Strategic Airlift Modernization: Analysis of C-5 Modernization and C-17 Acquisition Issues

Strategic Airlift Modernization: Analysis of C-5
Modernization and C-17 Acquisition Issues
Updated June 6, 2008
William Knight and Christopher Bolkcom
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division



Strategic Airlift Modernization: Analysis of C-5
Modernization and C-17 Acquisition Issues
Summary
Strategic airlift has played a pivotal role in U.S. national security strategy since
World War II. Since then, strategic airlift has provided timely worldwide reach for
both combat and humanitarian relief operations. The Department of Defense (DOD)
currently operates a mix of C-5 and C-17 aircraft. C-5s were built in two production
batches, designated the C-5A and C-5B, respectively. A total of 52 C-5s are
scheduled to undergo two major modification programs, after which they will be
redesignated C-5M Super Galaxies; the remaining 59 C-5s will a major avionics
upgrade. C-17s are currently in production, but the C-17 production line is scheduled
to close unless additional orders are placed in an anticipated FY2008 supplemental
appropriations bill.
A major issue currently before Congress is how big should the strategic airlift
fleet be. There is a consensus among policy makers that the DOD must maintain a
robust and effective strategic airlift fleet.
Currently, the most pressing issue is whether Congress should appropriate
money for the purchase of more C-17s in the FY2008 emergency supplemental bill
and, if so, for how many. A third potential issue is the optimal mix of C-5s and C-
17s that Congress should fund in FY2009 authorization and appropriation bills and
in the out years. At least five options have been proposed for C-5 modernization and
C-17 procurement including the following:
!Buy additional C-17s and pursue modernization of all C-5s.
!Halt C-17 production but modernize the current C-5 fleet.
!Maintain the C-5 fleet but forego modernization on all or part of the
C-5 fleet while replacing the capability gap with C-17s.
!Replace all C-5A-models with new C-17s.
!Replace 30 C-5s with 30 C-17s.
Most agree the strategic airlift fleet should consist of a mix of C-17s and
modified C-5s. Independent studies have analyzed policy options by attempting to
measure long-term costs associated with various alternatives of C-5 modernization
with C-17 acquisition. However, there remains disagreement over how many aircraft
are required, and of what type. Policy considerations include costs, budget
constraints, industrial base risk, aircraft performance considerations, and optimal
fleet mix.
In addition to the aforementioned options, DOD could increase use of
commercial aircraft, encourage foreign or civilian sales of the C-17, bolster reliance
on pre-positioning of equipment, leverage potential KC-X airlift capability, pursue
airships or hybrid airships, or simply accept less strategic airlift capability.
This report will be updated as events warrant.



Contents
In troduction ......................................................1
Background ......................................................2
Combat Operations............................................2
Brigade Airdrop...........................................3
Medical Evacuation........................................3
Humanitarian Relief Operations..................................3
Aircraft ..........................................................4
C-5 Galaxy...................................................4
Avionics Modernization Program (AMP).......................5
Reliability Enhancement Re-engining Program (RERP)............5
Legislative Retirement Restrictions............................8
“Bad Actors..............................................8
C-17 Globemaster III..........................................10
Convoy Relief...........................................11
Precision Airdrop.........................................11
Strategic Airlift Requirements.......................................11
Mobility Capability Study (MCS)................................11
Changes Since MCS..........................................13
92,000 Additional Troops..................................13
Army Transformation.....................................14
C-5 Modernization........................................15
Africa Command (AFRICOM)..............................15
Requirements Summary........................................16
Legislative Direction......................................16
Policy Considerations.............................................17
Costs .......................................................17
Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) Study.....................18
Rand Study..............................................20
Budget .....................................................20
C-17 Production Line and Risk..................................22
Other Strategic Airlifters...................................22
C-17 Production Requirements..............................23
Smart Shutdown Option....................................23
Long-term Cost Considerations..............................23
Long-Term Force Structure Implications.......................24
Performance .................................................24
Fleet Mix...................................................26
Low Density/High Demand (LD/HD) assets....................26
Homogeneous Strategic Airlift Fleet..........................26
Organic Fleet Size Impact on the Civil Reserve Air Fleet..........26
Fleet Mix Options for C-5 Modernization/C-17 Acquisition...............27
Modernize All C-5s and Purchase Additional C-17s..................27



Forego RERP on Some or All C-5s and Buy More C-17s..............28
Replace All C-5As with C-17s..................................29
Replace 30 C-5As with 30 C-17s.................................29
Other Strategic Airlift Options.......................................31
Increased Use of Commercial Aircraft............................31
Encourage Civilian/Foreign C-17 Sales............................32
BC-17X ................................................32
Foreign Sales............................................34
Bolster Reliance on Pre-positioning of Equipment...................36
Leverage Next Generation Tanker’s Airlift Capability................37
Pursue Airships or Hybrid Airships...............................39
Appendix A. FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181)
Report Language Directing Study on Size and Mix of Airlift Force.....40
Appendix B. C-5 System Description.................................44
Appendix C. C-17 System Description................................45
Appendix D. C-5 and C-17 Availability, and Readiness Comparisons........46
List of Figures
Figure 1. DOD Base Budget and GWOT..............................22
Figure 2. Comparison of C-5 and C-17 Capabilities.....................25
Figure 3. Number and Cost of An-124 Missions Contracted by Air
Mobility Command...........................................32
Figure 4. C-5 Galaxy at Balad Air Base, Iraq...........................44
Figure 5. C-17 Globemaster III Taking Off from Unfinished Runway........45
List of Tables
Table 1. Current C-5 Fleet...........................................4
Table 2. RERP Production Schedules and Cost Growth....................7
Table 3. C-5 Modernization vs. C-17 Procurement.......................18
Table 4. Life-Cycle Cost (LCC) Estimates of Potential Alternatives to
Modernizing the Strategic Airlift Fleet............................19
Table 5. Comparison of 180 C-17s with Various C-5 Fleets................29
Table 6. Typical Load Capabilities of 30 C-5A, C-5M, and C-17 Airlifters
Considering Expected Mission Capable Rates (MCR)................30
Table 7. C-17 Foreign Sales.........................................35
Table 8. KC-135 and Potential KC-X Airlift Capabilities..................38



Strategic Airlift Modernization: Analysis of
C-5 Modernization and C-17
Acquisition Issues
Introduction
The C-5 Galaxy and C-17 Globemaster III form the core of DOD’s strategic
airlift capability. Both posses intercontinental range and the ability to transport
outsized1 and oversized cargo.2 The C-5 is the Air Force’s largest strategic airlift
aircraft and can carry some loads too large for any other DOD airlifter. In addition
to its strategic airlift capabilities, the C-17 can perform the tactical airlift mission,
which the C-5 cannot.
The Air Force’s current plan is to extensively modernize a total of 52 C-5s,
partially modernize 59 C-5s, and end C-17 production. This represents a departure
from prior DOD plans that called for fully modernizing the Air Force’s entire C-5
fleet and was part of changes announced when DOD re-certified one of the C-5’s two
major modification programs following high program costs growth.3 The
Administration did not request C-17s in either its FY2008 or FY2009 budget
requests. Further, the Administration’s FY2009 budget request did not contain
funding to close the C-17 production line.4 However, the Air Force’s FY2009
Unfunded Priority List contained a request for 15 additional C-17s.5
Currently, the most pressing issue is whether Congress should appropriate
money for the purchase of more C-17s in the FY2008 emergency supplemental bill


1 Outsized cargo exceeds the dimensions of oversized cargo and requires the use of a C-5
or C-17 aircraft or surface transportation. (Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms, amended through October 17, 2007, p. 401).
2 Oversized cargo is air cargo that exceeds the dimensions of a standard (463L) pallet, but
is air transportable on the C-5, C-17, C-130, KC-10, and most civilian contract cargo
carriers. (Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,
amended through October 17, 2007, p. 402).
3 Jen DiMascio, “Young Certifies C-5 Re-engining Program,” Defense Daily, Vol. 237, Issue

31, February 15, 2008.


4 Marc V. Schanz, “The C-17 and the Airlift Question,” Daily Report, Air Force Magazine,
February 6, 2008, online at [http://dailyreport.afa.org/AFA/Features/modernization/
box020608airlift.htm] .
5 “FY2009 Unfunded Requirements List,” U.S. Air Force, SAF/FMB, Budget and
Appropriations Liaison Office, February 2008, p.2, online at [http://dailyreport.afa.org/
NR/rdonlyr es/BAD928B9-0927-4628-BE 43-14992CB464C1/0/FY09URL.pdf].

and, if so, for how many. A third potential issue is the optimal mix of C-5s and C-
17s that Congress should fund in FY2009 authorization and appropriation bills and
in the out years. Decisions made this year regarding force structure of the Air Force’s
strategic airlift fleet could significantly affect future U.S. military capabilities, Air
Force funding requirements, and the aerospace industrial base.
Background
A central tenet of U.S. national military strategy, strategic airlift is an essential
capability enabling the military power projection anywhere around the world.
Strategic airlift has proven critical in the success of global combat and humanitarian
relief operations. An alternative transportation mode, sealift, is capable of deploying
larger quantities of troops and cargo when compared with airlift, but it is slower and
sometimes constrained by a lack of seaports near potential contingency operations.
The capability that strategic airlift provides is the ability to deliver forces, equipment,
and supplies with the greatest speed to virtually any place on the globe.
Despite its importance, DOD’s strategic airlift system is under stress, having
supported continuous contingency operations over the last 17 years. At the same
time, the United States has reduced its Cold War infrastructure by closing two-thirds
of its forward bases. Thus, U.S. forces are now required to deploy more frequently
and over greater distances. For example, even before the 9/11 terrorist attacks and
resulting conflicts, the Air Force estimated that it was deploying four times more
frequently than when it enjoyed the larger Cold War infrastructure.6 The ongoing
war against terrorism has placed further demands on the strategic airlift system.
Combat Operations
The massive military buildup prior to the 1991 Gulf War highlighted the value
of strategic airlift when U.S. aircraft moved over 500,000 troops and 543,548 tons
of cargo into the Persian Gulf region.7 After Desert Storm, strategic airlift provided
12 years of continuous support to coalition forces enforcing the northern and
southern no-fly zones over Iraq. Since 1995, strategic airlift has also supported U.S.
and NATO operations in the Balkans.
Strategic airlift plays a key role in combat operations in the Middle East. On a
typical day, C-5s bring cargo and troops from the United States to staging bases in
Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East, while C-17s fly directly to forward
operating bases in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since September 2001, over 260,000 airlift
missions have delivered over 3.3 million passengers and 1.7 billion short tons of
cargo to Iraq and Afghanistan.8 Few nations possess the organic airlift capability


6 Maj. Gen. Howie Chandler, Basic Air Force Structure and Expeditionary Aerospace Force
Operations, Briefing to Congressional Air Force Caucus, March 23, 2001, Bolling AFB.
7 Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. V, (Washington: GPO, 1993), p. 76.
8 The Air Force Handbook 2007, pp 18-19.

necessary to project power around the world. Consequently, DOD’s strategic airlift
capability is often requisite to enabling coalition partners to join us in operations.
As part of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, nearly 170 C-5 and C-

17 cargo planes were initially dispatched to create an “air bridge” to this distant,


landlocked nation.9 Although distance was clearly a challenge, securing permission
for overflight and sourcing infrastructure appears to have been even more
burdensome. Most Afghan airfields from which C-17s operated were short (~3,500
feet) and strewn with debris and potholes. Some airfields were nothing more than
packed dirt, and C-5s cannot operate from these types of primitive airfields.10 Two
events from the Global War on Terrorism — the 2003 brigade airdrop and medical
evacuation missions — reflect the evolving capabilities of strategic airlift.
Brigade Airdrop. Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. commanders
expressed a desire to open a northern front during the invasion of Iraq. After the
Turkish government denied the United States rights to stage the land invasion fromrd
Turkey, Air Force C-17s executed a much publicized airdrop of the 173 Airborne
Brigade into northern Iraq on March 26, 2003.11
Medical Evacuation. DOD retired its dedicated aeromedical evacuation fleet
in 2003, switching to a concept where nearly every air mobility aircraft is capable of
performing this time-critical mission. Strategic airlift platforms are now routinely
tasked “in system” to perform patient movements. As a result, the time required to
return a wounded service member from the battlefield is now approximately 72 hours
— less than half that required for Desert Storm. This is contributing to survival rates
for casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq now exceeding 90%, compared with 75%
during Desert Storm.12
Humanitarian Relief Operations
Strategic airlift has proven its value many times since World War II by
delivering humanitarian relief. During a 15-month stretch in 1948 and 1949,
American and British airmen executed some 277,000 airlift sorties, keeping Berlin13
from being cut off from the West. During the 1990s, more than 85% of some

160,000 metric tons of food, medicine, and relief supplies reached besieged Sarajevo,


9 Eric Schmitt, “Busy Skies Over Asia Controlled from U.S.,” New York Times, October 14,

2001.


10 Seena Simon, “Air Force Makes Play for More C-17s,” Air Force Times, March 18, 2002,
p. 26.
11 Lt Col M. Shane Hershman, “Employment of the C-17 in Airdrop and Airland Operations
in Closing the Force,” March 18, 2005, pp. 6-7.
12 Bruce D. Callander and Adam J. Hebert, “The 90 Percent Solution,” Air Force Magazine,
October 2006, vol. 89, no. 10, [http://www.afa.org/magazine/oct2006/1006solution.asp].
13 Stewart M. Powell, “The Berlin Airlift,” Air Force Magazine, June 98, vol. 81, no. 6.

Bosnia-Herzegovina, via airlift.14 More recently, strategic airlift delivered disaster
relief after earthquakes in Iran (2003) and Pakistan (2005), the southeast Asia
tsunami (2004), and Hurricane Katrina (2005), demonstrating the importance of
strategic airlift in mitigating consequences after natural disasters.15
Aircraft
The Air Force currently operates two strategic airlift aircraft: the C-5 Galaxy
and the C-17 Globemaster III. Both are capable of being refueled in-flight. The C-5
is equipped with a nose section that opens, whereas both aircraft have rear-opening
doors to facilitate rapid on-loading and offloading. Also, DOD utilizes air refueling
aircraft and contract civilian carriers to provide additional strategic airlift.
C-5 Galaxy
Made by Lockheed Martin, the C-5 is the largest strategic airlift platform in the
DOD inventory. (C-5 specifications and basing appear in Appendix B.) The Air
Force operates a total of 111 C-5s in the active, Air National Guard, and Reserve
components. C-5s were built in two production batches, and aside from age, both
models are interchangeable operationally. The first production aircraft were
designated A-models, while later aircraft were designated as B-models. Two A-
models were later modified to carry outsize cargo such as NASA rocket components
and were redesignated C-models. The entire A/C-model fleet received new wings
during the 1980s. In 2004, the Air Force retired 14 A-model C-5s.16 Table 1
highlights key factors of the C-5 fleet.
Table 1. Current C-5 Fleet
C-5A/CC-5B
Current Inventory60/249
# Produced8150
Years Built1969-731985-89
Source: Teal Group Corporation, World Military & Civil Aircraft Briefing, September 2006.
All C-5s can carry large and irregularly shaped cargo, such as the Army’s 74-ton
mobile scissors bridge, that no other U.S. aircraft can hold. However, the C-5 has
been plagued by reliability problems. FY2005-FY2007 data show C-5 mission
capable rates of only 48% for C-5A/C and 65% for the C-5B. To address reliability
issues, the Air Force proposed two major modification programs designed to bring


14 Louis A. Arana-Barradas (MSgt, USAF), “A ‘Promise’ of Peace,” available at
[http://www.af. mil/news/airman/0396/promise.htm].
15 USTRANSCOM Annual Command Reports, FY2002-2006, [http://www.transcom.mil].
16 Susan H. H. Young, “Gallery of USAF Weapons: 2007 USAF Almanac,” Air Force
Magazine, May 2007, p. 146.

