"No Confidence" Votes and Other Forms of Congressional Censure of Public Officials

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

S.J.Res. 14 of the 110^th Congress, submitted on May 24, 2007, has been described as proposing a
vote of no confidence in Attorney General Alberto Gonzales. This report discusses the possible
significance of action by Congress or either House to adopt a resolution expressing “no
confidence” in a cabinet official or other official in the executive branch of the federal
government. It examines the legal issues that could be raised by resolutions of this kind and
discusses the relation of such action both to votes of no confidence in systems of parliamentary
government and to congressional action to censure or otherwise express disapprobation of public
officials. It also describes known instances in which action to express a lack of confidence in, or
impose another form of censure on, public officials have been attempted in Congress.

“No Confidence” Votes in a System of Separated Powers..............................................................1
Propriety of Congressional Censure of Public Officials..................................................................2
Relation to Other Forms of Congressional Action....................................................................3
Characteristics of Resolutions Proposed Since 1973......................................................................4
Terms of Disapprobation Used..................................................................................................4
Preambles .................................................................................................................................. 5
Inclusion of “Sense” Language.................................................................................................5
Form of Measure.......................................................................................................................5
Legislative Action.....................................................................................................................5
Examples of Earlier Resolutions.....................................................................................................6
Censure and Condemnation......................................................................................................6
Resignation and No Confidence................................................................................................7
Concluding Observations................................................................................................................8
Appendix. Congressional Resolutions Expressing Disapprobation of Executive Branch
Officials, 1973-2006.....................................................................................................................9
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................12

.J.Res. 14 of the 110^th Congress, submitted on May 24, 2007, has been described as
proposing a vote of no confidence in Attorney General Alberto Gonzales. This report
discusses the possible significance of action by Congress or either House to adopt a S

resolution expressing “no confidence” in a cabinet official or other official in the executive
branch of the federal government. It examines the legal issues that could be raised by resolutions
of this kind and discusses the relation of such action both to votes of no confidence in systems of
parliamentary government and to congressional action to censure or otherwise express
disapprobation of public officials. It also describes known instances in which action to express a
lack of confidence in, or impose another form of censure on, public officials have been attempted
in Congress.

The use of the term “vote of no confidence” to reflect a Senate, House or joint congressional
action on a resolution concerning an official of the executive branch might be somewhat
misleading because of the particular nature and impact of “no confidence” votes in parliamentary
democracies. A vote of no confidence has a technical meaning and concrete consequences only in
a parliamentary form of government, in which the continuance of the executive in office is
dependent on its maintaining majority support in the parliament (or one house thereof). The
American system of separated powers, on the other hand, makes no provision for votes of no
confidence in the parliamentary sense. Except through the process of impeachment, accordingly,
no action by the Congress (or of either House) can have any practical effect similar to that of a
parliamentary vote of no confidence.
For example, votes of “no confidence” or “votes of censure” in the British Parliament,¹ are votes
instituted in Parliament by the opposition party which, if they succeed, indicate that the
Government no longer has the support of the majority of Parliament (including the Government’s ²
own party members), and thus lead to a dissolution of the Government and new elections. Under
the U.S. system of government, with the constitutional scheme of separated powers, the
legislature—Congress—does not impact directly the removal of officials in the executive branch
of the Federal Government (other than through impeachments). Adoption of a resolution
expressing a lack of confidence could have symbolic effects as an expression of the sense of
Congress (or of either House). A vote expressing “no confidence” of the Senate or the House in a
particular official of the government, while it may certainly have political implications, would
have no specific legal import.

¹^A^lthoug^{h t}^h^e^p^h^r^a^s^e^“^v^ote^of^no^c^onf^ideⁿ^{ce” i}^s^gen^e^ral^l^y^u^s^edⁱⁿ^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^{es t}^o^d^e^scri^b^e^t^h^{e pro}^cess,ⁱⁿ
^Eng^l^a^nd,^the^c^o^m^p^le^te^{d v}^o^te^{on a}^m^o^{tion in}^tr^o^duc^e^d^by^the^op^pos^iti^{on is}^r^e^f^e^r^r^e^{d to a}^s^a^“^v^ote^of^c^eⁿ^s^u^r^e^.”
²^E^rskiⁿ^{e Ma}^{y’s T}^r^ea^tⁱ^s^{e on}^t^h^e^L^a^w,^P^rⁱ^vⁱ^l^e^g^e^s,^P^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g^s^aⁿ^d^U^s^a^g^e^o^f^P^a^rlⁱ^a^men^t^,^T^w^eⁿ^ty^-^s^e^c^o^{nd e}^d^itio^{n (S}^ir
^Dona^{ld L}ⁱ^m^{on a}ⁿ^d^W^.^{R. Mc}^Ka^y^,^e^d^itors),^a^t^p^p^.²⁸^0-2⁸¹⁽¹⁹⁹⁷^{). S}^e^e^W^illia^m^Sa^fⁱ^re^,^Safire^’^{s Poli}^tic^{al Dic}^tio^nary^{, a}^t
⁷⁶⁸⁽¹⁹⁷⁸⁾^{: “}^[^I^]^f^a^m^o^{tion of}ⁿ^o^c^onf^ideⁿ^c^e^isⁱⁿ^tr^o^duc^e^d^by^the^op^pos^iti^onⁱⁿ^the^H^o^us^e^of^C^o^m^m^ons^a^nd^pa^s^s^e^s^,^the
^re^{sult is c}^a^lle^{d a}^vo^t^e^o^f^cen^su^re⁽^a^ltho^u^g^h^{it c}^ontaⁱ^{ns the}^w^o^{rds “}ⁿ^{o c}^onf^ideⁿ^c^e^,^”^it^{is n}^o^{t re}^f^e^rre^{d to}^a^s^a^v^o^te^of^no
^coⁿ^fⁱ^d^en^ce^,^excep^tⁱⁿ^A^m^eri^ca);ⁱⁿ^t^h^at^case,^t^h^{e go}^vern^m^eⁿ^tⁱ^s^‘u^pset^{’ o}^r^‘f^al^l^s^,^’^an^d^{an el}^ectⁱ^oⁿⁱ^s^cal^l^e^d^.^”

