The Primary Residence Exception: Legislative Proposals in the 110th Congress to Amend Section 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
The U.S. housing market began to slow in early 2006 and has led to what many economists
believe is the worst housing finance environment since the Great Depression of the 1930s. As a
result, there has been a significant rise in late mortgage payments, foreclosures, and bankruptcies
nationwide. Many believe the market will get worse in the absence of changes in laws and/or
regulations. Additionally, there are a number of obstacles that may discourage mortgage servicers
and creditors from performing loan modifications in advance of a petition for bankruptcy, even in
situations in which a modification would be the most economically beneficial outcome for the
majority of interested parties. These obstacles include potential contract liability, tax regulations,
accounting standards, and payment schemes. Allowing bankruptcy courts to modify debts secured
by the debtor’s primary residence is seen by proponents as encouraging the modification of
mortgages before default or delinquency.
Bankruptcy provides an avenue by which debtors may get relief from their debts. Chapter 13 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code governs reorganizations for most individuals. The Code provides
courts some leeway to adjust the value of certain debts. For many secured debts, the court has
“strip down” – also, commonly referred to as “cram down” – authority. Strip down is the power to
lower, over the creditor’s objections, the secured claim to as low as the collateral’s fair market
value and treat the balance of the debt as an unsecured claim. However, Section 1322(b)(2) of the
Code prohibits the strip down of debts secured by the debtor’s primary residence.
At least three bills that would amend Section 1322 of the Bankruptcy Code have been introduced th
in the 111 Congress. These bills are S. 61 and its House companion, H.R. 200 (the Helping
Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009); and H.R. 225 (the Emergency Home
Ownership and Mortgage Equity Protection Act).
This report provides an overview of the general Chapter 13 process and analyzes how these bills
would amend certain sections of Chapter 13.
Mortgage Market Backdrop............................................................................................................1
Overview of Chapter 13..................................................................................................................4
S. 61 and H.R. 200....................................................................................................................6
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................8
The U.S. housing market began to slow in early 2006 and has led to what many economists 1
believe is the worst housing finance environment since the Great Depression of the 1930s. As a
result, there has been a significant rise of late mortgage payments, foreclosures, and bankruptcies 2
nationwide. Many believe the market will get worse in the absence of changes in laws and/or
regulations. For instance, Sheila Bair, Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
testified before the House Committee on Financial Services on November 18, 2008, that “over the
next two years, an estimated 4 to 5 million mortgage loans will enter foreclosure if nothing is 3
In an attempt to stem the tide of foreclosures and bankruptcies, a number of voluntary loan 4
modification programs have been initiated. These programs seek to make mortgage payments
more affordable to homeowners who are having, or likely will have difficulty meeting their
mortgage obligations, while also avoiding the costs for both debtors and creditors associated with
a foreclosure or bankruptcy. However, there are a number of obstacles that have operated to
discourage mortgage servicers and creditors from performing loan modifications in advance of
foreclosure or a petition for bankruptcy, even in situations in which a modification would be the
most economically beneficial outcome for most interested parties. These obstacles include 5
potential contract liability, tax regulations, accounting standards, and payment schemes.
Some argue that these voluntary modification programs have not been effective enough. In a
letter sent to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and House Minority Leader John Boehner, the
Attorneys General of 22 states and the District of Columbia stated:
In recent months, State Attorneys General have especially focused on urging mortgage
servicers to avoid unnecessary foreclosures by modifying unaffordable loans in a manner
that serves holders, servicers, homeowners, and the public. Through the multi-state
Foreclosure Prevention Working Group, we collected data which demonstrates that
1 See, e.g., Jon Hilsenrather, Serena Ng, and Damian Paletta, Worst Crisis Since the ‘30s, With No End Yet in Sight,
Wall Street Journal, Sept. 18, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122169431617549947.html (“‘This has
been the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. There is no question about it,’ said Mark Gertler, a New
York University economist who worked with fellow academic Ben Bernanke, now the Federal Reserve chairman, to
explain how financial turmoil can infect the overall economy.”).
