U.S.-Peru Economic Relations and the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement







Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress



On December 7, 2005, the United States and Peru concluded negotiations on the U.S.-Peru Trade
Promotion Agreement (PTPA). President Bush notified the Congress of the United States’
intention to enter into the PTPA on January 6, 2006, and the agreement was signed on April 12,
2006 by U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman and Peruvian Minister of Foreign Trade and
Tourism Alfredo Ferrero Diez. The PTPA is a comprehensive trade agreement that, if approved by
Congress, would eliminate tariffs and other barriers in goods and services trade between the
United States and Peru. The approval and implementation of a PTPA is a high priority for the
Peruvian government. Peruvian President Alan García has met with President Bush and Members
of Congress on several occasions in the United States to stress the importance of the agreement
for Peru.
The pending PTPA would likely have a small net economic effect on the United States because
U.S. trade with Peru accounts for a small percent of total U.S. trade. For Peru, the impact would
be more significant because the United States is Peru’s leading trade partner. In 2006, 23% of
Peru’s exports went to the United States, and 16% of Peru’s imports were supplied by the United rd
States. In that same year, Peru accounted for 0.5% of total U.S. trade. Peru ranks 43 among U.S. nd
export markets and 42 as a source of U.S. imports. The dominant U.S. import item from Peru is
gold (24% in 2006) and the leading U.S. export items to Peru are petroleum oils and related
products (9% in 2006).
Upon implementation, a PTPA would eliminate duties on 80% of U.S. exports of consumer and
industrial products to Peru. An additional 7% of U.S. exports would receive duty-free treatment
within five years of implementation. Remaining tariffs would be eliminated ten years after
implementation. A PTPA would make the preferential duty treatment for selected U.S. imports
from Peru permanent. The United States currently extends duty-free treatment to imports from
Peru under the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA; Title II of P.L. 102-182), enacted on
December 4, 1991 and reauthorized under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act
(ATPDEA; Title XXXI of P.L. 107-210). The preference program is scheduled to expire on
February 29, 2008.
The House passed (285-132) H.R. 3688 to implement the PTPA on November 8, 2007. The
Senate passed implementing legislation (77-18) on December 4, 2007 and President Bush signed
legislation on December 14, 2007 to implement the agreement (P.L. 110-138). On June 28, 2006,
the Peruvian Congress voted 79 to 14 to approve the agreement. In May 2007, Congress and the
Administration reached an agreement on a new bipartisan trade framework that calls for the
inclusion of core labor and environmental standards in the text of pending and future trade
agreements. The United States reached an agreement with Peru on June 25, 2007, on legally
binding amendments to the PTPA on labor, the environment, and other matters to reflect the
bipartisan agreement of May 10. On June 27, 2007, Peru’s Congress voted 70 to 38 in favor of the
amendments to the PTPA. This report will be updated as events warrant.






Introduc tion ..................................................................................................................................... 1
U.S.-Peru Economic Relations........................................................................................................2
U.S.-Peru Merchandise Trade...................................................................................................3
Andean Trade Preference Act....................................................................................................5
U.S.-Peru Bilateral Foreign Direct Investment.........................................................................7
Economic/Political Situation in Peru...............................................................................................7
Provisions of the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement...............................................................9
Key PTPA Provisions................................................................................................................9
Market Access.....................................................................................................................9
Services ............................................................................................................................. 10
In ve stme nt ......................................................................................................................... 10
IPR Protection...................................................................................................................10
Dispute Settlement............................................................................................................10
Labor Provisions................................................................................................................11
Environmental Provisions..................................................................................................11
Summary of Amendments to PTPA Reflecting Bipartisan Trade Framework.........................11
Provisions on Basic Labor Standards................................................................................12
Provisions on Environment...............................................................................................12
Other Provisions...............................................................................................................12
Issues for Congress........................................................................................................................13
Economic Impact....................................................................................................................13
Labor Issues............................................................................................................................14
Patent Protection and Access to Medicines.............................................................................15
Illegal Logging........................................................................................................................16
Discussion ..................................................................................................................................... 17

Figure 1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Peru..................................................................................5

Table 1. Key Economic Indicators for Peru and the United States..................................................2
Table 2. U.S. Trade with Peru, 2006................................................................................................3
Table 3. U.S. Imports from Peru under ATPA.................................................................................6
Table 4. U.S. Direct Investment Position in Peru (Historical-Cost Basis: 2006)............................7

Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................18






The United States and Peru concluded the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA), a
bilateral free trade agreement, on December 7, 2005. On April 12, 2006, U.S. Trade
Representative Rob Portman and Peruvian Minister of Foreign Trade and Tourism Alfredo
Ferrero Diez Canseco signed the agreement. Implementing legislation was passed by the House
on On November 8, 2007, the House passed (285-132) H.R. 3688 to implement the PTPA under
the Trade Promotion Authority, which requires an expedited process with limited debate and an
up or down vote. The Senate approved (77-18) legislation on December 4, 2007, and President
Bush signed the implementing bill for the free trade agreement on December 14, 2007 (P.L. 110-

138). In Peru, the Peruvian Congress voted 79 to 14 to approve the agreement on June 28, 2006.


Implementing legislation was considered by the U.S. Congress under Title XXI (Bipartisan Trade
Promotion Authority Act of 2002) of the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210), which requires an
expedited process with limited debate and an up or down vote. Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)
procedures require the President to submit formally the agreement and implementing legislation
to Congress after entering into an agreement; there is no time limit for the Administration to do
this.
The proposed PTPA is a comprehensive trade agreement that, upon approval by Congress,
eliminates tariffs and other barriers in goods and services trade between the United States and
Peru. A free trade agreement with Peru is one of several bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs)
negotiated or being considered by the United States with Latin American countries in its effort to
advance free trade throughout the region. Peru’s President Alan García has stated that he views
the pending agreement as fundamental to reforms Peru has taken for economic growth and social
redistribution.
The PTPA negotiations began in May 2004, when the United States, Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador 1
participated in the first round of negotiations for a U.S.-Andean free trade agreement (FTA).
After thirteen rounds of talks, however, negotiators failed to reach an agreement. Peru continued
negotiations alone with the United States and concluded a bilateral agreement in December 2005.
On January 6, 2006, President Bush notified the Congress of his intention to enter into a free
trade agreement with Peru. Colombia also continued negotiations with the United States in
January 2006, and this agreement was concluded on February 27 and signed on November 22,

2006.