C-5 mission capable rates to a goal of 75% — the Avionics Modernization Program
(AMP) and the Reliability Enhancement Re-engining Program (RERP). After
completing these two programs, C-5s will be designated C-5M Super Galaxies.
Avionics Modernization Program (AMP). AMP is a $1.4 billion project
to upgrade C-5 communications, navigation, and air traffic control surveillance17
components. AMP is intended to ensure C-5s comply with emerging air traffic
management requirements, allowing C-5s to fly in global airspace without
restrictions. Operational testing of AMP was completed in 2006, and the last of the
111 C-5s planned for upgrade is scheduled to be complete by 2015. As of September
2007, 30 C-5s had completed AMP modification, which establishes the digital
baseline for follow-on components to be installed under RERP.18
Reliability Enhancement Re-engining Program (RERP). RERP is a
reportedly $7.7 billion19 comprehensive modernization plan with more than 70
initiatives to upgrade major C-5 systems.20 The goal of RERP is to improve
availability, reliability, and maintainability of a portion of the C-5 fleet. The
centerpiece of RERP is replacing C-5 engines with modern General Electric CF6
engines. Air Force officials expect the C-5M (C-5s modernized through both AMP
and RERP) to bolster the strategic airlift capability by making more of the C-5 fleet
available on a daily basis. For example, C-5 mission-capable rates are expected to
improve from the low 50% range today to at least 76% in the future. In addition, the
C-5M is expected to possess operational improvements that will require 30% less
takeoff distance, while enabling the Super Galaxy to reach cruise altitude 58% faster
that current C-5s. Finally, the C-5M is anticipated to be more environmentally
friendly by creating less noise and fewer carbon emissions.21 Currently, three C-5s
have been modified with RERP — one A-model and two B-models — and are
undergoing operational testing.22


17 Selected Acquisition Report, C-5 AMP, December 31, 2007, p. 12, from Defense
Acquisition Management Information Retrieval. Cost is shown in 2007 This Year dollars
and includes $409.3 million for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation.
18 The Honorable Sue C. Payton, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), Written
Statement before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee,
Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and
International Security Subcommittee Hearing, September 27, 2007, pp. 3-4.
19 “Lockheed Deal Scaled Back,” Washington Post, February 15, 2008, p.D2.
20 Selected Acquisition Report, C-5 RERP, September 30, 2007, p. 9, from Defense
Acquisition Management Information Retrieval. Cost is shown in 2007 This Year dollars
and includes $1,657.2 million for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation.
21 Hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Federal
Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International
Security Subcommittee on Military Airlift Costs, September 27, 2007. Other sources cite
a 75% target mission capable rate.
22 The Honorable Sue C. Payton, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), Written
Statement before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee,
Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and
(continued...)

In 2007, significant cost growth estimates for C-5 RERP became an issue for
many in Congress prompting legislation. As a result of changes in program costs, in
February 2008, DOD announced changes for the C-5 RERP.
RERP Cost Growth. In 2007, Air Force officials began to express concern
about anticipated significant C-5 RERP cost growth. As late as December 2006, the
SAR for the C-5 RERP showed average procurement unit cost growth of 2.9% over
the current acquisition program baseline and 16% over the original baseline. This
rate of cost growth is significantly lower than 15% and 30% cost growth,
respectively, required to trigger a Nunn-McCurdy breech notification.23 In September

2007, the Air Force declared C-5 RERP had breached Nunn-McCurdy thresholds.


The September 2007 SAR followed, showing a cost increase of approximately $624
billion and estimating RERP will now cost a total of $17.5 billion.
Unfortunately, the Air Force and Lockheed Martin were far apart on cost
estimates for C-5 RERP. Lockheed Martin has submitted a combination firm-fixed
price (FFP)/not-to-exceed (NTE) contract offer for approximately $11.6 billion
dollars.25 Further, many contributing factors to RERP cost growth reported in the
SAR appeared to be one-time management problems that may not affect future costs.
For example, a permanent waiver to the Berry Amendment26 would allow the Air
Force to proceed with purchase of new General Electric engines that are built in part
with imported specialty metals.27 The impact of other factors affecting cost growth
has proven more difficult to reconcile.
In testimony before a Senate subcommittee, Lockheed Martin and the Air Force
explained their perspectives on cost growth. Ms. Payton, Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force for Acquisition, testified that the C-5’s AMP upgrade, a prerequisite the
RERP, has taken longer than anticipated, because the Air Force has encountered
unexpected repairs on its aging C-5s during the modification process. In addition,


22 (...continued)
International Security Subcommittee Hearing, September 27, 2007, p. 4.
23 The Nunn-McCurdy Amendment was designed to curtail cost growth in defense
procurement programs. When a program exceeds the Nunn-McCurdy thresholds for cost
growth, the service secretary must notify Congress, and the Secretary of Defense must (1)
either cancel the program or certify that it remains essential to national defense, (2) certify
that the program is the least cost alternative available, and (3) ensure that proper
management controls are in place.
24 Selected Acquisition Report, C-5 RERP, September 30, 2007, p. 19, from Defense
Acquisition Management Information Retrieval.
25 Michael Sirak, “Payton: Air Force Expects First C-5 RERP Contract in Early 2008,”
Defense Daily, vol. 236, issue 1, October 1, 2007.
26 For more on the Berry Amendment, see CRS Report RL31236, The Berry Amendment:
Requiring Defense Procurement to Come from Domestic Sources, and CRS Report
RL33751, The Specialty Metal Clause in the Berry Amendment: Issues for Congress, both
by Valerie Bailey Grasso.
27 Selected Acquisition Report, C-5 RERP, December 31, 2006, p. 4, from Defense
Acquisition Management Information Retrieval.

Ms. Payton expressed concern that the Air Force could not commit to a long-term
schedule that might form the basis of a FFP contract, noting uncertainty with legacy
maintenance issues and hard-to-predict wartime requirements. Under FFP contracts,
some changes in quantity could serve to reopen contract negotiations leading to
increased program costs. The Air Force believes this risk alone could drive engine
costs up by as much as $10 million per airplane in future years. In addition, the Air
Force believes that Lockheed Martin cost estimates for hands-on or touch labor are
overly optimistic. Further, the Air Force’s cost position accounts for anticipated
legacy aircraft repairs that are likely to be discovered during RERP production.28
While testifying, Larry McQuien, Vice President of Business Ventures for
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, acknowledged Lockheed Martin’s cost proposal did
not include costs for “training, spares, support equipment, over and above aircraft
maintenance, and program management.”29 However, he stated confidence in
estimates for engine costs and cited production changes that would eliminate about
19,600 hours in touch labor.30 Lockheed Martin argues that if its cost estimates are
proven correct, the RERP program will grow at rates below the Nunn-McCurdy
threshold notification requirement.31 Table 2 provides Lockheed Martin’s estimates
of various production schedules.
Table 2. RERP Production Schedules and Cost Growth
Total
F Y 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 ($B)
PB 03 5712121212121212128.7
PB 06 13579121212121212128.9
PB 08 139101010121213131229.8
LM 1 3 5 7 10 10 10 12 12 13 13 12 11.6
USAF 1 3 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 12 12 12 13 14.9
01/07
Source: Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company, September 10, 2007.
Note: PB = President’s Budget, LM = Lockheed Martin, USAF = U.S. Air Force.
RERP Legislation. Further, the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act
directed the Air Force to identify options for accelerating the C-5 RERP operational
testing. Congress also directed DOD to task IDA to perform an objective analysis


28 Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Federal Financial
Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security
Subcommittee Hearing on Military Airlift Costs, September 27, 2007.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 White Paper on C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engining Program (RERP) Costs,
Lockheed Martin Corp, [undated], e-mailed to CRS on April 27, 2007.

of the Air Force’s cost position regarding the C-5 RERP and to forward the review
to congressional defense committees by March 1, 2008.32
RERP Recertified by DOD. In Febraury 2008, Undersecretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, John Young, re-certified the C-5 RERP,
but with changes. Under the new program, the Air Force can contract with Lockheed
Martin to perform RERP modifications to the remaining 47 C-5Bs and 2 C-5Cs.
DOD officials expect the changes to save $9.8 billion by foregoing the RERP on 5933
older C-5As. This represents a departure from prior DOD plans that called for fully
modernizing the Air Force’s entire C-5 fleet.34
Legislative Retirement Restrictions. The FY2004 Defense Authorization
Act (P.L. 108-136, Sec. 132) prohibited the retirement of C-5A aircraft until the
effectiveness of the C-5A AMP and RERP efforts has been determined through
testing and evaluation and reported to Congress. As such, the Air Force modified
one C-5A through both AMP and RERP and is currently conducting operational
testing on the aircraft.
“Bad Actors.” During FY2008 budget deliberations, Air Force leaders
frequently requested permission to retire some C-5A aircraft independent of flight
test results on C-5A RERP and AMP. To support their request, former Secretary of
the Air Force, Michael W. Wynne, and former Air Force Chief of Staff, General T.
Michael “Buzz” Moseley, testified that some subset of the C-5A fleet is composed
of “bad actors,” — aircraft that are “hard broke” and prime candidates for retirement.
GEN. MOSELEY: In a perfect world, we would like to be able to manage that
inventory and divest ourselves of the bad-acting tail numbers, and some of them
are bad actors; they’re broke. A lot of the C-5As have low flight hours on them
because they’re broke and you can’t fly them.... If I could line up the best B
model or the best A model at the head of a line ... and go to the back end of the
line and begin to kill off the bad actors and replace them with something new, I
would be very happy. That doesn’t mean all of them; it doesn’t mean that we
class or block-retire airplanes, it just means let us get at the tail numbers that are35
bad actors.
SEC. WYNNE: There’s some that are really bad actors. And I think if you gave
us the right to manage the fleet, you would find that we would manage it in a way36


that would actually retain the best mission profiles....
32 H.Rept. 110-477, December 6, 2007, pp.746-747.
33 Andrea Shalai-Esa, “Pentagon Slashes Lockheed’s C-5 Upgrade Work,” Reuters, February

14, 2008.


34 Jen DiMascio, “Young Certifies C-5 Re-engining Program,” Defense Daily, Vol. 237,
Issue 31, February 15, 2008.
35 Hearing of the House Armed Services Committee on Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense
Budget Request From the Department of the Air Force, February 28, 2007, 2118 Rayburn
House Office Building, Congressional Transcript, Federal News Service, Inc.
36 Ibid.

SEC. WYNNE: I can tell you, sir, that right now some worry about the entirety
of the C-5 fleet. There are two things we should know about this. First is that we
don’t — we want to line up worst to best, and we think there are between 20, 2537
and 30 of bad actors that we would like to retire.
Some in Congress appeared supportive of Secretary Wynne’s and General
Moseley’s “bad actor” testimony and requested the Air Force provide a list of these
“hard broke” aircraft, presumably to make a judgement on whether these aircraft38
should indeed be retired early. Others were skeptical, concerned that Congress had
not received “factual data” on the health and performance of the C-5A fleet.
During a September 2007 Senate hearing, both Ms. Sue Payton, Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, and General Norton A. Schwartz,
Commander of U.S. Transportation Command, stated that they were unaware of39
specific “bad actor” C-5 aircraft. Further, an examination of C-5 reliability and
maintainability statistics for the past three fiscal years did not identify any obvious
subset of the C-5 fleet that stands out as notably “bad actors.” Reliability and
availability measures studied included the amount of time spent in a depot or
otherwise unavailable because of maintenance, mission capable rate, and mission
departure reliability. (Graphic representation of data and analysis of the C-5 fleet can
be found in Appendix D.)
Some might argue all C-5As could be considered bad actors. While the C-5A
may have many hours of life remaining, it is an older aircraft than the C-17.
However, the Air Force’s Fleet Viability Board found the C-5A fleet — with
appropriate investments — has at least 25 years of life remaining.40 In addition, the
Defense Science Board and the Institute for Defense Analysis have also endorsed the
viability of the C-5A fleet. Further, C-5A performance and reliability are not
uniformly inferior to the C-5B. Over the past three years, for example, the C-5A fleet
has averaged a marginally higher mission departure reliability rate (83.1%) than the
C-5B fleet (81.3%). This data may lead one to conclude that C-5A mission capable
rates lag behind those of the C-5B because of management decisions rather than
aging aircraft maintenance issues.


37 Hearing on the Senate Armed Services Committee on Air Force Authorization Request
for Fiscal Year 2008 and the Future Years Defense Program, March 20, 2007, 325 Russell
Senate Office Building, Congressional Transcript, Federal News Service, Inc.
38 See, for example, dialogue between Reps. Marshall and Saxton and Lt. Gen. Carol
“Howie” Chandler. Hearing of the Air and Land Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee on Air Force and Army Airlift and Aerial Refueling Fixed-Wing
Aircraft Programs, March 7, 2007, 2118 Rayburn House Office Building, Congressional
Transcript, Federal News Service, Inc.
39 Hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Federal
Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International
Security Subcommittee on Military Airlift Costs, September 27, 2007.
40 Tech. Sgt. David A. Jablonski, “Air Force Fleet Viability Board releases C-5A
Assessment,” Air Force Print News, July 15, 2004, and Amy Butler, “With a Little Help —
And Cash — C-5As Can Fly For 25 More Years, Panel Says,” Defense Daily, July 19, 2004.