2 See CRS Report RL33930, Subprime Mortgages: Primer on Current Lending and Foreclosure Issues, by Edward V.
Murphy. Chapter 13 filings in FY2008 were up 14% from the same period a year before, according to a Dec. 15, 2008
press release by the U.S. Courts [available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/2008/
BankruptcyFilingsDec2008.cfm]. It is unclear how much of this increase was directly related to mortgage debt.
3 Statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Oversight of Implementation of
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 and of Government Lending and Insurance Facilities, U.S. House
of Representatives, Committee on Financial Services, Nov. 18, 2008, available at
4 See, e.g., CRS Report RL34372, The HOPE NOW Alliance/American Securitization Forum (ASF) Plan to Freeze
Certain Mortgage Interest Rates, by David H. Carpenter and Edward V. Murphy; Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Press Release, FDIC Announces Availability of IndyMac Loan Modification Model, Nov. 20, 2008,
available at [http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08121.html]; Federal Housing Finance Agency Press
Release, FHFA Announces Implementation Plans for Streamlined Loan Modification Program, Dec. 18, 2008,
available at [http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/267/SMPimplementation121808.pdf].
5 See CRS Report RL34372, The HOPE NOW Alliance/American Securitization Forum (ASF) Plan to Freeze Certain
Mortgage Interest Rates, by David H. Carpenter and Edward V. Murphy.
voluntary loan modification measures have failed.... Because most troubled mortgages are
securitized, multiple stakeholders may be involved in the decision to modify mortgage loans,
causing a continued paralysis. Although some major lenders have recently embarked on loan
modifications on a wide scale, many servicers and secondary market investors remain 6
unwilling or unable to act, even when their own economic interests dictate otherwise.
Proponents of amending the Bankruptcy Code believe allowing strip down of primary residences
would have two important results. First, it would encourage the voluntary modification of
mortgages before default or delinquency that may drive borrowers into bankruptcy. Second, they
believe that where voluntary workouts prior to bankruptcy could not be achieved, strip down
would adjust the mortgage terms such that the costs and benefits are efficiently spread among
debtors and creditors, while allowing debtors to remain in the home after bankruptcy. Senator
Durbin, before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, stated:
As we heard at last year’s hearing, the benefits of this proposal [to allow the modification
of certain mortgage debts in bankruptcy] are clear. We heard testimony that:
My legislation would significantly reduce the number of foreclosures and help hundreds
of thousands of families stay in their homes.
Mortgage modification in bankruptcy benefits everyone - the homeowner, the lender, the
neighboring homeowners and the economy - far more than foreclosure.
My proposal would give lenders, servicers and investors a real incentive to voluntarily 7
Professor Adam Levitin, at the same Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, explained:
In a perfectly functioning market without agency and transaction costs, lenders would be
engaged in large-scale modification of defaulted or distressed mortgage loans, as the lenders
would prefer a smaller loss from modification than a larger loss from foreclosure. Voluntary
modification, however, has not been happening on a large-scale, for a variety of reasons,
most notably contractual impediments, agency costs, practical impediments, and other
If all distressed mortgages could be modified in bankruptcy, it would provide a method for
bypassing the various contractual, agency, and other transactional inefficiencies. Permitting
bankruptcy modification would give homeowners the option to force a workout of the
mortgage, subject to the limitations provided by the Bankruptcy Code. Moreover, the
possibility of a bankruptcy modification would encourage voluntary modifications, as
mortgage lenders would prefer to exercise more control over the shape of the modification.
An involuntary public system of mortgage modification would actually help foster voluntary,
private solutions to the mortgage crisis....
Allowing bankruptcy to serve as a forum for distressed homeowners to restructure their
mortgage debts is both the most moderate and the best method for resolving the foreclosure
crisis and stabilizing mortgage markets. Unlike any other proposed response, bankruptcy
6 Letter to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and House Minority Leader John Boehner, Jan. 6, 2009, available at
7 Statement of Senator Richard Durbin, Helping Families Save their Homes: the Role of Bankruptcy Law, U.S. Senate,
Committee on the Judiciary, Nov. 19, 2008, available at
modification offers immediate relief, solves the market problems created by securitization,
addresses both problems of payment reset shock and negative equity, screens out speculators,
spreads burdens between borrowers and lenders, and avoids both the costs and moral hazard 8
of a government bailout.
