Child Support Enforcement Program Incentive Payments: Background and Policy Issues








Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress



The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program was enacted in 1975 as a federal-state-local
partnership to help strengthen families by securing financial support from noncustodial parents.
The CSE program serves both welfare and non-welfare families. All 50 states and the four
jurisdictions of the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands operate CSE
programs. In FY2006, the CSE program collected $23.9 billion in child support payments and
served 15.8 million child support cases. In FY2006, CSE program expenditures amounted to $5.6
billion. The CSE program is funded with both state and federal dollars. The federal government
bears the majority of CSE program expenditures and provides incentive payments to the states for
success in meeting CSE program goals.
P.L. 105-200, the Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998, replaced the old
incentive payment system to states with a revised system that provides incentive payments based
on a percentage of the state’s CSE collections and incorporates five performance measures related
to establishment of paternity and child support orders, collections of current and past-due support
payments, and cost-effectiveness. P.L. 105-200 set specific annual caps on total federal incentive
payments and required states to reinvest incentive payments back into the CSE program. The
exact amount of a state’s incentive payment depends on its level of performance (or the rate of
improvement over the previous year) when compared with other states. In addition, states are
required to meet data quality standards. If states do not meet specified performance measures and
data quality standards, they face federal financial penalties.
P.L. 109-171 (the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005) prohibited federal matching (effective October
1, 2007) of state expenditure of federal CSE incentive payments. This means that CSE incentive
payments that are received by states can no longer be used to draw down federal funds. The
repeal of federal reimbursement for incentive payments reinvested in the CSE program has
garnered much concern over its fiscal impact on the states and has renewed interest in the
incentive payment system per se.
This report describes the current CSE incentive payment system, explains how state incentive
payments are derived, presents some of the state trends, and discusses the following list of issues:
(1) does the CSE incentive payment system reward good performance? (2) should incentive
payments be based on additional performance indicators? (3) should TANF funds be reduced
because of poor CSE performance? (4) why aren’t the incentives and penalties consistent for the
paternity establishment performance measure? (5) should incentive payments be based on
individual state performance rather than aggregate state performance? and (6) will the elimination
of the federal match of incentive payments adversely affect CSE programs?
The data analysis in this report covers the five-year period FY2002-FY2006. This report will not
be updated.






Introduc tion ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Backgr ound ..................................................................................................................................... 3
Financing Elements of the CSE Program..................................................................................3
Purpose of the Current CSE Incentive Payment System...........................................................5
Calculation of State CSE Incentive Payments.................................................................................5
Data Reliability.........................................................................................................................8
Federal Financial Penalties..............................................................................................................9
State Trends...................................................................................................................................10
Performance Incentive Scores..................................................................................................11
Paternity Establishment Percentage (PEP).......................................................................12
Child Support Order Establishment Percentage................................................................13
Current Child Support Collections Scores........................................................................14
Child Support Arrearage Cases Scores.............................................................................15
Cost-Effectiveness Scores.................................................................................................16
Incentive Payments for All Performance Measures................................................................17
Relationship Between Incentive Payments and Performance Measures.................................18
Policy Issues..................................................................................................................................19
Does the CSE Incentive Payment System Reward Good Performance?................................20
CSE Collections................................................................................................................20
Artificial Thresholds Related to Performance Levels.......................................................21
Should Incentive Payments Be Based on Additional Performance Indicators?......................22
Medical Child Support......................................................................................................23
Interstate Collections........................................................................................................23
Welfare Cost Avoidance....................................................................................................24
Payment Processing Performance.....................................................................................24
Should TANF Funds Be Reduced Because of Poor CSE Performance?.................................24
Why Aren’t the Incentives and Penalties Consistent for the Paternity Establishment
Performance Measure?.........................................................................................................26
Should Incentive Payments Be Based on Individual State Performance Rather Than
Aggregate State Performance?.............................................................................................27
Will the Elimination of the Federal Match of Incentive Payments Adversely Affect
CSE Programs?....................................................................................................................28
Figure 1. Paternity Establishment Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum...................................13
Figure 2. Child Support Order Establishment Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum.................14
Figure 3. Child Support Current Collections Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum..................15
Figure 4. Child Support Arrearage Cases Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum........................16
Figure 5. Cost-Effectiveness Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum...........................................17





Table B-1. Actual Incentive Payments, by State, FY2002-FY2005..............................................36
Table B-2. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Payments and Unaudited Incentive
Performance Scores, FY2002.....................................................................................................38
Table B-3. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Payments and Unaudited Incentive
Performance Scores, FY2003.....................................................................................................41
Table B-4. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Payments and Unaudited Incentive
Performance Scores, FY2004.....................................................................................................44
Table B-5. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Payments and Unaudited Incentive
Performance Scores, FY2005.....................................................................................................47
Table B-6. Child Support Enforcement Unaudited Incentive Performance Scores, FY2006........51
Appendix A. Legislative History of CSE Incentive Payments......................................................31
Appendix B. Tables.......................................................................................................................35
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................54






Since the Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program’s enactment in 1975, the federal
government has paid incentives (monetary payments) to states to encourage them to operate 1
efficient and effective CSE programs. The incentive payment system is part of the CSE
program’s strategic plan that rewards states for working to achieve the goals and objectives of the
program. Incentive payments, although small when compared to federal reimbursement payments
for state and local CSE activities, are a very important component of the CSE financing structure.
Together with the incentive payment system is a penalty system that imposes financial penalties
on states that fail to meet certain performance levels. The purpose of the two complementary
systems is to reward states for results while holding them accountable for poor performance,
thereby motivating states to focus their efforts on providing vital CSE services.
P.L. 105-200, the Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998 (enacted July 16, 1998), 2
replaced the old incentive payment system to states with a revised revenue-neutral (with respect
to the federal government) incentive payment system that (1) provided incentive payments based
on a percentage of the state’s CSE collections; (2) incorporated five performance measures
related to establishment of paternity and child support orders, collections of current and past-due
child support payments, and cost-effectiveness; (3) phased in the incentive system, with it being
fully effective beginning in FY2002; (4) required reinvestment of incentive payments into the
CSE program; and (5) used an incentive payment formula weighted in favor of Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and former TANF families.
P.L. 105-200 stipulated that the revised incentive payment system had to be revenue-neutral (with
respect to the federal government), which resulted in an annual cap on incentive payments.
Congress capped incentive payments by legislating the total amount of incentive payments that
states (in aggregate) could earn in each fiscal year. Federal law stipulates that the aggregate
incentive payment to the states can not exceed the following amounts: $422 million for FY2000,
$429 million for FY2001; $450 million for FY2002; $461 million for FY2003, $454 million for
FY2004; $446 million for FY2005; $458 million for FY2006; $471 million for FY2007; and
$483 million for FY2008. For years after FY2008, the aggregate incentive payment to the states
is to be increased to account for inflation. Congress based the capped aggregate incentive

1 The 1975 enacting legislation (P.L. 93-647) based incentive payments solely on child support collections made on
behalf of welfare (i.e., Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)) families. In 1984, pursuant to P.L. 98-378,
the law expanded the incentive payments formula to include child support collections made on behalf of nonwelfare
families. For a legislative history of CSE incentive payments, see Appendix A. Also note that the AFDC entitlement
program was replaced by the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant pursuant to P.L. 104-193
(the 1996 welfare reform law).
2 Under the old incentive payment system, each state received a minimum incentive payment equal to at least 6% of the
states total amount of child support collections made on behalf of AFDC/TANF families for the year, plus at least 6%
of the states total amount of child support collections made on behalf of non-AFDC/TANF families for the year. The
amount of a states incentive payment could reach a maximum of 10% of the AFDC/TANF collections plus 10% of the
non-AFDC/TANF collections, depending on the state’s ratio of CSE collections to CSE expenditures. There was an
additional limit (i.e., cap), however, on the incentive payment for non-AFDC/TANF collections. The incentive payment
for such collections could not exceed 115% of incentive payments for AFDC/TANF collections. In addition, the old
incentive payment system incorporated only one performance measure (i.e., cost-effectiveness) in determining
incentive payments to states. One of the main criticisms of the old incentive payment system was that it did not provide
an incentive for states to improve their programs because every state regardless of performance received the minimum
incentive payment. There was general agreement by Congress that states whose CSE programs performed poorly
should not be rewarded with federal funds.





payment amount on Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections of incentive payments at the 3
time that the Child Support Performance and Incentive bill was passed.
P.L. 105-200 also revised the financial penalty system for the CSE program to reflect that
improved performance is especially critical in three areas: paternity establishment, child support
order establishment, and current child support collections. If specified performance standards are
not met in these three areas, financial penalties against the state’s TANF program are imposed.
Before the beginning of FY2008, the federal government was required to match incentive funds
that states reinvested in the CSE program. P.L. 109-171 (the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005)
prohibits federal matching (effective October 1, 2007) of state expenditure of federal CSE
incentive payments. This means that CSE incentive payments that are received by states and
reinvested in the CSE program are no longer eligible for federal reimbursement. So, instead of
receiving 66% federal matching funds for incentive payments that are reinvested in the CSE
program, the states receive no federal matching funds for such incentive payments. The repeal of
federal matching funds for incentive payments reinvested in the CSE program has garnered much
concern over its fiscal impact on the states and has renewed interest in the incentive payment
system per se.
This report describes the current CSE incentive payment system, provides information on
financial penalties that are imposed on states if incentive payment data are unreliable or if
performance standards are not met, explains how state incentive payments are derived, discusses
some of the state trends, and presents some policy issues concerning incentive payments.
In addition, the report includes two appendices. Appendix A presents a legislative history of CSE
incentive payments. Appendix B includes several detailed state tables that display unaudited 4
incentive performance scores for each of the five performance measures. Table B-1 shows
incentive payments by state for each of the following years—FY2002, FY2003, FY2004, and 5
FY2005—and the amount that each state received. Table B-2 presents CSE incentive payments
for FY2002 together with unaudited incentive performance scores for each of the five
performance measures for FY2002. Table B-3 presents CSE incentive payments for FY2003
together with unaudited incentive performance scores for each of the five performance measures
for FY2003. Table B-4 presents CSE incentive payments for FY2004 together with unaudited
incentive performance scores for each of the five performance measures for FY2004. Table B-5
presents CSE incentive payments for FY2005 together with unaudited incentive performance
scores for each of the five performance measures for FY2005. Table B-6 shows only the
unaudited incentive performance scores for FY2006.

3 In FY1998, the incentive payment, which at that time came out of the gross federal share of child support collected on
behalf of TANF families, was $395 million. Beginning in FY2002, child support incentive payments were no longer
paid out of the federal share of child support collections made on behalf of TANF families. Instead, federal funds have
been specifically appropriated out of the U.S. Treasury for CSE incentive payments.
4 The unaudited incentive performance scores are readily available each year when the federal Office of Child Support
Enforcement (OCSE) publishes its preliminary data report. In this report the unaudited scores serve as a proxy for the
actual (audited) performance indicator scores upon which actual incentive payments are based. (OCSE does not
consistently publish actual (audited) performance indicator scores.)
5 OCSE has not yet published data on CSE incentive payments by state for FY2006.






The CSE program was enacted in 1975 as a federal-state-local partnership to help strengthen
families by securing financial support from noncustodial parents. The CSE program serves both
welfare and non-welfare families. In FY2006, the CSE program collected $23.9 billion in child
support payments and served 15.8 million child support cases. In FY2006, total CSE program
expenditures amounted to $5.6 billion, of which $458 million were incentive payments (i.e., 8%
of total program expenditures). In FY2006, the CSE program collected $4.58 in child support
(from noncustodial parents) for every dollar spent on the program. The CSE program is funded
with both state and federal dollars. The federal government bears the majority of CSE program
expenditures and provides incentive payments to the states for success in meeting CSE program
goals.
There are five funding streams for the CSE program. (For more details, see CRS Report
RL33422, Analysis of Federal-State Financing of the Child Support Enforcement Program, by
Carmen Solomon-Fears.)
First, states spend their own money to operate a CSE program; the level of funding allocated by 6
the state and localities determines the amount of resources available to CSE agencies.
Second, the federal government reimburses each state 66% of all allowable expenditures on CSE
activities. The federal government’s funding is “open-ended” in that it pays its percentage of
expenditures by matching the amounts spent by state and local governments with no upper limit
or ceiling. The federal government’s financial participation in the CSE program is the program’s
largest revenue source.
Third, the federal government provides states with an incentive payment to encourage them to
operate effective programs. Federal law requires states to reinvest CSE incentive payments back
into the CSE program or related activities. Effective October 1, 2007, P.L. 109-171 (enacted
February 8, 2006) prohibits federal matching of state expenditures of federal CSE incentive
payments. This means that beginning October 1, 2007, CSE incentive payments that are received
by states and reinvested in the CSE program are no longer eligible for federal reimbursement.
Fourth, states collect child support on behalf of families receiving Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) to reimburse themselves (and the federal government) for the cost of

6 As indicated earlier, the federal share of total CSE expenditures is 66%. This means that the state’s share of total CSE
expenditures is 34%. The following report found that in aggregate 25% of the states share of CSE expenditures is
financed with incentive payments (i.e., dollars received from the federal government). According to a Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS)-commissioned report,While the mix of funding sources for each state is different,
financing for the state and local share of CSE expenditures for the nation as a whole comes from state general fund
appropriations (42%), federal incentive payments (25%), the state share of retained TANF collections (15%), and
county general fund appropriations (9%). Overall, fees and other cost recoveries finance a negligible proportion (2%)
of state and local shares of CSE expenditures.” Source: State Financing of Child Support Enforcement Programs: Final
Report, prepared for the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation and the Office of Child Support Enforcement,
Department of Health and Human Services, prepared by Michael E. Fishman, Kristin Dybdal of the Legin Group, Inc.
and John Tapogna of ECONorthwest, September 3, 2003, p. iii.





TANF cash payments to the family. Federal law requires families who receive TANF cash
assistance to assign their child support rights to the state in order to receive TANF. In addition,
such families must cooperate with the state if necessary to establish paternity and secure child
support. CSE collections on behalf of families receiving TANF cash benefits are used to
reimburse state and federal governments for TANF payments made to the family (i.e., child
support payments go to the state instead of the family, except for amounts that states choose to
“pass through” to the family as additional income that does not affect TANF eligibility or benefit
amounts).
The formula for distributing the child support payments collected by the states on behalf of TANF
families between the state and the federal government is still based on the old Aid to Families 7
with Dependent Children (AFDC) federal-state reimbursement rates, even though the AFDC 8
entitlement program was replaced by the TANF block grant program. Under existing law, states
have the option of giving some, all, or none of their share of child support payments collected on
behalf of TANF families to the family. Pursuant to P.L. 109-171 (effective October 1, 2008),
states that choose to pass through some of the collected child support to the TANF family do not
have to pay the federal government their shares of such collections if the amount passed through
to the family and disregarded by the state does not exceed $100 per month ($200 per month for a
family with two or more children) in child support collected on behalf of a TANF (or foster care)
family. (For additional information, see CRS Report RL34105, The Financial Impact of Child
Support on TANF Families: Simulation for Selected States, by Carmen Solomon-Fears and Gene
Falk.)
Fifth, application fees and costs recovered from nonwelfare families may help finance the CSE
program. In the case of nonwelfare families, the custodial parent can hire a private attorney or
apply for CSE services on their own. The CSE agency must charge an application fee, not to
exceed $25, for families not on welfare who apply for CSE services. The CSE agency may charge
this fee to the applicant or the noncustodial parent, or pay the fee out of state funds. In addition, a
state may at its option recover costs in excess of the application fee. Such recovery may be either
from the custodial parent or the noncustodial parent. Fees and costs recovered from nonwelfare
cases must be subtracted from the state’s total administrative costs before calculating the federal
reimbursement amount (i.e., the 66% matching rate).
Moreover, effective October 1, 2006, P.L. 109-171 requires families that have never been on
TANF to pay a $25 annual user fee when child support enforcement efforts on their behalf are
successful (i.e., at least $500 annually is collected on their behalf). The state can collect the user

7 Under old AFDC law, the rate at which states were reimbursed by the federal government for the costs of cash
welfare was the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP), which varies inversely with state per capita income
(i.e., poor states have a higher federal matching rate, wealthy states have a lower federal matching rate). The FMAP
ranges from a minimum of 50% to a statutory maximum of 83%. Like the old AFDC program, current law requires that
child support collections made on behalf of welfare (i.e., TANF) families be split between the federal and state
governments according the FMAP. If a state has a 50% FMAP, the federal government is reimbursed $50 for each
$100 in child support collections for TANF families; if a state has a 70% FMAP, the federal government is reimbursed
$70 for each $100 in child support collections for TANF families. In the first example, the state keeps $50 and in the
second example, the state keeps $30. Thus, states with a larger FMAP keep a smaller portion of the child support
collections.
8 The TANF block grant replaced the AFDC entitlement program pursuant to P.L. 104-193, the 1996 welfare reform
law. Because the CSE incentive payments have changed significantly since 1975 (when the CSE program was enacted),
this report refers to both AFDC families/cases and TANF families/cases, depending on the time frame.





fee from the custodial parent, the noncustodial parent, or the state can pay the fee out of state
funds. This annual user fee is separate from the application fee.
From the outset, incentive payments were provided by the federal government to the states to
encourage them to operate effective CSE programs. P.L. 105-200, the Child Support Performance
and Incentive Act of 1998, was designed to further improve the CSE program by linking incentive
payments to states’ performance in five major areas. Instead of rewarding states only for their
program’s cost-effectiveness, the revised incentive payment system was designed to reward states
for good performance in five different areas that were closely related to children obtaining child
support payments (from their noncustodial parent). The new system was touted as one that would
provide real incentives for the states to improve the CSE program, help families attain self-
sufficiency, and support important societal goals like paternity identification and parental 9
responsibility.
The current CSE incentive payment system also adds an element of uncertainty to what used to be
a somewhat predictable source of income for states. Although in the aggregate, states receive
higher incentive payments than under the earlier incentive payment system, the total amount
available is fixed, and individual states have to compete with each other for their share of the
capped funds. Under the revised incentive system, whether or not a state receives an incentive
payment for good performance and the total amount of its incentive payment depends on several
factors: the total amount of money available in a given fiscal year from which to make incentive 10
payments, the state’s success in obtaining collections on behalf of its caseload, the state’s
performance in five areas (see text box below), the reliability of a state’s data, and the relative
success or failure of other states in making collections and meeting the performance criteria.
Moreover, unlike the old incentive system which allowed states and counties to spend incentive
payments on whatever they chose, the current incentive system requires that the incentive
payment be reinvested by the state into either the CSE program or some other activity which
might lead to improving the efficiency or effectiveness of the CSE program (e.g.,
mediation/conflict-resolution services to parents, parenting classes, efforts to improve the earning
capacity of noncustodial parents, etc.). Further, beginning October 1, 2007, federal matching
funds are not available to increase the value of incentive payments.