The issue of the propriety and the authority of Congress or of either House of Congress to
officially express an opinion concerning an executive branch officer, such as an opinion that the
President should remove an official, or that a cabinet official should resign, or to otherwise
formally reprimand, “censure,” or express disapprobation or loss of confidence concerning an
executive official has been debated and questioned from time to time in the House and the ³
Senate. In early congressional considerations some Members of Congress, in their opposition to
resolutions which declared either an opinion of praise or disapproval of the executive, cited the
lack of an express constitutional grant of authority for the House or the Senate to state an opinion
on the conduct or propriety of an executive officer in the form of a formal resolution of censure or ⁴
disapproval. Others have argued, including during the more recent consideration of the
impeachment of President Clinton, that impeachment was the proper, and exclusive,
constitutional response for Congress to entertain when the conduct of federal civil officers is ⁵
called into question, rather than a resolution of censure. Concerning judicial officers, precedents
indicate that the House has on occasion either rejected or not dealt with attempts to consider a
“censure” motion of federal judges offered by the Judiciary Committee as an alternative to
articles of impeachment, and parliamentarians have noted an apparent disinclination of the House ⁶
to consider censure as part of the impeachment procedure.
It has, however, become accepted congressional practice to employ a simple resolution of one
House of Congress, or a concurrent resolution by both Houses, for certain non-legislative matters,
such as to express the opinion or the sense of the Congress or of one House of Congress on a
public matter, and a resolution expressing an opinion of “no confidence” in, or other expression
of censure or disapproval of an executive branch official within a concurrent or simple resolution

³^II^Hi^nd^{s’ P}^r^eced^en^t^s^o^f^t^h^{e H}^o^u^s^{e o}^f^R^e^p^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^ves^[^Hiⁿ^d^s^{’ P}^r^eced^en^t^s^]^,^§1⁵⁶^9,^p.¹⁰²⁹⁽¹⁹⁰⁷⁾^{: “Wh}ⁱ^l^e^t^h^{e Ho}^u^s^e
^{in s}^o^m^e^c^a^s^e^s^ha^s^be^s^t^ow^e^d^pr^aⁱ^s^e^or^c^eⁿ^s^u^r^e^oⁿ^t^h^e^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t or}^a^m^e^m^b^e^r^of^his^C^a^bine^{t, s}^u^c^h^a^c^tⁱ^on^ha^s^a^t^ot^he^r
^tim^es^be^eⁿ^he^ld^to^be^im^pr^ope^r^.^”
⁴^II^Hi^nd^{s’ P}^r^eced^en^t^s^,^a^t^§1⁵⁶^9,^p^p^{. 1}⁰²⁹^-¹⁰³^{0: “}^I^t^w^a^{s obje}^c^t^e^d^th^a^t^the^Co^nstitu^tioⁿ^did^no^{t i}ⁿ^c^l^ude^suc^h^e^x^pre^ssions
^of^opinⁱ^oⁿ^a^m^ong^the^d^u^tie^{s of}^th^e^House^...^.”^(Citing^de^ba^te^aⁿ^d^v^o^te^oⁿ^a^re^sol^u^tioⁿ^of^a^pprov^a^l^of^the^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^t’s^th^nd
^c^ond^uc^{t, w}^h^ic^{h w}^a^{s la}^{id on}^the^ta^ble^,²⁰^An^na^l^s^of^th^{e C}^o^ng^ress^{, 1}¹^Cong^.,²^Se^s^s^{., a}^t⁹²^-¹^18,¹^34-¹⁵^1,¹⁵⁶^-¹^61,
¹⁶⁴^-¹^82,¹⁸^7-²¹^7,²¹⁹⁽¹⁸⁰⁹⁾⁾^.
⁵^N^o^te^dis^c^us^sⁱ^on^of^a^H^ous^e^r^e^s^o^l^u^tio^{n i}ⁿ¹⁸⁶⁷^e^x^pr^e^s^sⁱ^ng^o^pⁱⁿⁱ^oⁿ^{on t}^h^e^uⁿ^f^itne^s^s^f^o^r^the^of^fⁱ^c^e^of^Mr^{. H}^e^nr^y^Sm^y^t^h
^(II^Hiⁿ^d^s^{’ P}^r^eced^en^t^s^,^a^t^§¹⁵⁸¹^,^p^p^{. 1}⁰³⁵^-¹⁰³⁶⁾^,^a^{nd a}¹⁹²⁴^Se^na^te^r^e^s^o^luti^onⁱⁿ^dic^a^ting^its^s^e^ns^e^t^h^a^t^the^P^r^e^sⁱ^d^eⁿ^t^th^st
^“i^mmedⁱ^at^el^y^req^u^e^st^t^h^{e resi}^gn^atⁱ^oⁿ^”^o^f^t^h^{e S}^ecret^ar^y^o^f^Na^v^y^.⁶⁵^C^ongr^e^s^sⁱ^o^nal^Re^c^o^r^d^{, 68}^Cong^{., 1}^Se^s^s^.^,²²²³^-
²²⁴^{5 (}¹⁹²⁴⁾^{. B}^o^t^h^of^the^s^e^r^e^s^o^lu^tions^w^e^r^e^obje^c^t^e^d^t^o^b^y^s^o^me^M^e^mb^e^r^s^a^sⁱⁿ^t^e^r^f^e^r^ing^w^ith^the^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^t’s
^pre^r^og^a^tiv^e^s^{in a}^p^p^o^intm^eⁿ^{ts a}ⁿ^d^re^m^o^v^a^{ls of}^e^x^e^c^u^tiv^e^o^f^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^{s, a}^{nd t}^h^e^la^tte^{r a}^c^tio^{n a}^s^la^be^li^ng^w^{ith a}^“^b^raⁿ^d^of
^s^h^a^m^e^”^aⁿ^indivⁱ^d^u^a^lⁱⁿ^the^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt w}^{ithout c}^o^nd^uc^ting^im^p^each^m^eⁿ^t^p^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^gs.^S^{ee d}ⁱ^scu^ssi^oⁿⁱⁿ^Fⁱ^sh^er,
^“Coⁿ^g^{ress an}^d^t^h^{e Rem}^o^val^P^o^wer,^{” i}ⁿ^Con^g^r^ess^&^t^h^{e P}^r^esi^d^en^cy^{, V}^o^lum^e^{10, a}^t^67-⁶⁸⁽¹⁹⁸³⁾^{. C}^onc^e^rⁿⁱ^ng^the
^im^pe^ac^hm^eⁿ^{t of}^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t C}^lⁱⁿ^t^o^{n, s}^e^e^dis^c^us^sⁱ^oⁿ^sⁱⁿ^“^C^eⁿ^s^u^r^e^O^p^tion^L^o^sⁱ^ng^Su^pp^or^{t i}ⁿ^H^o^us^e^,^”^T^h^e^Hill^{, Se}^pte^m^be^r
^16,¹⁹⁹⁸^{; “}^S^eⁿ^a^t^or^s^Ex^plor^ing^a^For^m^of^C^e^ns^ur^e^A^r^e^B^u^m^p^ing^Iⁿ^{to O}^b^s^t^a^c^l^e^s^,”^W^a^s^hⁱⁿ^gt^{on Pos}^t^,^J^a^nua^r^y^{2, 19}^99.
⁶^T^h^e^c^eⁿ^s^u^r^e^of^U^.^{S. D}ⁱ^s^t^rⁱ^c^t^C^o^u^r^{t J}^udg^e^H^a^r^o^ld^L^oude^r^b^a^c^k^{, r}^e^c^o^m^m^e^nde^{d in a}^J^udicⁱ^a^r^y^C^o^m^m^itt^e^e^r^e^por^{t in}¹⁹³³
ⁱⁿ^st^ead^o^fⁱ^m^p^each^m^eⁿ^t^,^w^a^{s o}^b^j^ect^ed^t^o^,^f^o^{r exam}^p^l^e,^b^y^Rep^.^E^a^rl^Mⁱ^ch^en^er^o^f^Mⁱ^chⁱ^g^an^,^w^h^o^exp^l^aiⁿ^e^d^:^{“I do}ⁿ^o^t
^b^e^lⁱ^e^{ve t}^h^at^t^h^{e con}^s^tⁱ^t^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^a^l^p^o^w^e^{r o}^fⁱ^m^p^each^m^eⁿ^tⁱⁿ^cl^u^d^e^{s censu}^re.^”^T^h^{e reco}^mm^en^d^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^w^a^{s n}^o^t^a^p^p^r^o^v^ed^,^and
^the^House^a^d^op^te^{d a}^s^a^su^bstitu^te^aⁿ^a^m^eⁿ^d^m^eⁿ^{t im}^pe^a^c^hing^the^ju^dg^e^.³^Desch^l^{er’s P}^r^eced^en^t^s^o^f^t^h^{e U.}^S^.^Ho^u^s^e^o^f
^R^e^p^r^esen^t^a^tⁱ^ves^[^Desch^l^{er’s P}^r^eced^en^t^s^]^,^C^h^{. 1}⁴^,^§1^.3,^p.⁴^{00 (}¹⁹⁷⁷⁾^.^Iⁿ^ot^he^rⁱⁿ^s^t^aⁿ^c^e^s^r^e^c^o^m^m^e^nda^tions^of^c^eⁿ^s^u^r^e^of
^ju^d^g^{es, as altern}^ativ^{es to}^im^p^each^men^t^{, w}^e^re^mad^e^b^y^th^{e Ju}^dⁱ^ciary^Co^mm^{ittee, b}^u^tⁿ^o^{t acted}^oⁿ^b^y^th^{e Ho}^u^s^e.^Id^{. a}^t
⁴⁰⁰^-⁴^{01; I}^I^I^Hi^nd^{’s P}^r^eced^en^t^s^,^s^u^p^r^a^a^t^§^§²⁵¹⁹^,²⁵²⁰^.

