society..................................................................................13
Economic Conditions....................................................................................................................14
Economic Changes Under Raúl..............................................................................................15
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba..............................................................................................................17
Bush Administration Policy....................................................................................................18
May 2004 Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba Report.........................................18
July 2006 Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba Report..........................................19
U.S. Reaction to Fidel’s Ceding of Power........................................................................20
October 2007 Policy Speech ............................................................................................22
U.S. Response to Raúl’s Official Selection as President..................................................22
Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations.....................................................................................................23
Debate on the Overall Direction of U.S. Policy......................................................................23
Aftermath of 2008 Hurricanes and Tropical Storms...............................................................24
Legislative Initiatives........................................................................................................25
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances..................................................................................26
Legislative Initiatives........................................................................................................28
Agricultural Exports and Sanctions.........................................................................................29
Legislative Initiatives........................................................................................................30
Trademark Sanction................................................................................................................32
Offshore Oil Sector Development...........................................................................................33
Drug Interdiction Cooperation................................................................................................35
Legislative Initiatives........................................................................................................36
Cuba and Terrorism.................................................................................................................37
Cuba as the Victim of Terrorism.......................................................................................38
U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights.......................................................40
Oversight of U.S. Democracy Assistance to Cuba............................................................41
Radio and TV Marti................................................................................................................43
Controve rs ies .................................................................................................................... 44
Funding ........................................................................................................................ ..... 46
Migration Issues......................................................................................................................47
1994 and 1995 Migration Accords....................................................................................47
Coast Guard Interdictions.................................................................................................47
U.S. Travel Documents.....................................................................................................49
Migration Talks.................................................................................................................49
Guantanamo Naval Base.........................................................................................................50
Legislation in the 110^th Congress..................................................................................................51
Approved Measures................................................................................................................51
Additional Legislative Initiatives............................................................................................52

Legislation in the 109^th Congress..................................................................................................58
Appropriations Measures........................................................................................................58
Human Rights Resolutions......................................................................................................59
For Additional Reading.................................................................................................................60
Active CRS Reports................................................................................................................60
Archived CRS Reports............................................................................................................60
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................61

On December 17, 2008, Cuban President Raúl Castro offered to exchange some imprisoned
Cuban political dissidents for five Cubans imprisoned for espionage in the United States since
2001. The State Department responded that the jailed dissidents in Cuba should be released
immediately without any conditions.
On December 10, 2008, the House Appropriations Committee reported its version of the FY2009
Financial Services and General Government Appropriations bill, H.R. 7323, with several
provisions that would have eased restrictions on the sale of U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba and
on family travel to Cuba. A draft version of the bill had been approved by the committee on June

25, 2008. No final action was taken on the measure.

On November 26, 2008, Cuban President Raúl Castro stated in an interview that he would be
willing to meet with President-elect Barack Obama, and suggested the U.S. Naval Base at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as a location.
On November 24, 2008, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a second report
examining USAID’s Cuba democracy program. While GAO lauded the efforts taken by USAID
to improve oversight and address problems with the program, it also maintained that USAID
needed to hire more staff to implement monitoring activities, and that it needed to periodically
assess the program’s efforts regarding grantees’ adherence to internal controls, procurement
practices, and compliance with laws and regulations. (U.S. GAO, Foreign Assistance: Continued
Efforts Needed to Strengthen USAID’s Oversight of U.S. Democracy Assistance for Cuba, GAO-

09-165, November 2008.)

On November 8, 2008, Hurricane Paloma struck Cuba devastating the town of Santa Cruz el Sur.
Raúl Castro stated that overall damages from the series of hurricanes and tropical storm since
August amounted to some $10 billion.
On September 18, 2008, the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on International
Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight held a hearing on U.S. restrictions on Cuban-
American travel to Cuba.
From mid-August through September 10, 2008, four major storms (Hurricanes Gustav and Ike,
and Tropical Storms Hanna and Fay) caused widespread damage throughout Cuba. The two
hurricanes caused most of the damage. Overall, just 7 people were killed, but the hurricanes
severely affected the housing sector (with almost 500,000 homes damaged and over 63,000
destroyed), the power grid, and the agricultural sector. The United States provided assistance
through non-governmental organizations. U.S. offers of direct assistance to the Cuban
government were rejected. Instead, Cuba called on the United States to allow U.S. companies to
sell relief supplies to Cuba. In the aftermath of the hurricanes, several legislative initiatives were
introduced – S.Amdt. 5581 (Dodd) to S. 3001, H.R. 6913 (Flake), and H.R. 6962 (Delahunt) –
that would have temporarily eased U.S. embargo restrictions in several areas. No action was
taken on these initiatives. (See “Aftermath of 2008 Hurricanes and Tropical Storms” below.)
On July 21, 2008, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the FY2009
Agriculture Appropriations bill, S. 3289 (S.Rept. 110-426), with a provision (section 737) that
would have eased restrictions on travel to Cuba for the sale of agricultural and medical goods. No
action was taken on the measure.

On July 18, 2008, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the FY2009
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, S. 3288
(S.Rept. 110-425). Among its Cuba provisions, the bill would have provided $1 million for
preliminary work by the Department of State, or other entity designated by the Secretary of State,
to establish cooperation with appropriate Cuban agencies on counternarcotics matters. The report
to the bill recommended full funding for the Administration’s requests of $34.392 million for
Cuba broadcasting and $20 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs, and called for the State
Department and USAID to conduct regular evaluations to ensure the cost effectiveness of the
programs. No action was taken on the measure.
On July 14, 2008, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the FY2009
Financial Services and General Government Appropriations bill, S. 3260 (S.Rept. 110-417),
which included provisions that would have eased restrictions on payment terms for the sale of
agricultural goods to Cuba (section 618), travel relating to the sale of commercial and agricultural
goods (section 619), and family travel (section 620). No action was taken on the measure.
On July 11, 2008, the GAO issued a report that criticized the practices of the International
Broadcasting Bureau and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting for their practices in awarding
noncompetitive contracts in December 2006 to two private U.S. commercial stations to transit
Radio and TV Martí. According to GAO, the approach for awarding the two contracts did not
reflect sound business practices. (U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Broadcasting to
Cuba, Weaknesses in Contracting Practices Reduced Visibility into Selected Award Decisions,”
GAO-08-764, July 2008.)
On June 25, 2008, the House Appropriations Committee approved a draft version of the FY2009
Financial Services and General Government Appropriations bill that included provisions that
would have eased restrictions on family travel and U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba. The House
Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government had approved the
measure on June 17. No action was taken on the measure. (Also see “Restrictions on Travel and
Remittances” and “Agricultural Exports and Sanctions” below.)
On June 19, 2008, the European Union approved the permanent lifting of diplomatic sanctions
that it had imposed on Cuba in 2003. The action was largely symbolic, because the sanctions had
been temporarily suspended since 2005. Cuban Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque welcomed
the EU’s decision, which will be reviewed in 12 months. U.S. State Department officials looked
positively at the benchmarks that will be used in the EU’s dialogue with Cuba, including Cuba’s
release of political prisoners, implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, access to the Internet, and allowing all EU delegations to meet with members of the
opposition as well as the Cuban government.
On June 13, 2008, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it deported a U.S. citizen
wanted in the United States for sexual exploitation of a minor and for child pornography who had
entered Cuba from Mexico in April.
On June 4, 2008, the State Department issued its 2008 Trafficking in Persons Report, with Cuba
again placed on the Tier 3 list of countries that do not cooperate in the fight against trafficking.
According to the report, Cuba is principally a source country for women and children trafficked
within the country for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation. Cuba rejected the report as
distorting Cuban reality in an attempt to justify the U.S. embargo. Although countries on the list

are subject to U.S. foreign aid sanctions, Cuba is already ineligible for most U.S. assistance
because of other aid sanctions.
On May 21, 2008, the Senate passed S.Res. 573 (Martinez) by unanimous consent, which
recognized Cuba Solidarity Day and the struggle of the Cuban people. On the same day, President
Bush called for the Cuban government to take steps to improve life for the Cuban people,
including opening up access to the Internet. He also announced that the United States would
change U.S. regulations to allow Americans to send mobile phones to family members in Cuba.
On May 19, 2008, Cuba accused the chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, Michael
Parmly, of carrying mail to dissidents that contained private funds from Santiago Alvarez, a
Cuban American currently jailed in Miami on weapons charges.
In April 2008, the Cuban government announced that it would be revamping the state’s wage
system by removing the limit that a state worker can earn. (See “Economic Changes Under Raúl”
below.)
In March 2008, the Cuban government announced the lifting of restrictions on the sale of such
electronic consumer products as microwaves, DVD and video players, and on the sale and use of
cell phones. It also began rolling out a reform of the agricultural sector focusing on
decentralization in order to boost production. The government also lifted a ban on Cubans staying
at tourist hotels.
On March 11, 2008, the State Department issued its 2007 report on human rights practices in
Cuba, maintaining that the Cuban “government continued to deny its citizens their basic human
rights and committed numerous, serious abuses.” See the full report at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/
rls/hrrpt/2007/100635.htm.
On March 7, 2008, President Bush asserted that in order to improve U.S.-Cuban relations, Cuba
“must release all political prisoners...have respect for human rights in word and deed, and pave
the way for free and fair elections.”
On March 5, 2008, the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere held a hearing on Cuba
in the aftermath of Fidel Castro permanently stepping down from power.
On February 24, 2008, Cuba’s legislature, the National Assembly of People’s Power, selected
Raúl Castro as President of the Council of State, a position that makes him Cuba’s head of state
and government. In a surprise move, the Assembly also selected José Ramón Machado Venture as
the Council’s First Vice-President, making him the official successor to Raúl according to the
Cuban Constitution. A physician by training, Machado is 77 years old and part of the older
generation of so-called históricos, part of the 1959 Cuban revolution.
On February 19, 2008, Fidel Castro announced that he would not accept the position of President
of the Council of State when Cuba’s legislature meets on February 24 to select from among its
ranks the members of the 31-member Council of State.
On February 16, 2008, Cuba released four political prisoners—union activist Pedro Pablo Alvarez
Ramos, human rights activist Omar Pernet Hernández, and journalists Jose Gabriel Ramón
Castillo and Alejandro González Raga—but sent them into forced exile to Spain. The four had
been imprisoned since March 2003.

On January 20, 2008, Cuba elected representatives to its 614-member legislature, the National
Assembly of People’s Power, and Fidel Castro was once again among those elected. As in the
past, voters were offered only a single slate of candidates.

On December 11, 2007, the Senate Finance Committee held a hearing on the issue of “Promoting
American Agricultural and Medical Exports to Cuba” and a related bill, S. 1673 (Baucus).
On December 10, 2007, Cuba announced that it would sign two international human rights
agreements, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Amnesty International welcomed the news,
but noted that Cuba’s action would only be meaningful if the government changed its policies of
intimidation and arrests of political dissidents.
On December 4, 2007, Cuban security officials raided a Catholic Church hall in the city of
Santiago, using tear gas and force to detain 18 dissidents who had been protesting the recent
arrests of youths in Havana. Church officials said that Cuban government officials subsequently
apologized for invading church property, and had released the dissidents.
On November 30, 2007, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report on U.S.
enforcement of the Cuba embargo. The report recommended: 1) that the Secretary of Homeland
Security direct Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to re-evaluate whether the level of
resources dedicated to inspecting passengers from Cuba at the Miami International Airport
effectively balances its responsibility for enforcing the Cuba embargo with its responsibilities for
keeping terrorists, criminals, and inadmissible aliens out of the country; and 2) that the Treasury
Department direct the Office of Foreign Assets Control to reassess the allocation of resources for
investigating and penalizing violations of the Cuba embargo with respect to the 20 other sanctions
programs it administers. (See the full report available at
[htt p://www.gao.gov/docsearch/abs tr act.php?rpt no=GAO -08 -80])
On November 15, 2007, the House Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights,
and Oversight of the Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing focusing on the case of Luis
Posada Carriles, alleged to be involved in the 1976 bombing of a Cuban airliner that killed 73
people.
On November 5, 2007, President Bush awarded Cuban dissident Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet with the
Presidential Medal of Freedom. Biscet, who has spent most of the last eight years in jail, was
sentenced in 2003 to 25 years in prison.
On October 24, 2007, President Bush made a policy speech that reflected a continuation of the
sanctions-based approach toward Cuba. The President also proposed three new initiatives to
provide support to the Cuban people: allowing licensed groups to provide computers and Internet
access to the Cuban people; inviting Cuban youths whose families are oppressed to participate in
the Partnership for Latin American Youth scholarship programs; and developing an international
multi-billion dollar Freedom Fund for Cuba to help the Cuban people rebuild their economy and
make the transition to democracy.

In a September 25, 2007, speech before the U.N. General Assembly, President Bush stated that
“the long rule of a cruel dictator is nearing its end” in Cuba, and called on the United Nations to
insist on free speech, free assembly, and free elections as Cuba “enters a period of transition.”
In a September 17, 2007, speech on Cuba, U.S. Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez stated,
“The Administration’s position has been unfailingly clear and consistent. Unless the regime
changes, our policy will not. We are prepared to respond to genuine democratic change in Cuba.”
On September 6, 2007, during consideration of the FY2008 foreign aid appropriations measure,
H.R. 2764, the Senate approved S.Amdt. 2694 (Martinez) by voice vote that increased funding
for Cuba democracy programs by $30.7 million to fully fund the Administration’s request of
$45.7 million. The Senate Appropriations Committee report to the bill (S.Rept. 110-128) would
have provided $15 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs.
On July 27, 2007, the House rejected, by a vote of 182-245, H.Amdt. 707 (Rangel) to H.R. 2419,
the 2007 farm bill. The amendment would have eased restrictions on the commercial sale of
agricultural products to Cuba by clarifying the meaning of “payment of cash in advance” for the
sale of such products; authorizing direct transfers between U.S. and Cuban financial institutions
for such sales; and authorizing the issuance of U.S. visas for Cubans to conduct activities,
including phytosanitary inspections, related to such sales.
On July 26, 2007, in a speech on Cuba’s revolutionary anniversary, Raúl Castro acknowledged
that Cuban salaries were insufficient to satisfy needs, and maintained that structural changes were
necessary in order to increase efficiency and production. He also reiterated an offer to engage in
dialogue with the United States, and strongly criticized U.S. trade and economic sanctions on
Cuba.
On July 19, 2007, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved its version of the FY2008
Agriculture appropriations bill, which included a provision, adopted in committee by voice vote,
that would authorize general licenses for travel to Cuba for the sale and marketing of U.S.
agricultural and medical goods. S. 1859 (Kohl) was subsequently introduced and reported by the
Senate Appropriations Committee on July 24, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-134), with the provision in
Section 741 of the bill.
On July 19, 2007, the U.S. International Trade Commission issued a report, requested by the
Senate Committee on Finance, maintaining that the U.S. share of Cuba’s agricultural, fish, and
forest imports would rise from one-third to between one-half and two-thirds if trade restrictions
were lifted. According to the report, lifting travel restrictions would result in travel by U.S.
citizens to Cuba rising to between 550,000 and 1 million from an estimate of 171,000 in 2005.
See the full report available at
[htt p://www.usitc.gov/ ext_re lations/news_release/2007/er0719ee1.htm]
On July 12, 2007, the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and
Oversight of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing on human rights and U.S.
foreign policy that examined the cases of Azerbaijan, Cuba, and Egypt.
On July 3, 2007, independent journalist Armando Betancourt Reina was sentenced to 15 months
in prison.

On June 28, 2007, the House passed H.R. 2829, the FY2008 Financial Services and General
Government Appropriations Act, which contains a provision in Section 903 that would prevent
Treasury Department funds from being used to implement a February 2005 tightening of policy
requiring the payment of cash in advance prior to the shipment of U.S. agricultural goods to
Cuba. The House adopted the provision when it approved H.Amdt. 467 (Moran, Kansas) by voice
vote.
On June 26, 2007, the Senate approved by unanimous consent S. 1612, a measure that would
amend the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to increase the potential civil and
criminal penalties against violators of U.S. sanctions law. Civil penalties would increase to not
exceed the greater of $250,000 (from $50,000) or an amount that is twice the amount of the
transaction, while criminal penalties would increased to not more than $1 million and/or 20 years
imprisonment.
On June 22, 2007, the House passed the FY2008 State, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, H.R. 2764, with several Cuba provisions. It would fully fund the
Administration’s request for $45.7 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for Cuba
democracy programs. (The House committee-reported bill would have provided $9 million in
ESF for such programs, but during June 21, 2007 floor consideration, the House approved
H.Amdt. 351 (Diaz-Balart) by a vote of 254-170 that increased funding for Economic Support
Funds (ESF) by $36.7 million in order to fully fund the Administration’s request.) The House-
passed bill, in Section 607, would prohibit direct funding for Cuba, and, in Section 673, would
specifically prohibit International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement assistance to the
Cuban government. The report to the bill, H.Rept. 110-197, recommended $33.681 million for
Cuba broadcasting, $5.019 million below the Administration’s request of $38.7 million and
identical to the amount provided for FY2007.
On May 9, 2007 a federal judge in Texas dismissed immigration fraud charges against Luis
Posada Carriles, alleged to be involved in the 1976 bombing of a Cuban airliner and 1997
bombings in Cuba. The judge maintained that the U.S. government mistranslated testimony from
Posada and manipulated evidence. Posada had been released from jail in New Mexico on April

19, 2007, and allowed to return to Miami under house arrest awaiting trial.

On May 3, 2007, Cuban authorities prevented a hijacking from Havana to the United States by
two military recruits who killed an army lieutenant colonel that they had taken hostage. Cuba
denounced U.S. immigration policy for encouraging such violent action.
On April 25, 2007, Cuba expelled U.S. fugitive Joseph Adjmi to the United States. Adjmi had
been convicted of mail fraud in the 1960s, but disappeared before beginning his 10-year sentence.
On April 24, 2007, the Cuban government released six dissidents, arrested in 2005, after serving
most or all of their sentences.
On April 23, 2007, one of Cuba’s longest serving political prisoners, Jorge Luis García Pérez, was
released from prison after 17 years.
On April 16, 2007, many of Cuba’s leading dissident groups signed a statement declaring that
they were united in their struggle for a peaceful transition toward democracy.

In April 2007, the Cuban government conducted secret trials sentencing human rights activist
Rolando Jiménez Posada to 12 years in jail, and independent journalist Oscar Sánchez Madan to
four years.
On February 8, 2007, Cuba extradited alleged Colombia drug cartel leader Luis Hernando Gómez
Bustamante to Colombia. Gómez Bustamante was ultimately extradited to the United States in
July 2007 to face on drug trafficking charges.
In February 2007, the Cuban government released three political prisoners that had been held
since July 2005 before a planned protest at the French Embassy: prominent dissident René
Gómez Manzano was released February 8, while dissidents Julio César López and Raúl Martinez
were released on February 3.
In January 11, 2007 testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Defense
Intelligence Agency Director Lt. Gen. Michael Maples stated that “Raúl Castro is firmly in
control as Cuba’s acting president and will likely maintain power and stability after Fidel Castro
dies, at least for the short-term.”

On February 24, 2008, Cuba’s legislature selected Raúl Castro as President of the 31-member
Council of State, a position that officially made him Cuba’s head of government and state. Most
observers expected this since he already had been heading the Cuban government on a
provisional basis since July 2006 when his brother Fidel Castro, Cuba’s long-ruling communist
leader, stepped down as President because of poor health.
For many years, Raúl, as First Vice President of the Council of State and the Council of
Ministers, had been the officially designated successor and was slated to become chief of state
with Fidel’s departure. Raúl also had served as Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces
(FAR) since the beginning of the Cuban Revolution. When Fidel stepped down from power in
late July 2006 because of poor health, he signed a proclamation that ceded political power to Raúl
on a provisional basis, including the positions of First Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party
(PCC), Commander in Chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), and President of the
Council of State.
Despite the change in government in February 2008, Fidel still holds the official title of First
Secretary of the PCC. In late April 2008, Raúl announced that the PCC’s sixth congress would be
held at the end of 2009 (the last was held in 1997). Some observers speculate that Fidel Castro
could officially be replaced as the head of the party at that time, and it is likely that some of the
PCC’s 25-member Political Bureau (Politburo) will be replaced.
While it was not a surprise to observers for Raúl to succeed his brother Fidel as head of
government, the selection of José Ramón Machado Ventura as the Council of State’s First Vice
President was a surprise. A physician by training, Machado is 77 years old, and is part of the older
generation of so-called históricos of the 1959 Cuban revolution. He has been described as a hard-
line communist party ideologue, and reportedly has been a close friend and confident of Raul’s

for many years.¹ Machado’s position is significant because it makes him the official successor to
Raúl, according to the Cuban Constitution. Many observers had expected that Carlos Lage, one of
five other Vice Presidents on the Council of State, would have been chosen as First Vice
President. He was responsible for Cuba’s economic reforms in the 1990s, and at 56 years of age,
represents a younger generation of Cuban leaders. While not rising to First Vice President, Lage
nevertheless retained his position as a Vice President on the Council of State, and also will
continue to serve as the Council’s Secretary.
Several key military officers and confidants of Raúl also became members of the Council,
increasing the role of the military in the government. General Julio Casas Regueiro, 72 years of
age, who already was on the Council, became one of its five vice presidents. Most significantly,
Casas, who had been first vice minister in the FAR, was selected by Raúl as the country’s new
Minister of the FAR, officially replacing Raúl in that position. Casas also is chairman of GAESA
(Grupo de Administracion Empresarial, S.A.), the Cuban military’s holding company for its
extensive businesses. Two other military appointments to the Council were Gen. Alvaro López
Miera, the army’s chief of staff, and Gen. Leopoldo Cintra Frías, who commanded the Western ²
army, one of Cuba’s three military regions.
Since Fidel stepped down from power in 2006, Cuba’s political succession from Fidel to Raúl
Castro has been characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. Although initially there were
not any significant economic changes under Raúl, there were signs that changes could be coming.
In July 2007 speech, Raúl maintained that structural changes were needed in the Cuban economy
in order to increase efficiency and production. In his first speech as President in February 2008,
Raúl promised to make the government smaller and more efficient, to review the potential
reevaluation of the Cuban peso, and to eliminate excessive bans and regulations that curb ³
productivity. Since March 2008, the government has implemented a number of economic
changes that from the outside might not seem significant, but are significant policy changes for a
government that has heretofore followed a centralized communist economic model. (See
“Economic Changes Under Raúl” below.)
While additional economic changes under Raúl Castro are likely, few expect there will be any
change to the government’s tight control over the political system, which is backed up by a strong
security apparatus. Some observers point to the reduced number of political prisoners, from 283
at the end of 2006 to around 219 in mid-2008 as evidence of a lessening of repression, but
dissidents maintain that the overall situation has not improved. Some observers contend that as
the new government of Raúl Castro becomes more confident of ensuring social stability and does
not feel threatened, it could move to soften its hard repression, but for now the government is
continuing its harsh treatment of the opposition. The selection of José Ramón Machado as First
Vice President also appears to be a clear indication that the Cuban government has no intention of
easing tight control over the political system.
For background, also see CRS Report RS22742, Cuba’s Political Succession: From Fidel to Raul
Castro, and CRS Report RL33622, Cuba’s Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy

¹^D^a^nie^l^D^o^m^b^ey^{, R}ⁱ^c^h^a^r^{d L}^a^ppe^r^,^a^{nd A}^ndr^e^w^W^a^r^d^{, “A}^Famⁱ^l^y^B^u^sⁱ^ne^s^s^,^C^u^ba^n-^A^m^e^r^ic^aⁿ^s^L^ook^B^e^y^{ond t}^h^e
^H^a^v^a^na^H^a^ndov^e^r^,”^Fina^nc^ia^{l T}ⁱ^m^e^s^,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{27, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
²^P^a^blo^Ba^c^h^e^l^e^t^{, “}^N^e^w^Cuba^{n L}^e^a^d^e^r^A^{dds Milita}^ry^L^o^y^a^{lists to T}^e^a^m^,”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^{, Fe}^br^ua^r^y^{25, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
³^“^C^uba^{: F}^u^{ll T}^e^x^t^of^R^a^{úl C}^a^s^t^r^o^’^s^N^a^tiona^{l A}^s^s^e^m^b^l^y^A^ddr^e^s^s^,^”^C^ubav^isⁱ^óⁿ^,^Havan^a^{(as t}^r^an^sl^at^ed^b^y^Op^en^S^o^u^r^ce
^C^e^nte^r⁾^Fe^br^ua^r^y^24,²⁰⁰⁸^.

Approaches, written in the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s stepping down because of poor health in

2006.

Until Fidel stepped down, he had ruled since the 1959 Cuban Revolution, which ousted the
corrupt government of Fulgencio Batista. In April 1961, Castro stated that the Cuban Revolution
was socialist, and in December 1961, he proclaimed himself to be a Marxist-Leninist. From 1959
until 1976, Castro ruled by decree. A Constitution was enacted in 1976 setting forth the PCC as
the leading force in state and society, with power centered in a Political Bureau headed by Fidel ^th
Castro. In October 1997, the Cuban Communist Party held its 5 Congress (the prior one was
held in 1991) in which the party reaffirmed its commitment to a single party state and reelected
Fidel and Raúl Castro as the party’s first and second secretaries.
Cuba’s Constitution also outlines national, provincial, and local governmental structures.
Legislative authority is vested in a National Assembly of People’s Power that meets twice
annually for brief periods. When the Assembly is not in session, a Council of State, elected by the
Assembly, acts on its behalf. According to Cuba’s Constitution, the President of the Council of
State is the country’s head of state and head of government. Executive power in Cuba is vested in
a Council of Ministers, also headed by the country’s head of state and government, i.e. the
President of the Council of State. From the promulgation of the 1976 Constitution until February
24, 2008, Fidel served as served as head of state and government through his position as President
of the Council of State.
Although National Assembly members were directly elected for the first time in February 1993,
only a single slate of candidates was offered. Direct elections for the National Assembly were
again held in January 1998 and January 2003, but voters again were not offered a choice of
candidates. In contrast, at the local level elections for municipal elections are competitive, with
from two to eight candidates. To be elected, the candidate must receive more than half of the
votes cast. As a result, runoff elections between the two top candidates are common.
In 2007, the process of nominating candidates for the local municipal assemblies took place in
September 2007. Municipal elections were held October 21, 2007 (with runoffs on October 28),
and over 15,000 local officials were chosen. The new municipal assemblies then met on
December 2, 2007 to nominate candidates for provincial assemblies and for the National
Assembly of People’s Power.
National Assembly elections were held on January 20, 2008 (along with elections for 1,201
delegates to 14 provincial assemblies), and Fidel Castro was once again among the candidates
elected to the now 614-member legislative body. As in the past, voters were only offered a single
slate of candidates.
On February 24, 2008, the new Assembly was scheduled to select from among its ranks the
members of the Council of State and its President. Many observers speculated that because of his
poor health, Fidel would choose not be re-elected as President of the Council of State, which
would officially confirm his departure from heading the Cuban government. Statements from
Castro himself in December 2007 hinted at his potential retirement. That proved true on February
19, 2008, when Fidel announced that he would not accept the position as President of the Council
of State, essentially confirming his departure as titular head of the Cuban government.