The CSE incentive payment structure is very complex. For a fuller explanation of how state 11
incentive payments are calculated, see the example given in the CSE FY2006 data report.

9 Department of Health and Human Services. News Release. HHS Submits Plan to Congress on New Rewards for
States to Improve Child Support Collections. March 13, 1997.
10 The CSE program serves both welfare and nonwelfare families in its caseload. OCSE defines a CSE “case” as a
noncustodial parent (mother, father, or putative/alleged father) who is now or eventually may be obligated under law
for the support of a child or children receiving services under the CSE program. If the noncustodial parent owes support
for two children by different women, that would be considered two cases; if both children have the same mother, that
would be considered one case.
11 Go to the following website and scroll nearly to the end of the document to the section entitled How an Incentive
(continued...)





CSE incentive payments to states are based on several factors including state collections of child
support payments and the performance of the states in five areas. The five performance measures
are related to (1) establishment of paternity, (2) establishment of child support orders, (3)
collection of current child support, (4) collection of child support arrearages (i.e., past-due child
support), and (5) cost-effectiveness of the CSE program.
CSE Performance Measures
Paternity Establishment. States have two options:
(1) CSE Paternity Establishment Percentage (PEP). State performance on paternity establishment is calculated by
dividing the total number of children in the state’s CSE caseload during the fiscal year (or at state option at the end of
the fiscal year) who were born outside of marriage and for whom paternity has been established by the total number
of children in the state’s CSE caseload as of the end of the preceding fiscal year who were born outside of marriage;
(2) Statewide Paternity Establishment Percentage (PEP). State performance on paternity establishment is calculated by
dividing the total number of minor children who were born outside of marriage and for whom paternity has been
established during the fiscal year by the total number of children born outside of marriage during the preceding fiscal
year.
Establishment of Child Support Orders. State performance on support orders is calculated by dividing the number of
cases in the CSE caseload for which there is a support order by the total number of cases in the program.
Current Payments. State performance on current payments is obtained by dividing the total dollars collected for
current support in cases in the CSE caseload by the total amount owed on support in these cases which is not past-
due.
Arrearage Payments. State performance on arrears (i.e., past-due payments) is obtained by dividing the number of cases
in which there was some payment on arrearages during the fiscal year by the total number of cases in which past-due
support is owed. (Cases in which the family was formerly on welfare, and in which arrearages are collected by federal
income tax intercept, do not count as an arrearage payment case unless the state shares the collection with the
family.)
Cost-Effectiveness. State performance on cost-effectiveness is determined by dividing the total amount collected
through the child support program by the total amount spent by the program to make these collections.
Under the CSE incentive payment system, each of the five performance measures is translated
into a mathematical formula (see text box that follows). The amount of incentive payments for a
particular performance measure is based on a standard that is specified in law. For each
performance standard, there is an upper threshold. All states that achieve performance levels at or
above this upper threshold are entitled to the maximum possible incentive for that performance
measure. Simultaneously, there is also a minimum level of performance below which states do
not receive an incentive, unless the state makes significant improvement over its previous year’s
performance.

(...continued)
Payment is determined: http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2007/preliminary_report/.





To determine a state’s incentive payment, the following computations must be made. First, each
state’s performance percentage for each performance measure is separately determined and
translated into the applicable percentage for that particular performance measure. If the
performance percentage is at or above the upper threshold, the applicable percentage for that
performance measure would be 100%. If the performance percentage is below the lower 12
threshold, the applicable percentage for that performance measure would be 0%. If the
performance percentage is in between these two points (the upper and lower thresholds), the
applicable percentage is
obtained by referring to Performance Thresholds (and applicable percentage)
the tables specified in If PEP ≥ 80%, then 100% if < 50%, then 0%
federal law (Section

458(b)(6) of the Social If order establishment ≥ 80%, then 100% if < 50%, then 0%


Security Act) for each of If current support ≥ 80%, then 100% if < 40%, then 0%
the performance If arrearages ≥ 80%, then 100% if < 40%, then 0%
measures. For example, If cost-effectiveness ≥ 5.00, then 100% if < 2.00, then 0%
with regard to the


establishment of child
support orders, if the state’s performance percentage for this measure is 70%, meaning that 70%
of CSE cases in the state have a child support order, the applicable percentage is 80% (The tables
showing all of the applicable percentages for each performance measure are in Section

458(b)(6)(B) of the Social Security Act).


Second, after the applicable percentage for each performance measure is determined, that
percentage is multiplied by the “collections” base for an individual state. The collections base is
calculated by multiplying child support collections made on behalf of TANF families, Title IV-E
foster care families and Medicaid families in the state by a factor of 2 and then adding that
amount to the amount of collections made on behalf of families that were never on welfare [2 x 13
(TANF collections + formerly on TANF collections)+ never on TANF collections].
Third, if the performance measure is paternity establishment, child support order establishment,
or current collections, then the resulting amount (i.e., the applicable percentage multiplied by the
collections base) is multiplied by 100%. If the performance measure is past-due collections (i.e.,
arrearages) or cost-effectiveness, then the resulting amount is multiplied by 75%. These
calculations result in maximum incentives for each performance measure.

12 At the low end of the performance scale, there is a minimum level below which a state is not rewarded with an
incentive payment unless the state demonstrates a substantial improvement over the prior year’s performance. Even
though substantial improvement is recognized, the law stipulates that the incentive payment in such cases cannot
exceed 50% of the maximum incentive possible for that performance measure. The substantial improvement provisions
do not apply with respect to the cost-effectiveness performance measure.
13 It was decided during the negotiations on revising the incentive payment system that, because collecting child
support on behalf of TANF and former-TANF families is generally more difficult than collecting child support on
behalf of families who had never been on TANF, the incentive formula should provide a greater emphasis on collection
in TANF and former TANF cases. Moreover, it was mentioned that collections in TANF cases provide direct savings to
the state and federal governments. The incentive payment formula thus doubles the collections made on behalf of
TANF and former-TANF cases to give them extra emphasis. (See Office of Child Support Enforcement, Department of
Health and Human Services. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Funding. Report to the House Ways and Means
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee. February 1997. p. 8.)



Fourth, the maximum incentives are added together. The dollar amount that is obtained by adding
together the five maximum incentives for each performance measure is called the maximum
incentive base amount.
Fifth, all of the states’ (includes the four jurisdictions: the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands) maximum incentive base amounts are then added together for a total
maximum incentive base amount.
Sixth, each state’s individual maximum base amount is compared to the total maximum incentive
base amount. The mathematical formula would be—maximum state incentive base/sum of all
state incentive bases. An individual state’s share of the total is the percentage that is used to
determine the state’s actual incentive payment. For example, if a state’s share of the total is 17%,
then the state will receive 17% of the capped incentive payment for the fiscal year in question. In
FY2007 for example, the state’s incentive payment would be $80,070,000 (.17* $471 million).
The federal government makes incentive payments to states on an on-going quarterly prospective
basis using state estimates of what their incentive payments will total. After the audited
performance data (discussed below) are available, OCSE reconciles the incentive payment 14
actually earned with the amount previously estimated, and received, by the state.
Before enactment of P.L. 105-200, incentive payments (under the old system) were not dependent
on data reliability. Although audits were performed at least once every three years to ensure
compliance with federal CSE program requirements, the audits were focused on administrative
procedures and processes rather than performance outcomes and results.
Under current federal law, states are accountable for providing reliable data on a timely basis or
they receive no incentive payments. The data reliability provisions were enacted as part of P.L.
105-200, which established the current incentive payment system. They are in the law to ensure
the integrity of the incentive payment system. The federal Office of Child Support Enforcement
(OCSE) Office of Audit performs data reliability audits to evaluate the completeness, accuracy,
security, and reliability of data reported and produced by state reporting systems. The audits help
ensure that incentives under the Child Support Performance and Incentives Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-
200) are earned and paid only on the basis of verifiable data and that the incentive payments
system is fair and equitable. If an audit determines that a state’s data are not complete and reliable 15
for a given performance measure, the state receives zero payments for that measure.
If states do not meet the data quality standards, they do not receive incentive payments and are
subject to federal financial penalties. Although estimated incentive payments are sent to states on
a prospective quarterly basis, those estimated incentive payments are reconciled to the actual

14 Study of the Implementation of the Performance-Based Incentive System—Interim Report, by the Lewin Group
(Karen Gardiner, Michael Fishman, and Asaph Glosser) and ECONorthwest (John Tapogna). Prepared for the Office of
Child Support Enforcement. October 2003. p. 19.
15 FY2004 was the fifth year that OCSE calculated and paid incentives to states for meeting performance standards in
five performance measure areas. According to OCSE, 50 states and jurisdictions passed the audits for FY2004. Source:
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Administration for Children and Families. Office of Child Support
Enforcement. Office of Child Support Enforcement FY 2004 Annual Report to Congress. April 2007.
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2007/reports/annual_report/#26





incentive payment earned after the auditing process. Thus, if a state fails the audit on a particular
performance measure, the state would not receive an incentive payment for that measure (i.e., the 16
state’s funding would be reduced to reflect the audit’s findings).
The audit for the fiscal year generally begins at the beginning of a calendar year (after the fiscal 17
year has ended) and is completed by early summer. States provide the assigned regional OCSE
office with a universe of cases and audit trails. From this universe, a sample is selected. The
auditor selects at least 150 cases from the state’s universe. State are required to provide auditors
with documentation, through access to state computerized/automated systems and hard copies of
documents for each of the sample cases. The auditor reviews the sample cases to determine if the
items he or she is trying to verify are correct. For example, if the documentation indicates that
$450 in current support was paid during the fiscal year, the auditor looks up the collection history
for that particular case on the state’s automated system to determine if the $450 figure is correct.
Federal regulations (Title 45 CFR Section 305.1(i)) require data to meet a 95% standard of 18
reliability. Once the audit is completed, the general practice is for an auditor from a different
field office to review the findings. Moreover, the OCSE headquarters staff that work on audits
also review audit findings. Informational sessions and opportunities to contest the findings are 19
available during the audit process.

The CSE performance-based penalty system provides that a financial penalty be assessed when
data submitted for calculating state performance is found to be incomplete or unreliable. Penalties
may also be assessed when the calculated level of performance for any of three performance
measures—paternity establishment, support order establishment, or current collections—fails to
achieve a specified level or when states are not in compliance with certain child support
requirements.
There is an automatic corrective action year if performance measures and data reliability are not
achieved. The corrective action year is the immediately succeeding fiscal year following the year
of the deficiency. If the state’s data are determined complete and reliable and the related
performance is adequate for the corrective action year, the penalty is not imposed.

16 According to the federal regulations (45 CFR Part 304.12): Each state calculates the federal government’s share of
child support payments collected on behalf of TANF families. Then the state retains one-fourth of its annual estimate of
incentive payments from the federal government’s share of child support collected on behalf of TANF families each
quarter. Following the end of a fiscal year, the OCSE will calculate the actual incentive payment the state should have
received based on the reports submitted for that fiscal year. If adjustments to the estimate are necessary, the state’s
quarterly TANF grant award will be reduced or increased because of over- or under-estimates for prior quarters and for
other adjustments.
17 Thereby, the audit of FY2007 (October 1, 2006-September 30, 2007) incentive payment data would usually begin in
January 2008 and generally would be completed by July 2008. Once the audit is completed, estimated incentive
payments would be reconciled with actual incentive payments.
18 Title 45 CFR Section 305.1(i) states that ... data may contain errors as long as they are not of a magnitude that
would cause a reasonable person, aware of the errors, to doubt a finding or conclusion based on the data.”
19 Study of the Implementation of the Performance-Based Incentive System—Interim Report, by the Lewin Group
(Karen Gardiner, Michael Fishman, and Asaph Glosser) and ECONorthwest (John Tapogna). Prepared for the Office of
Child Support Enforcement. October 2003. p. 14.





If the corrective action was unsuccessful, the financial penalty is a reduction in the state’s TANF
block grant. Historically, Congress has linked the CSE program and the TANF (and old AFDC)
program. Currently Section 402(a)(2) of the Social Security Act (Title IV-A which deals with
TANF (and used to pertain to the AFDC program)) stipulates that the governor of a state must
certify that it will operate an approved CSE program as a condition of receiving TANF block
grant funding. Since the enactment of the CSE program in 1975, there has always been a
provision in federal law that linked poor performance (and penalties) or noncompliance in the
CSE program with a reduction in Title IV-A funding.
Under the performance-based audit procedures (Section 409(a)(8) of the Social Security Act), a
graduated penalty equal to 1%-5% of the federal TANF block grant is assessed against a state if
(1) on the basis of the data submitted by the state for a review, the state CSE program fails to 20
achieve the paternity establishment or other performance standards set by the HHS Secretary;
(2) an audit finds that the state data are incomplete or unreliable; or (3) the state failed to
substantially comply with one or more CSE state plan requirements, and the state fails to correct
the deficiencies in the fiscal year following the performance year (i.e., the corrective action plan
year).
The penalty amount is calculated as not less than 1% nor more than 2% of the TANF block grant 21
program for the first year of the deficiency. The penalty amount increases each year, up to 5%,
for each consecutive year the state’s data are found to be incomplete, unreliable, or the state’s
performance on a penalty measure fails to attain the specified level of performance.
According to the CSE annual data report for FY2004: “In 2004, nine States received a penalty
after the FY2003 corrective action year for the FY2002 performance period. Six States filed 22
appeals to the Department Appeals Board.”

