Navy Force Structure: Alternative Force Structure Studies of 2005 - Background for Congress

Navy Force Structure: Alternative Force Structure
Studies of 2005 — Background for Congress
April 9, 2007
Ronald O’Rourke
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division



Navy Force Structure: Alternative Force Structure
Studies of 2005 — Background for Congress
Summary
This CRS report summarizes three studies submitted to Congress in 2005 on
potential future Navy ship force structures, and is intended as a lasting reference
source on these three studies.
Two of the three studies were conducted in response to Section 216 of the
conference report (H.Rept. 108-354 of November 7, 2003) on the FY2004 defense
authorization act (H.R. 1588/P.L. 108-136 of November 24, 2003). The two studies
were conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and the Office of Force
Transformation (OFT, which was then a part of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense). They were submitted to the congressional defense committees in February
2005. The third study was conducted by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments (CSBA), an independent defense-policy research organization, on its
own initiative. The study was made available to congressional and other audiences
in March 2005.
The CNA study presents a fairly traditional approach to naval force planning in
which capability requirements for warfighting and for maintaining day-to-day naval
forward deployments are calculated and then integrated. The CNA-recommended
force parallels fairly closely Navy thinking at the time on the size and composition
of the fleet. This is perhaps not surprising, given that much of CNA’s analytical
work is done at the Navy’s request.
The OFT study fundamentally challenges current Navy thinking on the size and
composition of the fleet, and presents an essentially clean-sheet proposal for a future
Navy that would be radically different from the currently planned fleet. This is
perhaps not surprising, given both OFT’s institutional role within DOD as a leading
promoter of military transformation and the views of retired Navy admiral Arthur
Cebrowski — the director of OFT until January 31, 2005 — regarding network-
centric warfare and distributed force architectures. (OFT was disestablished on
October 1, 2006, and its activities were transferred to other DOD offices.)
The CSBA study challenges current Navy thinking on the size and composition
of the fleet more dramatically than the CNA report, and less dramatically than the
OFT report. Compared to the CNA and OFT reports, the CSBA report contains a
more detailed implementation plan and a more detailed discussion of possibilities for
restructuring the shipbuilding industrial base.
This CRS report will not be updated.



Contents
In troduction ......................................................1
The Three Studies.................................................2
Force Structure Recommendations................................2
CNA Report..............................................2
OFT Report..............................................3
CSBA Report.............................................5
Observations .................................................9
Organizations and Authors.................................10
Analytical Approach......................................10
Prospective Ship-Procurement Funding Levels as Consideration....11
Fleet Size and Structure....................................12
Does it Qualify as an Alternative Force Architecture.............13
New Ship Designs........................................14
Fleet Capability..........................................15
Implementation Risks.....................................18
Implications for Industrial Base..............................19
List of Tables
Table 1. CNA-Recommended Force and Other Proposals..................2
Table 2. Alternative Fleet Structures from OFT Report....................5
Table 3. CSBA-Recommended Force and Other Proposals.................6



Navy Force Structure: Alternative Force
Structure Studies of 2005 — Background
for Congress
Introduction
This CRS report summarizes three studies submitted to Congress in 2005 on
potential future Navy ship force structures, and is intended as a lasting reference
source on these three studies. The contents of this CRS report previously appeared
as an appendix to another CRS report.1
Two of the three studies were conducted in response to Section 216 of the
conference report (H.Rept. 108-354 of November 7, 2003) on the FY2004 defense
authorization act (H.R. 1588/P.L. 108-136 of November 24, 2003), which required
the Secretary of Defense to provide for two independently performed studies on
potential future fleet platform architectures (i.e., potential force structure plans) for
the Navy.2 The two studies were conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)
and the Office of Force Transformation (OFT, which was then a part of the Office of
the Secretary of Defense), and were submitted to the congressional defense
committees in February 2005. OFT was disestablished on October 1, 2006, and its
activities were transferred to other DOD offices.
The third study was conducted by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments (CSBA), an independent defense-policy research organization, on its
own initiative. The study was made available to congressional and other audiences
in March 2005.


1 CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. This appendix was in turn adapted from part of
the prepared statement of Ronald O’Rourke before the Senate Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Seapower, Hearing on Navy Capabilities and Force Structure, Apr. 12,

2005.


2 Section 216 was an amended version of a provision (Section 217) in the House-reported
version of H.R. 1588. See H.Rept. 108-354, pp. 28-29, 612-613 and H.Rept. 108-106, pp.

255-256.



The Three Studies
Force Structure Recommendations
CNA Report3. The CNA report uses essentially the same kinds of ships and
naval formations as those planned by the Navy. The report recommends a Navy
force structure range of 256 to 380 ships. The low end of the range assumed a greater
use of crew rotation and overseas homeporting of Navy ships than the high end.
Table 1 below compares the CNA-recommended force range to the Navy’s 375-ship
fleet proposal of 2002-2004 and the notional 260- and 325-ship fleets for FY2035
presented in a March 2005 Navy report to Congress.
Table 1. CNA-Recommended Force and Other Proposals
Notional Navy
Navyfleets for
375-shipFY2035
proposal
CNA forceof 2002-a260325
Ship typerange2004shipsships
Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)14141414
Cruise missile submarines (SSGNs)4444
Attack submarines (SSNs)38 to 62523741
Aircraft carriers10 to 12121011
Cruisers and destroyers66 to 1121096792
Littoral combat ships (LCSs)40 to 70566382
Amphibious ships18 to 30361724
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)19 to 21181420
ships
Combat logistics (resupply) ships25 to 33332426
Other b 22 41 10 11
Total battle force ships256 to 380375260325
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on CNA report and March 2005 Navy report.
a. Composition as shown in CNA report as the program of record for 2022.
b. Includes command ships, support ships (such as salvage ships and submarine tenders), dedicated
mine warfare ships, and sea basing connector ships.


3 Delwyn Gilmore, with contributions by Mark Lewellyn et al., Report to Congress
Regarding Naval Force Architecture, Center for Naval Analyses, CRM D0011303.A2/1Rev,
Jan. 2005.