Before Fidel stepped down from power in July 2006, observers discerned several potential
scenarios for Cuba’s future after Fidel. These fit into three broad categories: the continuation of a
communist government; a military government; or a democratic transition or fully democratic
government. According to most observers, the most likely scenario, at least in the short term, was
continued leadership under Raúl. This was likely for a variety of reasons, but especially because
of Raúl’s designation by Fidel as successor in the party and his position as leader of the FAR. The
FAR has been in control of the government’s security apparatus since 1989 and has played an
increasing role in Cuba’s economy through the ownership of numerous business enterprises. The
scenario of a military-led government was viewed by some observers as a possibility only if a
successor communist government failed because of divisiveness among leaders or political
instability. For many observers, the least likely scenario upon Fidel’s death or departure was a
democratic transition government. With a strong totalitarian security apparatus, the Castro
government successfully impeded the development of independent civil society, with only a small
and tightly regulated private sector, no independent labor movement, and no unified political
opposition.
Cuba has a poor record on human rights, with the government sharply restricting freedoms of
expression, association, assembly, movement, and other basic rights. It has cracked down on
dissent, arrested human rights activists and independent journalists, and staged demonstrations
against critics. Although some anticipated a relaxation of the government’s oppressive tactics in
the aftermath of the Pope’s January 1998 visit, government attacks against human rights activists
and other dissidents have continued since that time. The Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights maintains in its 2007 annual human rights report that the Cuban government’s “restrictions
on political rights, freedom of expression, and dissemination of ideas have created, over a period
of decades, a situation of permanent and systematic violations of the fundamental rights of Cuban ⁴
citi ze ns.”
According to the State Department’s human rights report for 2007, issued in March 2008, the
Cuban government continued to commit numerous serious abuses during the year. Among the
human rights problems cited in the State Department report were arbitrary arrest and detention of
human rights advocates and members of independent professional organizations; harassment,
beatings, and threats against political opponents by government-recruited mobs, police, and state
security officials; beatings and abuse of detainees and prisoners (which led to the death of two
prisoners in 2007); denial of fair trial; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions, including
denial of medical care; and interference with privacy, including pervasive monitoring of private
communications. As noted in the report, the government tightly controlled Internet access, with
citizens only accessing it through government-approved institutions or through a few Internet
facilities offered by foreign diplomatic offices. The government reviewed and censored e-mail,
and forbade attachments. (See the full State Department human rights report on Cuba, available at
http://www.sta te.gov/g/ drl/r ls/hrrpt/2007/100635.htm.)

⁴^O^r^g^a^niz^a^{tion of}^A^m^e^r^ic^aⁿ^Sta^t^e^s^,^Iⁿ^te^r^-^A^m^e^rⁱ^ca^{n C}^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on on}^H^u^m^a^{n R}ⁱ^g^h^ts^{, “}^A^nnua^{l R}^e^por^t^o^f^the^I^A^C^H^R
²⁰⁰⁷^,^{” Decem}^b^e^{r 2}⁹^,²⁰⁰⁷^,^“Ch^a^p^t^{er IV,}^Cub^{a” avai}^l^a^b^l^{e at}^h^t^t^p^:^/^/^www^.^cⁱ^d^h^.^o^r^g/^a^nnua^lr^e^p^/²⁰^07eⁿ^g^/^C^h^a^p^.4^b.htm^.

The government conducted a severe crackdown on activists in March 2003 and imprisoned 75
democracy activists, including independent journalists and librarians and leaders of independent
labor unions and opposition parties. At present, 55 of the “group of 75” political prisoners remain
incarcerated. The most recent release of the group of 75 occurred on February 16, 2008, when
Cuba released four political prisoners—union activist Pedro Pablo Alvarez Ramos, human rights
activist Omar Pernet Hernández, and journalists Jose Gabriel Ramón Castillo and Alejandro
González Raga—but sent them into forced exile to Spain. Prior to that, Hector Palacios was
released for health reasons in December 2006.
In 2007, the government released several other political prisoners, including prominent dissident
René Gómez Manzano and two others in February, and Jorge Luis García Pérez and six others in
April. Incarcerated for 17 years, García Pérez was one of Cuba’s longest serving political
prisoners. In August 2007, two more political prisoners were released after serving much of their
sentences: Francisco Chaviano Gonzalez, a leader of the dissident Cuban Civil Rights Council,
was released on medical parole after serving 13 of 15 years; Lazaro Gonzalez Adan was released
after serving three years in prison.
In July 2008, the independent Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation
(CCDHRN) documented at least 219 political prisoners, down from 234 in January 2008. This
number reflected a decline from previous years when the number of prisoners was at least 283 at
the end of 2006 and 333 at the end of 2005. The Commission maintains, however, that the real
number of prisoners is likely greater because of Cuba’s totalitarian regime that does not allow ⁵
scrutiny of the prison system.
Despite the reduction in the number of prisoners, human rights activists maintain that the overall
situation has not improved. Cuban human rights activist Elizardo Sánchez, the head of the
CCDHRN, asserts that the government is still repressing dissidents, with threats, police searches
of people’s homes, interrogations, and short detentions. Sánchez asserts that the police state is ⁶
still in force in Cuba, reflected in almost every aspect of national life. In late February 2008,
Cuba signed two U.N. human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Some
considered this a positive step, but others stressed that it remains to be seen whether the Cuban ⁷
government will take action to guarantee civil and political freedoms. One significant step taken
by the government in late March 2008 was the lifting of a ban on Cubans staying at tourist hotels.
Although few Cubans will be able to afford the cost of staying in such hotels, the move is
symbolically significant and ends the practices of what critics had dubbed “tourism apartheid.”
A human rights group known as the Ladies in White (Damas de Blanco) was formed in April

2003 by the wives, mothers, daughters, sisters, and aunts of the members of the “group of 75” ⁸

dissidents arrested a month earlier in Cuba’s human rights crackdown. The group conducts
peaceful protests calling for the unconditional release of political prisoners. Dressed in white, its
members attend Mass each Sunday at St. Rita’s church in Havana and then walk silently through
the streets to a nearby park. In October 2005, the group received the Sakharov Prize for Freedom
of Thought from the European Parliament. On April 21, 2008, ten members of the Ladies in

⁵^C^o^mⁱ^sⁱ^{ón C}^u^ba^na^de^D^e^r^e^c^hos^H^u^m^a^nos^y^R^e^c^onc^ilia^cⁱ^{ón N}^a^cⁱ^on^a^l^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t^12,²⁰⁰⁸^r^e^por^t.
⁶^Ibⁱ^d^;^Isab^el^S^aⁿ^c^h^ez,^“Cu^b^a^{’s Ra}^ú^l^Castro^Mark^{s 1}⁰⁰^Day^sⁱⁿ^P^o^w^e^r,”^A^g^en^{ce F}^r^aⁿ^ce-P^r^esse^{, J}^une^{2, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
⁷^J^a^m^e^s^C^.^Mc^Kⁱ^nle^y^{, J}^r^{, “}^C^uba^{n Sig}ⁿ^s^Rⁱ^g^h^ts^P^a^c^t^s^T^h^a^t^I^t^L^ong^H^a^{d Fo}^ug^ht,”^{New Y}^o^{rk Times}^{, M}^a^r^c^{h 1,}²⁰^08.
⁸^T^h^{e web}^sⁱ^t^e^o^f^t^h^{e Damas d}^e^Bl^an^coⁱ^s^avai^l^a^b^l^{e at}^ht^t^p^:^/^/^www^.^d^amasd^e^b^l^an^co^.^c^o^m^/^.

White were physically removed from a park near the Plaza of the Revolution in Havana when
they demanded the release of their husbands and the other members of the “group of 75” still
imprisoned.
In December 2006, independent Cuban journalist Guillermo Fariñas Hernández received the 2006
Cyber Dissident award from the Paris-based Reporters Without Borders. Fariñas went on a seven-
month hunger strike in 2006, demanding broader Internet access for Cubans.
In November 2007, President Bush awarded Cuban dissident Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet with the
Presidential Medal of Freedom. Biscet, who has spent most of the last eight years in jail, was ^th
sentenced in 2003 to 25 years in prison. Legislation was introduced in the 110 Congress in
March 2008—H.R. 5627 (Diaz-Balart, Lincoln) and S. 2777 (Martinez)—to award the
congressional gold medal to Biscet, although no action was taken on the measures.
Since late 2007, Cuban Internet blogger Yoaní Sánchez has received considerable international
attention for her website, Generación Y, that includes commentary critical of the Cuban
government. In May 2008, Sánchez was awarded Spain’s Ortega y Gasset award for digital
journalism, but the Cuban government did not provide her with an exit permit to accept the
award. (Sánchez’s website is available at http://www.desdecuba.com/generaciony/).
In late 2008, two international press rights groups gave awards to two Cuban independent
journalists who have been imprisoned since 2003. In November 2008, the New York-based
Committee for the Protection of Journalists selected Héctor Maseda Gutiérrez as a recipient of its
international press freedom award, while in early December 2008, the Paris-based press rights
groups Reporters Without Borders awarded Ricardo González Alfonso its journalist of the year
award. While in prison, Gutiérrez wrote a memoir that he managed to smuggle out of prison one
page at a time. Before his imprisonment, González had started an association to improve ⁹
independent journalism. As of December 2008, 23 journalists were imprisoned in Cuba.
Prior to the 60^th anniversary of the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on
December 10, 2008, up to a dozen Cuban human rights activists reportedly were detained in order ¹⁰
to prevent them from attending planned events.
On December 17, 2008, Cuban President Raúl Castro offered to exchange some imprisoned
Cuban political dissidents for five Cubans imprisoned for espionage in the United States since
2001. The five Cubans are serving sentences ranging from 15 years to life. Cuba’s National
Assembly had dubbed the so-called Cuban Five as “Heroes of the Republic,” and the Cuban
government has called for their return to Cuba. In response to Raúl Castro’s offer, the State
Department said that the jailed dissidents in Cuba should be released immediately without any ¹¹
conditions.

⁹^Fr^aⁿ^c^e^s^R^oble^s^{, "}^J^a^ile^{d C}^uba^{n J}^o^ur^na^lis^{t W}ⁱ^ns^P^r^iz^e^,^"^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^,^Decem^b^e^{r 5}^,²⁰⁰⁸^;^an^{d “Cu}^b^a^{’s Rep}^r^essi^oⁿ^,^”
^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^{24, 2}⁰^08.
¹⁰^Fraⁿ^c^e^s^Roble^s^{, "}^C^u^b^aⁿ^Polic^e^A^r^e^De^ta^ining^A^c^tiv^{ists P}^r^{ior t}^o^Hu^m^a^{n Rig}^h^{ts Da}^y^,^"^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^,^Dece^m^b^er¹¹^,
²⁰⁰^8.
¹¹^Ma^r^c^{o Si}^ba^ja^{, "}^R^a^u^{l C}^a^s^t^r^o^O^f^f^e^r^s^T^o^Fr^e^e^Dⁱ^s^sⁱ^de^ntsⁱⁿ^Ex^c^h^aⁿ^g^e^f^o^r^A^lleg^e^{d C}^uba^{n S}^p^ie^s^J^a^ile^d^{in U}^.^S^.,"
^Asso^cia^t^ed^{Press Newswires}^{, D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^18,²⁰⁰⁸^.

Named for the 19^th century priest, Felix Varela, who advocated independence from Spain and the
abolition of slavery, the Varela Project has collected thousands of signatures supporting a national
plebiscite for political reform in accordance with a provision of the Cuban Constitution. The
referendum, if granted, would call for respect for human rights, an amnesty for political prisoners,
private enterprise, and changes to the country’s electoral law that would result in free and fair
elections. The initiative is organized by Oswaldo Payá, who heads the Christian Liberation ¹²
Movement.
In May 2002, organizers of the Varela Project submitted 11,020 signatures to the National
Assembly calling for a national referendum. This was more than the 10,000 required under
Article 88 of the Cuban Constitution. Former President Jimmy Carter noted the significance of
the Varela Project in his May 14, 2002 address in Havana that was broadcast in Cuba. Carter
noted that “when Cubans exercise this freedom to change laws peacefully by a direct vote, the ¹³
world will see that Cubans, and not foreigners, will decide the future of this country.” In
response to the Varela Project, the Cuban government orchestrated its own referendum in late
June 2002 that ultimately led to the National Assembly amending the Constitution to declare
Cuba’s socialist system irrevocable. The Varela Project has persevered despite the 2003 human
rights crackdown, which included the arrest of 21 Project activists. In October 2003, Oswaldo
Payá delivered more than 14,000 signatures to Cuba’s National Assembly, again requesting a
referendum on democratic reforms. More recently, in October 2008, Varela Project activists
launched a third campaign to collect signatures.
Since December 2003, Payá has been involved in another project known as the National Dialogue
with the objective of getting Cubans involved in the process of discussing and preparing for a
democratic transition. According to Payá, thousands of Cubans have met in dialogue groups to
discuss a working document covering such themes as: economic, political, and institutional
changes; social issues; public health and the environment; public order and the armed forces; ¹⁴
media, science, and culture; reconciliation; and reuniting with the exile community.
Led by three prominent Cuban human rights activists—Marta Beatriz Roque, René Gómez
Manzano, and Felix Bone—the Assembly to Promote Civil Society held two days of meetings in
Havana on May 20-21, 2005, with some 200 participants. The date was significant because May
20 is Cuba’s independence day. Many observers had expected the government to prevent or
disrupt the proceedings. The Cuban government did prevent some Cubans and foreigners from
attending the conference, but overall the meeting was dubbed by its organizers as the largest ¹⁵
gathering of Cuban dissidents since the 1959 Cuban revolution. The Assembly issued a ten-¹⁶
point resolution laying out an agenda for political and economic change in Cuba. Among its
provisions, the resolution called for the release of all political prisoners, demanded respect for

¹²^For^f^u^r^t^he^r^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion, s}^e^e^the^w^e^bs^ite^of^O^s^w^a^ldo^P^a^y^á^{, a}^t^http:^//w^w^w^.osw^a^l^dopa^y^a^.or^g^/e^s^/^.
¹³^“T^e^x^t^o^f^Ji^mmy^C^a^rt^{er’s S}^p^eech^,^Bro^a^d^cast^Lⁱ^{ve t}^o^Cu^b^aⁿ^P^e^op^l^e^,^”^A^s^so^ci^at^ed^P^r^ess,^M^a^y¹⁵^,²⁰⁰²^.
¹⁴^O^s^w^a^ldo^P^a^y^á^{, “}^D^is^sⁱ^de^nts^’^G^o^a^l^{: A}^N^a^tiona^{l D}ⁱ^a^l^og^ue^,”^Mⁱ^{ami H}^e^rald^,^A^u^gu^st⁹^,²⁰⁰⁵^.
¹⁵^N^a^ncy^Sa^{n Ma}^r^tin^{, “}^‘^A^T^r^iu^m^ph’^{in C}^uba^a^s^Dⁱ^s^sⁱ^deⁿ^t^s^G^a^the^r^,”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^,^Ma^y^{21, 2}⁰⁰⁵^.
¹⁶^T^h^e^f^u^{ll te}^x^t^of^the^re^s^o^luti^on^is^a^v^a^ila^ble^{in S}^p^aⁿ^is^{h f}^r^om^Cuba^ne^t^:^htt^p^://w^w^w^.c^uba^ne^t.org^/^re^f^/^dis^/⁰⁵²³⁰⁵^.htm^.

human rights, demanded the abolition of the death penalty, and endorsed a 1997 dissident ¹⁷
document on political and economic rights entitled the “Homeland Belongs to Us All.”

With the cutoff of assistance from the former Soviet Union, Cuba experienced severe economic
deterioration from 1989-1993, with estimates of economic decline ranging from 35-50%, but
there has been considerable improvement since 1994. From 1994-2000, as Cuba moved forward
with some limited market-oriented economic reforms, economic growth averaged 3.7% annually.
Economic growth was strong in the 2005-2007 period, registering an impressive 11.2% in 2005
(despite widespread damage caused by Hurricanes Dennis and Wilma), 12.1% in 2006, and 7.3% ¹⁸
in 2007. The economy benefitted from the growth of the tourism, nickel, and oil sectors, and
support from Venezuela and China in terms of investment commitments and credit lines. Cuba
benefits from a preferential oil agreement with Venezuela, which provides Cuba with more than

90,000 barrels of oil a day. Some observers maintain that Venezuela’s oil subsidies amounted to ¹⁹

more than $3 billion a year in 2006. Venezuela also helped Cuba upgrade an oil refinery in
Cienfuegos, which was inaugurated in 2007.
In 2008, economic growth slowed to an estimated 4.5%. This was prompted by several problems,
including the declining price of nickel, which accounts for a major share of Cuba’s exports, the
rising cost of food imports, and the devastation wrought by Hurricanes Gustav and Ike in 2008, ²⁰
particularly in the agricultural sectors.
Over the years, Cuba has expressed pride for the nation’s accomplishments in health and
education. In 2005, according to the U.N. Development Program’s 2007/2008 Human
Development Report, life expectancy in Cuba was 77.7 years, adult literacy was estimated at
almost 100%, and the infant mortality rate was 6 per 1,000 live births, the lowest rate in Latin ²¹
America. For 2006 and 2007, Cuba has boasted an infant mortality rate of 5.3.
When Cuba’s economic slide began in 1989, the government showed little willingness to adopt
any significant market-oriented economic reforms, but in 1993, faced with unprecedented
economic decline, Cuba began to change policy direction. Beginning in 1993, Cubans were
allowed to own and use U.S. dollars and to shop at dollar-only shops previously limited to tourists
and diplomats. Self-employment was authorized in more than 100 occupations in 1993, most in
the service sector, and by 1996 that figure had grown to more than 150 occupations. Also in 1993,
the government divided large state farms into smaller, more autonomous, agricultural
cooperatives (Basic Units of Cooperative Production, UBPCs). It opened agricultural markets in
1994, where farmers could sell part of their produce on the open market, and it also permitted
artisan markets for the sale of handicrafts. In 1995, the government allowed private food catering,
including home restaurants (paladares), in effect legalizing activities that were already taking

¹⁷^Se^e^the^f^u^{ll te}^x^t^of^“^T^he^Hom^e^la^{nd Be}^l^ong^{s to}^Us^A^ll”^online^a^t^ht^tp://w^ww^.c^uba^ne^t.org^/^CNe^w^s/^y⁹^7/^jul97^/
^hom^doc^.htm^.
¹⁸^"^C^uba^C^o^untr^y^R^e^por^t,"^Ec^o^nom^{ist Inte}^lli^ge^nc^e^Unit^{, D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r²⁰⁰⁸^.
¹⁹^F^r^an^{ces Ro}^b^l^es,^“^V^en^ezu^el^an^Oi^l^S^u^b^sⁱ^dⁱ^e^{s t}^o^Cub^a^Bal^l^o^oⁿ^,^”^Mⁱ^a^m^{i He}^rald^,^A^u^gu^st^2,²⁰⁰⁷^.
²⁰^"^C^uba^C^o^untr^y^R^e^por^t,"^Ec^o^nom^{ist Inte}^lli^ge^nc^e^Unit^{, D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r²⁰⁰⁸^.
²¹^“^I^nf^aⁿ^{t Morta}^lity^{, .3 i}ⁿ²⁰^07!^”^G^r^anm^{a I}ⁿ^te^rⁿ^ac^ion^a^l^,^J^a^nua^r^y^4,²⁰⁰^8.

place), and approved a new foreign investment law that allows fully owned investments by
foreigners in all sectors of the economy with the exception of defense, health, and education. In
1996, it authorized the establishment of free trade zones with tariff reductions typical of such
zones. In 1997, the government enacted legislation to reform the banking system and established
a new Central Bank (BCC) to operate as an autonomous and independent entity.
After Cuba began to recover from its economic decline, the government began to backtrack on
some of its reform efforts. Regulations and new taxes made it extremely difficult for many of the
nation’s self-employed. Some home restaurants were forced to close because of the regulations.
In 2004, the Cuban government limited the use of dollars by state companies for any services or
products not considered part of their core business. Some analysts viewed the measure as an ²²
effort to turn back the clock on economic reform measures. Also in 2004, Fidel Castro
announced that U.S. dollars no longer would be used in entities that currently accept dollars (such
as stores, restaurants, and hotels). Instead, dollars had to be exchanged for “convertible pesos,”
with a 10% surcharge for the exchange. Dollar bank accounts are still allowed, but Cubans are not
able to deposit new dollars into the accounts. Beginning in April 2005, convertible pesos were no
longer on par with the U.S. dollar, but instead were linked to a basket of foreign currencies. This
reduced the value of dollar remittances sent to Cuba and provides more hard currency to the ²³
Cuban government.
When Raúl Castro assumed provisional power in July 2006, there was some expectation that the
government would be more open to economic policy changes, and a debate about potential
economic reforms re-emerged in Cuba. On July 26, 2007, in a speech commemorating Cuba’s
revolutionary anniversary, Raúl Castro acknowledged that Cuban salaries were insufficient to
satisfy needs, and maintained that structural changes were necessary in order to increase
efficiency and production. He also maintained that the government was considering increasing
foreign investment in the country. Some observers maintain that the speech was a forecast for
economic reforms under Raúl, while others stressed that only small marginal changes had ²⁴
occurred in Raúl’s first year in power.
In the aftermath of Raúl’s July 2007 speech, Cuban public expectations for economic reform
increased. Thousands of officially sanctioned meetings were held in workplaces and local PCC
branches around the country where Cubans were encouraged to air their views and discuss the
future direction of the country. Complaints focused on low salaries and housing and
transportation problems, and some participants advocated legalization of more private ²⁵
businesses. Raised expectations for economic change in Cuba increased the chance that
government actually would adopt some policy changes. Doing nothing would run the risk of
increased public frustration and a potential for social unrest. Increased public frustration was in
evident in a clandestine video, widely circulated on the Internet in early February 2008, of a
meeting between Ricardo Alarcón, the head of Cuba’s legislature, and university students in

²²^L^a^rr^y^L^u^xn^er,^“Ne^w^De^cree^Lⁱ^mi^t^s^Do^l^l^a^{r T}^r^an^sactⁱ^oⁿ^s^{as Cub}^a^Tⁱ^gh^t^eⁿ^s^Con^t^ro^l^s^Oⁿ^{ce A}^g^aiⁿ^,^”^C^ubaN^e^w^s^{, A}^p^ril
²⁰⁰^4.
²³^L^a^rr^y^L^u^xn^er,^“Cu^b^a^{’s ‘Co}ⁿ^v^ertⁱ^b^l^e^P^e^so^{’ N}^o^L^oⁿ^g^{er L}ⁱⁿ^k^ed^t^o^U.^S^.^Do^l^l^a^r,^”^C^u^b^a^News^,^A^p^rⁱ^l²⁰⁰⁵^,^p.^3.
²⁴^Ma^nue^{l R}^o^ig^-^F^r^a^nz^ia^{, “}^C^u^b^a^’^s^C^a^{ll f}^o^r^Ec^onom^ic^D^e^te^nte^,^”^W^a^s^hⁱ^ngt^{on Pos}^t^,^J^u^ly^27,²⁰^07.
²⁵^F^r^an^{ces Ro}^b^l^es,^“C^u^b^aⁿ^s^Urged^t^o^V^eⁿ^t^Vⁱ^ew^s,^”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^,^O^c^t^o^b^e^r^2,²⁰⁰⁷^.

which a student was questioning why Cuban wages are so low and why Cubans are prohibited
from visiting tourist hotels (a policy subsequently changed in late March 2008) or traveling
abroad. The video demonstrated the disillusionment of many Cuban youth with the poor
economic situation and repressive environment in Cuba.
Since Raúl Castro officially assumed the presidency in February 2008, his government has
announced a series of economic changes. In his first speech as President in February 2008, Raúl
promised to make the government smaller and more efficient, to review the potential reevaluation ²⁶
of the Cuban peso, and to eliminate excessive bans and regulations that curb productivity. In
mid-March, the government announced that restrictions on the sales of consumer products such as
computers, microwaves, and DVD and video players would be lifted. In late March, it announced
that it would lift restrictions on the use of cell phones, and this officially occurred in mid-April.
One of Cuba’s major reform efforts under Raúl Castro in 2008 was focused on the agriculture
sector, a vital issue because Cuba reportedly imports some 80% of its food needs and is paying an
increasing amount for such imports because of rising food prices. In an effort to boost food
production, the government is giving farmers more discretion over how to use their land and what
supplies to buy. Decision-making on agriculture reportedly has been shifted from the national
government to the local municipal level, with government bureaucracy reportedly cut ²⁷
significantly.
In April 2008, the government announced that it would be revamping the state’s wage system by
removing the limit that a state worker can earn. This an effort to boost productivity and to deal
with one of Cuba’s major economic problems: how to raise wages to a level where basic human
needs can be satisfied. Cuban state companies reportedly have until August to revise their salary ²⁸
structures in order to reward workers who work hard with more compensation. The problem of
low wages in Cuba is closely related to another major economic problem: how to unify the two
official currencies circulating in the country—the Cuban convertible peso (CUC) and the Cuban
peso, which trades for about 25 to 1 CUC. Most people are paid in Cuban pesos, and the ²⁹
minimum monthly wage in Cuba is about 225 pesos (about $9 U.S. dollars), but for increasing
amounts of consumer goods, convertible pesos are used. Cubans with access to foreign
remittances or work in jobs that give them access to convertible pesos are far better off than those
Cuban who do not have such access.
Looking ahead, several factors could restrain the magnitude of economic policy change in Cuba.
A number of observers believe that as long as Fidel Castro is around, it will be difficult for the
government to move forward with any major initiatives that are viewed as deviating from Fidel’s
orthodox policies. Other observers point to the significant oil subsidies and investment that Cuba
now receives from Venezuela that have helped spur Cuba’s high economic growth levels over the
past several years and maintain that such support lessens the government’s impetus for economic
reforms. Another factor that bodes against rapid economic policy reform is the fear that it could
spur the momentum for political change. Given that one of the highest priorities for Cuba’s

²⁶^“^C^uba^{: F}^u^{ll T}^e^x^t^of^R^a^{úl C}^a^s^t^r^o^’^s^N^a^tiona^{l A}^s^s^e^m^b^l^y^A^ddr^e^s^s^,^”^C^ubav^isⁱ^óⁿ^,^Havan^a^{(as t}^r^an^sl^at^ed^b^y^Op^en^S^o^u^r^ce
^C^e^nte^r⁾^Fe^br^ua^r^y^24,²⁰⁰⁸^.
²⁷^M^a^{rc F}^r^an^k,^“Raú^l^Cast^ro^Overhau^l^{s Cu}^b^a^{’s F}^a^rm^Bu^reau^crac^y^,^”^Reu^t^{ers News}^{, Ma}^y^{1, 200}^8.
²⁸^Fraⁿ^c^e^s^Roble^s^{, “}^C^uba^{ns W}^h^o^W^o^rk^More^W^{ill G}^e^{t Hig}^h^e^r^Sa^la^rie^s^,”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^{, J}^une^12,²⁰^08.
²⁹^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^Sta^t^e^,^“^C^ouⁿ^t^r^y^R^e^por^ts^{on H}^u^m^a^{n R}ⁱ^g^h^ts^P^r^a^c^tic^e^s²⁰⁰⁷^{, C}^u^ba^,”^Ma^r^c^h¹¹^{, 2}⁰^08.

government has been maintaining social and political stability, any economic policy changes are
likely to be smaller changes introduced over time that do not threaten the state’s control.
There was some expectation that Raúl Castro would announce additional economic reforms in his
July 26, 2008 speech on Cuba’s revolutionary anniversary, but there were no such
announcements. Instead, Castro acknowledged the “large number of problems that still need to be ³⁰
resolved, the majority of which directly affect the population.” Nevertheless, in an address
earlier in the month to the National Assembly, Raúl again pointed to the goal of increasing
salaries based on job performance. According to Castro: “Socialism means social justice and
equality, but equality of rights and opportunities, not salaries. Equality does not mean ³¹
egalitariani sm.”