In early 2007, a number of Members of Congress indicated that some of the agreement’s
provisions would have to be strengthened to gain their approval, particularly relating to core labor
standards. After several months of negotiation, Congress and the Administration reached an
agreement on May 10, 2007 on a new bipartisan trade framework that calls for the inclusion of
core labor and environmental standards in the text of pending and future trade agreements. On
June 25, 2007, U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab announced that the United States
reached an agreement with Peru on a number of legally binding amendments to the PTPA on
labor, the environment, and other matters to reflect the bipartisan agreement of May 10. On June

27, 2007, Peru’s unicameral Congress voted 70 to 38 in favor of the amendments to the PTPA.



1 See CRS Report RL32770, Andean-U.S. Free-Trade Agreement Negotiations, by M. Angeles Villarreal.





Several House Democratic leaders issued a press release on June 29, 2007, stating that the
proposed PTPA has potential to improve the standards of living in the United States and Peru, and
that it reflects “... long-standing Democratic priorities with the inclusion of enforceable, 2
internationally recognized labor rights and environmental standards.” The press release,
however, also stated that House Democratic leaders expected the Peruvian government to change
their laws “... so these agreements can come into effect promptly thereafter”, and that House
Ways and Means Committee Chairman Charles Rangel would lead a bipartisan delegation of
Members of Congress to Peru and Panama in August 2007 to consult with the two countries’ 3
legislatures and executive branches.

With a population of 28 million people, Peru is the fifth most populous country in Latin America,
after Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Argentina. Peru’s economy is relatively small compared to
the U.S. economy (see Table 1). Peru’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2006 was $93 billion,
about 0.7% of U.S. GDP ($13.2 trillion in 2005). Peru’s economy has shown strong growth over
the past four years, much of it fueled by export growth in minerals, textiles, and agricultural
products. GDP is estimated to have grown by 8.0% in 2006 and 6.3% in 2005. It is expected to 4
grow by 6.8% in 2007 and 5.4% in 2008. Peru’s exports accounted for 27% of GDP in 2006,
while imports accounted for 19%. The United States purchases 23% of Peru’s exports, thus any
change in U.S. demand for Peruvian products could have a noticeable effect on Peru’s economy.
Table 1. Key Economic Indicators for Peru and the United States
Peru United States
1996 2006a 1996 2006a
Population (millions) 24 28 270 299
Nominal GDP ($US billions)b 56 93 7,817 13,245
GDP, PPPc Basis ($US billions) 104 191 7,817 13,245
Per Capita GDP ($US) 2,303 3,290 28,987 44,237
Per Capita GDP in $PPPs 4,300 6,730 28,987 44,237
Total Merchandise Exports (US$ billions) 5.9 23.8 625 1,037
Exports as % of GDPd 13% 27% 11% 11%

2 House Speaker Nancy Pelosi News Room, “Pelosi, Hoyer, Rangel, and Levin Statement on Trade,Press Release,
June 29, 2007.
3 Ibid.
4 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Outlook: Peru, February 2006.





Peru United States
1996 2006a 1996 2006a
Total Merchandise Imports (US$billions) 7.9 15.0 795 1854
Imports as % of GDPd 18% 19% 12% 17%
Source: Compiled by CRS based on data from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) on-line database.
a. Figures for 2006 are estimates.
b. Nominal GDP is calculated by EIU based on figures from World Bank and World Development Indicators.
c. PPP refers to purchasing power parity, which reflects the purchasing power of foreign currencies in U.S.
dollars.
d. Exports and Imports as % of GDP are derived by the EIU and include trade in both goods and services.
The United States is Peru’s leading trade partner. In 2006, 23% of Peru’s exports went to the
United States, and 16% of Peru’s imports were supplied by the United States. The U.S. share of
total Peruvian trade fell somewhat in 2006. The share of exports to the United States declined by
seven percentage points in 2006 (from 30% to 23%), while the share of imports from the United
States decreased by almost two percentage points (from 18% to 16%). China is Peru’s second
most significant trade partner, accounting for 10% of Peru’s exports and 10% of Peru’s imports.
Other major trade partners for Peru are Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Colombia.
Peru accounts for 0.5% of total U.S. trade. Peru ranks 43rd among U.S. export markets ($2.9 nd
billion in 2006) and 42 as a source of U.S. imports ($5.9 billion in 2006). As shown in Table 2,
the dominant U.S. import item from Peru is gold (24% of U.S. imports from Peru in 2006),
followed by refined copper (17% of total), and petroleum oils and oil products (13% of total). The
leading U.S. export items are petroleum oils and oil products (9% of U.S. exports to Peru in
2006), machinery parts for trucks, bulldozers, snowplows, etc. (6% of total), and transmission
apparatus (5% of total).
Table 2. U.S. Trade with Peru, 2006
U.S. Exports U.S. Imports
Leading Items $ Mill. Share Leading Items $ Mill. Share
(HTS 4 Digit Level) (HTS 4 Digit level)
Petroleum Oils, and Other 272.7 9% Gold 1,408.5 24%
Oils and Products
Machinery Parts for Trucks, 176.7 6% Copper 994.6 17%
Bulldozers, Snowplows, etc.
Transmission Apparatus 157.9 5% Petroleum Oils, and 795.7 13%
Other Oils and Products
Automatic Data Processing 127.0 4% Sweaters and similar 316.6 5%
Machines & Unites knitted articles
Machinery Parts & Accessories 120.2 4% Silver 226.7 4%