A state’s share of incentive payments depends on many factors that are distinct to its population
and CSE caseload. CSE collection can be straightforward. In most CSE cases paternity has
already been established and in a majority of cases the child support order was established at the
time of the divorce or separation. Further, many noncustodial parents are up-to-date in their child
support payments and do not owe any past-due (arrearage) payments. However, in other cases
meeting CSE performance measures can be more difficult. Although not exactly sequential, the
CSE performance measures are very interdependent. A child support order cannot be established
if paternity has not been legally determined. Child support payments cannot be collected or
enforced unless a child support order has been established. Arrearage payments cannot be

20 There are three performance measures for which states have to achieve certain levels of performance in order to
avoid being penalized for poor performance. These measures are (1) paternity establishment [specifically mentioned in
the federal lawSection 409(a)(8)(A) of the Social Security Act], (2) child support order establishment, and (3) current
child support collections [these last two performance measures were designated by the HHS Secretary—45 CFR
Section 305.40].
21 The penalty amount is calculated as not less than 2% nor more than 3% of the TANF block grant program for the
second year of the deficiency. The penalty amount is calculated as not less than 3% nor more than 5% of the TANF
block grant program for the third or subsequent year of the deficiency.
22 Office of Child Support Enforcement, Department of Health and Human Services. Office of Child Support
Enforcement FY2004 Annual Report to Congress. April 2007.





collected if current child support is not paid. States that have more cases that require services
such as paternity establishment, child support order establishment, and payment of arrearages
generally have a tougher time collecting child support than states that do not face such challenges.
In FY2005, the aggregate incentive payment amount was $446 million. Among the 50 states and
the 4 jurisdictions of the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, CSE
incentive payments in FY2005 ranged from a high of $41.7 million in California to a low of 23
$108,972 in the Virgin Islands.
As mentioned earlier, incentive payments are a function of a state’s collections base, which is
largely dependent on population size. Thus, the aggregate amount of incentive dollars received by
individual states are a poor indicator of a state’s performance with respect to individual
performance measures. As discussed in more detail later, incentive payments are not directly
correlated with performance. In other words, even though a state may receive a high incentive
payment, the state’s performance on one or several individual performance measures may be very
poor. This results because child support collections are the critical determinant of incentive
payments to states. In fact, the top ten states with regard to collecting child support (in FY2002-24
FY2005) were the top ten states with regard to high incentive payments.
The data presented in this report are based on the unaudited incentive payment performance
scores. These data are readily available each year when OCSE publishes its preliminary data
report. Over the years, states have made significant improvement in the area of data reliability.
According to the final report on FY2004 data, only four jurisdictions failed data reliability audits.
A comparison of FY2002 performance score data to FY2006 performance score data25 shows that
CSE program performance has improved with respect to all five performance measures. The
following scores represent the total score for all 54 jurisdictions for each of the performance
measures (referred to in this analysis as national averages). The national average for the paternity
establishment score went from 73% (CSE program measure rather than statewide measure) in
FY2002 to 90% in FY2006; the score for child support order establishment increased from 70%
to 77%; the score for current child support collections increased from 58% to 60%; the score for
child support arrearage cases increased from 60% to 61%; and the cost-effectiveness score
increased from 4.13 to 4.58.
If state trends are examined in terms of the median score of the five performance measures rather
than the average score, the time-trend is similar to the trend in the national averages, but the
performance of the median state, over the five-year period, tends to be slightly higher than that of
the average state with respect to paternity establishment, child support order establishment, and
cost-effectiveness. With regard to the other two performance measures (i.e., current collections

23 The OCSE has not yet published actual incentive payment data by state for FY2006.
24 During the four-year period FY2002-FY2005, the states with the highest incentive payments were California, Texas,
Pennsylvania, New York, Michigan, Florida, New Jersey, and Wisconsin. These states also are the most populous
states.
25 The table for the FY2002 data can be found at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2003/reports/
prelim_datareport/. The table for the FY2006 data can be found at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2007/
preliminary_report/.





and arrearages), the median score is the same or almost the same as the average score.26 The
median score for paternity establishment went from 87% in FY2002 to 94% in FY2006; the score
for child support order establishment increased from 71% to 79%; the score for current child
support collections increased from 57% to 59%; the score for child support arrearage cases did
not change from 61%; and the cost-effectiveness score increased from 4.49 to 4.70.
The following analysis examines the individual CSE performance measures for the five-year 27
period FY2002-FY2006. It focuses on the median, maximum, and minimum scores for all five
performance measures.
One of the goals of the CSE program has always been to establish paternity for those needing that
service. In fact the official title of the program when it was enacted in 1975 and to this day is
Child Support and Establishment of Paternity. The CSE program’s strategic plan for FY2005-
FY2009 reiterates this by indicating that goal #1 of the program is that all children have an
established parentage and the program tries to achieve this goal by increasing the percentage of
children with a legal relationship with their parents.
As mentioned earlier in the CSE performance measures text box, states have two options for
determining the Paternity Establishment Percentage (PEP). They can use a PEP that is based on
data that pertains solely to the CSE program or they can use a PEP that is based on data that
pertains to the state population as a whole. In effect, the PEP compares paternities established
during the fiscal year with the number of nonmarital births during the preceding fiscal year.
During the period FY2002-FY2006, the median PEP score among the 54 jurisdictions28 with CSE
programs ranged from 86.64 in FY2002 to 94.11 in FY2006 (with a slight dip in FY2004). The
maximum PEP score was 130.75 in FY2002, it rose to 190.70 in FY2003 and dropped to 122.12
in FY2006. A PEP of 100% or more generally means that the state has established paternity for
more than just the newborns who were born outside of marriage in the specified year (i.e., the 29
state has established paternity for many older children as well). The minimum PEP score
fluctuated during the period FY2002 through FY2006. It started at 50.83 and ended at 59.44.

26 The median reflects the performance of the middle-ranked state, with all states weighted equally.
27 The median score sometimes better illustrates trends because unlike the mean (i.e., average) it is not affected by very
high or very low scores.
28 According to preliminary FY2002 data, Guam had the maximum PEP score of 452.87, but that score for Guam was
excluded because of conflicting data.
29 As mentioned earlier in the text box, a state may use as its PEP either the CSE PEP or the statewide PEP. The state
CSE PEP is based on the entire number of children in the CSE caseload who had been born outside of marriage,
regardless of year of birth, and whether paternity had been established for them. If the CSE PEP is more than 100%,
then the number of children on the CSE rolls who were born outside of marriage but had paternity established on their
behalf exceeded the number of children on the CSE rolls who were born outside of marriage in any previous year.
Whereas, if the statewide PEP is more than 100%, then the number of paternities established in the current fiscal year
exceeded the number of babies born outside of marriage in the preceding fiscal year.





Figure 1. Paternity Establishment Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum
FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Median 86.64 90.15 89.85 91.47 94.11
Maximum 130.75 190.70 117.76 112.42 122.12
Minimum 50.83 63.90 63.21 54.05 59.44
Source: Chart prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on data from the Office of Child Support
Enforcement, Department of Health and Human Services.
Note: The x on the line graphs highlights the median score. In FY2002, on the basis of preliminary data, Guam
had the maximum score (452.87). However, because of other conflicting data for Guam, that outlier PEP for
Guam was excluded from this analysis. The next highest PEP score in FY2002 was 130.75 (Idaho).
Goal #2 in the FY2005-FY2009 Strategic Plan of the Child Support Enforcement Program is for
all children in the CSE caseload to have child support orders. The second performance measure
focuses on the percentage of CSE cases that have a child support order (i.e., a legally-binding
document that requires the noncustodial parent to pay child support).
During the period FY2002-FY2006, the median child support order establishment score among
the 54 jurisdictions with CSE programs rose each year, starting at 71.28 in FY2002 and ending at
78.96 in FY2006. The maximum score for this performance measure fluctuated; it started at
92.03, reached a high of 96.00 in FY2005 and declined back to 92.98 in FY2006. The minimum
score for child support order establishment rose significantly during the five-year period, starting
at 29.66 in FY2002 and ending at 45.43 in FY2006.





Figure 2. Child Support Order Establishment Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum
FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Median 71.28 74.50 75.41 76.08 78.96
Maximum 92.03 94.10 93.73 96.00 92.98
Minimum 29.66 31.90 34.92 39.60 45.43
Source: Chart prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on data from the Office of Child Support
Enforcement, Department of Health and Human Services.
Note: The x on the line graphs highlights the median score.
Goal #430 in the FY2005-FY2009 Strategic Plan of the Child Support Enforcement Program is for
all children in the CSE caseload to receive the financial support owed by their noncustodial
parents. This goal encompasses both current child support payments and past-due child support
payments (i.e., arrearages). The third performance indicator measures the proportion of current
child support owed that is collected on behalf of children in the CSE caseload.
During the period FY2002-FY2006, the median child support current collections score among the

54 jurisdictions with CSE programs was 57.10 in FY2002, dropped to 56.65 in FY2003,


remained relatively unchanged in FY2004, and increased for the next two years to a score of
59.16 in FY2006. The maximum score was relatively stable, ranging from 74.37 to 74.80. The
minimum score increased every year over the five-year period, from 39.11 in FY2002 to 45.92 in
FY2006.

30 Goal #3 in the FY2005-FY2009 Strategic Plan of the CSE Program is for all children in the CSE program to have
medical coverage.





Figure 3. Child Support Current Collections Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum
FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Median 57.10 56.65 56.66 58.89 59.16
Maximum 74.70 74.80 74.37 74.72 74.65
Minimum 39.11 40.90 42.68 44.36 45.92
Source: Chart prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on data from the Office of Child Support
Enforcement, Department of Health and Human Services.
Note: The x on the line graphs highlights the median score.
The fourth performance indicator measures state efforts to collect money from CSE cases with an
arrearage (i.e., past-due child support payments are owed). This performance measure specifically
counts paying cases—and not total arrearage dollars collected—because states have different
methods of handling certain aspects of arrearage cases. For example, the ability to write off debt
that is deemed uncollectible varies by state. Moreover, some states charge interest on arrearages 31
(which is considered additional arrearages) while other states do not. As mentioned above, this
performance measure is incorporated in goal #4 as listed in the FY2005-FY2009 CSE Strategic
Plan.
During the period FY2002-FY2006, the median child support arrearage cases score among the 54
jurisdictions with CSE programs fluctuated slightly during the period. It was 60.71 in FY2002
and was 61.34 in FY2006. The maximum score increased from 71.58 in FY2002 to 75.21 in
FY2006 (with a drop between FY2003 and FY2004). The minimum score rose from 30.21 in
FY2002 to 42.33 in FY2004 and then declined to 41.01 in FY2006.

31 Study of the Implementation of the Performance-Based Incentive System—Interim Report, by the Lewin Group
(Karen Gardiner, Michael Fishman, and Asaph Glosser) and ECONorthwest (John Tapogna). Prepared for the Office of
Child Support Enforcement. October 2003. p. 7.





Figure 4. Child Support Arrearage Cases Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum
FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Median 60.71 59.80 59.15 60.59 61.34
Maximum 71.58 72.20 71.83 73.50 75.21
Minimum 30.21 37.00 42.33 41.36 41.01
Source: Chart prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on data from the Office of Child Support
Enforcement, Department of Health and Human Services.
Note: The x on the line graphs highlights the median score.
Goal #5 in the FY2005-FY2009 Strategic Plan of the Child Support Enforcement Program says
that the CSE program will be efficient and responsive in its operations. The fifth performance
measure assesses the total dollars collected by the CSE program for each dollar spent
During the period FY2002-FY2006, the median cost-effectiveness score among the 54
jurisdictions with CSE programs was 4.49 in FY2002, it rose and fell throughout the period, and
ended at 4.70 in FY2006. The maximum score went from 7.80 to 9.45 over the five-year period
(with a drop between FY2004 and FY2005). The minimum score was 1.46 in FY2002 reached

2.10 in FY2005 and dropped to 1.84 in FY2006.





Figure 5. Cost-Effectiveness Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum
FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Median 4.49 4.68 4.62 4.77 4.70
Maximum 7.80 7.91 8.70 8.53 9.45
Minimum 1.46 1.57 1.83 2.10 1.84
Source: Chart prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on data from the Office of Child Support
Enforcement, Department of Health and Human Services.
Note: The x on the line graphs highlights the median score.
Although CSE incentive payments were awarded to all 54 jurisdictions (including the 50 states,
the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands) during the FY2002-FY2006
period, some jurisdictions performed poorly on certain performance measures and thereby did not
receive an incentive for that measure. (See the earlier text box on performance thresholds for the
percentage scores on each performance measure that do not warrant an incentive payment.) Even
so, the 54 jurisdictions (in aggregate) improved their performance over the five-year period. In
FY2002, 46 jurisdictions received an incentive for all five performance measures compared to 53
jurisdictions in FY2005 and 52 jurisdictions in FY2006.
On the basis of the unaudited FY2002 performance incentive scores of the 54 jurisdictions, 46
jurisdictions received an incentive for all five performance measures, 3 jurisdictions received an
incentive for four performance measures (California, Hawaii, and Mississippi), and 5 jurisdictions
(Illinois, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands) received an
incentive for three performance measures. (See Appendix, Table B-2.)
On the basis of the unaudited FY2003 performance incentive scores of the 54 jurisdictions, 48
jurisdictions received an incentive for all five performance measures, 5 jurisdictions received an
incentive for four performance measures (Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, Guam, and the
Virgin Islands), and the remaining jurisdiction (the District of Columbia) received an incentive
for three performance measures. (See Appendix, Table B-3.)





On the basis of the unaudited FY2004 performance incentive scores of the 54 jurisdictions, 51
jurisdictions received an incentive for all five performance measures, and 3 jurisdictions received
an incentive for four performance measures (New Mexico, the District of Columbia, and the
Virgin Islands). (See Appendix, Table B-4.)
On the basis of the unaudited FY2005 performance incentive scores of the 54 jurisdictions, 53
jurisdictions received an incentive for all five performance measures and the remaining
jurisdiction (the District of Columbia) received an incentive for four performance measures. (See
Appendix, Table B-5.)
Table B-6 indicates that on the basis of the unaudited FY2006 performance incentive scores of
the 54 jurisdictions, 52 jurisdictions received an incentive for all five performance measures and
the remaining 2 jurisdictions (the District of Columbia and Guam) received an incentive for four
performance measures.
Given that the incentive payment is based on five performance measures, it is likely that all
jurisdictions would continue to receive some amount of incentive payments. However, if
individual performance measures are examined, a different picture develops; some states may not
perform well enough to receive an incentive payment with respect to one of the five performance
measures. Table B-2, Table B-3, Table B-4, and Table B-5 show actual incentive payments by
state (includes jurisdictions) for each of the four years FY2002-FY2005, respectively, along with 32
the five performance measures. The states in each of the tables are ranked from highest
performing state (relative to each indicator) to lowest performing state. These tables illustrate that
the relationship between actual performance and CSE incentive payments is not always
transparent. That is, even though a state may receive a high incentive payment, the state’s
performance on one or several individual performance measures may be very poor.
Child support collections are a very important component in determining the amount of a state’s
incentive payment. As mentioned earlier, incentive payments are a function of a state’s collections
base, which is composed of child support collected on behalf of current and former TANF
families multiplied by two plus the collection amount made on behalf of families who have never 33
been on TANF. The main reason that there is not a more direct relationship between incentive
payments and performance levels is that the incentive payment calculation is so heavily
dependent on child support collections.
Thus, a high collections base can mean that a state receives a high incentive payment despite low
performance measures. For example, although California received the highest incentive payment st
in each of the years FY2002-FY2005, it ranked very low with regard to cost-effectiveness (51 in thndstrd
FY2002, 50 in FY2003, 52 in FY2004, and 51 in FY2005); current collections (53 in stndthth
FY2002, 51 in FY2003, 52 in FY2004, and 50 in FY2005); and arrearage cases (40 in strdth
FY2002, 41 in FY2003, 43 in FY2004, and 37 in FY2005). However, because California
collected at least 31% more child support payments than the next ranking state (and at least 64%

32 OCSE has not yet published data showing the incentive payments received by states in FY2006.
33 State’s Collections Base = 2 x (TANF collections + Formerly on TANF collections) + Never on TANF collections.





of those collections were on behalf of TANF or former-TANF families), it is not surprising that
California received the highest amount of incentive payments in each of the years FY2002-34
FY2005. According to OCSE annual data reports, the top ten states with regard to collecting
child support (in FY2002-FY2005) were the top ten states with regard to high incentive payments
(although not in the same rank order).

The current performance-based incentive payments system is part of the CSE program’s strategic
plan to set goals and measure results. Despite a general consensus that the CSE program is doing
well, questions still arise about whether the program is effectively meeting its mission and
concerns exist over whether the program will be able to meet future expectations in light of recent
reductions in federal funding that were made pursuant to the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L.

109-171).


Some in the CSE “community” (e.g., states, CSE workers, analysts, state policymakers, and
advocates) contend that several factors may cause a state not to receive an incentive payment that
is commensurate with its relative performance on individual measures. These factors include
static or declining CSE collections; sliding scale performance scores that financially benefit states
at the upper end (but not the top) of the artificial threshold and financially disadvantage states at
the lower end of the artificial threshold; a limited number of performance indicators that do not
encompass all of the components critical to a successful CSE program; and a statutory maximum
on the aggregate amount of incentive payments that can be paid to states—which causes states to
have to compete with each other for their share of the capped funds.
Others point out that the current CSE incentive payment system was developed with much
thought and input from the CSE community. They maintain that the incentive payment formula
rewards states for their performance in five critical areas, consistent with the legislated mission of
the CSE program as well as the program’s strategic plan and related outcome measures. They say
that the performance thresholds were designed to provide tough but reachable targets for
performance by rewarding states with higher incentives as they improve. In addition, it is argued
that the annual cap on incentive payments (imposed by P.L. 105-200) has encouraged competition
among the states and that there is no evidence that the cap has stifled the motivation of states to
improve performance.
Many in the CSE community argue that any reduction in the federal government’s financial
commitment to the CSE system could negatively affect states’ ability to serve families. They
contend that a cost shift to the states (during this time when many interests are competing for
limited state dollars) could jeopardize the effectiveness of the CSE program and thereby could

34 California collected 31% more in child support payments than Texas in FY2002. In FY2003, California collected
41% more in child support payments than Texas. In FY2004, California collected 45% more in child support payments
than Texas and in FY2005, California collected 25% more in child support payments than Texas. California was the
highest ranked state with respect to CSE incentive payments in FY2002-FY2005, Texas was the next ranked state.
Given that the incentive formula gives more weight to child support collections made on behalf of TANF and former-
TANF families than on families that have never been on TANF, it is important to note that the majority of the child
support collected in California for the four years illustrated was on behalf of TANF and former-TANF families.
Specifically, in FY2002-FY2005, 75%, 64%, 71%, and 65% (respectively) of CSE collections in California were made
on behalf of TANF and former-TANF families.





have a negative impact on the children and families the CSE program is designed to serve.
Although most analysts agree that a reduction in CSE funding could result in a less effective CSE
program, several CSE directors who were surveyed in the Lewin Group study said that they
expected their states to replace all or most of federal funding shortfalls in the CSE program.
However, some of the directors moderated their statements by saying that the prospect of the state 35
replacing eliminated federal dollars with state dollars in years beyond FY2008 is uncertain.
This section discusses the following list of issues: (1) “Does the CSE Incentive Payment System
Reward Good Performance?” (2)”Should Incentive Payments Be Based on Additional
Performance Indicators?” (3) “Should TANF Funds Be Reduced Because of Poor CSE
Performance?” (4) “Why Aren’t the Incentives and Penalties Consistent for the Paternity
Establishment Performance Measure?” (5) “Should Incentive Payments Be Based on Individual
State Performance Rather Than Aggregate State Performance?” and (6) “Will the Elimination of
the Federal Match of Incentive Payments Adversely Affect CSE Programs?”
According to OCSE, all states received a CSE incentive payment in FY2006. This means that all
states attained a certain level of program performance. According to OCSE, for all five 36
performance measures, all states achieved applicable percentage scores that earned them
incentives. Moreover, a comparison of FY2002 data to FY2006 data shows that CSE program
performance has improved for all five performance measures. The national average for the
paternity establishment score increased from 73% (CSE measure rather than statewide measure)
in FY2002 to 90% in FY2006; the score for child support order establishment increased from
70% to 77%; the score for current child support collections increased from 58% to 60%; the score
for child support arrearage cases increased from 60% to 61%; and the cost-effectiveness score
increased from 4.13 to 4.58.
Nonetheless, many contend that the CSE incentive payment systems is too heavily based on child
support collections and that artificial thresholds adversely affect performance levels in that they
unfairly allow states that are performing at significantly higher levels than other states to be given
the same score (at the high end of the performance scale and at the low end of the performance
scale).
Ultimately the amount of a state’s incentive payment depends on how much the state collects in
child support payments. If a state has a small amount of child CSE collections, then even if it has
high performance percentages for all five measures, its CSE incentive payment would be small.