In the early 1960s, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated sharply when Fidel Castro began to build a
repressive communist dictatorship and moved his country toward close relations with the Soviet
Union. The often tense and hostile nature of the U.S.-Cuban relationship is illustrated by such
events and actions as U.S. covert operations to overthrow the Castro government culminating in
the ill-fated April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion; the October 1962 missile crisis in which the United
States confronted the Soviet Union over its attempt to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba;
Cuban support for guerrilla insurgencies and military support for revolutionary governments in
Africa and the Western Hemisphere; the 1980 exodus of around 125,000 Cubans to the United
States in the so-called Mariel boatlift; the 1994 exodus of more than 30,000 Cubans who were
interdicted and housed at U.S. facilities in Guantanamo and Panama; and the February 1996
shootdown by Cuban fighter jets of two U.S. civilian planes operated by the Cuban American
group, Brothers to the Rescue, which resulted in the death of four U.S. crew members.
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the island nation
through comprehensive economic sanctions, including an embargo on trade and financial
transactions. The Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), first issued by the Treasury
Department in July 1963, lay out a comprehensive set of economic sanctions against Cuba,
including a prohibition on most financial transactions with Cuba and a freeze of Cuban
government assets in the United States. The CACR have been amended many times over the
years to reflect changes in policy, and remain in force today.
These sanctions were made stronger with the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 (P.L. 102-

484, Title XVII) and with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-

114), the latter often referred to as the Helms/Burton legislation. The CDA prohibits U.S.

subsidiaries from engaging in trade with Cuba and prohibits entry into the United States for any
vessel to load or unload freight if it has engaged in trade with Cuba within the last 180 days. The
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, enacted in the aftermath of Cuba’s shooting down
of two U.S. civilian planes in February 1996, combines a variety of measures to increase pressure
on Cuba and provides for a plan to assist Cuba once it begins the transition to democracy. Most
significantly, the law codified the Cuban embargo, including all restrictions under the CACR.

³⁰^“Cu^b^a^{: Raú}^l^Castro^{’s 2}⁶^Ju^ly^Re^b^e^llioⁿ^Day^Sp^eech^{,” Ha}^v^aⁿ^a^Cu^b^a^vⁱ^sióⁿ^(Op^eⁿ^S^o^u^r^{ce Cen}^t^{er), J}^u^ly²⁶^,²⁰⁰⁶^.
³¹^“Cu^b^a^:^T^e^xt^o^f^Raú^l^Cast^ro^{’s 1}¹^Ju^l^y^Natⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^A^s^s^e^m^b^l^y^S^p^eech^,^”^Havan^a^Cu^b^a^vi^si^óⁿ^(Op^eⁿ^S^o^u^r^c^e^Cen^t^er),^Ju^l^y
^{11, 20}⁰⁸^.

This provision is especially noteworthy because of its long-lasting effect on U.S. policy options
toward Cuba. The executive branch is circumscribed in lifting or substantially loosening the
economic embargo without congressional concurrence until certain democratic conditions are
met. Another significant sanction in the law is a provision in Title III that holds any person or
government that traffics in U.S. property confiscated by the Cuban government liable for
monetary damages in U.S. federal court. Acting under provisions of the law, however, both
President Clinton and President Bush have suspended the implementation of Title III at six-month
intervals.
In addition to sanctions, another component of U.S. policy, a so-called second track, consists of
support measures for the Cuban people. This includes U.S. private humanitarian donations,
medical exports to Cuba under the terms of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, U.S. government
support for democracy-building efforts, and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to ^th
Cuba. In addition, the 106 Congress approved the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export
Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that allows for agricultural exports to Cuba,
albeit with restrictions on financing such exports.
The Clinton Administration made several changes to U.S. policy in the aftermath of the Pope’s
January 1998 visit to Cuba, which were intended to bolster U.S. support for the Cuban people.
These included the resumption of direct flights to Cuba (which had been curtailed after the
February 1996 shootdown of two U.S. civilian planes), the resumption of cash remittances by
U.S. nationals and residents for the support of close relatives in Cuba (which had been curtailed
in August 1994 in response to the migration crisis with Cuba), and the streamlining of procedures
for the commercial sale of medicines and medical supplies and equipment to Cuba. In January

1999, President Clinton announced several additional measures to support the Cuban people.

These included a broadening of cash remittances to Cuba, so that all U.S. residents (not just those
with close relatives in Cuba) could send remittances to Cuba; an expansion of direct passenger
charter flights to Cuba from additional U.S. cities other than Miami (direct flights later in the year
began from Los Angeles and New York); and an expansion of people-to-people contact by
loosening restrictions on travel to Cuba for certain categories of travelers, such as professional
researchers and those involved in a wide range of educational, religious, and sports activities.
The Bush Administration essentially continued the two-track U.S. policy of isolating Cuba
through economic sanctions while supporting the Cuban people through a variety of measures.
However, within this policy framework, the Administration emphasized stronger enforcement of
economic sanctions and further tightened restrictions on travel, remittances, and humanitarian gift
parcels to Cuba. There was considerable reaction to the Administration’s June 2004 tightening of
restrictions for family visits and to the Administration’s February 2005 tightening of restrictions
on payment terms for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba.
In May 2004, President Bush endorsed the recommendations of a report issued by the inter-
agency Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, chaired by then-Secretary of State Colin
Powell. The Commission made recommendations for immediate measures to “hasten the end of
Cuba’s dictatorship” as well as longer-term recommendations to help plan for Cuba’s transition
from communism to democracy in various areas. The President directed that up to $59 million be

committed to implement key recommendations of the Commission, including support for
democracy-building activities and for airborne broadcasts of Radio and TV Marti to Cuba. The
report’s most significant recommendations included a number of measures to tighten economic
sanctions on family visits and other categories of travel and on private humanitarian assistance in
the form of remittances and gift parcels. Subsequent regulations issued by the Treasury and
Commerce Departments in June 2004 implemented these new sanctions. (The full Commission
report is on the State Department website at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/cuba/commission/

2004/.)

In 2005, the Administration continued to tighten U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba by further
restricting the process of how U.S. agricultural exporters may be paid for their sales. In July 2005,
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice appointed Caleb McCarry as the State Department’s new
Cuba Transition Coordinator to direct U.S. government “actions in support of a free Cuba.”
Secretary Rice reconvened the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba in December 2005 to
identify additional measures to help Cubans hasten the transition to democracy and to develop a
plan to help the Cuban people move toward free and fair elections.
In July 2006, the inter-agency Commission for Assistance to Free Cuba issued its second report
making recommendations to hasten political change in Cuba toward a democratic transition. The
full report is available at http://www.cafc.gov/rpt/.
The Commission called for the United States to provide $80 million over two years for the
following: to support Cuban civil society ($31 million); to fund education programs and
exchanges, including university training in Cuba provided by third countries and scholarships for
economically disadvantaged students from Cuba at U.S. and third country universities ($10
million); to fund additional efforts to break the Cuban government’s information blockade and
expand access to independent information, including through the Internet ($24 million); and to
support international efforts at strengthening civil society and transition planning ($15 million).
According to the Cuba Transition Coordinator, this assistance would be additional funding ³²
beyond what the Administration is already currently budgeting for these programs. Thereafter,
the Commission recommended funding of not less than $20 million annually for Cuba democracy
programs “until the dictatorship ceases to exist.” This would roughly double the amount currently
spent on Cuba democracy programs.
The report also set forth detailed plans of how the U.S. government, along with the international
community and the Cuban community abroad, could provide assistance to a Cuban transition
government to help it respond to critical humanitarian and social needs, to conduct free and fair
elections, and to move toward a market-based economy. The report also outlined a series of
preparatory steps that the U.S. government could take now, before Cuba’s transition begins, so
that it will be well prepared in the event that assistance is requested by the new Cuban
government. These included steps in the areas of government organization, electoral preparation,
and anticipating humanitarian and social needs.
The Commission report received a mixed response from Cuba’s dissident community. Although
some dissidents, like former political prisoner Vladimiro Roca, maintain that they would

³²^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^Sta^t^e^,^Se^c^oⁿ^d^R^e^por^{t of}^the^C^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^{on f}^o^r^A^s^sⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^{to a}^Fr^e^e^C^uba^{, B}^r^ie^fⁱ^ng^{, J}^u^ly^10,²⁰^06.

welcome any U.S. assistance that helps support the Cuban dissident movement, others expressed
concerns about the report. Dissident economist and former political prisoner Oscar Espinosa
Chepe stressed that Cubans have to be the ones to solve their own problems. According to Chepe,
“We are thankful for the solidarity we have received from North America, Europe, and elsewhere, ³³
but we request that they do not meddle in our country.” Miriam Leiva, a founding member of
the Ladies in White, a human rights organization, expressed concern that the report could serve as ³⁴
a rationale for the government to imprison dissidents. Leiva also faulted the Commission’s
report for presuming what a Cuban transition must be before U.S. recognition or assistance can be
provided. According to Leiva, “Only we Cubans, of our own volition ... can decide issues of such
singular importance. Cubans on the island have sufficient intellectual ability to tackle a difficult, ³⁵
peaceful transition and reconcile with other Cubans here and abroad.”
In response to Fidel Castro’s announcement that he was temporarily ceding power to his brother
Raúl, President Bush issued a statement on August 3, 2006, that “the United States is absolutely
committed to supporting the Cuban people’s aspiration for democracy and freedom.” The
President urged “the Cuban people to work for democratic change” and pledged U.S. support to
the Cuban people in their effort to build a transitional government in Cuba. U.S. officials
indicated that there are no plans for the United States to “reach out” to the new leader. Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice reiterated U.S. support for the Cuban people in an August 4, 2006,
statement broadcast on Radio and TV Marti. According to Secretary Rice, “All Cubans who ³⁶
desire peaceful democratic change can count on the support of the United States.”
Although there was some U.S. concern that political change in Cuba could prompt a migration
crisis, there was no unusual traffic after Castro ceded provisional power to his brother. The U.S.
Coast Guard had plans to respond to such a migration crisis, with support from the Navy if
needed. In her August 4, 2006, message to the Cuban people, Secretary of State Rice encouraged
“the Cuban people to work at home for positive change.” Department of Homeland Security
officials also announced several measures to discourage Cubans from risking their lives on the
open seas. U.S. officials also discouraged those in the Cuban American community wanting to
travel by boat to Cuba to speed political change in Cuba. (For more, see “Migration Issues”
below.)
Raúl Castro asserted in an August 18, 2006, published interview that Cuba has “always been
disposed to normalize relations on an equal plane,” but at the same time he expressed strong
opposition to current U.S. policy toward Cuba, which he described as “arrogant and ³⁷
interventionist.” In response, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs
Thomas Shannon reiterated a U.S. offer to Cuba, first articulated by President Bush in May 2002,
that the Administration was willing to work with Congress to lift U.S. economic sanctions if Cuba
were to begin a political opening and a transition to democracy. According to Shannon, the Bush
Administration remains prepared to work with Congress for ways to lift the embargo if Cuba is

³³^Nic^hola^s^Kra^l^e^v^{, “}^B^{ush OKs In}ⁱ^tⁱ^a^tiv^e^{to Su}^pp^{ort O}^p^p^o^sitio^n,”^Washⁱⁿ^gt^on^Tⁱ^mes^{, J}^u^ly^{11, 2}⁰⁰⁶^.
³⁴^F^r^an^{ces Ro}^b^l^{es and}^P^a^b^l^o^Bach^el^et^,^“P^l^aⁿ^f^o^{r Ch}^an^{ge i}ⁿ^Cub^a^G^e^t^s^OK,^”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald,^J^u^ly^11,²⁰^06.
³⁵^Mⁱ^ri^am^L^eⁱ^v^a,^“^W^{e Cu}^b^aⁿ^s^M^u^s^t^Deci^d^e^,^”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^,^J^u^ly¹⁵^{, 20}⁰⁶^.
³⁶^U.^S^.^Dep^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^S^t^at^e,^“S^ecret^ar^y^o^f^S^t^at^{e Co}ⁿ^d^o^l^{eezza Ri}^{ce M}^e^ssag^e^t^o^t^h^e^P^e^o^p^l^e^o^f^Cu^b^a^,^”^A^u^gu^st⁴^,²⁰⁰⁶^.
³⁷^“^N^{o Ene}^m^y^C^a^{n D}^e^f^e^a^t^U^s^,”^inte^r^v^iew^of^R^a^{úl C}^a^s^t^r^o^by^La^s^z^a^r^B^a^r^r^e^{do Me}^di^na^,^Di^a^r^io^Gran^ma^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t^{18, 20}^06.

prepared to free political prisoners, respect human rights, permit the creation of independent ³⁸
organizations, and create a mechanism and pathway toward free and fair elections.
In a December 2, 2006 speech, Raúl reiterated an offer to negotiate with the United States. He
said that “we are willing to resolve at the negotiating table the longstanding dispute between the
United States and Cuba, of course, provided they accept, as we have previously said, our
condition as a country that will not tolerate any blemishes on its independence, and as long as
said resolution is based on the principles of equality, reciprocity, non-interference, and mutual ³⁹
respect.”
On July 26, 2007, in a speech on Cuba’s revolutionary anniversary (commemorating the 1953
attack on the Moncada military barracks), Raúl Castro reiterated for the third time an offer to
engage in dialogue with the United States, and strongly criticized U.S. trade and economic
sanctions on Cuba. A U.S. State Department spokesman responded that “the only real dialogue ⁴⁰
that’s needed is with the Cuban people.”
In the aftermath of Fidel’s ceding of power to his brother, the Bush Administration established
five interagency working groups to manage U.S. policy toward Cuba. The State Department led
working groups on diplomatic actions, to build international support for U.S. policies; strategic
communications, to ensure that Cubans understand U.S. government positions; and democratic
promotion. The Commerce Department led a working group on humanitarian aid, in the event
that a democratic transition government requests assistance. The Department of Homeland ⁴¹
Security and the National Security Council headed a working group on migration. In addition to
these working groups, in August 2006, then-U.S. Director of National Intelligence John
Negroponte announced the establishment of the position of Mission Manager for Cuba and
Venezuela responsible for integrating collection and analysis on the two countries across the
Intelligence Community.
In September 2007, President Bush and other key Administration officials made several
statements on Cuba. In a speech before the U.N. General Assembly on September 25, President
Bush stated that “the long rule of a cruel dictator is nearing its end,” and called on the United
Nations to insist on free speech, free assembly, and free elections as Cuba “enters a period of ⁴²
transition.” U.S. Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez stated in a speech on September 17 that
“unless the regime changes, our policy will not,” but indicated that the United States is “prepared ⁴³
to respond to genuine democratic change in Cuba.” In a speech on September 20, Assistant
Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon contended that “there is a
quiet consensus in the Americas and in Europe that Cuba’s future must be democratic.” He
maintained that there are differences about “how to promote Cuba’s democratic future” and
pointed out how “Latin America’s historic commitment to the principles of non-intervention and

³⁸^U.^S^.^Dep^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^S^t^at^e,^“U.^S^.^P^o^lⁱ^c^y^T^o^w^a^rd^Cu^b^a^,^”^T^h^o^m^{as S}^h^an^noⁿ^,^A^ssi^st^an^t^S^ecret^ar^y^f^o^{r W}^e^st^ern
^H^e^mⁱ^s^phe^r^e^A^f^f^a^ir^s^,^A^u^g^u^s^t^{23, 2}⁰⁰⁶^.
³⁹^“Eⁿ^g^lⁱ^s^h^T^r^an^scri^p^t^o^f^Rau^l^Cast^ro^{’s S}^p^eech^,^”^Mi^a^m^{i Hera}^l^d^,^Dece^m^b^{er 2}^,²⁰⁰⁶^.
⁴⁰^F^r^an^{ces Ro}^b^l^es,^“Raú^l^A^g^aiⁿ^O^f^{fers ‘Ol}ⁱ^v^{e Bran}^ch^{’ t}^o^U.^S^.^,^”^Mⁱ^a^m^{i He}^rald,^J^u^ly^{27, 2}⁰⁰⁷^{; “}^U^.S^.^G^o^v^e^rn^m^e^nt
^R^e^je^c^t^s^Dⁱ^a^l^og^ue^w^{ith C}^uba^,”^EF^E^{, J}^u^ly^27,²⁰⁰⁷^.
⁴¹^P^a^blo^B^a^c^h^e^l^e^t^{, “}^U^{.S. C}^r^e^a^t^e^s^Fi^v^e^G^r^oups^t^o^Ey^e^C^uba^,”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^,^S^e^pt^em^b^e^r¹³^,²⁰⁰⁶^.
⁴²^W^hⁱ^t^e^Ho^u^s^e,^Of^fⁱ^{ce o}^f^t^h^{e P}^r^ess^S^ecret^ar^y^,^“P^resi^d^eⁿ^t^B^u^sh^A^d^d^r^{esses t}^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^Natⁱ^oⁿ^s^G^eⁿ^e^ral^A^s^se^m^b^l^y^,^”
^Se^pte^m^be^r^{25, 2}⁰⁰⁷^.
⁴³^U.^S^.^Dep^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^Co^mm^er^ce,^“Co^{mmerce S}^ecr^et^ar^y^Carl^o^s^M^.^G^u^tⁱ^e^{rrez Re}^mark^{s at}^t^h^{e Heri}^t^a^{ge F}^o^un^d^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^,^”
^Se^pte^m^be^r^{17, 2}⁰⁰⁷^.

national sovereignty shape how many in the region are prepared to engage with Cuba.” He
maintained, however, that “helping the Cuban people achieve their democratic destiny and re-⁴⁴
integrate into the Americas will be one of the biggest diplomatic challenges we face.”

On October 24, 2007, President Bush made a policy speech on Cuba that reflected a continuation
of the sanctions-based approach toward Cuba. According to the President: “As long as the
[Cuban] regime maintains its monopoly over the political and economic life of the Cuban people,
the United States will keep the embargo in place.”
The President also proposed three new initiatives to provide support to the Cuban people. First,
the President proposed allowing licensed non-governmental organizations and faith-based groups
to provide computers and Internet access to the Cuban people if the Cuban government ends
restrictions on public Internet access. Second, the President proposed inviting Cuban youths
whose families suffer oppression to participate in the Partnership for Latin American Youth
scholarship programs if the Cuban government allows them to participate. Third, the President
announced a new effort to develop an international multi-billion dollar Freedom Fund for Cuba to
help the Cuban people rebuild their economy and make the transition to democracy. The effort
would be led by Secretary of State Rice and Secretary of Commerce Gutierrez and involve
enlisting foreign governments and international organizations to contribute to the initiative.
According to the President, monies from the fund would be available if the Cuban government
demonstrates that it has adopted, in word and in deed, fundamental freedoms, including freedom
of speech, freedom of association, freedom of press, freedom to form political parties, and
freedom to change the government through periodic, multi-party elections.
In the speech, President Bush also sent a message to Cuban military, police, and government
officials that “when Cubans rise up to demand their liberty,” they have a choice to embrace the
Cuban people’s desire for change or “defend a disgraced and dying order by using force.” The
President conveyed to these officials that “there is a place for you in a free Cuba.”
The President also lauded the countries of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as being
vital sources of support and encouragement to Cuba’s democratic opposition. He called on other
nations to make tangible efforts to show public support for the dissidents, by opening up their
embassies in Havana to pro-democracy leaders, use the lobbies of their embassies to give Cubans
access to the Internet and books and magazines, and encourage their country’s non-governmental
organizations to reach out directly to Cuba’s independent civil society.
In the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s February 19, 2008 announcement that he was officially
stepping down as head of state, President Bush maintained that he viewed “this as a period of
transition and it should be the beginning of a democratic transition in Cuba.” State Department
officials made clear that U.S. policy would not change. On February 24, 2008, the day that Raúl

⁴⁴^U.^S^.^Dep^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^S^t^at^e,^T^h^o^m^{as A}^.^S^h^anⁿ^oⁿ^,^A^ssi^st^an^t^S^ecret^ary^f^o^{r W}^e^st^ern^He^mⁱ^sp^h^e^{re Affai}^r^s,^“T^h^e^Am^eri^c^as:
^D^yⁿ^a^mⁱ^{c Ch}^an^{ge i}ⁿ^t^h^{e 21}^st^C^e^nt^ur^y^,^”^Se^ptem^be^r^20,²⁰^07.
⁴⁵^W^hⁱ^t^e^Ho^u^s^e,^Of^fⁱ^{ce o}^f^t^h^{e P}^r^ess^S^ecret^ar^y^,^“P^resi^d^eⁿ^t^B^u^sh^Di^{scusses Cu}^b^a^P^o^lⁱ^c^y^,^{” Oct}^o^b^e^{r 2}⁴^,²⁰⁰⁷^.

Castro officially became Cuba’s head of state, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice issued a
statement urging “the Cuban government to begin a process of peaceful, democratic change by
releasing all political prisoners, respecting human rights, and creating a clear pathway towards
free and fair elections.”
In remarks on Cuba policy in early March 2008, President Bush maintained that in order to
improve U.S.-Cuban relations, “what needs to change is not the United States; what needs to
change is Cuba.” The President asserted that Cuba “must release all political prisoners ... have ⁴⁶
respect for human rights in word and deed, and pave the way for free and fair elections.” He ⁴⁷
reiterated these words again in a speech to the Council of the Americas on May 7, 2008. On
May 21, 2008, President Bush called for the Cuban government to take steps to improve life for
the Cuban people, including opening up access to the Internet. He also announced that the United
States would change regulations to allow Americans to send mobile phones to family members in ⁴⁸
Cuba.

Over the years, although U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall objectives of U.S. policy
toward Cuba—to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island—there have
been several schools of thought about how to achieve those objectives. Some advocate a policy of
keeping maximum pressure on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while continuing
current U.S. efforts to support the Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes
referred to as constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are
hurting the Cuban people, and move toward engaging Cuba in dialogue. Still others call for a
swift normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting the U.S. embargo.
Fidel Castro’s initially provisional, and now permanent, departure as head of government could
eventually foster a re-examination of U.S. policy. In this new context, there are two broad policy
approaches to contend with political change in Cuba: a status-quo approach that would maintain
the U.S. dual-track policy of isolating the Cuban government while providing support to the
Cuban people; and an approach aimed at influencing the Cuban government and Cuban society
through increased contact and engagement. (For additional information, see CRS Report
RS22742, Cuba’s Political Succession: From Fidel to Raul Castro. Also see CRS Report
RL33622, Cuba’s Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches, written in the aftermath
of Fidel Castro’s stepping down from power in July 2006.)
In general, those who advocate easing U.S. sanctions on Cuba make several policy arguments.
They assert that if the United States moderated its policy toward Cuba—through increased travel,
trade, and diplomatic dialogue—then the seeds of reform would be planted, which would
stimulate and strengthen forces for peaceful change on the island. They stress the importance to
the United States of avoiding violent change in Cuba, with the prospect of a mass exodus to the

⁴⁶^W^h^ite^H^ous^e^,^“^P^r^e^sⁱ^deⁿ^t^B^u^s^h^D^e^liv^e^r^s^R^e^m^a^r^k^s^{on C}^uba^,”^Ma^r^c^h^7,²⁰^08.
⁴⁷^“T^e^x^t^o^f^Bu^sh^S^p^eech^t^o^C^o^un^ci^l^o^f^t^h^{e Am}^eri^c^as,^”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^,^Ma^y^{9, 200}^8.
⁴⁸^W^h^ile^H^ous^e^,^“^P^r^e^sⁱ^deⁿ^t^B^u^s^h^Dⁱ^s^c^us^s^e^s^C^uba^{, Ma}^r^k^s^D^a^y^of^Solida^r^ity^,”^May^{21, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.

United States and the potential of involving the United States in a civil war scenario. They argue
that since the demise of Cuba’s does not appear imminent, even without Fidel Castro at the helm,
the United States should espouse a more pragmatic approach in trying to induce change in Cuba.
Supporters of changing policy also point to broad international support for lifting the U.S.
embargo, to the missed opportunities for U.S. businesses because of the unilateral nature of the
embargo, and to the increased suffering of the Cuban people because of the embargo. Proponents
of change also argue that the United States should be consistent in its policies with the world’s
few remaining communist governments, including China or Vietnam, and also maintain that
moderating policy will help advance human rights.
On the other side, opponents of changing U.S. policy maintain that the current two-track policy of
isolating Cuba, but reaching out to the Cuban people through measures of support, is the best
means for realizing political change in Cuba. They point out that the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 sets forth the steps that Cuba needs to take in order for the
United States to normalize relations. They argue that softening U.S. policy at this time without
concrete Cuban reforms would boost the Castro government, politically and economically, and
facilitate the survival of the communist regime. Opponents of softening U.S. policy argue that the
United States should stay the course in its commitment to democracy and human rights in Cuba,
and that sustained sanctions can work. Opponents of loosening U.S. sanctions further argue that
Cuba’s failed economic policies, not the U.S. embargo, are the causes of Cuba’s difficult living
conditions.
From mid-August through early September 2008, two hurricanes and two tropical storms caused
widespread damage throughout Cuba. Tropical Storm Fay passed through central Cuba on August
18, causing severe flooding. On August 31, Hurricane Gustav struck the tobacco-growing
province of Piñar del Río in western Cuba and the Isle of Youth. Tropical Storm Hanna, which did
not strike Cuba directly, caused flooding in eastern Cuba in early September. Hurricane Ike made
landfall in eastern Cuba on September 7 as a Category Four hurricane and severely affected both
the eastern and western parts of the island, but especially the provinces of Holguin, Camaguey,
and Las Tunas in the eastern part of the island. The two hurricanes caused most of the damage.
Overall, just 7 people were killed, but the hurricanes severely affected the housing sector (with
almost 500,000 homes damaged and over 63,000 destroyed), the power grid, and the agricultural ⁴⁹
sector. On November 8, 2008, Hurricane Paloma struck Cuba devastating the town of Santa
Cruz el Sur. Initially damages from the storms in August and September were estimated to
amount to $5 billion, but Raúl Castro noted in the aftermath of Hurricane Paloma that overall ⁵⁰
damages from the storm since August amounted to some $10 billion.
The U.S. Chief of Mission at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, Jonathan Farrar, issued a
disaster declaration for Cuba on September 3, 2008, and the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) approved the release of $100,000 in emergency relief funds to ⁵¹
nongovernmental organizations in Cuba in response to Hurricane Gustav. On September 12, in

⁴⁹^U.^N.^Of^fⁱ^ce^f^o^{r t}^h^{e Coo}^r^dⁱⁿ^a^tⁱ^{on o}^f^Hu^m^aⁿⁱ^t^a^ri^an^Affai^r^{s (OCH}^A),^“Sⁱ^t^u^atⁱ^o^{n Rep}^o^r^t¹⁷^{– Cari}^bb^ean^Hu^rri^can^e
^Se^a^s^on,”^Se^pte^m^be^r^22,²⁰⁰⁸^.
⁵⁰^"^"^P^a^l^om^a^B^r^ing^s²⁰⁰⁸^H^u^r^rⁱ^c^aⁿ^e^Se^a^s^{on t}^o^a^C^l^os^e^;^D^a^m^a^g^e^s^Ex^ce^e^d^$1^{0 B}^ill^io^n,"^,^"^C^ubaN^e^w^s^{, D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^2008.
⁵¹^US^A^I^D,^Bu^reau^f^o^{r De}^m^o^crac^y^,^Coⁿ^f^lⁱ^c^t^,^an^{d Hu}^m^aⁿⁱ^t^a^ri^an^A^ssi^s^t^an^{ce (DCHA}⁾^,^O^f^fⁱ^{ce o}^f^U.^S^.^F^o^rei^gⁿ^Di^sast^er
^A^s^si^st^an^{ce (OF}^D^A⁾^,^“L^atⁱⁿ^Am^erⁱ^{ca an}^d^t^h^{e Cari}^b^b^ean^–^Hurri^{cane S}^easoⁿ²⁰⁰⁸^,^F^act^S^h^eet^#3^,^F^Y²⁰⁰⁸^,^{” S}^e^p^t^em^b^e^r
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

response to Hurricane Ike, the U.S. government provided another $100,000 in cash assistance to
relief organizations on the ground in Cuba. The State Department maintains that the United States
offered to send a humanitarian assessment team to Cuba to determine additional assistance needs,
but that the Cuban government rejected the offer. U.S. officials subsequently offered a $5 million
aid package for disaster relief for Cuba on September 13 that was also rejected by the Cuban
government. USAID Administrator Henrietta Fore reportedly maintained that $2 million in plastic
sheeting, hygiene kits, and other relief items would have been provided directly to the Cuban ⁵²
government, but that about $3 million in cash would still be provided through NGOs. The State
Department made a new offer to Cuba on September 19 to supply some $6.3 million in
corrugated zinc roofs, nails, tools, lumber, sheeting, and light shelter kits that would help some ⁵³

48,000 people, but the Cuban government did not accept the offer.