OFT Report4. The OFT report employs eight new ship designs that differ
substantially from the designs of most ships currently in the fleet, under construction,
or planned for procurement. Among the eight new ship designs were four types of
large surface ships that would be built from a common, relatively inexpensive,
merchant-like hull design developed in 2004 for the Navy’s Maritime Prepositioning
Force (Future) analysis of alternatives. These four types of ships, which would all
displace 57,000 tons, include:
!An aircraft carrier that would embark a notional air wing of 30
Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs), 6 MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, and
15 unmanned air vehicles (UAVs). The total of 36 manned aircraft
is about half as many as in today’s carrier air wings, and the OFT
architecture envisaged substituting two of these new carriers for each
of today’s carriers. This new carrier would also have support spaces
for unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), unmanned surface
vehicles (USVs), and mission modules for the 1,000-ton surface
combatant described below.
!A missile-and-rocket ship that would be equipped with 360 vertical
launch system (VLS) missile tubes and 4 trainable rocket launchers.
Additional spaces on this ship could be used to support UUVs,
USVs, and mission modules for the 1,000-ton surface combatant.
Alternatively, these spaces could be used to provide limited stowage
and working space for the 100-ton surface combatant described
below, and mission modules for these 100-ton ships.
!An amphibious assault ship that would embark a notional air wing
of either 30 CH-46 equivalents or 6 JSFs, 18 MV-22s, and 3
gyrocopter heavy-lift helicopters. It would also have spaces for
Marine Corps equipment, unmanned vehicles, and mission modules
for the 1,000-ton surface combatant.
!A “mother ship” for small combatants that would contain stowage
and support spaces for the 100-ton surface combatant described
below.
The four other new-design ships in the OFT architecture are:
!A 13,500-ton aircraft carrier based on a conceptual surface effect
ship (SES)/catamaran hull design developed in 2001 by a team at the
Naval Postgraduate School. This ship would embark a notional air
wing of 8 JSFs, 2 MV-22s, and 8 UAVs. The total of 10 manned


4 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Alternative Fleet
Architecture Design (Report for the Congressional Defense Committees, Office of Force
Transformation). The OFT report was also published in slightly modified form as Stuart E.
Johnson and Arthur K. Cebrowski, Alternative Fleet Architecture Design. Washington,
National Defense University, 2005. 96 pp. (Defense & Technology Paper 19, Center for
Technology and National Security, National Defense University, August 2005)

aircraft is roughly one-eighth as many as in today’s carrier air wings,
and the OFT architecture envisages substituting eight of these new
carriers for each of today’s carriers. This new ship would have a
maximum speed of 50 to 60 knots.
!A 1,000-ton surface combatant with a maximum speed of 40 to 50
knots and standard interfaces for accepting various modular mission
packages. These ships would self-deploy to the theater and would
be supported in theater by one or more of the 57,000-ton ships
described above.
!A 100-ton surface combatant with a maximum speed of 60 knots
and standard interfaces for accepting various modular mission
packages. These ships would be transported to the theater by the
57,000-ton mother ship and would be supported in theater by that
ship and possibly also the 57,000-ton missile-and-rocket ship.
!A non-nuclear-powered submarine equipped with an air-
independent propulsion (AIP) system. These AIP submarines would
be lower-cost supplements to the Navy’s nuclear-powered
submarines (SSNs) and would be transported from home port to the
theater of operations by transport ships. The OFT architecture
envisaged substituting four of these submarines for the SSN in each5
carrier strike group.
The 1,000- and 100-ton surface combatants would be built as relatively
inexpensive sea frames, like the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
The OFT report combines these eight types of ships, plus the Navy’s currently
planned TAOE-class resupply ship, into a fleet that would include a much larger total
number of ships than planned by the Navy, about the same number of carrier-based
aircraft as planned by the Navy, and large numbers of unmanned systems. The OFT
report presents three alternative versions of this fleet, which the report called
Alternatives A, B, and C. The report calculates that each of these alternatives would
be equal in cost to the equivalent parts of the Navy’s 375-ship proposal. Each of
these alternative force structures, like the equivalent parts of the Navy’s 375-ship
proposal, would be organized into 12 carrier strike groups (CSGs), 12 expeditionary
strike groups (ESGs), and 9 surface strike groups (SSGs). The three alternative force
structures are shown in Table 2 below.


5 The report states that “Alternatives to the SSNs in formations were diesel Air Independent
Propulsion (AIP) submarines and unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs). The AIP
submarines were substituted for Virginia class SSNs on a cost basis of roughly four to one.
These submarines could be nuclear-powered if they are designed and built based upon a
competitive, cost suppressing business model.” (Page 60) The strategy of transporting the
AIP submarines to the theater using transport ships is not mentioned in the report but was
explained at a February 18, 2005 meeting between CRS and analysts who contributed to the
OFT report.

Table 2. Alternative Fleet Structures from OFT Report
Alternative
Ship typeABC
57,000-ton aircraft carrier24240
57,000-ton missile-and-rocket ship333333
57,000-ton amphibious assault ship242424
57,000-ton mother ship02424
13,500-ton aircraft carrier0096
1,000-ton surface combatant41700
100-ton surface combatant0609609
AIP submarine484848
TAOE-class resupply ship121212
Subtotal 1,000- and 100-ton ships417609609
Subtotal other ships141165237
Total shipsa558a774a846a
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on figures in OFT report.
a. The totals shown in early copies of the OFT report are 36 ships lower in each case due to an error
in those copies in calculating the numbers of ships in the 12 carrier strike groups.
The totals shown in the table do not include SSNs, cruise missile submarines
(SSGNs), and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) operating independently of the
12 CSGs, 12 ESGs, and 9 SSGs. The totals also do not include combat logistics
ships other than the TAOEs (e.g., oilers, ammunition ships, and general stores ships)
and fleet support ships. The Navy’s 375-ship proposal, by comparison, included all
these kinds of ships.
As also can be seen from the table, the difference between Alternatives A and
B is that the former uses 1,000-ton surface combatants while the latter uses 100-ton
surface combatants that are transported into the theater by mother ships, and the
difference between Alternatives B and C is that the former uses 57,000-ton aircraft
carriers while the latter substituted 13,500-ton carriers.
CSBA Report6. The CSBA report uses many of the same ship designs
currently planned by the Navy, but also proposes some new ship designs. The CSBA
report also proposed ship formations that in some cases are different than those
planned by the Navy. Table 3 below compares the CSBA-recommended force
structure to CNA’s recommended force range, the Navy’s 375-ship fleet proposal of
2002-2004, and the notional 260- and 325-ship fleets for FY2035 presented in the
Navy’s March 2005 report to Congress.


6 Robert O. Work, Winning the Race: A Naval Fleet Platform Architecture for Enduring
Maritime Supremacy, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), 2005.

