The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

The Department of Defense (DOD) has long played a role in U.S. efforts to assist foreign
populations, militaries, and governments. The use of DOD to provide foreign assistance stems in
general from the perception that DOD can contribute unique or vital capabilities and resources
because it possesses the manpower, materiel, and organizational assets to respond to international
needs. Over the years, Congress has helped shape the DOD role by providing DOD with its
mandate for such activities through a wide variety of authorities.
The historical DOD role in foreign assistance can be regarded as serving three purposes:
responding to humanitarian and basic needs, building foreign military capacity and capabilities,
and strengthening foreign governments’ ability to deal with internal and international threats
through state-building measures. The United States and the U.S. military benefit from DOD
foreign assistance activities in several ways. U.S. diplomacy benefits from the U.S. military’s
capacity to project itself rapidly into extreme situations, such as disasters and other humanitarian
emergencies, enhancing the U.S. image as a humanitarian actor. Humanitarian assistance, military
training, and other forms of assistance also provide opportunities to cultivate good relations with
foreign populations, militaries, and governments. U.S. military personnel have long viewed such
activities as opportunities to interact with foreign militaries as part of their professional
development. Since the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, DOD
training of military forces and provision of security assistance have been an important means to
enable foreign militaries to conduct peacekeeping operations and to support coalition operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
DOD’s perception of the appropriate non-combat role for the U.S. military has evolved over time.
Within the past few years, the perceptions of DOD officials, military officers, and defense
analysts have coalesced around a post-9/11 strategy that calls for the use of the U.S. military in
preventive, deterrent, and preemptive activities. This strategy involves DOD in the creation of
extensive international and interagency “partnerships,” as well as an expanded DOD role in
foreign assistance activities. Critics point to a number of problems with an expanded DOD role in
many activities. Indeed, a key DOD document acknowledges that state-building tasks may be
“best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals.” Nevertheless, although
reluctant to divert personnel from combat functions, DOD officials believe that the U.S. military
must develop its own capacity to carry out such activities in the absence of appropriate civilian
In the second session of the 110th Congress, Members have faced several choices regarding the
DOD role in foreign assistance. The Bush Administration has proposed legislation to make
permanent two controversial DOD authorities. It has also proposed legislation to enable U.S.
government civilian personnel to perform some of the tasks currently carried out by the U.S.
military, as well as to form a civilian reserve corps for that purpose. Congress may also consider
options to improve DOD coordination with civilian agencies on foreign assistance activities.

Introduc tion ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Overview: DOD’s Evolving Response to Perceived Needs...........................................................3
Responding to Humanitarian and Basic Needs.........................................................................5
Evolution of Humanitarian Programs, Authorities, and Funding Since the 1980s.............5
Disaster Relief and Related Humanitarian Assistance........................................................6
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance in the Context of Military Training and
Operations ........................................................................................................................ 6
New DOD Health Programs...............................................................................................7
Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Commander’s Emergency Response
Program Funds in Afghanistan and Iraq..........................................................................7
Perspectives on Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance......................................................8
Building Military Capacity and Capabilities.............................................................................9
Evolution of Military Assistance Authority......................................................................10
Perspectives on Building Foreign Military and Other Security Force Capacity...............14
Strengthening Foreign Governments Against Internal and International Threats...................15
Historical Precedents and Current Activities....................................................................15
Perspectives on State-Building.........................................................................................16
Major Issues and Options for Congress.........................................................................................18
What Are the Effects of DOD Activities on U.S. Foreign Relations and Foreign
Policy Goals?.......................................................................................................................18
Summary of Benefits........................................................................................................18
Summary of Critiques.......................................................................................................19
Relative Costs...................................................................................................................21
Can Current DOD and State Department Coordination Be Improved?..................................21
Congress’s Role in Specifying Interagency Coordination ...............................................22
Interagency Coordination in Practice................................................................................23
Current Initiatives to Improve Interagency Coordination.................................................24
Further Considerations and Options.................................................................................25
Should Civilian Capabilities to Carry Out Foreign Assistance Activities Be
Enhanced? ...................................................................................................................... ...... 26
DOD Manpower and Budget Advantages.........................................................................27
Possible Options to Enhance U.S. Government Civilian Capabilities..............................28
Need to Examine Other Civilian Capabilities...................................................................29
Table 1. Congressional Action on Selected DOD-Requested New or Expanded
Authorities for FY2009 Relevant to Foreign Assistance Activities Referenced Above.............31
Table A-1. Section 401 Humanitarian Assistance and Civic Action: Costs, Number of
Projects, and Number of Countries, by Fiscal Year....................................................................40
Table A-2. Geographical Distribution of Section 401 Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
Activities: Number of Countries, by Region and Fiscal Year....................................................41
Table B-1. DOD Funding for Global HIV/AIDS Prevention Programs, by Fiscal Year,

Table B-2. PEPFAR Funding Transfers to DOD Global HIV/AIDS Prevention Programs,
FY2004 through FY2008...........................................................................................................44
Table C-1. DOD Humanitarian Mine Action Funds Expended, by Fiscal Year, FY2000-
FY2007 ....................................................................................................................................... 48
Table C-2. Countries Assisted with DOD HMA Funding, by Fiscal Year, FY2000-
FY2007 ....................................................................................................................................... 48
Table F-1. Timeline of Major Congressional Authorities and Executive Directives Related
to CN..........................................................................................................................................56
Table F-2. DOD CN Funding by U.S. Combatant Command, FY2005 and FY2006..................58
Table F-3. Top 10 DOD CN Assistance Recipients, FY2005 and FY2006..................................58
Table I-1. GPOI Funding, by Fiscal Year, FY2005-FY2009.........................................................73
Appendix A. Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance, Including Civic Action....................33
Appendix B. DOD Global Health Programs.................................................................................42
Appendix C. Department of Defense Humanitarian Mine Action Program..................................46
Appendix D. Foreign Military Sales and Financing Program.......................................................49
Appendix E. International Military Education and Training Program..........................................52
Appendix F. Counternarcotics.......................................................................................................55
Appendix G. Foreign Anti-Terrorism and Counterterrorism Train and Equip Assistance
and Education Programs.............................................................................................................62
Appendix H. Foreign Military Capacity Building Section 1206 Authority...................................67
Appendix I. Global Peace Operations Initiative Train and Equip Program..................................72
Appendix J. The Department of Defense in Nonproliferation: The Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program.....................................................................................................................75
Appendix K. DOD in Iraq and Afghanistan Economic Reconstruction and State-Building.........80
Appendix L. Foreign Security Assistance Initiatives for Afghanistan and Iraq............................86
Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................92
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 93

Among the foreign policy questions that the 111th Congress will face is one that has surfaced
repeatedly for over 60 years and has resurfaced during the previous Congress: what is the
appropriate role for the Department of Defense (DOD) in foreign assistance? DOD has long
played a role in U.S. efforts to assist foreign populations, militaries, and governments. The use of
DOD to provide foreign assistance stems in general from the perception that DOD can contribute
unique or vital capabilities and resources because it possesses the manpower, materiel, and
organizational assets to respond to international needs. Over the years, Congress has shaped the
DOD role through a wide variety of authorities contained in the Foreign Relations and Intercourse
(Title 22 U.S. Code) and Armed Services (Title 10 U.S. Code) statutes, and through annual
legislation. To some analysts, the DOD role has been in effect a product of Congress’s willingness
to fund defense rather than foreign affairs budgets. In some instances, the activities in which
DOD participates serve an institutional purpose for the U.S. military, providing U.S. soldiers and
sailors with opportunities for military training, for cultivating military-to-military contacts, and
for gathering information on foreign countries where they may someday be called to operate.
The historical DOD role in foreign assistance can be regarded roughly as serving three purposes:
• Responding to humanitarian and basic needs. Since at least the 19th century,
U.S. military forces have provided urgent assistance to foreign populations in
time of disasters, such as earthquakes and floods. More recently, U.S. military
forces have also provided aid in humanitarian crises such as famines and forced
population movements. DOD aids foreign populations under authorities to
conduct humanitarian assistance in a variety of other circumstances, including as
an adjunct to military training and exercises with and as part of military
• Building foreign military capacity and capabilities. DOD provides military
equipment, weapons, training, and other assistance to build up the military
capacity and capabilities of friendly foreign countries. Such support is provided
to augment military capacity to perform counternarcotics, counterterrorism,
internal defense, border defense, and other missions, and as part of post-conflict
state-building. The origins of current programs date to the early years after World
War II, when the United States sought to help rebuild Europe.
• Strengthening foreign governments. Besides building foreign military capacity,
DOD plays a role in U.S. efforts to help foreign governments secure their
territories against internal and international threats with a variety of non-military
tools. These include state-building efforts, such as strengthening police forces,
and bolstering the legitimacy of foreign governments by undertaking small-scale
economic, health, and social projects (and in the case of conflict zones, political
projects), generally in areas outside capital cities. Although such efforts were th
carried out sporadically as early as the 19 century, the post-World War II U.S.
occupations in Germany and Japan are regarded as state-building models. More

1 The introduction and overview were prepared by Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs. These
sections draw on the appendices at the end of the report by several CRS analysts from the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and
Trade Division.

recently, DOD support for border protection and nuclear non-proliferation
initiatives strengthens foreign governments by curbing international threats.
During the past few years, Congress has provided DOD with new, non-combat authorities to 2
prosecute the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and to conduct counterterrorism activities elsewhere.
Congress granted these authorities in response not only to the immediate needs of U.S. military
operations in conflict zones, but also to the Bush Administration’s efforts, in the wake of the
terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 (9/11), to redirect and reshape U.S.
government capabilities in a new strategic environment. As a result, some analysts believe that
DOD is playing too large a role in assisting foreign populations, militaries, and governments.
Critics view this role as potentially detrimental to U.S. foreign policy, citing a perceived lack of
strategic coordination between DOD and the State Department (and other agencies where
applicable), a failure to ensure that DOD programs are sustainable, and a militarization of the
United States’ image abroad. These analysts call for greater clarity and reforms in defining 3
DOD’s foreign assistance role and responsibilities. This report provides Congress with historical
context and current information and perspectives regarding DOD’s role and responsibilities in a
range of foreign assistance activities.
In an overview and appendices, this report provides background information on and discusses
issues related to the DOD’s role in providing U.S. foreign assistance and undertaking foreign
assistance-type activities. Topics include the types of assistance DOD provides, the authorities
under which DOD conducts its programs, and coordination and cooperation mechanisms between
DOD and other agencies. The report begins with a brief introduction to the three areas in which
DOD plays a role in foreign assistance and to Congress’s part in authorizing that role. Next, the
report briefly discusses the general evolution of DOD’s role and the Department of State’s current
perception of that role based on current national security needs. The report then provides an
overview of the evolution of the DOD role and current activities in the three areas cited above,
with a snapshot of the varying perspectives on the DOD roles in these areas. Finally, the report
discusses issues that Congress may wish to consider. The appendices provide more detailed
information on the current and most significant foreign assistance programs in which DOD plays
a role.
This report refers to a Department of Defense role in foreign assistance rather than a U.S. military
role because DOD may use either military troops or civilian contractors, or both, to implement