In addition, according to the State Department, the U.S. government increased authorizations for
U.S.-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to provide larger amounts of assistance to
Cuba in the aftermath of the hurricanes, including expedited authorization over 90 days for up to ⁵⁴
$10 million per NGO.
In response to the U.S. offer to send a disaster assessment team, the Cuban government
maintained that it already had a sufficient number of well-trained experts in Cuba, and noted that
other countries worldwide were sending humanitarian aid without inspecting the affected areas.
Instead, Cuba asked the United States to allow U.S. companies 1) to sell needed relief supplies to
Cuba for the repair of housing and electrical networks; and 2) to grant private commercial credit ⁵⁵
to Cuba in order to buy food in the United States. In response to the U.S. offer to send $2
million in supplies to the Cuban government, the Cuban Interests Section in Washington again
called for the United States to allow U.S. companies to sell relief supplies to Cuba, if not on a ⁵⁶
permanent basis, then at least for the next six months.
In the aftermath of the hurricanes, a number of observers, including some Members of Congress,
called for the temporary relaxation of restrictions on family travel and remittances (limited to ⁵⁷
$300 per quarter) as well as on the provision of gift parcels to Cuba, but the Administration did
not take any of these actions. Some observers also have called for temporary changes to the U.S.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^{10, 20}⁰⁸^.
⁵²^F^r^an^{ces Ro}^b^l^es,^“C^u^b^a^Rej^ect^{s U.}^S^.^S^u^pp^lⁱ^e^s,^A^s^ks^f^o^{r S}^u^sp^en^si^oⁿ^o^f^T^r^ad^{e E}^m^b^a^rgo^,^”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^{, Se}^pte^m^be^r
^{16, 20}⁰⁸^.
⁵³^Fr^aⁿ^c^e^s^R^oble^s^{, “}^U^.S^{. O}^f^f^e^r^s^$6.^{3M i}ⁿ^C^o^ns^tr^uc^ti^on^Ma^te^rⁱ^a^l^s^to^C^uba^,”^Mi^a^mⁱ^Hera^ld^,^Se^pte^m^be^r^22,²⁰⁰⁸^{; J}^o^s^hua
^P^a^r^t^l^o^w^,^“^H^ur^rⁱ^c^aⁿ^e^s^Shif^{t D}^e^ba^te^{on Em}^ba^r^g^{o A}^g^aⁱ^ns^{t C}^uba^,”^Wa^shⁱⁿ^gt^on^Po^st^{, Se}^pte^m^be^r^24,²⁰⁰^8.
⁵⁴^U.^S^.^Dep^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^S^t^at^e,^“Hu^m^anⁱ^t^a^ri^an^A^ssi^st^an^{ce t}^o^t^h^{e Cub}^aⁿ^P^e^op^l^e^F^o^l^l^o^wⁱⁿ^{g Hu}^rri^can^{es G}^u^s^t^{av an}^d^Ike,^”
^Se^pte^m^be^r^{15, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
⁵⁵^C^ubaⁿ^Mi^nis^t^r^y^of^For^e^ig^{n A}^f^f^aⁱ^r^s^,^“^C^uba^A^s^k^s^W^a^s^h^ing^t^{on t}^o^Lⁱ^f^t^C^o^m^m^e^r^cⁱ^a^l^R^e^s^t^rⁱ^c^tions^,”^Se^pt^em^be^r^11,²⁰^08;
^a^{nd “}^S^ta^te^m^e^{nt by}^the^Minis^t^r^y^of^For^e^ig^{n A}^f^f^a^ir^s^,^”^Se^ptem^be^r^{6, 2}⁰⁰⁸^.
⁵⁶^K^a^r^e^{n D}^e^Y^oung^{, “}^U^.S.^U^r^g^e^s^C^uba^{to A}^ccep^t^Aⁱ^d^;^S^t^o^r^m^Relⁱ^e^f^W^o^u^l^d^{Be S}^eⁿ^t^Di^rect^l^y^t^o^Havan^a^G^o^v^e^rn^men^t^,^”
^Wa^shⁱⁿ^gt^on^Po^st^{, Se}^pte^m^be^r^16,²⁰⁰^8.
⁵⁷^Iⁿ^J^u^ne²⁰⁰⁴^{, t}^h^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^C^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^’^s^B^u^r^e^a^u^of^I^ndus^tr^y^and^Se^c^u^r^ity⁽^B^I^S⁾^pu^blis^he^d^c^h^aⁿ^g^e^s^{to the}^Ex^por^t
^A^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^st^ratⁱ^oⁿ^Regu^l^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^t^h^at^pl^acedⁿ^e^w^lⁱ^mⁱ^t^s^oⁿ^gi^f^t^p^a^rcel^{s se}ⁿ^t^t^o^Cub^a^.^T^hⁱ^sⁱⁿ^cl^u^d^e^d^p^r^o^hⁱ^bⁱ^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^{e i}ⁿ^cl^u^sⁱ^oⁿ
^of^pr^e^v^ious^ly^-^a^llow^e^{d ite}^m^s^s^u^c^h^a^s^s^e^e^d^s^,^c^l^othing^,^pe^r^s^oⁿ^a^l^hy^gⁱ^ene^ite^m^s^{, v}^e^te^rⁱ^na^r^y^m^e^dicⁱ^ne^s^a^{nd s}^u^pplie^s^,^fⁱ^s^hⁱⁿ^g
^e^quipm^eⁿ^{t a}ⁿ^d^s^u^p^p^lie^s^,^aⁿ^{d s}^o^a^p^-^m^a^k^ing^e^quipm^eⁿ^{t. (}^Fe^de^{ral Re}^gⁱ^ste^r^{, J}^une²²^,²⁰⁰⁴^{, p}^p^.³⁴⁵⁶^5-³⁴⁵⁶⁷⁾^.

embargo regulations to allow for unrestricted U.S. cash sales to Cuba of food and medicines, farm
machinery or equipment, and relief supplies, including building materials and electrical supplies.
On September 5, 2008, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Howard Berman
asked President Bush to suspend for 90 days restrictions on family visits, remittances, and gift
parcels.
Several legislative initiatives were introduced that would have temporarily eased U.S. embargo
restrictions in several areas. On September 15, 2008, Senator Dodd offered S.Amdt. 5581 to the
Department of Defense authorization bill (S. 3001) that would have, for a 180-day period:
allowed unrestricted family travel; eased restrictions on remittances by removing the limit and
allowing any American to send remittances to Cuba; expanded the list of allowable items that
may be included in gift parcels; and allowed for unrestricted U.S. cash sales of food, medicines,
and relief supplies to Cuba. The amendment was not considered, and therefore not part of the
final bill.
In the House, two legislative initiatives were introduced. On September 16, 2008, Representative
Flake introduced H.R. 6913, which would have prohibited any funds from going to the
Department of Commerce to implement, administer, or enforce tightened restrictions on the
contents of gift parcels to Cuba that were introduced in June 2004. On September 18, 2008,
Representative Delahunt introduced H.R. 6962, the Humanitarian Relief to Cuba Act, which
would have, for a 180-day period: allowed unrestricted family travel; eased restrictions on
remittances by removing the limit and allowing any American to send remittances to Cuba; and
expanded the list of allowable items that may be included in gift parcels.
Restrictions on travel to Cuba have been a key and often contentious component of U.S. efforts to
isolate the communist government of Fidel Castro for much of the past 40 years. Over time there
have been numerous changes to the restrictions and for five years, from 1977 until 1982, there
were no restrictions on travel. Restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba are part of the
CACR, the overall embargo regulations administered by the Treasury Department’s Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
Major arguments made for lifting the Cuba travel ban are that it contributes to the suffering of
Cuban families; it hinders efforts to influence conditions in Cuba and may be aiding Castro by
helping restrict the flow of information; it abridges the rights of ordinary Americans; and
Americans can travel to other countries with communist or authoritarian governments. Major
arguments in opposition to lifting the Cuba travel ban are that more American travel would
support Castro’s rule by providing his government with potentially millions of dollars in hard
currency; that there are legal provisions allowing travel to Cuba for humanitarian purposes that
are used by thousands of Americans each year; and that the President should be free to restrict
travel for foreign policy reasons.
Under the current Bush Administration, enforcement of U.S. restrictions on Cuba travel has
increased, and restrictions on travel and on private remittances to Cuba have been tightened. In
March 2003, the Administration eliminated travel for people-to-people educational exchanges
unrelated to academic course work. In June 2004, the Administration significantly restricted
travel, especially family travel, and the provision of private humanitarian assistance to Cuba in
the form of remittances and gift parcels. In April 2005, OFAC cracked down on certain religious
organizations promoting licensed travel to Cuba and warned them not to abuse their license by

taking individuals not affiliated with their organizations. OFAC’s actions were prompted by
reports that groups practicing the Afro-Cuban religion Santería had been taking large groups to ⁵⁸
Cuba as a means of skirting U.S. travel restrictions. In 2006, the Administration suspended the
licenses of several travel service providers, including one of the largest such providers in Florida,
La Estrella de Cuba. Several religious organizations also had their licenses suspended, and church
groups and several Members of Congress expressed concern about more restrictive licenses for ⁵⁹
religious travel.
Among the June 2004 restrictions that remain in place are the following:
• Family visits were restricted to one trip every three years under a specific license
and are restricted to immediate family members, with no exceptions. Under
previous regulations, family visits could occur once a year under a general
license, with travel more than once a year allowed, but under a specific license.
Previously travel had been allowed to visit relatives to within three degrees of
relationship to the traveler.
• Cash remittances, estimates of which range from $400 million to $800 million,
were further restricted. Quarterly remittances of $300 may still be sent, but are
now restricted to members of the remitter’s immediate family and may not be
remitted to certain government officials and certain members of the Cuban
Communist Party. The regulations were also changed to reduce the amount of
remittances that authorized travelers may carry to Cuba, from $3000 to $300.
• Gift parcels were limited to immediate family members and were denied to
certain Cuban officials and certain members of the Cuban Communist Party. The
contents of gift parcels may no longer include seeds, clothing, personal hygiene
items, veterinary medicines and supplies, fishing equipment and supplies, or
soap-making equipment.
• The authorized per diem allowed for a family visit was reduced from the State
Department per diem rate (currently $179 per day for Havana) to $50 per day.
• With the exception of informational materials, licensed travelers may not
purchase or otherwise acquire merchandise and bring it back into the United
States. Previous regulations allowed visitors to Cuba to import $100 worth of
goods as accompanied baggage.
• Fully-hosted travel, by a person not subject to U.S. jurisdiction, was prohibited as
a permissible category of travel.
• Travel for educational activities was further restricted, including the elimination
of educational exchanges sponsored by secondary schools.
There was mixed reaction to the tightening of Cuba travel and remittance restrictions. Supporters
maintain that the increased restrictions deny the Cuban government dollars that help maintain its
repressive control. Opponents argue that the tightened sanctions are anti-family and only result in
more suffering for the Cuban people. There were also concerns that the new restrictions were

⁵⁸^{Oscar Co}^rral^,^{“Is S}^aⁿ^t^erí^a^Used^a^s^P^l^o^y^t^o^S^kⁱ^r^t^T^r^avel^Ru^l^e^s?,^”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{27, 2}⁰⁰⁵^.
⁵⁹^{Oscar Co}^rral^,^“F^ed^{s L}^a^y^Do^wⁿ^t^h^{e L}^a^w^oⁿ^Cub^a^t^o^T^r^avel^Agen^t^s^,^”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^,^A^p^r^{il 2}⁹^,²⁰^06;^P^a^b^l^{o B}^a^c^h^e^l^e^t^,
^“^N^ew^R^u^le^s^I^m^pe^de^R^e^lig^ious^T^r^a^v^e^l^,”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^,^Ma^r^c^{h 16,}²⁰⁰^6.

drafted without considering the full consequences of their implementation. For example, the
elimination of fully-hosted travel raised concerns about the status of 70 U.S. students receiving
full scholarships at the Latin American School of Medicine in Havana. Members of the
Congressional Black Caucus, who were instrumental in the establishment of the scholarship
program for U.S. students, expressed concern that the students may be forced to abandon their
medical education because of the new OFAC regulations. As a result of these concerns, OFAC
ultimately licensed the medical students in August 2004 to continue their studies and engage in
travel-related transactions.
On July 19, 2007, the U.S. International Trade Commission issued a report, requested by the
Senate Committee on Finance, maintaining that lifting travel restrictions would result in travel by
U.S. citizens to Cuba rising to between 550,000 and 1 million from an estimate of 171,000 in

2005.

From 2000-2004, one or both houses of Congress approved amendments to appropriations bills
that would have eased restrictions on travel to Cuba in various ways, but these provisions
ultimately were stripped out of final enacted measures. The Administration regularly threatened
to veto legislation if it contained provisions weakening Cuba sanctions.
In the first session of the 110^th Congress, two Senate Appropriations Committee reported-versions
of appropriations bills had provisions that would have eased restrictions on travel to Cuba for the
marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods, but ultimately these provisions were not
included in the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161). The Senate version of
the FY2008 Financial Services and General Government appropriations bill, reported July 19,
2007, H.R. 2829, had a provision in Section 620 that would eased such travel restrictions, while
the Senate version of the FY2008 Agriculture appropriations bill, S. 1859, reported July 24, 2007,
had such a provision in Section 741.
In the second session of the 110^th Congress, several appropriations bills had provisions that would
have eased restrictions on travel to Cuba, but none of these were included in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act for FY2009 (P.L. 110-329) that funded appropriations through March 6, 2009.
The House version of the FY2009 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations
bill, H.R. 7323, reported by the House Appropriations Committee December 10, 2008 (H.Rept.
110-920), included provisions that would have eased restrictions on family travel. The committee
had approved a draft version of the bill on June 25, 2008. The bill would have liberalized family
travel to Cuba by allowing for such travel once a year (instead of the current restriction of once
every three years) and allowing such travel to visit aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and first
cousins (instead of currently being limited to immediate family members). The Senate version of
the bill, S. 3260 (S.Rept. 110-417), reported out of the Senate Appropriations Committee on July
14, 2008, included provisions that would have eased restrictions on family travel and on travel to
Cuba relating to the commercial sale of agricultural and medical goods. With regard to family
travel (section 620), the bill would provide that no funds may be used to administer, implement,
or enforce the Administration’s June 2004 tightening of restrictions related to travel to visit
relatives in Cuba. With regard to travel for agricultural or medical sales (section 619), the bill
would allow for a general license for such travel instead of a specific license that requires
permission from the Treasury Department. This is similar to a provision (section 737) in the
Senate Appropriations Committee version of the FY2009 Agriculture Appropriations bill, S. 3289
(S.Rept. 110-426), reported out of committee on July 21, 2008.

A number of other initiatives introduced in the 110^th Congress would ease Cuba travel
restrictions, but no action was taken on these measures. H.R. 654 (Rangel), S. 721 (Enzi), and
Section 254 of S. 554 (Dorgan) would have prohibited the President from regulating or
prohibiting travel to Cuba or any of the transactions incident to travel. Two bills that would have
lifted overall economic sanctions—H.R. 217 (Serrano) and H.R. 624 (Rangel)—would also have
lifted travel restrictions. H.R. 177 (Lee) would have eased restrictions on educational travel to
Cuba. H.R. 757 (Delahunt) would have lifted restrictions on family travel and the provision of
remittances for family members in Cuba. H.R. 1026 (Moran, Jerry), which would have facilitated
the sale of U.S. agricultural products to Cuba, included a provision that would have provided for
general license authority for travel-related transactions for people involved in agricultural sales
and marketing activities or in the transportation of such sales. H.R. 2819 (Rangel) and S. 1673
(Baucus), which would have eased restrictions on U.S. agricultural and medical exports to Cuba,
would also have lifted restrictions on travel to Cuba.
In addition, as noted above, several initiative introduced in the aftermath of Hurricanes Gustav
and Ike would temporarily ease U.S. embargo restrictions in several areas, including travel and
remittances, but no action was taken on these measures. S.Amdt. 5581 (Dodd) to S. 3001, the
FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act, and H.R. 6962 (Delahunt) would have allowed for
family travel and unrestricted remittances for six months.
U.S. commercial agricultural exports to Cuba have been allowed for several years, but with ^th
numerous restrictions and licensing requirements. The 106 Congress passed the Trade Sanctions
Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 or TSRA (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that allows for
one-year export licenses for selling agricultural commodities to Cuba, although no U.S.
government assistance, foreign assistance, export assistance, credits, or credit guarantees are
available to finance such exports. TSRA also denies exporters access to U.S. private commercial
financing or credit; all transactions must be conducted in cash in advance or with financing from
third countries. TSRA reiterates the existing ban on importing goods from Cuba but authorizes
travel to Cuba, under a specific license, to conduct business related to the newly allowed
agricultural sales.
In February 2005, OFAC amended the Cuba embargo regulations to clarify that TSRA’s term of
“payment of cash in advance” means that the payment is received by the seller or the seller’s
agent prior to the shipment of the goods from the port at which they are loaded. U.S. agricultural
exporters and some Members of Congress strongly objected that the action constitutes a new
sanction that violates the intent of TSRA and could jeopardize millions of dollars in U.S.
agricultural sales to Cuba. OFAC Director Robert Werner maintained that the clarification ⁶⁰
“conforms to the common understanding of the term in international trade.” On July 29, 2005,
OFAC clarified that, for “payment of cash in advance” for the commercial sale of U.S.
agricultural exports to Cuba, vessels can leave U.S. ports as soon as a foreign bank confirms
receipt of payment from Cuba. OFAC’s action was aimed at ensuring that the goods would not be
vulnerable to seizure for unrelated claims while still at the U.S. port. Supporters of overturning
OFAC’s February 22, 2005 amendment, such as the American Farm Bureau Federation, were

⁶⁰^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^the^T^r^e^a^s^ur^y^,^T^e^s^tⁱ^m^on^y^of^R^obe^r^t^W^e^rⁿ^e^r^{, D}ⁱ^r^e^c^t^or^{, O}^F^A^C^{, be}^f^o^r^e^the^H^ous^e^C^o^m^m^itte^e^on
^Ag^ricu^ltu^{re, March}¹⁶^{, 2}⁰⁰⁵^.

pleased by the clarification but indicated that they would still work to overturn the February ⁶¹
rule.
Since late 2001, Cuba has purchased almost $2.6 billion in agricultural products from the United
States. Overall U.S. exports to Cuba rose from about $7 million in 2001 to $404 million in 2004.
U.S. exports to Cuba declined in 2005 and 2006 to $369 million and $340 million, respectively,
but increased to $447 million in 2007. In the first 10 months of 2008, U.S. agricultural exports to
Cuba amounted to $608 million, far higher than the same time period in previous years, in part
because of the rise in the cost of food prices and because of Cuba’s increased food needs in the
aftermath of several hurricanes and tropical storms that severely damaged Cuba’s agricultural ⁶²
sector.
On July 19, 2007, the U.S. International Trade Commission issued a report, requested by the
Senate Committee on Finance, maintaining that the U.S. share of Cuba’s agricultural, fish, and
forest imports would rise from one-third to between one-half and two-thirds if trade restrictions
were lifted. See the full report available at http://www.usitc.gov/ext_relations/news_release/2007/
er0719ee1.htm
Some groups favor further easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba. They argue that the
restrictions harm the health and nutrition of the Cuban population. U.S. agribusiness companies
that support the removal of restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba believe that U.S. farmers
are missing out on a market of over $700 million annually so close to the United States. Some
exporters want to change U.S. restrictions so that they can sell agriculture and farm equipment to ⁶³
Cuba. Agricultural exporters who support the lifting of the prohibition on financing contend that
allowing such financing would help smaller U.S. companies expand purchases to Cuba more ⁶⁴
rapidly.
Opponents of further easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba maintain that U.S. policy
does not deny such sales to Cuba, as evidenced by the large amount of sales since 2001.
Moreover, according to the State Department, since the Cuban Democracy Act was enacted in

1992, the United States has licensed billions of dollars in private humanitarian donations.

Opponents further argue that easing pressure on the Cuban government would in effect be lending
support and extending the duration of the Castro regime. They maintain that the United States
should remain steadfast in its opposition to any easing of pressure on Cuba that could prolong the
Castro regime and its repressive policies. Some agricultural producers that export to Cuba support
continuation of the prohibition on financing for agricultural exports to Cuba because it ensures
that they will be paid.
In the first session of the 110^th Congress, Congress approved the FY2008 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161) in December 2007, which dropped provisions easing Cuba

⁶¹^C^h^rⁱ^s^t^o^phe^r^{S. R}^u^g^a^be^r^,^“^T^r^e^a^s^u^r^y^C^l^a^rⁱ^f^ies^C^uba^Fa^r^m^Ex^por^{t R}^u^le^{, a}^{nd B}^a^uc^us^R^e^le^nts^{on N}^o^mⁱ^ne^e^s^,”
^Iⁿ^te^r^nat^io^{nal Tr}^a^d^e^Re^por^te^r^{, A}^u^g^u^s^t^4,²⁰^05.
⁶²^W^o^r^l^{d T}^r^a^d^e^A^tla^s^,^w^h^ic^{h us}^e^s^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^C^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^Sta^tis^tic^s.
⁶³^“^A^g^G^r^oups^S^p^{lit O}^v^e^r^T^r^a^d^e^W^{ith Cu}^ba^,”^C^o^ngr^e^s^s^D^a^ily^AM^{, N}^a^tiona^{l J}^o^ur^na^l^,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{11, 2}⁰⁰³^.
⁶⁴^“F^arm^E^q^uⁱ^p^m^en^t^E^x^p^o^r^t^s^Lⁱ^kel^y^t^o^F^ace^T^o^u^g^h^Opp^o^sⁱ^tⁱ^oⁿ^f^r^o^m^W^hⁱ^t^e^Ho^u^s^e,^C^oⁿ^g^ress,^”^C^u^b^a^T^r^ade^r^{, V}^o^l^.^III,
^N^o^{. 7}^,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{17, 2}⁰⁰³^.

sanctions that had been included in the House-passed and Senate-committee versions of H.R.
2829, the FY2008 Financial Services and General Government appropriations bill, and the
Senate-committee version of S. 1859, the FY2008 agriculture appropriations bill. The House-
passed version of H.R. 2829 had a provision in Section 903 that would have prevented Treasury
Department funds from being used to implement the February 2005 tightening of policy requiring
the payment of cash in advance prior to the shipment of U.S. agricultural goods to Cuba. The
House had adopted the provision during June 28, 2007 floor consideration when it approved
H.Amdt. 467 (Moran, Kansas) by voice vote. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported
version of the bill included a similar provision in Section 619, and in Section 620 that would have
ease travel to Cuba for the marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods. The
Administration’s statement of policy on the bill maintained that the President would veto the
measure if it contained a provision weakening current restrictions against Cuba. The Senate
Appropriations Committee-reported version of the S. 1859 (S.Rept. 110-134) included a
provision that would have authorized general licenses for travel to Cuba for the marketing and
sale of agricultural and medical goods.
In other first session action, on July 27, 2007, the House rejected (by a vote of 182-245) H.Amdt.
707 (Rangel) to H.R. 2419, the Farm, Nutrition, and Bioenergy Act of 2007, also known as the
2007 farm bill. The amendment would have eased restrictions on the commercial sale of
agricultural products to Cuba by clarifying the meaning of “payment of cash in advance” for the
sale of such products; authorizing direct transfers between U.S. and Cuban financial institutions
for such sales; and authorizing the issuance of U.S. visas for Cubans to conduct activities,
including phytosanitary inspections, related to such sales.
In the second session of the 110^th Congress, several appropriations bills had provisions that would
have eased restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba, but none of these were included in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2009 (P.L. 110-329) that funded appropriations through
March 6, 2009. The House version of the FY2009 Financial Services and General Government
Appropriations bill, H.R. 7323, reported by the House Appropriations Committee December 10,

2008 (H.Rept. 110-920), included provisions easing restrictions on U.S. agricultural exports.

The committee had approved a draft version of the bill on June 25, 2008. The bill had a provision
that would have prohibited funds in the Act from being used to administer, implement, or enforce
an amendment to the Cuban embargo regulations from February 25, 2005, that requires that U.S.
agricultural exports must be paid for before they leave U.S. ports. The Senate version of the bill,
S. 3260 (S.Rept. 110-417), reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 14, 2007,
included a similar provision (section 618) easing restrictions on payment terms for the sale of
agricultural goods to Cuba. The bill also had a provision easing restrictions on the travel related
to the commercial sale of agricultural and medical goods (section 619). This was similar to a
provision (section 737) in the Senate Appropriations Committee version of the FY2009
Agriculture Appropriations bill, S. 3289 (S.Rept. 110-426), reported out of committee on July 21,

2008. As noted above, none of these provisions were enacted into law.

Several other legislative initiatives introduced in the 110^th Congress would have eased restrictions
on the sale of U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba, but none of these were considered:
• H.R. 1026 (Moran, Jerry) would have facilitated the sale of U.S. agricultural
products to Cuba by providing for general license authority for travel-related
expenses for people involved in sales and marketing activities or in the
transportation for such sales; authorizing the issuance of a temporary visa for a
Cuban national conducting activities related to the purchase of U.S. agricultural

goods, including phytosanitary inspections; clarifying the “payment of cash in
advance” term used in TSRA to mean that the payment by the purchaser and the
receipt of such payment to the seller occurs prior to the transfer of title of the
commodity or product to the purchaser and the release of control of such
commodity or product to the purchaser; and prohibiting the President from
restricting direct transfers from a Cuban financial institution to a U.S. financial
institution for U.S. agricultural sales under TSRA.
• H.R. 2819 (Rangel) and S. 1673 (Baucus), among other provisions, would have
clarified the meaning of “payment of cash in advance;” authorize direct transfers
between Cuban and U.S. financial institutions for the execution of payments for
sales pursuant to TSRA; establish an agricultural export promotion program with
respect to Cuba; and increase the airport ticket tax for travel to or from Cuba by
$1.00, with funds going to a newly established Agricultural Export Promotion
Trust Fund. The Senate Finance Committee held a hearing on S. 1673 on
December 11, 2007.
• Two broader bills that would have lifted economic sanctions on Cuba—H.R. 217
(Serrano) and H.R. 624 (Rangel)— included provisions lifting restrictions on
agricultural exports to Cuba by amending TSRA. Three bills that would have
lifted overall travel restrictions—H.R. 654 (Rangel), S. 554 (Dorgan), and S. 721
(Enzi)—would have had the effect of lifting travel restrictions for those involved
in travel related to agricultural sales.