Table 3. CSBA-Recommended Force and Other Proposals
Notional Navy
Navy 375-fleets for
shipFY2035
proposal
CNA forceof 2002-a260325
Ship typeCSBA forcerange2004shipsships
Ballistic missile submarines12b14141414
(SSBNs)
Cruise missile submarines6 b4444
(SSGNs)
Attack submarines (SSNs)54c38 to 62523741
Large-deck aircraft carriers1010 to 12121011
(CVNs)
Medium aircraft carriers40000
(CVEs)
Afloat forward staging base10000
(AFSB)
Cruisers and destroyers84 or 8666 to 1121096792
Littoral combat ships8440 to 70566382
(LCSs)
Amphibious ships32d18 to 30361724
Maritime Prepositioning16e19 to 21e18e14e20e
Force ships
Combat logistics (resupply)36f25 to 33332426
ships
Other g 34h 22 41 10 11
Total battle force ships373 or 375i256 to 380375260325
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on CSBA report, CNA report, and March 2005 Navy report.
a. Composition as shown in CNA report as the program of record for 2022.
b. Alternatively, 10 SSBNs and 8 SSGNs.
c. Includes one special-mission submarine. Total number drops slightly over next 12 years.
d. Includes eight LHDs and 24 LPD-17s.
e. In the CSBA force, these are existing MPF ships; in the other fleets, they are MPF(Future) ships.
f. Includes eight TAOEs, 11 TAKEs, and 17 TAOs.
g. Includes command ships, and support ships (such as salvage ships and submarine tenders),
dedicated mine warfare ships, and sea basing connector ships.
h. Includes, among other ships, 2 TAVBs and 8 TLKAs associated with the amphibious and MPF
ship s.
i. In addition to these ships, the CSBA report notes that U.S. maritime forces would include 35 DOD
prepositioning and surge sealift ships used primarily by the Army and Air Force, and 91 large,
medium, and fast-response (i.e., small) cutters planned for procurement under the Coast Guard
Deepwater acquisition program.



The CSBA report makes numerous specific recommendations for ship force
structure and ship acquisition, including the following:
Aircraft Carriers. When the George H.W. Bush (CVN-77) enters service in

2008 or 2009:


!Retire the two remaining conventional carriers — the Kitty Hawk
CV-63) and the Kennedy (CV-67).
!Convert the Enterprise (CVN-65) into an afloat forward staging base
(AFSB) with a mixed active/reserve/civilian crew, to be used in
peacetime for aviation testing and in crises for embarking special
operations forces, Army or Marine Corps forces, or joint air wings.
!Begin replacing the 10 Nimitz (CVN-68) class carriers on a one-for-
one basis with CVN-21-class carriers procured once every five years
using incremental funding.
!Redesignate the LHA(R) as a medium sized carrier (CVE) and
procure one every three years starting in FY2007 using incremental
funding.7
Submarines.
!Maintain Virginia-class SSN procurement at one per year for the
next several years, producing an eventual total of perhaps 20
Virginia-class boats.
!Begin immediately to design a new “undersea superiority system”
with a procurement cost 50% to 67% that of the Virginia-class
design, with the goal of achieving a procurement rate of two or three
of these boats per year no later than FY2019.
!Study options for extending the service lives of the three Seawolf
SSNs and the 31 final Los Angeles-class SSNs to mitigate the
projected drop in SSN force levels during the 2020s.
!Reduce the SSBN force from 14 ships to 12 ships and convert an
additional two SSBNs into SSGNs, for a total of six SSGNs.
!Study the option of reducing the SSBN force further, to 10 ships,
which would permit another two SSBNs to be converted into
SSGNs, for a total of eight SSGNs.8
Destroyers and Cruisers.
!Procure a single DDG-1000 in FY2007, using research and
development funding, as the first of three surface combatant
technology demonstrators.
!Start a design competition for a next generation, modular surface
combatant or family of combatants, with capabilities equal to or
greater than the DDG-1000/CG(X), but with a substantially lower
procurement cost.


7 CSBA report, slides 154-158.
8 CSBA report, slides 276, 284, 289, 297, 299.

!Build two additional surface combatant technology demonstrators to
compete against the DDG-1000 design.
!Use the results of this competition to inform the design of a new
surface combatant, called SCX, with a procurement cost perhaps
one- third to one-half that of the DDG-1000.
!Begin procuring this new design in FY2015 as a replacement for the
DDG-1000/CG(X) program.
!Consider modifying the LPD-17 design into a low-cost naval surface
fire support ship carrying the Advanced Gun System (AGS) that was
to be carried by the DDG-1000.
!Consider procuring two additional DDG-51s to help support the
surface combatant industrial base in the near-term.9
Littoral Combat Ships and Coast Guard Deepwater Cutters.
!Procure six LCSs per year for a total of 84 LCSs — 42 of the
Lockheed design, and 42 of the General Dynamics design.
!Organize these 84 ships into 42 divisions, each consisting of one
Lockheed ship and one General Dynamics ship, so that each division
can benefit from the complementary strengths of the two designs.
!Ensure that mission packages for the LCS and mission packages for
the Coast Guard’s large and medium Deepwater cutters are as
mutually compatible as possible.
!Include the Coast Guard’s Deepwater cutters when counting ships
that contribute to the country’s total fleet battle network.
!Begin a research and development and experimentation program
aimed at building several competing stealth surface combatant
technology demonstrators for operations in contested or denied-
access waters.10
Amphibious Ships.
!Complete LHD-8 to create a force of eight LHDs.
!Rather than stopping procurement of LPD-17s after the ninth ship in
FY2007, as now planned by the Navy, increase the LPD-17
procurement rate to two ships per year and use multiyear
procurement (MYP) to procure a total of 24 LPD-17s.
!Retire the 12 existing LSD-41/49 class ships, leaving a 32-ship
amphibious fleet consisting of eight LHDs and 24 LPD-17s.


9 CSBA report, slides 246, 249, and 251-253. Slide 249 states that possibilities for a
reduced-cost alternative to the DDG-1000 include a surface combatant based on the LPD-17
design, a semi-submersible ship built to commercial standards (like a ship called the
“Stryker” that was proposed several years ago), and a large or medium “carrier of large
objects,” perhaps built to relaxed commercial standards.
10 CSBA report, slides 275, 277, and 283.