Others argue that amending the Bankruptcy Code alone would not promote voluntary
modifications outside of bankruptcy because such legislation would not directly address the
litigation, tax, accounting, and payment concerns that are the main deterrent to voluntary 9
modifications. For instance, a group of Columbia University professors argue that
[P]roposals to change the [Bankruptcy] Code could dramatically increase bankruptcy-filing
rates. Servicers will prefer mortgage modification in bankruptcy because their expenses are
reimbursed in bankruptcy, not outside it. Thus, proposed reforms could push millions of
borrowers into bankruptcy, delaying the resolution of the current crisis for years.
Still others believe allowing modifications of these mortgages in bankruptcy will reduce market
stability. For instance, Professor Mark S. Scarberry, a Resident Scholar at the American
Bankruptcy Institute, believes allowing strip down of primary residence mortgages would “cause
problems in the secondary mortgage market” and would “substantially change the risk 10
characteristics of home mortgages....” Additionally, David G. Kittle, Chairman of the Mortgage
Bankers Association, has testified:
One of the greatest potential destabilizing initiatives is the topic of discussion today -
allowing bankruptcy “cramdown” for home mortgages.... We understand the well intentioned
goal of such legislation is to provide a back stop against the large numbers of foreclosures.
However, the unintended result would be large numbers of bankruptcies, higher losses to
servicers, lenders and investors, and reduced ability by the financial industry to extend
affordable credit. Such bankruptcy reform will have a negative impact on individual 11
borrowers, a housing recovery and the economy as a whole.
At least three bills that would amend Section 1322 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code12 have been th
introduced in the 111 Congress. These bills are S. 61 and its House companion, H.R. 200 (the
Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009); and H.R. 225 (the Emergency
Home Ownership and Mortgage Equity Protection Act). This report provides an overview of the
general Chapter 13 process and analyzes how the three bills seek to amend Chapter 13. As these
bills, in some cases, deal with matters beyond the scope of this report, the analysis of them is
limited to proposed effects on when the modification of mortgages secured by the debtor’s
primary residence would be allowed; when prepayment penalties on these loans could be waived;
whether and to what extent repayment of these loans would be allowed; whether and to what
8 Written Testimony of Adam J. Levitin, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center, Helping Families Save
their Homes: the Role of Bankruptcy Law, U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Nov. 19, 2008, available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=3598&wit_id=7542 (internal citations omitted).
9 See, e.g., Christopher Mayer, Edward Morrison, and Tomasz Piskorski, A New Proposal for Loan Modifications, Jan.
7, 2009, available at [http://www4.gsb.columbia.edu/realestate/research/housingcrisis/mortgagemarket].
10 Statement of Mark S. Scarberry, Professor of Law and Robert M. Zinman Resident Scholar at the American
Bankruptcy Institute, The Looming Foreclosure Crisis: How To Help Families Save Their Homes, U.S. Senate,
Committee on the Judiciary, Dec. 5, 2007.
11 Statement of David G. Kittle, Chairman of the Mortgage Bankers Association, Helping Families Save their Homes:
the Role of Bankruptcy Law, U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Nov. 19, 2008, available at
12 11 U.S.C. § 101, et seq.
degree interest rates and annual percentage rates (APRs) on these loans could be modified; and
whether and in what circumstances the credit counseling requirement could be waived or
Bankruptcy provides an avenue by which debtors may get relief from their debts. Chapter 13
governs reorganizations for most individuals. A reorganization generally means that debts are
paid from the debtors’ future income. Outside of bankruptcy, debtors and creditors may attempt to
consensually modify the terms of their contractual obligations. If the parties attempt to reach a
voluntary workout outside of bankruptcy, the Chapter 13 framework may serve as a baseline for
negotiations with the parties understanding that if they cannot agree, the terms may be modified 13
in accordance with the parameters of the Code if the debtor files and qualifies for bankruptcy.