would appear to be in the nature of such a “sense of Congress” or “sense of the Senate” (or ⁷
House) resolution. The absence of express constitutional language that the Congress, or the
House or the Senate individually, may state its opinion on matters of public import in a resolution
of praise or censure is not necessarily indicative of a lack of capacity to do so, or that such
practice is per se unconstitutional. It is recognized in both constitutional law and governmental
theory that there are, of course, a number of functions and activities of Congress which are not
expressly stated or provided in the Constitution, but which are nonetheless valid as either inherent
or implied components of the legislative process or of other express provisions in the
Constitution, or are considered to be within the internal authority of democratic legislative ⁸
institutions and elective deliberative bodies generally. The practice of the House, Senate, or
Congress to express facts or opinion in simple or concurrent resolutions has been recognized
since its earliest days as an inherent authority of the Congress and of democratic legislative
institutions generally, and the adoption of “sense of” the House or Senate resolutions on various ⁹
subjects and in reference to various people, is practiced with some frequency in every Congress.
The resolutions or statements both the House and the Senate have adopted in the past concerning
a Government official, other than a Member of Congress, have expressed disapproval, censure, or
opinion that an officer should be removed, Such an expression of opinion, censure, disapproval or
lack of confidence in or of a federal officer by the House, the Senate, or the Congress is not an
“impeachment” of that civil officer under Article I, Section 2, clause 5 and Section 3, clause 6 of ¹⁰
the Constitution; nor is it a “punishment” of one of the House’s or Senate’s own Members under
Article I, Section 5, clause 2.
Furthermore, a censure or vote of no confidence would also not, in most cases, be within those
inherent or implicit authorities, in the nature of contempt, typically imputed to democratic
legislative assemblies to protect the dignity and integrity of the institution, its members and ¹¹
proceedings. Finally, because there is no legal consequence to a resolution expressing an