35 The Lewin Group. Anticipated Effects of the Deficit Reduction Act Provisions on Child Support Program Financing
and Performance Summary of Data Analysis and IV-D Director Calls. Prepared for the National Council of Child
Support Directors by the Legin Group and ECONorthwest. July 20, 2007. p. 4; http://www.nccsd.net/documents/
nccsd_final_report_revised_2_437782.pdf.
36 Two jurisdictions, the District of Columbia and Guam, received incentive payments in four rather than five
performance areas. The District of Columbia failed to meet the performance threshold for child support order
establishment and Guam failed to meet the cost-effectiveness threshold.





Total child support collections for a state may vary for a number of reasons. Some factors that
may influence the amount of child support a state collects include the population of the state, the
number of single parents in the state, the number of children in the state, the number of unmarried
parents in the state, the number of successful paternity determinations, the number of successful
child support order establishments, the size of the TANF caseload, the size of the former-TANF
caseload, the number of interstate cases, the effectiveness of the state’s CSE program, state per
capita income, state child poverty rate, and unemployment rate.
All of the performance measures have a sliding scale so that increased performance earns a higher 37
level of the incentive payment. However, they also all have upper and lower thresholds. This
means that above a certain percentage, all percentages are translated into the maximum applicable
percentage. By the same policy, all performance percentages that are below a certain threshold
percentage are translated into zero (i.e., the state would not be eligible for an incentive payment),
unless the program improves sufficiently and quickly.
For performance measures pertaining to the establishment of paternity or the establishment of
child support orders, if a state establishes paternity for at least 80% of its caseload or establishes a
child support order for at least 80% of its caseload, the state receives a percentage score of 100%.
In FY2006, this meant that Louisiana, a state that established paternity for 81.07% of the children
in the state without legally identified fathers, and Oklahoma, a state that established paternity for 38
122.12% of the children in the state without legally identified fathers, both received a paternity
establishment percentage score of 100%. Thus, states separated by more than 40 percentage
points received the same performance ranking—thereby not fully rewarding the performance of
the more successful state. With regard to the establishment of child support orders, in FY2006,
South Dakota, a state with an order establishment percentage of 92.98%, received the maximum
possible percentage score of 100% as did California, a state with a child support order
establishment percentage of 80.57%.
By the same reasoning, the lower threshold of 50% treats states establishing zero paternities and
zero child support orders the same as states establishing paternities or child support orders for
49% of their caseload. (In FY2006, only one jurisdiction (the District of Columbia—order
establishment [45.43%]) had an applicable percentage score below 50% for either paternity
establishment or child support order establishment.) (See Appendix, Table B-6.)
The upper threshold for the current collections performance measure also is 80% but the lower
threshold is 40%. The performance measure for current child support collections is based on the

37 P.L. 104-193 (enacted August 22, 1996), the 1996 welfare reform law directed the HHS Secretary to develop a new
revenue-neutral performance-based incentive payment system in consultation with state CSE directors. The federal
Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) convened an Incentive Funding Work Group in late 1996 to develop a
new incentive payment system. The work group consisted of 26 persons representing state and local CSE programs,
HHS regional offices, and the OCSE central office. The work group determined the minimum and maximum standards
(i.e., thresholds) for each performance measure based on historic performance by the states and state trends. In general,
the upper threshold was based on the view that most states could realistically achieve that level of performance.
38 States are able to establish paternities for more than 100% of children needing paternity established because the
paternity establishment performance measure compares current year data to previous years data and includes paternity
established on behalf of newborns born outside of marriage as well as older children who were born outside of
marriage.





amount of collections (i.e., a dollar measure). In FY2006, the thresholds were not an issue
because the highest percentage attained on the current collections performance measure was
74.65% (Pennsylvania) and the lowest percentage attained was 45.92% (Nevada). (See
Appendix, Table B-6.)
Likewise, the upper threshold for the arrearage (i.e., past-due) collections performance measure is 39
80% and the lower threshold is 40%. The performance measure for arrearage child support
collections assesses the state’s efforts to collect money from noncustodial parents for past-due
support (i.e., a case [“person”] measure). In FY2006, the thresholds were not an issue because the
highest percentage attained on the arrearage collections performance measure was 75.21%
(Pennsylvania) and the lowest percentage attained was 41.01% (Hawaii). (See Appendix, Table
B-6.)
The upper threshold for the cost-effectiveness performance measure is 5.0 and the lower
threshold is 2.0. In FY2006, Mississippi had a cost-effectiveness score of 9.45 and West Virginia
had a score of 5.00. Even though there was a 4.45 percentage point difference between the two
states, the applicable incentive percentage for those two states and the other 22 states with scores
of at least 5.0 was 100%. In FY2006, only one jurisdiction (Guam—1.84) was below the lower
threshold of 2.0. (See Appendix, Table B-6.)
The establishment and implementation of the current CSE incentive payment system was in part a
recognition that a single indicator (i.e., cost-effectiveness) could not effectively evaluate the
performance of the CSE program. The current CSE incentive payment system bases incentives on
the state’s success in achieving a number of goals, in addition to its ability to provide services in a
cost-effective manner. Incentive payments are tied to the rates of paternity establishment, child
support order establishment, collection of current child support payments, and collection of
arrearages (past-due child support payments), as well as the amount of child support collected for
each dollar spent (i.e., cost-effectiveness).
Some in the CSE community contend that several other indicators of performance have just as
much legitimacy as the five measures that were enacted. They include medical child support,
interstate collections, welfare cost avoidance, payment processing performance, and customer
service. In contrast, according to a report on the implementation of the CSE incentive payment
system, many states indicated that the five measures were adequate and that adding new ones 40
would be premature.

39 States that fail to attain an applicable percentage score of 40% with respect to arrearage collections can still earn an
incentive payment if the state improves its performance by at least 5 percentage points over its previous year’s score. A
financial penalty is not imposed on states that fail to meet specified performance levels with respect to the arrearage
collections performance measure.
40 Study of the Implementation of the Performance-Based Incentive System—Final Report. Prepared for the Office of
Child Support Enforcement by the Legin Group (Karen N. Gardiner, Michael E. Fishman, and Asaph Glosser) and
ECONorthwest (John Tapogna), 2004.





P.L. 105-200 required the HHS Secretary in consultation with state CSE directors and custodial
parents to develop a performance indicator that would measure the effectiveness of states in
establishing and enforcing medical child support obligations. Supporters maintained that a
medical child support measure would encourage states to strengthen their efforts to ensure that
every child who is eligible for CSE services has comprehensive health care coverage. But even
supporters of the proposal agree that not enough reliable data exist upon which to calculate a
medical child support measure. Some supporters have also expressed concern about the benefits
of implementing a performance measure before states have adequate tools to improve their 41
performance in this area. According to the CSE Justifications of Appropriations document for
FY2008, OCSE is developing two new indicators to measure the extent to which medical child
support is ordered and provided in child support cases. According to the Justifications, states have
submitted medical support performance measure data for FY2006 and during calendar year 2007 42
data reliability audits will be conducted on the medical child support data.
Many CSE workers contend that the most difficult child support orders to establish and enforce
are interstate cases. Although states are required to cooperate in interstate child support
enforcement, problems arise due to the autonomy of local courts. Family law has traditionally
been under the jurisdiction of state and local governments, and citizens fall under the jurisdiction
of the courts where they live. Many child support advocates argue that a child should not be
seriously disadvantaged in obtaining child support just because his or her parents do not live in
the same state. Despite several federal enforcement tools intended to facilitate the establishment
and enforcement of interstate collections, problems still exist. Given that about 33% of all CSE
cases involve more than one state, some analysts maintain that a performance indicator that
would measure whether states were successfully establishing and enforcing interstate child 43
support cases would significantly improve the overall effectiveness of the CSE program.
Others acknowledge the importance of interstate collections but argue that states are not yet in a
position to perform satisfactorily on an interstate performance measure. They acknowledge that
although interstate collections increased by 39% over the eight-year period FY1998-FY2006,
from $1.032 billion in FY1998 to $1.438 billion in FY2006, interstate collections (i.e., child
support collections forwarded to other states) comprised between 6% and 7% of total CSE
collections over the period FY1998-FY2006.

41 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Administration for Children and Families. Office of Child Support
Enforcement. 21 Million Children’s Health: Our Shared Responsibility - The Medical Child Support Working Groups
Report. June 2000. See Chapter 7.
42 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Administration for Children and Families FY2008 Justification of
Estimates for Appropriations Committee. February 2007. p. 259.
43 U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Ways and Means. 2004 Green Book: Background Material and Data
on the Programs Within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means. March 2004. WMCP:108-6, p. 8-43—
8-49.





Unlike other social services programs, the CSE program is intended to transfer private—not
public—funds to nonwelfare families enrolled in the program. Thus, the CSE program imposes
personal responsibility on noncustodial parents by requiring them to meet their financial
obligations to their children, thereby alleviating taxpayers of this responsibility. These child
support payments reduce government spending by providing families with incomes sufficient to
make them ineligible for programs such as TANF, food stamps, and Medicaid.
In FY2004, child support payments enabled 331,000 CSE families to end their TANF eligibility.
Research has indicated that families go on welfare less often and leave sooner when they receive
reliable child support payments. In addition, federal costs for Medicaid, food stamps, and other 44
means-tested programs decrease when both parents support their children.
Although it is difficult to determine how much money might have been spent on various public
assistance programs without the collection of child support payments, some analysts contend that
it would be good public policy to add a performance indicator that attempts to measure—or at
least estimate—the impact of CSE collections in reducing or eliminating costs in other public 45
benefit/welfare programs. Other analysts argue that adding a performance indicator to measure
welfare cost avoidance would only add more complexity to an already complicated incentive
payment system.
Some state policymakers and advocates want to look at an even broader set of factors when
evaluating their state CSE program. They maintain that a legitimate purpose of performance
standards in some instances is to set expectations. They contend that, because the CSE program
has expanded its mission from welfare cost recovery to include promotion of self-sufficiency and
personal responsibility and service delivery, it should account for payment processing
performance. Such a measure would try to capture whether or not child support payments were
accurately accounted, whether families were paid in a timely manner, and whether both custodial 46
and noncustodial parents were satisfied with the state’s CSE dispute resolution system.
Several persons who commented on the federal regulations for implementation of the CSE
incentive payment and audit penalty provisions said that incentive payments and financial

44 The Effects of Child Support on Welfare Exits and Re-entries, by Chien-Chung Huang, James Kunz, and Irwin
Garfinkel. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 21, No. 4, p. 557-576 (2002);
http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/Courses/PA882/Huangm%20et%20al_JPAM.pdf.
45 Urban Institute, prepared for the Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and
Families, Office of Child Support Enforcement, Child Support Cost Avoidance in 1999, Final Report, by Laura
Wheaton, June 6, 2003, Contract No. 105-00-8303; http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2003/reports/
cost_avoidance/#N10026.
46 National Conference of State Legislatures. Issue Brief: Accurately Evaluating State Child Support Program
Performance, by Teresa A. Myers; http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/PerformIB.htm.





penalties are at odds with each other because they affect different programs (i.e., CSE and 47
TANF). Incentive payments are given to states from federal CSE funding and penalties are 48
taken from a state’s TANF funding.
Historically, Congress has linked the CSE program and the TANF (and old AFDC) program.
Currently Section 402(a)(2) of the Social Security Act (Title IV-A which deals with TANF (and
used to pertain to the AFDC program)) stipulates that the Governor of a state must certify that it
will operate an approved CSE program as a condition of receiving TANF block grant funding.
Since the enactment of the CSE program in 1975, there has always been a provision in federal
law that linked poor performance (and penalties) or noncompliance in the CSE program with a
reduction in Title IV-A funding.
The principle that there are levels of state performance that would merit an incentive payment and
there are levels that would warrant a penalty was incorporated into the current CSE incentive
payment system. But, the law also provides that, before a penalty is imposed, states with lower
performance levels may be able to receive some incentive, provided their program improves 49
sufficiently and quickly. States with poor performance are able to still qualify for an incentive
payment if a significant increase over the previous year’s performance is achieved in those
measures (i.e., 10 percentage points on the paternity establishment performance level, 5
percentage points on the child support order establishment performance level, 5 percentage points
on the current support collections performance level, and 5 percentage points on the arrearage
collections performance level).
Federal law stipulates that with regard to the three “more important” performance measures,
states must achieve certain levels of performance in order to avoid being penalized for poor
performance. The three performance measures are: paternity establishment, child support order
establishment, and collection of current child support payments. A graduated penalty equal to a

1% to 5% reduction in federal TANF block grant funds is assessed against states that fail to meet 50


the CSE performance requirements.
Although there is an interaction between the incentive payment and financial penalty systems,
they affect different programs. Thus, even if a state’s incentive payment is larger than any penalty
assessed against the state, the state cannot easily reconcile the difference because the state is
required to reinvest incentive payments back into the CSE program. The state would have to
expend other state funds (that are not earmarked for the CSE program) to replace the loss in
TANF funding.

47 Federal Register, Vol. 64, No. 249. Office of Child Support Enforcement, Department of Health and Human
Services. Child Support Enforcement Program; Incentive Payments, Audit Penalties. Final Rule. December 27, 2000
(p. 50 of 71).
48 Even in cases in which the amount of the child support payment incentive is larger than the amount of the TANF
penalty imposed, a state is required to reinvest its incentive payment in its CSE program, while penalties are assessed
from the TANF funding stream. States that acquire a penalty would find that each quarterly TANF payment for the
upcoming year would be reduced for a total of the TANF penalty amount. These states would then additionally have to
expend an equivalent amount of state funds if they wanted to replace the reduction of federal funds.
49 Under this alternative improvement formula, the CSE incentive payment can never be more than half (50%) of the
maximum incentive possible. The cost-effectiveness performance indicator is the only measure whereby improved
performance does not translate into an incentive payment.
50 The percentage reduction depends on number of times a state fails to comply with CSE state plan requirements (i.e.,
at least 1% but not more than 2% for the 1st failure to comply, at least 2% but not more than 3% for the 2nd failure, and rd
at least 3% but not more than 5% for the 3 and subsequent failures).