In the summer of 2007, two C-5A aircraft were restricted from flight, and 12
were load-restricted or flight profile-restricted, because of a variety of maintenance
or repair issues. Some suggest these 14 aircraft are appropriate candidates for early
retirement. In contrast, others cite that it is estimated to cost only $26.7 million to
repair all 14 aircraft. In addition, 8 of the 14 restricted aircraft required routine
modifications to address human-error damage incurred during routine maintenance.
Arguably, these problems are minor and easily addressed, and do not warrant early
retirement. While this counter-argument appears sound, it also speaks to the value
of conducting robust analysis of an aircraft’s maintenance and performance history
and projected future costs and challenges. A single-point snapshot of an aircraft’s
condition can be an incomplete and misleading description of its health, and, by
itself, a poor basis for retirement decisions.
C-17 Globemaster III41
Made by Boeing, the C-17 is DOD’s most modern strategic airlifter. (C-17
specifications and basing are located in Appendix C.) Because it can use short and
unfinished runways and has high maneuverability on the ground, the C-17 can
operate in environments traditionally confined to smaller airlifters. Thus, C-17s can
often deliver payloads from the United States directly to forward bases near the
battle. Like C-5s, C-17s can carry outsize and oversize cargo such as helicopters and
missile launchers.
Current DOD plans call for the acquisition of 190 C-17s. The Administration
did not request additional C-17s in either its FY2008 or FY2009 budget requests.
Further, the Administration’s FY2009 budget request did not contain funding to close
the C-17 production line.42 However, the Air Force’s FY2009 Unfunded Priority List43
contained a request for $3.9 billion to fund 15 additional C-17s.
The C-17 is also capable of performing tactical airlift missions. During
Operation Allied Force, the Kosovo Campaign in 1999, 12 C-17s were tasked to fly
intra-theater airlift missions moving 24 Apache helicopters, 36 Abrams tanks, and

58 Bradley fighting vehicles from bases within Europe to Tirana, Albania.44


Likewise, the C-17 has been used extensively in a tactical role in both Afghanistan
and Iraq. In the summer of 2006, the Air Force forward-deployed two squadrons of
C-17s. In addition to connecting mobility hubs in southwest Asia and Europe, these
two squadrons have been used extensively in both Afghanistan and Iraq.


41 See CRS Report RS22763, Military Airlift: C-17 Program Background, by William
Knight and Christopher Bolkcom.
42 Marc V. Schanz, “The C-17 and the Airlift Question,” Daily Report, Air Force Magazine,
February 6, 2008, online at [http://dailyreport.afa.org/AFA/Features/modernization/
box020608airlift.htm] .
43 “FY2009 Unfunded Requirements List,” U.S. Air Force, SAF/FMB, Budget and
Appropriations Liaison Office, February 2008, p. 2, online at [http://dailyreport.afa.org/
NR/rdonlyr es/BAD928B9-0927-4628-BE 43-14992CB464C1/0/FY09URL.pdf].
44 Lt Gen William J. Begert, USAF, “Kosovo and Theater Air Mobility,” Aerospace Power
Journal, Winter 1999.

Convoy Relief. In late 2004, military commanders increased intra-theater
airlift capability to reduce the number of ground convoys exposed to ambush in Iraq
and Afghanistan. C-17s were tasked to transition to the tactical airlift role along side
C-130s to perform this mission.45 The reported effect of increased tactical airlift has
been to “relieve nearly 3,500 vehicles and 9,000 convoy operators per month from
having to travel treacherous Iraqi and Afghan roads.”46
Precision Airdrop. Enabling coalition ground forces operating in the rugged
mountains of Afghanistan, C-17s are using the Joint Precision Airdrop System
(JPADS) to airdrop supplies with GPS-guided steerable parachutes. JPADS allows
the resupply of field units with a high degree of accuracy helping ground forces
receive supplies while avoiding the exposure of larger, traditional drop zones. Also,
airdrops can be flown from high altitude, increasing safety margins to airlift aircraft.47
Strategic Airlift Requirements
Strategic airlift requirements are ultimately derived from the President’s overall
national security strategy. Based on the President’s strategy, DOD periodically
studies the global threat environment and seeks to identify the military force structure
necessary to meet national objectives, and articulates this analysis in the National
Military Strategy (NMS) and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Then, in the case
of strategic airlift, DOD examines the status of its fleet and quantifies future airlift
requirements to judge whether airlift modernization programs are sufficient to
support DOD force structure and the President’s strategy. In June 2004, DOD began
its first “post 9/11” review of transportation requirements. The most recent Mobility
Capability Study (MCS) was completed in December 2005 and briefed to Congress
in February 2006. Currently, two studies are underway that are expected to quantify
strategic airlift requirements. The Institute of Defense Analyses is conducting a
congressionally mandated study on the size and mix of DOD’s air mobility fleet that
is due to Congress in January 2009. DOD is conducting a Mobility Capabilities and
Requirements Study that is expected to be completed by May 2009.
Mobility Capability Study (MCS)
The current analytical basis for DOD’s strategic airlift requirements is the MCS
of 2005. The unclassified executive summary of the MCS notes that unlike past
mobility studies, the MCS did not recommend an airlift requirement expressed in
million-ton-miles per day (MTM/D). Instead, the MCS assessed the capabilities of
the current and projected force by providing a range of potential resource


45 TSgt Don Nelson, “Increased C-130, C-17 Flights Relieve Army Ground Convoys,” Air
Force Print News, December 15, 2004, [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/
news/2004/12/mil-041215-afpn04.htm] .
46 Gen T. Michael Moseley, USAF, “CSAF’s Vector: Air Mobility’s Strategic Impact,” May

23, 2007, [http://www.af.mil/library/viewpoints/csaf.asp?id=324].


47 Air Mobility Command Public Affairs, “C-17 Employs “Screamer” in Combat Airdrop,”
May 25, 2007, [http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123054785].

requirements for strategic airlift, intra-theater (tactical) airlift, and air refueling fleets.
The MCS identified a need for between 292 and 383 strategic airlift aircraft. This
assessment coincided with the Air Force’s program of record at the time of 292
aircraft (180 C-17s and 112 C-5s with engine and avionics upgrades).48 Thus, MCS
recommended a strategic airlift force structure at the bottom of the range necessary
to meet NMS requirements with “acceptable risk.”49 Subsequently, the 2006 QDR
stated a DOD goal of maintaining 292 strategic airlifters.50 To provide Congress with
greater clarity into airlift requirements, the FY2007 Defense Authorization Act (P.L.
109-364, Sec. 1034) required DOD to submit a report to Congress no later than
February 1, 2007, defining airlift requirements in terms of million-ton-miles per day.
In response to this requirement, DOD delivered a classified report to the
congressional defense committees on February 27, 2007.
The MCS findings surprised observers. Many expected the study to project a
growth in airlift needs — perhaps a requirement closer to 60 MTM/D — from the
previous estimate. The mobility study immediately prior to the MCS, the Mobility
Requirements Study 2005 (MRS-05), completed in 2000, set airlift requirements at
54.5 MTM/D.51 Others speculated the MCS would not increase the 54.5 MTM/D
requirement because planners knew that DOD could not afford to purchase enough
aircraft to provide additional airlift.52 They imply the MCS was not an unbiased
study of requirements, but a compromise between what is needed and what can likely
be afforded within current budget constraints.
Analysts also criticized the MCS for its methodology and focus. In September
2005, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) documented a number of
shortcomings in methodology for the ongoing MCS.53 A more detailed GAO
criticism followed in September 2006 after the final MCS was released.54 Others
criticized the study for not adequately addressing DOD intra-theater airlift needs and
for focusing on “near-term” capabilities rather than taking a longer view.55 Criticism


48 One C-5B was destroyed in a crash on April 3, 2006. See unattributed, “17 Airmen
Survive Dover C-5 Crash,” Air Force Print News, San Antonio, April 3, 2006, at
[http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123018520].
49 “Headquarters Air Mobility Command White Paper, KC-X: The Next Mobility Platform,
The Need For A Flexible Tanker,” p. 4.
50 “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” February 6, 2006, p. 54.
51 Marc Selinger, “DoD Launching New Review of Transportation Needs,” Aerospace
Daily, March 11, 2004.
52 John Tirpak, “Air Mobility in the Doldrums,” Air Force Magazine, vol. 88, issue 8,
August 2005, at [http://www.afa.org/magazine/aug2005/0805mobility.html].
53 Defense Transportation: Opportunities Exist to Enhance the Credibility of the Current
and Future Mobility Capabilities Studies, Government Accountability Office, September,

2005.


54 Defense Transportation: Study Limitations Raise Questions About the Adequacy and
Completeness of the Mobility Capabilities Study and Report, GAO, September 2006.
55 John T. Bennett, “Influential DoD Mobility Study’s Focus on Intratheater Needs
(continued...)

of the MCS with regard to intra-theater airlift requirements is particularly germane
because the C-17 can be used in both the strategic and intra-theater roles. As a result,
some believe DOD requires more C-17s to meet tactical requirements, even if
strategic airlift requirements can be met with DOD’s current programs of record.
In light of the criticism, some have called for DOD or an independent agency
to conduct another mobility study to rectify the MCS’s perceived shortcomings. In
September 2006, it was reported that the Air Force’s Air Mobility Command was
again studying DOD airlift needs. Some may interpret the Air Force’s initiation of
another airlift study so soon after the completion of the MCS as tacit
acknowledgment of flaws in the MCS and an attempt to ameliorate them.56 DOD’s
ongoing study, the Mobility Capability and Requirements Study (MCRS), is expected
to be completed by May 2009.57 Some have criticized the timing of the completion
of the MCRS for being “late to need” to inform near-term force structure decisions
currently being debated by Congress.
Changes Since MCS
Advocates of a larger strategic airlift force structure often point contextual
changes that were not considered by the MCS. Those that hold this view often point
to four issues that have arisen since the MCS was released that may potentially
increase strategic airlift requirements:
!Planned growth of the Army and Marine Corps by 92,000 troops
!Army’s ongoing transformation
!C-5 Modernization Program Changes
!Stand up of United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM)

92,000 Additional Troops. On January 11, 2007, Secretary of Defense,


Robert Gates announced a recommendation to the President to raise military end-
strength by 65,000 Army soldiers and 27,000 Marines.58 The President concurred
with the recommendation, and bipartisan support was received for expanding active-
duty end-strength by approximately 92,000 service members.59
The adequacy of the Air Force’s current and projected strategic airlift fleet to
support these additional ground forces will need to be carefully evaluated. For
example, if additional troops are used to form additional combat maneuver units,


55 (...continued)
Questioned,” Inside the Air Force, April 7, 2006.
56 Michael Fabey, “AF Formulating Mobility Plan,” Aerospace Daily, September 28, 2006.
57 General Arthur J. Lichte, USAF, Written Statement to the House Armed Services
Committee, Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Hearing on United States Transportation
Command Posture and Air Force Mobility Aircraft Programs, April 1, 2008, p. 4.
58 Robert M. Gates, Briefing by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 11, 2007.
59 See CRS Report RL33999, Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations, by
Stephen Daggett and Amy Belasco.

some in the Air Force reportedly believe it will take another 35 strategic airlift
aircraft to support them.60 In contrast, the placement of additional ground forces into
support units of current combat maneuver units would require less additional airlift,
as the number of maneuver units available for deployment would more closely
parallel the force structure studied in the MCS. Further, how new ground forces are
intended to be employed could also potentially impact strategic airlift requirements.
For example, if additional forces are intended to increase the number of maneuver
units for potential future ground force operational surges, then additional strategic
airlift may be necessary to adequately support those forces. However, a scenario
where additional ground force end strength is used to reduce operational tempo of
both the Army and Marine Corps would be less likely to change overall strategic
airlift requirements.
Army Transformation. As yet unclear is the impact that the Army
transformation will have on future requirements. A key facet of the Army plan is the
Brigade Combat Team (BCT).61 BCTs and future forces are being designed to be
lighter and more easily air transportable. Therefore, the Army set a goal of obtaining
the capability to deploy a “BCT anywhere in the world in 96 hours after liftoff, a62
division on the ground in 120 hours, and five divisions in theater in 30 days.”
Although this organizational initiative may have merit, it is not clear that the current
strategic airlift fleet will be able to meet these deployability targets. For example, a
typical Stryker BCT consists of approximately 3,500 soldiers, 327 Stryker vehicles,

600 wheeled vehicles, field and air defense artillery, and engineering equipment.


When considering the feasability of Army plans, a June 2003 GAO study found that
“at present, it would take from five to 14 days, depending on brigade location and
destination, and require over one third of the Air Force’s C-17 and C-5 transport63
aircraft fleet to deploy one Stryker brigade by air.” Some might argue this
illustrates a shortfall in strategic airlift capability. Others may point to pre-
positioning and fast sealift as better methods to accelerate BCT deployment
timelines. Further, some may propose a change in the composition of ground
maneuver units to make them more deployable.
Future airlift requirements may also be affected by the Army’s Future Combat
System (FCS). A 2007 Defense Science Board (DSB) report cautioned increasing
weights of FCS vehicles stating, “vehicles originally intended to weigh 17 to 18 tons
are now approaching 30 tons.”64 The additional weight could prove significant: FCS
vehicles may become too heavy for C-130 tactical transports, leaving only strategic-
sized airlifters capable of moving the FCS. While testifying before Congress,
General T. Michael Moseley stated,


60 John A. Tirpak, “The Air Force Starts Over: What Will it take to Get Some Stability into
the Air Force Program?” Air Force Magazine, August 2007, vol. 90, no. 8, p. 36.
61 BCTs have three organizational constructs: light infantry, armor, and Stryker. See CRS
Report RL32476, U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
62 U.S. Department of the Army, Concepts for the Objective Force, 2001, p. 9.
63 GAO Report to Congressional Committees, Military Transformation: Realistic
Deployment Timelines Needed for Stryker Brigades, June 2003.
64 DSB Task Force, “Future Need for VTOL/STOL Aircraft,” July 2007, p. viii.

The Future Combat System vehicle that we have counted on being able to fit in
the C-130, we’re told now that it likely won’t fit in the C- 130. We’ll have to put
it into C-17s and C-5s ... And sir, as we look at the difference up-armored
Humvees and MRAPs, and to be able to move those, it takes us away from the65
C-130 capability.
Further, some have suggested that the Army use the C-17 as the “sizing template” for
carrying future Army vehicles — this concept, if accepted, would almost certainly
require more strategic airlift aircraft.66
C-5 Modernization. Both the MCS and QDR called for fully modernizing the
entire C-5 fleet. However, cost growth identified in 2007 led to changes in DOD’s
modernization plans for the C-5 fleet. The Air Force’s current plan is to modernize
all C-5s through the Avionics Modernization Program and a total of 52 C-5s with the
Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Propgram (RERP) — all 49 C-5Bs, 2 C-
5Cs, and 1 C-5A.67 The program change was announced when DOD re-certified the
C-5 RERP following costs growth estimates for the previous 111-aircraft program
reached $17.5 billion.68 As a result, some may question whether the current program
of record for 190 C-17s — an increase of 10 aircraft over force structure recommend
in the most recent MCS and QDR — is sufficient to compensate for capability lost69
by forgoing the RERP on 59 C-5As.
Africa Command (AFRICOM). Some have suggested that the emergence of
AFRICOM will lead to the need for a larger strategic airlift force. For example, Vice
Admiral Robert Moeller, AFRICOM’s deputy commander, reportedly highlighted
airlift capability as “probably the biggest need that we anticipate in the years to
come.”70 Further, during testimony before the Senate Armed Service Committee
General Moseley was asked to explain why the Air Force had requested 15 C-17s on
its FY2009 unfunded requirements list. In response, General Moseley testified in
part that,


65 Transcript from the Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Fiscal Year

2009 National Defense Budget Request From the Department of the Air Force, March 5,


2008.