A provision in the FY1999 omnibus appropriations measure (Section 211 of Division A, Title II,
P.L. 105-277, signed into law October 21, 1998) prevents the United States from accepting
payment for trademark registrations and renewals from Cuban or foreign nationals that were used
in connection with a business or assets in Cuba that were confiscated, unless the original owner of
the trademark has consented. The provision prohibits U.S. courts from recognizing such
trademarks without the consent of the original owner. The measure was enacted because of a
dispute between the French spirits company, Pernod Ricard, and the Bermuda-based Bacardi Ltd.
Pernod Ricard entered into a joint venture with the Cuban government to produce and export
Havana Club rum, but Bacardi, whose company in Cuba was expropriated in the 1960s, maintains
that it holds the right to the Havana Club name. Although Pernod Ricard cannot market Havana
Club in the United States because of the trade embargo, it wants to protect its future distribution
rights should the embargo be lifted.
The European Union initiated World Trade Organization dispute settlement proceedings in June
2000, maintaining that the U.S. law violates the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS). In January 2002, the WTO ultimately found that the trademark
sanction violated WTO provisions on national treatment and most-favored-nation obligations in
the TRIPS Agreement.
On March 28, 2002, the United States agreed that it would come into compliance with the WTO ⁶⁶
ruling through legislative action by January 3, 2003. That deadline was extended several times

⁶⁵^For^a^dditi^ona^l^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion, s}^e^e^,^a^{nd C}^R^S^R^e^por^t^R^S²¹⁷⁶⁴^,^Re^s^t^rⁱ^c^ting^Tr^ade^m^a^r^k^Rⁱ^g^h^ts^of^C^u^baⁿ^s^:^W^T^O^D^e^cⁱ^sⁱ^on
^and^C^o^ngr^e^s^sⁱ^on^al^Re^s^p^oⁿ^s^e^{, by}^Ma^r^g^a^r^e^t^Miky^ung^Le^e^.

since no legislative action had been taken to bring Section 211 into compliance with the WTO
ruling. On July 1, 2005, however, in an EU-U.S. bilateral agreement, the EU agreed that it would
not request authorization to retaliate at that time, but reserved the right to do so at a future date, ⁶⁷
and the United States agreed not to block a future EU request. On August 3, 2006, the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office announced that Cuba’s Havana Club trademark registration was
“cancelled/expired,” a week after OFAC had denied a Cuban government company the license ⁶⁸
that it needed to renew the registration of the trademark.
Two different approaches have been advocated to bring Section 211 into compliance with the
WTO ruling. Some want a narrow fix in which Section 211 would be amended so that it also
applies to U.S. companies instead of being limited to foreign companies. Advocates of this
approach argue that it would affirm that the United States “will not give effect to a claim or right ⁶⁹
to U.S. property if that claimed is based on a foreign compensation.” Others want Section 211
repealed altogether. They argue that the law endangers over 5,000 trademarks of over 500 U.S. ⁷⁰
companies registered in Cuba. They maintain that Cuba could retaliate against U.S. companies
under the Inter-American Convention for Trademark and Commercial Protection.
In the 110^th Congress, five initiatives—H.R. 217 (Serrano), H.R. 624 (Rangel), H.R. 2819
(Rangel), S. 1673 (Baucus), and S. 1806 (Leahy)—had provisions that would have repealed the
Section 211 trademark sanction from law, while two other initiatives—H.R. 1306 (Wexler) and S.
749 (Nelson)—would have advanced the narrow fix to Section 211 in order to comply with the
WTO ruling. No action was taken on these measures. Similar legislative initiatives on both sides ^th^th
of the issue were introduced in the 108 and 109 Congresses, but no action was taken on these
measures. The July 2005 EU-U.S. bilateral agreement, in which the EU agreed not to retaliate
against the United States, but reserved the right to do so at a later date, reduced pressure on
Congress to take action to comply with the WTO ruling.
The issue of Cuba’s development of its deepwater offshore oil reserves in the Gulf of Mexico has
been a concern among some Members of Congress. According to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration, industry analysts maintain that there could be at least 1.6 billion crude oil
reserves in Cuba’s offshore sector; the U.S. Geological Survey estimated a mean of 4.6 billion ⁷¹
barrels of undiscovered oil. In October 2008, an official of Cuba’s state oil company,

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
⁶⁶^“^U^{.S., EU A}^g^re^e^{on De}^a^d^line^f^o^r^Com^p^ly^ing^w^{ith Se}^c^tion²¹^{1 W}^T^{O Fin}^d^ing^,^”^Iⁿ^sid^e^U.^S.^T^r^ad^e,^A^p^rⁱ^l¹²^,²⁰⁰²^.
⁶⁷^“Jap^an^,^E^U^S^u^sp^end^W^T^{O Ret}^a^lⁱ^atⁱ^oⁿ^A^g^aiⁿ^s^t^U.^S^.ⁱⁿ^T^w^o^Cases,^”^Iⁿ^sⁱ^de^U^.^S^.^Tr^ade^{, J}^u^ly^{15, 2}⁰⁰⁵^.
⁶⁸^“P^T^O^Can^cel^{s Cu}^b^a^{n ‘Havan}^{a Cl}^u^b^’^M^a^rk;^Bacardⁱ^S^e^t^t^o^S^e^l^l^R^u^m^Un^d^e^{r S}^a^m^e^M^a^rk,^”^Iⁿ^te^r^natio^{nal Tr}^ade^D^a^ily^,
^A^u^g^u^s^t^10,²⁰^06.
⁶⁹^B^r^ia^{n L}^e^hm^aⁿ^{, te}^s^tⁱ^m^ony^bef^o^r^e^the^Se^na^te^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on the}^J^u^di^cⁱ^a^r^y^,^he^a^r^ing^{on “}^A^{n Ex}^a^m^ina^{tion of}^Se^c^tio^{n 2}¹¹
^of^the^O^m^nibus^A^ppr^opr^ia^tio^ns^A^c^{t of}¹⁹⁹^8,”^J^u^ly^{13, 2}⁰⁰⁴^.
⁷⁰^“US^A^-Eⁿ^g^a^g^{e Jo}ⁱⁿ^{s Cu}^b^a^Fⁱ^gh^t^,^”^C^uba^Tr^a^d^e^r^{, A}^p^{ril 1,}²⁰⁰²^.
⁷¹^U^.^{S. E}ⁿ^e^r^g^y^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion A}^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^tion^{, “}^C^ou^ntr^y^Aⁿ^a^l^y^s^is^B^r^ief^s^{: C}^a^rⁱ^bbe^aⁿ^,”^Se^pte^m^be^r²⁰⁰^7;^U^.^{S. G}^e^olog^ic^a^l
^Sur^v^e^y^{, “A}^s^s^e^ssm^eⁿ^{t of}^U^ndis^c^o^v^e^r^e^{d O}^{il a}^{nd G}^a^s^R^e^s^our^c^e^s^of^the^N^o^r^t^h^C^u^ba^{n B}^a^sⁱⁿ^,^C^u^ba^{, 2}⁰⁰⁴^,”^Fa^c^t^S^h^e^e^t
²⁰⁰^5-³⁰^{09, Fe}^br^ua^r^y^2005.

Cubapetroleo (Cupet), maintained there may be more than 20 billion barrels of oil in Cuba’s ⁷²
deepwaters, but energy analysts expressed skepticism for such a claim.
To date, Cuba has signed agreements for seven concessions involving eight foreign oil companies
for the exploration of offshore oil and gas. Repsol (Spain), Norsk-Hydro (Norway), and ONGC
(India) are partners in a joint project, while Sherritt International (Canada), ONGC (India),
PdVSA (Venezuela), Petronas (Malaysia), PetroVietnam, and Petrobras (Brazil) also have
additional concessions. In February 2008, Petrobras signed a wide-ranging agreement for
potential exploration and production cooperation with Cuba’s state oil company, Cupet. This
ultimately led to an oil exploration agreement between Petrobras and Cupet signed in late October
2008. Some Members have expressed concern about oil development so close to the United
States and about potential environmental damage to the Florida coast. The Repsol project has
plans to drill a second well (the first was drilled in 2004) in mid-2009, and some press reports ⁷³
maintain that if that goes well, Cuban oil could be flowing to the market by 2013.
Although there have been some claims that China is drilling in Cuba’s offshore deepwater oil
sector, to date its involvement in Cuba’s oil sector has been focused on exploring onshore/close
coastal oil extraction in Piñar del Rio province through its state-run China Petroleum and ⁷⁴
Chemical Corporation (Sinopec). China does not have a concession in Cuba’s offshore oil sector ⁷⁵
in the deepwaters of the Gulf of Mexico.
In the 110^th Congress, two legislative initiatives—H.R. 1679 (Ros-Lehtinen), S. 876 (Martinez),
and S. 2503 (Nelson, Bill)—would have imposed sanctions related to Cuba’s offshore oil
development on its northern coast, but no action was taken on the measures. H.R. 1679 and S.
876 would have excluded from admission to the United States aliens who have made investments
contributing to the enhancement of the ability of Cuba to develop its petroleum resources off its
coasts; and require the President to impose sanctions on persons (including foreign subsidiaries)
that are determined to have made an investment equal to or exceeding $1 million that contributes
to the enhancement of Cuba’s ability to develop petroleum resources of the submerged lands off
Cuba’s coast. S. 2503 would also have excluded from admission to the United States aliens who
have directly and significantly contributed to the ability of Cuba to develop its petroleum
resources. The bill would also have nullified a 1977 Maritime Boundary Agreement between the
United States and Cuba.
In contrast, several legislative initiatives – S. 1268 (Dorgan), S. 2953 (Craig), H.R. 3182 (Udall),
H.R. 3435 (Pickering) – would have allowed U.S. companies to work with Cuba for the offshore
exploration and extraction of oil along Cuba’s northern coast. In addition, H.R. 6735 (Hobson)
would have terminated the application of restrictions on exploration, development, and

⁷²^J^e^f^f^Fr^aⁿ^k^s^{, "}^C^uba^O^{il C}^l^aⁱ^m^s^R^a^is^e^E^y^e^b^r^o^w^s^{in Ene}^r^gy^W^o^r^l^d,"^O^c^tobe^r²⁴^,²⁰⁰⁸^{; a}ⁿ^{d L}^a^r^r^y^L^uxne^r^,^“^C^uba^Ma^y
^ha^v^e^{20 B}^ill^io^{n B}^a^r^r^e^ls^of^O^{il B}^u^t^C^a^s^h^C^r^unc^{h T}^h^r^e^a^t^eⁿ^s^Iⁿ^v^e^s^t^m^e^nt,”^C^u^baN^e^w^s^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r²⁰⁰^8.
⁷³^J^o^r^g^e^Pⁱ^ño^{n, “}^C^uba^’^s^Eⁿ^e^r^gy^Fut^u^r^e^,”^C^a^na^diaⁿ^Fo^un^da^tio^{n f}^o^r^th^e^A^m^e^r^ic^a^s^,^Foc^a^lPoin^t^,^A^p^r^{il 20}^{07, V}^o^{l. 6,}^N^o^{. 3;}
^“^P^e^t^r^o^Vie^t^na^m^G^e^ts^G^o^-^A^he^a^d^to^Ex^plor^e^Se^v^e^{n C}^u^ba^{n O}ⁱ^{l Fie}^l^ds^,^”^D^o^w^J^one^s^Iⁿ^te^r^nati^oⁿ^a^{l N}^e^w^s^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^20,
²⁰⁰^{7; a}^{nd L}^a^rry^L^u^xⁿ^e^r^{, “}^C^uba^Ma^y^ha^v^e^{20 Billi}^on^Ba^rre^{ls of}^{Oil But Ca}^sh^Cruⁿ^c^h^T^h^re^a^t^eⁿ^{s Inv}^e^st^m^e^nt,”
^C^ubaN^e^w^s^{, N}^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^2008.
⁷⁴^D^o^mⁱ^ng^{o A}^m^uc^ha^s^t^eg^{ui, “}^C^ubaⁿ^A^g^aⁱ^{n I}ⁿ^v^ite^s^U^.^{S. O}ⁱ^l^Gⁱ^aⁿ^ts^to^Iⁿ^v^e^s^t^{in O}^il^Se^c^t^or^,”^C^u^baN^e^w^s^{, Ma}^y^2007.
⁷⁵^L^e^sle^y^Cl^a^r^k^a^{nd Erik}^a^Bolsta^d,^“^C^hina^-Cu^b^a^Rum^o^rs^Fue^l^Re^ne^w^e^{d O}^f^f^s^hore^Drilling^De^ba^te^{, Ru}^m^o^{rs of}^China
^D^r^illingⁱⁿ^Cu^ba^{n W}^a^te^rs^A^r^e^Ra^lly^ing^Suppor^{t f}^o^{r D}^r^illi^ng^of^f^Florida^’^s^Coa^s^{t, B}^u^{t Ex}^pe^rts^Sa^y^T^h^ey^’r^e^Uⁿ^true^,”
^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^{, J}^une^12,²⁰⁰⁸^.

production of oil and gas in areas of the outer Continental Shelf adjacent to Cuba. No action was
taken on these measures.
Because of Cuba’s geographic location, the country’s waters and airspace have been used by
illicit narcotics traffickers to transport drugs for ultimate destinations in the United States. Over
the past several years, Cuban officials have expressed concerns over the use of their waters and
airspace for drug transit as well as increased domestic drug use. The Cuban government has taken
a number of measures to deal with the drug problem, including legislation to stiffen penalties for
traffickers, increased training for counternarcotics personnel, and cooperation with a number of
countries on anti-drug efforts. Cuba has bilateral counternarcotics agreements with 33 countries
and less formal arrangements with 16 others, according to the Department of State. For several
years, Cuba’s Operation Hatchet has focused on maritime and air interdiction and the recovery of
narcotics washed up on Cuban shores. Narcotics smuggling through Cuban territory deceased in ⁷⁶
2006, according to both U.S. and Cuban officials. According to the Department of State, Cuba
aggressively pursues an internal enforcement and investigation program against its incipient drug
market with an effective nationwide drug prevention and awareness campaign, Operation Popular
Shield.
Over the years, there have been varying levels of cooperation with Cuba on anti-drug efforts. In
1996, Cuban authorities cooperated with the United States in the seizure of 6.6 tons of cocaine
aboard the Miami-bound Limerick, a Honduran-flag ship. Cuba turned over the cocaine to the
United States and cooperated fully in the investigation and subsequent prosecution of two
defendants in the case in the United States. Cooperation has increased since 1999 when U.S. and
Cuban officials met in Havana to discuss ways of improving anti-drug cooperation. Cuba
accepted an upgrading of the communications link between the Cuban Border Guard and the U.S.
Coast Guard as well as the stationing of a U.S. Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist (DIS) at
the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. The Coast Guard official was posted to the U.S. Interests
Section in September 2000, and since that time, coordination has increased.
The State Department, in its March 2008 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,
maintains that narcotics cooperation occurs on a case-by-case basis primarily through the Coast
Guard DIS, which increased in 2007. The report noted that Cuban authorities carried out some
operations in coordination with the Coast Guard DIS in 2007. These included cooperation in the
interception of a drug-laden aircraft destined for the Bahamas in February and a joint U.S.-Cuba
container inspection at the port of Havana in June. The report also noted that Cuban authorities
have provided the DIS more exposure to Cuban counternarcotics efforts, including investigative
criminal information, debriefings on drug trafficking cases, visits to the Cuban national canine
training center and anti-doping laboratory in Havana, and access to meet with the Chiefs of
Cuba’s INTERPOL and Customs office.
Cuba maintains that it wants to cooperate with the United States to combat drug trafficking, and
on various occasions has called for a bilateral anti-drug cooperation agreement with the United ⁷⁷
States. In January 2002, Cuba deported to the United States Jesse James Bell, a U.S. fugitive

⁷⁶^F^r^an^{ces Ro}^b^l^es,^“Dru^g-T^r^affⁱ^c^kⁱⁿ^{g at}¹¹^-^{Year L}^o^w^,^Cu^b^a^S^a^y^s^,^”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^,^Ma^r^c^{h 3}^,²⁰⁰⁷^{; U}^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}
^Sta^t^e^,^Iⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^tⁱ^ona^l^N^a^r^c^otic^s^C^oⁿ^t^r^o^{l S}^t^r^a^te^gy^R^e^por^{t, Ma}^r^c^h²⁰^07,^p.¹⁸^8.
⁷⁷^Oⁿ^Ma^r^c^h¹²^{, 2}⁰⁰²^{, C}^uba^’^s^Mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^r^y^of^For^e^ig^{n A}^f^f^a^ir^s^a^{nd the}^C^u^ba^{n I}ⁿ^te^r^e^s^t^s^Se^c^tion^{in W}^a^s^h^ing^t^on^de^liv^e^r^e^d
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

wanted on drug charges, and in early March 2002, Cuba arrested a convicted Colombian drug
trafficker, Rafael Bustamante, who escaped from jail in Alabama in 1992. At the time, then Drug
Enforcement Administration head Asa Hutchison expressed appreciation for Cuba’s actions, but
indicated that cooperation would continue on a case-by-case basis, not through a bilateral ⁷⁸
agreement. In February 2007, Cuba extradited drug trafficker Luis Hernando Gómez
Bustamante to Colombia, an action that drew praise from U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for ⁷⁹
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Anne Patterson. Gómez Bustamante was
subsequently extradited to the United States in July 2007 to face drug trafficking charges.
In April 2008, John Walters, Director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy,
lauded U.S. anti-drug cooperation with Cuba as a good example of how cooperation has been ⁸⁰
achieved despite overall political differences between the two countries.
Over the past several years, House and Senate versions of Foreign Operations appropriations bills
have contained contrasting provisions related to funding for cooperation with Cuba on
counternarcotics efforts. House bills have generally prohibited funds for such efforts, while
Senate versions would have funded such efforts. Ultimately, none of these provisions were
included in enacted measures.
This happened again in December 2007 when Congress approved the FY2008 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161). The act dropped contrasting provisions from the House and
Senate versions of H.R. 2764, the FY2008 State, Foreign Operations and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act. The House-passed version of H.R. 2764 contained a provision, in Section
673, that would have specifically prohibited International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) assistance to the Cuban government. In contrast, the Senate-passed version
of the bill would have provided, in Section 696, $1 million in INCLE funding for preliminary
work by the Department of State, or such other entity as the Secretary of State may designate, to
establish cooperation with the Cuban government on counternarcotics matters. The amount would
not have been available if Cuba did not have in place appropriate procedures to protect against the
loss of innocent life in the air and on the ground in connection with the interdiction of illegal
drugs, and if there is credible evidence of involvement of the Cuban government in drug
trafficking during the preceding 10 years.
In the second session of the 110^th Congress, the Senate Appropriations Committee version of the
FY2009 State, Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, S.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^thr^e^e^di^plom^a^tic^note^s^to^the^U^.^S.^Iⁿ^te^r^e^s^t^s^Se^c^tionⁱⁿ^H^a^v^a^na^a^{nd t}^h^e^Sta^t^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt in W}^a^s^h^ing^t^on^pr^o^posⁱⁿ^g
^a^g^re^e^m^eⁿ^{ts on dr}^ugⁱⁿ^te^rdic^tio^n,^t^e^rrorism^{, a}^{nd m}ⁱ^g^r^a^{tion issue}^s^.^Se^e^“^S^ta^te^m^e^{nt f}^r^o^m^the^Ministry^{of Fore}^ig^{n A}^f^f^a^irs:
^P^r^om^ineⁿ^{t D}^r^ug^T^r^a^f^fⁱ^ck^e^r^A^r^r^e^s^t^e^dⁱⁿ^our^C^o^untr^y^,”^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^tion^O^f^fⁱ^ce^{, C}^uba^{n I}ⁿ^te^r^e^s^t^s^Se^c^tio^n,^Ma^r^c^{h 17}^{, 2}⁰⁰²^;
^“^C^uba^O^f^fe^rs^{to Sig}ⁿ^Aⁿ^ti-D^r^ug^P^a^c^t^,”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^ra^ld,^A^p^r^{il 8, 20}^06.
⁷⁸^Aⁿ^thony^B^o^a^d^le^{, “}^U^.S.^T^h^aⁿ^k^s^C^uba^{, B}^u^{t D}^e^c^line^s^Aⁿ^ti-^D^r^ug^A^c^c^o^r^d^,”^R^e^ute^r^s^,^Ma^r^c^{h 1}⁹^,²⁰⁰²^.
⁷⁹^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^Sta^t^e^,^R^e^le^a^s^e^of^the²⁰⁰⁷^Iⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^t^io^na^{l N}^a^r^c^ot^ic^s^C^ontr^o^{l Str}^a^te^g^y^R^e^por^{t, A}^nne^W^.^P^a^tte^r^s^oⁿ^,
^A^s^sⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^{t Se}^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of^Sta^t^e^f^o^r^Iⁿ^te^rⁿ^a^tiona^l^N^a^r^c^otic^s^a^{nd L}^a^w^Enf^o^r^c^em^eⁿ^{t A}^f^f^a^ir^s^,^Oⁿ^-^T^he^-^R^ec^or^{d B}^r^ie^fⁱ^ng^{, Ma}^r^c^h
¹^,²⁰⁰⁷^.
⁸⁰^“^W^hite^H^ous^e^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^of^N^a^tiona^{l D}^r^ug^C^ontr^o^l^Polⁱ^c^y^Dⁱ^r^e^c^t^or^W^a^te^r^s^H^o^lds^N^e^w^s^B^r^iefⁱ^ng^{on Em}^e^r^gⁱ^ng
^T^r^an^sat^l^aⁿ^tⁱ^c^Dru^g^T^h^reat^{s at}^t^h^{e F}^o^rei^gⁿ^P^r^{ess Cen}^t^er,^”^Newsma^{kers Tra}ⁿ^s^crip^{ts, CQ.c}^o^m^{, A}^p^r^{il 2}⁸^,²⁰^08.

3288, contained a provision (section 779) that would have provided for $1 million for preliminary
work by the Department of State, or other entity designated by the Secretary of State, to establish
cooperation with appropriate Cuban agencies on counternarcotics matters. The money would not
be available, however, if the Secretary certifies that Cuba 1) does not have in place procedures to
protect against the loss of innocent life in the air and on the ground in connection with the
interdiction of illegal drugs; and 2) there is credible evidence of involvement of the government
of Cuba in drug trafficking during the preceding 10 years. No action was taken on the measure,
and no such provision was included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2009 (P.L.

110-329 ) that provided foreign operations funding until March 6, 2009.

Cuba was added to the State Department’s list of states sponsoring international terrorism in 1982
because of its alleged ties to international terrorism and support for terrorist groups in Latin
America. Cuba had a long history of supporting revolutionary movements and governments in
Latin America and Africa, but in 1992, Fidel Castro said that his country’s support for insurgents
abroad was a thing of the past. Cuba’s change in policy was in large part because of the breakup
of the Soviet Union, which resulted in the loss of billions of dollars in annual subsidies to Cuba,
and led to substantial Cuban economic decline.
Cuba remains on the State Department’s terrorism list. According to the State Department’s
Country Reports on Terrorism 2007 report (issued April 30, 2008), Cuba has “remained opposed
to U.S. counterterrorism policy, and actively and publicly condemned many associated U.S.
policies and actions.” The report also noted that Cuba maintains close relationships with other
state sponsors of terrorism, such as Iran and Syria, and has provided safe haven for members of
several Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs): the Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA) and
two Colombian insurgent groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the
National Liberation Army (ELN). Colombia has publicly acknowledged that it wants Cuba
mediation with the ELN.
The 2007 report also maintained that Cuba continued to permit U.S. fugitives from justice to live
legally in Cuba. Most of the fugitives entered Cuba in the 1970s, and are accused of hijacking or
committing violent actions in the United States. The State Department report noted that Cuba
stated in 2006 that it would no longer provide safe haven to new fugitives who may enter Cuba.
In 2006, Cuba returned a U.S. fugitive who had sequestered his son and flew a stolen plane to
Cuba in September. In April 2007, Cuba returned another U.S. fugitive, Joseph Adjmi, who was
convicted of mail fraud in the 1960s, but disappeared before beginning his 10-year sentence. On
June 13, 2008, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it deported another U.S.
citizen, Leonard Auerbach, wanted in the United States for sexual exploitation of a minor and for ⁸²
child pornography who had entered Cuba from Mexico in April. More recently, press reports
maintain that a number of fugitives from Florida accused of bilking the U.S. government of ⁸³
millions through Medicare fraud have fled to Cuba.

⁸¹^For^f^u^r^t^he^r^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion, s}^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³²²⁵^1,^C^u^ba^aⁿ^d^t^h^{e Sta}^t^{e Sp}^on^so^{rs of T}^e^rro^{rism L}ⁱ^st^{, by}^M^a^r^k^P^.
^Sulliv^aⁿ^.
⁸²^P^a^tric^ia^G^r^og^g^,^“^C^uba^{: G}^o^v^e^rn^m^e^{nt De}^{ports U.}^{S. Ci}^tiz^eⁿ^Cha^r^g^e^d^w^{ith Child}^A^buse^,^”^In^{ter Press Service}^{, J}^une^16,
²⁰⁰^8.
⁸³^Ja^y^We^a^v^e^r^{, "}^F^ug^itiv^e^s^Fle^e^Sout^{h Fl}^orida^w^ith^Me^dic^a^r^e^Milli^ons,^"^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^{, J}^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^{2, 20}^09.