U.S. Exports U.S. Imports
Leading Items $ Mill. Share Leading Items $ Mill. Share
(HTS 4 Digit Level) (HTS 4 Digit level)
All Other 2,070.7 71% All Other 2,154.8 37%
Total Exports 2,927.2 Total Imports 5,896.9
Source: Compiled by CRS using USITC Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb at http://dataweb.usitc.gov: HTS
4-digit level.
U.S. imports from Peru have been increasing significantly since 1996, from $1.26 billion in 1996
to $5.90 billion in 2006, a 368% increase. Between 1995 and 2006, the U.S. trade balance with
Peru went from a surplus of $0.74 billion to a deficit of almost $3 billion in 2006 (see Figure 1).
Peru’s export growth with the United States has helped economic growth and has also helped
strengthen the Peruvian currency.
Peru applies tariffs in the 4% to 20% range to virtually all imports from the United States though
the government has consistently lowered tariff rates since the early 1990s. Peru’s average applied
rate is approximately 10%. The government also maintains a five percent “temporary” tariff
surcharge on agricultural goods to protect the domestic industry. It has eliminated almost all non-
tariff barriers, including subsidies, import licensing requirements, import prohibitions and
quantitative restrictions. However, the government bans the imports of some products, including
used clothing, used shoes, used tires, remanufactured goods, cars over five years old, and heavy
trucks over eight years old. U.S. industry is concerned about enforcement of Peru’s intellectual
property rights (IPR) laws, particularly with respect to the relatively weak penalties imposed on
IPR violators. Peruvian law restricts foreign investment in the following way: majority ownership
of broadcast media to Peruvian citizens; ownership of land or investment in natural resources
within 50 kilometers of a border; and operation of national air and water transportation. Peru’s 5
laws also place limits of up to 30% on a local company’s employment of foreign workers.

5 United States Trade Representative (USTR), 2006 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, pp.
512-517.





Figure 1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Peru
Source: Compiled by CRS using USITC Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb at http://dataweb.usitc.gov.
The United States currently extends duty-free treatment to imports from Peru under the Andean 6
Trade Preference Act (ATPA), a regional trade preference program. The trade preferences
program began under the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA; Title II of P.L. 102-182), enacted
on December 4, 1991. ATPA authorized the President to grant duty-free treatment to certain
products from the four Andean countries that met domestic content and other requirements. It was
intended to promote economic growth in the Andean region and to encourage a shift away from
dependence on illegal drugs by supporting legitimate economic activities. ATPA was originally
authorized for 10 years and lapsed on December 4, 2001.
Some months after ATPA had lapsed, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act
(ATPDEA; Title XXXI of P.L. 107-210), was enacted on August 6, 2002. ATPDEA reauthorized
the ATPA preference program and expanded trade preferences to include additional products that
were excluded under ATPA, including petroleum and petroleum products, certain footwear, tuna
in flexible containers, and certain watches and leather products. ATPDEA also authorized the
President to grant duty-free treatment to U.S. imports of certain apparel articles, if the articles met
domestic content rules. Andean trade preferences were scheduled to end on December 31, 2006. th
Legislation was enacted late in the 109 Congress (P.L. 109-432) to extend Andean trade th
preferences until June 30, 2007. In the 110 Congress, legislation was enacted to extend the ATPA
for all four countries until February 29, 2008 (P.L. 110-42). Congress may consider extending
trade preferences under the ATPA for Peru until the U.S.-Peru FTA is implemented.
In 2006, 54% of all U.S. imports from Peru received preferential duty treatment under ATPA. Of
those, the leading imports were refined copper and petroleum oils. The trade preference program
contributed to a rapid increase in U.S. imports from Peru. Between 2001 and 2006, U.S. total

6 For more information see CRS Report RS22548, ATPA Renewal: Background and Issues, by M. Angeles Villarreal.





imports from Peru increased by 226%, while imports under ATPA increased by 367%. In 2003,
ATPDEA imports increased 235% and continued to rise from 2004 to 2006 (see Table 3). The
rapid increase in import value was partially due to an increase in the volume of imports caused by
the trade preferences act, but rising prices of mineral and energy-related imports were also a
major factor.
Table 3. U.S. Imports from Peru under ATPA
($ in millions)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
ATPA Import Valuea 686.3 381.8 1,279.3 1,602.7 2,282.7 3,201.9
% Change -20% -44% 235% 25% 42% 40%
Total Imports ($ millions) 1,805.5 1,952.9 2,415.8 3,684.8 5,122.6 5,896.9
% Change -8% 8% 24% 53% 39% 15%
Source: Compiled by CRS using USITC data.
a. Includes imports under ATPA and ATPDEA.
A USITC report on the Impact of the Andean Trade Preference Act states that, the overall impact
on the United States is small and would likely have minimal future effects on the U.S. economy
because the share of imports from Peru is so small. The USITC report states that, according to the
U.S. Embassy in Peru, the ATPA and ATPDEA have provided significant economic benefits to 7
Peru, especially in the textiles, apparel and agricultural industries. The study reports that Peru’s
textile and apparel sector directly employed about 150,000 workers and indirectly employed
350,000 workers in 2004. Exports in these industries increased by 25% in 2004. Economic
analysts in Peru attribute the growth in textile and apparel exports to the United States to the trade 8
preferences granted by the ATPDEA. The USITC report states the Peru’s agricultural sector has
benefitted under the ATPDEA. Peru has become the world’s largest exporter of asparagus and
paprika. According to the Peruvian agricultural industry, investment representing the purchase of
imported machinery and equipment for the agricultural sector rose 79% in 2004, after a decade of 9
fluctuating investment levels.
The share of Peru’s overall exports going to the United States has grown from 24% of total
exports in 2001 to 30% of total exports in 2006. The USITC study reports that Peru’s Ministry of
Economy and Finance claimed that Peru’s strong GDP growth rate in 2004 was largely due to
increased access to the U.S. market. The study reports that U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in
ATPA or ATPDEA-related investments was significant, but that companies reported that they had
limited their investments because of the trade preferences expiration expected at the end of 2006.
It states that business leaders are concerned about whether a free trade agreement with Peru will
be in place before ATPA benefits expire, and that any large investments will be postponed until 10
either ATPA has been extended or a free trade agreement has been ratified.

7 United States International Trade Commission (USITC), The Impact of the Andean Trade Preference Act: Eleventh
Report 2004, USITC Publication 3803, September 2005, p. 3-29.
8 Ibid, pp. 3-32 through 3-33.
9 Ibid, p. 3-31.
10 Ibid, p. 3-30.