When a qualified debtor cannot meet outstanding obligations or negotiate revised payments with 14
his or her creditors, the debtor may file a petition for an individual reorganization. In most 15
cases, debtors must receive credit counseling before filing a Chapter 13 petition. Under Chapter 16
Chapter 13 plan generally is submitted at the same time as the petition for bankruptcy. Section
1322(a) states the requirements for all plans. Section 1322(b) states additional parameters that a
plan may meet, if applicable. If the plan meets the Code’s requirements, including the guidelines
13 For instance, 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) requires a Chapter 13 petitioner to have a regular income and limited amount of
secured and unsecured debt.
14 Voluntary mortgage modifications were relatively rare prior to 2008. See Statement of Henry J. Sommer, President
of the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, The Looming Foreclosure Crisis: How To Help
Families Save Their Homes, U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Dec. 5, 2007. (“If cramdown is not permitted for
debtors who cannot pay their mortgages, debtors and creditors have several other alternatives, none of which is more
favorable to the mortgage creditor: ... (4) Voluntary modification, which lenders rarely agree to, in which an
arrangement similar to cramdown results.”) (emphasis added) (“But the truth is that voluntary modifications are not
being made in any significant numbers ... In a dramatic example, it was recently reported that when state housing
finance agencies sought to help borrowers by asking lenders to modify loans so the agencies could then refinance them,
they had no success because lenders would not make the modifications. If mortgage companies will not modify loans
even when they will receive an immediate payoff through refinancing, they certainly will not modify them in cases
where they will be paid over a long period of time.”).
However, voluntary modifications are becoming more and more common as the housing market has continued to lag
and market participants have devised ways to perform modifications. See, e.g., CRS Report RL34372, The HOPE NOW
Alliance/American Securitization Forum (ASF) Plan to Freeze Certain Mortgage Interest Rates, by David H. Carpenter
and Edward V. Murphy; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Press Release, FDIC Announces Availability of
IndyMac Loan Modification Model, Nov. 20, 2008, available at [http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/
pr08121.html]; Federal Housing Finance Agency Press Release, FHFA Announces Implementation Plans for
Streamlined Loan Modification Program, Dec. 18, 2008, available at
15 This requirement can delay bankruptcy filings. Such a delay may be detrimental to debtors seeking to save their
homes from foreclosure through a Chapter 13 reorganization.
16 11 U.S.C. § 1321.
17 Bankruptcy Rule 1007(c) allows the debtor to file a reorganization plan within 15 days of petition.
of Section 1322, the court may confirm the plan in accordance with Section 1325.18 Chapter 13 19
plan disputes among debtors and creditors are settled by the bankruptcy judge.
The Code provides courts some leeway to adjust the value of certain debts. For many secured
debts, the court has “strip down” – also, commonly referred to as “cram down” – authority. Strip
down is the power to lower, over the creditor’s objections, the amount the debtor must pay the
creditor for the secured claim to as low as the collateral’s fair market value. Amounts in excess of 20
fair market value are treated as unsecured debt and may be discharged.
Among the secured debts that the court may not strip down under the current Chapter 13 are those 21
that are secured by the debtor’s principal residence. Section 1322(b)(2) states in relevant part,
“the plan may ... modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only
by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s primary residence.”
Other real property liens, however, are commonly modified in bankruptcy reorganizations. As a
general rule, a real property lien is only protected as a nondischargeable secured debt up to the
market value of the collateral. Indebtedness under a mortgage or security interest is treated as
unsecured – and therefore modifiable or potentially dischargeable to the extent that the amount of 22
indebtedness exceeds the value of the collateral. The Code allows a court to modify a mortgage 23
secured by the debtor’s vacation home, investment home, and family farm, for instance, but by 24
virtue of § 1322(b)(2) – and a parallel provision in Chapter 11 – a court may not strip down the
claim on a mortgage secured by the same individual’s primary residence. Even after this
provision was enacted by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, some courts interpreted the Code
as allowing strip down of primary residences until they were overruled by a 1992 U.S. Supreme 25
Court decision. Hence, the Code’s prohibition on the modification of liens that secure a primary
residence is arguably the exception, not the rule.
The purpose of the exception, at least based on analysis of its legislative history as expressed in a
concurring Supreme Court opinion by Justice Stevens, was to “encourage the flow of capital into 26
the home lending market.”
18 11 U.S.C. § 1325 provides the standards by which a bankruptcy court may confirm a reorganization plan.