2 The term counterterrorism in this report refers to offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.
3 Several recent reports reflect these perceptions. Two of these are congressional reports: U.S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations. Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign. Washington, D.C.,
December 2006 (hereafter referred to as 2006 SFRC Report) and U.S. Congress, House, Conference Report on the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008 to accompany H.R. 1585,H.Rept. 110-447, Section 952, December 6,
2007. Two were produced by Washington, D.C.-based think tanks: Center for Strategic and International Studies st
(CSIS), Integrating 21 Century Development and Security Assistance, Final Report of the Task Force on Non-
Traditional Security Assistance, CSIS Report, December 2007 (hereafter referred to as CSIS Task Force Final Report
2007); and Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DOD’s
Expanding Role, Center for Global Development, Working Paper no. 131, November 2007 (hereafter referred to as The
Pentagon and Global Development). Another was produced by an international organization: Organization for
Economic Co-Operation and Development, The United States: Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer
Review, 2006, p. 15, (hereafter referred to as the DAC Peer Review 2006). Another was produced by a group of non-
governmental organizations: George Withers, Adam Isacson, Lisa Haugaard, Joy Olson, and Joel Fyke, Ready, Aim,
Foreign Policy, a joint publication of the Center for International Policy, the Latin America Working Group Education
Fund, and the Washington Office on Latin America, March 2008.

programs. The term U.S. military is used only for activities in which U.S. troops are used

DOD’s perception of the appropriate non-combat role for the U.S. military has evolved over time.
During the years in which the United States’ primary national security threats were posed by other
States, there were differing perspectives within DOD on the use of the military in non-combat
roles. With the fall of the Soviet Union, these differences sharpened. Within the past few years,
the perceptions of DOD officials, military officers, and defense analysts have coalesced around a
post-9/11 strategy that calls for the use of the U.S. military in preventive, deterrent, and
preemptive activities. This strategy involves DOD in the creation of extensive international (and
interagency) “partnerships,” as well as an expanded DOD role in foreign assistance activities.
The February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) is the first key document that
reflects the evolution of DOD thinking as it grapples with the implications of 9/11 for U.S. 4
national security and U.S. defense policy. The assertion of top U.S. defense officials and military
leaders that DOD needs “new and more flexible” authorities to operate in the current strategic 5
environment forms the rationale for DOD’s request for new authorities, especially to advance a 6
new “Partnership Strategy.”
As outlined in the 2006 QDR, the Partnership Strategy is one of DOD’s key tools for the United
States’ “long war” against a new threat—that is, the decentralized networks of “violent extremists
who use terrorism as their weapon of choice,” who “will likely attempt to use” weapons of mass 7
destruction “in their conflict with free people everywhere.” Countering such networks, as well as
the rogue powers that may sponsor them, will require “long-duration, complex operations
involving the U.S. military, other government agencies and international partners,” which are 8
waged simultaneously in multiple countries. To do so will also require that the United States

4 U.S. Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. February 6, 2006. (Hereafter referred to as 2006
QDR.) The QDR is a congressionally mandated report (Title 10 U.S.C. Section 118) produced every four years that
delineates a national defense strategy consistent with the Presidents most recent National Security Strategy, based on
the perceived threats to U.S. interests, and defines the necessary force structure, modernization plans, infrastructure,
budget, and other elements to carry out that defense strategy. The 2002 National Security Strategy, the most recent
before the 2006 QDR, sets forth eight tasks for the U.S. government, among them four which directly involve DOD:
(1)strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; (2)work
with others to defuse regional conflicts; (3)prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with
weapons of mass destruction”; and (4)transform Americas national security institutions to meet the challenges and
opportunities of the twenty-first century. pp. 1-2.
5 Ibid., p. 83. The full quote states:The ability to wage irregular and unconventional warfare and the skills needed for
counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction, ‘military diplomacy and complex interagency coalition operations
are essential—but in many cases require new and more flexible authorities from the Congress.”
6 2006 QDR, op. cit. The previous QDR, although published in late September 2001, was written and cleared before the
9/11 attacks.
7 Ibid., p. v.
8 Ibid., p. 23.

“assist others in developing the wherewithal to protect their own populations and police their own 9
territories, as well as to project and sustain forces to promote collective security.”
In the 2006 QDR, as elsewhere, DOD maintains that developing the foreign “wherewithal” to
enhance domestic and collective security requires a “whole of government” approach. Through
the November 2005 DOD Directive 3000.05, entitled the Directive on Military Support for
Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, defense leaders mandated
that DOD “be prepared to conduct and support” civilian agencies in conducting SSTR operations,
but also indicated doubt that civilian agencies will create the needed capabilities to carry out
state-building tasks. Thus, while DOD acknowledges that state-building tasks may be “best
performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals,” it also sees a need to develop
its own capability to perform “all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians 10
cannot do so.” As reflected in the 2006 QDR, DOD is placing a new emphasis on the utility of
non-combat foreign assistance activities and expects to continue to play an important, if not a
proportionately expanding, role in U.S. foreign assistance in the developing world.
DOD subsequently reiterated these points. In October 2007, Defense Secretary Robert Gates
referred to this new perception of the DOD role: “And until our government decides to plus up
our civilian agencies like the Agency for International Development [USAID], Army soldiers can
expect to be tasked with reviving public services, rebuilding infrastructure, and promoting good
governance. All these so-called ‘nontraditional’ capabilities have moved into the mainstream of 11
military thinking, planning, and strategy—where they must stay.” This theme was once again
repeated in the June 2008 National Defense Strategy, which found that U.S. forces had “stepped
up to the task of long-term reconstruction, development, and governance” and that the “U.S.
Armed Forces will need to institutionalize and retain these capabilities,” while noting that “this is 12
no replacement for civilian involvement and expertise.”
In a report to Congress in mid-2007, the State Department had argued in favor of new permanent
DOD authorities. It viewed such authorities, including several mentioned below, as a means “to
provide a flexible, timely, and effective whole-of-government approach to today’s security
environment that is well coordinated in the interagency [coordination process] both in
Washington at the policy level and in the field at the operational level, and with appropriate, 13
relevant oversight by Congress.”

9 Ibid., p. 20.
10 The November 2005 DOD Directive 3000.05, the Directive on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition,
and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. (Hereafter referred to as DOD Directive 3000.05.) This directive discusses
state-building tasks as part of stability operations. It is the first DOD document to designate stability operations as “a
core U.S. military mission.” The state-building tasks it specifically lists are helping to rebuild indigenous institutions,
including security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems; reviving or building the private sector, and
developing representative governmental institutions. This directive may be accessed at
directives/corres/html/300005.htm; last accessed July 22, 2008. For more on this topic, CRS Report RL33557,
Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement, by Nina M. Serafino.
11 U.S. Department of Defense. Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates to the Association of the United
States Army, Washington, D.C., October 10. 2007. Accessed through; last
accessed July 22, 2008.
12 U.S. Department of Defense. National Defense Strategy, June 2008, p. 17. In the same paragraph, this document
stated: “Greater civilian participation is necessary both to make military operations successful and to relieve stress on
the men and women of the armed forces. Having permanent civilian capabilities available and using them early could
also make it less likely that military forces will need to be deployed in the first place.”
13 U.S. Department of State. Report to Congress: Section 1206(f) of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act.

The following sections discuss DOD’s traditional and current responsibilities in disaster
assistance and humanitarian activities, assistance to foreign militaries, and assistance in other
state-building areas. They also discuss recent proposals for enhanced authorities as spelled out in
the QDR and related legislation submitted to Congress.
DOD engagement in U.S. government disaster relief and humanitarian assistance activities is
longstanding, with U.S. military forces playing an important role in U.S. disaster assistance since th14
at least the 19 century. DOD also plays a role in other humanitarian emergency situations, such
as providing aid and protection for relief workers in cases of famine or forced population
movements. More routine humanitarian assistance activities and civic action programs abroad th
date back at least to the turn of the 20 century; these usually take place in the context of U.S.
training exercises or military operations.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, Congress provided specific DOD authorities for humanitarian aid as
the Reagan Administration’s civilian leadership sought means to support its allies in conflicts in
Central America and Afghanistan. During that period, Congress provided specific authority to
DOD to (1) provide nonlethal excess property and supplies from the DOD stocks when requested
by the State Department and for distribution by the State Department; (2) provide space-available
military transportation for private donors to send supplies and food to needy foreign populations;
and (3) carry out civic assistance programs that involve small-scale construction, reconstruction,
and maintenance projects, and provide limited medical attention to rural populations. (See
Appendix A and Appendix C.)
Since then, Congress has somewhat modified and expanded DOD disaster response and
humanitarian programs, incorporating aid to mitigate environmental disasters and demining
training, and has introduced separate health programs. (See Appendix A, Appendix B, and
Appendix C.) Thus, DOD disaster and humanitarian aid now encompasses a broader range of
potential assistance than the basic humanitarian relief of food and emergency supplies provided
by non-governmental organizations. In 1994, Congress established the Overseas Humanitarian, 15
Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) DOD budget account to fund many of these programs.

Released by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. July 3, 2007. Hereafter referred to as the Section 1206(f) 2006
NDAA Report. This report is available through the Department of State website:
90867.htm; last accessed July 22, 2008.
14 Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2007), p. 63.
15 Section 1411, P.L. 103-337, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 1995. The account was
first authorized at $86 million. It was established to cover activities under 10 U.S.C. 401, 402, 404 (newly established
by that bill), 2547, and 2551.