!Form eight “distributed expeditionary strike bases” — each of which
would include one LHD, three LPD-17s, one Aegis cruiser, three
Aegis destroyers, two LCSs, and one SSGN.11
MPF and Other Ships.
!Retain the three existing MPF squadrons over the near- to mid-term.
!Reconfigure two of the squadrons for irregular warfare.
!Use the third squadron as a swing asset to either reinforce the two
irregular-warfare squadrons or to provide lift for assault follow-on
echelon amphibious landing forces.
!Develop high-speed intra-theater and ship-to-shore surface
connectors.
!Design an attack cargo ship (TAKA) to help support sustained joint
operations ashore, with a target unit procurement cost of $500
million or less, and begin procuring this ship in FY2014.
!Replace the two existing hospital ships, the four existing command
ships, and existing support tenders with new ships based on the
LPD-17 design.
!Initiate a joint experimental program for future sea-basing platforms
and technologies.12
The CSBA report raises several questions about the Navy’s emerging sea basing
concept for conducting expeditionary operations ashore. The report states:
The work done thus far on sea basing is intriguing, but neither the concept nor
the supporting technologies appear sufficiently mature to justify any near-term
decisions such as canceling LPD-17 [procurement] in favor of MPF(F) ships, or
removing the well deck from the big deck amphibious assault platforms, both of
which would severely curtail the [fleet’s] ability to launch surface assaults over
the longer term.
Given these large uncertainties, no major moves toward the sea basing vision
should be made without further exploring the sea basing concept itself, and
experimenting with different numbers and types of sea base platforms,13
connectors, and capabilities.
Observations
Observations about the CNA, OFT, and CSBA reports can be made on several
points, including the following:
!organizations and authors;
!analytical approach;


11 CSBA report, slides 227 and 236.
12 CSBA report, slides 228-232, and 307.
13 CSBA report, slide 212.

!use of prospective ship-procurement funding levels as a force-
planning consideration;
!fleet size and structure;
!whether the recommended force qualifies as an alternative fleet
architecture;
!fleet capability;
!transition risks; and
!implications for the industrial base.
Each of these is discussed below.
Organizations and Authors.
CNA Report. CNA is a federally funded research and development center
(FFRDC) that does much of its analytical at the Navy’s request. The CNA report’s
discussion of how crew rotation may alter force-level requirements for maintaining
day-to-day forward deployments is somewhat detailed and may have been adapted
from other work that CNA has done on the topic for the Navy.
OFT Report. The OFT report was prepared under the direction of retired Navy
admiral Arthur Cebrowski, who was the director of OFT from October 29, 2001 until
January 31, 2005 and the President of the Naval War College (NWC) from July 24,
1998 to August 22, 2001. During his time at NWC and OFT, Cebrowski was a
leading proponent of network-centric warfare and distributed force architectures.
CSBA Report. The CSBA report was prepared by Robert Work, CSBA’s
analyst for maritime issues. CSBA describes itself as “an independent, policy
research institute established to promote innovative thinking about defense planning
and investment strategies for the 21st century. CSBA’s analytic-based research
makes clear the inextricable link between defense strategies and budgets in fostering
a more effective and efficient defense, and the need to transform the US military in
light of an emerging military revolution.”14 CSBA’s Executive Director is Dr.
Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., whose previous experience includes work in DOD’s
Office of Net Assessment, the office directed by Andrew Marshall. Krepinevich is
generally considered a major writer on defense transformation.
Analytical Approach.
CNA Report. The CNA report grounds its analysis in traditional DOD force-
planning considerations and campaign modeling. The report cites past DOD force-
planning studies that reflect similar approaches. The implicit argument in the CNA
report is that its findings have weight in part because they reflect a well-established
and systematic approach to the problem.


14 See CSBA’s website [http://www.csbaonline.org].

OFT Report. In contrast to the CNA report, the OFT report “calls into
question the viability of the longstanding logic of naval force building.”15 The OFT
report grounds its analysis in four major force-design principles that the report
identifies as responsive to future strategic challenges and technological16
opportunities. The report then seeks to design a fleet that it is consistent with these
principles, and assesses that fleet using a new set of metrics that the report believes
to be consistent with these principles. The implicit argument in the OFT report is
that its findings have weight in part because they reflect major force-design principles
that respond to future strategic challenges and technological opportunities.
CSBA Report. The CSBA report employs an extensive historical analysis of
the missions and structure of the U.S. Navy and other navies. The report argues that
the structure of the U.S. Navy has shifted over time in response to changes in
technology and U.S. security challenges, and that U.S. military forces have entered
a new security era (which the report calls the “Joint Expeditionary Era”) during
which the U.S. Navy will need to do three things.17 To do these three things, the
report argues, the Navy should be structured to include four different force
elements.18 The report constructs these four force elements and then combines them
to arrive at an overall recommended Navy force structure. The implicit argument in
the CSBA report is that its findings have weight in part because they reflect insights
about future missions and force requirements gained through careful historical
analysis of the missions and structure of the U.S. Navy and other navies.
Prospective Ship-Procurement Funding Levels as Consideration.
CNA Report. The CNA report aimed at designing a cost-effective fleet. It
also mentions cost estimates relating to the option of homeporting additional attack
submarines at Guam.19 Prospective ship-procurement funding levels, however, are
not prominently featured in the CNA report as a force-planning consideration.
OFT Report. Prospective ship-procurement funding levels are a significant
force-planning consideration in the OFT report. The report argues that an important
metric for assessing a proposed fleet architecture is the ease or difficulty with which
it can be scaled up or down to adapt to changes in ship-procurement funding levels.


15 OFT report, p. 1.
16 The principles are complexity, smaller ships and improved payload fraction,
network-centric warfare, and modularity.
17 These three things are: (1) contribute to the global war on terrorism (GWOT); (2) prepare
for possible nuclear-armed regional competitors; and (3) hedge against the possibility of a
disruptive maritime competition with China.
18 These four force elements are: (1) a sea-based power-projection and regional deterrence
force; (2) a global patrol, GWOT, and homeland defense force; (3) a force for prevailing
over enemy anti-access/area-denial forces; and (4) a strategic deterrence and dissuasion
force.
19 CNA Report, p. 36.