⁷^“^S^im^ple^re^s^o^lutio^ns^a^r^e^us^e^dⁱⁿ^d^e^a^ling^w^{ith non}^le^gⁱ^s^l^a^tiv^e^m^a^tte^rs^s^u^c^h^a^s^e^x^pre^s^sⁱ^ng^opiⁿⁱ^ons^{or f}^a^c^t^s^{.... Ex}^c^e^p^{t a}^s
^s^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^ca^ll^y^pr^ov^ide^d^by^law^,^they^ha^v^e^{no le}^g^a^{l e}^f^f^e^c^t^{, a}^{nd r}^e^quir^e^{no a}^c^tioⁿ^by^the^othe^r^H^ous^e^.^C^o^ntaⁱⁿⁱ^ng^no
^le^gⁱ^sla^tiv^e^prov^{isions, t}^h^e^y^a^r^e^no^{t pre}^s^eⁿ^te^{d t}^o^t^h^e^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^t^of^the^Unite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^f^o^{r his a}^ppr^ov^a^l^{, a}^s^{in t}^h^e^c^a^s^e^of^bills
^a^{nd j}^o^int^re^solu^tio^ns.”⁷^Desch^l^er^{’s P}^r^eced^en^t^s^{, C}^h^.²⁴^{, §}^6.^“^[^C^oⁿ^c^ur^r^e^{nt r}^e^s^o^l^u^tio^ns^]^a^r^eⁿ^o^t^us^e^dⁱⁿ^the^a^d^o^p^tioⁿ^of
^g^e^ne^r^a^{l le}^gⁱ^s^l^a^{tion. ...}^[^T^hey^]^a^r^e^us^e^dⁱⁿ^...^e^x^pr^e^s^sⁱ^ng^the^s^e^ns^e^of^C^ong^r^e^s^s^on^pr^o^pos^it^io^ns^...^{. A}^c^onc^ur^r^e^nt
^r^e^s^o^luti^on^doe^s^not^inv^o^lv^e^aⁿ^e^x^e^r^cⁱ^s^e^of^the^le^gⁱ^s^l^a^tive^pow^e^r^un^de^r^a^r^tic^le^I^of^the^C^o^ns^tit^uti^{on i}ⁿ^w^h^ic^{h the}^th^st
^P^r^e^s^ideⁿ^{t m}^u^{st pa}^rtic^ipa^t^e^.^”^Id^.^a^t^{§ 5.}^B^r^ow^n,^H^o^us^e^Pr^ac^tic^e^{, 10}⁸^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,¹^Se^s^s^{., a}^t¹⁶^{8: “}^S^im^ple^or^c^onc^ur^r^e^nt
^r^e^s^o^luti^ons^a^r^e^us^e^d^...^{to e}^x^pr^e^s^s^f^a^c^t^s^or^opⁱⁿⁱ^ons^,^or^t^o^dis^p^os^e^of^s^o^m^e^othe^r^no^nle^g^is^la^tiv^e^m^a^tte^r^.^”^Se^e^a^l^s^o^Rⁱ^dd^ic^k
^{& F}^r^u^mⁱⁿ^,^Rid^d^ic^k^’^s^Seⁿ^a^te^Pr^oc^e^dur^e^{, 1}²⁰²⁽¹⁹⁹^2).
⁸^T^h^e^m^o^s^t^c^o^m^m^{on e}^x^am^ple^of^inhe^r^e^{nt or}^im^plie^{d a}^u^t^hor^ity^of^C^ong^r^e^s^s^is^the^ov^e^r^sⁱ^g^h^{t a}^nd^inv^e^s^tig^a^t^or^y^a^u^thor^ity
^of^e^ithe^r^H^ous^e^,ⁱⁿ^c^l^u^d^ing^t^h^e^p^o^w^e^r^{to c}^o^m^p^e^l^a^tte^nda^nc^e^of^w^itne^s^s^e^s^a^{nd pr}^o^duc^ti^on^of^doc^um^eⁿ^ts^{. Suc}^h^a^u^th^or^ity^is
^{not e}^x^pre^ssly^prov^ide^dⁱⁿ^t^h^e^Con^s^tituti^on,^b^u^{t t}^h^e^a^b^ility^to^c^o^l^l^e^c^t^f^a^c^t^{s a}^{nd o}^pⁱⁿⁱ^ons,^aⁿ^d^to^p^ublis^h^suc^h^opi^nioⁿ^{s a}ⁿ^d
^f^a^ct^s,^{are co}ⁿ^sⁱ^d^eredⁱⁿ^h^e^ren^tⁱⁿ^t^h^{e au}^t^h^o^rⁱ^t^y^t^o^l^e^gi^sl^at^e.^M^c^G^r^{ain v}^.^D^a^u^ghe^r^t^y^,²⁷^{2 U}^.^S^.¹³⁵⁽¹⁹²⁷⁾^;^W^a^tk^ins^v^.
^Uⁿ^ite^{d State}^s^{, 35}⁴^U^.^{S. 17}^{8, 18}^{7, 200}⁽¹⁹⁵⁷⁾^.
⁹^S^{ee n}^o^t^e⁹^,^s^upr^a;^C^u^s^h^ing^,^a^t³¹^{4. I}ⁿ^the¹⁰⁵^th^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,^f^o^r^e^x^am^ple^,^t^h^e^H^ous^e^una^nim^ous^ly^a^dopt^e^d^a^r^e^s^o^luti^on
^t^o^“co^nd^emⁿ^”^{as a “raci}^st^act^{” t}^h^{e al}^l^e^ged^actⁱ^oⁿ^s^o^f^t^h^{ree exp}^r^essl^{y n}^a^m^e^dⁱⁿ^dⁱ^vi^du^al^{s i}ⁿ^T^e^xas^w^h^o^w^e^r^e^arrest^edⁱⁿ^th
^coⁿⁿ^ectⁱ^oⁿ^wⁱ^t^h^w^h^atⁱ^s^rep^o^r^t^e^d^{as a raci}^al^l^y^m^o^tⁱ^v^at^ed^h^o^mⁱ^cⁱ^d^{e (H.}^R^es.⁴⁶⁶^,¹⁰⁵^C^ong⁾^.
¹⁰^S^{ee 3}^Desch^l^{er’s P}^r^eced^en^t^s^,^C^h^.^14,^§^1.
¹¹^A^s^{to inhe}^r^e^nt^c^onte^m^{pt a}^u^t^hor^it^y^,^s^e^e^Ande^r^s^{on v}^.^D^uⁿⁿ^,^{19 U}^.^S.²⁰⁴⁽¹⁸²¹⁾^{. N}^o^te^{, g}^e^ne^r^a^lly^{, C}^u^s^h^ing^,^E^l^emen^t^s^of
^the^Law^a^nd^Pr^ac^tic^e^of^Le^gis^l^ati^v^e^As^s^e^m^b^lie^s^{in the}^Uⁿ^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^{of Am}^e^r^ic^a^[^C^us^hi^ng^]^,²^45-²⁵^{5, 255}^-²⁷²⁽¹⁸⁵⁶⁾^.
^Sⁱⁿ^{ce su}^ch^actⁱ^oⁿ^d^o^e^sⁿ^o^t^b^{ear up}^oⁿ^t^h^e^p^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^{gs an}^d^p^rⁱ^vⁱ^l^e^{ges o}^f^t^h^{e Ho}^u^s^e,^andⁱ^sⁿ^o^t^p^a^rt^o^fⁱ^m^p^e^a^c^h^m^en^t^,^su^ch
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

opinion of the Senate or the House, and because such expression in a simple resolution does not
appear to technically be a “bill” referred to in the constitutional prohibition on “bills of attainder,” ¹²
it is unlikely that such an expression would violate that constitutional restriction on Congress.