66 Gen. (Ret) Barry R. McCaffrey, Adjunct professor of International Affairs, Department
of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, After Action Report
— Visit to Nellis and Scott AFB, 14-17 August 2007, October 15, 2007, p. 4.
67 Jen DiMascio, “Young Certifies C-5 Re-engining Program,” Defense Daily, Vol. 237,
Issue 31, February 15, 2008.
68 “Lockheed Deal Scaled Back,” Washington Post, February 15, 2008, p.D2.
69 Caitlin Harrington, “U.S. DOD Cancels Engine Replacements for Older Galaxies,” Jane’s
Defence Weekly, February 27, 2008 on line at [http://www.janes.com].
70 Christopher J. Castelli, “AFRICOM Eyes Airlift Needs,” Inside Washington Publishers,
May 29, 2008, on-line at [http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/defense_docnum.asp?f=
defense_2002.ask&docnum=5292008_may29b].

AFRICOM has stood up, which will be an incredibly mobility- intense operation
to be able to move humanitarian relief and disaster relief, equipment and people71
around that huge continent, that huge AOR.
Others may counter that having one combatant command responsible for directing
operations on the continent of Africa does not necessarily increase the number of
operations that strategic airlift aircraft will support on the continent.
Requirements Summary
How significant is the potential airlift shortfall, and does it jeopardize force
projection capabilities? In November 2007, General Schwartz reportedly told
Members of Congress that he believes the “sweet spot” for the strategic airlift fleet
is 205 C-17s and 111 fully modernized C-5s — an increase of 15 C-17s over the
current program of record.72 In March of 2008 — with the C-5’s RERP program
reduced and recertified by DOD — General Schwartz reiterated that he believes
DOD needs a fleet of 111 C-5s and 205 C-17s.73
It may be difficult for Congress to evaluate DOD’s airlift recapitalization plans
because answers from DOD and independent studies are either dated, unclear, or
classified. Questions include How much outsized/oversized airlift capacity is
required, now that major state-on-state conventional warfare appears less likely, but
still a contingency for which DOD must plan? How many aircraft are required now
that irregular warfare — which can occur less predictably, and frequently in theaters
with limited infrastructure — appears more likely? Will the standup of U.S. Africa
Command result in additional strategic airlift requirements?
Legislative Direction. Section 1046 of the 2008 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) directed DOD to conduct a comprehensive requirements-
based study of fixed-wing airlift to include full-spectrum life-cycle costs of operating
current and planned strategic airlift, tactical airlift, and air refueling fleets.
Specifically, the legislation requires DOD to analyze the size and mix of the strategic
airlift fleet while considering emerging requirements to transport new Army
equipment such as the Future Combat System and leveraging new capabilities such
as the anticipated airlift capability of future Air Force air refueling aircraft. Further,
the study is expected to to analyze whether the estimated cost of C-5 RERP makes
a RERP-modified C-5 fleet’s life cycle costs higher when compared with alternative
fleets with fewer C-5Ms and more C-17s. This study is required to forecast
requirements for 2012, 2018, and 2024, respectively.


71 Transcript from the Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Fiscal Year

2009 National Defense Budget Request From the Department of the Air Force, March 5,


2008.


72 Amy Butler, “Schwartz Says No to C-17 Line Closure,” Aviation Week and Space
Technology, November 7, 2007, at [http://www.aviationweek.com].
73 Transcript from the Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower
on Fiscal Year 2009 Budget for the Department of Defense Strategic Lift Programs, March

12, 2008 obtained through [http://www.cq.com].



The Air Force has contracted with the Institute of Defense Analyses (IDA) for
completion of this study.74 In an April 2008 letter to DOD and IDA, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) criticized IDA’s initial study plan, stating it “does not
meet the terms of the Act and lacks sufficient detail for assessment.”75 In response,
DOD concurred with the GAO recommendations that the study be of sufficient detail
to meet legislative requirements, and IDA has agreed to submit a more robust study
plan to DOD by June 2008.76 DOD is required to submit the results of this study to
Congress by January 10, 2009.77 Report language from Section 1046 of the 2008
NDAA is provided in Appendix A.
Policy Considerations
In addition to strategic airlift requirements, additional factors to consider
regarding the future strategic airlift fleet include the following:
! Costs.
!Budget Constraints.
!Industrial Base Risk.
!Aircraft Performance.
!Optimal Fleet Mix.
Costs
Making an “apples-to-apples” comparison of C-5 and C-17 costs is complicated.
The scope and time frame considered (e.g., flyaway cost, procurement cost, life-cycle
cost), rate of production assumed, and procurement approach used (e.g., multi-year,
annual, or supplemental procurement) all affect comparisons. For example, it is
estimated 10 C-17s procured via annual congressional earmark cost approximately
$20 million more per aircraft than C-17s procured via multiyear contracts.78
Consequently, some may question whether it is appropriate to compare these costs
to those incurred by acquisitions included in annual Air Force budgets. Table 3
summarizes some factors to consider when comparing costs of C-5 modernization
with C-17 procurement.


74 Marcus Weisgerber, “Report Due in January 2009: Institute of Defense Analyses Submits
Airlift Study Plan to Congress,” Inside the Air Force, April 25, 2008,
[ ht t p: / / www.i nsi dedef e nse.com/ secur e / def ense_do c n u m. a s p ?f =def ense_2002.ask&docnu
m= AIRFORCE-19-17-11].
75 Letter from William M. Solis (GAO) to IDA and DOD, “Defense Transportation: DOD
Should Ensure that the Final Size and Mix of Airlift Force Study Plan Includes Sufficient
Detail to Meet the Terms of the Law and Inform Decision Makers,” April 28, 2008, p. 3.
76 Ibid, pp. 6-7.
77 H.Rept. 110-477, Section 1046, December 6, 2007, pp.313-316.
78 Conversation between SAF/AQQ and CRS, September 21, 2007.

Table 3. C-5 Modernization vs. C-17 Procurement
RERP Entire C-5 FleetBuy More C-17s
Average Procurement Unit Costa$146.7 Millionb$276.9 Million
Estimated Flying Hour Costc$23,075d$11,330
Production Rate~12 aircraft/ year~15 aircraft/year
Aircraft Flying Hours Remaining26,000 hours30,000 hours
a. DOD Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval,
C-17A (Dec. 2007 SAR, p. 21), and C-5RERP (Sept. 2007 SAR, pp. 16-17).
b. These costs have and will likely fluctuate over time. The procurement cost of future C-17s will
likely be lower than the average, as learning increases and fixed costs are amortized over a
longer production run.
c. Aircraft Reimbursement Rates (per Flying Hour) FY2007. Air Force Cost Analysis Agency, Cost
Factors Branch. Table A15-1.
d. Aircraft Reimbursable Rates (per Flying Hour) reflect amortization of modernization programs, but
not procurement costs. Because the C-5 AMP and RERP modernization programs are in their
early phases, these costs strongly affect the hourly cost to operate the C-5. The C-17 is not
implementing a modernization plans on the scale of AMP and RERP.
Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) Study. The Air Force’s decision to
modernize all C-5 aircraft was informed by a March 2000 Institute of Defense
Analysis (IDA) study on the cost and reliability implications of various C-17 and C-5
force structure options. The idea of modernizing the C-5 to achieve improved
availability gained support in 1996 when the Air Force asked Lockheed Martin to
submit proposals to bring C-5 performance in-line with other air mobility assets. In
1997, IDA validated that the concepts proposed by Lockheed Martin could be cost
effective if near-term dollars were available to fund the modernization program.79
IDA noted that earlier studies indicated:
Upgrading the C-5 may be cost-effective if the C-5 is to be retained in the fleet
long enough, the larger question of whether money spent for improving strategic
airlift should be directed toward C-5 improvements or toward some other80
improvements, such as adding more C-17s, or even some of both, is an issue.
IDA measured the life-cycle cost (LCC) of nine alternatives for C-5
modernization and C-17. Findings are summarized in Table 4. However, at least
three assumptions have changed since the IDA study was published, causing some
to question the validity of the now seven-year-old study:
!Analysis was based on C-17 procurement of 135 aircraft, compared
with the 190-aircraft program of record today.81


79 Analysis of Alternatives for Out- and Over-Size Strategic Airlift: Reliability and Cost
Analyses, Institute for Defense Analyses, IDA Paper P-3500, March 2000, pp. 1-2.
80 Ibid., p. 1.
81 Ibid., p. 3.

!Analysis was based on modernization of the Air Force’s 126-aircraft
C-5 fleet, compared with the current 111-aircraft C-5 fleet today.82
!IDA calculated a $5.7 billion cost for RERP.83 Using the 2.9%
discount rate IDA used in the study, this translates to a 2007 cost of
$6.96 billion — significantly below DOD’s September 2007
estimated cost of $17.5 billion.84
Table 4. Life-Cycle Cost (LCC) Estimates of Potential
Alternatives to Modernizing the Strategic Airlift Fleet
C-5 A C-5 B LC C LC C
RERPRERP# ofLCCDiscountedThen-
AlternativeMTM/DupgradeupgradeC-17s Constant $B$Byear $B
1 24.9 No No 135 60.5 32.9 98.5
2 27.1 No No 155 72.4 40.8 115.5
3 30.1 No No 180 87.3 50.4 137.0
4 27.8 No Yes 155 70.2 40.4 110.6
5 30.7 No Yes 180 85.1 50.0 132.1
6 27.2 Yes Yes 135 56.7 32.5 89.5
7 32.3 Yes Yes 180 83.5 50.0 127.9
8 27.7 Retired Yes 210 80.2 49.0 120.9
9 27.9 Retired Retired 257 88.3 55.4 129.3
Source: IDA Paper P-3500, March 2000. Tables 2 and 3 combined and adapted by CRS.
Notes: All cost estimates expressed in $FY2000. Constant dollars allow comparisons over different
time periods without inflation. Discounted dollars are adjusted to account for the year in which funds
are expended. OMB discount factor of 2.9% per year used. Then-year dollars represent the estimated
actual outlay of funds through 2040, including inflation. MTM/D = million-ton-miles per day.
IDA found “... the least costly option was Alternative 6, a full upgrade to the
C-5 fleet with no additional C-17s,” and that “... the $5 billion required for the
upgrades in Alternative 6 more than pays for itself in reduced operating costs over85
the 40-year period examined.” Skeptics might contend that Alternative 6 is no
longer a viable option because Congress has already funded a C-17 fleet of 190
aircraft. While some may question whether IDA’s study is still valid, others believe
it is still relevant to C-5 modernization and C-17 procurement decisions. For
example, a comparison of Alternatives 1 and 6 reveals the cost of a re-engined C-5


82 Ibid., p. 6.
83 Ibid., p. 44.
84 Selected Acquisition Report, C-5 RERP, September 30, 2007, p. 9, from Defense
Acquisition Management Information Retrieval. Cost is shown in 2007 This Year dollars.
85 Analysis of Alternatives for Out- and Over-Size Strategic Airlift: Reliability and Cost
Analyses, Institute for Defense Analyses, IDA Paper P-3500, March 2000, p. 11.

fleet may be lower than one without re-engining while also providing a higher
MTM/D capacity. In addition, a comparison of Alternatives 3, 5, and 7 — the
alternatives that most closely approximate DOD’s current program of record —
indicates that modernization of all C-5s maybe more cost effective and provide more
capability than modernizing no C-5s or only the C-5B fleets.
Rand Study. In 2005, the Rand Corporation completed a study proposing a
model to inform decisions about modernizing aging aircraft and procuring
replacements. The study specifically compared C-5A RERP with C-17 procurement
using the Air Force’s Total Ownership Cost as a measure. Like IDA’s study, some
may criticize Rand’s analysis for underestimating the cost of RERP by using a cost
of $75 million per RERP-modernized C-5A — approximately $18 million per
RERP-modernized aircraft below estimates found in the Air Force’s December 2006
SAR after adjusting with a discount factor of 2.9% per year. Second, the study was
unable to fully isolate C-5A cost factors from those of the C-5B. This could be
problematic if younger B-models masked higher operating costs potentially
associated with flying older A-models. As a result, the study’s authors viewed their
“findings as illustrative and suggestive, rather than definitive, particularly in light of86
concerns with” C-5A cost parameters utilized in the study.
Rand’s study found for C-5A RERP to cost less than new C-17s, RERP would
have to start prior to 2015. To some, this indicates beginning C-5A RERP earlier
makes the program more attractive than C-17 acquisition. When the first C-5A
begins RERP upgrade in 2014, the youngest A-model will be 41-years old.87 In 2004,
former commander of U.S. Transportation Command, General John Handy, stated,
“by 2012 it may be that the whole notion (of performing the RERP on the C-5As) is
overcome by events.” The A-models, he said, might be too far gone to be worth the
investment.88 Rand’s study also suggested the number of C-17s required to replace
C-5As was a second key consideration. Results indicated if 70 or more C-17s were
required to replace the C-5A fleet, then RERP becomes the lower-cost option.89
Budget
Both the IDA and Rand studies suggested life cycle costs savings favor C-5
RERP performed sooner rather than later by providing a longer period for the Air
Force to recoup its up-front investment. Likewise, testimony by both Lockheed
Martin and the Air Force suggests that a predictable schedule, although difficult to
achieve, is potentially a critical element to keeping program costs down over time.


86 Edward G. Keating, Don Snyder, Matthew Dixon, and Elvira N. Loredo, Rand
Corporation Project Air Force, Aging Aircraft Repair-Replacement Decisions with Depot-
Level Capacity as a Policy Choice Variable, Santa Monica, CA, 2005, pp. xii-xiii.
87 Selected Acquisition Report, C-5 RERP, September 30, 2007, p. 12, from Defense
Acquisition Management Information Retrieval.
88 John A. Tirpak, “Saving the Galaxy,” Air Force Magazine, January 2004, pp. 31-35.
89 Edward G. Keating, Don Snyder, Matthew Dixon, and Elvira N. Loredo, Rand
Corporation Project Air Force, Aging Aircraft Repair-Replacement Decisions with Depot-
Level Capacity as a Policy Choice Variable, Santa Monica, CA, 2005, p. xiii.