The OFT report contains a fairly detailed discussion of the Navy’s budget
situation that calls into question, on several grounds, the Navy’s prospective ability
to afford its 375-ship proposal. The report concludes that funding for Navy ship-
procurement in future years may fall as much as 40% short of what would be needed
to achieve the Navy’s 375-ship fleet proposal. If the shortfall is 40%, the report
estimates, the Navy could maintain a force of 270 to 315 ships, which is comparable
in number to today’s force of 282 ships, except that the future force would include
a substantial number of relatively inexpensive LCSs. If proportionate reductions are
applied to the OFT fleets shown in Table 2, Alternative A would include 402 to 469
ships, Alternative B would include 557 to 650 ships, and Alternative C would include
609 to 711 ships. Again, these totals would not include certain kinds of ships
(independently operating SSNs, etc.) that are included in the total of 270 to 315 ships
associated with the Navy’s currently planned architecture.
CSBA Report. As with the OFT report, prospective ship-procurement funding
levels are a significant force-planning consideration in the CSBA report. The CSBA
report estimates that in future years, the Navy may have an average of about $10
billion per year in ship-acquisition funding. The report then aims at designing a force
whose ships could be acquired for this average annual amount of funding.
Fleet Size and Structure.
CNA Report. The 380-ship fleet at the high end of the CNA range is similar
in size and composition to the Navy’s 375-ship fleet proposal. The 256-ship fleet at
the low end of the CNA range is similar in size and composition to the Navy’s 260-
ship fleet for FY2035, except that the 260-ship fleet has more LCSs and fewer ships
in the “other ships” category.20
OFT Report. The OFT-recommended fleet would have a much larger total
number of ships than the Navy’s planned fleet. The OFT fleet would also feature a
much larger share of small combatants. Of the ships shown in Table 2, the small
combatants account for about 75% in Alternative A, about 79% in Alternative B, and
about 72% in Alternative C. (Adding into the mix SSNs and other kinds of ships not
shown in Table 2 would reduce these percentages somewhat.) In the Navy’s notional
260- and 325-ship fleets, by contrast, LCSs account for about 25% of the total
number of ships.
The OFT architecture is similar in certain ways to a fleet architecture proposed
by the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) between 1989 and 1992 and
sometimes referred to as the Carrier of Large Objects (CLO) proposal. The NSWC
architecture, like the OFT architecture, employed a common hull design for a large


20 Additional points of comparison: The CNA range of 256 to 380 ships overlaps with
potential ranges of 290 to 375 ships, 260 to 325 ships, and 243 to 302 ships presented in the
Navy’s February 2005 testimony to Congress. The mid-point of the CNA-recommended
range (318 ships) is similar in terms of total numbers of ships to the 310-ship fleet from the
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Unlike the 2001 QDR fleet, however, the
CNA-recommended force includes several dozen Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) and smaller
numbers of other kinds of ships.

ship that could be built in several variants for various missions, including aviation,
missile launching and fire support, amphibious warfare, logistics support, and
mother-ship support of small, fast, surface combatants. The small, fast surface
combatants in the NSWC architecture were called scout fighters and were in the same
general size range as the 100- and 1,000-ton surface combatants in the OFT
archi t ect ure. 21
CSBA Report. The CSBA force would have about the same total number of
ships as the Navy’s 375-ship fleet proposal. CSBA’s subtotals for some ship
categories are similar to subtotals in one or more of the other fleet proposals shown
in Table 1. Significant differences between the CSBA proposal and the other fleet
proposals shown in Table 3 include:
!the four medium-sized aircraft carriers (CVEs);
!the conversion of a carrier into an afloat forward staging base;
!the composition of the cruiser-destroyer force (which would include
SCXs rather than DDG-1000s and CG(X)s);
!the composition of the amphibious fleet (which would have
additional LPD-17s in lieu of today’s LSD-41/49s); and
!the composition of the maritime prepositioning force (which would
continue to include, for a time at least, today’s MPF ships rather than
the Navy’s planned MPF(F) ships).
Does it Qualify as an Alternative Force Architecture.
CNA Report. As mentioned earlier, the CNA report uses essentially the same
kinds of ships and naval formations as those planned by the Navy. If an alternative
fleet platform architecture is defined as one that uses ship types or naval formations
that differ in some significant way from those currently used or planned, then the
CNA-recommended force arguably would not qualify as an alternative fleet platform
architecture.
OFT Report. Since the OFT report proposes building ships that are
substantially different from those currently planned, and combines them ships into
formations which, although similar in name to currently planned formations (i.e.,
CSGs, ESGs, and SSGs), might be viewed by some observers as substantially
different in composition from the currently planned versions of these formations, the


21 For more on this proposed fleet architecture, see Norman Polmar, “Carrying Large
Objects,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1990, pp. 121-122; Michael L.
Bosworth et al, “Multimission Ship Design for an Alternative Fleet Concept,” Naval
Engineers Journal, May 1991, pp. 91-106; Michael L. Bosworth, “Fleet Versatility by
Distributed Aviation,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Jan. 1992, pp. 99-102; and Victor
A. Meyer, “Naval Surface Warfighting Vision 2030,” Naval Engineers Journal, May 1992,
pp. 74-88. See also “USN’s ‘2030' Plan For Future Fleet,” Sea Power, Apr. 1992, pp. 79,
82; Edward J. Walsh, “‘Alternative Battle Force’ Stresses Commonality, Capability,” Sea
Power, Feb. 1991, pp. 33-35; Robert Holzer, “Navy Floats Revolutionary Ship Design for
Future Fleet,” Defense News, May 14, 1990, pp. 4, 52; and Anne Rumsey, “Navy Plans Ship
Look-A-Likes,” Defense Week, Mar. 13, 1989, p. 3.

OFT-recommended force arguably would qualify as an alternative fleet platform
architecture.
CSBA Report. Since the CSBA report proposes building ships that in some
cases are different from those currently planned, and combines these ships into
formations that in some cases are different in composition from those currently
planned, the CSBA-recommended force arguably would qualify as an alternative fleet
platform architecture, though less dramatically so than the OFT-recommended force.
New Ship Designs.
CNA Report. The CNA report does not propose any ship designs other than
those already planned by the Navy.
OFT Report. The 57,000-ton aircraft carrier in the OFT report would be
roughly the same size as the United Kingdom’s new aircraft carrier design, and
somewhat larger than the U.S. Navy’s 40,000-ton LHA/LHD-type amphibious
assault ships. Compared to the U.S. Navy’s aircraft carriers, which displace 81,000
to 102,000 tons, this ship could be considered a medium-size carrier.
The 57,000-ton missile-and-rocket ship in the OFT report could be considered
similar in some respects to the Navy/DARPA arsenal ship concept of 1996-1997,
which would have been a large, relatively simple surface ship equipped with about

500 VLS tubes.22


The 13,500-ton aircraft carrier in the OFT report would be slightly larger than
Thailand’s aircraft carrier, which was commissioned in 1997, and somewhat smaller
than Spain’s aircraft carrier, which was based on a U.S. design and was
commissioned in 1988. Due to its SES/catamaran hull design, this 13,500-ton ship
would be much faster than the Thai and Spanish carriers (or any other aircraft carrier
now in operation), and might have a larger flight deck. This ship could be considered
a small, high-speed aircraft carrier.
The 1,000- and 100-ton surface combatants in the OFT report could be viewed
as similar to, but smaller than, the 2,500- to 3,000-ton Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
Compared to the LCS, they would be closer in size to the Streetfighter concept (a
precursor to the LCS that was proposed by retired admiral Cebrowski during his time
at the Naval War College).
The AIP submarine in the OFT report could be similar to AIP submarines
currently being developed and acquired by a some foreign navies.