U.S. foreign direct investment in Peru on a historical-cost basis totaled $4.98 billion in 2006 (see
Table 4). The largest amount is in mining, which accounted for 62%, or $3.09 billion, of total
U.S. FDI in Peru in 2006. The second largest amount, $380 million (8% of total), is in 11
manufacturing, followed by $103 million in finance (not including depository institutions).
U.S. investors in Peru had a number of disputes with the Peruvian government in the past, which
have mostly been resolved. Some of these involved alleged mistreatment by Peru’s national tax
authority. National treatment for foreign investors is guaranteed under Peru’s 1993 constitution.
Under the constitution, arbitration is available for disputes between foreign investors and the
government of Peru, and several U.S. companies chose to pursue claims through arbitration. They
complained that executive branch ministries, regulatory agencies, the tax agency and the judiciary
lack the resources, expertise and impartiality necessary to carry out their respective mandates.
Through FTA negotiations, the U.S. government sought a range of protections with respect to the
treatment of U.S. investors, as well as a guaranteed right for those investors to have recourse to 12
international arbitration in the event of investment disputes.
Table 4. U.S. Direct Investment Position in Peru (Historical-Cost Basis: 2006)
Industry Amount % of Total
(U.S.$ Millions)
Mining 3,085 61.96%
Manufacturing 380 7.63%
Finance (except depository institutions) 103 2.07%
Total 4,979 100.00%
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Economic Accounts.

Peru’s President Alan García was elected to his second term on June 4, 2006. President Garcia
took office for a five-year term at the end of July 2006, replacing outgoing president, Alejandro
Toledo. In spite of the recent economic growth, over half of Peruvians live in poverty and a large
portion of the population is underemployed. Unemployment and underemployment levels total 13
64.5% nationwide. The economic sector in Peru with the highest employment is wholesale/retail
trade and repair services, followed by manufacturing.
Since taking office, President García has taken steps to assure the international financial
community that he is running Peru as a moderate rather than as the leftist he had been in his early
career. García’s first presidency (1985-1990) was marked by hyper-inflation, increased poverty,
and a crumbling infrastructure, which were largely caused by his unorthodox economic policies.

11 Based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, see http://www.bea.gov.
12 USTR, p. 484.
13 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Background Note: Peru, June 2006, p. 5.





By 1990, the last year of García’s term, the rate of inflation exceeded 7,500%.14 During the
1980s, a violent guerrilla insurgency took place in the country. In the mid 1980s, the army was
given responsibility for counter-insurgency operations, and widespread violations of human rights 15
ensued.
During the regime of former President Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), the government led a major
crackdown on terrorism, and implemented a radical economic reform program to control
hyperinflation and bring economic stability to the country. President Fujimori’s administration
implemented measures to eliminate price controls and state subsidies, liberalize markets, and
implement structural reforms. The program also included a wide-ranging privatization plan and a
relaxation of foreign investment restrictions to help increase foreign investment. Existing labor
laws were relaxed significantly during this time. Since 2001, however, Peru has made much
progress in strengthening labor protections by implementing labor law reform and protecting
workers’ rights.
President Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) presided over a period in which Peru was one of the
fastest growing economies in Latin America, largely due to growth in the mining and export
sectors. President Toledo’s administration could be characterized as one marked by public
protests and a number of government scandals, but it was also responsible for having a broadly 16
orthodox economic policy which helped control public spending and promote economic growth.
Peru’s GDP rate of growth increased from 0.2% in 2001 to 8.0% in 2006.
President García has continued the pro-market economic policies of his predecessor, President
Alejandro Toledo. Since initiating his political comeback in 2001, García has softened his
populist rhetoric, and apologized for his earlier errors. He says he is now governing not as a leftist
but as a moderate. Hoping to regain credibility with Peru’s business sector and international 17
financial institutions, he has pledged to maintain orthodox macro-economic policies. García has
appointed a fiscal conservative as finance minister and cut the pay of government workers. He
also has sought to reassure poor Peruvian citizens that he is addressing their needs by pledging
austerity measures such as halving the Government Palace’s annual spending and redirecting the 18
funds to a rural irrigation project.
García has embraced the PTPA in his efforts to strengthen the bilateral relationship with the
United States and to fight poverty and inequality in Peru. Recognizing that a free trade agreement
would not be sufficient to eliminate inequality, President García has initiated a number of internal
reforms that would help spread benefits of free trade to the poorer regions of the country and
reduce the level of poverty. Over half of Peru’s population lives below the poverty line. Poverty is
concentrated in rural and jungle areas, and among the indigenous population.

14 The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, Peru: Country Profile, 2007.
15 Ibid., p. 5.
16 Ibid., p. 24.
17 “Perus García Gets Chance at Redemption,Associated Press, July 27, 2006.
18 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Country Report - Peru,” April 2007.







The comprehensive free trade agreement would eliminate tariffs and other barriers to goods and
services. This section summarizes several key provisions in the original agreement text as
provided by the United States Trade Representative (USTR), and the legally binding amendments
agreed upon by the United States and Peru in June 2007. The amendments reflect the bipartisan
trade framework that was agreed upon by Congress and the Bush Administration on May 10,

2007.



Upon implementation, the agreement would eliminate duties on 80% of U.S. exports of consumer
and industrial products to Peru. An additional 7% of U.S. exports would receive duty-free
treatment within five years of implementation. Remaining tariffs would be eliminated ten years
after implementation. The PTPA would make the preferential duty treatment for U.S. imports
from Peru under the ATPDEA permanent.
In agricultural products, the agreement would grant duty-free treatment immediately to more than
two-thirds of current U.S. farm exports to Peru. These products include high quality beef, cotton,
wheat, soybeans, soybean meal and crude soybean oil, certain fruits and vegetables, and many
processed food products. Tariffs on most remaining agricultural products would be phased out
within 15 years, and all tariffs eliminated in 18 years.
In textiles and apparel, products that meet the agreement’s rules of origin requirements would
receive duty-free treatment immediately. The rules of origin requirements are generally based on
the yarn forward standard to encourage production and economic integration. A “de minimis”
provision would allow limited amounts of specified third-country content to go into U.S. and
Peruvian apparel to provide producers in both countries flexibility. A special textile safeguard
would provide for temporary tariff relief if imports prove to be damaging to domestic producers.
The agreement includes comprehensive rules of origin provisions that would ensure that only
U.S. and Peruvian goods could benefit from the agreement. The agreement also includes customs
procedures provisions, including requirements for transparency and efficiency, procedural
certainty and fairness, information sharing, and special procedures for the release of express
delivery shipments.
In government procurement contracts, U.S. companies would be granted non-discriminatory
rights to bid on contracts from Peruvian government ministries, agencies, and departments. These
provisions would cover the purchases of most Peruvian central government entities and state-