The most efficient rate of RERP production is 12 aircraft per year. Obtaining and
sustaining this production rate over a longer period could save $6 billion, when
comparing the President’s Budget from 2003 and most recent Air Force RERP
profiles.90 The challenge of achieving this schedule appears to be primarily
budgetary. Some assert that more money will be required in the Air Force’s air
mobility account during the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) than currently exists
to keep C-5A modernization LCC below the LCC for C-17 acquisition.
Proponents of C-17 acquisition have suggested that retiring some C-5s early
could make funds available for additional C-17s. However, these funds do not “line
up” in the DOD budget. C-5 RERP procurement funds for FY2008 are only $253
million — just less than the cost of a single C-17. C-5 RERP funds in FY2009 are
$540 million — approximately the cost of two C-17s. Significant C-5 RERP funds
are not projected to be available until the end of the FYDP, and continued C-17
production is an FY2008 issue, given the imminent closure of the C-17 production
line. Therefore, if more C-17s are to be purchased in FY2008, room would need to
be found in the Air Force’s “base budget,” or Congress would need to add funds to
DOD’s FY2008 Global War on Terror (GWOT) funding request.
Figure 1 highlights how defense appropriations exempted from budget caps
(including “bridge funds” for overseas operations provided as separate titles in the
regular defense appropriations bills) have grown considerably in recent years, in both
absolute terms and as a proportion of overall defense spending. According to some,
this growth
reflects a progressive expansion of the kinds of equipment and operational
support that both the Defense Department and Congress have agreed to consider
as sufficiently urgent to warrant inclusion in emergency funding measures, even
though the funding may not meet definitions either of the narrowly defined
incremental costs of military operations, or of what constitutes an emergency by91


congressional standards.
90 Factors other than production rate may affect costs, making the degree of causality
uncertain.
91 CRS Report RL33900, FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, Foreign
Affairs, and Other Purposes, by Stephen Daggett, Amy Belasco, Pat Towell, Susan B.
Epstein, Connie Veillette, Curt Tarnoff, Rhoda Margesson, and Bart Elias.

Figure 1. DOD Base Budget and GWOT


700
598.4 62 3.1600
93.4 141.7501 52 6
500
101 115 70444 443ns
69 6 6345400o
1417311300 Billi
4 81.4$
400 411 43 5200
297 328 37 5 377
100
0
FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08
Base BudgetSupplementals Enacted
FY07 Supplemental RequestFY08 DoD Budget Request
FY08 GWOT RequestTotals
Source: FY2008 Global War on Terror Request. Department of Defense, February 2007, p.1.
Decisions to add funds to DOD’s FY2008 GWOT request for C-17s are likely
to be influenced by a wider debate on whether some of the large increase in weapons
procurement requested in the past supplemental appropriation bills goes beyond the
expanded definition of war-related requirements that some have come to accept.
Those opposed to expanded use of emergency supplementals may argue adding funds
to the FY2008 GWOT request is inappropriate because the rationale for doing so is
not related to the immediate conflict. Instead, the arguments proffered by the Air
Force pertain to long-term savings. Those in favor of expanded use of supplemental
appropriations may point to congressional action in the FY2007 supplemental, where
Congress provided over $1 billion more than requested for DOD procurement.
C-17 Production Line and Risk
The C-17 production line is scheduled to close without additional DOD orders
for FY2008. Arguments for continued C-17 production often revolve around the
concept of risk. Questions commonly asked in discussions that address the risk of
closing America’s only strategic airlift production line include the following:
!What alternative strategic airlift platforms are in production?
!How many C-17s would DOD have to purchase to keep the C-17
line open?
!Can the C-17 line be shutdown in such a way that would allow it to
reopen later?
!What are the long-term costs of keeping the C-17 production line
open?
!What are the long-term force structure implications of continuing C-

17 production?



Other Strategic Airlifters. Currently, the C-17 is the only strategic airlift
aircraft specifically designed for military applications still in production. European
Aeronautic Defence and Space (EADS) Company is nearing production of the
A400M that some tout as a potential strategic airlift competitor. Others counter that
with less than one-half the payload capacity of a C-17 and roughly one quarter the
payload capacity of a C-5, the A400M is too small to meet the Air Force’s strategic92
airlift needs. Reportedly, the Air Force has asked EADS for data on the freighter
version of the A380 as a potential C-5 replacement.93 While an A380 is capable of
carrying a larger payload than a C-5, like most commercial aircraft, its airframe
design has been optimized for carrying passengers and pallets. This may lead some
to argue it is not suitable for moving outsized and oversized cargo like the C-5 or C-

17.


C-17 Production Requirements. Boeing representatives say that depending
on their success in negotiating near-term international sales of the C-17, Boeing will
require funding for between 14 and 18 Globemasters in FY2008 or the production
line will begin to shut down in January or February 2008 with a full shutdown in
mid-2009.94 However, to date, Boeing officials have kept the C-17 line open in
anticipation of additional orders through the anticipated FY2008 supplemental war
appropriations bill.95
Smart Shutdown Option. If Congress foregoes additional C-17
procurement, a decision will have to be made regarding maintaining capacity to build
C-17s in the future. When planning for the C-17 line’s end, the Air Force budgeted
$650 million to be spent shutting down the line in a manner that would facilitate its
restoration if necessary. The advantage of this strategy is that the government pays
a one-time sum to hedge its bets. A disadvantage of a “smart shutdown” is that in
addition to the monetary cost of storing and maintaining tooling necessary to build
future C-17s, there is also risk associated with losing the expertise of the current C-
17 production workforce. Some believe that Boeing may sell its production site at
Long Beach, California, if the C-17 line closes. Having to restart C-17 production96
at a new location would likely further increase costs. A comparison of estimated
costs over different time spans between a “smart shutdown,” followed by line
restoration, and keeping the C-17 line open via additional purchases would be useful.


92 According to EADS, the max payload of an A400M is 37 tons, or approximately 74,000
pounds. See [http://www.eads.com/1024/en/businet/miltrair/a400m/teca400m.html].
93 Stephen Trimble, “Exclusive: US Considers Airbus A380 as Air Force One and
potentially a C-5 replacement,” Flightglobal.com, October 17, 2007.
94 Telephone conversation between CRS and Boeing officials, February 26, 2007. “Boeing
Announces C-17 Line May End in mid-2009; Stops Procurement of Long-lead Parts,” News
Release, Boeing Integrated Defense Systems, March 2, 2007.
95 Damian Kemp, “Boeing Remains Confident C-17 Production Will Be Extended,” Jane’s
Defense Weekly, February 6, 2008, at [http://www.janes.com].
96 “C-17 Lobbying Picks up in Wake of Commerce Department Report,” Defense Industry
Daily, February 22, 2006, at [http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/c17-lobbying- picks-up-
in-wake-of-commerce-dept-r eport-01916].

Long-term Cost Considerations. Some argue that purchasing aircraft
predominantly to keep the line alive, while safeguarding rapid production capability,
also incurs billions of dollars of costs over the aircraft’s lifetime. However, these life
cycle costs could be offset to some degree if older aircraft were retired. When DOD
officials defended the FY2006 budget decision to end C-17 procurement, they argued
keeping the C-17 production line open “would be a smart thing to do” from a pure
risk perspective, but “the cost would be prohibitive” given the other airlift
procurement programs in Air Force plans.97 In a 2005 study on mobility, the Defense
Science Board (DSB) also considered risk an issue to consider in determining the
total number of C-17s to purchase.
The task force understands that each year of additional (C-17) production beyond
2008 would represent an additional $2.4 billion acquisition and $2-3 billion life
cycle cost commitment, which the department must weigh against other war-
fighting capabilities it could not acquire. However, in view of the prominence of
organic strategic airlift in enabling rapid response to crises, the task force
believes it is prudent to keep options open for the acquisition of additional C-98

17s.


Long-Term Force Structure Implications. While decisions about C-5
modernization and C-17 acquisition must be made near-term, there are long-term
implications to these decisions. For example, Air Force leaders have stated the C-5
RERP will enable C-5Ms to remain in service until 2040.99 In 2040, C-17s will
average 30-40 years old, potentially reaching the end of their service life. Will C-17s
be viable candidates for a service life extension program after years of heavy use?
Will pursuing DOD’s current program of record result in DOD’s entire strategic
airlift fleet reaching the end of its service life at about the same time? When is the
optimal time to shift focus to future technology that may be better tailored to support
the very dynamic requirements expected to be driven by Army transformation?
Performance
Some view the C-17 as better-suited than the C-5 for counter-insurgency
operations in parts of the world with limited aviation infrastructure. A Cold War
model of using strategic airlifters to transport large amounts of materiel from major
stateside aerial ports to theater mobility hubs before trans-loading into smaller intra-
theater aircraft for delivery into forward operating locations is no longer the most
expedient airlift method. C-17s, able to operate in hostile and austere environments,
remove long-standing seams traditionally woven together by strategic C-5s and
tactical C-130s. Air mobility leaders often tout this concept of “velocity” as the


97 Michael Sirak, “Senior DOD Officials Defend Decision To Halt C-17 Production At 180,”
Defense Daily, February 10, 2006.
98 Defense Science Board Task Force on Mobility, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(AT&L), September 2005, p. 14.
99 The Honorable Sue C. Payton, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), Written
Statement to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Federal
Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International
Security Subcommittee Hearing on Military Airlift Costs, September 27, 2007, p. 3.

ultimate measure of success for airlift.100 Some argue that velocity is improved by
having a larger, mid-sized fleet capable of generating a larger number of sorties and
supporting more point-to-point service.
The C-5’s unique capabilities may also argue for its continuation, potentially at
the expense of additional C-17s. In a period where DOD’s force posture is moving
from forward basing to expeditionary, it may be unwise to prematurely retire aircraft
in today’s inventory. In addition to its capability to carry approximately 60% more
cargo than a single C-17, the C-5 can carry several unique loads that do not fit on a
C-17. However, it is not clear how many C-5s are needed to meet DOD’s
requirement to carry loads that cannot fit on C-17s. Just as the C-17 can improve
airlift velocity by providing planners with the ability to generate more sorties by
supporting more point-to-point pairings, the C-5 is superior in moving bulk.101
General Handy recalled, “in this last conflict [there were] many, many times when,
frankly, the only way to unclog [Charleston AFB, SC, Dover AFB, DE, or Ramstein
Airbase, Germany, was] to get the C-5 in there in sufficient numbers ... and literally,
in a weekend, ... clean out all three aerial ports.”102 Figure 2 provides a comparison
of selected airlift loads that can be carried on C-17s and C-5s.
Figure 2. Comparison of C-5 and C-17 Capabilities


Source: FY06 Congressional Overview (C-5, C-130J), “C-5 Operations During Iraqi Freedom,”
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company, p. 18.
100 Michael Sirak, “Payton: Air Force Expects First C-5 RERP Production Contract in Early

2008,” Defense Daily, vol. 235, issue 1, October 1, 2007.


101 Air transportation it typically conducted using two models: hub and spoke or point-to-
point. Point-to-point service is faster because it takes cargo directly from origin (spoke) to
destination (spoke) avoiding delays associated with connecting through major ports (hubs).
102 John A. Tirpak, “Saving the Galaxy,” Air Force Magazine, vol. 87, no. 1, January 2004,
[ ht t p: / / www.af a.or g/ ma ga zi ne/ j an2004/ 0104gal axy.asp] .

Fleet Mix
How to maintain the optimal fleet mix of the Air Force’s strategic airlift fleet
is often debated in Congress. In deliberations, three issues are often discussed
including:
!The potential for turning the C-5 fleet into a low density/high
demand (LD/HD) asset
!The merits of maintaining a single-aircraft type fleet against the
perceived risk of a potential fleet-wide grounding.
!The need to balance the size of the Air Force’s organic fleet while
maintaining incentives for commercial air carriers to participate in
the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).103
Low Density/High Demand (LD/HD) assets. For many, potential cost and
capability concerns intersect when reductions to the size of the C-5 fleet are
discussed. DOD’s program of record maintains a fleet of over 100 C-5Ms through
the 2040s. If the C-5As are not modernized, some believe the Air Force will be left
with a fleet of approximately 50 C-5Ms as older C-5As are potentially divested from
the Air Force’s inventory. Some would argue that this would create another LD/HD
challenge for the Air Force because of the relatively small number of C-5Ms that
would remain in the inventory. Both the 1997 and 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Reviews identified the challenges of operating and maintaining small aircraft fleets
that are heavily used in peacetime and in war. Both studies recommended changes
to asset management in order to reduce the prevalence of LD/HD aircraft fleets.
Likewise, Air Force leaders have taken steps, such as implementing the
Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) construct, in part to mitigate the LD/HD
problem. Conversely, others might argue that if the tonnage capacity of retired C-5s
was replaced by C-17s, then a smaller C-5 fleet would not be in high demand as long
as enough C-5Ms were retained to move bulk cargo shipments between air mobility
hubs and large cargo loads unable to fit on smaller C-17s.
Homogeneous Strategic Airlift Fleet. Some voice concern that a fleet
composed entirely of one model of aircraft is less robust than a fleet composed of two
aircraft types, pointing out that if one aircraft type is grounded for safety, the other
can still fly. Others argue homogeneous fleets offer potentially significant savings
in operations, training, and maintenance costs. Those that hold this view might point
to Southwest Airlines — an airline that has turned an enviable string of profitable
years in part by using a homogeneous fleet designed to minimize maintenance,
training, and operating costs. Likewise, the bulk of DOD’s intra-theater airlift fleet
has been composed of just C-130s for decades.
Organic Fleet Size Impact on the Civil Reserve Air Fleet. Some
believe there is a need to maintain a balance between DOD’s organic airlift capability
and the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program. Under the CRAF program,
commercial carriers agree to make their commercial airliners available to DOD to


103 See CRS Report RL33692, Civil Reserve Air Fleet, by Christopher Bolkcom and William
Knight.

enable surge airlift operations in exchange for a portion of DOD’s airlift business
during peacetime. During congressional testimony General Schwartz, cautioned that
too large of an organic airlift fleet could potentially hurt the CRAF program in the
future when he stated,
One of the things that you hold me accountable for is sort of maintaining the
balance between the organic fleet and the commercial capability. And as I
mentioned in my opening remarks, I caution about overbuilding the organic fleet;
because if that occurs, it can competes in peace time with that preference cargo,
the incentives that we offer our commercial partners. And so that’s one of the104
reasons that I believe 205 is the right number of C-17s.
Fleet Mix Options for C-5 Modernization/C-17
Acquisition
As the C-17 production line wanes, pressure is building to procure more aircraft.
In effect, this brings long-term Air Force funding for C-17 production into direct
competition with C-5 modernization. However, there are strong arguments for both
programs, and viewing them from this “either/or” perspective may be unnecessary
and counter-productive. Because the C-17 can perform both tactical and strategic
airlift, it also competes to some degree with the C-130J for funding. Thus, decisions
on C-130 recapitalization affect strategic airlift. Preferably, air mobility programs
should be developed, planned, funded, and executed in a joint and interdependent
way. Below are five commonly proposed tradeoffs between C-5 modernization and
C-17 procurement, with some pros and cons for each.
Modernize All C-5s and Purchase Additional C-17s
Advocates of this option might believe the current Mobility Capabilities Study
(MCS) underestimated strategic airlift requirements or accepted too much risk. Some
in Congress have encouraged DOD to procure more C-17s than are currently planned,
arguing airlift needs are increasing.105 For example, General Schwartz recently stated
that he believes the “sweet spot” for the strategic airlift fleet is 205 C-17s and 111
fully modernized C-5s.106 These arguments are often based on planned force
structure increases or Army plans to deploy faster that may foreshadow additional
strategic airlift requirements. Finally, proponents might cite the economic and
industrial benefits of continuing the C-17 production line. For example, a longer
production run might allow potential foreign or civilian sales to come to fruition and
provide a hedge against future uncertainty. One might also assert the C-17’s


104 Transcript from the Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower
on Fiscal Year 2009 Budget for the Department of Defense Strategic Lift Programs, March

12, 2008 obtained through [http://www.cq.com].