22 For more on the arsenal ship, see CRS Report 97-455, Navy/DARPA Arsenal Ship
Program: Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke; and CRS Report 97-1044,
Navy/DARPA Maritime Fire Support Demonstrator (Arsenal Ship) Program: Issues Arising
From Its Termination, by Ronald O’Rourke. Both reports are out of print and are available
directly from the author.

CSBA Report. The proposal in the CSBA report for an afloat forward staging
base (AFSB) is similar to other proposals for AFSBs that have been reported in
recent years, though other proposals have suggested using commercial ships or
military sealift ships rather than converted aircraft carriers as the basis for the23
AFSB.
The CVE in the CSBA report, like the 57,000-ton carrier in the OFT report, can
be viewed as a medium-sized carrier. With a full load displacement of perhaps about
40,000 tons, the CVE would be somewhat smaller than the 57,000-ton carrier and
consequently might embark a smaller air wing. The CVE, however, would be based
on the LHA(R) amphibious ship design rather than a merchant-like hull, and
consequently could incorporate more survivability features than the 57,000-ton
carrier.
Fleet Capability.
CNA Report. The CNA report uses essentially the same kinds of ships and
formations as planned by the Navy, and recommends generally the same numbers of
ships as a function of force-planning variables such as use of crew rotation. As a
consequence, the CNA-recommended force range would be roughly similar in overall
capability to the Navy’s planned architecture.
OFT Report. The OFT architecture differs so significantly from the Navy’s
planned architecture that assessing its capability relative to the Navy’s planned
architecture is not easy. As a general matter, the OFT report stresses overall fleet
survivability more than individual-ship survivability, and argues that fleet
effectiveness can be enhanced by presenting the enemy with a complex task of
having to detect, track, and target large numbers of enemy ships. The OFT report
argues that in addition to warfighting capability, a fleet can be judged in terms of its
capability for adapting to changes in strategic demands and funding levels.24


23 See, for example, Stephen M. Carmel, “A Commercial Approach to Sea Basing — Afloat
Forward Staging Bases,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Jan. 2004, pp. 78-79;
Christopher J. Castelli, “Budget Anticipates Developing MPF(F) Aviation Variant From
LMSR,” Inside the Navy, Jan. 19, 2004; Christopher J. Castelli, “Brewer Proposes
Commercial Ship To Test Seabasing Technologies,” Inside the Navy, Jan. 27, 2003;
Christopher J. Castelli, “In POM-04, Navy Cancels JCC(X), Plans To Substitute MPF(F)
Variant,” Inside the Navy, Sept. 2, 2002; Christopher J. Castelli, “Navy May Develop New
Support Ships, Pursue Sealift Experimentation,” Inside the Navy, May 27, 2002.
24 The OFT report argues that its recommended fleet architecture would:
!“provide a quantum leap ahead in capabilities against a spectrum of
enemies ranging from large, highly developed competitors to small but
determined asymmetric adversaries” (page 6) and be adaptable, in a
dynamic and less-predictable security environment, to changing strategic
or operational challenges;
!be capable of both participating in joint expeditionary operations and
maintaining “the strategic advantage the Navy has developed in the global
(continued...)

Readers who agree with most or all of these propositions might conclude that
the OFT-recommended architecture would be more capable than the Navy’s planned
architecture. Readers who disagree with most or all of these propositions might
conclude that the OFT-recommended architecture would be less capable than the
Navy’s planned architecture. Readers who agree with some of these propositions but
not others (or who agree with these propositions up to a certain point, but less
fervently than OFT), might conclude that the OFT-recommended architecture might
be roughly equal in total capability to the Navy’s planned architecture.
In addressing the question of fleet capability, the OFT report states:
Alternative fleet formations consisting of small fast and relatively
inexpensive craft combining knowledge and attaining flexibility through
networking appear superior to the programmed fleet for non-traditional warfare
in a variety of settings. This is due to increasing the complexity the enemy faces
and increasing U.S. fleet options that in turn reduce enemy options. The speed
and complexity of the alternative fleets can provide them with the capability to
complicate and possibly defeat the attempts of non-traditional adversaries to
elude surveillance. The enemy could have difficulty determining what to expect
and how to defeat them all. The superior speed and more numerous participants
than in the programmed fleet provide a stronger intelligence base and more
numerous platforms from which to conduct strikes and interceptions. This
appears to be true even if the smaller craft are individually somewhat less
capable and less able to sustain a hit than the larger ships in the programmed
fleet.
If these circumstances are not achieved, and the enemy can continue to
elude and deceive, the [Navy’s] programmed fleet often is as good as the [OFT]
alternatives, sometimes even better. It is not necessarily better in cases in which


24 (...continued)
commons,” avoiding a need to choose between optimizing the fleet for
“performance against asymmetric challenges at the expense of its ability
to confront a potential adversary capable of traditional high intensity
conflict,”such as China; (pages 1 and 2)
!pose significant challenges to adversaries seeking to counter U.S. naval
forces due to the “large numbers of combat entities that the enemy must
deal with; a great variety of platforms with which the enemy must
contend; speed; different combinations of forces; distribution of forces
across large areas; and [adversary] uncertainty as to the mission and
capabilities of a given platform;” (page i)
!permit more constant experimentation with new operational concepts, and
thereby achieve higher rates of learning about how to evolve the fleet over
time; and
!recognize potential future constraints on Navy budgets and make the Navy
more smoothly scalable to various potential future resource levels by
shifting from a fleet composed of limited numbers of relatively expensive
ships to one composed of larger numbers of less expensive ships.