These resolutions, expressing the disapproval of Congress (or of either house) with an official of ¹³
the executive branch, have in the past sometimes been submitted, and occasionally adopted. For
recent years, it has been possible to identify resolutions of this kind systematically through a
search of the Legislative Information System of the Congress (LIS), which includes a database of ^rd
introduced measures extending back to the 93 Congress (1973-1974). An initial search identified
simple and concurrent resolutions described with any form of the terms “confidence,” “censure,”
or “condemnation.” On the basis of information independently acquired about resolutions offered
in the early 1950s against Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the search was also was extended to
include simple and concurrent resolutions described with any form of the term “resignation.”
From among the measures identified by these searches, those relating to federal officials other ¹⁴
than Members of Congress were selected. These searches together yielded 31 resolutions ^rd^th
submitted from the 93 through 109 Congresses (1973-2006) and directed against federal
officials. Information about the subject and form of these 31 measures is presented in Appendix.
It appears that such resolutions have been stated not usually in terms of no confidence, but more
often in terms of censure or condemnation, or as calls for resignation. Of the 31 resolutions
identified by the search, 13 expressed censure of the official, condemnation of the official or his
or her actions, or both. The remaining 18 resolutions called either for the official in question to
resign or for the President to request resignation, making this form of disapproval the most
common among measures identified from recent times.
Only one of the 31 resolutions referred explicitly to a loss of confidence, and this language was
contained only in the preamble of a resolution that also called for resignation. Although the term
“no confidence” was not necessarily expressly stated in nearly all of these resolutions, however,
such opinion was obviously implied by the actual wording of a number of the resolutions.
Previous to S.J.Res. 14, nevertheless, no resolution known in recent times has stated only a loss
of confidence, unaccompanied by reference to any other form of disapprobation. The use solely
of this language might suggest a lack of awareness that the reference to a loss of confidence, in

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^a^r^e^s^o^lutio^{n w}^oul^{d g}^e^ne^r^a^lly^not^be^c^onsⁱ^d^e^r^e^d^to^be^a^pr^iv^ile^g^e^{d r}^e^s^o^lutio^n.^Se^e³^Desch^l^{er’s P}^r^eced^en^t^s^,^C^h^a^p^te^{r 1}⁴^,
^{§ 1,}^p.⁴^01.
¹²^A^r^tic^le^{I, Se}^c^tion^{9, c}^l^a^u^se³^.^Se^e^Nixoⁿ^v.^Ad^miⁿⁱ^stra^t^o^{r of Gen}^e^ra^{l S}^e^rvices,⁴^{33 U}^.^S.⁴²^5,⁴⁶^{8 (}¹⁹⁷⁷⁾^;ⁿ^o^te
^de^fⁱ^nition^of^“^b^ill”ⁱⁿ⁷^Desch^l^{er’s P}^r^eced^en^t^s^{, C}^h^.²⁴^{, §}^2.^For^a^di^s^c^us^sⁱ^on^of^the^s^e^le^g^a^{l is}^s^u^e^s^{, a}^{nd s}^e^pa^r^a^tion^of
^pow^e^r^s^c^ons^ide^r^a^tio^ns^{, s}^e^e^C^R^S^R^e^por^t^98-⁸⁴^3,^Cen^s^u^r^{e o}^f^t^h^{e P}^r^esi^d^en^t^b^y^t^h^{e Con}^g^r^ess^,^b^y^Jack^M^a^skel^l^.
¹³^F^o^{r exam}^p^l^es,^{see ar}^chⁱ^v^ed^CRS^Rep^o^r^t⁹⁸^-⁹⁸³^G^O^V^,^Cen^s^u^r^e^o^f^E^xecu^tⁱ^{ve a}ⁿ^d^Ju^dⁱ^ci^a^l^B^r^aⁿ^c^{h Of}^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^s^{: P}^a^st
^C^ongr^e^s^sⁱ^o^nal^Pr^o^ceedⁱⁿ^g^s^,^b^y^Rⁱ^ch^ard^S^.^Bet^h^(avai^l^a^b^l^{e f}^r^o^m^t^h^{e au}^t^h^o^r).
¹⁴^On^{e o}^f^t^h^{e reso}^l^u^tⁱ^oⁿ^sⁱⁿ^cl^ud^ed^pro^p^o^s^{es t}^o^cen^su^{re a f}^o^rm^{er o}^f^fⁱ^ci^al^f^o^{r act}^{s su}^b^s^eq^u^eⁿ^t^t^o^l^eaviⁿ^{g o}^f^fⁱ^ce;ⁱ^t^w^a^s
ⁱⁿ^cl^ud^edⁱⁿ^t^h^{e an}^al^y^sⁱ^s^oⁿ^t^h^{e p}^rⁱⁿ^ci^p^l^{e t}^h^at^bo^rd^erlⁱⁿ^e^{cases were}^b^e^t^t^e^{r t}^a^kenⁱⁿ^t^o^con^sⁱ^d^eratⁱ^oⁿ^t^h^anⁱ^gⁿ^o^r^e^d^.

the American context, lacks any distinctive or special force not shared by other terms in which
resolutions with similar prospective effects have been couched. The use of “no confidence”
language would not suffice actually to endow the proposal uniquely with any such distinctive or
special force.
Most of the resolutions identified that were submitted in or after 1973 have included a preamble
stating the reasons for the congressional disapproval. Of the total of 31, just three lacked such a
preamble. The current S.J.Res. 14, which also lacks a preamble, accordingly represents a less
common variation.
Similarly, 16 of the 31 resolutions identified by electronic search explicitly declared themselves
to be statements of the sense of the Congress or of the house acting (usually in those terms,
though a few refer instead to the “sentiment” or “judgment” of Congress or either house). This
form of language again appears consistent with an understanding that any such measure could
have symbolic, rather than determinative, effects. This language appears to have been included in ^th
measures of this kind less frequently since 1996 (105 Congress), but is adopted by S.J.Res. 14.
All 31 of the resolutions identified through the electronic search were either concurrent
resolutions or simple resolutions of one house. No search was conducted for joint resolutions,
because of the inappropriateness of this form of measure to the kind of action possible in the
American system. For this reason, no conclusion can be offered about whether any earlier
measures to express disapproval of a federal official have taken the form of a joint resolution.
Use of simple and concurrent resolutions suggests awareness that adoption of such a measure
would have no imperative force parallel to that of a vote of no confidence in a parliamentary
system. By contrast, even though the language of S.J.Res. 14 explicitly disavows any mandatory
intent, by stating itself as an expression of the sense of the Senate, the measure is couched as a
joint resolution. Joint resolutions are normally lawmaking vehicles, and require passage by both
chambers and presentation to the President. It is not clear what proponents intend by submitting
the measure in this form, which would have the effect of affording the House of Representatives
and the President a role in stating what the sense of the Senate is. It is conceivable that the use of
this form of measure in the current case implicitly indicates an intent to achieve effects
resembling those of an actual vote of no confidence.
Congress did not finally adopt any of the 31 resolutions identified in the present search, and on ^th
none but two did any floor action occur at all. In 1997 (105 Congress), the House adopted
H.Con.Res. 197, declaring that Sara A. Lister, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and ^th
Reserve Affairs, should resign or be removed. In 1999 (106 Congress), the Senate rejected an
attempt to bring to the floor S.Res. 44, censuring President Clinton.