105 Gail Kaufman, “USAF C-17s May Come Earlier Than Requested,” Defense News,
March 29, 2004.
106 Amy Butler, “Schwartz Says No to C-17 Line Closure,” Aviation Week and Space
Technology, November 7, 2007, at [http://www.aviationweek.com].

capability to perform tactical airlift missions justifies continued production at the
expense of C-130 buys. Others could argue adding dollars to the strategic airlift
portfolio will pull scarce resources from higher priority programs in the zero-sum
gain DOD budget when there is no quantified requirement present. Likewise, some
DOD leaders caution against building too much strategic airlift capacity, as General
Schwartz recently testified:
In terms of organic capacity, too much aluminum is just as counterproductive as
not enough. We should guard against overbuilding the organic fleet to the
detriment of other strategic necessities, such as modernizing the aging tanker107
fleet or the viability of our commercial partners.
Modernize All C-5s and Halt Acquisition of the C-17
This option was DOD’s program of record until DOD cancelled the RERP for
additional C-5As. Advocates of this approach note that DOD has not requested more
C-17s during the budget process. Likewise, some assert that there are no validated
requirements to justify purchasing additional C-17s for the tactical airlift role.
Further, some state this option is backed by both the most recent MCS and the 2000108
IDA study as the most cost effective solution. Others counter that recent cost
growth has invalidated C-5 RERP cost assumptions used in IDA’s analysis.
Opponents also criticize this approach because it allows the C-17 production line to
shut down before operational testing validates whether C-5As can reach availability
and reliability rates planned for in AMP and RERP. Further, some fear without the
competitive option of C-17 buys, future C-5 RERP cost may soar.
Forego RERP on Some or All C-5s and Buy More C-17s
This option appears to most closely resemble DOD’s current program of record.
Another alternative is to accept the current mission-capable rates and availability of
the C-5 fleet, but to invest some C-5A RERP dollars into additional C-17
procurement. Some favor this option because it preserves the unique outsize cargo
capability of the C-5, keeps the C-17 production line open and allows DOD to move
to a less risky point on the continuum established in the most recent MCS. However,
it is unclear how many C-17s would be required to fill the airlift gap created by not
improving C-5 reliability. Some may argue that the 10 C-17s Congress provided the
Air Force with FY2007 funds is sufficient to compensate for the loss of one C-5 as
a result of an accident, and DOD’s decision to forego RERP on remaining C-5As.
Skeptics also assert this option runs counter to analysis in the 2000 IDA study.
Table 5 summarizes the IDA study alternatives that compared the purchase of 180
C-17s with various mixes of C-5 fleets.


107 Hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Federal
Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International
Security Subcommittee on Military Airlift Costs, September 27, 2007.
108 Analysis of Alternatives for Out- and Over-Size Strategic Airlift: Reliability and Cost
Analyses, Institute for Defense Analyses, IDA Paper P-3500, March 2000.

Table 5. Comparison of 180 C-17s with Various C-5 Fleets
C-5 A LC C LC C LC C
RERPC-5B RERP# ofConstantDiscountedThen-
AlternativeMTM/DupgradeupgradeC-17s $B$Byear $B
3 30.1 No No 180 87.3 50.4 137.0
5 30.7 No Yes 180 85.1 50.0 132.1
7 32.3 Yes Yes 180 83.5 50.0 127.9
Source: Extracted from IDA Paper P-3500, March 2000. Tables 2 and 3 combined and adapted by
CRS.
Note: All cost estimates expressed in $FY2000.
Although the IDA study is dated in many ways, a closer examination of the three
alternatives that hold the number of C-17s constant at a total acquisition program
similar to DOD’s current program of record of 190 C-17s may prove helpful. Based
on the assumptions IDA examined, fully modernizing all C-5s produced the highest
airlift capacity in terms of million-ton-miles per day for the lowest life cycle costs.
However, it is not clear where the near-term money would come from to keep C-17
production going, nor whether cost assumptions used in the IDA study invalidate this
comparison.
Replace All C-5As with C-17s
DOD could also replace all C-5As with C-17s. A principal advantage of this
approach is investing budget resources into new aircraft thereby facilitating
recapitalization of the Air Force’s aging fleet. Some believe that this might provide
a more flexible airlift fleet than DOD’s current program of record and would closely
mirror Air Force plans prior to being faced with C-5 retirement restrictions from109
Congress. However, some contend that this option runs counter to analysis
conducted by both the Rand Corporation and IDA. Others point out that this option
would likely take resources from potentially higher DOD acquisition priorities. Like
the “30/30” proposal discussed below, murkiness of requirements as defined in the
latest MCS makes it unclear how many C-17s would be required to replace retiring
C-5s. Further, it is also unclear whether this approach would leave DOD with
sufficient C-5s for cargo that can only be carried by the Galaxy or that would
optimally be transported on a C-5.
Replace 30 C-5As with 30 C-17s
In early 2007, senior Air Force officials proposed buying 30 additional C-17s
instead of modernizing 30 C-5As. Likewise, it was reported Boeing provided the Air
Force with an unsolicited bid for a multiyear purchase of 30 Globemasters purchased
at a rate of 10 per year. According to the report, the cost of purchasing 30 C-17s and
retiring 30 C-5s was roughly equivalent — “couple hundred million dollars apart,”


109 U.S. Representative Jim Saxton, “There’s More To The Story,” Washington Post,
October 30, 2007, p. 14.

but where the Air Force would find funds for this proposal is unclear.110 Proponents
of this idea argue it would allow the Air Force to retire the oldest or poorest
performing A-models and invest in the youngest portion of the C-5 fleet — the
portion that has the most time to return dividends on the up-front RERP investment.
Opponents of this option contend this approach is premature because operational
testing of the first A-model upgraded to the C-5M configuration is incomplete.
Likewise, because of budget pressures, a “30/30” proposal may only be executable
as an add to the FY2008 GWOT request.111 Furthermore, skeptics may point out the
Air Force has not proven that there is a subset of the C-5A fleet that chronically
underperforms the remainder of the fleet.
Replacing 30 C-5 aircraft with 30 C-17s might also present airlift capability
issues. Airlift capability can be measured in different ways, but it appears clear that
on a one-for-one basis, the C-5 can carry more outsize cargo and more cargo pallets
than the C-17. In many cases, C-5s can carry twice as much of a given piece of
outsize cargo as the C-17.112 The C-5’s advantage in size is offset, to a degree, by
lower availability. Thus, Figure 2 does not compare accurately the two aircrafts’
capabilities over multiple sorties. Table 6 illustrates the effect the C-17’s superior
mission capable rate has on airlift capabilities by providing a simplified comparison
of 30 C-5As, 30 C-5Ms, and 30 C-17s moving typical wartime loads over an
intercontinental distance in a single day.
Table 6. Typical Load Capabilities of 30 C-5A, C-5M, and C-17
Airlifters Considering Expected Mission Capable Rates (MCR)
C-5AC-5MC-17
(50% MCR)(75% MCR)(85% MCR)
M1A1 Abrams30 4525
M2/M3 Bradley609051
AH-64 Apache9013576
Patriot Missile Launcher304525
HMMWV TOW210315255
Pallets 540 810 459
Maximum Payload3,915,000 lbs.5,872,500 lbs.4,204,950 lbs.
Source: CRS. Figures extrapolated from data provided by Lockheed Martin.


110 Carlos Munoz, “As Boeing Submits C-17 Bid to Service ... Air Force Floats Multiyear
Globemaster Buy to Defense Lawmakers,” Inside the Air Force, April 20, 2007, at
[ ht t p: / / www.i nsi dedef e n s e . c o m/ s e c u r e / d e f ense_docnum.asp?f =def ense_2002.ask&docnum
=AIRFORCE-18-16-1].
111 CRS interview with SAF/FML April 27, 2007.
112 Outsize cargo is defined by DOD as cargo that exceeds the dimensions of oversized cargo
and requires the use of a C-5 or C-17 aircraft or surface transportation: a single item that
exceeds 1,000 inches long by 117 inches wide by 105 inches high in any one dimension.

Other Strategic Airlift Options
At least four other approaches have been suggested to address DOD’s strategic
needs. These approaches include increasing use of commercial aircraft, encouraging
foreign or civilian sales of C-17s, bolstering reliance on pre-positioning of
equipment, leveraging potential KC-X airlift capabilities, and pursuing airships. Like
the tradeoffs of buying C-17s compared with upgrading C-5s, each of these options
has strengths and weaknesses. These options are not mutually exclusive from the C-

5/C-17 debate, as some might be pursued concurrently.


Increased Use of Commercial Aircraft
DOD currently contracts with civilian carriers to move passengers and cargo.
Under the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program, DOD can also obtain use of
additional civilian airliners to augment the Air Force’s organic strategic airlift fleet.113
Some suggest that DOD should increase the use of commercial aircraft, which offer
many advantages over dedicated military aircraft. Commercial aircraft are numerous,
tend to have longer range, and are typically less expensive to buy and operate than
most military aircraft. However, civilian aircraft also have limitations. Most cannot
carry outsized cargo, conduct special missions like airdrops, or support special
operations. Also, they tend to congest airfields because of longer ground times
resulting from a lack of roll on/roll off capability and reduced ramp
maneuverability.114 Further, potential hostile fire effectively deters civilian crews
from entering combat zones.
It is noteworthy that during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom,
DOD has leased Russian An-124 aircraft to carry outsize and oversize cargo. The
An-124 Condor is a strategic lift aircraft larger than, but comparable to, the C-5. It
also appears that DOD use of An-124 missions is accelerating. Some contend that
while C-5s may not be as modern as C-17s, or able to operate from as many runways,
the fact that DOD is outsourcing missions to Russian aircraft indicates C-5s offer
important capabilities other U.S. aircraft may not be able to satisfy. In contrast, it is
possible An-124 contract missions may be the result of the convenient availability
of relatively low-cost airlift near a busy theater of operations. Since the Air Force
retired 14 C-5s in 2004, the number of An-124 missions has increased. During
congressional testimony, General Schwartz explained that costs associated with
transporting Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles to Iraq were about
$130,000 per MRAP for both C-5s and An-124s — and less expensive than moving
them on C-17s. However, he suggested An-124 reliability made it the logical choice
stating, “because kids are in jeopardy, I’m not going to have airplanes broke in
Europe or somewhere else when I have an alternative which, to date, has not resulted


113 See CRS Report RL33692, Civil Reserve Air Fleet, by Christopher Bolkcom and William
Knight.
114 Robert C. Owen, Professor, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-Daytona Beach, FL,
“Transport Trade-offs,” written in response to a previous letter to the editor in
“Correspondence,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 8, 2007, p. 8.

in a late delivery.”115 Figure 3 illustrates that the Air Force has spent nearly $170
million since FY2002 for An-124 missions.
Figure 3. Number and Cost of An-124 Missions Contracted by Air
Mobility Command


140
120
100
80 #Missions
60 $Million s
40
20
0 0 2 0 3 04 05 06 0 7
FY
TOTAL: 434 missions. $168,434,265.00
Source: USAF Air Mobility Command, International Airlift Procurement Branch, February 23, 2007.
Perhaps DOD is already exploiting commercial aircraft to its maximum
potential. The Air Force indicates in the MRS-05 study that it could not use the 20.5
MTM/D of CRAF capability assigned for most of the halt phase of the wartime
scenarios studied, because of the limitations listed above. Likewise, planning to
utilize foreign-owned contract carriers during contingency operations might be risky
because of potential political constraints a foreign carrier’s government may impose
on their use.
Encourage Civilian/Foreign C-17 Sales
Civilian sales and international exports of C-17s are seen as potentially
complementary methods of keeping the C-17 production line open and reducing the
per-unit production costs. Likewise, foreign military sales could potentially reduce
allied nations’ demand on U.S. strategic airlift platforms in future operations.
BC-17X. One civil aircraft initiative that may have some utility for the military
is the effort by Boeing, with the Air Force’s endorsement, to market a civilian version
of the C-17. Appropriations conferees have directed the Air Force to study options
for commercializing the heavy, outsized aircraft for incorporation into the CRAF.116
However, is there sufficient market for these aircraft to be commercially viable? In
May of 2007, Boeing’s C-17 Program Manager, Dave Bowman, stated, “we have
115 Hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Federal
Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International
Security Subcommittee on Military Airlift Costs, September 27, 2007.
116 H.Rept. 108-553, p. 77.

several customers with money that have given us requests for proposals.”117 Some
industry studies suggest that a commercial market for up to 10 C-17s may exist for
use in heavy industry, mining, or similar endeavors, while Boeing believes there is
market potential of “upwards of 100 aircraft.”118 The Air Force and Boeing have
considered a number of different potential strategies to exploit or expand this
potential market.
If the Commercial Application of Military Airlift Aircraft (CAMAA) were
pursued, DOD would loan money directly to companies or guarantee their financing
to enable purchase of C-17s from Boeing. Civilian owners of the BC-17X (as the
commercial variant would be called) would make the aircraft available to DOD in
time of need, much like CRAF. The Air Force proposed several options to “sweeten
the deal,” such as helping companies find customers who need outsized cargo
delivery and providing them monthly military business paid for at commercial rates.
In addition to having access to these aircraft, the Air Force and civilian users could
benefit, because building BC-17Xs for civilian use would effectively exploit excess
production capacity and help lower the per-unit cost of aircraft bought by DOD.119
In October 2002, it was reported that DOD’s Business Initiatives Council had
approved CAMAA as an “efficiency measure.”120 However, DOD has reportedly
cooled to this approach. In an April 2006 letter to Congress, Secretary Michael
Wynne wrote the Pentagon’s recent reviews of mobility requirements determined
there is no need for an outsized, commercial aircraft in CRAF.121
A second strategy could be for the Air Force or the General Services
Administration (GSA) to sell used C-17s to commercial companies. Commercial
clients would, presumably, be interested in used aircraft because they would cost less
than new aircraft. As part of the arrangement, commercial owners would make the
aircraft available to DOD in times of crisis, thus increasing the potential inventory
of outsize/oversize airlifters available to DOD. The Air Force could use the proceeds
from the sales to help finance the purchase of new C-17s.
A third approach might allow the Air Force to trade older C-17s to Boeing and
receive credit toward the purchase of new ones. Reportedly, the Air Force prefers
this option over selling aircraft directly to commercial companies because it would
avoid potential costs with certifying C-17s for civil application.122 Some analysts