The DOD role in providing disaster relief to foreign populations when natural and manmade
disasters strike serves both foreign affairs and military needs. The lead authority for disaster
response is the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and DOD participation is
conducted on the direction of the President or at the request of the State Department, through the
appropriate U.S. ambassador. Nevertheless, DOD is often the first U.S. agency to respond to
foreign disasters and other humanitarian crises because of its readily deployable resources. DOD
international emergency responses allow the United States to contribute effectively in alleviating
suffering abroad and enhancing the country’s international image, as well as the U.S. domestic
and foreign image of the U.S. military. (See Appendix A.) Such activities are also undertaken for
strategic or foreign policy reasons. A famous post-World War II example of such motivation was
the 1948-1949 Berlin airlift, when U.S. Air Force and [British] Royal Air Force flights of relief
supplies to Soviet-blockaded West Berlin demonstrated a U.S. and U.K. commitment to a
strategically important area.
Humanitarian and civic assistance programs, as currently conducted, usually take place in the
context of training exercises and military operations. In that context, they are carried out as much
for the U.S. military to gain situational awareness and the support of local populations as to
alleviate suffering. When provided under Title 10 U.S. Code (10 U.S.C. 401), the primary
purpose of the program must be to train U.S. armed forces. In addition, the assistance must not
duplicate any other assistance, and it must meet the security interests of both the United States
and the host country. Section 401 authority has been often used for training exercises for the
National Guard, and for military reserve personnel and active duty personnel in certain
specialties, especially medical personnel. U.S. Special Operations Forces also conduct
humanitarian assistance activities as an adjunct to military training exercises with foreign
militaries and as an integral part of stability and counterinsurgency operations. The Joint
Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercises with friendly foreign militaries are conducted
under 10 U.S.C. 2011, primarily for the benefit of training the Special Operations Forces, but
humanitarian assistance programs such as medical and veterinary visits may be added to cultivate
goodwill among local populations and as part of the training for foreign troops.
U.S. humanitarian and civic assistance activities also can be an integral part of military
operations. During the Korean and Vietnam conflict eras, military civic action programs that
included medical assistance were an integral part of military efforts. Now, in counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency operations, teams of U.S. Special Operations Forces work together with
foreign militaries on small-scale humanitarian and civic action projects. The primary purposes of
humanitarian and civic assistance in such operations are to extend the reach of the national
government, enhance its legitimacy among local populations, and cultivate relationships and trust 16
that may lead to information sharing on terrorists’ locations and planned activities.

16 Authors’ interview with DOD officials, January 2008.

Recently, Congress has added new health programs to the humanitarian assistance portfolio of the
U.S. military. Beginning in FY2000, Congress has provided funds through the Defense Health
Program to educate foreign military forces in HIV prevention activities in conjunction with U.S.
military training exercises and humanitarian assistance activities in Africa. Subsequently, other
DOD health programs have been added. (See Appendix B.)
Congress provides special funding and authorities for programs with a humanitarian assistance
component in the war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq. The DOD-lead Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and State Department-led units in Iraq, for which DOD provides
security, are central to U.S. efforts to promote host government authority and stability to areas
outside the capitals in those countries. These integrated civilian and military teams count
humanitarian assistance among their tools to provide stability in difficult areas, extend the reach
of the central government, strengthen local governments in Afghanistan and Iraq, and stimulate
local economies. In addition, commanders on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq use
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, which Congress appropriates, to 17
respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs. (See Appendix K)
Funding Accounts
For many years, prior to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, funding for DOD disaster response
and humanitarian assistance projects was appropriated annually in the Overseas Humanitarian,
Disaster, and Civic Assistance (OHDACA) Account. This account covers disaster response and a 18
variety of other humanitarian assistance programs codified under six Title 10 authorities.

17 CERP was created in 2003 by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. It initially used Iraqi funds for use in that
country. Subsequently, Congress has provided CERP funding for use in Afghanistan and Iraq. Congress first provided
up to $180 million for the Commanders Emergency Response Program in the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations for Defense and the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, P.L. 108-106, Section 1110,
November 6, 2003. (Hereafter referred to as the FY2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act.) Congress
subsequently provided additional funds: up to $854 million in FY2005, up to $500 million each for FY2006 and
FY2007, and up to $500 million thus far for FY2008. (See the Ronald W. Reagan NDAA for Fiscal Yar 2005, P.L.
108-375, Section 1201, as amended by the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War
on Terror and Tsunami Relief, 2005, P.L. 109-12, Section 1006; the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006, P.L. 109-163,
Section 1202; and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, P.L. 110-161, Section 606(a)). The Duncan Hunter
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (P.L. 110-417), Section 1214, reset the FY2008 authorization
at $1.7 billion and set the FY2009 authorization at $1.5 billion. Note that the spelling for the first word in the name of
this program is not consistent; it is sometimes spelled Commanders’. This report uses the spelling first used in
18 These are 10 U.S.C. 401, 402, 404, 407, 2557, and 2561 (previously 2551). Section 401 authorizes DOD to carry out
humanitarian and civic assistance activities in host nations in conjunction with military operations. Section 402,
popularly referred to as the Denton Amendment, authorizes the Secretary of Defense to transport, without charge,
humanitarian supplies (as well as supplies that respond to serious threats to the environment if other transport is not
available) that have been provided by a non-governmental source to any country on a space available basis. Section 404
authorizes the President to direct the Secretary of Defense to provide international disaster assistance to prevent the loss
of lives or serious harm to the environment. Section 407 provides authority for humanitarian demining assistance.
Section 2557 authorizes providing nonlethal excess DOD supplies for humanitarian relief. Section 2561 provides
additional authority for the transport of humanitarian relief and for other humanitarian purposes worldwide, as well as

Congress gradually increased appropriations for OHDACA from $49.7 million in FY2002 to 19
$63.204 million in FY2007. These funds were available for one fiscal year. For FY2008,
Congress appropriated $40 million in that account specifically for disaster relief and response, to
be available for two fiscal years (i.e., through FY2009), and an additional $63.3 million to be
available for those purposes for three fiscal years (i.e., through FY2010). For FY2009, Congress 20
provided the Administration with the requested $83.273 million in OHDACA funding.
For FY2009, the Bush Administration sought monies for humanitarian purposes under a
longstanding DOD account, the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF), that provides
funds to combatant commanders for a variety of purposes. In its FY2009 budget request, the Bush
Administration asked for $100 million for the CCIF specifically to meet unanticipated
humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs. Over the past decade at least, Congress has
appropriated $25 million in annual DOD appropriation bills for the CCIF, and additional amounts
in FY2005-FY2007 supplemental appropriations legislation, but, through FY2007 at least, the 21
CCIF does not appear to have been used extensively for humanitarian projects. For FY2009, 22
Congress appropriated $50 million for that account.
U.S. officials state that DOD has instructed military commanders to look more broadly than in the
past at humanitarian assistance, employing it as a component of U.S. security cooperation with 23
foreign nations. Guidance to U.S. combatant commanders has stated that DOD regards
humanitarian assistance as “foremost a tool for achieving U.S. security objectives,” which can 24
also serve several “complementary security goals.” The “complementary” goals cited are
“improving DOD visibility, access, influence, interoperability, and coalition-building with
military and civilian host nation counterparts; building/reinforcing security and stability in a host
nation or region; generating positive public relations and goodwill for DOD that will enhance our
ability to shape the regional security environment; bolstering host nation capacity to respond to

authority to transport supplies to respond to or mitigate serious harm to the environment.
19 The amounts in the intervening years were $58.4 million for FY2003, $59.0 million for each FY2004 and FY2005,
and $61.546 million for FY2006. Figures from annual DOD appropriations acts.
20 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, P.L. 110-417.
21 U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request Summary Justification, February 4, 2008, p.103.
When codified in 1991 (Title 10 U.S.C. Section 166a), the CCIF (then known as the CINC Initiative Fund), provided
funds for exercises and military education and training of foreign personnel, and for “humanitarian and civil
assistance. A 2006 amendment changed “civil assistance” to “civic assistance, to include urgent and unanticipated
humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance,” and made the latter a priority category, “particularly in a foreign
country where the armed forces are engaged in a contingency operation.” (John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007,
P.L. 109-364, Section 902.) To this point, this fund may not have been used for extensively for humanitarian programs.
In response to a Congressional Research Service request for information in 2007, DOD stated that just under $1 million
had been used for humanitarian purposes from FY2005 through FY2007. (Information provided by the Office of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, e-mail correspondence of November 7, 2007.)
22 Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriation Act, 2009, P.L. 110-329.
23 Authors’ interview with DOD officials, December 2006.
24 Joint message from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity
Conflict (SO/LIC) and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), providing policy and program management
direction for FY2005 OHDACA planning and execution. Section 3 (General Guidance) A and B.

disasters ... and promoting specific operational readiness skills of US military personnel.”25 The
2006 QDR places humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations under the rubric of
“humanitarian and early preventive measures” and claims that the use of such measures can 26
“prevent disorder from spiraling into wider conflict or crisis.”
State Department officials welcome the U.S. military’s ability to deliver disaster and
humanitarian relief assistance in a timely fashion. They also tend to favor routine humanitarian
assistance and civic action projects, albeit as a matter of necessity, because such projects allow
the U.S. government to provide supplies and medical services to needy populations, and to
construct schools and clinics in underserved areas, where funds are not otherwise available. These
projects can create goodwill and personal contact for the United States, often in areas where U.S.
diplomats would otherwise not venture.
DOD and U.S. military personnel attitudes toward disaster response and humanitarian relief vary.
Attitudes tend to be favorable for immediate disaster response and for training exercises,
particularly for National Guard and Reserve troops. Attitudes become ambivalent when U.S.
military personnel are used for prolonged periods for humanitarian assistance in conventional
Over the years, observers have raised a variety of concerns regarding humanitarian and civic
assistance in non-emergency situations. Analysts have long faulted such assistance for sometimes 27
being short-sighted and producing ill will when projects are not well selected. In the 1990s, 28
Congress scrutinized U.S. humanitarian and civic action activities in Central America. Critics
continue to view some projects as ill-conceived and at odds with sound development policy; for
instance, schools built in areas where there are no teachers to staff them undermine the credibility
of the United States and the host nation government, or assistance that, albeit inadvertently, 29
benefits one ethnic group over another exacerbates ongoing conflicts. (See Appendix A.) The
Bush Administration has recently created new coordination mechanisms that may address such
concerns. (See the section on DOD interaction with other agencies, below.)
Since the early years after World War II, U.S. military assistance programs to train and equip
foreign military forces have been an important component of U.S. foreign assistance, and DOD
has played a major role in those programs. Even though the major train and equip efforts are
conducted under State Department programs, DOD has long been responsible for carrying out
most of the work involved in building foreign military capacity and capabilities. Sizable military
assistance programs put in place soon after World War II served the primary purpose of bolstering
the defense capabilities of major allies against the Soviet Union, but in subsequent years, military

25 Ibid., Section 3B.
26 2006 QDR, op. cit., p. 12.
27 See especially John W. DePauw, “Understanding Civic Action,” in Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of
Military Civic Action, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1990, pp. 1-7. This
book presents critical views of civic action from a sympathetic perspective.
28 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Role of the
DOD in Humanitarian Assistance, hearing , 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., April 19, 1994, H.A.S.C. No. 103-49 (Washington:
GPO, 1995).
29 The Pentagon and Global Development, op. cit.