An alternative to imposing penalties in the form of reducing TANF funding to a state for the
inadequacies of its CSE program would be to reduce funding for the CSE program instead. This
could be done by taking the financial penalty out of the state’s incentive payment and/or
subtracting the penalty from the federal government’s 66% matching funds to the state.
Unlike the other performance measures, the paternity establishment indicator has two separate
standards to which it must adhere. First, the Paternity Establishment Percentage (PEP), must meet
a 90% standard (Section 452(g) of the Social Security Act). This means that federal law currently
requires that states must establish paternity for at least 90% of the children who need to have their
father legally identified in order to substantially comply with the requirements of the CSE 51
program.
If a state does not meet the PEP, it must raise its performance by a specified level of improvement
in order to avoid having a financial penalty imposed. The percentage of improvement required
varies with a state’s performance level. The increase needed to avoid a penalty decreases with
higher PEP scores until a state reaches a 90% or higher PEP, at which point the penalty is avoided 52
without an increase in performance. For example, a state with a PEP of less than 40% needs a 6
percentage point increase over the prior year to avoid the penalty. Whereas, a state with a PEP
between 75% and 90% needs a 2 percentage point increase over the previous year to avoid the 53
penalty. If the state fails to increase the PEP by the necessary percentage points after a
corrective action period, the state is penalized by a 1%-5% reduction in its state’s TANF funding.
Second, in a separate provision (Section 458 of the Social Security Act) the PEP is included as
one of the five CSE performance measures. Thus, states can receive incentive payments if their
PEP meets certain requirements. The incentive payment provision with respect to the PEP is
consistent with the view of the CSE community that only poor performance should be penalized.
Thus, under the incentive formula, an incentive is awarded to a state with a PEP of 50% or more.
The incentive formula provides that a state that achieves a PEP of 80% or more will receive 100%
of the applicable state collection’s base for that measure. If a state has a PEP of less than 50%, the

51 The original Paternity Establishment Percentage (PEP) was enacted into law as part of the Family Support Act of
1988 (P.L. 100-485, Section 452(g) of the Social Security Act). The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (P.L.
103-66) increased the percentage of children for whom a state must establish paternity (PEP) from 50% to 75%. P.L.
103-66 also imposed financial penalties against states that failed to comply with the mandatory paternity standards. The
financial penalty translated into a reduction in federal matching funds for the states AFDC program. P.L. 104-193, the
1996 welfare reform law, raised the PEP from 75% to 90%.
52 Report on State Child Support Enforcement Performance Penalties. Recommendations of the State/Federal Penalties
Work Group. July 27, 1998; http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pol/DCL/1998/dcl9893a.htm.
53 A state with a paternity establishment percentage at a level between 75% and 90% is required to increase its paternity
establishment percentage by two percentage points over the previous year’s percentage. A state with a paternity
establishment percentage at a level between 50% and 75% is required to increase its paternity establishment percentage
by three percentage points over the previous year’s percentage. A state with a paternity establishment percentage at a
level between 45% and 50% is required to increase its paternity establishment percentage by four percentage points
over the previous year’s percentage. A state with a paternity establishment percentage at a level between 40% and 45%
is required to increase its paternity establishment percentage by five percentage points over the previous years
percentage. A state with a paternity establishment percentage at a level less than 40% is required to increase its
paternity establishment percentage by six percentage points over the previous years percentage.





state must increase its PEP score by at least 10 percentage points over the previous year’s score in
order to receive an incentive payment.
From the outset of the performance measure debate (1996-1998), there was a concern about
whether states should be subject to penalties and be eligible for incentives at the same time. Some
argued that the lack of an incentive payment would make some states doubly penalized by not
improving performance. It was decided that states should be eligible for incentive payments based
on performance even if they were subject to penalties because their performance had not 54
improved to the extent required to avoid the penalty. The work group that developed the current
incentive payment system maintained that the existing statutory PEP standard of 90% was too
high and that it conflicted with their premise that only very poor performance should be
penalized. Thus, the work group overlaid another provision on top of existing law which provided
that a state that had a PEP of 80% or higher would receive 100% of the applicable state
collection’s base for the paternity establishment performance measure. This new PEP for
incentive payment purposes created what many maintain is an inconsistency in CSE law.
According to the National Council of Child Support Directors:
It is inconsistent to reward a state that achieves a paternity establishment percentage of 80%
with maximum child support incentive funding, but impose a penalty against the States
TANF funding if a 2 percentage point increase is not achieved between 80% and 90% 55
performance.
The National Council of Child Support Directors recommended that “the paternity establishment
penalty provisions set the upper threshold at 80%, which will then make it consistent and uniform
with the existing incentive formula under which a state that has a paternity establishment 56
percentage of 80% or more receives 100% of the weight allowable for that measure.” If this
recommendation was enacted into law, states would be required to establish paternity for at least
80% of the children who need to have their father legally identified rather than 90% (as required
by current law).
The CSE incentive payment system adds an element of uncertainty to what used to be a
somewhat predictable source of income for states. Although in the aggregate, states receive
higher incentive payments than under the earlier incentive payment system, these totals are a
fixed amount, and individual states have to compete with each other for their share of the capped
funds. The revenue-neutral capped incentive payment system creates an interactive effect—an
increase in incentive payments to one state must be matched by a decrease in payments to other
states. Similarly, if one state’s performance weakens or the state fails an audit, every other state 57
obtains an increase in incentive payments.

54 Incentive Funding Work Group: Report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. January 31, 1997. p. 9.
55 National Council of Child Support Directors. Position Paper on Paternity Performance Penalty Revisions, February
24, 2005.
56 Ibid.
57 Study of the Implementation of the Performance-Based Incentive System—Interim Report, by the Lewin Group
(continued...)





Although CSE incentive payments were constructed to compare a state’s program performance to
itself rather than a “national average,” the fixed amount of aggregate incentive payments forces a 58
state to compete with the other states for its share of the aggregate amount.
Under the current incentive system, whether or not a state receives an incentive payment for good
performance and the total amount of the incentive payment depend on four factors: the total
amount of money available in a given fiscal year from which to make incentive payments, the
state’s success in obtaining collections on behalf of its caseload, the state’s performance in five
areas, and the relative success or failure of other states in making collections and meeting these
performance criteria. Because the incentive payments are now capped, some states face a loss of
incentive payments even if they improve their performance.
Some analysts argue that each state is unique in terms of its CSE caseload and thereby should
only have to make improvements over its performance in previous years with regard to rewarding
of incentive payments. Nevertheless, CSE programs are compared to one another in that there is a
capped funding source and it must be shared by all. So even though Texas has a large CSE
caseload, shares an international border, and has vast cultural and socioeconomic diversity among
its residents, its program is in essence compared to that of a small mid-western state or a wealthy 59
northeastern state in determining its share of CSE incentive dollars.
Others contend that if a state deems that it has not received a sufficient amount of incentive
payments and that more CSE funding is necessary, it is the state’s prerogative to augment federal
funding. They maintain that the federal government is carrying too much of the financial burden
of CSE program. They point out that the federal government matches state funds at a 66% rate
and additionally provides states with incentive payments.
As mentioned earlier, the CSE funding structure requires states to spend state dollars on the
program in order to receive federal matching funds. An important source of those states’ dollars
has been CSE incentive payments. CSE incentive payments represent a significant percentage of
CSE financing for the states. A 2003 report commissioned by HHS indicated that for the nation as 60
a whole, federal CSE incentive payments represented 25% of CSE financing for the states.

(...continued)
(Karen Gardiner, Michael Fishman, and Asaph Glosser) and ECONorthwest (John Tapogna). Prepared for the Office of
Child Support Enforcement. October 2003. p. 9 and p. 20.
58 P.L. 105-200 stipulated that the aggregate incentive payment to the states could not exceed the following amounts,
i.e., $422 million for FY2000, $429 million for FY2001; $450 million for FY2002; $461 million for FY2003, $454
million for FY2004; $446 million for FY2005; $458 million for FY2006; $471 million for FY2007; and $483 million
for FY2008. For years after FY2008, the aggregate incentive payment to the states is to be increased to account for
inflation.
59 National Conference of State Legislatures. Issue Brief: Accurately Evaluating State Child Support Program
Performance, by Teresa A. Myers; http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/PerformIB.htm.
60 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. State Financing of Child Support Enforcement Programs: Final
Report, prepared for the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation and the Office of Child Support Enforcement,
prepared by Michael E. Fishman, Kristin Dybdal of the Legin Group, Inc. and John Tapogna of ECONorthwest,
September 3, 2003, p. iii.





Until now, states have received a 66% federal match for every dollar invested in the CSE
program, including incentive payments (which came from the federal government). Although
incentive payments per se are not affected, P.L. 109-171 included a provision that eliminated
(effective October 1, 2007) the federal match on CSE incentive payments that states, in
compliance with federal law, reinvest back into the CSE program. This provision was passed as
part of the Deficit Reduction Act because many argued that “reinvesting” incentive payments
back into the CSE program was really supplanting state funding. States are no longer entitled to
receive federal matching funds for CSE incentive payments that the state reinvests in the CSE
program. The elimination of federal reimbursement of CSE incentive payments is likely to result
in a significant reduction in CSE financing. Two bills (H.R. 1386/S. 803) have been introduced in th
the 110 Congress to repeal the provision that eliminates the federal match on incentive
payments. In other words, both bills would restore the federal match on incentive payments.
Under previous law, the 66% federal matching rate on incentive payments resulted in a near
tripling of state CSE funding—in that for every dollar the state reinvested in the CSE program, 61
the federal government matched that investment with about $2. Thereby, states were able to
significantly leverage their investment through the federal financial structure.
Both a 2003 study by the Lewin Group (mentioned earlier) and a recent 2007 study by the Lewin
Group indicate that CSE incentive payments represent 25% of all funds used to draw down the
federal match for the CSE program. According to the Lewin study:
... there is substantial variation across states in the proportion of the state share financed by
incentives (from 7 percent to 54 percent). This variation may be due to a number of factors,
such as poor state performance on incentive measures (thus low incentive payments) or
higher appropriations from state legislatures. Similarly, the decrease in expenditures 62
assuming no new state outlays ranges from 5 percent to 36 percent.
The 2007 Lewin study also indicates that because about a third of the CSE caseload is composed
of interstate cases, CSE directors expect that the elimination of the federal match on incentive
payments will probably result in negative interstate ramifications. The study uses the following
illustration.
For example, consider two states. State A replaces funding and maintains strong
performance, but State B cuts back services due to funding shortfalls and performance
declines. State A needs assistance from State B on interstate cases, but State B cuts back staff 63
on this labor-intensive unit. State A’s performance is affected negatively as a result.

61 The general CSE federal matching rate is 66%. This means that for every dollar that a state spends on its CSE
program, the federal government will reimburse the state 66 cents. So if the state spends $1 on its program, the federal
share of that expenditure is 66 cents and the state share of that expenditure is 34 cents. The algebraic formula for this
relationship is represented by .66/.34=x/1. Thereby, if the state share of the expenditure is $1, the federal share is $1.94
(i.e., the federal share is 1.94 times the state share), and the total expenditure by the state is $2.94 ($1+$1.94).
Similarly, if the state share of expenditures amounted solely to the incentive payment of $471 million (i.e., the statutory
cap on the aggregate CSE incentive payment for FY2007), the federal share would amount to 1.94 times that amount,
or $914 million, translating into $1.385 billion in total CSE expenditures/funding.
62 The Lewin Group. Anticipated Effects of the Deficit Reduction Act Provisions on Child Support Program Financing
and Performance Summary of Data Analysis and IV-D Director Calls. Prepared for the National Council of Child
Support Directors by the Lewin Group and ECONorthwest. July 20, 2007. p. 4; http://www.nccsd.net/documents/
nccsd_final_report_revised_2_437782.pdf.
63 Ibid., p. iv.





It is generally agreed that state spending/investment in the CSE program significantly impacts
program performance. Several studies have indicated that most of the best-performing state CSE 64
programs also have the most generous funding levels. The elimination of the federal match of
incentive payments is expected to reduce overall CSE program expenditures and correspondingly
reduce the rate of growth of child support collections. The OCSE expects that while states will
increase their state contributions to cover some of the lost federal funds, they will not completely 65
make up the shortfall and overall CSE expenditures will be reduced.

64 Center for Law and Social Policy. You Get What You Pay For: How Federal and State Investment Decisions Affect
Child Support Performance, by Vicki Turetsky. December 1998. See also National Conference of State Legislatures.
Issue Brief: Accurately Evaluating State Child Support Program Performance, by Teresa A. Myers.
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/PerformIB.htm
65 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Administration for Children and Families. Fiscal Year 2008
Justification of Estimates for Appropriations Committees. Child Support Enforcement. p. 443-445.







Before enactment of the CSE program in 1975, when a state or locality collected child support
payments from a noncustodial parent on behalf of a family receiving Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC), the federal government was reimbursed for its share of the cost of 66
AFDC payments to the family. Although local units of government (e.g., counties) often
enforced child support obligations, in most states they did not make any financial contributions
toward funding AFDC benefit payments. Therefore the localities were not eligible for any share
of the “savings” that occurred when child support was collected from a noncustodial parent on
behalf of an AFDC family. From the debate on the establishment of a CSE program, Congress
concluded that a fiscal sharing in the results of child support collections could be a strong 67
incentive for encouraging the local units of government to improve their CSE activities.
Although the formal CSE program was not in existence, P.L. 90-248 provided for the
development and implementation of a program under which a state agency would undertake the
responsibility for (1) determining the paternity of children receiving AFDC and who were born
outside of marriage, and (2) securing financial support from the noncustodial parent for these and
other children receiving AFDC, using reciprocal arrangements with other states to obtain and
enforce court orders for support. (P.L. 89-97, the Social Security Amendments of 1965 (enacted
July 30, 1965), allowed states to use the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) to
determine federal-state cost sharing for Title IV-A (i.e., AFDC expenditures), which ranged from
a minimum of 50% to a maximum of 83%.) Title IV-A included the child support enforcement
provisions indicated above. This meant that if a state collected child support payments on behalf
of an AFDC family, the federal government would be reimbursed at the state’s FMAP. If the state
had an FMAP of 60%, the federal government was reimbursed $60 for every $100 the state
collected (from the noncustodial parent) in child support payments for AFDC families.

P.L. 93-647 required that if a child support collection were made by any locality in the state or by
the state for another state, that locality or state was to receive a special bonus—incentive
payment—based on the amount of any child support collected from a noncustodial parent to
reimburse amounts paid out as AFDC. The incentive payment was equal to 25% of the amount of
child support collected on behalf of AFDC families for the first 12 months and 10% thereafter.
The incentive payment came out of the federal share of the child support recovered (i.e., 69
collected) on behalf AFDC families.

66 The federal share of AFDC benefit expenditures ranged from 50% to 83%, depending on state per capita income.
67 U.S. Senate. Committee on Finance. Social Services Amendments of 1974; a report to accompany H.R. 17045.
December 14, 1974. S.Rept. 93-1356. p. 50-51.
68 The CSE program was enacted as Title IV-D of the Social Security Act.
69 P.L. 93-647 stipulated that child support payments on behalf of AFDC families were to be paid to the states
following an assignment of child support rights by the AFDC client to the state. Because federal dollars were used to
(continued...)





P.L. 95-30 changed the rate at which incentives were paid to states and localities for child support
collections used to reimburse AFDC payments. This amendment to Section 458 of the Social
Security Act simplified the complex process of computing incentive payments at two different
rates by adopting a flat 15% incentive payment rate. The incentive payment was now equal to
15% of child support collections made on behalf of AFDC families. The incentive payment came
out of the federal share of the child support recovered (i.e., collected) on behalf AFDC families.
P.L. 97-248 reduced the incentive payment rate from 15% of child support collections made on
behalf of AFDC families to 12% of child support collections made on behalf of AFDC families.
The incentive payment came out of the federal share of the child support recovered (i.e.,
collected) on behalf AFDC families.
P.L. 98-378 significantly revised incentive payments. Instead of making incentive payments to
localities and states that collected child support payments on another state’s behalf, the federal 70
government made the incentive payments directly to the states and each state was required to
pass incentive payments through to local CSE agencies if those agencies shared in funding the
state CSE program. In order to improve cost-effectiveness and encourage states to emphasize
child support collections on behalf of both AFDC and non-AFDC families, the incentive payment
formula was changed so that states were paid a minimum of 6% of their child support collections
in AFDC cases and 6% of their child support collections in non-AFDC cases. Under this
approach, there was the potential to earn up to 10% of both AFDC and non-AFDC child support
collections depending on the state’s cost-effectiveness in running a child support program (i.e.,
ratio of state collections to the state’s cost of operating the CSE program). The federal
government paid the incentive payments from its share of retained collections for AFDC families
and capped the amount of incentive payments any state could earn on the non-AFDC cases at

(...continued)
finance a portion of the state AFDC benefit payment, states were required to split child support payments collected on
behalf of AFDC families with the federal government. The child support collections obtained on behalf of AFDC
families are divided between the state and the federal government according to their respective share of total AFDC
benefit payments (a small percentage of AFDC collections is paid directly to families). As noted above, the federal
share of AFDC benefit expenditures ranged from 50% to 83%, depending on state per capita income. The federal share
is also called the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage or FMAP.
70 Before 1984, a state that initiated a successful action to collect child support from another state did not receive an
incentive payment. Rather, the state that made the collection received the incentive payment. P.L. 98-378 stipulated
that each state involved in an interstate child support collection be credited with the collection for purposes of
computing the incentive payment. This “double-counting” was intended to encourage states to pursue interstate child
support cases as energetically as they pursued intrastate child support cases.





115%71 of the AFDC incentive payment earned. The incentive payments came out of the federal
share of the child support recovered (i.e., collected) on behalf AFDC families.
P.L. 100-485 included a provision that authorized Congress to create a U.S. Commission on
Interstate Child Support to make recommendations to Congress on improving the child support
program. That Commission’s report called for a study of the federal funding formula and changes
to an incentive structure that is based on performance. In addition, other national organizations,
including the National Conference of State Legislatures, the American Public Welfare Association
(now the American Public Human Services Association, APHSA), the National Governors
Association, and several national advocacy organizations recommended the adoption of a new 72
performance-based incentive system.
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193)
required the HHS Secretary, in consultation with state CSE program directors, to recommend to
Congress a new incentive funding system for state CSE programs based on program performance.
P.L. 104-193 required that (1) the new incentive funding system be developed in a revenue-
neutral manner; (2) the new system provide additional payments to any state based on that state’s
performance; and (3) the Secretary report to Congress on the proposed new system by March 1,

1997.


The Incentive Funding Workgroup was formed in October 1996. This group consisted of 15 state
and local CSE directors or their representatives and 11 federal staff representatives from HHS.
Earlier efforts of this state-federal partnership produced the National Strategic Plan for the CSE
program and a set of outcome measures to indicate the program’s success in achieving the goals
and objectives of the plan. Using the same collaboration and consensus-building approach, state
and federal partners recommended a new incentive funding system based on the foundation of the
CSE National Strategic Plan.
Over a period of three months, recommendations for the new incentive funding system emerged.
State partners consulted with state CSE programs not represented directly on the Workgroup. The
final recommendations represented a consensus among state and federal partners on the new
incentive funding system. The Secretary fully endorsed the incentive formula recommendations.
The Secretary’s report made recommendations for a new CSE incentive payment system to the 73
House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance.