No feasible means appeared of comprehensively identifying similar measures for the period
preceding the availability of electronically searchable data. In the historical period before that
covered by the LIS database, nevertheless, several instances are known in which the House or the
Senate expressed a specific opinion disapproving of conduct of an executive official, or ¹⁵
suggesting that a particular executive officer resign or be removed by the President.
The instances discussed in this section constitute only examples of congressional actions; they are
known not to compose a comprehensive list of all resolutions to censure executive (and judicial)
officials that may have been adopted or considered by either House. Accordingly, available
information can permit no definite assertion whether a vote of no confidence fully similar to that
proposed by S.J.Res. 14 has ever previously occurred in American history. It might be considered
unlikely, however, that resolutions critical of officials during earlier periods of history would have
been couched solely in terms of “no confidence,” because proponents would likely have
understood that these terms have a technical meaning only in a parliamentary system of
government.
The earliest attempt to censure an official found thus far concerned a series of resolutions
proposing the censure and disapproval of Secretary Alexander Hamilton in 1793, the texts of
which were considered by historians to have been drafted by Thomas Jefferson for introduction ¹⁶
by Representative William Branch Giles of Virginia.
In 1860, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution stating that the conduct of the
President, and his Secretary of the Navy, was deserving of its “reproof,” in a matter concerning
the alleged conduct of President Buchanan and his Secretary of the Navy in allowing political
considerations and alleged campaign contribution “kickbacks” to influence the letting of ¹⁷
Government contracts to political supporters, rather than the lowest bidder. After debating both
the substance of the charges and the authority of the House to adopt such a resolution,
characterized by one Member as “censur[ing] indiscriminately the President of the United States ¹⁸¹⁹
and the Secretary of Navy,” the House adopted the resolution 106-61.

¹⁵^T^h^e^e^x^am^ple^s^dis^c^us^s^e^{d in the}^s^e^c^tion^on^“^C^eⁿ^s^u^r^e^aⁿ^d^C^o^nde^mⁿ^a^tion”^a^r^e^dr^a^w^{n f}^r^om^C^R^S^R^e^por^t^98-⁹⁸^3,
^“Cen^su^{re o}^f^E^x^ecu^tⁱ^v^{e an}^d^Ju^dⁱ^ci^al^Bran^ch^Of^fⁱ^ci^al^s:^P^a^st^Con^g^ressi^oⁿ^a^l^P^r^o^ceedⁱⁿ^gs,^”^b^y^Ri^ch^ard^S^.^Bet^h^(archⁱ^ved^,
^avai^l^a^b^l^{e f}^r^o^m^t^h^{e au}^t^h^o^r).
¹⁶^She^r^idaⁿ^{, E}^u^g^e^ne^R^{., “}^T^hom^a^s^Je^f^f^e^r^s^{on a}^nd^the^G^ile^s^R^e^s^o^lutioⁿ^s^,”^W^{illiam a}^{nd M}^a^ry^Quarte^rly^{, T}^h^ird^Se^rie^s^,
^Vol^u^m^e^{49, I}^s^s^u^e^{4, a}^t⁵⁸^9-⁶⁰⁸⁽^O^c^t^obe^r¹⁹⁹²⁾^.^T^h^e^r^e^s^o^l^u^tio^ns^dⁱ^{d n}^o^t^pa^s^s^.
¹⁷^“^R^eso^l^ved^,^T^h^at^t^h^e^P^r^esi^d^ent^and^S^ecret^ary^o^f^t^h^{e Nav}^y^,^b^y^r^ecei^viⁿ^g^an^d^con^sⁱ^d^eriⁿ^{g t}^h^{e p}^a^rt^y^rel^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^o^f^bⁱ^dd^ers
^f^o^{r co}ⁿ^t^ract^{s w}ⁱ^t^h^t^h^{e Un}ⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^es,^an^d^t^h^{e eff}^ect^o^f^a^w^ardⁱⁿ^g^co^nt^ract^{s u}^p^oⁿ^p^eⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^el^ectⁱ^oⁿ^s^,^h^a^{ve set}^an^exa^m^p^l^e^th^st
^da^ng^e^r^ous^t^o^t^h^e^p^ublic^s^a^f^e^t^y^{, a}^{nd de}^s^e^r^v^ing^the^r^e^pr^oof^of^this^H^o^us^e^.^”^Co^ng^ressioⁿ^a^{l Glob}^e^{, 36}^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,¹^Se^s^s^.,
²⁹⁵^{1 (}^J^une^13,¹⁸⁶⁰⁾^.
¹⁸^Id^.^a^t²⁹⁵¹^{. (Mr.}^Cla^r^k^of^Mis^s^o^u^r^i).
¹⁹^Id^.^{, at}²⁹⁵¹^.

The Senate adopted a resolution in 1886 in which it expressed its “condemnation” of President
Cleveland’s Attorney General A.H. Garland concerning his refusal to provide certain records and ²⁰
papers to the Senate about the removal from office of a district attorney by the President.
In 1896, the House adopted a resolution where it found that a United States Ambassador, by his
speech and conduct “has committed an offense against diplomatic propriety and an abuse of the
privileges of his exalted position,” and therefore, “as the immediate representatives of the
American people, and in their names, we condemn and censure the said utterances of Thomas F. ²¹
Bayard.”
Some congressional resolutions over the years have merely found misconduct on the part of an
executive officer and urged the President to seek the officer’s resignation, without expressing a
specific term of censure or condemnation, or a specific expression of loss of “confidence.” For
example, after having conducted investigations into the conduct of the administration of the New
York custom-house by Mr. Henry Smyth, and finding that “there is not sufficient time prior” to
adjournment to finish the matter, the House expressed in a resolution “Henry A. Smyth’s
unfitness to hold the office,” and recommended that he “should be removed from the office of ²²
coll ector.”
Similarly, the Senate in 1924, during the Teapot Dome investigation passed a resolution
indicating its sense that the President “immediately request the resignation” of the Secretary of ²³
Navy.
In the 81^st and 82^nd Congresses (1949-1952), six resolutions were submitted containing demands
for the resignation of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and one seeking that of Secretary of
Defense George C. Marshall. All of these resolutions, unlike many more recent measures, lacked
preambles setting forth the reasons for the action. These measures provide one of the few earlier
instances known that were described as proposing votes of no confidence in the respective
officials. Three of the seven resolutions explicitly stated a popular loss of confidence along with
(but not instead of) the calls for resignation (although one, like the 1983 instance discussed
earlier, did so only in the preamble). Several of these resolutions, apparently including those
whose text did not contain this explicit phrase, were also described, in public discussion, as
declarations of no confidence. Finally, during the same time period, a loss of public confidence in
Secretary Acheson was declared by votes of the Republican Conference in at least one chamber.
These events illustrate that a resolution may be described as a “no confidence” measure without
having the characteristics that would make it equivalent to an actual vote of no confidence in a
parliamentary system.