assistance programs also began increasingly to serve political and diplomatic, as well as military,
ends. For the past several decades, military assistance—carried out through the State
Department’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and International Military and Education Training
(IMET) programs—has become an important tool of bilateral relations, intended to strengthen
and cement relations with foreign governments, reward allies, and cultivate new partners. A
recently added State Department program to train and equip foreign peacekeepers and a DOD
program to train and equip foreign military forces for both counterterrorism missions and stability
operations reflect the intention to develop capable international partners in quelling conflict and
curbing terrorism. For many years, DOD training of foreign military forces was carried out by
Special Operations Forces, but now DOD officials describe it as a key mission for the U.S. 30
military as a whole.
The Mutual Defense Assistance Act (MDAA) of 1949 was the legal forerunner to all major post-
World War II military assistance programs. Congress passed the MDAA to provide weapons and
military equipment to the newly established North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and to a 31
number of other countries. The MDAA’s successors, the Military Security Act (MSA) of 1951 32
and the MSA of 1954, were the major vehicles for U.S. foreign assistance until the enactment of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which stands today as current law. The MSA of 1951 created
the Mutual Security Agency in the Executive Office of the President. The MSA Director was
responsible for the “continuous supervision, general direction, and coordination of all foreign 33
aid—military, economic, and technical assistance.” Thus, during the early part of the 1950s,
DOD administered the military assistance programs under the White House’s policy direction and 34
guidance. Congress subsequently moved responsibility for non-military aid to the State
Department (P.L. 81-329, 63 Stat. 714), whose officials were charged with coordinating with 35
DOD regarding military aid. As described by the forerunner of the Congressional Research
Service in 1959, the purpose of the State Department coordination of military aid (identified as
“an important instrument of U.S. foreign policy”) with other forms of aid was “to help achieve
the basic policy goals decided upon by the President with the advice of the National Security 36
Council” (NSC).

30 Secretary of Defense Gates’ October 2007 speech, op. cit.
31 The MDAA (P.L. 81-329, 63 Stat. 714) authorized military aid to the original NATO nations (Canada and 10
European nations) and to Turkey, Greece, Korea, Iran, the Philippines, and Taiwan. CRS Report 85-91 F, An Overview
of United States Military Assistance Programs, by Richard F. Grimmett. This archived report is available from the
32 P.L. 82-165 (65 Stat. 373) and P.L. 83-665 (68 Stat. 832).
33 The Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, U.S. Foreign Aid: Its Purposes, Scope, Administration and
Related Information, February 27, 1959, pp. 139-140. Hereafter referred to asU.S. Foreign Aid.”
34 With the creation of a Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) in 1953 to administer economic aid and technical
assistance, the Secretary of Defense was also subject to coordination with and supervision by the FOA Director, who
reported directly to the President. Congress divested the FOA director of responsibility for supervising military aid in
1954. U.S. Foreign Aid, ibid., pp. 141-142.
35 In 1955, Congress established the International Cooperation Administration within the State Department, among
whose functions was coordinating nonmilitary aid with DOD-administered military aid. Congress moved coordination
responsibility to a higher level, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, when it created that post in 1958.
U.S. Foreign Aid, op. cit., p. 142.
36 U.S. Foreign Aid, op. cit., p. 130.

As economic and development assistance became the U.S. government’s preferred tool for
countering Soviet influence in the developing world, Congress entrusted the State Department
with the leadership role for foreign assistance, including military assistance, when it passed the 37
Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961. Since then, with the exception of the period inclusive of
the Vietnam War in the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, the major foreign military assistance
programs—the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program,
and the International Military Education Training (IMET) program—have been carried out under 38
State Department oversight and guidance. These programs are implemented, however, by a
DOD agency: the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) under the DOD Under 39
Secretary for Policy, and its predecessor. (See Appendix D and Appendix E.) In 2005,
Congress created a third State Department train and equip program, the Global Peace Operations
Initiative (GPOI), to provide training in peacekeeping skills and related equipment to foreign
militaries. (See Appendix I.)
In addition to the major programs to build foreign military capacity under State Department
authority, Congress authorizes and funds DOD to conduct a wide variety of smaller military-to-
military education and training programs. These offer foreign military personnel the opportunity
to attend U.S. military education and training programs, in addition to those funded under IMET,
as well as conferences and meetings. They also provide the U.S. military with important
opportunities to cultivate relations with foreign military officers. Congress generally requires all 40
such activities to be conducted with the approval of the Secretary of State. Combatant

37 As now stated in the FAA of 1961, as amended, Section 622(c) (22 U.S.C. 2382) states that the Secretary of State,
under the direction of the President, “shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of
economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs, including but not limited to
determining whether there shall be a military assistance (including civic action) or a military education and training
program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and
abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby.” The original, 1961 language of Section
622(c) stated that the section applied toassistance programs authorized by this Act....” A 1976 amendment deleted this
limitation. (International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, P.L. 94-329, Section 543(b)(2)(B)). The
Arms Export Control Act, which as of 1968 authorizes the FMS/FMF program, similarly mandates that the Secretary of
State, under the direction of the President, be responsible forthe continuous supervision and general direction of sales,
leases, financing, cooperative projects, and exports under this chapter....” (P.L. 90-629, as amended, Chapter 1, Section
2(b), 22 U.S.C. 2752.)
38 Foreign Military Financing, as well as Foreign Miltary Sales, are carried out under the Arms Export Control Act
(AECA), as amended (P.L. 90-629). Section 2(a) of that Act (22 U.S.C. 2752) states that nothing contained in the Act
shall be construed to infringe upon the powers or functions of the Secretary of State. Section 2(b) states that the
Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, “shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general
direction of sales, leases, financing, cooperative projects, and exports under this Act....”
39 The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) became the DSCA in 1999. In 2000, DOD Directive 5105.65
expanded the responsibilities originally carried out by the DSAA. Among other tasks, DSCA helps develop, coordinate,
and implement security and cooperation assistance plans and programs, including FMS, FMF, IMET, humanitarian
assistance, humanitarian civic action, mine action training, and other programs. More information is available on its
website, at; last accessed July 22, 2008.
40 Numerous DOD educational institutions offer education and training to foreign students. The military service schools
offer such opportunities, as do the DOD regional centers for security studies (i.e., the George C. Marshall European
Center for Security Studies, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies,
the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, and the Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies [the last three of
which are at the National Defense University]). The Political-Military Bureau at the State Department publishes an

commanders may also use up to $5 million from the CCIF in any fiscal year “to provide military
education and training (including transportation, translation, and administrative expenses) to 41
military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries....”
Under Title 10 U.S. Code (10 U.S.C. 124), DOD is the lead U.S. government agency on the
detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal narcotics into the United States,
but it falls under the oversight of the Secretary of State, who is charged with coordinating
counternarcotics assistance (22 U.S.C. 2291). Since the 1990s, DOD has provided training and
related support to foreign militaries and law enforcement authorities for counternarcotics
purposes under authorities that Congress extends regularly in annual defense authorization
legislation. (See Appendix F.) Under “Section 1004” authority, first established in 1990 to enable 42
DOD to support counterdrug agencies and currently extended through FY2011, DOD may
provide training and other support to improve foreign counternarcotics capabilities at the request
of any U.S. federal department or agency, or of any U.S. state, local, or foreign law enforcement
agency. Under “Section 1033” authority, first established in 1997 and currently extended through 43
FY2009, DOD may provide patrol, boats, vehicles, aircraft, and other equipment to designated
foreign governments and maintain and repair those items. Originally provided for Colombia and
Peru, this authority now covers 16 more countries. Human rights concerns have figured
prominently in congressional consideration of the DOD role in counternarcotics programs.
Largely in response to such concerns, in 1998, Congress placed a restriction in the DOD
appropriations bill prohibiting U.S. training of foreign military units for which credible evidence 44
exists of gross violations of human rights. This restriction has been extended annually but is less
restrictive than the provision in foreign operations appropriations, first enacted in 1997 and
codified in 2007, which prohibits the use of State Department funds for any assistance to military 45
units for which credible evidence is found of gross violations of human rights.

annual report entitled Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement Activities of Interest, as required by the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, Section 656 (22 U.S.C. 2416). The State Department publishes the
unclassified portions of the report on its website.
41 10 U.S.C. 166a(e)(C).
42 NDAA for Fiscal Year 1991, P.L. 101-510, Section 1004 (10 U.S.C. 374 note); last extended and amended by the
Duncan Hunter NDAA for FY2009, P.L. 110-417, Section 1024.
43 NDAA for Fiscal Year 1998, P.L. 105-85, Section 1033, last amended and extended through legislation including the
FY2007 John Warner NDAA, P.L. 109-364, Section 1022.
44 Department of Defense Appropriations, 1999, P.L. 105-262, Section 8130 and restated in annual defense
appropriations acts thereafter, most recently in, DOD Appropriations, 2008 (P.L. 110-116, Section 8062). The latest
version of the “Leahy Amendment states that none of the funds made available by the Actmay be used to support
any training program involving a unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of Defense has
received credible information from the Department of State that the unit has committed a gross violation of human
rights, unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken.” The Secretary of Defense may waive this provision if he
determines thatsuch a waiver is required by extraordinary circumstances.” The earlier version forbid the use of funds
if a member of a potential recipient unit had committed such a violation.
45 The comprehensive version of the human rights provision popularly known as the Leahy Amendment (i.e., the ban
on any foreign operations assistance to foreign security forces for which credible evidence was found of gross
violations of human rights) was first enacted as Section 570 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998 (P.L. 105-118), and in annual foreign operations appropriations thereafter. Earlier
versions of this restriction had applied to specific countries, programs, or funding accounts; e.g., such a restriction was
placed on counternarcotics assistance in the section on the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control