In the 110^th Congress, H.R. 525 (King), which was not considered, would have amended the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 to require that, in order to determine that a
democratically elected government in Cuba exists, the Cuban government extradite to the United
States individuals who are living in Cuba in order to escape prosecution or confinement for ^th
criminal offense committed in the United States. A similar initiative was introduced in the 109
Congress, H.R. 332 (King), but no legislative action was taken. In addition, Section101(1)(H) of
House-passed H.R. 2601 would have authorized funds for the U.S. Interests Section in Havana to
disseminate the names of U.S. fugitives residing in Cuba and any rewards for their capture, but
action on the measure was not completed before the end of the Congress.
In general, those who support keeping Cuba on the terrorism list argue that there is ample
evidence that Cuba supports terrorism. They point to the government’s history of supporting
terrorist acts and armed insurgencies in Latin America and Africa. They point to the government’s
continued hosting of members of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice.
Critics of retaining Cuba on the terrorism list maintain that it is a holdover from the Cold War.
They argue that domestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list and maintain
that Cuba’s presence on the list diverts U.S. attention from struggles against serious terrorist
threats.
Cuba has been the target of various terrorist incidents over the years. In 1976, a Cuban plane was
bombed, killing 73 people. In 1997, there were almost a dozen bombings in the tourist sector in
Havana and in the Varadero beach area in which an Italian businessman was killed and several
others were injured. Two Salvadorans were convicted and sentenced to death for the bombings in
March 1999, and three Guatemalans were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 10-15 years in
January 2002. Cuban officials maintain that Cuban exiles funded the bombings.
In November 2000, four anti-Castro activists were arrested in Panama for a plot to kill Fidel
Castro. One of the accused, Luis Posada Carriles, was also allegedly involved in the 1976 Cuban ⁸⁴
airline bombing noted above. The four stood trial in March 2004 and were sentenced on
weapons charges in the case to prison terms ranging from seven to eight years. In late August
2004, Panamanian President Mireya Moscoso pardoned the four men before the end of her
presidential term. Three of the men are U.S. citizens and traveled to Florida, where they received
strong support from some in the Cuban American community, while Posada Carriles reportedly
traveled to another country.
On April 13, 2005, Posada’s lawyer said that his client, reportedly in the United States after
entering the country illegally, would seek asylum in the United States because he has a “well-⁸⁵
founded fear of persecution” for his opposition to Fidel Castro. Posada, a Venezuelan citizen,
had been imprisoned in Venezuela for the bombing of the Cuban airliner in 1976, but reportedly
was allowed to “escape” from prison in 1985 after his supporters paid a bribe to the prison ⁸⁶
warden. He had been acquitted for the bombing but remained in prison pending a prosecutorial ⁸⁷
appeal. Posada also reportedly admitted, but later denied, involvement in the string of bombings

⁸⁴^Fr^aⁿ^c^e^s^R^oble^s^{, “}^A^{n O}^l^d^Foe^of^C^a^s^t^r^o^L^ook^s^B^a^c^k^{on H}ⁱ^s^Fig^h^t,”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^,^Se^pte^m^be^r^4,²⁰⁰³^.
⁸⁵^A^l^f^ons^{o C}^h^a^r^dy^a^{nd N}^a^ncy^Sa^{n Ma}^r^{tin, “}^L^a^w^y^e^r^Ex^pe^c^t^s^P^o^s^a^da^{to S}^how^So^on,”^Mi^a^m^{i Hera}^l^d^{, A}^p^rⁱ^l¹⁴^,²⁰⁰⁵^.
⁸⁶^A^{nn L}^ouis^e^B^a^r^d^a^c^h^{, “}^O^ur^Ma^n’^s^{in Mia}^m^i.^P^a^tr^iot^or^T^e^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^t^?^,^”^Wa^sh^ing^t^on^P^o^st^,^A^p^rⁱ^l¹⁷^,²⁰^05.
⁸⁷^A^lthoug^h^Pos^a^da^w^a^s^a^c^quitte^{d b}^y^a^m^ilita^r^y^c^{ourt, a}^hig^h^e^r^c^ourt^orde^re^{d a}^ne^w^cⁱ^v^ilia^{n tria}^{l. Re}^po^rte^d^ly^a^fⁱ^rs^{t s}^e^t
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

in Havana in 1997, one of which killed an Italian tourist.⁸⁸ Posada subsequently withdrew his
application for asylum on May 17, 2005. Later that day, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) arrested Posada, and subsequently charged him with illegally entering the
United States. A Department of Homeland Security press release indicated that ICE does not ⁸⁹
generally deport people to Cuba or countries believed to be acting on Cuba’s behalf. Venezuela
requested Posada’s extradition and pledged that it would not hand Posada over to Cuba. On
September 26, 2005, however, a U.S. immigration judge ruled that Posada likely faced torture in
Venezuela and could not be deported in keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention ⁹⁰
Against Torture.
ICE reviewed the case and determined on March 22, 2006, that Posada would not be freed from a ⁹¹
detention federal immigration facility in El Paso, Texas. In November 2006, however, a U.S.
federal judge, who was considering Posada’s plea that he be released, ordered the government to
supply evidence, by February 1, 2007, justifying his continued detention. On January 11, 2007, a
federal grand jury in Texas indicted Posada on seven counts for lying about how he entered the
United States illegally in March 2005, whereupon he was transferred from immigration detention
in El Paso to a country jail in New Mexico near the Texas border. The Cuban government
responded by maintaining that Posada needs to be charged with terrorism, not just lying about
how he entered the United States. Another grand jury in New Jersey is reportedly examining ⁹²
Posada’s alleged role in the 1997 bombings in Cuba. Press articles in early May 2007 reported
that the FBI has been gathering evidence in the 1997 bombing and that FBI agents have visited ⁹³
Havana as part of their investigation.
Posada was released from jail in New Mexico on April 19, 2007, and allowed to return to Miami
under house arrest to await an upcoming trial on immigration fraud charges, but on May 9, 2007 a
federal judge in Texas dismissed the charges. The judge maintained that the U.S. government ⁹⁴
mistranslated testimony from Posada and manipulated evidence. On June 5, 2007, Justice ^th
Department prosecutors filed a notice of appeal with the 5 U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New
Orleans and on November 6, 2007, federal prosecutors field a brief requesting that the court ⁹⁵
reverse the lower court’s decision. On June 4, 2008, the appeals court heard arguments from ⁹⁶
both sides in the case; a ruling reportedly could take several months. Both Cuba and Venezuela
strongly denounced Posada’s release, contending that he is a terrorist. In late June 2008, Panama’s

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^o^f^p^r^o^s^ecu^t^o^{rs reco}^m^m^en^d^e^d^agaiⁿ^s^t^ch^argiⁿ^g^P^o^sad^a^,^bu^t^{a seco}^{nd set}^o^f^p^r^o^s^ecu^t^o^rs^t^o^o^k^t^h^{e case t}^o^t^rⁱ^a^l^,^aⁿ^d^P^o^sad^a
^escap^ed^d^u^rⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^at^tⁱ^m^{e i}ⁿ¹⁹⁸⁵^.^S^{ee Oscar Co}^rral^,^“Deb^at^{e F}^o^cu^s^e^{s o}ⁿ^E^s^cap^e,^”^Mi^a^mⁱ^Hera^ld^{, J}^u^ne¹⁹^{, 2}⁰⁰⁵^.
⁸⁸^O^s^c^a^r^C^o^r^r^a^{l a}^{nd A}^l^f^ons^{o C}^h^a^r^d^y^{, “}^V^ic^ti^m^’^s^Kⁱ^{n O}^p^p^o^s^e^P^o^s^a^da^Bⁱ^{d f}^o^r^A^s^y^l^u^m^,”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^,^Ma^y^{7, 200}^5.
⁸⁹^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^H^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^rⁱ^t^y^{, Of}^fⁱ^ce^of^P^u^blic^A^f^f^a^ir^s^,^Sta^t^em^eⁿ^{t, Ma}^y^{17, 2}⁰⁰⁵^.
⁹⁰^A^lic^ia^Ca^ld^w^e^{ll, “}^J^udg^e^Sa^y^s^Cuba^{n Mi}^lita^nt^Ca^{n’t Be}^De^p^o^rte^d^t^o^V^e^ne^z^u^e^l^a^,^”^A^sso^ci^a^t^e^d^P^r^ess^{, Se}^pte^m^be^r^28,
²⁰⁰^5.
⁹¹^{Oscar Co}^rral^,^“Cu^b^a^{n E}^xⁱ^l^e^Mⁱ^lⁱ^t^aⁿ^t^L^uⁱ^s^P^o^sad^a^Denⁱ^e^d^Rel^ease,^”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^,^Ma^r^c^h^22,²⁰⁰⁶^.
⁹²^A^l^f^oⁿ^s^o^Ch^ar^d^y^an^d^Ja^y^W^eav^er,^“P^o^s^ad^{a a T}^a^rget^o^f^Ne^w^F^e^d^e^ral^P^r^ob^es,^”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^,^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^12,²⁰⁰⁶^{, a}ⁿ^d
^“^G^r^a^{nd Jury}^Indic^t^{s Cu}^ba^{n Ex}^ile^Milita^nt^L^u^is^P^o^sa^da^Ca^rrile^s,”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^{, J}^a^nua^r^y^12,²⁰⁰⁷^.
⁹³^A^l^f^ons^{o C}^h^a^r^dy^{, O}^s^c^a^r^C^o^r^r^a^{l, and J}^a^y^We^a^v^e^r^{, “}^F^B^I^{, C}^uba^C^o^o^p^e^r^a^ting^on^Pos^a^da^,”^Mi^a^mⁱ^Hera^ld^,^M^a^y³^,²⁰⁰⁷^;
^“^U^{.S., C}^u^ba^Uⁿ^ite^{to I}ⁿ^v^e^s^tig^a^t^e^For^m^e^r^C^I^A^O^p^,”^N^a^tiona^l^Publ^ic^R^a^dio,^Morⁿⁱⁿ^g^Editi^on^{, Ma}^y^4,²⁰⁰^7.
⁹⁴^Ca^{rol J. W}^illia^m^s^{, “}^P^re^ssure^G^r^ow^{s to P}^r^ose^c^u^te^Cuba^{n Ex}^ile^,”^L^o^{s An}^g^e^{les T}ⁱ^mes^{, Ma}^y^10,²⁰⁰⁷^.
⁹⁵^T^h^e^f^e^de^ra^{l prose}^c^u^{tors’ brie}^f^{is a}^v^a^ila^ble^a^t^http://m^e^d^ia^.m^ia^mⁱ^he^ra^ld.c^om^/s^m^e^dia^/²⁰⁰⁷^/^11/^06/^20/^Posa^da^_5CA^_⁰⁷^-
⁵⁰⁷³⁷^_e^le^c^t^ronⁱ^c^_^c^o^py^.s^ourc^e^.^prod_a^f^f^ilia^te^.56.p^d^f^.
⁹⁶^Mic^h^a^e^l^Ku^nz^e^l^m^a^{n, “}^A^ppe^a^l^{s Court He}^a^r^{s Cu}^ba^{n M}^ilita^nt^{’s Im}^mⁱ^g^r^a^{tion Ca}^se^,”^A^sso^ci^a^t^{ed P}^r^ess^,^Juⁿ^e^4,²⁰⁰⁸^.

Supreme Court ruled that Posada’s 2004 pardon was unconstitutional, and in mid-July 2008, a
Panamanian court initiated a request for Posada’s extradition to the Panamanian government.
The House Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing focusing on the Posada case on November 15, 2007.
Since 1996, the United States has provided assistance—primarily through the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), but also through the State Department and the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED)—to increase the flow of information on democracy, human
rights, and free enterprise to Cuba.
USAID’s Cuba program has supported a variety of U.S.-based non-governmental organizations
with the goals of promoting a rapid, peaceful transition to democracy, helping develop civil ⁹⁷
society, and building solidarity with Cuba’s human rights activists. These efforts are largely
funded through Economic Support Funds (ESF) in the annual foreign operations appropriations
bill. In recent years, funding for such projects amounted to about $5 million for each of FY2001
and FY2002, $6 million in FY2003, $21.4 million in FY2004 (because of re-programmed ESF
assistance to fund the democracy-building recommendations of the Commission to Provide
Assistance for a Free Cuba), and $8.9 million in FY2005. In FY2006, $10.9 million in Cuba
democracy funding was provided, including $8.9 million in ESF and $2 million in Development
Assistance.
For FY2007, the Administration requested $9 million in ESF to support the recommendations of
the President’s Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, and to support USAID-administrated
democracy and human rights programs. The report to the House-passed version of the FY2007
Foreign Operations appropriations bill, H.R. 5522 (H.Rept. 109-486), recognized the work of
USAID in promoting democracy and humanitarian assistance for Cuba and urged the agency to
continue to promote its Cuba program. The report to the Senate version of H.R. 5522 (S.Rept.
109-277) recommended $2.5 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs, $6.5 million less than
the Administration’s request. Final action on H.R. 5522 was not completed before the end of the ^th

109 Congress. Foreign Operations appropriations for FY2007 was funded by a series of ^th

continuing resolutions completed in the 110 Congress. Ultimately, the Administration provided
$13.3 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs in FY2007, $4.3 million more than it
requested.
For FY2008, Congress fully funded the Administration’s request for $45.7 million in ESF for
democracy assistance for Cuba in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008 (P.L. 110-

161); an estimated $45.33 million, however, will be provided because of an overall 0.81%

rescission. The amount is more than four times the amount provided in FY2006 and more than
five times the amount requested in FY2007. According to the State Department’s FY2008
Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ), the increase in assistance is in order to fulfill the
recommendations of the July 2006 report of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba to
provide support for Cuban civil society, expand international awareness, break the regime’s
information blockade, and continue support for a democratic transition. That report, as described

⁹⁷^Se^e^USA^I^{D’s Cuba}^prog^ra^m^we^bsite^{: htt}^p^://w^ww^.usa^id.g^ov^/^l^oc^a^tio^ns/la^tin^_a^m^e^ric^a^_c^a^r^ibbe^aⁿ^/c^ou^nt^ry^/^c^uba^/.

above, recommended $80 million over two years for a variety of measures to hasten Cuba’s
transition to democracy, and not less than $20 million annually thereafter for Cuba democracy
programs.
Both the House- and Senate-passed versions of the FY2008 State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, H.R. 2764, fully funded the Administration’s request for
$45.7 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs. The House committee-reported version of
the bill would have provided just $9 million in ESF for such programs, but during June 21, 2007,
floor consideration, the House approved H.Amdt. 351 (Diaz-Balart) by a vote of 254-170 that
increased funding for ESF by $36.7 million in order to fully fund the Administration’s request.
The Senate Appropriations Committee report to the bill would have provided $15 million in ESF
for Cuba democracy programs. However, during September 6, 2007, floor consideration, the
Senate approved S.Amdt. 2694 (Martinez) by voice vote that increased funding for Cuba
democracy programs by $30.7 million to fully fund the Administration’s request.
For FY2009, the Administration requested $20 million in ESF to continue to implement program
recommendations of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba. The money would assist
human rights activists, independent journalists, Afro-Cubans, and women, youth, and student
activists. The report to the Senate Appropriations Committee version of the FY2009 State
Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, S, 3288 (S.Rept. 110-
425), recommended fully funding the Administration’s request for Cuba, but also called for the
State Department and USAID to conduct regular evaluations to ensure the cost effectiveness of ^th
the programs. No final action on the appropriations measure was taken in the 110 Congress, but
overall foreign operations funding was continued under a short-term continuing resolution (P.L.

110-329) until March 6, 2009.

Until FY2008, NED’s democratization assistance for Cuba had been funded largely through the
annual Commerce, Justice, and State (CJS) appropriations measure, but is now funded through
the State Department, Foreign Operations and Related Agencies appropriations measure. NED
funding for Cuba has steadily increased over the past several years: $765,000 in FY2001;
$841,000 in FY2002; $1.14 million in FY2003; and $1.15 million in FY2004. For FY2005, NED
funded 17 Cuba projects with $2.4 million. For FY2006, NED funded 13 projects with almost
$1.5 million, including $0.4 million from State Department ESF. For FY2007, NED funded 12
projects with almost $1.5 million, which included almost $1.4 million funded by the State
Department.
In November 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report examining U.S.
democracy assistance for Cuba from 1996-2005, and concluded that the U.S. program had
significant problems and needed better management and oversight. According to GAO, internal
controls, for both the awarding of Cuba program grants and oversight of grantees, “do not provide
adequate assurance that the funds are being used properly and that grantees are in compliance ⁹⁸
with applicable law and regulations.” Investigative news reports on the program maintained that ⁹⁹
high shipping costs and lax oversight have diminished its effectiveness. Representative William

⁹⁸^U^.^{S. G}^o^v^e^rnm^e^nt^A^c^c^ounta^b^ility^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^,^U^.^{S. D}^e^m^o^c^r^a^c^y^A^s^sⁱ^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^f^o^{r Cuba}^N^e^e^d^s^Be^tte^{r Ma}^na^g^e^m^e^{nt a}^nd
^Oversigh^t,^GAO-0⁷^-¹⁴⁷^,^N^o^ve^mb^{er 2}⁰⁰⁶^.
⁹⁹^{Oscar Co}^rral^,^“F^ed^eral^P^r^o^g^ram^t^o^Hel^p^Dem^o^crac^yⁱⁿ^Cu^b^a^F^a^l^l^s^S^h^o^r^t^o^f^M^a^rk,^”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^,^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r^14,
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

Delahunt, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on International
Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, had requested the GAO study along with
Representative Jeff Flake.
In March 2008, a White House aide to President Bush, Felipe Sixto, resigned because of alleged
misuse of funds when he worked for the Center for a Free Cuba, which has been a major recipient ¹⁰⁰
of U.S. democracy funding. On December 19, 2008, Sixto pled guilty to stealing nearly ¹⁰¹
$600,000, and is expected to be sentenced in March 2009. Another group, Grupo de Apoyo a la
Democracia (Group in Support of Democracy), is also under investigation by USAID for misuse
of funds. Historically these two groups have been the two largest recipients of U.S. democracy ¹⁰²
funding for Cuba.
GAO issued a second report examining USAID’s Cuba democracy program on November 24, ¹⁰³
2008. The report lauded the steps that USAID had taken since 2006 to address problems with
its Cuba program and improve oversight of the assistance. These included awarding all grants
competitively since 2006, hiring more staff for the program office since January 2008; and
contracting for financial services in April 2008 to enhance oversight of grantees. The GAO report
also noted that USAID had worked to strengthen program oversight through preaward and
follow-up reviews, improving grantee internal controls and implementation plans, and providing
guidance and monitoring about permitted types of assistance and cost sharing. The report also
maintained, however, that USAID had not staffed the Cuba program to the level needed for
effective grant oversight. GAO also noted the difficulty of assessing USAID’s action to improve
its Cuba program because most of its actions to improve the program were only taken recently.
Procurement reviews completed in August 2008 by the new financial services contractor
identified internal control, financial management, and procurement weaknesses at three grantees.
GAO recommended that USAID: 1) ensure that its Cuba program office is staffed at the level that
is needed to fully implement planned monitoring activities; and 2) periodically assess the Cuba
program’s overall efforts to address and reduce grantee risks, especially regarding internal
controls, procurement practices, expenditures, and compliance with laws and regulations.
The Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) released a report in May 2008 maintaining
that a majority of the assistance for Cuba has been spent in operating expenses by U.S.-based
grantees, transition studies, and U.S.-based activities. Among the recommendations in its report,
the CANF called for USAID grantees to spend a minimum of 75% of government funds in direct
aid to Cuban civil society. It also called for the assistance program to provide direct cash aid to ¹⁰⁴
independent civil society groups, dissidents, and families of political prisoners.

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
²⁰⁰⁶^,^aⁿ^d^{“Is U.}^S^.^Aⁱ^d^Reachⁱⁿ^g^Cast^ro^F^o^es?”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^,^Nove^m^b^er¹⁵^,²⁰⁰⁶^.
¹⁰⁰^A^l^f^ons^{o C}^h^a^r^dy^a^{nd P}^a^blo^B^a^c^h^e^l^e^t^{, “}^C^ubaⁿ^Ex^ile^A^c^tiv^is^{t Fe}^{lt ‘}^B^e^t^r^a^y^a^l’^b^y^E^m^ploy^ee^s^,^”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald,^A^p^ril^24,
²⁰⁰^8.
¹⁰¹^Je^sse^{J. Holla}^nd,^"^F^orm^e^{r Bush A}ⁱ^de^P^l^e^a^d^{s G}^u^ilty^to^Ste^a^ling^f^r^om^Aⁿ^ti-Ca^{stro Cuba}^{n De}^m^o^c^r^a^c^y^A^d^v^o^c^a^t^e^s^,^"
^Asso^cia^t^ed^{Press Newswires}^{, D}^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^19,²⁰⁰⁸^.
¹⁰²^F^r^an^{ces Ro}^b^l^es,^“Hol^d^oⁿ^F^uⁿ^d^s^f^o^{r Cu}^b^a^Dem^o^crac^{y P}^r^o^j^ect^Lⁱ^f^t^ed^,^”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^,^Ju^l^y²³^,²⁰^08.
¹⁰³^U^.^{S. G}^o^v^e^rnm^e^nt^A^c^c^ounta^b^ility^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^,^Fo^reigⁿ^Assistan^{ce: Co}^nt^inue^d^Eff^o^r^t^s^N^e^e^d^e^d^t^o^S^t^r^e^ngt^he^{n U}^S^AI^D^'^s
^O^v^e^r^sⁱ^{ght of U}^.^{S. D}^e^m^o^c^r^ac^y^As^sⁱ^s^t^anc^e^for^C^u^b^a^{, G}^A^O^-^09-¹⁶^5,^N^o^v^e^m^b^e^r²⁰⁰^8.
¹⁰⁴^A^l^f^ons^{o Cha}^r^dy^{, “}^E^x^ile^G^r^oup:^N^o^{t En}^oug^h^Mo^ne^y^G^e^tting^{to Cu}^ba^{n D}ⁱ^s^sⁱ^deⁿ^t^s^,^”^Mi^a^mⁱ^Hera^ld^,^Ma^y^{15, 20}^08;
^C^uba^{n A}^m^e^r^icaⁿ^N^a^tiona^{l F}^o^uⁿ^d^a^tion,^“^Fⁱⁿ^ding^s^aⁿ^{d R}^e^c^o^m^m^e^nda^tions^{on t}^h^e^M^o^s^t^Ef^f^e^c^tⁱ^v^e^U^s^e^of^U^S^A^I^D^-^C^U^B^A
^Fun^d^s^A^u^thor^iz^e^d^by^Se^c^tion¹⁰⁹⁽^a⁾^of^the^C^uba^{n L}ⁱ^be^r^t^y^a^{nd D}^e^m^o^c^r^a^tic^Soli^da^r^ity⁽^H^e^l^m^s^-^B^ur^ton)^A^c^{t of}^1996,”
^Ma^r^c^{h 20}⁰⁸^.

U.S.-government sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba—Radio and TV Martí—
began in 1985 and 1990 respectively. As spelled out in the Broadcasting Board of Governors
FY2009 Budget Request, the objectives of Radio and TV Martí are (1) to support the right of the
Cuban people to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers; (2) to be effective in furthering the open communication of information
and ideas through use of radio and television broadcasting to Cuba; (3) to serve as a consistently
reliable and authoritative source of accurate, objective, and comprehensive news; and (4) to
provide news, commentary, and other information about events in Cuba and elsewhere to promote
the cause of freedom in Cuba.
Until October 1999, U.S.-government funded international broadcasting programs had been a
primary function of the United States Information Agency (USIA). When USIA was abolished
and its functions were merged into the Department of State at the beginning of FY2000, the
Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) became an independent agency that included such
entities as the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free
Asia, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB), which manages Radio and TV Marti. OCB is
headquartered in Miami, Florida, and operates under the BBG’s International Broadcasting ^th
Bureau (IBB). Legislation in the 104 Congress (P.L. 104-134) required the relocation of OCB
from Washington D.C. to south Florida. The move began in 1996 and was completed in 1998.
Radio Martí broadcasts on short and medium wave (AM) channels for 24 hours six days per
week, and for 18 hours one day per week utilizing transmission facilities in Marathon, Florida
and Greenville, North Carolina, according to the BBG.
TV Martí broadcasts daily from its facilities in Cudjoe Key Florida, on the Hispasat satellite, and
is available on the Internet 24 hours a day. It is also available on 176 cable stations throughout
Latin America, according to the BBG. Until July 2005, TV Martí had also been broadcast via
blimps from facilities in Cudjoe Key, Florida for four and one-half hours daily, but the aerostats
were destroyed by Hurricane Dennis. From mid-2004 until 2006, TV Martí programming was
transmitted for several hours once a week via an airborne platform known as Commando Solo
operated by the Department of Defense utilizing a C-130 aircraft. In August 2006, OCB began to
use a contracted private aircraft to transmit pre-recorded TV Martí broadcasts six days weekly,
and by late October 2006 the OCB inaugurated an aircraft-broadcasting platform known as Aero
Martí with the capability of transmitting live broadcasts. Aero Martí transmits broadcasts five
hours daily from Monday to Saturday during the evening. According to OCB, since mid-FY2007,
it has had two contracted private aircraft transmitting the broadcasts.
In December 2006, the OCB contracted with two private U.S. commercial stations to transmit ¹⁰⁵
Radio and TV Martí. It provided a six-month contract with Radio Mambí (710 AM) in Florida,
at a cost of $182,500, to broadcast one hour of Radio Martí programming five days a week from
midnight to 1:00 am. Radio Mambí is a popular station in south Florida, with a 50,000 watt
capacity, that is well-known for its strong anti-Castro stance. A second six-month OCB contract
with WPMF (Channel 38) in Miami, known as TV Azteca, at a cost of $195,000, provided for
two 30-minute TV Martí newscasts at 6 pm and 11:30 pm weekdays, along with one-minute news
updates hourly over a 12 hour period weekdays. OCB chose the station because it is offered on

¹⁰⁵^Ch^ri^stⁱⁿ^{a Ho}^ag,^“Radⁱ^o^,^T^V^M^a^r^t^í^T^o^{Be A}ⁱ^red^L^o^cal^l^y^,^”^Mⁱ^{ami H}^e^rald^,^Decem^b^e^{r 1}⁹^,²⁰⁰⁶^.