individual ship survivability dominates, a perhaps counterintuitive result until we
realize that fleet survivability not individual ship survivability is what dominates.
An area in which programmed fleets might have an advantage would be
when the long loiter time or deep reach of CTOL [conventional takeoff and
landing] aircraft on programmed big-deck CVNs [nuclear-powered aircraft
carriers] is needed. That said, there need be no great sacrifice. With airborne
tanking, the VSTOL [very short takeoff and landing] aircraft in the alternatives
could meet the deep strike and long loiter demands. Also, as mentioned earlier,
a combination of advances in EMALS [electromagnetic aircraft launch system]
and modifications to the JSF will make it possible to launch the JSF with only
a marginal range-payload capability penalty. Moreover, trends in technology are
providing unmanned aircraft greater capability, including greater loiter time and25
sensor capability.
CSBA Report. The CSBA report argues that its architecture would provide
a total capability equal to that of the Navy’s planned architecture, but at a lower total
cost, because the CSBA architecture would:
!employ new ship designs, such the new undersea superiority system
and the SCX, that, because of their newer technologies, would cost
less than, but be equal in capability to, current designs such as the
Virginia-class SSN and DDG-1000 destroyer; and
!make more use of the LPD-17 hull design, whose basic design costs
have already been paid, and which can be produced efficiently in
large numbers and adapted economically to meet various mission
requirements.
It is plausible that using newer technologies would permit new, reduced-cost,
ship designs to be more capable than such designs would have been in the past.
Whether the increases in capability would always be enough to permit these ships to
be equal in capability to more expensive current designs is less clear. The Navy may
be able to achieve this with a new SSN design, because several new submarine
technologies have emerged since the Virginia-class design was developed in the
1990s, but achieving this with a new large surface combatant design could be more
challenging, because the DDG-1000 design was developed within the last few years
and few new surface combatant technologies may have emerged since that time. If
one or more of the reduced-cost designs turn out to be less capable than current
designs, then the CSBA architecture would not generate as much total capability as
the report projects.
The CSBA report also argues that its architecture would produce a force with
a mix of capabilities that would better fit future strategic demands. To achieve this,
the report recommends, among other things, reducing currently planned near-term
procurement of new destroyers and MPF(F) ships, increasing currently planned
procurement of new amphibious ships, and a changing the currently planned
investment mix for aircraft carriers.


25 OFT report, pp. 75-76. Italics as in the original.

Readers who agree with CSBA’s description of future strategic demands, and
who agree that CSBA’s recommended investment changes respond to those demands,
might conclude that the CSBA-recommended architecture would be better optimized
than the Navy’s planned architecture to meet future needs. Readers who disagree
with one or both of these propositions might conclude that the Navy’s planned
architecture might be better optimized, or that neither architecture offers clear
advantages in this regard.
Implementation Risks.
CNA Report. Implementation risks associated with the force recommended
in the CNA report include developing and designing the various types of ships
included in the plan — including in particular the DDG-1000 destroyer, which is to
incorporate a number of new technologies — and the issue of whether Navy funding
levels in coming years would be adequate to build and maintain the recommended
fleet.
OFT Report. The OFT report does not include a detailed plan for transitioning26
from today’s fleet architecture to its proposed architecture, but such a plan could be
developed as a follow-on analysis. The plan could involve replacing existing ship
designs and associated formations as they retire with OFT’s recommended new ship
designs and associated formations. Implementation risks associated with the force
recommended in the OFT report include developing and designing the eight new
types of ships included in the plan, including the four types of large ships based on
the 57,000-ton commercial-like hull, the 13,500-ton SES/catamaran aircraft carrier
(since it would be much larger than other SES/catamaran ships), the AIP submarine
(since the AIP technology is relatively new and a non-nuclear-powered submarine
has not been designed and built for the U.S. Navy since the 1950s), and the 1,000-
and 100-ton surface combatants (since new technologies are needed to achieve the
increased payload fraction that these ships are to have). The OFT-recommended


26 On the topic of transitioning to the proposed fleet architecture, the report states:
Implementation of the alternative fleet architecture should start now and
should target option generation, short construction time, and technology
insertion. The alternative further provides an opportunity to reinvigorate the
shipbuilding industrial base. The many smaller ships, manned and unmanned, in
the alternative fleet architecture could be built in more shipyards and would be
relevant to overseas markets. The potential longevity of the existing fleet will
sustain existing shipyards as they move into building smaller ships more rapidly
in this broader market and more competitive environment. The shipyards would
develop a competence, broad relevance, and operate in an environment driven by
market imperatives instead of a framework of laws that frustrates market forces.
As the new ships enter service and the fleet has the opportunity to
experiment with new operational concepts (expanded network-centric warfare
in particular) existing ships can be retired sooner to capture operations savings.
At this point, the sooner the existing fleet is retired, the sooner the benefits of the
alternative fleet architecture design will accrue. (Page 3)
Additional general discussion of implementation is found on pp. 76-77 of the report.

force could pose implementation risks due to the new kinds of naval formations that
would be used, which could require development of new doctrine, concepts of
operations, and tactics.
CSBA Report. A stated goal of the CSBA report is to provide a detailed,
practical transition road map for shifting from today’s fleet structure to the report’s
recommended fleet structure. The many specific recommendations made in the
report could be viewed as forming such a road map. Implementation risks associated
with the force recommended in the CSBA report include developing and designing
the reduced-cost SSN and the reduced-cost SCX surface combatant, particularly since
these two new ship designs are to be equal in capability to the more expensive
designs they would replace.
Implications for Industrial Base.
CNA Report. Since the CNA report uses essentially the same kinds of ships
and naval formations as those in use today or planned by the Navy, and recommends
similar numbers of ships, the industrial-base implications of the CNA-recommended
force would appear to be similar to those of the Navy’s current plans.
OFT Report. The OFT report seeks to reduce unit shipbuilding costs, and
thereby permit an increase in total ship numbers, by shifting the fleet away from
complex, highly integrated ship designs that are inherently expensive to build and
toward less-complex merchant-like hulls and small sea frames that are inherently less
expensive to build. Similarly, the OFT report seeks to increase shipbuilding options
for the Navy by shifting the fleet away from complex, highly integrated ship designs
that can be built only by a limited number of U.S. shipyards and toward less-complex
merchant-like hulls and small sea frames that can be built by a broader array of
shipyards. The OFT report also aims to make it easier and less expensive to
modernize ships over their long lives, and thereby take better advantage of rapid
developments in technology, by shifting from highly integrated ship designs to
merchant-like hulls and sea frames.
As a consequence of these objectives, the OFT report poses a significant
potential business challenge to the six shipyards that have built the Navy’s major
warships in recent years. The report’s discussion on implementing its proposed
architecture states in part:
The shipbuilding industrial base would also need to start to retool to build
different types of ships more rapidly. Smaller shipyards, which presently do
little or no work for the Navy could compete to build the smaller ships, thereby
broadening the capabilities base of ship design and construction available to the
Navy. The change to smaller, lower unit cost ships would also open up overseas
markets. With more shipyards able to build the ships and potential for a broader
overall market, the U.S. shipbuilding industry would have the chance to expand
its competence, innovation and relevance. Taken together this would sharpen the
industry’s ability to compete and provide alternatives to a ship procurement