19 The text of the PTPA is available online at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) website:
http://www.ustr.gov.





owned enterprises, including Peru’s oil company and its public health insurance agency (a major
purchaser of pharmaceuticals).
In services trade, Peru would grant market access to U.S. firms in most services sectors, with very
few exceptions. The affected services sectors would include telecommunications, financial
services, distribution services, express delivery services, computer and related services,
audiovisual and entertainment services, energy services, transport services, construction and
engineering services, tourism, advertising, professional services (architects, engineers,
accountants, etc.), and environmental services. In telecommunications services, the agreement
would prevent local firms from having preferential access to telecommunications networks. All
users of a network would be guaranteed reasonable and nondiscriminatory access to the network.
Peru agreed to exceed its commitments made in the World Trade Organization (WTO), and to
dismantle services and investment barriers that would include such measures as requiring U.S.
firms to purchase local goods or to hire nationals rather than U.S. professionals. Market access to
services would be supplemented by requirements for regulatory transparency. The financial
services chapter of the agreement includes core obligations of nondiscrimination, most favored
nation treatment, and additional provisions on transparency of domestic regulatory regimes.
The agreement includes investment provisions intended to establish a secure predictable legal
framework for U.S. investors operating in Peru. The agreement would grant investors the right to
establish, acquire and operate investments in Peru on an equal footing with local investors and
investors of other countries. The agreement draws from U.S. legal principles and practices that
include due process protections and the right to receive a fair market value for property in the
event of an expropriation. Protections for U.S. investments would be backed by a transparent,
binding international arbitration mechanism.
The agreement would provide intellectual property rights (IPR) protections for U.S. companies.
The agreement’s IPR protection provisions include protection for U.S. trademarks, copyrighted
works in a digital economy, and patents and trade secrets. The agreement also provides for
penalties on piracy and counterfeiting.
The core obligations of the agreement, including labor and environmental provisions, are subject
to dispute settlement provisions. These provisions include procedures for openness and
transparency and emphasis on promoting compliance through consultation and trade-enhancing
remedies. An enforcement mechanism includes monetary penalties to enforce commercial, labor,
and environmental obligations of the trade agreement.





The labor obligations are included in the core text of the agreement. The agreement would require
parties to effectively enforce their own domestic labor laws. In the original text of the agreement,
this was the only labor obligation that would be enforceable through the agreement’s dispute
settlement procedures, which have an enforcement mechanism that would include monetary 20
penalties to enforce labor obligations. Under the amended agreement reflecting the May 2007
bipartisan trade framework, labor obligations would be subject to the same dispute settlement,
same enforcement mechanisms, and same criteria for selection of enforcement mechanisms as all
other obligations in the agreement. Failure to pay a monetary assessment could result in the
suspension of trade benefits. The agreement states that emphasis would be placed on promoting
compliance through consultation and trade-enhancing remedies. The agreement also includes
procedural guarantees that would ensure that workers and employers would have fair, equitable,
and transparent access to labor tribunals.
The environmental obligations are included in the core text of the agreement. The agreement
would require the United States and Peru to effectively enforce their own domestic environmental
laws. This provision would be enforceable through the PTPA’s dispute settlement procedures. The
PTPA includes an environmental cooperation agreement that would provide a framework for
undertaking environmental capacity building in Peru and establish an Environmental Cooperation
Commission. The PTPA would require both countries to commit to establish high levels of
environmental protection. The PTPA also includes provisions for recognizing the importance of
protecting biodiversity and procedural guarantees to ensure environmental protection. The PTPA’s
environmental chapter includes provisions for creating a public participation process,
benchmarking environmental cooperation activities by international organizations, and enhancing
mutual supportiveness of multilateral environmental agreements.
On June 25, 2007, the U.S. Ambassador to Peru J. Curtis Struble and Peruvian Foreign
Commerce and Tourism Minister Mercedes Araoz signed amendments to the pending PTPA. The
amendments are based on the agreement reached between the Bush Administration and Congress
on May 10, 2007. The Administration stated that, because the new commitments would have to
be “legally binding,” they could not have been incorporated into the agreement as side letters.
Some of the key amendments incorporated into the agreement include obligations related to five
basic ILO labor rights, multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), and pharmaceutical
intellectual property rights (IPR). These provisions would be fully enforceable through the
agreement’s dispute settlement mechanism.

20 The domestic labor law enforcement provision is subject to the dispute settlement provisions of the agreement, which
include provisions for openness and transparency by requiring at least one open public hearing and public release of
legal submissions.






The United States and Peru would be required to “adopt, maintain and enforce in their own laws
and in practice” the five basic internationally-recognized labor standards, as stated in the 1998
ILO Declaration. These include 1) freedom of association; 2) the effective recognition of the right
to collective bargaining; 3) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; 4) the
effective abolition of child labor and a prohibition on the worst forms of child labor; and 5) the
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. These obligations would
refer only to the 1998 ILO Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
Another change relates to labor law enforcement. Any decision made by a signatory on the
distribution of enforcement resources would not be a reason for not complying with the labor
provisions. Parties would not be allowed to derogate from labor obligations in a manner affecting
trade or investment.
Amendments to the proposed PTPA would commit both parties to effectively enforce their own
domestic environmental laws, and to adopt, maintain, and implement laws and all other measures
to fulfill obligations under the seven covered multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). All
obligations in the environment chapter would be subject to the same dispute settlement
procedures and enforcement mechanisms as all other obligations in the agreement. The
environment chapter includes an Annex on Forest Sector Governance that addresses
environmental and economic consequences of trade associated with illegal logging and illegal
trade in wildlife. The Annex would require concrete steps for the two countries to enhance forest
sector governance and promote legal trade in timber products.
Additional amendments to the PTPA include provisions on generic medicines and government
procurement, among others. Regarding the provisions on generic medicines, the trading partners
would provide five years of data exclusivity for test data related to pharmaceuticals. If Peru relies
on U.S. Federal Drug Administration (FDA) approval of a given drug, and meets certain
conditions for expeditious approval of that drug in Peru, the data exclusivity period would expire
at the same time that the exclusivity expired in the United States. These provisions would 22
reportedly allow generic medicines to enter more quickly into the market in Peru. In
government procurement, the amended provisions would allow U.S. state and federal
governments to condition government contracts on the adherence to the give basis ILO labor 23
standards.