In 2005, Congress provided DOD with authority and funds for a major DOD-run train and equip
program. Established by Section 1206 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006 as a temporary “pilot
program,” this “Foreign Military Capacity Building” authority allows DOD to transfer funds to
train and equip foreign militaries to enable those forces to better conduct counterterrorism
operations or to “participate in or support military and stability operations in which the United 46
States Armed Forces” participate. Currently in effect through FY2008, this “Section 1206”
authority has provided up to $200 million in FY2006, and up to $300 million in FY2007 and
FY2008 to meet needs that emerged after the planning cycle for the regular budget submission. In
the Duncan Hunter NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009, Section 1206, Congress increased funding
authority to $350 million, extended the authority through FY2011, and broadened the scope of
authority to include building the capacity of a foreign country’s maritime security forces to
conduct counterterrorism operations. Section 1206 authority is subject to strict conditionality. The
original FY2006 legislation required a presidential initiative to initiate a program; in FY2007, this
was changed to permit the Secretary of Defense to authorize a program with the concurrence of
the Secretary of State. Although the legislation does not require the Secretary of State’s
“approval,” DOD and the State Department currently interpret “concurrence” to mean 47
“approval.” (See Appendix H.)
In 2007, Congress denied a DOD request to significantly expand Section 1206 authority to train
and equip foreign military forces, substantially increase the funding, and make it permanent. In
May 2007, DOD had proposed legislation for “Building the Partnership Capacity of Foreign
Military and Other Security Forces” that would provide a new, permanent DOD authority to
spend (or to transfer to the Department of State or other federal agency) up to $750 million per
year to train and equip foreign military and security forces to conduct counterterrorism operations
or to participate in or support military and stability operations. There would be no requirement, as
in Section 1206, that training for military and stability operations be tied to operations in which
the U.S. military participated. The extension would permit DOD to train and equip gendarmerie,
constabulary, internal defense, infrastructure protection, civil defense, homeland defense, coast
guard, border protection, and counterterrorism forces. Rejecting the strict conditionality of

account, P.L. 104-208, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1997. Section 651 of Division J, P.L.
110-161, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, codifies this restriction at Section 620J (22 U.S.C. 2378d) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. This provides that no assistance shall be furnished under the Foreign
Assistance Act or the Arms Export Control Act “to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary
of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights.” An exception is made if
the Secretary of State determines and certifies to Congress that the government of a countryis taking effective
measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.
46 NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006, P.L. 109-163, Conference Report H.Rept. 109-360,p. 801, and the FY2007 John
Warner NDAA Conference Report H.Rept. 109-702, p. 833.
47 A DOD FY2009 budget document states that under thedual-key approval system developed for Section 1206
programs, U.S. embassies and the military combatant commands are encouraged to jointly formulate programs and the
responsible embassy and command “must approve each program explicitly in writing.U.S. Department of Defense,
Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request Summary Justification, February 4, 2008, p. 103.

Section 1206, DOD proposed that the Secretary of State be permitted to waive any restrictions
that might apply. In 2007, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) expressed skepticism 48
regarding an extension of the program “in the absence of ... an established record of success.”
In its FY2009 budget request, the Bush Administration asked Congress to codify an expanded
version of Section 1206 that would increase the annual authorization to $750 million and include
a broad array of security forces in addition to military forces. The House version of the bill would
extend current authority through FY2010 (Section 1206, H.R. 5658, the Duncan Hunter NDAA
for FY2009). The Senate version of the NDAA for FY2009 (Section 1204, S. 3001) would extend
Section 1206 authority through FY2011, increasing the annual authorization to $400 million. It
would also authorize the use of funds for security forces whose primary mission is
counterterrorism, subject to the police training restrictions of 22 U.S.C. 2420. (See the section
below on civilian capabilities for substantive objections to such authority.)
DOD views training for foreign military and other security forces as an expanding area, and seeks
expanded authorities for DOD programs. The 2006 QDR calls for DOD to “improve and increase
IMET-like opportunities targeted at shaping relationships and developing future foreign 49
leaders.” More specifically, it recommends the expansion of DOD and State Department
authorities “to train and equip foreign security forces best suited to internal counter-terrorism and
counter-insurgency operations,” noting that these “may be non-military law enforcement or other 50
security forces....” In late 2007, Secretary of Defense Gates identified “the standing up and 51
mentoring of indigenous army and police” as “a key mission for the military as a whole.”
In the post-9/11 environment, some defense analysts have urged policy makers to develop more
expeditious mechanisms for the United States to provide military training and military support.
DOD officials argue that the routine planning processes through the traditional State Department
“train and equip” authorities are too cumbersome and time-consuming, reflecting political rather
than operational military needs, with the planning, budgeting, and implementation cycle taking
two to three years. On the other hand, some Members of Congress have faulted Section 1206 for
lacking enough added value to justify making permanent a major train and equip program outside
the State Department’s authority. In a December 2006 report, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee stated its concern that the program was used largely to fund areas where the U.S.

48 In its report on the NDAA for FY2008, HASC stated that it had provided DOD with the limited Section 1206
authority over the past two years, despite the State Department’s historical responsibility for foreign military capacity
building, because of DOD’s expression of “strong interest” in the program. Congress, however, according to HASC,
has clearly and strongly discouraged further legislative proposals to expand or make permanent DODstrain and
equip authorities in the absence of this required report and an established track record of success.” U.S. Congress,
House Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, report of the thst
Committee of Armed Services on H.R. 1585 together with additional views, 110 Cong., 1 sess., H.Rept. 110-146,
part 1 (Washington: GPO, 2007), p. 401. Hereafter referred to as HASC.Report 110-146 on the FY2008 NDAA.
49 2006 QDR, op. cit., p. 91.
50 2006 QDR, op. cit., p. 90.
51 He suggested that this is in contrast to the past, when only Special Operations Forces focused on training missions,
but the inclusion of “police”—historically the province of other agencies—may be telling. See U.S. Department of
Defense. Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, the “Landon Lecture” delivered at Kansas State University,
Manhattan, Kansas, November 26, 2007. Accessed through; last accessed July 22,

military sought to enhance military-to-military relations rather than to meet emerging needs.52
The committee recommended that all security assistance, including that administered under
Section 1206, be placed under State Department control.
Similarly, in line with a 2006 QDR recommendation53 and the desire for more flexibility in
providing assistance to allies and friendly states, DOD has also sought broader reimbursement
authority for coalition support forces and expanded logistics support to other States “partnering”
with the United States. Congress has been more responsive to these requests. (See Appendix L.)
DOD has supported foreign governments’ efforts to counter internal and international threats with
assistance that goes beyond help to foreign military forces. In many situations, and currently in
Afghanistan and Iraq, DOD has played a significant, if not a leading, role in tasks related to
nation-building or state-building. Such tasks include helping establish or strengthen rule of law
capabilities (police, judicial, and prison institutions and facilities), reinforcing the administrative
capacity of central governments, strengthening local governments in rural areas, and bolstering
national economies. Such state-building support is now widely perceived as a means to deter or
control internal and international threats. Although U.S. military personnel carry out this role
most often in combat situations, where the presence of untrained, unarmed civilians may be a
liability, they may also carry out this role because of a shortage of trained civilian personnel.
Because the circumstances have varied greatly, such assistance has usually been carried out under
a mix of authorities and programs.
The most notable example of U.S. military involvement in state-building occurred in the post-
World War II military occupations of Germany and Japan, although there are earlier examples, th
such as the U.S. military occupation of the Philippines around the turn of the 20 century. In the
1990s, DOD personnel provided such assistance in peacekeeping and post-conflict operations as
part of military operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. Sometimes DOD provides such
assistance to foreign governments as part of military counterterrorism, internal defense, and
counterinsurgency efforts. Special operations forces teams carry out a variety of state-building
activities, to strengthen local leaders and defuse ethnic and other rivalries, as part of their civic
assistance projects. Congress also provides DOD with authority to train and otherwise assist
foreign law enforcement officials to perform counternarcotics operations, although there is no
standard source for determining the degree to which DOD provides such support.

52 2006 SFRC Report, op. cit.Section 1206 assistance, with the exception of Lebanon and Pakistan, is not addressing
threats to the United States that are so immediate that ... [they] cannot be included in normal budget processes. The
Secretary of State should insist that all security assistance, including Section 1206 funding, be included under his/her
authority in the new process for rationalizing and prioritizing foreign assistance.” p. 3.
53 2006 QDR, op. cit. The recommendation is to expand DOD authority to provide logistics support, supplies and
services to allies and coalition partners, without reimbursement if necessary, to enable them to participate in operations
with U.S. armed forces. Two related recommendations are toEstablish a Defense Coalition Support Account to fund,
and, as appropriate, stockpile routine defense articles such as helmets, body armor and night vision devices for use by
coalition partners” and toExpand Department authority to lease or lend equipment to allies and coalition partners for
use in military operations in which they are participating with U.S. forces.” pp. 89-90.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) carry out state-building
political and economic activities, in addition to civic assistance and humanitarian activities.
Although no data are available on the extent to which state-building activities are directed or
conducted by U.S. military personnel, soldiers are involved, particularly when there are not
enough civilian members of a PRT.
U.S. military field commanders Iraq and Afghanistan carry out reconstruction projects with CERP
funds, with each major subordinate commander authorized to approve grants up to $500,000.
Originally intended to help military commanders establish stability in hostile areas, CERP has 54
now become a main source of funding for infrastructure development. (See Appendix K on
DOD in Iraq and Afghanistan Economic Reconstruction.) Congress has thus far denied 55
Administration requests to extend CERP funding authority for DOD use on a worldwide basis.
In Iraq, DOD’s large role in infrastructure reconstruction has been unusual. While the State
Department and USAID were tapped to manage early economic assistance programs in Iraq,
DOD was called on in 2004 to carry out the largest infrastructure projects. Nevertheless, DOD’s
own Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) also was initially found insufficient to manage the task, and
DOD contracted the job directly with private companies. ACE was subsequently tapped for a
management role. Although the State Department assumed responsibility in 2005 for setting
priorities for most aid programs, DOD developed, and Congress funded, a DOD program to
rehabilitate some 200 Iraqi firms that had been state-owned under the Hussein regime, without
either State Department or USAID input. (See Appendix K.)
Much of DOD’s state-building activities have thus far been carried out within the context of
military operations. For many years, DOD and U.S. military leaders rejected a nation-building
role, arguing that it was not appropriate for U.S. military forces and detracted from combat
readiness. As defense analysts and military personnel began to perceive state-building as essential
to the success of peacekeeping and related operations, attitudes began to shift about the
desirability of the U.S. military role in state-building. In 2005, DOD Directive 3000.05 identified
state-building as key to the success of stability operations and stated that “U.S. military forces
shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians 56
cannot do so.”
Critics find DOD state-building activities marred by a lack of both strategic planning and
application of economic development “best practices,” by the absence of civilian input and
integration with civilian efforts, and by insufficient oversight. Some critics, however, recognize
that the context in which some of these activities are undertaken can justify their ad hoc nature,

54 Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Review of the Effectiveness of the Provincial
Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, 07-015, October 18, 2007, pp. 23-34. Hereafter referred to as SIGIR Review of
PRT Effectiveness.
55 The HASC, in its report on the FY2008 NDAA, stated that current DOD authority for humanitarian and
reconstruction assistance under Title 10 U.S.C. Chapter 20 and 10 U.S.C. 2561 can be used by field commanders
without bureaucratic obstacles. HASC Report 110-146 on the FY2008 NDAA, op. cit., p. 399.
56 DOD Directive 3000.05, op. cit., p. 2.

short-term objectives, and lack of civilian expertise, and note that DOD has made efforts to 57
improve soldiers’ ability to carry out such tasks. Concerns focus on the extension of state-
building activities to non-conflict situations; for example, extending CERP authority worldwide,
as requested by the Administration, without more State Department control, or activities of
combatant commands, especially AFRICOM, might lead to perceptions that the United States is
“militarizing” its foreign policy.
Defense experts implicitly acknowledged a factual basis for at least some criticisms of its state-
building role by expressly stating in 2005 DOD Directive 3000.05 that civilians would be better
suited to accomplish political, social, and economic tasks in many circumstances. Nevertheless,
DOD officials regard the United States as faced with a strategic imperative to undertake such
activities in the new global environment, and the U.S. military as charged with performing them
where civilians cannot. DOD officials are currently grappling with the many issues and tradeoffs
involved in better preparing military forces to carry out a wide variety of political, social, and
economic tasks for stabilization and reconstruction, as well as other activities, alone or in 58
conjunction with civilian personnel, in the absence of civilian personnel. An important part of
this task for DOD, the State Department, USAID, and other civilian agencies is to determine and
prioritize an appropriate civil-military division of labor in non-combat areas.
With DOD’s renewed request in 2008 to expand Section 1206 to allow training of foreign police
and related security forces (including gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense, and
infrastructure) in addition to military forces, Congress is faced with a sensitive issue. Since at
least the 1970s, Congress has been concerned with the possible human rights implications of U.S. 59
assistance to foreign police forces in general, and DOD assistance in particular. Nevertheless,
many analysts argue that many more foreign police personnel are needed, especially gendarmes 60
trained in both police and military skills, for post-conflict operations, and some might prefer
that DOD provide personnel to fill that training gap, especially in major post-conflict zones.