DirecTV and because it has only a small audience in Miami. In June 2007, the two contracts were
extended for an additional six months with similar terms. The contract with Radio Mambí
subsequently expired in early 2008, whereas TV Martí continues to be shown on Channel 38.
Both Radio and TV Martí have at times been the focus of controversies, including questions
about adherence to broadcast standards. There have been various attempts over the years to cut
funding for the programs, especially for TV Martí, which has not had much of an audience
because of Cuban jamming efforts. In December 2006, press reports alleged significant problems ¹⁰⁶
in the OCB’s operations, with claims of cronyism, patronage, and bias in its coverage. In
February 2007, the former director of TV Martí programming pled guilty in U.S. federal court to
receiving more than $100,000 in kickbacks over a three-year period from a vendor receiving ¹⁰⁷
OCB contracts.
Over the years, there have been various government studies and audits of Radio and TV Martí,
including investigations by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, by a 1994
congressionally established Advisory Panel on Radio and TV Martí, and by the State ¹⁰⁸
Department’s and BBG’s Office Inspector General offices in 1999, 2003, and 2007.
In July 2008, GAO issued a report that criticized the IBB’s and OCB’s practices in awarding the
two contracts to Radio Mambí and TV Azteca as lacking discipline required to ensure
transparency and accountability. According to GAO, the approach for awarding the Radio Mambi ¹⁰⁹
and TV Azteca contracts did not reflect sound business practices.
The most recent State Department/BBG Office of Inspector General (OIG) report, issued in June

2007, maintained that OCB has significantly improved its operations under its current director,

Pedro Roig, with an organizational realignment that has streamlined operations and has helped
improve the quality of broadcasts. According to the report, “IBB quality reviews show that radio
and television broadcasts have markedly improved over the past two years in production quality
and content,” although the report also called for greater emphasis on internal quality control to
ensure that editorial standards are followed. The report lauded the introduction of new technology
allowing OCB to broadcast television signals live into Cuba using airborne platforms, and

¹⁰⁶^{Oscar Co}^rral^,^“Radⁱ^o^,^T^V^M^a^rt^í^F^ace^Aⁿ^o^t^h^e^{r G}^o^vern^m^eⁿ^t^A^u^dⁱ^t^,^”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^,^Decem^b^e^{r 1}⁸^,²⁰⁰⁶^,^and
^“P^r^o^b^l^em^{s Do}^{g Bro}^a^d^cast^e^r,^”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^,^D^e^c^e^m^b^e^r^19,²⁰⁰⁶^.
¹⁰⁷^Ja^y^W^eav^er,^“T^V^M^a^rt^í^E^x^ecu^tⁱ^v^{e A}^d^mⁱ^t^s^T^a^kiⁿ^g^Ki^c^k^b^acks,^”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{14, 2}⁰⁰⁷^.
¹⁰⁸^S^{ee th}^{e f}^o^llo^wⁱⁿ^g^rep^o^r^{ts a}ⁿ^d^a^u^d^{its: U.}^S^.^G^eⁿ^e^{ral Acco}^uⁿ^tin^{g Of}^fⁱ^{ce (}^GAO),^Br^oadc^as^ts^to^C^u^b^a^,^{TV M}^a^r^ti
^S^u^r^{veys a}^r^{e F}^l^a^w^ed^,^GA^O/NS^I^AD-9⁰^-²⁵^2,^A^u^gu^{st 1}⁹⁹⁰^{; U.}^S^.^GAO,^{TV M}^a^r^ti,^C^o^s^t^s^an^{d C}^o^m^p^li^an^c^e^w^{ith Br}^o^adc^as^t
^Staⁿ^d^a^r^d^s^an^{d I}ⁿ^te^rⁿ^ati^oⁿ^a^{l A}^g^r^e^e^m^eⁿ^ts^{, G}^A^O^/^N^S^I^A^D^-^92-^199,^M^a^y¹⁹⁹²^{; U}^.^S.^G^A^O^,^L^e^tte^r^{to H}^{on. H}^o^w^a^r^d^L^.
^B^e^r^m^aⁿ^a^{nd H}^o^{n. J}^o^hn^{F. K}^e^r^r^y^r^e^g^a^r^d^ing^R^a^{dio Ma}^r^tⁱ^br^oa^dc^a^s^{t s}^t^a^nda^r^d^s^,^G^A^O^/N^SI^A^D^-^93-^126R^,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^17,
¹⁹⁹^{3; A}^d^vⁱ^s^o^r^y^P^a^ne^l^{on R}^a^dⁱ^{o a}^{nd T}^V^Ma^r^ti,^Re^por^t^of^the^A^d^vⁱ^s^o^r^y^Pane^l^oⁿ^Ra^di^{o a}ⁿ^d^{TV M}^a^r^tⁱ^,^T^h^{ree V}^o^l^u^m^e^s,
^Ma^r^c^{h 19}⁹⁴^{; U}^.^S^.^G^A^O^,^Radi^{o M}^a^r^{ti, Pr}^ogr^am^Re^vⁱ^e^w^Pr^oc^e^s^s^e^s^N^e^e^d^Str^e^ngt^heⁿⁱ^ng^,^GA^O/NS^I^AD-9⁴^-²⁶^5,
^Se^pte^m^be^r¹⁹⁹⁴^{; U}^.^S^.^G^A^O^,^U.S.^Inform^atio^{n A}^g^eⁿ^c^y^,^Issue^s^Re^la^t^e^{d to}^Re^inv^eⁿ^ti^on^Plaⁿⁿⁱ^ngⁱⁿ^the^Offic^e^{of C}^u^b^a
^Br^oadc^as^tin^g^{, G}^A^O^/N^SI^A^D^-^96-^110,^Ma^y^1996;^U^.^S.^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^Sta^t^e^,^O^f^fⁱ^ce^of^the^Iⁿ^s^p^e^c^t^or^G^e^ne^r^a^l,^R^evi^{ew o}^f
^Polic^e^s^an^{d Pr}^oc^e^dur^e^s^for^Ens^u^rⁱ^ng^th^{at R}^adi^{o M}^a^r^ti^Br^oa^dc^as^ts^Adhe^r^e^to^Ap^plic^a^b^le^Re^q^u^ir^e^m^eⁿ^ts^{, 9}⁹^-^IB-0¹⁰^,
^J^une¹⁹⁹⁹^{; U}^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^Sta^t^e^a^{nd the}^B^r^oa^dc^a^s^ting^B^o^a^r^{d of}^G^o^v^e^r^nor^s^,^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^o^f^Iⁿ^s^p^e^c^t^or^G^e^ne^r^a^l,^R^evi^{ew o}^f
^the^Effe^c^tiv^eⁿ^e^{ss an}^{d Imp}^l^e^m^eⁿ^ta^tion^{of Of}^fic^e^{of C}^u^b^a^Br^oa^dc^asti^{ng’s Ne}^{w Pro}^g^{ram I}ⁿ^iti^ativ^e^s^{, Re}^{port N}^o^{. IBO}^-^A^-
^03-^01,^J^a^nua^r^y²⁰⁰³^{, a}ⁿ^d^Re^p^o^r^t^{of I}ⁿ^s^p^e^c^tion^,^O^ffic^e^o^f^C^u^ba^Br^o^adc^as^ti^ng^,^R^e^po^r^t^N^o^{. I}^S^P^-^I^B⁰⁷^-^{35, J}^une²⁰^07.
¹⁰⁹^U^.^{S. G}^o^v^e^rnm^e^nt^A^c^c^ounta^b^ility^O^f^fⁱ^c^e^,^“^B^roa^d^c^a^s^ting^to^Cuba^,^W^e^ak^ne^s^s^e^s^{in Co}^ntra^c^ting^P^r^a^c^tⁱ^c^e^s^Re^duc^e^d
^Vⁱ^sib^ility^into^Se^le^c^t^e^d^Aw^a^r^{d De}^cⁱ^sions,”^G^AO-08-76^{4, J}^u^ly²⁰⁰⁸^.

maintained that there are indications that more Cubans are watching TV Martí broadcasts. It
recommended that the BBG’s International Broadcasting Bureau should review and assess the
leases with Radio Mambí and TV Azteca at the end of the lease period to determine whether they
provide additional listeners and viewers and are worth the cost, or whether they could be replaced
with lease options for other stations. Looking ahead, the report maintained that OCB needs a
“long-term strategic plan that anticipates the future needs of the Cuban audience, provides a
template on how to compete with commercial broadcasters, and addresses what to do with OCB
and its broadcasting facilities if and when uncensored broadcasting is allowed inside a democratic ¹¹⁰
Cuba.”
One of the most controversial aspects of the OIG report, and one that has often been at the center
of past congressional debate over TV Martí, is the extent to which TV Martí can be viewed in
Cuba. The report maintains that there is anecdotal evidence that the Aero Martí airborne
transmissions have increased viewership. The report refers to a January 2007 survey of Cuban
arrivals—commissioned by Spanish Radio Productions with the cooperation of Miami Dade
College—that found listening rates for Radio and TV Martí within Cuba were significantly higher
than previously reported, especially for TV Martí. Although specific survey figures are not cited
in the OIG report, OCB officials maintain that the survey shows that 17% of recent Cuban ¹¹¹
arrivals had watched TV Martí. The OIG report also points to a February 2007 survey by the
U.S. Interests Section (USINT) in Havana that reflected increased viewership. According to the
BBG, that survey was completed by 500 Cuban visitors to the USINT (where TV Martí can be
viewed) in January and February 2007, with 10% of the visitors indicating that they could watch
TV Martí via UHF for brief periods.
Other observers contend that TV Martí can hardly be viewed in Cuba because of the
government’s jamming efforts. John Nichols, a Pennsylvania State University communications
professor, visited Cuba in late June 2007 on a fact-finding mission sponsored by the Center for
International Policy (a group that opposes U.S. policy toward Cuba), and concluded “that the
signal from the plane is essentially unusable” and that there was “no evidence of significant ¹¹²
viewership of TV Martí.” In interviews with the Associated Press, more than two dozen Cuban
immigrants to Florida contended that while Radio Martí can be heard throughout Cuba, TV Martí ¹¹³
can rarely be seen. Prior BBG commissioned phone surveys in Cuba from 2003, 2005, and
November 2006 estimated past week TV Martí viewership between 0.1% and 0.3% of those
surveyed and past month viewership of almost 0.5%. The November 2006 survey, reportedly
designed to show the early effects of the Aero Martí transmissions that began in late October,
showed no statistically significant change from the 2003 and 2005 surveys. In the same surveys,
Radio Martí had listenership of between 1% to 2% in the past week and 4% to 5% in the past
month.

¹¹⁰^T^h^e^Sta^t^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt or}^ig^ina^lly^is^s^u^e^d^a^tw^o-^pa^g^e^s^u^m^m^a^r^y^o^f^the^r^e^por^t^on^its^w^e^bs^ite^{on J}^u^ne⁵^,²⁰⁰^{7, a}^nd
^poi^nte^d^out^tha^t^the^f^u^{ll r}^e^p^o^r^t^r^e^c^e^iv^e^d^only^“^lⁱ^m^ite^{d of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^dis^t^rⁱ^buti^oⁿ^.^”^Oⁿ^J^u^ly^{31, 2}⁰⁰⁷^{, t}^h^e^Sta^t^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^nt
ⁱ^ssu^ed^t^h^{e e}ⁿ^tⁱ^r^{e 43}^-p^{age rep}^o^r^t^onⁱ^t^s^w^e^b^sⁱ^t^e^,^wⁱ^t^h^cert^aⁱⁿ^sectⁱ^o^{ns red}^act^ed^.^T^h^at^versi^oⁿⁱ^s^avai^l^a^b^l^{e at}
^http:^//oig^.sta^te^.g^ov^/^l^bry^/^.
¹¹¹^P^a^b^l^{o Bach}^el^et^,^“M^art^í^E^x^t^e^ndⁱ^{ng It}^{s Reach}^,^U.^S^.^S^a^y^s^,^”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^{, J}^u^ne²⁰^,²⁰⁰⁷^.
¹¹²^V^aⁿ^e^{ssa Bau}^za,^“T^V^M^a^rt^í^Sⁱ^gn^al^W^{eak i}ⁿ^Cu^b^a^,^Bro^a^d^cast^S^p^eci^alⁱ^s^t^S^a^y^s^,^”^{South F}^l^or^id^a^Su^n-^Se^ntine^l^,^J^u^ly^31,
²⁰⁰^7.
¹¹³^L^a^ura^Wⁱ^de^s^-^Muñoz^{, “}^D^e^s^pite^E^x^pe^ndit^u^re^s^,^T^V^Ma^rtí^Still^T^oug^{h to}^Se^eⁱⁿ^Cuba^,”^A^s^s^o^cⁱ^a^t^e^d^P^r^e^s^s^,^J^u^ly^30,
²⁰⁰^7.

From FY1984 through FY2007, about $564 million has been spent for broadcasting to Cuba, with
$28.6 million in FY2005, $37.5 million in FY2006, and $33.9 million in FY2007, and an
estimated $33.4 million in FY2008. For FY2009, the Bush Administration has requested $34.4
million for broadcasting to Cuba. Until FY2005, the Administration provided funding information
for Cuba broadcasting with a breakdown of the amounts spent for Radio versus TV Martí. Since
FY2005, however, the Broadcasting Board of Governors has not made such a distinction in its
annual budget request.
The Administration requested $36.279 million for Cuba broadcasting in FY2007, with $2.7
million of this to purchase an aerostat for broadcasting TV Marti. The request was slightly below
the $37.129 million appropriated in FY2006 (when Congress funded the Administration’s request
to acquire and outfit an aircraft for dedicated airborne radio and television broadcasts to Cuba),
but almost $9 million above the $27.6 million appropriated in FY2005. On June 29, 2006, the
House passed H.R. 5672, the FY2007 Science, State, Justice, Commerce and Related Agencies
appropriations bill, that would fund Cuba broadcasting under the International Broadcasting
Operations account. The report to the bill (H.Rept. 109-520) recommended $36.102 million for
Cuba broadcasting, including $2.7 million to improve transmission capabilities via aerostat for
broadcasting TV Martí. The Senate version of H.R. 5522, the FY2007 Foreign Operations
appropriations bill, would fund Cuba broadcasting. The Senate report to the bill (S.Rept. 109-

277) recommended full funding of the Administration’s request of $36.279 million. Final action ^th

was not completed on either bill before the end of the 109 Congress, but ultimately was funded ^th
by a series of continuing resolutions completed in the 110 Congress that provided $33.9 million
for Cuba broadcasting for FY2007.
For FY2008, the Administration requested $38.7 million for Cuba broadcasting, including $3.2
million to enhance programming to Cuba in support of the recommendations of the July 2006
report of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba. According to the BBG’s FY2008 budget
request, of the $3.2 million to enhance programming to Cuba, $1.2 million would be to improve
programming and Radio and TV Martí program production in OCB’s Miami facility by adding a
second television studio, virtual sets, and additional portable production capability. The remaining
$2 million would be spent to continue and expand transmission leases begun in FY2007 for
DirecTV and medium wave radio frequencies.
Congress provided $33.681 million for Radio and TV Marti in the FY2008 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161), while a 0.81% rescission brought the enacted amount to
$33.408 million. This was about $5 million less than the Administration’s request and similar to
the amount provided for FY2007. Both the House and Senate committee reports to the FY2008
State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Program Appropriations bill had
recommended $33.681 million. S.Amdt. 2695 (Martinez), which was withdrawn from
consideration on September 6, 2007, would have increased funding by $5.019 to fully fund the
Administration’s request.

For FY2009, the Administration requested $34.392 million for broadcasting to Cuba, slightly
more than provided by Congress in FY2008. The request amount included funding for the
airborne platform that the Office of Cuba Broadcasting uses to broadcast Radio and TV Martí.
The report to the Senate Appropriations Committee version of the FY2009 State Department,
Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, S. 3288 (S.Rept. 110-425), ^th
recommended fully funding the Administration’s request for Cuba broadcasting. The 110
Congress did not finalize FY2009 appropriations, although it did approve the Consolidated
Appropriations Act for FY2009 (P.L. 110-329) that provides funding until March 6, 2009.
Cuba and the United States reached two migration accords in 1994 and 1995 designed to stem the
mass exodus of Cubans attempting to reach the United States by boat. On the minds of U.S.
policymakers was the 1980 Mariel boatlift in which 125,000 Cubans fled to the United States
with the approval of Cuban officials. In response to Castro’s threat to unleash another Mariel,
U.S. officials reiterated U.S. resolve not to allow another exodus. Amid escalating numbers of
fleeing Cubans, on August 19, 1994, President Clinton abruptly changed U.S. migration policy,
under which Cubans attempting to flee their homeland were allowed into the United States, and
announced that the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy would take Cubans rescued at sea to the U.S.
naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Despite the change in policy, Cubans continued fleeing in
large numbers.
As a result, in early September 1994, Cuba and the United States began talks that culminated in a
September 9, 1994 bilateral agreement to stem the flow of Cubans fleeing to the United States by
boat. In the agreement, the United States and Cuba agreed to facilitate safe, legal, and orderly
Cuban migration to the United States, consistent with a 1984 migration agreement. The United
States agreed to ensure that total legal Cuban migration to the United States would be a minimum
of 20,000 each year, not including immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. In a change of policy, the
United States agreed to discontinue the practice of granting parole to all Cuban migrants who
reach the United States, while Cuba agreed to take measures to prevent unsafe departures from
Cuba.
In May 1995, the United States reached another accord with Cuba under which the United States
would parole the more than 30,000 Cubans housed at Guantanamo into the United States, but
would intercept future Cuban migrants attempting to enter the United States by sea and would
return them to Cuba. The two countries would cooperate jointly in the effort. Both countries also
pledged to ensure that no action would be taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as a
consequence of their attempt to immigrate illegally. On January 31, 1996, the Department of
Defense announced that the last of some 32,000 Cubans intercepted at sea and housed at
Guantanamo had left the U.S. Naval Station, most having been paroled into the United States.
Since the 1995 migration accord, the U.S. Coast Guard has interdicted thousands of Cubans at sea
and returned them to their country, while those deemed at risk for persecution have been

transferred to Guantanamo and then found asylum in a third country or eventually the United
States. Those Cubans who reach shore are allowed to apply for permanent resident status in one
year, pursuant to the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-732). This so-called “wet foot/dry
foot” policy has been criticized by some as encouraging Cubans to risk their lives in order to
make it to the United States and as encouraging alien smuggling. Others maintain that U.S. policy
should welcome those migrants fleeing communist Cuba whether or not they are able to make it
to land.
The number of Cubans interdicted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard has risen in recent years, from
931 in 2002 to 2,952 in 2005, almost twice the number interdicted in 2004. In 2006, Cuban
interdictions drooped to 2,293, but 2007 saw a large increase with 3,197 Cubans interdicted for ¹¹⁴
the year. As of late June 2008, over 1,000 Cuban migrants were interdicted at sea. In recent
years, increasing numbers of Cuban migrants attempting to reach the United States have been
intercepted in Mexico, with some 1,359 intercepted in 2007 and some 1,000 in the first four
months of 2008. Cuba and Mexico are reportedly negotiating a migration agreement to curb the ¹¹⁵
irregular flow of migrants through Mexico.
U.S. prosecution against migrant smugglers in Florida has increased in recent years with
numerous convictions. There have been several violent incidents in which Cuban migrants have
brandished weapons or in which Coast Guard officials have used force to prevent Cubans from
reaching shore. In late December 2007, a Coast Guard official in Florida called on the local
Cuban American community to denounce the smuggling and stop financing the trips that are ¹¹⁶
leading to more deaths at sea. The Cuban government also has taken forceful action against
individuals engaging in alien smuggling. Prison sentences of up to three years may be imposed
against those engaging in alien smuggling.
In the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s July 2006, announcement that he was temporarily ceding
political power to his brother, Department of Homeland Security officials announced several
measures to discourage Cubans from risking their lives on the open seas. On August 11, 2006,
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Deputy Secretary Michael P. Jackson urged “the Cuban
people to stay on the island” and discouraged “anyone from risking their life in the open seas in
order to travel to the United States.” At the same time, DHS announced additional measures to
discourage Cubans from turning to alien smuggling as a way to enter the United States. The
measures support family reunification by increasing the numbers of Cuban migrants admitted to
the United States each year who have family members in the United States, although the overall
number of Cubans admitted to the United States annually will remain at about 21,000. Cubans
who attempt to enter the United States illegally will be deemed ineligible to enter under this new
family reunification procedure. In another change of policy, Cuban medical personnel currently
conscripted by the Cuban government to work in third countries are now allowed to enter the ¹¹⁷
United States; their families in Cuba are also allowed to enter the United States.

¹¹⁴^{U.S. C}^o^a^s^{t G}^u^a^r^{d, A}^lie^{n Mig}^r^aⁿ^t^Inte^rdic^ti^on^{, Coa}^s^{t G}^u^a^r^{d Of}^fⁱ^c^e^of^L^a^w^En^f^o^rc^e^m^eⁿ^{t, “}^T^ota^l^Inte^rdic^tio^ns,
^C^a^le^nde^r^Y^e^a^r¹⁹^{82 t}^o^P^r^e^s^eⁿ^t^,^”^J^une²⁰^,²⁰⁰⁸^.
¹¹⁵^Dⁱ^e^g^{o C}^e^v^a^llos^,^“^M^ig^r^a^tion:^Mor^e^a^{nd M}^o^r^e^C^u^ba^ns^Eⁿ^te^rⁱ^ng^U^.^S^.^T^h^r^oug^{h Me}^xⁱ^c^o^,”^Iⁿ^{ter Press S}^e^{rvice News}
^A^g^en^cy^{, J}^u^ne¹⁷^,²⁰^08.
¹¹⁶^L^a^ur^a^Mor^a^le^s^,^“^E^x^ile^s^U^r^g^e^{d to}^Ste^m^Tⁱ^de^of^C^uba^ns^,”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^,^Decem^b^e^{r 2}⁹^,²⁰⁰⁷^.
¹¹⁷^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^H^o^m^e^la^{nd Se}^c^u^rⁱ^t^y^{, “}^D^H^S^A^nnounc^e^s^A^dditi^ona^l^Me^a^s^ur^e^s^{to C}^o^m^b^a^t^A^lie^{n Sm}^ugg^ling^of^C^uba^ns^,”
^a^{nd “}^U^{SCIS W}^ill^Furt^he^{r Stre}^ng^t^h^eⁿ^Me^a^s^ure^s^tha^t^Su^pp^{ort t}^h^e^Re^unifⁱ^c^a^tion^of^Fa^m^ilie^{s Se}^pa^ra^te^{d by}^the^Ca^stro
^Regi^m^e^,^”^P^r^{ess Rel}^ease^s^,^A^u^gu^st¹¹^,²⁰⁰⁶^;^P^a^bl^o^Bach^el^et^,^“U.^S^.^P^r^o^g^ra^m^f^o^{r De}^f^e^ctⁱⁿ^{g Cu}^b^aⁿ^D^o^ct^o^r^{s a S}^u^ccess,^”
^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^{, Ma}^r^c^h¹²^{, 20}⁰⁷^.

In March 2007, some 50 federal, state, and local agencies conducted a two-day mass migration
response exercise in Florida, dubbed Operation Vigilant Sentry, that was designed to prepare for
potential mass migration from Cuba in the event of the collapse of the communist government.
Coordinated by the Coast Guard, the exercise was designed to improve migrant-interdiction skills
as well as skills to intercept vessels heading to Cuba.
On July 17, 2007, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement maintaining that the
United States had only awarded 10,724 visas for permanent legal migration to the United States
so far in FY2007 as of the end of June 2007, out of an annual minimum of 20,000 agreed to in the
1994 bilateral migration accord. The State Department subsequently responded that the United
States was not going to meet its minimum quota because Cuba has impaired the ability of the
U.S. Interests Section in Havana to operate in several ways. It maintained that Cuba has refused
to allow the U.S. Interests Section to hire local staff to replace those who have resigned or retired;
for over a year, has held at least 28 shipping containers with essential supplies and materials for
the operation of the diplomatic facility; and has refused to issue temporary visas for U.S. ¹¹⁸
technical personnel to visit Havana to maintain systems in the diplomatic facility. In early
October 2007, an official at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana said that the United States had
issued only about 15,000 of the 20,000 emigrant visas and blamed Cuba because of the inability ¹¹⁹
to hire local personnel.
On November 21, 2007, the Department of Homeland Security announced that it was creating a
new Cuban Family Reunification Parole (CFRP) Program that offers beneficiaries of approved
family-based immigration visa petitions an opportunity to come to the United States rather than
remain in Cuba to apply for a green card. According to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS), the purpose of the program is to expedite family reunification through safe,
legal, and orderly channel of migration to the United States and to discourage dangerous and ¹²⁰
irregular maritime migration. Those granted parole into the United States will count towards
the annual 20,000 figure set forth in the 1994 migration accord.
Semi-annual U.S.-Cuban talks alternating between Cuba and the United States had been held
regularly on the implementation of the 1994 and 1995 migration accords, but the State ^th
Department cancelled the 20 round of talks scheduled for January 2004, and no migration talks
have been held since. According to the State Department, Cuba has refused to discuss five issues
identified by the United States: (1) Cuba’s issuance of exit permits for all qualified migrants; (2)
Cuba’s cooperation in holding a new registration for an immigrant lottery; (3) the need for a
deeper Cuban port used by the U.S. Coast Guard for the repatriation of Cubans interdicted at sea;
(4) Cuba’s responsibility to permit U.S. diplomats to travel to monitor returned migrants; and (5)
Cuba’s obligation to accept the return of Cuban nationals determined to be inadmissible to the

¹¹⁸^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^rtm^e^{nt of}^Sta^t^e^,^D^a^ily^P^r^e^s^s^Brie^fⁱ^ng^{, Se}^aⁿ^Mc^Corm^a^c^k^,^J^u^ly^{18, 2}⁰⁰⁷^.
¹¹⁹^Aⁿ^ita^Snow^{, “}^U^{.S. Sa}^y^s^{it G}^r^aⁿ^{ted 1}⁵^,0⁰⁰^of²⁰^,0⁰⁰^Vis^a^Q^uota^f^o^r^C^uba^ns^L^a^s^t^Fis^c^a^l^Y^e^a^r^,”^A^s^s^o^cⁱ^a^t^e^d^Pr^e^s^s^,
^O^c^tobe^r^1,²⁰⁰⁷^.
¹²⁰^U.^S^.^Dep^a^rt^m^eⁿ^t^o^f^Ho^m^e^l^aⁿ^d^S^ecu^ri^t^y^,^U.^S^.^Ci^tⁱ^zen^shⁱ^p^an^{d Imm}ⁱ^gratⁱ^oⁿ^S^e^rvi^ces,^“F^act^S^h^eet^:^Cu^b^aⁿ^F^a^mⁱ^l^y
^R^e^unifⁱ^c^a^tion^P^r^og^r^a^m^,^”^N^ovem^b^e^r^21,²⁰⁰⁷^.

United States.¹²¹ In response to the cancellation of the talks, Cuban officials maintained that the
U.S. decision was irresponsible and that Cuba was prepared to discuss all of the issues raised by ¹²²
the United States.
The 45-square mile U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has been a U.S. base since
1903, and under a 1934 treaty that remains in force, the U.S. presence can only be terminated by
mutual agreement or by abandonment by the United States. When Fidel Castro assumed power in
the 1959 Cuban revolution, the new government gave assurances that it would respect all its
treaty commitments, including the 1934 treaty covering the Guantanamo base. Subsequently,
however, as U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated, the Cuban government opposed the presence as
illegal.
The mission of the base has changed over time. During the Cold War, the base was viewed as a
good location for controlling Caribbean sea lanes, as a deterrent to the Soviet presence in the
Caribbean, and as a location for supporting potential military operations in the region. In 1994-
1995, the base was used to house thousands of Cubans and Haitians fleeing their homeland, but
by 1996 the last of the refugees had departed, with most Cubans paroled into the United States,
pursuant to a May 1995 U.S.-Cuban migration accord. Since the 1995 accord, the U.S. Coast
Guard has interdicted thousands of Cubans at sea and returned them to Cuba, while a much
smaller number, those deemed at risk for persecution, have been taken to Guantanamo and then
granted asylum in a third country.
Another mission for the Guantanamo base emerged with the U.S.-led global campaign against
terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States. With
the U.S. war in Afghanistan in 2001, the United States decided to send some captured Taliban and
Al Qaeda fighters to be imprisoned in Guantanamo. Although the Cuban government has objected
to the U.S. presence at Guantanamo, it did not initially oppose the new mission of housing
detainees. Defense Minister Raúl Castro noted that, in the unlikely event that a prisoner would ¹²³
escape into Cuban territory, Cuba would capture the prisoner and return him to the base. The
Cuban government, however, has expressed concerns about the treatment of prisoners at the U.S.
base and has said it will keep pressing the international community to investigate the treatment of ¹²⁴
terrorist suspects. In January 2005, it denounced what it described as “atrocities” committed at ¹²⁵
the Guantanamo base.
Some Members of Congress have called for the closure of the Guantanamo detention facility. In ^th
the 110 Congress, S. 1249 (Feinstein) and H.R. 2212 (Harman) would have required the
President to close the detention facility at Guantanamo within one year, while S. 1469 (Harkin)
would have require the closure of the facility within 120 days. The final version of H.R. 1585, the

¹²¹^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^Sta^t^e^.^Sta^t^e^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt R}^e^g^u^la^r^B^r^ie^fⁱ^ng^{, R}ⁱ^cha^r^{d B}^o^uc^he^r^.^J^aⁿ^u^a^r^y^{7, 20}⁰⁴^.
¹²²^“^M^ig^ra^{tion T}^a^lk^{s Ca}^nc^e^lle^d,”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^rald^,^J^a^nua^r^y^{8, 2}⁰⁰⁴^.
¹²³^“Cu^b^a^W^o^u^l^d^Hand^{Over E}^s^cap^ees,^Raú^l^Cast^ro^S^a^y^s^,^”^Mⁱ^{ami He}^r^a^ld^,^J^a^nua^r^y^20,²⁰^02.
¹²⁴^Forⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion on}^te^r^r^o^rⁱ^s^t^s^u^s^p^e^c^t^s^he^{ld a}^t^G^u^aⁿ^ta^na^m^o^{, s}^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^t^R^L³¹³⁶⁷^,^Tre^a^tmeⁿ^t^of^“Battle^fie^l^d
^Detaⁱⁿ^ees”^{in th}^{e Wa}^r^oⁿ^T^e^rro^ri^sm^{, by}^J^e^nnif^e^r^K^.^Els^e^a^;^a^{nd C}^R^S^R^e^por^t^R^S²²¹⁷³^,^D^e^taiⁿ^e^e^s^at^G^uant^an^am^o^Bay^,
^by^J^e^nnif^e^r^K^.^Els^e^a^.
¹²⁵^Aⁿ^a^R^a^de^la^{t, “}^C^uba^T^u^rⁿ^s^U^p^R^h^e^t^or^ic^{on G}^u^aⁿ^ta^na^m^o^a^s^U^N^C^onde^mⁿ^s^H^u^m^a^{n R}ⁱ^g^h^ts^A^bus^e^s^,”^C^ubaN^e^w^s^,
^A^p^r^{il 200}^5.