²⁰¹⁷^C^o^ng^ressioⁿ^a^l^Reco^r^d^{, 49}^th^Cong^.,¹^st^Se^s^s^{., p}^p^.¹⁵^84-¹⁵⁹¹^{, 2}⁷^84-²⁸^{10 (}^M^a^r^c^h²⁶^,¹⁸⁸⁶⁾^:^“^R^e^sol^ved^,^T^h^at^t^h^e
^Se^na^te^he^r^e^by^e^x^pr^e^s^se^s^its^c^onde^mⁿ^a^{tion of}^the^r^e^f^u^s^a^{l of}^the^A^ttorⁿ^e^y^-^G^eⁿ^e^r^a^l^{, unde}^r^w^h^a^t^e^v^e^r^inf^l^ue^nc^e^,^to^s^e^{nd t}^o^th
^the^Se^na^te^c^o^pie^s^of^pa^pe^r^s^c^a^lle^d^f^o^r^by^its^r^e^s^o^lutio^{n of}^the²⁵^of^J^a^nua^r^y^{, a}^{nd s}^e^{t f}^o^r^t^{h in}^the^r^e^po^r^t^of^the
^C^o^m^m^itte^e^{on the}^J^u^dicⁱ^a^r^y^,^is^{in v}ⁱ^ola^tion^of^his^of^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^duty^a^{nd s}^ubv^e^r^sⁱ^v^e^of^the^f^unda^m^e^nta^l^prⁱⁿ^cⁱ^ple^s^of^the
^G^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt a}^nd^of^a^g^{ood a}^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^r^a^tion^the^r^e^o^f^.^”
²¹²⁸^C^o^ng^ressioⁿ^a^l^Reco^r^d^{, 54}^th^Cong^.,¹^st^S^e^ss.^,^p.³⁰³⁴⁽^M^ar^ch^20,¹⁸⁹⁶⁾^.
²²^Co^ng^ressioⁿ^a^l^Glob^e^{, 40}^th^C^ong^.^,¹^st^Se^s^s^{., pp.}²^55-²⁵^{6, 28}^2-²^85,³⁹⁴^-³⁹⁵⁽¹⁸⁶⁷⁾^.
²³⁶⁵^C^o^ng^ressioⁿ^a^l^Reco^r^d^{, 68}^th^Cong^.,¹^st^S^e^ss.^,²²²³^-²²⁴⁵⁽^F^eb^r^u^ar^y¹¹^,¹⁹²⁴⁾^.

Although there has been discussion in both Houses of Congress of the appropriateness of such
actions, resolutions have been introduced and considered in each House of Congress in the past,
and on occasion have been adopted, wherein the House or the Senate has expressed the “sense” of
the institution that an official in the executive branch has engaged in conduct worthy of censure,
condemnation, or other expression of disapprobation; should resign or be removed by the
President; and, in a few circumstances, expressly stating in the preamble or the operative portion
of the resolution that the public or the particular House of Congress has lost “confidence” in the
official. Such actions and proposals would appear to be in the nature of “sense of Congress” or
“sense of the Senate” (or House) resolutions in which it has been the practice for the Senate or the
House to address certain non-legislative matters, such as to express the opinion or the sense of ²⁴
Congress or of one House of Congress on a public matter. Aside from obvious symbolic,
political or publicity implications, there are no specific legal consequences in the passage of such
a resolution, nor is there any legal significance or consequence for the Senate or the House to
choose one phrase of disapprobation or condemnation over another, or to include or not to include
the concept or expression of a loss of “confidence” in an official.
Several features of S.J.Res. 14 seem to make explicit its difference from an actual “vote of no
confidence” such as could occur in a parliamentary system, but others suggest a failure to take
account of that difference. To the extent that the resolution purports to present a proposition
functionally similar to a vote of no confidence in a parliamentary system, present knowledge does
not permit identifying any similar proposition as having been offered in the past. On the other
hand, to the extent that the present resolution purports to present such a proposition, it cannot,
under the American constitutional system, succeed in doing so. Instead, the proposition actually
presented by the resolution can only be that of expressing congressional disapproval of a federal
official, and in that general respect the resolution is not dissimilar from a number of others that
have been offered, from time to time, throughout American history.

²⁴⁷^Desch^l^{er’s P}^r^eced^en^t^s^{, C}^h^.²⁴^,^{§ 6}^;^Rⁱ^ddic^k^&^Fr^um^in,^Rⁱ^d^d^ic^k^’^s^Se^nate^Pr^oc^e^dur^e^{, 12}⁰²⁽¹⁹⁹²⁾^.

^{Provisions on}^{Measure Number}^{Notes and}
^Cong^ress^{and Date of}^{Official Framing}^{Loss of}^{(in it}^al^ics)
^Introdu^ction^Confiden^ce^Resignation^Censure^{Floor Act}^ioⁿ
^{93 H.Con.Res.}³⁷¹^President^Preamble;^Censure^Each^{resolution also states that}
^10/2^0/1⁹⁷³^{Richard M. Nixon}^{sense of}^{this action carries}^{no prejudice t}^o
^Congress^impeachme^nt
^{93 H.Con.Res.}³⁶⁵^President^Preamble;^Censure,
^10/2^3/1⁹⁷³^{Richard M. Nixon}^{sense of}^condemn
^Congress
^{93 S.Res.}¹⁹¹^Sol^{icitor General}^Preamble^{In title:}
^10/2^3/1⁹⁷³^{(Acting Attorney Ge}^neral)^censu^re;ⁱⁿ
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL34037}^{Robert Bork}^body:^condemn
^g/w
^s^.or^{93 H.Con.Res.}³⁷⁶^President^Preamble;^Should^resign
^le^ak^11/7/¹⁹⁷³^{Richard M. Nixon}^{sense of}
^Congress
^://wiki^{93 H.Res.}⁶⁸⁴^President^Preamble;^Should^resign^{Identical resolutions also ask that}
^h^ttp^11/6/¹⁹⁷³^{Richard M. Nixon}^{Judgment of}^{Nixon first}^{nominate someone}
^House^{other tha}^{n Ge}^{rald Ford to be}
^{93 H.Res.}⁷³⁴^President^Preamble;^Should^resign^{Vice President}
^12/4/¹⁹⁷³^{Richard M. Nixon}^{Judgment of}
^House
^{93 H.Res.}¹²⁸⁸^President^Preamble^Censure
^8/4/1⁹⁷⁴^{Richard M. Nixon}
^{93 H.Con.Res.}⁵⁸⁹^President^Preamble;^Censure^{Also sense of Congress t}^{hat if}
^8/6/1⁹⁷⁴^{Richard M. Nixon}^{sense of}^{Nixon resigns, impea}^chme^nt^not
^Congress^{be p}^urs^ued
^{96 H.Con.Res.}¹⁴⁶^{Secretary of E}^nergy^Should^resign
^6/26/¹⁹⁷⁹^{James Schlesinger}
^{96 H.Con.Res.}¹⁶¹^{Secretary of E}^nergy^Preamble^Should^resign