57 For example, see 2006 CSIS Task Force Report, op. cit., pp. 12-20.
58 A May 2006 DOD memo on implementing the 2006 QDR strategy states that DOD “must be prepared to grow a new
team of leaders and operators, who are comfortable working in remote regions of the world, dealing with local and
tribal communities, adapting to foreign languages and cultures, working with local networks, operating alongside or
within United Nations organizations, and working alongside non-governmental organizations to further US and partner
interests through personal engagement, persuasion, and quite influencerather than through military force alone. To
support this effort, new approaches to education assignments and career incentives, as well as new authorities are
needed. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum on Quadrennial Defense Review Building Partnership Capacity
(BCP) Execution Roadmap (unclassified), May 22, 2006. p. 6.
59 Congress has limited the assistance that U.S. government agencies can provide to foreign police forces since the
1970s, when such assistance was provided to police forces that were perceived of as violating human rights. Over the
years, Congress has loosened restrictions by adding statutory exceptions to the codified prohibition on police training
(Section 660 of the 1961 FAA, 22 U.S.C. 2420) for certain situations and providing exceptions for assistance to certain
countries and situations elsewhere in law. Currently, the U.S. government provides assistance through the State
Department and the Justice Department to foreign police forces in many countries. In addition, as mentioned above,
since the 1990s, Congress has authorized DOD to provide training and other assistance to police forces and other law
enforcement officials for counternarcotics purposes.
60 The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) has published several works pointing to this gap. Recent publications
include one on building U.S. police capacity to fill the gap, while another discusses the work of an Italian school to
train constabulary police. See Robert M. Perito, “U.S. Police in Peace and Stability Operations, USIP Special Report
191, August 2007, and Michael Dziedzic and Colonel Christine Stark,Bridging the Public Security Gap: The Role of
the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) in Contemporary Peace Operations,” USIPeace Briefing,
June 2006. Both last accessed through, July 22, 2008.

DOD is involved in a broad range of foreign assistance activities. U.S. military personnel deploy
as first responders to foreign disasters and provide humanitarian relief and basic needs assistance
in other urgent situations. U.S. military personnel also provide medical and veterinary assistance
and civic support (such as the construction or repair of small educational and medical facilities)
as a routine part of their training and as part of military operations. U.S. troops routinely train
foreign military forces and are authorized to train police forces for counternarcotics missions.
Recently, in the context of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and elsewhere, they have
provided humanitarian assistance and taken on state-building tasks related to political and
economic development. For the past several years, DOD has worked to enhance its own
capabilities to carry out state-building and to draw on civilian advice. It has also urged Congress
to enhance the capabilities of civilian agencies to form partnerships with DOD in those activities.
DOD stresses a national security imperative for its activities in the foreign assistance area. Critics,
however, most often judge DOD involvement in foreign assistance activities in terms of its effect
on foreign relations and foreign policy goals. The following sections recapitulate the perceived
benefits and liabilities of that involvement.
The United States and the U.S. military benefit from DOD foreign assistance activities in several
ways. U.S. diplomacy benefits from the U.S. military’s capacity to project itself rapidly into
extreme situations, such as disasters and other humanitarian emergencies, promoting the image of 61
the United States as an humanitarian actor. Especially in conflict situations, military forces can
provide needed security, intelligence and aerial reconnaissance, command and control and 62
communications capabilities, and maritime support. Humanitarian assistance also provides a
means to cultivate good relations with foreign populations, militaries, and governments. For U.S.
diplomacy, military training and other security assistance can be a potent tool to cultivate or
cement relations with foreign governments.
U.S. military personnel view humanitarian assistance and military training and education and
other opportunities to interact with foreign militaries as part of their professional development.
Such opportunities help soldiers enhance their skills to operate in a variety of foreign

61 While the military can move quickly once authorized to deploy, one author points out thatThe decision-making
processes that activate them [i.e., military personnel] may reduce their respective advantage. Larry Minear and
Philippe Guillot, Soldiers to the Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 1966, p. 151. Hereafter referred to as Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda.
62 This list of benefits is taken from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development
Assistance Committee, (OECD/DAC) Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operations, Civilian and
Military Means of Providing and Supporting Humanitarian Assistance During Conflict: Comparative Advantages and
Costs, Paris: OECD, 1998, pp. 12-15. (Hereafter cited as OECD/DAC Comparative Advantages and Costs.) This
document also lists a military advantage providing a response to a possible future use of nuclear, biological or chemical
weapons (p. 15).

environments and establish contacts with foreign military personnel that may serve them in future
operations. Since 9/11, DOD training of military forces and provision of security assistance have
been an important means to enable foreign militaries to conduct peacekeeping operations under
the aegis of the United Nations and regional organizations and to participate with the United
States in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Observers have advanced several critiques of the DOD role. These deal with the effects on
humanitarian activities of non-governmental organizations; the implications for foreign policy
objectives, including counterterrorism, economic development, and state-building and democracy
promotion; and the relative effectiveness of civilian versus military personnel.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that carry out humanitarian missions hold mixed views
on DOD humanitarian assistance activities. They generally do not criticize the use of the U.S.
military in first response disaster relief operations. Some are critical, however, of the use of U.S.
military forces in a broad range of “humanitarian and basic needs” activities in conflict areas.
Although military forces can provide needed security in unstable environments, in some
situations, military involvement in humanitarian assistance can be problematic. Especially when
military personnel are directly involved in providing humanitarian assistance and other
humanitarian acts, military assistance can be viewed as jeopardizing the lives and work of NGO
personnel by stigmatizing them as participants in a military effort. These criticisms were
provoked by the U.S. military’s humanitarian role in Afghanistan, where non-governmental
humanitarian aid workers felt their neutrality was compromised by soldiers in civilian dress who
distributed humanitarian aid as part of military operations. Since then, DOD has made an effort to
engage non-governmental aid workers and to develop means to work together. While some
humanitarian relief NGOs now welcome the security that military forces can provide in hostile
areas, others still feel that their lives are endangered by the proximity of soldiers engaged in
humanitarian activities. In areas without U.S. military involvement, local populations may also
take the use of military personnel for such activities as a prelude to military action or 63
The use of military forces may also impede the advancement of foreign policy goals. For
instance, the December 2006 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, Embassies as
Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign, viewed the use of DOD personnel for
counterterrorism programs as an obstacle: “In Latin America, especially, military and intelligence
efforts are viewed with suspicion, making it difficult to pursue meaningful cooperation on a 64
counterterrorism agenda.” As pointed out in Appendix F on counternarcotics cooperation,
Mexico has resisted counternarcotics assistance that would involve the U.S. military. One analyst
claims that “African publics and governments have already begun to complain that U.S. 65
engagement is increasingly military.”

63 2006 SFRC Report, op. cit., states that there is evidence that some host country nationals question “the increasingly
military component of Americas profile overseas. In Uganda, a military civil affairs team went to the northern part of
the country to help local communities build wells, erect schools and carry out other small development projects to help
mitigate the consequences of a long-running regional conflict. Local NGOs questioned whether the military was there
to take sides in the conflict.” p. 12.
64 2006 SFRC Report, op. cit., p. 12.
65 Gerald Loftus, “Speaking Out: Expeditionary Sidekicks? The Military-Diplomatic Dynamic, Foreign Service

In the area of economic development, some analysts question whether the U.S. military objectives
in carrying out small-scale infrastructure projects in conjunction with exercises and operations
respond to short-term exigencies rather than abiding by development “best practices” to 66
accomplish long-term structural reforms. In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, some analysts
point out that “some normal development practices will inevitably take a back seat to operational 67
realities.” In the case of humanitarian and civic action activities in non-conflict areas, however,
a lack of integration with long-term development plans can raise expectations of economic
growth and development that cannot be fulfilled with the limited resources available.
The use of U.S. military personnel in state-building activities may convey mixed signals in
activities where the objective is to promote democracy and enhance civilian control. While the
use of U.S. military forces is seen as appropriate in state-building efforts that involve the training
of foreign militaries, some analysts believe that it may undermine that objective when used in
other state-building activities by reinforcing stereotypes in underdeveloped nations—such as that
military forces are more competent than civilians—or legitimize the use of military forces for
civilian governmental responsibilities. Further, some analysts believe that DOD has failed to 68
strengthen institutional mechanisms for civilian control in its dealings with foreign militaries.
The lack of expertise within the military to carry out coherent plans for economic and political
development in foreign nations is also considered problematic. While the placement of USAID
officers within combatant commands may alleviate some of the worst problems, some analysts
believe that their presence may not be sufficient to ensure that best practices are routinely 69
Civilians are cited as enjoying an overall advantage in many humanitarian and state-building
tasks. Military forces are, however, recognized as possessing a decided advantage in some
humanitarian mission tasks, such as providing security and air support, particularly in hostile
situations. Despite that military advantage, however, one study judged civilian personnel more
effective in carrying out a wide range of humanitarian tasks in conflict situations. These tasks are
acquiring the supplies necessary for humanitarian assistance operations, assessing and utilizing
local resources, interacting with the local population, providing the most suitable medical 70
response, managing refugee camps, and providing water and sanitation. Another study judged
that although most multinational military personnel assisting with the Rwanda crisis in 1994 were
“skilled in their own areas, [they] had no unique competence in such matters as refugee camp
construction, community health and disease control, or shelter management. Moreover, their