21 For more details, see CRS Report RS22521, Peru Trade Promotion Agreement: Labor Issues, by Mary Jane Bolle
and M. Angeles Villarreal.
22 International Trade Daily,Democratic, GOP Lawmakers Reach Agreement With Administration on FTAs,” by
Rosella Brevetti, May 11, 2007.
23 Ibid.






When fully implemented, the PTPA will likely have a have a small, but positive, net economic
effect on the United States because of the relatively small size of Peru’s economy in relation to
the U.S. economy. In 2006, Peru had a nominal GDP of $93 billion, approximately 0.7% the size
of the U.S. GDP of $13.2 trillion. Another reason the net effect would be expected to be small is
that the value of U.S. trade with Peru is small when compared to overall U.S. trade. U.S. trade
(imports plus exports) with Peru accounts for about 0.3% of total U.S. trade. U.S. imports from
Peru account for 0.3% of total U.S. imports, and U.S. exports to Peru account for 0.3% of total
U.S. exports. Most of the economy-wide trade effects of trade liberalization from the PTPA would
be due to Peru’s removal of tariff barriers and other trade restrictions. U.S. exporters have
substantially larger tariff barriers on their exports to Peru than do Peruvian exporters on their
exports to the United States.
The USITC study on the potential effects of a PTPA, estimates that U.S. imports from Peru would
increase by $439 million and U.S. exports to Peru would increase by $1.1 billion. The study also
estimates that U.S. GDP would increase by over $2.1 billion (0.02%) as a result of the agreement.
In terms of losses, the report estimates that three U.S. sectors, metals (mainly gold, copper, and
aluminum), crops (such as cut flowers, live plants, and seeds), and paddy rice, would experience 24
reductions in output, revenue, or employment of more than 0.10%.
The proposed PTPA is unlikely to affect the aggregate employment level in the United States, but
it could impact jobs in specific industries. According to the USITC study, the largest U.S.
employment gain (1%) is estimated to be in wheat production. Declines are estimated in metals
(gold, copper, and aluminum), rice production, and miscellaneous crops (cut flowers, live plants
and seeds) which could lose up to 0.2% of their employment, displaced by imports. Some labor
groups argue that U.S. exports of basic grains could adversely affect the livelihoods of
subsistence farmers in Peru, where agriculture is the main source of jobs.
Another factor for consideration is the extent to which the proposed PTPA would provide trade 25
creation over trade diversion. One of the drawbacks to a bilateral free trade agreement is that it
may result in trade diversion because it is not fully inclusive of all regional trading partners.
Trade diversion results when a country enters into an FTA and then shifts the purchase of goods
or services (imports) from a country that is not an FTA partner to a country that is an FTA partner
but still a higher cost producer. In the case of the United States and Peru, for example, goods from
the United States may replace Peru’s lower-priced imports from other countries in Latin America.
If this were to happen, the United States would now be the producer of that item, not because it
produces the good more efficiently, but because it is receiving preferential access to the Peruvian
market.

24 USITC PTPA Report, p. xv.
25 When a trade agreement lowers trade barriers on a good, production may shift from domestic producers to lower cost
foreign producers and result in substituting an imported good for the domestic good. This process is called trade
creation. Trade creation provides economic benefits as consumers have a wider choice of goods and services available
at lower costs. Trade creation also results in adjustment costs, however, usually in the form of domestic job losses as
production shifts to another country.






The labor provisions have been among the more controversial in the negotiation of the agreement.
Supporters of the agreement have argued that Peru has ratified all eight International Labor
Organization (ILO) core labor standards; that a PTPA would reinforce Peru’s labor reform 27
measures of recent years; and that PTPA provisions would go beyond labor protections in U.S.
laws under the ATPA and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Critics argue that, with
enforceable ILO core labor standards in the language of the agreement, the main issues at this
point are Peru’s adoption of new labor laws and enforcement of labor law.
A number of Members of Congress indicated early in 2007 that PTPA labor requirements would
have to be strengthened for the agreement to be approved, stating that enforceable ILO core labor
standards should be included in the text of the agreement. In March 2007, the Democratic
leadership of the House Ways and Means Committee announced a set of trade principles 28
(Democratic Trade Principles) that can “pave the way to re-establishing a bipartisan consensus 29
on trade.” These principles included a commitment that free trade agreement (FTA) signatory
countries adopt basic ILO labor standards and agree to enforcement provisions for those 30
standards in agreements.
On May 10, 2007, after much negotiation, Congress and the Administration announced an
agreement for a “New Trade Policy for America,” which incorporated key Democratic priorities
relating to labor and other issues. Key concepts in the new trade-labor policy include fully
enforceable provisions that 1) incorporate ILO core labor standards as stated in the 1998 ILO
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (henceforth referred to as the ILO 31
Declaration); and 2) prohibit partner countries from weakening laws relating to ILO core labor
standards in order to attract trade or investment.
Before the new PTPA language was released, some observers noted that the United States has
ratified only two ILO conventions, while Peru has ratified all eight. In addition, the U.S. has some
laws that may not totally conform with language of ILO conventions. A possible example is some
state laws which permit employment-without-pay for prisoners. Consequently, they express
concern that including enforceable ILO core labor standards into trade agreements could subject
the entire U.S. labor code to challenges by trading partners. This issue is addressed by language
in the PTPA that (a) restricts the application of the PTPA provisions to trade-related matters; and