system that is beset by laws and regulations that frustrate, even pervert, market27
forces.
The report’s concluding section lists five “dangers” that “risk the Navy’s ‘losing
the way.’” One of these, the report states, is “Shielding the shipbuilding industrial
base from global competition,” which the report states “guarantees high cost, limited
innovation, and long cycle times for building ships.”28
CSBA Report. The CSBA report similarly raised significant potential issues
for the six shipyards that have built the Navy’s major warships in recent years. The
report states that “Rationalizing the defense industrial base is... a critical part of
DoN’s [the Department of the Navy’s] maritime competition strategy, and should be
the subject of immediate consideration and deliberation by the Congress, DoD, and29
the DoN.” The report states:
Numerous studies have indicated that the six Tier I yards [i.e., the six yards that
have built the Navy’s major warships in recent years] have “exorbitant excess
capacities,” which contribute to the rising costs of [Navy] warships, primarily
because of high industrial overhead costs. These capacities are the result of
“cabotage laws and fluctuating national security acquisition policies that force
shipbuilders of combatants to retain capacities to address required surges in
coming years.” This last point is especially important: the DoN contributes
greatly to the problem of “exorbitant capacities” by its consistent tendency to30
portray overly optimistic ramp ups in ship production in budget “out years.”
The report recommends the following as part of its overall transition strategy:
!Minimize production costs for more expensive warships (defined in
the report as ships costing more than $1.4 billion each) by
consolidating production of each kind of such ship in a single
shipyard, pursuing learning curve efficiencies, and requesting use of
multiyear procurement (MYP) whenever possible.
!Minimize production costs for warships and auxiliaries costing less
than $1.4 billion each by emphasizing competition, shifting
production to smaller “Tier II” yards, using large production runs,
and enforcing ruthless cost control.31


27 OFT report, p. 76.
28 OFT report, p. 80.
29 CSBA report, slide 314.
30 CSBA report, slide 315.
31 CSBA report, slide 316. Other steps recommended as part of the report’s overall
transition strategy (see slides 124 and 125) include the following:
!Plan to a fiscally prudent steady-state shipbuilding budget of $10 billion
per year.
!Maximize current capabilities and minimize nonrecurring engineering
(continued...)

The report states that “the strategy developed in this report suggests that [Navy]
planners might wish to:”
!maintain production of aircraft carriers at NGNN,
!consolidate production of large surface combatants and amphibious
ships at NG/Ingalls, and
!consolidate submarine building GD/EB, or with a new, single
submarine production company.32
The report states that the second of these possibilities is guided by the building
sequence of LPD-17s and SCXs recommended in the report, NG/Ingalls’ ability to
build a wider variety of ships than GD/BIW, NG/Ingalls’ surge capacity, and the
availability of space for expanding NG/Ingalls if needed.33
The report states that the third of these possibilities is guided by the low
probability that procurement of Virginia-class submarines will increase to two per
year, the cost savings associated with consolidating submarine production at one
yard, GD/EB’s past experience in building SSBNs and SSNs, GD/EB’s surge
capacity, and the fact that building submarines at GD/EB would maintain two
shipyards (GD/EB and NGNN) capable of designing and building nuclear-powered
combatants of some kind.34
The report acknowledges that yard consolidation would reduce the possibilities
for using competition in shipbuilding in the near term and increase risks associated
with an attack on the shipbuilding infrastructure, but notes that DOD consolidated
construction of nuclear-powered carriers in a single yard years ago, and argues that


31 (...continued)
costs for new platforms by maintaining and pursuing hulls in service, in
production or near production that can meet near- to mid-term GWOT
requirements and that are capable of operating in defended-access
scenarios against nuclear-armed regional adversaries.
!Identify and retain or build large numbers of common hulls that have a
large amount of internal reconfigurable volume, or that can carry a variety
of modular payloads, or that can be easily modified or adapted over time
to new missions.
!Pursue increased integration of Navy and Marine warfighting capabilities
and emphasize common systems to increase operational effectiveness and
reduce operation and support (O&S) costs.
!Focus research and development efforts on meeting future disruptive
maritime challenges, particularly anti-access/area-denial networks
composed of long-range systems and possibly weapons of mass
destruction.
32 CSBA report, slides 317-318.
33 CSBA report, slide 318.
34 CSBA report, slide 318. See also slide 298.

competition might be possible in the longer run if future aircraft-carrying ships, the
SCX, and the new undersea superiority system could be built in Tier II yards.35
The report states:
Given their current small yearly build numbers, consolidating construction of
aircraft carriers, surface combatants, and submarines in one yard [for each type]
makes sense. However, the same logic does not hold true for auxiliaries and
smaller combatants. These ships can normally be built at a variety of Tier I and
Tier II yards; competition can thus be maintained in a reasonable and cost-
effective way. For example, competing auxiliaries and sea lift and maneuver sea
base ships between NASSCO, Avondale, and Tier II yards may help to keep the
costs of these ships down.
Building multiple classes of a single ship [type] is another prudent way to
enforce costs, since the DoN can divert production of any ship class that exceeds
its cost target to another company/class that does not. Simultaneously building
both the [Lockheed] and [General Dynamics] versions of [the] LCS, and the
Northrop Grumman National Security Cutter, Medium [i.e., the medium-sized
Deepwater cutter] gives the DoN enduring capability to shift production to
whatever ship stays within its cost target....
Of course, Congress and the DoN may elect to retain industrial capacity, and to
pay the additional “insurance premium” associated with having excess
shipbuilding capacity. For example: Congress and the DoN might wish to retain
two submarine yards until the [undersea superiority system] design is clear, and
wait to rationalize the submarine building base after potential [undersea
superiority system] yearly production rates are clear....
In a similar vein, Congress and the DoN might wish to retain two surface
combatant yards until the design of the SCX is clear, and wait to rationalize the
surface combatant building base after potential SCX yearly production rates are
clear. In this regard, Congress could consider authorizing a modest additional
number of [Aegis destroyers] to keep both BIW and Ingalls “hot” until the SCX
is designed....
The key point is that the US shipbuilding infrastructure must be rationally sized
for expected future austere shipbuilding budgets, and whatever fiscally prudent
[Navy] transition plan is finally developed by DoN planners.36


35 CSBA report, slides 318-319.
36 CSBA report, slide 319.