Journal, December 2007, p. 16. (Hereafter referred to asExpeditionary Sidekicks?)
66 The Pentagon and Global Development, op. cit., p. 13.
67 Ibid.
68 The Pentagon and Global Development, op. cit. According to this report: “While the Pentagon conducts training
programs to promote professionalism and civilian control of ... foreign militaries, it gives relatively less attention to
broader security sector report (SSR)—including the effort to ensure that military, police, and intelligence services and
ministries are accountable to democratically-elected governments.” pp. 14-15.
69 Among the findings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff delegation that compiled the 2006 SFRC report
wasthat country teams in embassies with USAID presence are far more capable of ensuring sufficient review of
military humanitarian assistance projects than those that have no USAID office. Budgetary cutbacks at USAID,
affecting both personnel and programs, are repeatedly cited as a deficiency in the U.S. campaign against extremism in
susceptible regions of the world.” p. 9.
70 OECD/DAC Comparative Advantages and Costs, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

security preoccupations—for example, the prohibition against U.S. forces from leaving the Kigali
airport, the reluctance of the Japanese to work in refugee camps—also circumscribed what the 71
troops themselves were able to achieve.”
There is a widespread presumption that using military forces for many humanitarian missions,
military support, and state-building activities costs more than using civilian personnel for the
same tasks, but analysts note the absence of reliable studies on relative costs. One 1998 study on
the use of international military forces for humanitarian assistance in conflict situations judged
that the use of the military is “generally more costly than civilian means” and “will far exceed the
costs of providing the aid itself.” The study attributed the greater costs to the military emphasis
on making its activities “fail-safe” rather than cost-effective, building into its procedures
“safeguards, redundancies, and limitations that often do not exist with civilian means.... Civilian 72
and commercial means are, in general, leaner and less redundant.” The study cautioned, 73
however, that its general conclusions were “presented as hypotheses.”
Relative costs can vary according to the circumstances. For instance, according to the 1998 study
cited above, when “military assets are already deployed (either for humanitarian assistance or for
peacekeeping), the marginal cost of using these personnel and resources will be low. In these
areas, then, the military can be a cost-effective means of delivering and supporting humanitarian 74
assistance.” A variety of other factors can influence relative costs. The military’s economies of
scale and shared costs may reduce the price tag on the use of military forces; on the other hand,
the degree of force protection in the field and the amount of equipment with which the military
deploys can raise costs.
For some analysts, cost considerations are beside the point, as there are certain situations where
military forces are indispensable and certain places where few civilians will go. Decisions on the
most appropriate division of labor between military and civilian personnel are better made on the
basis of comparative advantage in each situation.
A key to ensuring that DOD plays an effective role in foreign assistance may be improving
interagency coordination in planning and implementing such activities. DOD and the State
Department recently have created new coordination mechanisms, but some analysts believe the
imbalance between DOD and State Department resources may be a continuing problem,
especially for activities that take place in the context of military operations.

71 Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda, op. cit., p. 150.
72 OECD/DAC Comparative Advantages and Costs, op. cit., p. 16.
73 OECD/DAC Comparative Advantages and Costs, op. cit., pp. 15-16.
74 Ibid.

In approving legislation governing the DOD role in foreign assistance, Congress can mandate the
type and degree of interaction between DOD and civilian agencies. It can maintain or strengthen
the leadership role that the State Department has traditionally had in foreign assistance activities.
Or it can respond to the concerns of some defense officials and analysts that DOD lacks
appropriate authority and flexibility to carry out foreign assistance activities expeditiously, and
enhance the DOD role.
Since at least the early 1960s, Congress has made the Secretary of State the lead U.S. government
official regarding oversight of foreign assistance, including military assistance, and assigned U.S.
Ambassadors or other officials carrying out the responsibilities of a chief of a United States
diplomatic mission a lead role in coordinating military assistance with foreign policy. Section 622
of the 1961 FAA (22 U.S.C. 2382), entitled Coordination with Foreign Policy, contains these
Section 622(c) of the original version of the 1961 FAA provided that the Secretary of State “shall
be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of the assistance programs
authorized by this Act, including but not limited to determining whether there shall be a military
assistance program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are
effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best
served thereby.” (Section 622(c).)
In 1976, Congress amended that provision,76 deleting the limitation that made it applicable solely
to programs in the 1961 FAA, as amended. Section 622(c) now charges the Secretary of State
with responsibility for “the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance,
military assistance, and military education and training programs, including but not limited to
determining whether there shall be military assistance (including civic action) or a military
education and training program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs
are effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is
best served thereby.” The 1961 FAA, as amended, does not define military assistance or civic 77
action. It does, however, define “military education and training.”
The Chief of Mission’s responsibility was contained in Section 622(b). Under that provision, the
Ambassador (or other responsible official) exercises leadership, under procedures prescribed by
the President, over ensuring coordination regarding foreign assistance programs among U.S.
government representatives in each country. Section 622(b) specifically ties this role to military
assistance. The original language reads: “The Chief of the diplomatic mission shall make sure
that recommendations of such representatives pertaining to military assistance are coordinated
with political and economic considerations, and that his comments shall accompany such

75 This section was prepared in conjunction with R. Chuck Mason, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division, CRS.
76 This amendment was contained in the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, P.L. 94-329,
Section 543(b)(2)(B).
77 Section 644(n) defines military education and training to includeformal or informal instruction of foreign students
in the United States or overseas by officers or employees of the United States, contract technicians, contractors
(including instruction at civilian institutions), or by correspondence courses, technical, educational, or information
publications and media of all kinds, training aids, orientation, and military advice to foreign military units and forces.”

recommendations if he so desires.” Congress later amended this language to specify that civic 78
action and military education and training programs were covered by this section.
Section 623 (22 U.S.C. 2383) charges the Secretary of Defense with several responsibilities
regarding the provision of military equipment, as well as “the supervision of the training of
foreign military and related civilian personnel.”
Through legislation, Congress often has required that the Department of State approve an activity.
Some of the temporary authorities for Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, require the concurrence
(i.e., the approval) of the Secretary of State. Under pre-9/11 legislation, DOD needs to secure the
concurrence of the Secretary of State for programs regarding the educational programs, capacity
building, and logistic support for allies. Other Title 10 U.S. Code programs under DOD authority
require the Secretary of Defense to secure the approval of the Secretary of State for military to
military contacts and the approval of both the Secretary of State and the Attorney General for
certain counternarcotics and counterterrorism activities (i.e., support for law enforcement officials
outside the United States).
In other cases, however, Congress had mandated that DOD coordinate or consult with the State
Department and other relevant agencies. DOD must develop certain counternarcotics and
counterterrorism activities in consultation with the Secretary of State. DOD and State Department
officials report that whatever the statutory language, these departments now develop a consensus 79
about foreign assistance-type activities before proceeding.
Despite these legislative mandates, the actual degree and type of interagency coordination and
consultation appear to have varied greatly over time, and from program to program. There are
established mechanisms for coordinating projects, but at least in the past there have been
occasions when they appear to have broken down. Factors identified as causing interagency
coordination to lull or lapse include individual personalities, a lack of State Department personnel
to perform coordinating tasks, a blurred division of labor, and the routinization of tasks. (See
Appendix G, Appendix J, and Appendix K.)
For many years, much of the formal coordination has been carried out by the DOD Defense
Security Cooperation Agency for established programs. The DSCA receives project proposals
from combatant commanders. In many cases, these proposals require the approval of the U.S.
ambassador in the country in which programs will be conducted, although ambassadorial
approval is not required for regional programs or in war zones. DSCA then coordinates the
approval process in Washington, D.C., as required by statute or policy guidance, for both State
Department programs (i.e., security assistance, IMET, and GPOI) and DOD humanitarian
assistance and other programs. The DSCA Security Affairs Officers (SAOs) located at U.S.
embassies worldwide bear a large part of the responsibility for implementing these programs.

78 Section 302(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-583) inserted civic action; Section 106(b) of the
International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329) inserted military education and
79 Authors’ interviews with DOD and State Department officials in November and December 2007.

Within the State Department, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs coordinates the
Department’s position on military assistance. The bureau is also the lead State Department office
for interagency coordination. It coordinates the interagency response (State Department, USAID,
DOD, and NSC) to requests by foreign governments for humanitarian demining and other
humanitarian assistance. It also coordinates the State Department response to plans for military
exercises in politically sensitive areas, as required by National Security Presidential
Determination 42. In addition, it coordinates the vetting of foreign forces that receive 80
counternarcotics training and that participate in JCETs.
Over the past few years, DOD and the civilian agencies have created new mechanisms for
planning and coordinating DOD foreign assistance activities. These include new arrangements in
combatant commands, as well as new offices in USAID and the State Department.
• DOD has created new interagency groups or new posts for civilian agency
representatives in its institutions, particularly at four geographical combatant
commands that plan and carry out combat operations and non-combat activities 81
in their “areas of responsibility.” Regional combatant commands host a “Joint
Interagency Coordinating Group” (JIACG) composed of military personnel from
all services and civilian personnel from a variety of agencies that act as an
advisory body to the combatant command.
• Combatant commands also are beginning to integrate personnel from civilian
agencies in greater numbers. The U.S. Southern Command reportedly has already
incorporated civilians into its structure, as has the Special Operations 82
Command. The newly planned Africa Command (currently being created to
handle all of Africa, which is now split between EUCOM and CENTCOM) will 83
also incorporate a significant number of diplomats and development experts.
• In 2005, USAID established a new USAID Office of the Military Advisor, which
provides USAID officials to the regional combatant commands, as well as the
Special Operations Command, where they help plan for and oversee all foreign
assistance activities.

80 Authors’ interviews with DOD officials, December 2007. The Federation of American Scientists, which compiles
available public information on presidential directives, lists NSPD 42 under the title On Significant Military Exercise
Briefs (SMEB), dated January 26, 2005. No other information is listed.
81 These commands are comprised of personnel from all four branches of the U.S. military services that are responsible
for carrying out assigned missions, including combat and non-combat operations and activities. (Current combatant
commands are the U.S. European Command [EUCOM], the U.S. Central Command [CENTCOM], the U.S. Southern
Command [SOUTHCOM], and the U.S. Pacific Command [PACOM].)
82 As of early 2008, the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) included seven people from U.S. civilian agencies:
three from the Department of State, one from USAID, one from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, one from the
Department of Energy, and one from the Department of Transportation. (E-mail correspondence from SOCOM,
February 1, 2008.)
83 For more information on AFRICOM, see CRS Report RL34003, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the
Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch. Based on interviews by the author of that report, early plans called
for up to a quarter of AFRICOM personnel to be non-DOD civilians, to date, according to her June 19, 2008 interview,
less than 10 non-DOD civilians are on board. According to a recent Foreign Service Journal article, diplomats and
development experts would comprise up to a third of AFRICOM headquarters personnel. Also see Expeditionary
Sidekicks?, op. cit., p. 15.