117 Guy Norris, online at Flightglobal.com, May 23, 2007.
118 Ibid.
119 Amy Butler, “Commercial C-17 Buys Would Stabilize Cost, Enhance Reserve Air Fleet,”
Inside the Air Force, December 22, 2000; Christian Lowe, “Air Force Issues Draft
Solicitation for Civilian C-17s,” Defense Week, July 9, 2001.
120 “DOD Business Initiatives Council Supports C-17 ‘Commercialization,’” Defense Daily,
October 16, 2002, p. 8.
121 Jason Sherman, “Wynne: No Room for Commercialized C-17 in Civil Reserve Air Fleet,”
Inside Defense.com, April 6, 2006.
122 Cynthia Di Pasquale, “Pentagon Proposes Trading in Older C-17s to Boeing to Grow
CRAF,” Inside the Air Force, April 22, 2005.

might question why the Air Force would want to sell any of its C-17s if there is a
growing requirement for them.
The feasibility of these strategies is unclear as few companies may wish to risk
investing in expensive outsize cargo aircraft. Conversely, one private company —
Cargo Force — has publicly stated a desire to purchase 25-80 C-17s, but alleges that
DOD is blocking deals fearing commercial sales may dampen Congress’s interest in
funding more C-17s for the Air Force.123 Some also question Congress’s appetite for
unconventional financing and procurement strategies in the aftermath of the KC-767
tanker lease proposal.124 Creative attempts to establish an outsize/oversize
commercial market using C-17s would likely have to be done without DOD incurring
financial liability.125
Foreign Sales. Allied nations also have strategic airlift requirements that
could potentially be satisfied by the C-17. In August 2006, the Royal Australian Air
Force awarded Boeing a $780 million contract for four C-17 aircraft.126 Likewise,127
Canada is also importing four C-17s. Whether the C-17 is successful in the export
market will be determined in part by its competition. The most prominent competitor
is EADS’s A400M aircraft. Having long recognized a deficit in long-range airlift
capabilities, several NATO countries (Germany, France, Spain, Britain, Turkey,
Belgium, and Portugal) plan on purchasing the jointly developed A400M turboprop
airlifter. This program has experienced numerous perturbations in schedule and
budget. In December 2002, for example, Germany announced that it would reduce
its planned acquisition of the A400M from 73 to 60 aircraft. In October, 2007,128
EADS informed A400M customers to expect delivery delays of 6 to 12 months.
British defense officials view the C-17 as an asset that can be used in rapid-
reaction operations. The United Kingdom’s Strategic Defense Review of July 1998
first indicated that the Ministry of Defense might lease or buy several C-17s to meet
air mobility requirements of Britain’s Rapid Reaction forces. In August 2006, it was
reported that the U.K.’s Royal Air Force had committed to purchasing outright four
C-17s it had leased from Boeing and would purchase a fifth aircraft in 2008.129 In
July 2007, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense announced purchase of a sixth


123 Dave Ahearn, “Air Force maneuvers to Ensure it Gets 220 C-17s — Analyst,” Defense
Today, March 7, 2005.
124 See CRS Report RL32056, The Air Force KC-767 Tanker Lease Proposal: Key Issues
for Congress, coordinated by Christopher Bolkcom.
125 Di Pasquale, op.cit.
126 “Boeing to Provide Four C-17s to Australia Air Force,” Defense Daily, August 1, 2006.
127 “Canada to Spend $1.3 billion for Four Boeing C-17 Globemasters,” Defense Daily,
September 15, 2006.
128 Press Release, “EADS informs A400M Customers about Revised Delivery Schedule,”
Amsterdam, October 17, 2007.
129 “More C-17s,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report. August 8, 2006.

C-17 to fill strategic airlift needs.130 Britain had “conditionally committed” to
purchase 25 Airbus A400M transports following the C-17 lease, but it is unclear
whether the U.K. will purchase additional C-17 instead of the A400M aircraft.
Continued delays could drive customers to alternatives like the C-17 or C-130J.
Table 7 summarizes C-17 foreign military sales.
Table 7. C-17 Foreign Sales
CountyC-17 Orders
Australia4
Canada4
United Kingdom6
Source: Defense Industry Daily, “Defense Industry Daily Focus: The Global C-17 Sustainment
Partnership,” September 13, 2007, at [http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com].
In September 2006, NATO announced a group of member nations had signed
a letter of intent to jointly purchase up to four C-17 aircraft for NATO’s Strategic
Airlift Capability (SAC).131 These aircraft are intended to be shared by member132
nations in what amounts to a time-share plan. To support this effort, Section 1032
of the FY2008 Defense Authorizations Act allowed the Air Force to send one C-17133
from the current inventory in addition to NATO’s proposed buy. In return, the Air
Force would receive an amount of time equal to one C-17 (approximately 1,000
flying hours annually) from the proposed program to meet current and future airlift
requirements. DOD notified Congress in May 2008 of the possible sale of two C-17s134
to the NATO SAC.
Some Persian Gulf states have also reportedly expressed interest in the C-17
with an eye toward increased participation in humanitarian or disaster relief missions.
For example, reportedly Qatar has agreed to purchase two C-17s with options for two
additional aircraft.135 As with the proposed NATO arrangement, C-17s could be


130 United Kingdom Ministry of Defense Press Release, July 27, 2007, online at
[ h t t p : / / www.mod.uk/ Def enceInt er net / DefenceNews/ Equi pment AndLogi s t i c s/ Br owne
PurchaseOf ExtraC17WillsignificantlyBoostUkMilitaryOperations.htm] .
131 Nicholas Fiorenza, “NATO pools resources to buy C-17s,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,
September 13, 2006.
132 Each C-17 will be programmed to fly 1,000 hours yearly. Participating nations will share
costs based on the number of flying hours reserved for annual utilization.
133 H.Rept. 110-477, Section 1032, December 6, 2007.
134 Richard J. Millies, Deputy Director of Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Letter to
The Honorable Nancy Pelosi, May 9, 2008, on-line at
[ ht t p: / / www.i nsi dedef e nse.com/ secur e / dat a_ext r a/ pdf 7/ dpl us2008_1462.pdf ] .
135 Amy Butler, “Qatar Lined Up to Purchase C-17, Program Source Says,” Aerospace Daily
and Defense Report, February 25, 2008, p. 5.

purchased by individual states or as part of a consortium.136 If these sales come to
fruition they would represent a significant boost for the Globemaster’s export
prospects.
Bolster Reliance on Pre-positioning of Equipment137
Potential risk incurred by ending C-17 production is not apportioned solely over
the airlift fleet. Long-range cargo aircraft are only one component of a larger military
mobility system. While aircraft offer advantages over other transportation modes,
such as speed and flexibility, these characteristics may potentially be offered by a mix
of other assets. Both the Defense Science Board and the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) recommended that DOD improve its mobility capabilities by increased
investments in afloat pre-positioning of equipment, not by large investments in fixed-
wing long-range airlift. For example, the DSB found that
investments now in intermediate staging bases, more and improved force and
sustainment pre-positioning and high-speed, intratheater vessels capable of
austere port access could add significant new capabilities to enable land force
deployments and meet a variety of contingencies. These investments need to be
complemented by incremental investments in aerial tankers and possibly in138
strategic airlift.
Both the DSB and CBO found pre-positioning equipment offered opportunities
to increase delivery velocity. For example, the DSB found that “pre-positioning is
the sole component of the mobility system that can deliver employable
heavy/medium land forces early in a campaign.”139 CBO added, “Prepositioning sets
of unit equipment offers greater improvements in the promptness of cargo deliveries
than the other options that CBO examined” such as increasing airlift and fast sea-lift140
capabilities. Further, “increasing the number of existing ships and aircraft would
offer very limited improvements in the promptness of unit deliveries during large141
deployments.”
Further, there are some instances where an increased reliance on strategic airlift
could exacerbate logistical choke-points potentially slowing the deployment of
forces. Often, the transportation problem is not too few aircraft, but too few airfields
or poor infrastructure. A study conducted by the Army’s Military Traffic


136 Michael Sirak, “Air Force Promotes Airlift Options for Middle East Partners,” Defense
Daily, vol. 236, issue 32, November 14, 2007.
137 See CRS Report RL32513, Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious and Maritime
Prepositioning Ship Programs: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke.
138 Defense Science Board Task Force on Mobility. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(AT&L), September 2005, p. 14.
139 Ibid., p.10.
140 Options for Strategic Military Transportation Systems, Congressional Budget Office,
September 2005. p. x.
141 Ibid, pp. x, xiii.

Management Command found the biggest roadblock to achieving the service’s
deployment goals is limited infrastructure at forward airfields.142 Infrastructure
shortfalls could include a lack of ramp space or loading/unloading equipment.
During Operation Allied Force, for example, “there were not enough air bases in the
area immediately around Kosovo to support all the aircraft....”143 In addition, the
CBO observed,
Aircraft offer rapid delivery of individual loads, but any attempt to significantly
increase their total cargo deliveries to a distant theater would probably be
hampered by constrained infrastructure at airfields, which is anticipated for144
many, if not most, future conflicts.
Leverage Next Generation Tanker’s Airlift Capability
Acquisition decisions regarding KC-X, the Air Force’s next generation tanker145
program, may also affect strategic airlift capability. Both competitors for the KC-
X program, the Northrop Grumman KC-30 based on the Airbus 330-200 and the KC-
767 based on Boeing’s 767-200, could add airlift capability compared to the KC-135s
they are envisioned to replace. On February 29, 2008, the Air Force awarded the KC-
X contract to Northrop Grumman. The initial $12.1 billion KC-X contract provides
for the purchase the first 68 KC-45s of the anticipated 179 aircraft.146 On March 11,
2008, Boeing protested the Air Force’s decision to the Government Accountability
Office (GAO).147 The GAO is expected to adjudicate Boeing’s protest by June 19,148

2008.


First, some believe DOD should factor airlift capacity of tankers into strategic
airlift requirements derived from mobility capability studies. However, in
congressional testimony General Schwartz stated that KC-X proposals are not
expected to have the roll-on/roll-off capability of the Air Force’s current strategic


142 Kim Burger, “Army Study: Poor Forward Airfields Jeopardize Deployment Goals,”
Inside the Army, August 21, 2000.
143 Kosovo After Action Review, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and Gen. Henry H.
Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Senate Armed Services Committee, October

14, 1999.


144 Options for Strategic Military Transportation Systems. Op cit. p. x.
145 See CRS Report RL34398, Air Force Air Refueling: The KC-X Acquisition Program, by
William Knight and Christopher Bolkcom.
146 “Tanker Contract Award Announced,” Air Force Print News, February 29, 2008, online
at [http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123088392].
147 Boeing News Release, “Boeing Protests U.S. Air Force Tanker Contract Award,” March

11, 2008 online at [http://www.boeing.com/ids/globaltanker/news/2008/q1/


080311b_nr.html ].


148 GAO Press Statement, “GAO Statement Regarding Protest Filed by Boeing Company
with the Government Accountability Office,” March 11, 2008 online at
[http://www.gao.gov/ press/pressstmt-boeing0311.pdf].

airlift fleet or the ability to handle oversized or outsized cargo.149 Others also point
out that airlift is a secondary mission for aerial refuelers and that tanker capability
could be fully tapped to perform core refueling missions during times of peak airlift
demand. Therefore, some argue that tanker airlift capacity should be viewed as
additive to other transportation means when calculating strategic airlift requirements.
Even though airlift is viewed as a secondary mission for KC-X, most agree
airlift capacity on tankers can reduce strain on the strategic airlift fleet. General
Schwartz expects the KC-X to “mitigate wear and tear on the C-5 and C-17.”150 The
Air Force envisions KC-X to be built from the outset with reinforced floors necessary
for carrying either passengers or cargo in the fuselage, a cargo door sized to facilitate
loading and off-loading, and defensive systems enabling a KC-X to land in certain
combat environments.151 With these capabilities, a KC-X could potentially fly a
scheduled combat air refueling mission, be subsequently retasked in-flight, land at
an airfield located within a threat environment, upload battle casualties, and air
evacuate the patients to needed medical care in another theater. This illustrates how
a KC-X, with defensive systems not currently found on KC-135s, might give
planners additional options to execute an unplanned medical evacuation sortie
perhaps negating the need to tap a strategic airlift platform. Likewise, this scenario
could be applied to the movement other time-sensitive cargo or passengers. Thus,
some believe purchasing a KC-X platform with robust airlift capabilities may extend
the service life of other airlifters. Table 8 summarizes airlift capability of selected
air refueling platforms.
Table 8. KC-135 and Potential KC-X Airlift Capabilities
KC-135 KC-30 K C-767
Passengers 54 226 200
463L Pallets63219
Defensive SystemsNoPlannedPlanned
Source: USAF, Northrop Grumman and Boeing. KC-135 information derived from KC-135
Stratotanker Fact Sheet, [http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=110], and the Air Force
Handbook 2007.


149 Hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Federal
Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International
Security Subcommittee on Military Airlift Costs, September 27, 2007.
150 Gen. Norton A. Schwartz (USAF), Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, Written
Statement before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee,
Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and
International Security Subcommittee, September 27, 2007, p. 6.
151 Defensive systems facilitate a tanker aircraft’s primary mission of in-flight air refueling
by potentially enabling the tanker to operate closer to its refueling track, thus making more
fuel available on each mission. As this example illustrates, defensive systems also increase
a tanker’s capability in its secondary mission of airlift.