19 11 U.S.C. §§ 502 and 1325.
20 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b)(2). To determine the fair market value of a collateral for the purpose of exercising its strip
down authority, the court generally holds a hearing during which the parties submit evidence to support a value. After
this hearing, the court determines the appropriate fair market value, and that amount is used to set the reduced debt
value, which is plugged into the debtor’s reorganization plan.
21 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2). An exception to this rule is provided for primary residence mortgages in which the final
payment under the original terms would be due during the reorganization plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2); see In re th
Paschen, 296 F.3d 1203 (11 Cir. 2002). While modification generally is not allowed, a debtor may be able to cure
defaults and otherwise reinstate the terms of a debt secured by the debtor’s primary residence pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § th
1322(b)(5). See 8 Collier on Bankr., (15 Ed. 2008), p. 1322.09.
22 11 U.S.C. § 506.
23 11 U.S.C. § 1222(b)(2).
24 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5). Individuals who do not qualify for Chapter 13 may be able to file for a reorganization in
Chapter 11 in spite of the fact that Chapter 11 is generally for commercial debtors. 11 U.S.C. § 109; see also, Toibb v.
Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991). A Chapter 13 petitioner, for instance, must have secured and unsecured debts that fall
below certain thresholds. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e).
25 Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1992).
26 Id. at 332 (citing Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Sav. Ass’n., 730 F. 2d 236, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1984). Despite Justice
S. 61 and its House companion H.R. 200 (the Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy
Act of 2009), as introduced, would allow for certain modifications of debts secured by the
debtor’s primary residence “that is the subject of a notice that a foreclosure may be commenced.”
The foreclosure process varies by state. In some states, the process can start and finish in a matter
of days. Requiring a foreclosure notice before a debtor may take advantage of the strip down in
bankruptcy may limit the law’s effectiveness because it could force a debtor to file a bankruptcy
petition within a short period of time. Making the decision to file for bankruptcy may be difficult
to do quickly because potential debtors may desire to compare bankruptcy to other options based
on the effect a reorganization is likely to have on their ability to retain certain property, their
credit worthiness, their future income, etc. Potential debtors may need to discuss their situation
with a bankruptcy attorney in order to make a knowledgeable decision.
News sources indicate that changes to these two bills are imminent. The specifics of the changes
are not yet available. But according to these sources, the bills may be amended to limit mortgage
modifications in bankruptcy only to loans entered into prior to the bills enactment. In addition,
debtors would have to certify that they sought contact with their lender/servicer to attempt a loan 27
modification prior to filing a petition for bankruptcy in order to benefit from the change in law.
The remainder of the analysis in this report is based on the bills as introduced. The report will be
updated as new details become available.
If a qualified debtor’s mortgage meets the above requirements, then the debtor’s Chapter 13
reorganization plan may modify the terms of the mortgage debt in several different ways. First,
the secured claim may be stripped down to the fair market value of the property, and the 28
remaining balance would be treated as an unsecured claim.
Stevens’s statement, it is unclear whether encouraging capital into the mortgage lending market was the only, or even
primary, legislative purpose of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2). The language of § 1322(b)(2) was the result of a compromise
between the House and Senate versions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-598). However, there was no
conference report for this bill, and CRS research of the recorded legislative history of § 1322(b)(2) yielded little to
explain the purpose behind the exception for debts secured by the debtor’s primary residence. Grubbs’s conclusion,
which was relied upon by Justice Stevens, appeared to be based on witness testimony during hearings on the act, which thth
were conducted in the 94 and 95 Congresses. Some of the more relevant testimony cited was given by Edward J. th
Kulik during the hearings from the 95 Congress. Mr. Kulik, representing the Real Estate Division of the
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company, expressed concern about provisions of the bills that would allow
modification of secured debts. He stated “[t]hese provisions may cause residential mortgage lenders to be
extraordinarily cautious in making loans in cases where the general financial resources of the individual borrower are
not particularly strong.” Mr. Kulik continued: “[s]erious consideration should be given to modifying both bills so that,
at the least ... a mortgage on real property other than investment property may not be modified.... ” See Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2266and H.R. 8200, U.S. Senate, Subcommittee of Improvements in Judicial thst
Machinery of the Committee on the Judiciary, 95 Cong., 1 Sess., 707, 714-15 (1977).