FY2008 defense authorization bill, H.R. 1585, had a provision (Section 1067) requiring the
Secretary of Defense to prepare a report within 60 days on transferring individuals detained at
Guantanamo. (An earlier version of that provision was first added to the bill by H.Amdt. 297
(Moran, Virginia), approved during May 17, 2007 House floor consideration.) The President
ultimately vetoed H.R. 1585 on December 28, 2007 for other policy reasons, but the new version
of the FY2008 defense authorization bill, H.R. 4986, approved by both houses in January 2008
and signed into law on January 28, 2008 (P.L. 110-181) contains the identical provision on
Guantanamo in Section 1067.
With regard to the future of the Guantanamo base, a provision in the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114, Section 210) states that once a democratically
elected Cuban government is in place, U.S. policy is to be prepared to enter into negotiations
either to return the base to Cuba or to renegotiate the present agreement under mutually agreeable
terms.

P.L. 110-161 (H.R. 2764). FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act. H.R. 2764 was originally
introduced and reported by the House Committee on Appropriations (H.Rept. 110-197) on June
18, 2007 as the FY2008 State, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. The
House passed (241-178) the measure on June 22, 2007. The Senate Appropriations Committee
reported the bill on July 10, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-128), and the Senate passed (81-12) it on
September 6, 2007. On December 17, 2007, H.R. 2764 subsequently became the vehicle for the
FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, which included 11 FY2008 appropriations measures.
The President signed the measure into law on December 26, 2007.
As signed into law, Division J of the Consolidated Appropriations Act covers State Department,
Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies appropriations. The law has the following Cuba
provisions:
• Similar to previous years, Section 607 of Division J would prohibit direct
funding for Cuba. This provision had been included in both the House and Senate
versions of the bill.
• Section 620 of Division J adds Cuba to the list of countries requiring a special
notification to the Appropriations Committees for funds obligated or expended
under the act. This provision had been included in the Senate version of the bill.
• Section 691(b) of Division J provides that Cubans who supported an anti-Castro
guerrilla group in the 1960s know as the Alzados are eligible for U.S. refugee
status. The Senate version of the bill had included this provision.
• As set forth in the joint explanatory statement, the measure provides $45.7
million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs as requested by the Administration.
Both the House- and Senate-passed versions of H.R. 2764 fully funded the
Administration’s request for $45.7 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs.
The House committee-reported bill would have provided $9 million in ESF for
such programs, but during June 21, 2007, floor consideration, however, the

House approved H.Amdt. 351 (Diaz-Balart) by a vote of 254-170 that increased
ESF by $36.7 million in order to fully fund the Administration’s request. The
Senate Appropriations Committee report to the bill would have provided $15
million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs, but during September 6, 2007,
floor consideration, the Senate approved S.Amdt. 2694 (Martinez) by voice vote
that increased funding for Cuba democracy programs by $30.7 million to fully
fund the Administration’s request.
• As set forth in the joint explanatory statement, the measure provides $33.681
million for Radio and TV Marti broadcasting to Cuba, $5.019 million below the
Administration’s request of $38.7 million and identical to the amount provided
for FY2007. Both the House and Senate committee reports to the bill had
recommended $33.681 million for Cuba broadcasting. S.Amdt. 2695 (Martinez),
which was withdrawn from consideration on September 6, 2007, would have
increased funding by $5.019 to fully fund the Administration’s request.
• The measure does not include contrasting provisions related to counternarcotics
assistance for Cuba that were included in the House and Senate versions of the
bill. Section 673 of the House bill would have specifically prohibited
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance to the
Cuban government. Section 696 of the Senate bill would have provided $1
million in INCLE assistance for preliminary work by the Department of State, or
such other entity as the Secretary of State may designate, to establish cooperation
with the Cuban government on counternarcotics matters.
The final enacted measure does not include provisions easing Cuba sanctions that had been
included in the House and Senate-committee versions of the FY2008 Financial Services and
General Government Appropriations Act or the Senate-committee reported version of the FY2008
Agriculture Appropriations bill.
P.L. 110-96 (S. 1612). International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act. Introduced
and reported by the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on June 13, 2007
(S.Rept. 110-82). Senate approved, amended, by unanimous consent on June 26, 2007. House
approved by voice vote October 2, 2007. As approved, the bill amends the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to increase the potential civil penalty imposed on any
person who commits an unlawful act under the act to not exceed the greater of $250,000 (from
$50,000) or an amount that is twice the amount of the transaction. The bill also increases a
criminal penalty to not more than $1 million and/or 20 years imprisonment.
S.Res. 573 (Martinez). Celebrates Cuba Solidarity Day, recognizes the injustices face by the
Cuban people, and stands in solidarity with the Cuban peoples as they continue to work towards
democratic changes in their homeland. Introduced and passed by the Senate on May 21, 2008, by
unanimous consent.
H.Res. 995 (Diaz-Balart, Mario). Commemorates the 12^th anniversary of the 1996 shooting
down of two unarmed U.S. civilian aircraft by the Cuban regimes. Introduced February 25, 2008;
referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

H.R. 177 (Lee). Pursuit of International Education (PIE) Act of 2007. Prohibits the use of funds
available to the Department of the Treasury to implement regulations from June 2004 that
tightened restrictions on travel to Cuba for educational activities. Introduced January 4, 2007;
referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 216 (Serrano). Baseball Diplomacy Act. Waives certain prohibitions with respect to
nationals of Cuba coming to the United States to play organized baseball. Introduced January 4,

2007; referred to Committees on Foreign Affairs and Judiciary.

H.R. 217 (Serrano). Cuba Reconciliation Act. Lifts the trade embargo. Removes provisions
restricting trade and other relations with Cuba, including repeal of the Cuban Democracy Act of
1992, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, and provisions of Section 211 of
the Department of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999 related to
transactions or payments with respect to trademarks. Introduced January 4, 2007; referred to the
Committees on Foreign Affairs, Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, Judiciary, Financial
Services, Oversight and Government Reform, and Agriculture.
H.R. 275 (Smith, Christopher). Would promote freedom of expression on the Internet, and
protect U.S. businesses from coercion to participate in repression by authoritarian foreign
governments. Introduced January 5, 2007, and referred to Committees on Foreign Affairs and on
Energy and Commerce. Reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs December 10,

2007 (H.Rept. 110-481, Part 1).

H.R. 525 (King). Amends the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 to require
that, in order to determine that a democratically elected government in Cuba exists, the
government extradite to the United States convicted felon William Morales and all other
individuals who are living in Cuba in order to escape prosecution or confinement for criminal
offense committed in the United States. Introduced January 17, 2007; referred to the Committee
on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 624 (Rangel). Free Trade With Cuba Act. Would lift most economic sanctions on Cuba,
including a trademark sanction in Section 211 of the Department of Commerce and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999. Introduced January 22, 2007; referred to the Committees on
Foreign Affairs, Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, Judiciary, Financial Services,
Oversight and Government Reform, and Agriculture.
H.R. 654 (Rangel). Export Freedom to Cuba Act of 2007. Would lift overall restrictions on travel
to Cuba. Introduced January 24, 2007; referred to House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 757 (Delahunt). Cuban-American Family Restoration Act. Would lift restrictions on family
travel and the provision or remittances for family members in Cuba. Introduced January 31, 2007;
referred to House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 1026 (Moran, Jerry). Agricultural Export Facilitation Act of 2007. Would facilitate the sale
of U.S. agricultural products to Cuba by providing for general license authority for travel-related
expenditures for persons engaging in sales and marketing activities for agricultural products or in
the transportation by sea or air of such products; authorizing a consular officer to issue a
temporary visa for a Cuban national conducting activities related to the purchase of U.S.
agricultural goods, including phytosanitary inspections; clarifying the “payment of cash in
advance” term used in the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA)

to mean that the payment by the purchaser and the receipt of such payment to the seller occurs
prior to the transfer of title of the commodity or product to the purchaser and the release of
control of such commodity or product to the purchaser; and prohibiting the President from
restricting direct transfers from a Cuban financial institution to a U.S. financial institution for
U.S. agricultural sales under TSRA. Introduced February 13, 2007; referred to House Committees
on Foreign Affairs, Judiciary, Financial Services, and Agriculture.
H.R. 1306 (Wexler)/S. 749 (Nelson). Identical bills would modify the prohibition on recognition
by U.S. courts of certain rights relating to certain marks, trade names, or commercial names. H.R.
1306 introduced March 1, 2007; referred to House Committee on the Judiciary. S. 749 introduced
March 2, 2007; referred to Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
H.R. 1679 (Ros-Lehtinen). Caribbean Coral Reef Protection Act. Would exclude from admission
to the United States aliens who have made investments contributing to the enhancement of the
ability of Cuba to develop its petroleum resources off its coast; require the President to impose
economic sanctions on persons (including foreign subsidiaries) that are determined to have made
an investment equal to or exceeding $1 million that contributes to the enhancement of Cuba’s
ability to develop petroleum resources of the submerged lands off Cuba’s coast. Introduced
March 26, 2007; referred to House Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committees
on Foreign Affairs, Financial Services, and Oversight and Government Reform. Similar, but not
identical, to S. 876 described below.
H.R. 2419 (Peterson). Farm, Nutrition, and Bioenergy Act of 2007. Introduced May 22, 2007;
House passed July 27, 2007. Senate passed December 14, 2007. During House floor
consideration on July 27, 2007, the House rejected (182-245) H.Amdt. 707 Rangel, that would
have clarified the meaning of “payment of cash in advance” for the sale of agricultural
commodities to Cuba; authorized direct transfer between U.S. and Cuban financial institutions for
a product authorized for sale under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of

2000; and would have authorized the issuance of U.S. visas for Cubans to conduct activities,

including phytosanitary inspections, related to the export of U.S. agricultural goods to Cuba.
In the Senate, S.Amdt. 3660 (Baucus), which would have eased restrictions on U.S. agricultural
sales to Cuba, was proposed on December 11, 2007, but subsequently withdrawn the same day.
Several amendments regarding Cuba were submitted, but never proposed: S.Amdt. 3668
(Baucus), would have eased restrictions on U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba; S.Amdt. 3796
(Nelson, Bill), would have required a certification of certain human rights conditions in Cuba
before restrictions on U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba would be eased; S.Amdt. 3792 (Martinez),
would have expressed the sense of the Senate regarding the human rights situation in Cuba; and
S.Amdt. 3793 (Martinez), would have prevented the easing of restrictions on U.S. agricultural
exports to Cuba as long as the country is identified by the Secretary of State as a “state sponsor of
terror.”
H.R. 2819 (Rangel)/S. 1673 (Baucus). Promoting American Agricultural and Medical Exports to
Cuba Act of 2007. H.R. 2819 introduced June 21, 2007; referred to the Committees on Foreign
Affairs, Ways and Means, Judiciary, Agriculture, and Financial Services. S. 1673 introduced June

21, 2007; referred to the Committee on Finance, which held hearings on December 11, 2007.

Among other provisions, the bills would clarify the meaning of “payment of cash in advance;”
authorize direct transfers between Cuban and U.S. financial institutions for the execution of
payments for sales pursuant to the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act;
establish an agricultural export promotion program with respect to Cuba; repeal the so-called

Section 211 Cuba trademark sanction; lift restrictions on travel to Cuba; repeal an onsite
verification requirement for the commercial sale of medicines and medical devices to Cuba; and
increase the airport ticket tax for travel to or from Cuba by $1.00, with funds going to a newly
established Agricultural Export Promotion Trust Fund.
H.R. 2829 (Serrano). FY2008 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act.
Introduced and reported by House Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 110-207) June 22, 2007.
Reported by Senate Appropriations Committee July 13, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-129). House passed
(240-179) June 28, 2007. As approved by the House, Section 903 would have prevented Treasury
Department funds from being used to implement a February 2005 regulation that requires the
payment of cash in advance prior to the shipment of U.S. agricultural goods to Cuba. The House
adopted the provision during June 28, 2007 floor consideration when it approved H.Amdt. 467
(Moran, Kansas) by voice vote. The Senate Appropriations Committee version had a similar
provision in Section 619, as well as another provision in Section 620 that would have allowed for
travel to Cuba under a general license for the marketing and sale of agricultural and medical
goods. The Cuba provisions of both the House and Senate versions of the bill were not included
in the final enacted version of the measure, which was included as Division D of the FY2008
Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161, H.R. 2764).
H.R. 3161 (DeLauro)/ S. 1859 (Kohl). FY2008 Agricultural, Rural Development, Food and
Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. H.R. 3161 introduced and
reported by House Appropriations Committee July 24, 2007; House passed August 2, 2007. S.

1859 introduced and reported by Senate Appropriations Committee July 24, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-

134). Section 741 of the Senate bill would authorize travel to Cuba under a general license for the
marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods to Cuba. The Cuba provision in the Senate
version was not included in the final enacted version of the measure, which was included as
Division A of the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161, H.R. 2764).
H.R. 3182 (Udall). U.S. Participation in Cuban Energy Exploration Act. Would allow U.S.
persons to participate in energy development offshore from Cuba and other nearby countries.
Introduced July 25, 2007; referred to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Ways and Means.
H.R. 3435 (Pickering). SAFE Energy Act of 2007. Includes provisions that would allow
authorize activities and exports for the exploration of hydrocarbon resources from any portion of
any foreign exclusive economic zone that is contiguous to the exclusive economic zone of the
United States (section 201); and that would allow for travel-related transactions under a general
license for travel to Cuba by persons engaging in hydrocarbon exploration and extraction
activities (section 202). Introduced August 3, 2007; referred to the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on Ways and Means, Science and Technology,
Natural Resources, Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, and Intelligence.
H.R. 5627 (Diaz-Balart, Lincoln)/ S. 2777 (Martinez). Similar bills to award the congressional
gold medal to Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet, in recognition of his courageous and unwavering
commitment to democracy and human rights in Cuba. Both bills were introduced March 13,
2008, with H.R. 5627 referred to the House Committee on Financial Services and S. 2777
referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
H.R. 6735 (Hobson). Would terminate the application of restrictions on exploration,
development, and production of oil and gas in areas of the outer Continental Shelf adjacent to
Cuba. Introduced July 31, 2008; referred to the Committee on Natural Resources.

H.R. 6913 (Flake). Would provide that no funds made available to the Department of Commerce
may be used to implement, administer, or enforce certain amendments made to regulations
relating to license exemptions for gift parcels and humanitarian donations for Cuba. Introduced
September 16, 2008; referred to House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 6962 (Delahunt). Humanitarian Relief to Cuba Act. Would, for a 180-day period: allow
unrestricted family travel; ease restrictions on remittances by removing the limit and allowing any
American to send remittances to Cuba; and expand the list of allowable items that may be
included in gift parcels. Introduced September 18, 2008; referred to House Committee on Foreign
Affairs.
H.R. 7323.(Serrano). FY2009 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations bill.
Introduced and reported by the House Appropriations Committee on December 10, 2008 (H.Rept.
110-920). The committee had approved a draft version of the bill on June 25, 2008. The bill has
several provisions that would have eased Cuba sanctions. Section 621 would have prohibited
funds in the Act from being used to administer, implement, or enforce new language in the Cuban
embargo regulations added on February 25, 2005 (31CFR Part 515.533) that requires that U.S.
agricultural exports to Cuba must be paid for before they leave U.S. ports. Section 622 would
have allowed for family travel once a year (instead of the current restriction of once every three
years). Section 623 would have expanded family travel to visit an aunt, uncle, niece, nephew, or
first cousin (instead of the current restriction limiting such travel to visit a spouse, child,
grandchild, parent, grandparent, or sibling.) The report to the bill would require the Treasury
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to provide detailed information on
OFAC’s Cuba-related licensing and enforcement actions. None of these provisions were included
in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2009 (P.L. 110-329) that provided funding until
March 6, 2009.
S. 554 (Dorgan). Act For Our Kids. Title I, Section 101 would terminate U.S. government-
sponsored television broadcasting to Cuba and prohibit funding. Title II, Section 254, the
Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act of 2007, would prohibit the President from regulating or
prohibiting travel to or from Cuba by U.S. citizens or legal residents, or any of the transactions
ordinarily incident to such travel. Introduced February 12, 2007; referred to Senate Committee on
Finance.
S. 721 (Enzi). Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act of 2007. Would prohibit the President from
regulating or prohibiting travel to or from Cuba by U.S. citizens or legal residents, or any of the
transaction ordinarily incident to such travel. Introduced March 1, 2007; referred to Committee
on Foreign Relations.
S. 876 (Martinez). Would exclude from admission to the United States aliens who have made
investments contributing to the enhancement of the ability of Cuba to develop its petroleum
resources off its coast; require the President to impose economic sanctions on persons (including
foreign subsidiaries) that are determined to have made an investment equal to or exceeding $1
million that contributes to the enhancement of Cuba’s ability to develop petroleum resources of
the submerged lands off Cuba’s coast. Introduced March 14, 2007; referred to the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Similar, but not identical, to H.R. 1679 described above.
S. 1268 (Dorgan). Would provide for the development of certain outer Continental resources.
Amends the Cuba embargo regulations to provide for general license authority for travel-related

expenditures by persons engaging in hydrocarbon exploration and extraction activities.
Introduced May 2, 2007; referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
S. 1806 (Leahy). Would repeal the so-called Section 211 Cuba trademark sanction provision of
the FY1999 Department of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. Introduced July

17, 2007; referred to Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

S. 2503 (Nelson, Bill). Would nullify the 1977 Maritime Boundary Agreement between the
United States and Cuba, and would exclude from admission to the United States any aliens who
have directly and significantly contributed to the ability of Cuba to develop its petroleum
resources. Introduced December 18, 2007; referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
S. 2953 (Craig). Domestic Offshore Energy Security Act of 2008. Includes provisions (in section
2) that would: authorize activities and exports for the exploration of hydrocarbon resources from
any portion of any foreign exclusive economic zone that is contiguous to the exclusive economic
zone of the United States; and allow for travel-related transactions under a general license for
travel to Cuba by persons engaging in hydrocarbon exploration and extraction activities.
Introduced May 1, 2008; referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
S. 3001(Levin). FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act. S.Amdt. 5581 (Dodd), submitted
on September 15, 2008, would, for a 180-day period: allow unrestricted family travel; ease
restrictions on remittances by removing the limit and allowing any American to send remittances
to Cuba; expand the list of allowable items that may be included in gift parcels; and allow for
unrestricted U.S. cash sales of food, medicines, and relief supplies to Cuba. The amendment was
not considered and therefore not included in the final bill.
S. 3260 (Durbin). Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2009.
Introduced and reported by Senate Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 110-417) on July 14,
2008. Includes provisions easing restrictions on payment terms for the sale of agricultural goods
to Cuba (section 618), travel relating to the commercial sale of agricultural and medical goods
(section 619), and family travel (section 620). None of these provisions were included in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2009 (P.L. 110-329) that provided funding until March 6,

2009.

S. 3288 (Leahy). Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 2009. Introduced and reported by Senate Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 110-425) July
18, 2008. Includes several Cuba provisions: section 706 continues a prohibition on assistance to
Cuba, unless the President determines that it is in the national interest of the United States;
section 719 continues the provision from FY2008 that requires that any assistance for Cuba go
through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations; section 779
provides for $1 million for preliminary work by the Department of State, or other entity
designated by the Secretary of State, to establish cooperation with appropriate Cuban agencies on
counternarcotics matters, although the money would not be available if the Secretary certifies that
Cuba 1) does not have in place procedures to protect against the loss of innocent life in the air and
on the ground in connection with the interdiction of illegal drugs; and 2) there is credible
evidence of involvement of the government of Cuba in drug trafficking during the preceding 10
years. The Senate Appropriations Committee report to the bill recommended full funding for the
Administration’s requests of $34.392 million for Cuba broadcasting and $20 million in ESF for
Cuba democracy programs, and called for the State Department and USAID to conduct regular
evaluations to ensure the cost effectiveness of the programs.

S. 3289 (Kohl). Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2008. Introduced and reported by Senate Appropriations
Committee (S.Rept. 110-426) July 21, 2008. Includes a provision (section 737) that would ease
restrictions on travel to Cuba for the sale of agricultural and medical goods. This provision was
not included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2009 (P.L. 110-329) that provided
funding until March 6, 2009.

The following listing consists of enacted appropriations measures with Cuba-related provisions, ^th
FY2007 appropriations bills with Cuba provisions that were not completed by the end of the 109
Congress, and human rights resolutions that were approved. For a complete listing of legislative ^th
initiatives in the 109 Congress, see CRS Report RL32730, Cuba: Issues for the 109th Congress,
by Mark P. Sullivan.
P.L. 109-102 (H.R. 3057). FY2006 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs.
Signed into law November 14, 2005. Funds FY2006 democracy and human rights funding for
Cuba. The Administration requested $15 million in ESF assistance for democracy activities for
Cuba. Neither the House nor the Senate versions addressed this issue, and the conference report
did not include a specific earmark for Cuba.
P.L. 109-108 (H.R. 2862). FY2006 Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act. Reported by Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 109-118). House passed
June 16, 2005. Senate passed September 15, 2005. Conference report (H.Rept. 109-272) filed
November 7, 2005. House approved conference November 9; Senate approved conference
November 16, 2005. Signed into law November 22, 2005. The report to the House bill included a
committee recommendation of $27.9 million for Cuba broadcasting, $10 million below the
Administration’s request, and did not provide funding for an aircraft to transmit Radio and TV
Marti programming. Senate action on appropriations for Cuba broadcasting were included in the
Senate version of H.R. 3057 rather than H.R. 2862, and fully funded the Administration’s request
of $37.7 million. The conference report fully funded the Administration’s request of $37.7 million
for Broadcasting to Cuba under the International Broadcasting Operations account.
H.R. 5384 (Bonilla). FY2007 Agriculture Appropriations bill. Introduced and reported by House
Appropriations Committee May 12, 2006; passed House May 23, 2006. Senate Appropriations
Committee reported its version June 22, 2006 (S.Rept. 109-266). The Senate version contained a
provision, Section 755, providing for travel to Cuba under a general license for travel related to
the sale of agricultural and medical goods to Cuba. Currently such travel is provided under a
specific license issued by the Treasury Department on a case-by-case basis. Final action was not ^th
completed by the end of the 109 Congress.
H.R. 5522 (Kolbe). FY2007 Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs.
Introduced June 5, 2006, and reported by the House Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 109-
486); House passed (373-34) June 9, 2006. The Senate Appropriations reported its version of the
bill July 10, 2006 (S.Rept. 109-277). With regard to Cuba democracy programs, the Senate-
reported version recommended $2.5 million in ESF, $6.5 million less than the request, while the

House report to the bill recognized the work of USAID in promoting democracy and
humanitarian assistance for Cuba and urged the agency to continue to promote its Cuba program.
With regard to counternarcotics cooperation with Cuba, the House-passed bill, in Section 570,
would have provided that no International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)
funds may be made available for Cuba, while the Senate-reported version, in Section 551(e),
would have provided $5 million in INCLE funds for preliminary work to establish cooperation
with Cuba. The money would not be available if the President certified that Cuba did not have in
place appropriate procedures to protect against the loss of innocent life in the air and on the
ground in connection with the interdiction of illegal drugs and there was evidence of involvement
of the Cuban government in drug trafficking. The Senate-reported version also would have
funded Cuba broadcasting, with the Senate report to the bill recommending full funding of the
Administration’s $36.279 million request. The House would have funded Cuba broadcasting in
H.R. 5672, the FY2007 Science, State, Justice, Commerce and Related Agencies appropriations ^th
bill, described below. Final action was not completed before the end of the 109 Congress.
H.R. 5576 (Knollenberg). FY2007 Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development,
the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act. Introduced
June 9, 2006; reported by House Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 109-495). House passed
(406-22) June 14, 2006. Reported by Senate Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 109-293) July
26, 2006. Both the House and Senate versions of the bill include a provision (Section 950 in the
House version and Section 846 in the Senate version) that prohibits funds from being used to
implement tightened restrictions on financing for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba that were
issued in February 2005. In the House bill, the provision was added by H.Amdt. 1049 (Moran,
Kansas), approved by voice vote during floor consideration on June 14, 2006. Final action on the ^th
measure was not completed by the end of the 109 Congress.
H.R. 5672 (Wolf). FY2007 Science, State, Justice, Commerce and Related Agencies
appropriations. Introduced June 22, 2006; reported by House Appropriations Committee (H.Rept.
109-520). House passed June 29, 2006. As approved, Cuba broadcasting is to be funded under the
International Broadcasting Operations account. The report to the bill recommends $36.102
million for Cuba broadcasting, including $2.7 million to improve transmission capabilities via
aerostat for broadcasting TV Marti. Final action on the measure was not completed before the end ^th
of the 109 Congress.
H.Con.Res. 81 (Menendez). Expresses the sense of Congress regarding the two-year anniversary
of the human rights crackdown in Cuba. Introduced March 2, 2005; approved by the House
Committee on International Relations March 9, 2005. House passed (398-27, 2 present) April 27,

2005.

H.Res. 193 (Diaz-Balart, Mario). Expresses support of the House of Representatives to the
organizers and participants of the May 20, 2005, meeting in Havana of the Assembly to Promote
Civil Society. Introduced April 6, 2005; approved by the Committee on International Relations
April 27, 2005. House passed (392-22, 1 present) May 10, 2005.
H.Res. 388 (Diaz-Balart, Lincoln). Expresses the sense of the House of Representatives
regarding the Cuban government’s extreme repression against members of Cuba’s pro-democracy
movement in July 2005; condemns gross human rights violations committed by the Cuban
regime; calls on the Secretary of State to initiate an international solidarity campaign on behalf of

the immediate release of all Cuban political prisoners; calls on the European Union to reexamine
its current policy toward the Cuban regime; and calls on the U.S. Permanent Representative to the
United Nations and other international organizations to work with member countries of the U.N. ^nd
Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) to ensure a strong resolution on Cuba at the 62
session of the UNCHR. Introduced July 26, 2005. House passed (393-31) September 29, 2005.
S.Res. 140 (Martinez). Expresses support of the Senate for the May 20, 2005 meeting in Havana
of the Assembly to Promote Civil Society. Introduced May 12, 2005; Senate approved by
unanimous consent May 17, 2005.
S.Res. 469 (Lieberman). Condemns the April 25, 2006, beating and intimidation of Cuban
dissident Martha Beatriz Roque. Introduced May 8, 2006; Senate passed May 25, 2006, by
unanimous consent.

CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RS22742, Cuba’s Political Succession: From Fidel to Raul Castro, by Mark P.
Sullivan.
CRS Report RL34523, Financial Services and General Government (FSGG): FY2009
Appropriations, by Garrett Hatch.
CRS Report RS22094, Lawsuits Against State Supporters of Terrorism: An Overview, by Jennifer
K. Elsea.
CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K.
Elsea.
CRS Report RL32014, WTO Dispute Settlement: Status of U.S. Compliance in Pending Cases, by
Jeanne J. Grimmett.
CRS Report RS20450, The Case of Elian Gonzalez: Legal Basics, by Larry M. Eig.
CRS Report RL33622, Cuba’s Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches, by Mark
P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL32730, Cuba: Issues for the 109^th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL31740, Cuba: Issues for the 108^th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.

CRS Report RL30806, Cuba: Issues for the 107^th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan and Maureen
Taft-Morales.
CRS Report RL30628, Cuba: Issues and Legislation In the 106^th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan
and Maureen Taft-Morales.
CRS Report RL30386, Cuba-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Key Events 1959-1999, by Mark P.
Sullivan.
CRS Report RS20468, Cuban Migration Policy and Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
CRS Report RL33499, Exempting Food and Agriculture Products from U.S. Economic Sanctions:
Status and Implementation, by Remy Jurenas.
CRS Report RS22094, Lawsuits Against State Supporters of Terrorism: An Overview, by Jennifer
K. Elsea.
CRS Report RL32826, The Medical Device Approval Process and Related Legislative Issues, by
Erin D. Williams.
CRS Report 94-636, Radio and Television Broadcasting to Cuba: Background and Issues
Through 1994, by Susan B. Epstein and Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RS21764, Restricting Trademark Rights of Cubans: WTO Decision and
Congressional Response, by Margaret Mikyung Lee.

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