71 The total amount of incentives awarded for non-AFDC collections could not exceed the amount of the states
incentive payments for AFDC collections for FY1986 and FY1987. The incentive paid for non-AFDC collections was
capped at 105% of the incentive for AFDC collections for FY1988, 110% for FY1989, and 115% for FY1990 and
years thereafter.
72 The incentive payment system had been criticized for focusing on only one aspect of the CSE program: cost-
effectiveness. It was faulted for not rewarding states for other important aspects of child support enforcement, such as
paternity and support order establishment. In addition, because all states received the minimum incentive payment
amount of 6% of both AFDC and non-AFDC collections regardless of the states performance, many analysts claimed
that the CSE incentive payment system did not have a real incentive effect.
73 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Administration for Children and Families. Office of Child Support
(continued...)





Most of the HHS Secretary’s recommendations for a new incentive payment system were
included in P.L. 105-200. This law replaced the old incentive payment system to states with a
revised revenue-neutral incentive payment system that provides (1) incentive payments based on
a percentage of the state’s collections; (2) incorporation of five performance measures related to
establishment of paternity and child support orders, collections of current and past-due support
payments, and cost-effectiveness; (3) phase-in of the incentive system, with it being fully
effective beginning in FY2002; (4) mandatory reinvestment of incentive payments into the CSE
program (or an activity that contributes to improving the effectiveness or efficiency of the CSE
program); and (5) an incentive payment formula weighted in favor of TANF and former TANF
families.
P.L. 105-200 required the HHS Secretary to make incentive payments to the states and stipulated
that the aggregate incentive payment to the states could not exceed the following amounts: $422 74
million for FY2000, $429 million for FY2001, $450 million for FY2002, $461 million for
FY2003, $454 million for FY2004, $446 million for FY2005, $458 million for FY2006, $471
million for FY2007, and $483 million for FY2008. For years after FY2008, the aggregate
incentive payment to the states is to be increased to account for inflation.
P.L. 109-171 included a provision that eliminated (effective October 1, 2007) the 66% federal
match on CSE incentive payments that states, in compliance with federal law, reinvest back into
the CSE program. This means that CSE incentive payments that are received by states and
reinvested in the CSE program are no longer eligible for federal reimbursement.

(...continued)
Enforcement. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Funding. Report to the House of Representatives Committee on
Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance. February 1997.
74 Before FY2002, CSE incentive payments were paid out of the federal share of child support collected on behalf of
TANF families. Since October 1, 2001 (when the revised incentive payment system was fully phased-in), CSE
incentive payments have been paid with federal funds that have been specifically appropriated out of the U.S. Treasury.






Appendix B includes several detailed state tables. Table B-1 shows that all states received
incentive payments in FY2002, FY2003, FY2004, and FY2005 and the amounts they received.
Table B-2 presents CSE incentive payments for FY2002 together with unaudited incentive
performance scores for each of the five performance measures for FY2002. Table B-3 presents
CSE incentive payments for FY2003 together with unaudited incentive performance scores for
each of the five performance measures for FY2003. Table B-4 presents CSE incentive payments
for FY2004 together with unaudited incentive performance scores for each of the five
performance measures for FY2004. Table B-5 presents CSE incentive payments for FY2005
together with unaudited incentive performance scores for each of the five performance measures 75
for FY2005. Table B-6 shows only the unaudited incentive performance scores for FY2006.

75 OCSE has not yet published CSE incentive payment data by state for FY2006.




Table B-1. Actual Incentive Payments, by State, FY2002-FY2005
(arranged by state with the highest incentive payment to state with the lowest incentive payment)
State FY2002 State FY2003 State FY2004 State FY2005
1 California 36,814,328 1 California 45,258,302 1 California 43,917,140 1 California 41,743,556
2 Texas 33,815,354 2 Texas 36,825,204 2 Texas 35,018,030 2 Texas 37,594,823
3 Ohio 32,204,888 3 New York 30,829,027 3 Ohio 30,840,836 3 Ohio 28,985,608
4 Pennsylvania 30,284,824 4 Ohio 30,351,415 4 Michigan 29,072,933 4 New York 26,242,919
5 New York 30,176,739 5 Pennsylvania 29,533,145 5 Pennsylvania 26,532,361 5 Michigan 26,035,157
6 Michigan 30,128,156 6 Michigan 27,371,576 6 New York 26,298,854 6 Pennsylvania 25,422,058
7 Florida 21,261,888 7 Florida 22,545,490 7 Florida 25,086,328 7 Florida 25,263,730
8 New Jersey 17,367,328 8 New Jersey 17,895,131 8 New Jersey 16,335,761 8 New Jersey 15,974,982
9 Wisconsin 15,924,085 9 Wisconsin 15,632,872 9 Wisconsin 14,529,242 9 Wisconsin 13,748,475
iki/CRS-RL3420310 Washington 15,204,033 10 Washington 14,675,136 10 Washington 13,445,851 10 North Carolina 13,461,627
g/w
s.or11 Minnesota 13,555,076 11 Minnesota 13,492,130 11 Minnesota 13,048,434 11 Washington 12,719,377
leak12 Georgia 11,999,643 12 North Carolina 12,209,075 12 North Carolina 12,807,092 12 Minnesota 12,135,231
://wiki13 North Carolina 11,741,877 13 Virginia 11,431,758 13 Virginia 10,673,373 13 Georgia 10,808,188
http14 Virginia 11,212,586 14 Georgia 10,453,125 14 Georgia 10,574,394 14 Virginia 10,237,234
15 Massachusetts 9,717,960 15 Massachusetts 9,958,854 15 Missouri 10,525,886 15 Missouri 10,204,439
16 Maryland 8,749,496 16 Missouri 8,653,176 16 Massachusetts 9,168,115 16 Massachusetts 8,898,038
17 Missouri 8,496,830 17 Kentucky 7,954,630 17 Illinois 8,440,244 17 Illinois 8,650,633
18 Kentucky 8,088,515 18 Tennessee 7,716,005 18 Tennessee 7,766,731 18 Indiana 8,385,495
19 Iowa 7,126,528 19 Iowa 7,220,705 19 Kentucky 7,627,918 19 Tennessee 7,837,795
20 Tennessee 6,811,758 20 Illinois 7,166,179 20 Iowa 7,247,439 20 Maryland 7,303,489
21 Oregon 6,541,362 21 Maryland 6,537,765 21 Indiana 7,080,909 21 Iowa 6,917,274
22 Illinois 6,183,369 22 Oregon 6,336,173 22 Oregon 5,956,034 22 Louisiana 6,213,377
23 Indiana 5,564,581 23 Louisiana 6,130,392 23 Louisiana 5,878,940 23 Oregon 5,600,727
24 Connecticut 5,491,503 24 Indiana 5,552,522 24 Maryland 5,478,845 24 Arizona 5,423,112




State FY2002 State FY2003 State FY2004 State FY2005
25 Colorado 5,356,965 25 Arizona 5,065,465 25 Arizona 4,992,036 25 Kentucky 5,208,111
26 Arizona 5,206,147 26 Colorado 4,920,924 26 Colorado 4,833,238 26 Connecticut 4,865,914
27 Louisiana 4,389,087 27 West Virginia 4,209,015 27 Alabama 3,923,947 27 Colorado 4,750,251
28 West Virginia 4,058,389 28 Alabama 4,001,595 28 West Virginia 3,775,411 28 Alabama 4,020,646
29 South Carolina 3,899,715 29 Connecticut 3,942,741 29 Utah 3,677,929 29 West Virginia 3,879,643
30 Arkansas 3,217,437 30 South Carolina 3,928,609 30 Nebraska 3,635,367 30 Oklahoma 3,643,878
31 Puerto Rico 3,201,676 31 Utah 3,493,011 31 South Carolina 3,605,396 31 Nebraska 3,475,303
32 Utah 3,101,832 32 Puerto Rico 3,463,489 32 Connecticut 3,455,259 32 South Carolina 3,321,883
33 Nebraska 3,056,992 33 Arkansas 3,146,484 33 Oklahoma 3,437,279 33 Kansas 3,289,970
34 Alabama 2,900,775 34 Kansas 3,105,801 34 Arkansas 3,361,187 34 Utah 3,288,628
35 Oklahoma 2,899,609 35 Nebraska 3,089,869 35 Kansas 3,306,309 35 Puerto Rico 3,268,672
iki/CRS-RL3420336 Kansas 2,873,656 36 Oklahoma 3,056,022 36 Puerto Rico 3,273,456 36 Mississippi 3,222,870
g/w37 Maine 2,596,197 37 Maine 2,556,766 37 Mississippi 3,246,021 37 Arkansas 2,490,610
s.or38 Mississippi 2,526,611 38 Mississippi 2,482,905 38 Maine 2,339,229 38 Idaho 2,389,857
leak
39 Alaska 1,679,107 39 Idaho 2,216,477 39 Idaho 2,335,547 39 Maine 2,167,195
://wiki40 South Dakota 1,656,493 40 Alaska 2,140,882 40 Alaska 1,934,767 40 Nevada 1,826,744
http41 Idaho 1,650,232 41 New Hampshire 1,982,008 41 New Hampshire 1,803,991 41 Alaska 1,809,329
42 New Hampshire 1,438,353 42 South Dakota 1,660,526 42 Hawaii 1,566,788 42 New Hampshire 1,650,128
43 Montana 1,202,605 43 Hawaii 1,588,312 43 North Dakota 1,542,418 43 North Dakota 1,560,854
44 Wyoming 1,201,957 44 Nevada 1,293,543 44 South Dakota 1,517,780 44 South Dakota 1,466,513
45 North Dakota 1,192,916 45 North Dakota 1,264,209 45 Nevada 1,355,443 45 Hawaii 1,431,973
46 Vermont 1,127,161 46 Wyoming 1,163,775 46 Rhode Island 1,270,822 46 Rhode Island 1,211,250
47 Delaware 1,034,185 47 Montana 1,155,004 47 Delaware 1,265,209 47 Wyoming 1,163,702
48 Rhode Island 1,016,821 48 Vermont 1,086,334 48 Vermont 1,197,334 48 New Mexico 1,055,389
49 Hawaii 973,201 49 Delaware 970,247 49 Wyoming 1,180,509 49 Montana 1,028,469
50 Nevada 857,000 50 Rhode Island 962,198 50 Montana 1,061,120 50 Vermont 977,267
51 New Mexico 554,604 51 New Mexico 672,821 51 New Mexico 970,705 51 Delaware 900,305




State FY2002 State FY2003 State FY2004 State FY2005
52 District of Columbia 502,393 52 District of Columbia 491,354 52 District of Columbia 597,907 52 District of Columbia 598,507
53 Guam 101,209 53 Virgin Islands 99,488 53 Virgin Islands 105,718 53 Guam 119,823
54 Virgin Islands 63,968 54 Guam 60,339 54 Guam 80,188 54 Virgin Islands 108,972
Total 450,000,000 Total 461,000,000 Total 454,000,000 Total 446,000,000
Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on data from the Office of Child Support Enforcement, Department of Health and Human Services.
Note: The shaded areas shows the rank order of each state from state with the highest incentive payment (ranked 1) to the state withe the lowest incentive payment
(ranked 54). The four jurisdictions of the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands are included in the state totals.
Table B-2. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Payments and Unaudited Incentive Performance Scores, FY2002
(arranged by highest performing state to lowest performing state)
Incentive Paternity Establish-Cases with Current Arrearage Cost-Effective-
Payments State ment State Orders State Collections State Cases State ness
iki/CRS-RL34203(dollars) Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Score
g/w
s.or14,328 Guam 452.87a South Dakota 92.03 Pennsylvania 74.70 New 71.58 Indiana 7.80
leakHampshire
33,815,354 Idaho 130.75 Washington 91.00 Minnesota 72.96 Pennsylvania 70.68 South Dakota 7.59
://wiki32,204,888 Montana 113.07 Iowa 87.79 Wisconsin 72.68 Vermont 70.64 Mississippi 7.12
http
84,824 Texas 108.43 Maine 87.17 North 71.55 South Dakota 68.59 Pennsylvania 6.85
Dakota
York 30,176,739 California 107.94 Vermont 85.80 South Dakota 67.70 Washington 68.33 Hawaii 6.53
28,156 New 106.74 Utah 85.11 Ohio 66.77 Delaware 67.83 Virginia 6.34
Hampshire
61,888 South Dakota 106.46 North 84.76 Nebraska 66.49 Ohio 67.46 Puerto Rico 6.27
Dakota
Jersey 17,367,328 Pennsylvania 106.01 Colorado 83.46 Vermont 66.34 Alaska 67.39 Wisconsin 6.11
24,085 Ohio 103.38 Montana 83.10 New 65.51 North 66.12 South 5.87
Hampshire Dakota Carolina
15,204,033 Colorado 102.85 Pennsylvania 82.97 New York 65.12 Colorado 66.10 Oregon 5.85
13,555,076 Washington 100.88 Alaska 82.90 New Jersey 65.00 Utah 66.04 Massachusetts 5.77




Incentive Paternity Establish-Cases with Current Arrearage Cost-Effective-
Payments State ment State Orders State Collections State Cases State ness
(dollars) Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Score
11,999,643 Wyoming 97.78 Wyoming 82.75 Washington 63.98 Minnesota 65.07 Iowa 5.63
11,741,877 Illinois 97.06 New 82.02 West Virginia 62.33 Texas 64.45 Texas 5.41
Hampshire
11,212,586 Maryland 96.67 Virginia 80.20 Maryland 62.02 Maryland 64.29 Idaho 5.29
usetts 9,717,960 Wisconsin 94.50 Wisconsin 78.99 North 61.26 Montana 63.72 Wyoming 5.00
Carolina
8,749,496 Oregon 94.40 Missouri 78.93 Rhode Island 61.11 Iowa 63.34 Washington 4.95
8,496,830 Vermont 94.08 New Jersey 78.90 Delaware 60.74 Florida 62.83 Louisiana 4.87
8,088,515 Maine 93.56 Idaho 78.64 Oregon 60.41 Nevada 62.03 West Virginia 4.87
7,126,528 Michigan 92.04 Arkansas 78.53 Wyoming 60.05 Nebraska 61.66 New Jersey 4.83
iki/CRS-RL342036,811,758 West Virginia 90.49 Minnesota 78.04 Texas 59.93 Wyoming 61.57 Ohio 4.81
g/w6,541,362 Utah 90.27 Michigan 76.22 Massachusetts 59.68 Maine 61.25 Kentucky 4.71
s.or
leak6,183,369 Virginia 90.14 Nebraska 76.04 Michigan 59.36 New Jersey 61.18 North Dakota 4.71
://wiki5,564,581 Alaska 89.64 California 75.32 Iowa 59.10 Wisconsin 61.07 Missouri 4.63
http5,491,503 Puerto Rico 88.17 West Virginia 74.90 Virginia 58.97 Oregon 61.04 Michigan 4.59
o 5,356,965 New York 87.77 North 73.15 Utah 58.60 Kansas 61.03 Rhode Island 4.52
Carolina
5,206,147 Iowa 87.57 New York 73.05 Montana 58.50 Georgia 60.78 Tennessee 4.50
9,087 North 87.40 Ohio 71.38 Maine 57.76 Michigan 60.78 Alaska 4.49
Dakota
Virginia 4,058,389 Arkansas 85.88 Massachusetts 71.17 Louisiana 56.44 Louisiana 60.63 New York 4.49
3,899,715 Connecticut 85.06 Indiana 70.59 Florida 56.40 New York 60.43 North 4.43
Carolina
7,437 North 84.41 Delaware 70.34 Idaho 55.43 New Mexico 60.33 New 4.37
Carolina Hampshire
Rico 3,201,676 Georgia 83.25 Kentucky 70.04 Kansas 55.06 North 60.32 Maine 4.28