^7/12/¹⁹⁷⁹^{James Schlesinger}

^{Provisions on}^{Measure Number}^{Notes and}
^Cong^ress^{and Date of}^{Official Framing}^{Loss of}^{(in it}^al^ics)
^Introdu^ction^Confiden^ce^Resignation^Censure^{Floor Act}^ioⁿ
⁹⁷^{H.Con.Res. 242}^Environme^{ntal Protection}^Preamble;^Should^resign
^12/1^6/1⁹⁸¹^{Agency Director An}^ne^{sense of}
^Gorsuc^h^Congress
^{97 H.Con.Res.}²⁴⁷^{Federal Reserve Board}^Preamble;^Should^resign
^1/26/¹⁹⁸²^{Chairman Paul Volcker}^{sense of}
^Congress
^{98 H.Res.}³²¹^{Secretary of the}^Inte^rior^{Sense of}^President
^9/28/¹⁹⁸³^{James Watt}^House^{should ask}
^{98 H.Res.}³²⁴^{Secretary of the}^Inte^rior^Preamble;^{in preamble:}^President
^9/29/¹⁹⁸³^{James Watt}^{sense of}^{people lost}^{should ask}
^House
^{98 H.Con.Res.}²⁴⁹^{Secretary of Defe}^nse^{Sense of}^Should^resign
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL34037}^2/2/1⁹⁸⁴^{Caspar Weinb}^erger^Congress
^g/w^{103 H.Res.}⁵⁴⁵^{Surgeon Ge}^neral^Preamble;^President
^s^.or^9/23/¹⁹⁹⁴^{Jocelyn Elders}^{sense of}^{should ask}
^le^ak^House
^{103 H.Con.Res.}²⁹⁷^{Surgeon Ge}^neral^Preamble;^President
^://wiki^9/26/¹⁹⁹⁴^{Jocelyn Elders}^{sense of}^{should ask}
^h^ttp^Congress
^{104 H.Res.}²⁸³^{Secretary of E}^nergy^Preamble;^President^{Also provisions on}
^11/2^8/1⁹⁹⁵^{Hazel O’Leary}^{sense of}^{should ask}^reimbur^sement
^House
^{104 H.Res.}³⁰⁸^{Secretary of E}^nergy^Preamble;^President^{Also provisions on investigation}
^12/1^5/1⁹⁹⁵^{Hazel O’Leary}^{sense of}^{should ask}^{and reimb}^urseme^nt
^Congress
^{105 H.Con.Res.}¹⁹⁷^{Assistant Secretary of}^the^Preamble^{Should resign or}^{House adopted, 11/13/1997}
^11/1^3/1⁹⁹⁷^{Army for}^Manpowe^{r and}^{be removed}
^{Reserve Affairs Sara}^E.
^Lister
^{105 H.Res.}⁵³¹^{President Will}^iam^Preamble^House^calls

^9/11/¹⁹⁹⁸^Jefferson^Clinton^{upon to re}^sign

^{Provisions on}^{Measure Number}^{Notes and}
^Cong^ress^{and Date of}^{Official Framing}^{Loss of}^{(in it}^al^ics)
^Introdu^ction^Confiden^ce^Resignation^Censure^{Floor Act}^ioⁿ
¹⁰⁶^{S.Res. 44 2/12/}¹⁹⁹⁹^{President Will}^iam^Preamble^Censure;^{Senate rejected attempt to bring to}
^Jefferson^Clinton^condemn^{floor, 2/12/1999}
^conduct
¹⁰⁶^{H.Res. 416}^2/7/²⁰⁰⁰^{U.S. D}^{istrict Judge}^Preamble^Condemn
^{Alan McDonald}^conduct
^{108 H.Res.}⁴¹⁹^{Deputy U}^ndersecreta^{ry of}^Preamble^President
^10/2^8/2⁰⁰³^{Defense Lieute}^nant^Ge^neral^should
^Will^{iam Boykin}^censu^re
^{108 H.Res.}⁴²⁰^{Deputy U}^ndersecreta^{ry of}^Preamble^Condemn
^10/2^8/2⁰⁰³^{Defense Lieute}^nant^Ge^neral^rhetoric
^Will^{iam Boykin}
^{108 H.Con.Res.}³²³^{Secretary of Defe}^nse^Preamble^President
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RL34037}^11/7/²⁰⁰³^{Donald Rumsfeld}^{should ask}
^g/w^{109 H.Con.Res.}⁴⁷⁰^{Secretary of Defe}^nse^Preamble;^effect^{“Replace” in title; not found by}
^s^.or^9/13/²⁰⁰⁶^{Donald Rumsfeld}^{sense of}^resignation^search
^le^ak^Congress
¹⁰⁹^{S.Res. 262 9/3}^0/2⁰⁰⁵^{former Secretar}^{y of}^Preamble^Condemn
^://wiki^{Education William J. Bennett}^statement
^h^ttp^{109 H.Res.}⁶³⁶^President^Preamble^Censure
^12/1^8/2⁰⁰⁵^{George W. Bush}
^{109 H.Res.}⁶³⁷^{Vice President}^Preamble^Censure
^12/1^8/2⁰⁰⁵^{Richard B. Cheney}
¹⁰⁹^{S.Res. 398 3/1}^3/2⁰⁰⁶^President^Preamble^Censure;
^{George W. Bush}^condemn
^actions
^Source:^{Legislative Information}^{System of the U.S. Congress;}^{Congressional Record}^.

^J^ack^Mas^k^ell ^Rⁱ^ch^{ard S. B}^e^th
^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^at^iv^{e A}^t^torn^e^y^Specialis^{t on}^t^h^{e C}^oⁿ^g^r^es^s^an^d^L^e^gis^l^ati^v^{e P}^r^oces^s
^j^m^as^k^e^ll^@^c^rs^.loc.g^o^v^{, 7-}⁶⁹⁷²^rbet^h^@^crs^.^l^o^c.g^o^v^,^7-⁸⁶⁶⁷