26 For more details, see CRS Report RS22521, Peru Trade Promotion Agreement: Labor Issues, by Mary Jane Bolle
and M. Angeles Villarreal.
27 During the regime of former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori (1990 to 2000), labor laws in Peru were relaxed
significantly as the government implemented a radical economic reform program to bring economic stability to the
country. Since 2002, however, Peru has made significant progress in strengthening labor protections by implementing
labor law reforms and protecting workers rights.
28 House Ways and Means Committee, A New Trade Policy for America, see http://waysandmeans.house.gov.
29 Brevetti, Rosella, “Democrats Rangel and Levin Unveil Wide-Ranging Trade Proposal for FTAs,” International
Trade Reporter, March 29, 2007.
30 These principles were publicly released in a one-page description of the plan which did not discuss details of the
trade policy proposal nor how these principles would be incorporated into trade agreements.
31 These are:(a) the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; (b) the
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; (c) the effective abolition of child labor; and (d) the elimination
of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.” The ILO Declaration does not include in (c) the “worst
forms of child labor,” but the new text of the PTPA adds them to this list “for purposes of this agreement.





(b) incorporates only the principles of the four basic ILO rights listed in the ILO Declaration and
quoted on p. 4, footnote 2, rather than the detailed language of the specific eight conventions.
Another of the controversial issues surrounding the proposed PTPA is that of patent protection
and access to medicines. Some organizations were concerned that the agreement’s stronger
protection of intellectual property rights (IPR), patents, and trade secrets could jeopardize access
to medicines by poorer segments of the population. They argued that the agreement’s provisions
could delay the entry of generic drugs into the market in Peru and cause the price of medicines to
rise.
The primary issue related to patent protection and access to medicines involves the data
exclusivity term. To bring a patented drug to market, a drug company must demonstrate through
clinical trials that the drug is both safe and effective. Under U.S. law, the data used to establish
these claims are protected from use by generic manufacturers to certify their own products for a
period of five years from the time the patented drug is approved for use in a country’s market.
This protection refers the so-called data exclusivity term. The amendments to the text of the PTPA
on data exclusivity would grant Peru the period of data protection to be concurrent with the term
of protection provided in the United States, which could shorten the time line for allowing generic
medicines into the Peruvian market. The original text of the agreement would have delayed the
availability of generic pharmaceuticals in the Peruvian market for at least five years, even if the
patent had already expired.
In April 2005, Peru’s Health Ministry released an evaluation of potential effects of a free trade
agreement on access to medicines in Peru. The study stated that an agreement would affect
generic brands of medicine in that many of these medicines would no longer be eligible to be 32
branded as generic. A number of non-government organizations based in the United States and
Latin America were also concerned that a PTPA would reduce access to essential medicines by
the poor populations of Peru. They argued that the agreement’s provisions far exceeded 33
international standards established by the WTO.
The pharmaceutical industry has denied claims that patents may prevent access to essential
medicines in developing countries. According to industry representatives, very few medicines on
the World Health Organization’s list of essential medicines are patented. The International
Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (IFPMA) and Associations report that 95% of
essential medicines, including antiretrovirals for treating HIV/AIDS, are off-patent and can
therefore be legally copied by generic manufacturers anywhere in the world. However, according
to IFPMA, generic copies of these products are still not reaching the poorest populations of the 34
world. The pharmaceutical industry believes that without patent protection, many of the
innovative medicines that are saving lives would not be available.

32 Valladares Alcalde, Raúl Cruzado Ubillús, Juan Seclén Palacín Zósimo, and Juan Pichihua Serna, Evaluation of
Potential Effects of the Free Trade Agreement Being Negotiated with the United States on Access to Medicines
(Official Translation), Health Ministry of Peru, Lima, Peru, April 2005.
33 ACT Up Philadelphia, African Services Committee, AIDS Foundation of Chicago, and other organizations (37 in
total), Open Letter on Access to Medicines and the U.S.-Peru Free Trade Agreement, see http://www.citizen.org.
34 International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA), Position Paper, 2005-2006,
see http://www.ifpma.org.





A major environmental issue surrounding a possible PTPA is related to U.S. imports of bigleaf
mahogany and reports of illegal logging in Peru. Environmental groups are concerned that an
agreement could lead to an increase in exports of illegal logged mahogany to the United States
from Peru. The United States is the world’s largest wood products consumer and one of the top
importers of tropical hardwoods. Some environmentalists believe that U.S. demand for tropical
timber from countries in Latin America may be a driving force for illegal logging. PTPA
environmental provisions require each country to enforce domestic environmental laws and
establish a policy mechanism to address public complaints that a party is not enforcing its
environmental laws, whether or not the failure is trade-related.
In early 2007, a number of Members of Congress emphasized that environmental provisions of 35
the agreement needed to be strengthened. The May 10 Bipartisan Democratic Trade Principles
stated that Peru should be required to adopt and enforce laws on logging Mahogany and that the
United States should promote sustainable development and combat global warming by requiring
countries to implement and enforce common Multilateral Environmental Agreements. These
principles were incorporated into the agreement in the June 2007 amendments. Annex 18.3.4 of
the amendment to Chapter 18, the environmental chapter, of the proposed PTPA is devoted to
forest sector governance and subject to the dispute settlement provisions of the agreement. The
annex specifically mentions protection measures for mahogany within the norms established by
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).
The annex includes a section on enforcement measures on forest sector governance, and
provisions related to the harvest of and trade in timber products.
The United States currently requires an export permit from Peru validating that mahogany
entering the United States was harvested in a sustainable manner that is not detrimental to the
species. Some argue, however, that Peruvian mahogany is nonetheless harvested illegally at times
and that export permits provided by Peru have been granted without sufficient monitoring and 36
assessment of harvesting practices. The Peruvian non-government organization, Native
Federation of Madre de Dios (FENAMAD) recently teamed with the Natural Resource Defense
Council to file a suit against the U.S. government and U.S. timber importers to the U.S. Court of
International Trade stating that the government was authorizing trade in bigleaf mahogany from
Peru without valid export permits. The court, however, rejected these claims and moved to 37
dismiss the complaint stating a lack of jurisdiction. U.S. timber importers announced in a press
release after the court’s decision that they were pleased with the court decision and that the 38
lawsuit was a “mischaracterization” of international trade regulations.
Under the PTPA, there are more legal protections for U.S. investors in Peru which could
potentially lead to a larger timber industry in Peru and greater harvesting. On the other hand, an
agreement may increase awareness of the illegal logging issue and add mechanisms that may be
used to increase protection. Critics of the proposed PTPA environmental provisions, in the