Carolina


Incentive Paternity Establish-Cases with Current Arrearage Cost-Effective-
Payments State ment State Orders State Collections State Cases State ness
(dollars) Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Score
3,101,832 Kentucky 82.54 Oklahoma 69.69 Connecticut 55.04 Idaho 60.11 Arizona 4.25
ka 3,056,992 Massachusetts 82.45 Texas 69.00 Colorado 54.97 Mississippi 59.84 Georgia 4.24
2,900,775 Minnesota 82.06 Maryland 68.65 Alaska 53.84 Massachusetts 58.32 Maryland 4.19
9,609 South 81.44 Georgia 68.16 Kentucky 52.80 Rhode Island 58.19 Montana 4.10
Carolina
2,873,656 Hawaii 81.41 Louisiana 67.36 Hawaii 51.13 West Virginia 57.53 Minnesota 4.05
2,596,197 New Jersey 81.37 Arizona 66.99 Missouri 50.74 Oklahoma 56.78 Florida 4.03
2,526,611 Nebraska 81.03 Oregon 66.91 Tennessee 50.44 Virginia 56.37 Vermont 3.93
9,107 Oklahoma 80.69 South 66.71 Arkansas 50.32 Arkansas 55.53 Utah 3.89
Carolina
iki/CRS-RL34203Dakota 1,656,493 Florida 80.10 Alabama 66.22 Georgia 49.73 California 54.92 Connecticut 3.76
g/w1,650,232 Missouri 79.74 Florida 65.23 Mississippi 49.55 Tennessee 54.54 Colorado 3.66
s.or
leakhire 1,438,353 Delaware 77.21 Connecticut 64.34 South Carolina 49.51 Connecticut 53.13 Delaware 3.66
://wiki1,202,605 Tennessee 76.94 Kansas 63.91 Puerto Rico 48.67 Indiana 52.58 Alabama 3.64
http1,201,957 Louisiana 76.83 Puerto Rico 63.76 Indiana 48.52 Illinois 52.30 Nebraska 2.87
1,192,916 District of 75.23 Nevada 60.35 District of 47.96 South 51.84 Nevada 2.87
Columbia Columbia Carolina
1,127,161 Kansas 74.75 Hawaii 59.22 Alabama 47.77 Puerto Rico 50.84 Illinois 2.80
1,034,185 Mississippi 69.82 Tennessee 56.55 Virgin Islands 47.02 Arizona 50.63 Oklahoma 2.80
Island 1,016,821 Rhode Island 68.85 Rhode Island 51.24 Nevada 46.99 Missouri 50.00 District of 2.69
Columbia
973,201 Nevada 67.89 Guam 50.17 New Mexico 46.75 Kentucky 49.97 Arkansas 2.66
857,000 Alabama 65.39 Mississippi 49.84 Oklahoma 46.46 Virgin Islands 48.69 Kansas 2.61
Mexico 554,604 New Mexico 57.61 New Mexico 47.51 Arizona 44.48 Alabama 47.95 California 1.91
502,393 Virgin Islands 52.94 Illinois 40.82 Guam 43.16 Guam 37.08 Guam 1.64




Incentive Paternity Establish-Cases with Current Arrearage Cost-Effective-
Payments State ment State Orders State Collections State Cases State ness
(dollars) Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Score
101,209 Arizona 51.02 Virgin Islands 38.07 California 42.40 Hawaii 36.87 Virgin Islands 1.58
63,968 Indiana 50.83 District of 29.66 Illinois 39.11 District of 30.21 New Mexico 1.46
Columbia Columbia
Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on data from the Office of Child Support Enforcement, Department of Health and Human Services.
Note: The paternity establishment percentage can be greater than 100% because states can take credit for paternities established for children of any age and compare that
number established to the number of births outside of marriage for a single year.
a. Because of conflicting information and data in other reports Guam’s PEP score of 452.87 was excluded from this report’s analysis.
Table B-3. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Payments and Unaudited Incentive Performance Scores, FY2003
(arranged by highest performing state to lowest performing state)
iki/CRS-RL34203Paternity Cost-
g/wIncentive Payments State Establish-ment State Cases with Orders State Current Collections State Arrearage Cases State Effective-ness
s.or(dollars) Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Score
leak
45,258,302 Kentucky 190.70 South Dakota 94.10 Pennsylvania 74.80 New 72.20 Indiana 7.91
://wikiHampshire
http25,204 Texas 112.10 Washington 91.00 North 71.30 Pennsylvania 71.50 South Dakota 7.80
Dakota
York 30,829,027 California 107.10 Maine 90.00 Minnesota 69.90 Vermont 69.80 Mississippi 7.50
30,351,415 Montana 103.30 Iowa 88.60 Wisconsin 67.70 South Dakota 69.20 Pennsylvania 6.80
29,533,145 Colorado 101.20 Vermont 87.60 Ohio 67.30 Washington 68.90 Virginia 6.52
27,371,576 Idaho 100.80 Wyoming 86.50 South Dakota 67.10 North 68.80 South 6.32
Dakota Carolina
45,490 Hawaii 100.60 North 85.70 Nebraska 66.30 Minnesota 68.00 Wisconsin 5.95
Dakota
Jersey 17,895,131 Pennsylvania 99.70 Utah 84.90 Vermont 65.80 Alaska 67.60 Oregon 5.93
32,872 New 99.30 Montana 84.10 New Jersey 65.00 Ohio 66.30 Idaho 5.70


Hampshire


Paternity Cost-
Incentive State Establish-State Cases with State Current State Arrearage State Effective-
Payments ment Orders Collections Cases ness
(dollars) Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Score
14,675,136 Maine 99.20 Colorado 83.70 New York 64.70 Utah 65.80 Puerto Rico 5.67
13,492,130 South Dakota 99.20 Virginia 82.90 New 64.30 New Jersey 65.60 Texas 5.63
Hampshire
12,209,075 Washington 98.50 Alaska 82.80 Washington 64.30 Delaware 64.80 Wyoming 5.57
11,431,758 New Jersey 98.10 Pennsylvania 81.50 Maryland 63.20 Florida 64.60 Iowa 5.52
53,125 Wisconsin 97.90 New 81.20 West Virginia 62.80 Montana 64.30 Tennessee 5.47
Hampshire
usetts 9,958,854 Vermont 96.10 West Virginia 81.10 North 61.80 Georgia 63.60 Massachusetts 5.46
Carolina
8,653,176 Illinois 95.30 Wisconsin 80.30 Rhode Island 61.80 Iowa 63.40 Louisiana 5.11
iki/CRS-RL342034,630 North 95.10 Minnesota 79.60 Massachusetts 60.90 New Mexico 63.20 North 5.10
g/wDakota Dakota
s.or7,716,005 Ohio 95.10 Missouri 79.50 Wyoming 60.90 Wyoming 63.20 Hawaii 5.08
leak
7,220,705 Georgia 95.00 New Jersey 79.50 Delaware 60.70 Maryland 62.40 New Jersey 5.06
://wiki7,166,179 Iowa 95.00 Arkansas 79.00 Iowa 60.00 Texas 62.30 New York 5.00
http
6,537,765 Alaska 94.60 Idaho 77.90 Oregon 59.90 Kansas 62.00 Maine 4.99
6,336,173 Oregon 93.60 Nebraska 77.90 Virginia 59.70 Wisconsin 62.00 North 4.99
Carolina
6,130,392 Oklahoma 92.60 California 76.40 Montana 59.10 Oregon 61.60 Missouri 4.95
2,522 Maryland 92.20 North 76.40 Utah 58.60 Nevada 61.20 Ohio 4.91
Carolina
5,465 North 91.00 New York 75.80 Arkansas 58.30 Colorado 60.50 Kentucky 4.88
Carolina
o 4,920,924 Puerto Rico 90.30 Texas 75.70 Texas 57.70 Massachusetts 60.40 Michigan 4.79
Virginia 4,209,015 Utah 90.30 Indiana 75.10 Louisiana 56.90 Louisiana 59.80 New 4.72
Hampshire
4,001,595 New York 90.00 Massachusetts 73.90 Florida 56.40 New York 59.80 Rhode Island 4.63




Paternity Cost-
Incentive State Establish-State Cases with State Current State Arrearage State Effective-
Payments ment Orders Collections Cases ness
(dollars) Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Score
3,942,741 Florida 89.40 Michigan 72.90 Alaska 55.70 Maine 59.60 Washington 4.54
3,928,609 Wyoming 89.10 Kentucky 72.40 Maine 55.70 West Virginia 59.40 West Virginia 4.54
3,493,011 West Virginia 88.20 Ohio 71.40 Michigan 55.70 Idaho 59.20 Maryland 4.53
Rico 3,463,489 Nebraska 88.10 Oklahoma 70.80 Kansas 55.30 Nebraska 59.20 Arizona 4.47
3,146,484 Massachusetts 86.50 South 70.70 Colorado 55.20 Michigan 59.00 Georgia 4.47
Carolina
3,105,801 Arkansas 86.00 Delaware 70.50 Connecticut 54.80 Mississippi 58.90 Florida 4.39
ka 3,089,869 Mississippi 85.50 Georgia 70.10 Idaho 53.90 North 58.40 Alaska 4.24
Carolina
iki/CRS-RL342033,056,022 Missouri 85.50 Alabama 69.70 Tennessee 53.70 Virginia 57.50 Utah 4.13
g/w2,556,766 Kansas 85.30 Florida 68.80 Kentucky 53.60 Oklahoma 57.40 Minnesota 4.05
s.or2,482,905 Virginia 85.10 Maryland 68.80 Virgin Islands 53.10 Tennessee 57.30 Connecticut 4.04
leak2,216,477 Minnesota 84.90 Oregon 68.60 Missouri 52.70 Rhode Island 57.20 Alabama 3.78
://wiki2,140,882 Michigan 83.50 Louisiana 68.50 Puerto Rico 52.60 Arkansas 56.10 Vermont 3.78
http1,982,008 Connecticut 83.20 Kansas 68.30 Mississippi 52.00 California 55.40 Montana 3.63
hire
Dakota 1,660,526 Guam 81.70 Connecticut 65.30 Hawaii 51.30 Indiana 54.80 Colorado 3.22
1,588,312 Tennessee 79.00 Puerto Rico 64.70 Georgia 51.00 Connecticut 54.50 Nebraska 3.22
1,293,543 Louisiana 78.80 Arizona 63.20 Indiana 50.50 Puerto Rico 52.40 Arkansas 3.12
1,264,209 South 78.80 Tennessee 60.30 Alabama 49.90 Illinois 51.40 Kansas 3.12
Carolina
1,163,775 Virgin Islands 78.60 Hawaii 59.80 District of 49.70 South 51.30 Nevada 3.12
Columbia Carolina
1,155,004 Delaware 73.70 Virgin Islands 54.90 South 49.20 Arizona 50.80 Oklahoma 3.12
Carolina
1,086,334 Indiana 72.30 Nevada 53.50 New Mexico 49.00 Missouri 50.80 Delaware 3.03




Paternity Cost-
Incentive State Establish-State Cases with State Current State Arrearage State Effective-
Payments ment Orders Collections Cases ness
(dollars) Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Score
970,247 Arizona 71.60 Rhode Island 52.30 Oklahoma 48.40 Kentucky 50.70 Illinois 2.64
Island 962,198 Alabama 70.00 New Mexico 52.00 Illinois 47.00 Alabama 48.70 California 2.31
Mexico 672,821 New Mexico 67.30 Guam 49.90 California 45.20 Virgin Islands 46.20 Guam 2.10
491,354 Nevada 66.20 Mississippi 49.60 Guam 44.60 Guam 45.80 District of 2.09
Columbia
Islands 99,488 Rhode Island 64.90 Illinois 46.70 Arizona 43.20 Hawaii 40.30 Virgin Islands 1.84
39 District of 63.90 District of 31.90 Nevada 40.90 District of 37.00 New Mexico 1.57
Columbia Columbia Columbia
Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on data from the Office of Child Support Enforcement. Department of Health and Human Services.
Note: The paternity establishment percentage can be greater than 100% because states can take credit for paternities established for children of any age and compare that
iki/CRS-RL34203number established to the number of births outside of marriage for a single year.
g/w
s.orTable B-4. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Payments and Unaudited Incentive Performance Scores, FY2004
leak(arranged by highest performing state to lowest performing state)
://wikiPaternity Cost-
httpIncentive Payments State Establish-ment State Cases with Orders State Current Collections State Arrearage Cases State Effective-ness
(dollars) Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Score
43,917,140 California 117.76 South Dakota 93.73 Pennsylvania 74.37 New 71.83 Hawaii 8.70
Hampshire
18,030 Colorado 108.72 Maine 90.31 North 72.02 Pennsylvania 70.97 Mississippi 7.96
Dakota
30,840,836 Illinois 106.57 Washington 89.69 Minnesota 69.53 Vermont 70.39 Puerto Rico 7.88
29,072,933 New Jersey 106.27 Wyoming 88.33 South Dakota 68.29 South Dakota 68.76 South Dakota 7.49
26,532,361 Montana 104.98 Vermont 88.08 Ohio 67.88 North 67.35 Indiana 7.04
Dakota
York 26,298,854 Oklahoma 104.62 Iowa 86.96 Wisconsin 67.64 Washington 67.17 Pennsylvania 7.01
25,086,328 Texas 103.47 Alaska 86.82 Nebraska 67.37 Alaska 66.63 South 7.00




Paternity Cost-
Incentive State Establish-State Cases with State Current State Arrearage State Effective-
Payments ment Orders Collections Cases ness
(dollars) Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Score
Carolina
ey 16,335,761 South Dakota 103.31 North 86.59 Vermont 66.12 Ohio 66.34 Virginia 6.33
Dakota
14,529,242 Ohio 102.59 Montana 85.25 New Jersey 64.92 Iowa 66.12 Oregon 6.17
13,445,851 Pennsylvania 101.38 Utah 85.25 New York 64.75 Minnesota 66.00 Kentucky 5.95
48,434 Maine 101.05 Colorado 84.73 New 64.54 Florida 65.75 Texas 5.95
Hampshire
12,807,092 North 100.85 Pennsylvania 84.05 Washington 62.87 Utah 65.20 Idaho 5.94
Dakota
10,673,373 Wisconsin 100.15 Virginia 83.54 West Virginia 62.85 Colorado 64.93 Wisconsin 5.91
74,394 New 100.04 West Virginia 82.82 North 62.72 Nebraska 64.62 Iowa 5.59
iki/CRS-RL34203Hampshire Carolina
g/w10,525,886 Minnesota 98.78 Wisconsin 81.92 Massachusetts 62.64 Delaware 64.30 Ohio 5.46
s.or
leakusetts 9,168,115 Vermont 97.53 Minnesota 81.00 Iowa 62.18 Wisconsin 64.26 Michigan 5.42
0,244 Washington 96.82 New 80.98 Rhode Island 61.92 Wyoming 64.11 Missouri 5.40
://wikiHampshire
http7,766,731 Maryland 96.75 Missouri 80.70 Maryland 61.79 Texas 63.54 North 5.37
Dakota
7,627,918 Iowa 96.10 New York 80.15 Wyoming 60.79 Montana 63.53 New 5.27
Hampshire
7,247,439 Puerto Rico 95.90 Arkansas 79.87 Delaware 60.29 New Jersey 63.34 Tennessee 5.16
7,080,909 Idaho 94.87 Texas 79.83 Michigan 60.21 Kansas 62.30 Wyoming 5.16
6,034 North 93.32 New Jersey 79.63 Virginia 60.04 Maryland 62.10 Louisiana 5.04
Carolina
5,878,940 Florida 92.46 Nebraska 78.92 Utah 59.82 New Mexico 61.22 North 5.01
Carolina
8,845 Alaska 91.82 North 78.85 Oregon 59.29 Oregon 61.19 Rhode Island 5.01
Carolina
4,992,036 Nebraska 90.56 Idaho 78.55 Texas 58.54 North 61.02 New Jersey 4.89




Paternity Cost-
Incentive State Establish-State Cases with State Current State Arrearage State Effective-
Payments ment Orders Collections Cases ness
(dollars) Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Score
Carolina
o 4,833,238 New Mexico 90.25 California 78.13 Montana 58.40 Maine 59.75 Massachusetts 4.88
3,923,947 New York 90.25 Kentucky 75.85 Florida 56.75 Tennessee 59.17 Georgia 4.67
Virginia 3,775,411 Kentucky 89.45 Michigan 74.96 Maine 56.57 Georgia 59.12 Maryland 4.57
3,677,929 Missouri 88.89 Massachusetts 74.42 Louisiana 55.93 New York 59.08 Washington 4.52
ka 3,635,367 Arkansas 88.21 Maryland 73.77 Idaho 55.68 Rhode Island 58.94 Alaska 4.50
3,605,396 Hawaii 87.90 Alabama 73.05 Colorado 55.51 West Virginia 58.86 Florida 4.50
3,455,259 West Virginia 87.52 Kansas 73.00 Alaska 55.49 Massachusetts 58.81 Arizona 4.42
3,437,279 Virginia 86.98 Delaware 72.05 Arkansas 55.34 Louisiana 58.53 West Virginia 4.42
iki/CRS-RL342033,361,187 Wyoming 86.89 Ohio 71.58 Tennessee 54.71 Illinois 58.22 Maine 4.35
g/w3,306,309 Kansas 86.61 Louisiana 71.29 Kentucky 54.70 Mississippi 58.22 New York 4.31
s.or
leak3,273,456 Connecticut 86.40 South 71.17 Connecticut 54.54 Oklahoma 57.51 Vermont 4.22
Carolina
://wiki3,246,021 Michigan 86.11 Georgia 71.13 Kansas 54.38 Virginia 57.42 Minnesota 4.10
http2,339,229 Massachusetts 85.86 Indiana 70.54 Puerto Rico 53.84 Arkansas 57.40 Utah 4.08
2,335,547 Utah 84.41 Florida 70.03 Missouri 53.33 Idaho 56.46 Alabama 3.95
1,934,767 Oregon 84.38 Oklahoma 69.54 Virgin Islands 53.24 Indiana 56.19 Montana 3.94
1,803,991 Virgin Islands 83.91 Arizona 68.80 Hawaii 53.09 Michigan 55.60 Arkansas 3.88
hire
6,788 South 82.28 Connecticut 67.63 Mississippi 52.79 Connecticut 55.02 Oklahoma 3.64
Carolina
1,542,418 Georgia 81.64 Oregon 67.48 Georgia 51.88 California 54.94 Nebraska 3.63
Dakota 1,517,780 Indiana 79.52 Puerto Rico 65.47 Alabama 51.26 Puerto Rico 53.56 Colorado 3.55
1,355,443 Louisiana 78.81 Tennessee 63.92 District of 51.22 Missouri 51.59 Nevada 3.31