27 See, e.g., National Public Radio, Citigroup Anti-Foreclosure Plan Would Alter Loans, Jan. 8, 2009, available at
28 S. 61 § 4 and H.R. 200 § 4. The holder of the claim that is modified pursuant to § 4 of these bills would continue to
have a lien on the property until the secured claim is fully paid under the plan or until the claim is discharged in
accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 1328, whichever comes later. S. 61 § 6 and H.R. 200 § 6.
Second, the plan may prohibit, reduce, or delay changes in variable interest rates.29 This provision
would address, in part, mortgages that started with relatively low fixed rates, but subsequently
adjusted to a significantly higher variable rate. These low, initial rates are often referred to as
teaser rates. Borrowers who could meet the payments at the introductory rate may not be able to
afford the higher, adjusted rate.
Third, the plan may allow for payment of the qualifying mortgage debt for 40 years less the
number of years the loan has been outstanding or for the remaining payment term, whichever is 30
longer. This provision would not adjust the payment of other debts beyond the normal three- to
five-year term of repayment plans. In other words, the bills would allow for repayment of
modified primary residence debts over 40 or more years, but the repayment period of all other
debts would not be changed by the bills. Requiring debtors to pay off a potentially large debt, like
a primary residence mortgage, in five years or less could be prohibitively difficult and could
undermine the effectiveness of the law. This provision of S. 61 and H.R. 200 is important because
most courts interpret the current Code as requiring debtors to pay off the entire secured claim of
non-primary residence mortgages that are modified in accordance with § 1322(b)(2) during the 31
three- to five-year plan.
Fourth, plans may provide a fixed interest rate based on the prevailing rate as published by the 32
Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve System, plus a reasonable yield for risk. This
provision would allow the reduction of fixed interest rates to levels consistent with current market
conditions for comparable mortgages.
Fifth, plans may waive prepayment penalties that are provided for in the loan document.33
Prepayment penalties are intended to cover the mortgage holder for lost interest payments
incurred due to early payment. These fees were especially common in subprime mortgages.
Finally, the bill would allow for the elimination of the Code’s credit counseling requirement if the
debtor certifies to a court that a foreclosure sale has been scheduled on the debtor’s principal 34
residence. This waiver would remove a procedural hurdle that could slow the debtor’s ability to
file a bankruptcy petition, which may be important in light of the streamlined foreclosure process,
as discussed above.
29 S. 61 § 4 and H.R. 200 § 4.
30 S. 61 § 4 and H.R. 200 § 4.
31 See, e.g., In re Enewally, 368 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Therefore, a debtor may not use § 506(a) in
combination with § 1322(b)(5) to reduce the secured claim and repay it over a period longer than the plan term.”); In re
Kinney, LEXIS 22313, 18 (Conn. 2000) (“If the [mortgage] payments are changed, sections 1322(c) and 1325(a)(5)
both require that they be completed over the life of the plan, which cannot exceed five years.... ” (quoting In re
MacGregor, 172 B.R. 718, 721 (Mass. 1994) (internal citations omitted)); In re Pruett, 178 B.R. 7 (N.D.Ala. 1995); In
re Brown, 175 B.R. 129 (Mass. 1994); In re Murphy, 175 B.R. 134 (Mass. 1994). There is some disagreement among
the courts as to what adjustments to mortgage terms constitute a “modification” pursuant to § 1322(b)(2). Compare In
re Koper, 284 B.R. 747, 752 (Conn. 2002) with In re Pruett, 178 B.R. at 9.
32 S. 61 § 4 and H.R. 200 § 4.
33 S. 61 § 5 and H.R. 200 § 5.
34 S. 61 § 2 and H.R. 200 § 2.
H.R. 225 (the Emergency Homeownership and Equity Protection Act), as introduced, is identical
to S. 61 and H.R. 200 as they were introduced with regards to the terms discussed in this report,
except that modifications could only be made to qualifying debts that were entered into prior to 35
the bill’s enactment date.
David H. Carpenter
35 H.R. 225 § 3.