35 House Ways and Means Committee Staff, A New Trade Policy for America, March 27, 2007.
36 See CRS Report RL33932, Illegal Logging: Background and Issues, by Pervaze A. Sheikh.
37 International Trade Reporter,CIT Denies Plaintiffs Bid to Enjoin Imports of Bigleaf Mahogany From Peru,” by
Rosella Brevetti, April 26, 2007.
38 Bozovich Timber press release, “Court of International Trade Rejects Natural Resource Defense Councils Attack on
International Trade in Peruvian Mahogany, April 18, 2007.





original text prior to the amendments, claimed that the provisions were weak and that illegal
logging should be addressed specifically in the agreement. FENAMAD joined forces with U.S.
environmental groups to urge Members of Congress to include specific provisions in the PTPA to 39
prevent imports of illegally logged mahogany.

Implementing legislation for a PTPA was considered by the U.S. Congress under Title XXI
(Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002) of the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210) on 40
an expedited basis that is limited in debate and with no amendments.Gaining passage of a PTPA
was a high priority for the government of Peru. Peruvian President Alan García Perez met with
President Bush on at least two occasions to discuss the free trade agreement. After an April 2007
meeting, President García stated that he was in the United States to promote a free trade
agreement with the United States. He said that “It is vital for our country. It is fundamental to 41
continue this path of growth and social redistribution that we have started in my country.”
The Bush Administration has been a strong supporter of the expansion of free trade with Peru and
issued a statement in October 2006 that a PTPA would be mutually beneficial “in strengthening
bilateral ties while leveling the trade playing field, spurring job creation, and reducing poverty 42
and inequality”. On July 9, 2007, President Bush reaffirmed his support for the agreement and
called on Congress to approve the proposed PTPA by the beginning of August 2007. On July 6,
USTR Susan Schwab wrote a letter to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi saying that House Democrats
should not insist on having possible FTA partners change their laws as a precondition to
congressional approval. According to a news report article, USTR Schwab stated in her letter that
the Bush Administration was “deeply concerned” that some Members were considering imposing
preconditions that would further delay the pending Peru and Panama FTAs, and that “...requiring
another sovereign country to change its domestic laws before the U.S. Congress approves a trade 43
agreement would be a fundamental break with U.S. law, policy, and practice.” Several House
Democratic leaders issued a statement on June 29, 2007 stating that they hoped to consider the
Peru and Panama agreements later in 2007, but only if these countries implemented necessary 44
changes to their laws prior to the time the FTAs “can come into effect”.
President Alan García met with Members of Congress on several occasions to emphasize the
importance for Peru of strengthening trade relations with the United States in its efforts to fight
poverty and strengthen equality among the Peruvian people. President García had stated that a

39 Natural Resources Defense Council, “Peruvian Winner of 2007 Goldman Environmental Prize Calls for Congress to
Stop Importation of Illegally Logged Mahogany, April 25, 2007.
40 Bilateral agreements with Panama, Peru, Colombia, and South Korea were signed in time to be considered under the
2002 TPA.
41 International Trade Reporter,Perus President García Meets with Bush, Promotes Value of FTA with the United
States,” April 26, 2007.
42 The White House, “Joint Statement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Peru, Press Release,
October 2006. See http://www.whitehouse.gov.
43 International Trade Reporter,President Bush Calls on Congress to Pass Peru Free Trade Agreement by Early
August,” July 12, 2007.
44 House Speaker Nancy Pelosi News Room, “Pelosi, Hoyer, Rangel, and Levin Statement on Trade,Press Release,
June 29, 2007.





considerable share of Peru’s exports to the United States receives trade preferences under the
ATPA and, without renewal or passage of a PTPA, many of Peru’s exports to the United States
would have faced higher duties. ATPA supporters maintain that the program has had a positive
impact in the region by increasing investor confidence, creating thousands of jobs in alternative
sectors, and preventing organized crime. Some Peruvian policymakers believe that maintaining
confidence in the bilateral trade environment with the United States is key to the long-term
stability of the region.
In the United States, a number of groups, such as the AFL-CIO, Public Citizen, and American
Friends Service Committee generally are skeptical of free trade agreements. They argue that,
among other things, FTAs tend to protect the rights and profits of multinational corporations, cost
the U.S. economy jobs, and erode protection for the environment and workers’ rights in Peru.
Public Citizen issued a statement after the May 10 bipartisan agreement, saying that bipartisan
agreement between Congress and the Administration did not go far enough in making changes to
the PTPA in order to protect the rights of the people and that the FTAs with Peru and Panama
would undermine access to essential services in these countries. According to the statement, the
provisions on trade in services and foreign investment would place limits on the ability of the
government to regulate essential services such as education, health services, and electric power
distribution. Such limitations, according to Public Citizen, could potentially prevent the 45
distribution of these services throughout the country.
Much of the business community in the United States supports a U.S.-Peru FTA. The National
Association of Manufacturers (NAM), for example, has issued statements in support of the
proposed PTPA, and, in a July 9 letter to the Democratic and Republican leadership of the House
and Senate, called for a vote in July 2007. NAM stated that it supported the bipartisan agreement
on enforceable labor and environmental provisions because it was clear that the pending FTA
would not move forward in Congress without these provisions. According to a news report article
from July 2007, NAM President John Engler was concerned that additional roadblocks were 46
being placed in front of specific agreements.
M. Angeles Villarreal
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
avillarreal@crs.loc.gov, 7-0321





45 Public Citizen, FTA Provisions Not Altered in May 10 “Deal” Undermine Access to Essential Services in Peru and
Panama. See http://www.citizen.org.
46 International Trade Daily,NAM Urges July Vote on Peru FTA, Blasts Roadblocks Delaying FTAs, TPA, July 11,
2007.