Columbia


Paternity Cost-
Incentive State Establish-State Cases with State Current State Arrearage State Effective-
Payments ment Orders Collections Cases ness
(dollars) Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Score
Island 1,270,822 Tennessee 77.71 Nevada 59.78 Nevada 51.11 Nevada 51.44 Illinois 3.22
1,265,209 Arizona 74.75 Hawaii 58.66 Indiana 51.04 Kentucky 51.34 Connecticut 3.20
1,197,334 Rhode Island 74.75 Virgin Islands 54.85 New Mexico 49.42 Arizona 50.50 Kansas 3.15
1,180,509 Mississippi 74.47 New Mexico 53.92 Illinois 49.25 Alabama 50.00 District of 3.14
Columbia
1,061,120 Delaware 74.13 Rhode Island 52.53 Oklahoma 48.60 South 49.21 Delaware 3.01
Carolina
Mexico 970,705 Alabama 73.72 Mississippi 52.13 South 48.39 Virgin Islands 47.93 Guam 2.26
Carolina
597,907 Guam 71.12 Illinois 51.50 California 47.96 Guam 47.52 California 2.12
iki/CRS-RL34203105,718 District of 64.34 Guam 50.11 Guam 46.66 Hawaii 42.84 New Mexico 1.87
g/wColumbia
s.or88 Nevada 63.21 District of 34.92 Arizona 42.68 District of 42.33 Virgin Islands 1.83
leakColumbia Columbia
://wikiSource: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on data from the Office of Child Support Enforcement. Department of Health and Human Services.
httpNote: The paternity establishment percentage can be greater than 100% because states can take credit for paternities established for children of any age and compare that
number established to the number of births outside of marriage for a single year.
Table B-5. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Payments and Unaudited Incentive Performance Scores, FY2005
(arranged by highest performing state to lowest performing state)
Paternity Cost-
Incentive State Establish-State Cases with State Current State Arrearage State Effective-
Payments ment Orders Collections Cases ness
(dollars) Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Score
41,743,556 Oklahoma 112.42 South Dakota 96.00 Pennsylvania 74.72 Pennsylvania 73.50 Indiana 8.53
94,823 Maine 111.02 Alaska 92.41 North 72.70 New 71.97 Mississippi 8.53
Dakota Hampshire
28,985,608 Texas 107.95 Washington 89.57 Minnesota 69.31 Vermont 71.01 South Dakota 7.76




Paternity Cost-
Incentive State Establish-State Cases with State Current State Arrearage State Effective-
Payments ment Orders Collections Cases ness
(dollars) Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Score
26,242,919 California 106.54 Wyoming 89.38 South Dakota 69.04 North 69.69 South 7.07
Dakota Carolina
26,035,157 Montana 105.43 Maine 89.10 Wisconsin 69.01 South Dakota 69.52 Texas 6.81
25,422,058 Alaska 104.79 Montana 88.12 Ohio 68.98 Wyoming 67.76 Michigan 6.70
25,263,730 Puerto Rico 104.40 Vermont 88.02 Nebraska 67.84 Utah 67.57 Virginia 6.52
ey 15,974,982 Ohio 104.13 North 86.75 Vermont 66.98 Alaska 67.46 Rhode Island 6.45
Dakota
13,748,475 South Dakota 103.56 Colorado 85.38 New Jersey 65.27 Florida 66.71 Pennsylvania 6.39
13,461,627 North 102.88 Iowa 85.35 New York 65.13 Ohio 66.54 Wyoming 6.25
Dakota
iki/CRS-RL3420319,377 New Hampshire 102.53 Utah 85.25 Iowa 64.74 Washington 66.11 North Dakota 6.03
g/w
s.or35,231 New Jersey 100.45 Pennsylvania 84.71 New Hampshire 64.63 Minnesota 66.08 Puerto Rico 6.01
leak
08,188 Wisconsin 100.23 Virginia 84.68 North 64.52 Iowa 65.70 Kentucky 5.95
://wikiCarolina
http10,237,234 Florida 99.90 Wisconsin 83.55 Massachusetts 63.79 Colorado 65.65 Massachusetts 5.93
10,204,439 Vermont 98.82 West Virginia 83.54 West Virginia 63.69 Texas 65.23 Oregon 5.93
usetts 8,898,038 Pennsylvania 98.73 Arkansas 82.41 Wyoming 63.67 Nebraska 64.96 Iowa 5.80
8,650,633 Hawaii 98.09 Texas 82.23 Washington 63.31 Wisconsin 64.19 Ohio 5.66
5,495 North 96.37 Minnesota 82.12 Maryland 63.08 Montana 64.14 Idaho 5.58
Carolina
7,837,795 Minnesota 96.09 Missouri 81.63 Utah 61.39 Maryland 63.92 Tennessee 5.44
3,489 Washington 95.16 New 81.15 Virginia 60.91 Delaware 63.71 Missouri 5.41
Hampshire
7,274 Iowa 94.76 North 80.88 Montana 60.68 New Jersey 63.20 Wisconsin 5.41
Carolina
6,213,377 Idaho 93.97 New Jersey 80.72 Rhode Island 60.63 West Virginia 62.88 Georgia 5.20




Paternity Cost-
Incentive State Establish-State Cases with State Current State Arrearage State Effective-
Payments ment Orders Collections Cases ness
(dollars) Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Score
5,600,727 Kentucky 92.53 California 80.28 Michigan 60.52 Kansas 62.59 North 5.10
Carolina
5,423,112 Missouri 92.52 New York 80.03 Texas 60.51 North 62.16 West Virginia 4.90
Carolina
5,208,111 Colorado 92.36 Idaho 78.58 Delaware 60.41 New Mexico 61.32 Maryland 4.88
4,865,914 Illinois 92.19 Nebraska 77.72 Maine 60.30 Arkansas 60.87 Florida 4.80
o 4,750,251 Oregon 91.71 Kentucky 77.51 Oregon 60.09 Oregon 60.72 New York 4.79
4,020,646 Massachusetts 91.22 Maryland 74.65 Colorado 57.69 Mississippi 60.46 New 4.75
Hampshire
Virginia 3,879,643 Kansas 91.19 Michigan 74.50 Arkansas 57.09 Tennessee 60.05 New Jersey 4.74
iki/CRS-RL342033,643,878 Arkansas 90.57 Georgia 74.47 Florida 56.72 Georgia 59.16 Washington 4.74
g/wka 3,475,303 Maryland 90.57 Kansas 74.41 Idaho 55.81 New York 59.02 Arizona 4.73
s.or3,321,883 New York 90.33 Alabama 73.93 Virgin Islands 55.66 Rhode Island 58.03 Louisiana 4.71
leak
://wiki3,289,970 Virginia 89.34 Arizona 73.91 Louisiana 55.45 Indiana 58.01 Alaska 4.54
http3,288,628 Connecticut 87.87 Delaware 73.83 Tennessee 55.43 Massachusetts 57.86 Hawaii 4.39
Rico 3,268,672 West Virginia 87.65 Massachusetts 73.60 Connecticut 55.38 Virginia 57.76 Maine 4.27
3,222,870 Michigan 86.46 Ohio 72.69 Kentucky 55.31 Louisiana 57.64 Alabama 4.26
0,610 South 84.67 Florida 72.18 Hawaii 55.30 California 56.03 Minnesota 4.22
Carolina
2,389,857 Georgia 83.69 Louisiana 71.99 Puerto Rico 55.28 Connecticut 55.51 Utah 4.03
7,195 Utah 83.47 South 71.23 Alaska 54.96 Oklahoma 55.18 Montana 4.02
Carolina
1,826,744 Wyoming 82.90 Connecticut 69.52 Missouri 54.69 Idaho 54.66 Vermont 3.91
1,809,329 Nebraska 82.49 Indiana 69.39 Kansas 54.52 South 53.80 Oklahoma 3.79
Carolina
1,650,128 Indiana 82.28 Oklahoma 69.09 Mississippi 53.47 Kentucky 53.44 Arkansas 3.68


hire


Paternity Cost-
Incentive State Establish-State Cases with State Current State Arrearage State Effective-
Payments ment Orders Collections Cases ness
(dollars) Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Score
1,560,854 Louisiana 81.93 Oregon 67.41 Illinois 53.29 Michigan 53.18 Colorado 3.68
1,466,513 Alabama 81.89 Puerto Rico 66.37 District of 52.89 Maine 52.96 Connecticut 3.68
Columbia
1,431,973 Arizona 81.11 Tennessee 64.84 Indiana 52.82 Puerto Rico 52.55 Illinois 3.68
Island 1,211,250 Tennessee 80.48 Nevada 62.41 Georgia 52.56 Missouri 52.10 Nebraska 3.57
1,163,702 Virgin Islands 79.56 Guam 60.18 Alabama 51.74 Arizona 51.37 Kansas 3.39
Mexico 1,055,389 Guam 79.27 New Mexico 59.83 Oklahoma 50.11 Guam 50.33 Delaware 3.10
1,028,469 Delaware 79.14 Illinois 59.35 New Mexico 50.00 Alabama 49.96 Nevada 2.98
977,267 Mississippi 77.80 Hawaii 58.30 California 49.27 Nevada 49.60 District of 2.45
iki/CRS-RL34203Columbia
g/w900,305 Rhode Island 77.02 Rhode Island 57.18 South 47.41 Virgin Islands 47.78 California 2.15
s.orCarolina
leak598,507 District of 74.81 Virgin Islands 55.41 Guam 47.33 Illinois 45.91 Guam 2.11
Columbia
://wiki119,823 Nevada 66.30 Mississippi 53.63 Nevada 45.68 District of 43.68 Virgin Islands 2.11
httpColumbia
108,972 New Mexico 54.05 District of 39.60 Arizona 44.36 Hawaii 41.36 New Mexico 2.10
Columbia
Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on data from the Office of Child Support Enforcement. Department of Health and Human Services.
Note: The paternity establishment percentage can be greater than 100% because states can take credit for paternities established for children of any age and compare that
number established to the number of births outside of marriage for a single year.




Table B-6. Child Support Enforcement Unaudited Incentive Performance Scores, FY2006
(arranged by highest performing state to lowest performing state)
Paternity
State Establish- ment State Cases with Orders State Current Collections State Arrearage Cases State Cost-Effectiveness
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Score
Oklahoma 122.12 South Dakota 92.98 Pennsylvania 74.65 Pennsylvania 75.21 Mississippi 9.45
North Dakota 114.40 Alaska 92.24 North Dakota 73.42 New 72.18 Indiana 8.92
Hampshire
New 113.20 Washington 89.86 Wisconsin 70.64 Vermont 70.68 South Dakota 8.23
Hampshire
New Jersey 113.20 Wyoming 89.09 South Dakota 69.47 North Dakota 70.15 Texas 7.52
Utah 112.18 Montana 87.96 Ohio 69.14 Wyoming 69.38 South 7.40
Carolina
California 109.88 Utah 87.83 Minnesota 68.83 South Dakota 68.53 Virginia 6.58
iki/CRS-RL34203Montana 108.68 Maine 87.67 Vermont 67.46 Utah 68.46 Pennsylvania 6.45
g/w
s.orSouth Dakota 108.68 North Dakota 87.50 Nebraska 67.44 Texas 67.35 Ohio 6.29
leakIdaho 104.84 Colorado 86.29 Wyoming 65.85 Washington 67.34 Wyoming 6.29
://wikiHawaii 103.31 Iowa 85.87 Iowa 65.66 Colorado 67.30 Georgia 6.18
httpWest Virginia 102.57 Vermont 85.87 North 65.64 Ohio 67.30 Kentucky 6.16
Carolina
Vermont 101.01 West Virginia 85.42 New Jersey 65.57 Iowa 67.18 Tennessee 6.08
Wisconsin 100.23 Virginia 85.19 Massachusetts 65.44 Alaska 66.51 North Dakota 5.86
Arkansas 100.13 Pennsylvania 84.50 New York 64.91 Minnesota 66.22 Oregon 5.86
Pennsylvania 100.11 Wisconsin 83.81 West Virginia 64.48 Montana 65.41 Iowa 5.79
Puerto Rico 99.29 Arkansas 83.61 New 64.38 Nebraska 65.21 Wisconsin 5.79
Hampshire
Florida 99.22 Missouri 82.81 Washington 64.33 New Jersey 63.77 Massachusetts 5.59
Illinois 98.32 Texas 82.74 Maryland 64.19 Maryland 63.72 Missouri 5.58
Washington 98.00 Minnesota 82.54 Utah 63.57 Florida 63.71 Puerto Rico 5.43
Alaska 97.95 New 82.54 Texas 62.33 New Mexico 63.62 Idaho 5.35




Paternity
State Establish- ment State Cases with Orders State Current Collections State Arrearage Cases State Cost-Effectiveness
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Score
Hampshire
North 97.71 New Jersey 82.03 Virginia 61.61 North 63.40 Michigan 5.29
Carolina Carolina
Minnesota 96.48 New York 81.60 Montana 61.49 Kansas 63.28 Maryland 5.20
Massachusetts 96.46 North 81.05 Michigan 61.38 Arkansas 62.51 Hawaii 5.00
Carolina
Maine 96.34 California 80.57 Maine 61.05 Oregon 62.51 West Virginia 5.00
Iowa 95.53 Michigan 79.79 Delaware 60.48 Delaware 62.32 North 4.97
Carolina
Ohio 95.25 Kentucky 79.73 Oregon 60.42 Mississippi 61.35 New York 4.75
Nebraska 95.23 Idaho 79.49 Rhode Island 59.23 West Virginia 61.34 New 4.70
iki/CRS-RL34203Hampshire
g/wColorado 92.99 Nebraska 78.42 Colorado 59.09 Tennessee 60.56 Rhode Island 4.70
s.or
leakTexas 92.96 Maryland 77.66 Arkansas 59.02 Georgia 60.24 Florida 4.60
Missouri 92.91 Arizona 76.48 Virgin Islands 57.17 Oklahoma 59.92 Louisiana 4.58
://wikiOregon 92.05 Georgia 75.67 Hawaii 56.93 Wisconsin 59.03 New Jersey 4.56
http
Connecticut 91.99 South 75.65 Kentucky 56.64 Indiana 58.82 Washington 4.41
Carolina
New York 91.75 Delaware 75.11 Idaho 55.86 New York 58.81 Alabama 4.38
Virginia 91.69 Massachusetts 74.85 Missouri 55.68 Massachusetts 58.54 Arizona 4.35
Kansas 91.48 Kansas 74.72 Tennessee 55.68 Rhode Island 58.44 Utah 4.28
Kentucky 91.39 Florida 73.79 Kansas 55.29 Virginia 58.09 Alaska 4.27
Maryland 90.75 Ohio 73.33 Puerto Rico 55.07 Connecticut 57.73 Montana 4.19
Michigan 90.71 Louisiana 73.10 Connecticut 54.99 Kentucky 56.92 Maine 4.16
Tennessee 89.48 Connecticut 70.99 Alaska 54.90 California 56.46 Arkansas 4.08
Georgia 87.30 Oklahoma 69.63 Florida 54.38 Louisiana 55.93 Minnesota 4.05
Indiana 86.19 Indiana 68.44 Mississippi 54.32 Arizona 55.49 Oklahoma 3.99




Paternity
State Establish- ment State Cases with Orders State Current Collections State Arrearage Cases State Cost-Effectiveness
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Score
Rhode Island 86.15 Puerto Rico 67.44 Louisiana 54.05 Maine 55.02 Colorado 3.94
Wyoming 86.07 Illinois 66.86 Indiana 53.82 Michigan 54.30 Illinois 3.84
Arizona 84.27 Nevada 66.80 New Mexico 52.97 Idaho 54.05 Vermont 3.80
South 84.24 Oregon 66.36 Alabama 52.87 Missouri 53.36 Nebraska 3.78
Carolina
Virgin Islands 83.53 Tennessee 63.87 Oklahoma 52.68 South 52.98 Connecticut 3.74
Carolina
Alabama 81.69 New Mexico 63.24 District of 52.53 Puerto Rico 52.37 Kansas 3.38
Columbia
Delaware 81.61 Guam 58.80 Georgia 51.93 Nevada 51.53 Nevada 3.34
iki/CRS-RL34203Louisiana 81.07 Rhode Island 58.57 Illinois 51.76 Illinois 51.29 Delaware 2.70
g/wMississippi 79.98 Hawaii 58.53 California 50.39 Guam 49.46 District of 2.55
s.orColumbia
leakDistrict of 78.09 Virgin Islands 55.46 South 49.31 Virgin Islands 47.61 New Mexico 2.36
Columbia Carolina
://wikiGuam 77.29 Mississippi 54.13 Arizona 46.55 District of 41.66 Virgin Islands 2.13
httpColumbia
Nevada 69.35 Alabama 50.91 Guam 46.39 Hawaii 41.01 California 2.03
New Mexico 59.44 District of 45.43 Nevada 45.92 Alabama N.A. Guam 1.84
Columbia
Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on data from the Office of Child Support Enforcement. Department of Health and Human Services.
Note: The paternity establishment percentage can be greater than 100% because states can take credit for paternities established for children of any age and compare that
number established to the number of births outside of marriage for a single year.





Carmen Solomon-Fears
Specialist in Social Policy
csolomonfears@crs.loc.gov, 7-7306