Pursue Airships or Hybrid Airships152
Another potential strategy to bolster strategic airlift capability might be to re-
invigorate DOD efforts to develop heavy-lift airships. Before Congress cancelled the
program in 2006, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency was developing
a hybrid airship capable of transporting up to 1,000 tons across international
distances. Unlike traditional, cigar-shaped airships, a hybrid airship is shaped more
like an aircraft’s wing, to generate lift through aerodynamic forces. Advocates hope
airships may be capable of carrying a complete Army brigade directly from “the fort
to the fight,” overcoming logistic choke points and mitigating the effects of limited
forward basing.
In addition to very large payloads and long range, airships and hybrids may offer
other advantages to the strategic airlift mission. First, they may not require as
expensive and as specialized infrastructure as aircraft. A CBO study estimated
developing and procuring 14-16 heavy-lift airships would have the same life cycle
cost as 21 C-17 aircraft ($11 billion) but would deliver cargo at a rate nearly three
times greater. Second, they may be able to deliver their payloads near the conflict,
rather than at ports or airfields miles to the rear, thus overcoming logistic choke
points and mitigating the effects of limited forward basing. Airships and hybrids may
be able to land on water, which could prove valuable in realizing the Department of
the Navy’s sea basing concept.
Detractors challenge airship survivability and ability to operate in adverse
weather. Also, hybrid airships use aerodynamic lift and will take-off and land much
like conventional aircraft. Some estimate that 1,000 ton-class hybrid aircraft will
require 5,000 foot-long runways.153 Along with loading/offloading equipment and
facilities, these runways appear to constitute infrastructures like those required by
conventional aircraft. In addition, delivering a brigade-sized payload directly to a
theater of conflict sounds attractive from a conventional wisdom point of view.
However, large payloads take longer to consolidate, load, and unload than smaller
payloads, and the their delivery must be tightly scheduled. Likewise, the in-flight
loss of a single airship carrying a 3,500-soldier brigade could be both operationally
and politically catastrophic. Finally, while life-cycle costs for these concepts could
be notably less than manned aircraft, can DOD find budget room for another
procurement program?


152 See CRS Report RS21886, Potential Use of Airships and Aerostats, by Christopher
Bolkcom.
153 John Wood, “Airships: Good for Business, or Good for Nothing?” Presentation before
the 5th International Airship Convention & Exhibition, August 2004, Oxford, England.

Appendix A. FY2008 National Defense Authorization
Act (P.L. 110-181) Report Language Directing Study
on Size and Mix of Airlift Force
Section 1046 of the Conference Report (H.Rept. 110-477, December 6, 2007)
to H.R. 1585 stated the following:
SEC. 1046. STUDY ON SIZE AND MIX OF AIRLIFT FORCE.
(a) STUDY REQUIRED. — The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a
requirements-based study on alternatives for the proper size and mix of fixed-
wing intratheater and intertheater airlift assets to meet the National Military
Strategy for each of the following timeframes: fiscal year 2012, 2018, and 2024.
The study shall —
(1) focus on organic and commercially programmed airlift capabilities;
(2) analyze the full-spectrum lifecycle costs of the various alternatives for
organic models of each of the following aircraft: C — 5A/B/C/M, C — 17A, KC
— X, KC — 10, KC — 135R, C — 130E/H/J, Joint Cargo Aircraft; and
(3) incorporate the augmentation capability, viability, and feasibility of the
Civil Reserve Air Fleet during activation stages I, II, and III.
(b) USE OF FFRDC. — The Secretary shall select, to carry out the study
required by subsection (a), a federally funded research and development center
that has experience and expertise in conducting similar studies.
(c) STUDY PLAN. — The study required by subsection (a) shall be carried
out under a study plan. The study plan shall be developed as follows:
(1) The center selected under subsection (b) shall develop the study plan
and shall, not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, submit
the study plan to the congressional defense committees, the Secretary, and the
Comptroller General of the United States.
(2) The Comptroller General shall review the study plan to determine
whether it is complete and objective, and whether it has any flaws or weaknesses
in scope or methodology, and shall, not later than 30 days after receiving the
study plan, submit to the Secretary and the center a report that contains the
results of that review and provides any recommendations that the Comptroller
General considers appropriate for improvements to the study plan.
(3) The center shall modify the study plan to incorporate the
recommendations under paragraph (2) and shall, not later than 45 days after
receiving that report, submit to the Secretary and the congressional defense
committees a report on those modifications. The report shall describe each
modification and, if the modifications do not incorporate one or more of the
recommendations, shall explain the reasons for not doing so.
(d) ELEMENTS OF STUDY PLAN. — The study plan required by
subsection (c) shall address, at minimum, the following:
(1) A description of lift requirements and operating profiles for airlift
aircraft required to meet the National Military Strategy, including assumptions
regarding the following:
(A) Current and future military combat and support missions.
(B) The planned force structure growth of the military services.



(C) Potential changes in lift requirements, including the deployment of the
Future Combat Systems by the Army.
(D) New capability in airlift to be provided by the KC(X) aircraft and the
expected utilization of such capability, including its use in intratheater lift.
(E) The utilization of intertheater lift aircraft in intratheater combat mission
support roles.
(F) The availability and application of Civil Reserve Air Fleet assets in
future military scenarios.
(G) Air mobility requirements associated with the Global Rebasing
Initiative of the Department of Defense.
(H) Air mobility requirements in support of worldwide peacekeeping and
humanitarian missions.
(I) Air mobility requirements in support of homeland defense and national
emergencies.
(J) The viability and capability of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet to augment
organic forces in both friendly and hostile environments.
(K) An assessment of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet to adequately augment the
organic fleet as it relates to commercial inventory management restructuring in
response to future commercial markets, streamlining of operations, efficiency
measures, or downsizing of the participant.
(2) An evaluation of the state of the current airlift fleet of the Air Force,
including assessments of the following:
(A) The extent to which the increased use of airlift aircraft in ongoing
operations is affecting the programmed service life of the aircraft of that fleet.
(B) The adequacy of the current airlift force, including whether or not a
minimum of 299 strategic airlift aircraft for the Air Force is sufficient to support
future expeditionary combat and non-combat missions, as well as domestic and
training mission demands consistent with the requirements of meeting the
National Military Strategy.
(C) The optimal mix of C — 5 and C — 17 aircraft for the strategic airlift
fleet of the Air Force, to include the following:
(i) The cost-effectiveness of modernizing various iterations of the C — 5A
and C — 5B/C aircraft fleet versus procuring additional C — 17 aircraft.
(ii) The military capability, operational availability, usefulness, and service
life of the C — 5A/B/C/M aircraft and the C — 17 aircraft. Such an assessment
shall examine appropriate metrics, such as aircraft availability rates, departure
rates, and mission capable rates, in each of the following cases:
(I) Completion of the Avionics Modernization Program and the Reliability
Enhancement and Reengining Program.
(II) Partial completion of the Avionics Modernization Program and the
Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program, with partial completion of
either such program being considered the point at which the continued execution
of each program is no longer supported by the cost-effectiveness analysis.
(iii) At what specific fleet inventory for each organic aircraft, to include air
refueling aircraft used in the airlift role, would it impede the ability of Civil
Reserve Air Fleet participants to remain a viable augmentation option.
(D) An analysis and assessment of the lessons that may be learned from the
experience of the Air Force in restarting the production line for the C — 5



aircraft after having closed the line for several years, and recommendations for
the actions that the Department of Defense should take to ensure that the
production line for the C — 17 aircraft could be restarted if necessary, including

(i) an analysis of the methods that were used and costs that were incurred
in closing and re-opening the production line for the C — 5 aircraft;
(ii) an assessment of the methods and actions that should be employed and
the expected costs and risks of closing and re-opening the production line for the
C — 17 aircraft in view of that experience. Such analysis and assessment should
deal with issues such as production work force, production facilities, tooling,
industrial base suppliers, contractor logistics support versus organic
maintenance, and diminished manufacturing sources.
(E) Assessing the military capability, operational availability, usefulness,
service life and optimal mix of intra-theater airlift aircraft, to include —
(i) the cost-effectiveness of procuring the Joint Cargo Aircraft versus
procuring additional C — 130J or refurbishing C — 130E/H platforms to meet
intra-theater airlift requirements of the combatant commander and component
commands; and
(ii) the cost-effectiveness of procuring additional C — 17 aircraft versus
procuring additional C — 130J platforms or refurbishing C — 130E/H platforms
to meet intra-theater airlift requirements of the combatant commander and
component commands.
(3) Each analysis required by paragraph (2) shall include —
(A) a description of the assumptions and sensitivity analysis utilized in the
study regarding aircraft performances and cargo loading factors; and
(B) a comprehensive statement of the data and assumptions utilized in
making the program life cycle cost estimates and a comparison of cost and risk
associated with the optimally mixed fleet of airlift aircraft versus the program of
record airlift aircraft fleet.
(e) UTILIZATION OF OTHER STUDIES. — The study required by
subsection (a) shall build upon the results of the 2005 Mobility Capabilities
Studies, the ongoing Intratheater Airlift Fleet Mix Analysis, the Intratheater Lift
Capabilities Study, the Joint Future Theater Airlift Capabilities Analysis, and
other appropriate studies and analyses, such as Fleet Viability Board Reports or
special aircraft assessments. The study shall also include any testing data
collected on modernization, recapitalization, and upgrade efforts of current
organic aircraft.
(f) COLLABORATION WITH UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION
COMMAND. — In conducting the study required by subsection (a) and
preparing the report required by subsection (c)(3), the center shall collaborate
with the commander of the United States Transportation Command.
(g) COLLABORATION WITH COST ANALYSIS IMPROVEMENT
GROUP. — In conducting the study required by subsection (a) and constructing
the analysis required by subsection (a)(2), the center shall collaborate with the
Cost Analysis Improvement Group of the Department of Defense.



(h) REPORT. — Not later than January 10, 2009, the center selected under
subsection (b) shall submit to the Secretary and the congressional defense
committees a report on the study required by subsection (a). The report shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but shall include a classified annex.



Appendix B. C-5 System Description154
Power plant: Four General Electric TF-39 engines
Wingspan: 222.9 feet (67.89 meters)
Length: 247.1 feet (75.3 meters)
Height:65.1 feet (19.84 meters)
Cargolength, 143 feet, 9 inches (43.8 meters); width, 19 feet (5.79
compartment: meters); height, 13.5 feet (4.11 meters)
Speed: 518 mph (.77 Mach)
Service ceiling: 45,000 feet (13,716 meters)
Range: Global with in-flight refueling
Crew: Seven (2 pilots, 2 flight engineers, and 3 loadmasters)
Maximum T/O769,000 pounds (348,818 kilograms) in peacetime; 840,000
weight: pounds (381,024 kilograms) in wartime
Load:81 troops and 270,000 pounds (122,472 kilograms) of cargo (36
pallet positions) simultaneously
Basing. Active duty C-5s are stationed at Dover AFB, DE, and Travis AFB, CA, in
associate units teamed with the Air Force Reserve.155 C-5s are assigned to Reserve
units at Lackland AFB, TX; Westover Air Reserve Base, MA; and Wright-Patterson
AFB, OH, and to Air National Guard (ANG) units at Martinsburg ANGB, WV;156
Memphis, TN; and Stewart ANGB, NY.
Figure 4. C-5 Galaxy at Balad Air Base, Iraq


Source: USAF photo by SSgt Toney R. Tolley.
154 Derived from C-5 Galaxy Fact Sheet, [http://www.af.mil/factsheets/
factsheet.asp?fsID=84], and Air Force Magazine, 2007 USAF Almanac, May 2007, p. 146.
155 Associate units share aircraft between the active duty Air Force and either the Air Force
Reserve or the Air National Guard components.
156 Derived from C-5 Galaxy fact Sheet, [http://www.af.mil/factsheets/
factsheet.asp?fsID=84], and Air Force Magazine, 2007 USAF Almanac, May 2007, pp. 105-

108.



Appendix C. C-17 System Description157
Power plant: Four Pratt & Whitney F117-PW-100 turbofan engines
Wingspan: 169 feet 10 inches (to winglet tips) (51.76 meters)
Length: 174 feet (53 meters)
Height:55 feet 1 inch (16.79 meters)
Cargo compartment:length, 88 feet (26.82 meters); width, 18 feet (5.48 meters);
height, 12 feet 4 inches (3.76 meters)
Speed:450 knots at 28,000 feet (8,534 meters) (Mach .76)
Service ceiling: 45,000 feet at cruising speed (13,716 meters)
Range: Unlimited with in-flight refueling158
Crew: Three (two pilots and one load master)
Max. T/O weight: 585,000 pounds (265,352 kilograms)
Load:102 troops/paratroops; 36 litter and 54 ambulatory patients
and attendants; 170,900 pounds (77,519 kilograms) of cargo
(18 pallet positions)
Basing. Active duty C-17s are based at Charleston AFB, SC; Dover AFB, DE;
Edwards AFB, CA; Elmendorf AFB, AK; Hickam AFB, HI; McChord AFB, WA;
McGuire AFB, NJ; and Travis AFB, CA, in associate units. The Air Force Reserve159
operates eight C-17s at March ARB, CA; the ANG operates eight at Jackson, MS.
Figure 5. C-17 Globemaster III Taking Off from
Unfinished Runway
Source: USAF photo by 1st Lt. Laurel Scherer.


157 Derived from C-17 Globemaster III Fact Sheet, [http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.
asp?fsID=86], and Air Force Magazine, 2007 USAF Almanac, May 2007, p. 146.
158 The first 70 C-17s have an unrefueled range of 4,370 miles with a 90,000 lb. load. An
extra fuel tank was installed on the 71st and subsequent aircraft extending unrefueled range
to 5,060 miles with a 90,000 lb. load. Seena Simon, “Extra Fuel Tank Allows C-17s to Fly
Farther,” Air Force Times, April 2, 2001.
159 Derived from C-17 Globemaster III Fact Sheet, [http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.
asp?fsID=86], and Air Force Magazine, 2007 USAF Almanac, May 2007, pp. 105-108.

Appendix D. C-5 and C-17 Availability, and
Readiness Comparisons160
Comparison of C-5 Fleet for 3 Availability / Reliability Measures FY05-FY07


Worst C-5s for Depot %Worst C-5s for Mission Capable RateWorst C-5s for Mission Departure Reliability
MXRMCRDepot%Tail #MXRMCRDepot%MXRMCRDepot%
83.12758.569000003 87 .326 .45.669000014 5059.10700001 68
84.446 .554.270000445 81 .12758.669000003 70.144.612.6700004 61
7537 .247.568000219 78 .927 .446.269000025 71.465.324.7700004 62
83.329 .747.370000456 85 .629 .747.470000456 71.465.91690000 10
78.927 .446.269000025 78 .933 .17.170000451 73.162.363840000 59
75.558 .639.187000038 82 .233 .86.168000215 73.234.524.9700004 57
iki/CRS-RL34264 84.342 .936.568000220 73 .234 .524.970000457 74.642.622.1690000 20
g/w
s.or 82.245 .935.768000224 82 .735 .730.368000212 7537.247.6680002 19
leak 83.549 .934.370000447 7537 .247.668000219 75.658.251.3850000 05
://wiki 804731.170000453 83 .638 .941.570000460 75.662.815.1870000 29
http 81.551 .930.970000446 85 .639 .36.870000455 75.859.642.3870000 45
82.735 .730.368000212 81 .539 .72.368000221 76.948.80670001 74
C-5A Fleet Avg. 21.3C-5A Fleet Avg. 48.2C-5A Fleet Avg. 83.1
Tail Numbers in:
Italics = worse than average in all 3 categories
Bold= among the worst (not just below average) in two of the three categories
Boldand Background = among the worst in all three categories
160 Source of charts: CRS, based on data provided by AMC.