• Within the State Department, the Director of Foreign Assistance has instituted
new interagency groups to plan and vet DOD foreign assistance activities.
Despite the increasing number of mechanisms for civil-military coordination on DOD foreign
assistance activities, some analysts are concerned that the State Department lead has eroded, and
that the new DOD mechanisms provide an inappropriate subordinate role for the State 84
Department. This can be a disadvantage in planning for, implementing, and overseeing these
activities, even when the State Department’s approval is required. The answer for some is to
increase the DOD role in such activities in general, while others argue for increasing the State
Department and USAID ability to plan, oversee, and coordinate activities. One often-mentioned
factor impeding the latter option is the lack of adequate numbers of State Department and USAID
personnel at U.S. embassies and in Washington, D.C. A recent CSIS report details
recommendations to increase civilian staff for counterterrorism, post-conflict, and humanitarian 85
operations. An MIT study recommends establishing a permanent interagency group under the
National Security Council, co-chaired by the Office of Management and Budget, to oversee 86
security assistance program integration. A third option would be for Congress to reinforce the
role of U.S. ambassadors as the top U.S. government official in all countries by requiring that
U.S. ambassadors approve all foreign assistance-type activities of all U.S. military personnel or
DOD contractors operating in their countries, regardless of the statutory authorities under which
they operate. A fourth possibility for enhancing State Department control, in the view of some
analysts, would be to create new regional mechanisms for State Department coordination, both
among embassies and with the U.S. military.
One of DOD’s primary advantages in planning and carrying out foreign assistance activities is its
regional organization, with four geographic combatant commands. Some analysts believe that this
regional focus combined with a regional field presence allows for better foreign assistance
planning, compared with the State Department’s traditional bilateral focus, with foreign
assistance planning in each country initiated and overseen by U.S. ambassadors reporting to the
Department’s Washington, D.C.-based regional bureaus. The DOD regional arrangement may
also place some DOD foreign assistance activities beyond the purview of U.S. ambassadors, as
regional DOD activities may not necessarily be cleared with ambassadors and ambassadors lack 87
sufficient civilian staff to manage all military activities. Congress could provide funding for the

84 Expeditionary Sidekicks?, op. cit., p. 15.
85 CSIS Task Force Final Report 2007, op. cit., pp. 33-43.
86 The oversight role of this new interagency group would be to ensurethe integration of security assistance policies
and programs into the broader national security strategy, resolve disagreements between DOD and the State
Department regarding policies and programs, and provide overarching policy guidance. Cindy Williams and Gordon
Adams, Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource Allocation, MIT Security
Studies Program Occasional Paper, June 2008, pp. 72-73.
87 At least in the past, there have been reports that Special Operations Forces have not informed ambassadors of SOF
activities in their countries, and given the classified nature of many SOF activities, it is not clear whether this is still
true. (See CRS Report RL30034, Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and Human Rights: Background and
Issues for Congress, by William C. Story, June 26, 1999, p. 5.) Although in early 2007 the GAO noted coordination for
Section 1206 activities had improved over time, the GAO reported at that time that poor coordination was more
common for regional programs. See, for instance, GAO 07-416R, Section 1206 Security Assistance Programs:
Findings on Criteria, Coordination, and Implementation, February 28, 2007, p. 24, and 2006 SFRC Report, op. cit., p.

State Department to hold regular meetings of regional ambassadors and other senior interagency
personnel for discussions of regional issues together with regional combatant commanders and 88
other military personnel, along the lines of the counterterrorism Regional Strategic Initiative.
More ambitiously, it could locate abroad the regional Assistant Secretaries or special offices of
regional bureaus to provide a venue for such meetings and for daily coordination with the
combatant commands, or provide another means for regional coordination. As part of its
oversight role, Congress might also urge the executive branch to take steps to ensure that 89
ambassadors exercise greater control over activities in their countries.
Some defense officials, on the other hand, argue for greater DOD autonomy in planning and
carrying out foreign assistance activities in order to expedite urgent operations. In addition to the
new DOD authorities requested in recent years—especially a permanent Title 10 U.S. Code train
and equip authority and a permanent fund for field commanders to carry out humanitarian
assistance activities—some analysts have argued for other changes that would accomplish those
ends. Among the options posited by one analyst are several that could be the subject of
congressional action: (1) increase the budgets and discretionary spending authority of the
geographic combatant commands to meet emerging political-military needs; (2) expand Section
1206 authority to include state-building activities and activities to develop “future capacity for
employment on operations as a U.S. partner”; and (3) expand the scope and authorities of the
JIACG by enabling the JIACG to coordinate combatant commands’ security cooperation
activities, thus facilitating “proactive conflict-prevention tasks” and empowering JIACG
members “to make decisions and coordinate regional interagency security cooperation 90
Many consider DOD to have a marked advantage in planning and carrying out a variety of
activities in the foreign assistance area because of the greater number of personnel and its large
budget. This resource advantage sometimes has created friction between State Department and
DOD officials over the use of DOD resources. As DOD begins to implement its “Partnership
Strategy,” its resource advantages are once again highlighted. DOD officials have made clear,
however, that they believe that Congress should provide the State Department and USAID with
the resources to build their capacity to carry out foreign assistance duties. In a July 2008 speech,
Secretary of Defense Gates urged the United States “to harness ‘the full strength of America,’” by

88 Under the RSI, senior interagency personnel, including ambassadors, regional assistant secretaries and personnel
from combatant commands, in eight geographical regions meet on a regional basis twice a year to deliberate
counterterrorism strategic responses. The 2006 SFRC report recommended that the Secretary of Stateregularize and
expand the Department’s Regional Strategic Initiative ...” and that meetings should be held “at the most senior level
possible, with ambassadors themselves actively engaged and involved. op. cit., p. 4.
89 The 2006 SFRC Report suggests regularizing the presence of military personnel in foreign countries byspecifically
placing them under the ambassador’s authority....” National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 38 of June 2, 1982,
Staffing at Diplomatic Missions and their Overseas Posts, requires Chief of Mission approval for any proposed
change in in the size, composition, or mandate staff under Chief of Mission authority. (This directive is accessible
through, last accessed July 22, 2008.) The 2006 SFRC Report noted that
DOD objected to that suggestion because some of the military personnel present in embassies are serving under a
regional combatant command. op. cit., p. 11.
90 Thomas P. Galvin, “Extending the Phase Zero Campaign Mindset, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 45, 2nd quarter,
2007, pp. 49-50.

strengthening these civilian agencies. “It has become clear,” he said, “that America’s civilian
institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and underfunded
for far too long—relative to what we spend on the military, and more important, relative to the 91
responsibilities and challenges our nation has around the world.”
In addition to its regional advantage, DOD enjoys two other advantages: greater planning and
execution capabilities, and substantially greater budgetary resources. DOD can muster more
manpower than any other agency. While U.S. military personnel may be stretched in wartime,
there still exist substantial reserves of personnel that can be tapped to plan and carry out
activities. The combatant commands enjoy considerably more personnel than do individual
embassies, and their personnel are oriented toward planning activities, whereas State Department
personnel are oriented toward collecting information and furthering U.S. policy through
diplomacy, such as person-to-person contact. Despite waging a war in Iraq, CENTCOM created a
new Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa (CJT-HOA) of roughly 2,000 U.S. military personnel
(the number fluctuates regularly) to plan and carry out efforts in the Horn of Africa that include
much foreign assistance activity. In Iraq, DOD temporarily provided military personnel to fill
about 100 State Department PRT posts, until the State Department could contract persons with the
needed expertise to fill them.
Congress also grants considerable funding to DOD to carry out foreign assistance-type activities.
For example, Congress funded DOD’s OHDACA appropriation at roughly $60 million a year for
FY2005-FY2007 and provided for FY2008 a total of $103.3 million, of which part is multiple
year money. These sums represent more funding than the State Department provides annually to
many individual countries receiving U.S. foreign assistance. In addition, these amounts are but a
small part of the actual cost of the activities undertaken under OHDACA authorities. OHDACA
funding does not cover the total cost of an activity, but only its incremental cost (i.e., the amount
above the normal peacetime cost of a soldier). In terms of historical spending, Congress’s
FY2009 OHDACA authorization for $83.3 million in is about the same, in nominal terms, as the
$86 million (current dollars) that Congress authorized for OHDACA when the account was
created in 1994. However, in constant terms, OHDACA funding has shrunk, as the initial
OHDACA authorization would be $131 million in FY2009 dollars.
Some analysts believe that Congress has given DOD an advantage by increasing DOD allocations
for foreign assistance-type activities, because such funds are more easily included in the defense 92
budget than in the foreign assistance budget. In particular, these funds include the CERP for
Afghanistan and Iraq, and an increase in discretionary money in the CCIF, which can be used for
a variety of purposes in addition to humanitarian relief.

91 U.S. Department of Defense. Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates to the U.S. Global Leadership
Campaign, Washington, D.C., July 15, 2008. Accessed through; last accessed
July 22, 2008. Secretary Gates also stated that while he could not “pretend to know the right dollar amount—I know
its a good deal more than the one percent of the federal budget than it is right now” and, given thatthe budgets we are
talking about are relatively small compared to the rest of government, a steep increase of these capabilities is well
within reach—as long as there is the political will and wisdom to do it.”
92 The CSIS Task Force Final Report 2007 finds acontinued neglect of critical non-military components of national
power and influence” and views the use of DOD for non-traditional security assistance as “defaulting to reliance on the
military. p. IX.

Although DOD enjoys greater resources, these resources do not necessarily provide DOD with
the needed competence and expertise to carry out foreign assistance activities. For instance, for
many years, some defense analysts have stated that the U.S. military civil affairs speciality does
not have an adequate number of personnel to carry out the wide variety of state-building tasks
needed; with a recent increase in the number of civil affairs personnel, one analyst’s concern now
focuses on whether civil affairs personnel are properly organized, trained, educated, and provided 93
the resources to fulfill their mission. In some U.S. embassies, U.S. civilian personnel
interviewed criticized some military personnel as “poorly trained in information gathering” and 94
“rarely” possessing regional or linguistic expertise. DOD Directive 3000.05 points to a need to
develop personnel qualified to engage in state-building and economic reconstruction activities.
DOD is still deliberating whether to devote funding and time to develop a cadre with the 95
necessary range of expertise to plan and carry out such activities on its own. DOD Directive

3000.05 points out that civilians are often better suited to carry out such tasks.

DOD officials join many other analysts in urging Congress to augment the ability of civilian
federal agencies to carry out the state-building and economic measures that will prevent and deter
conflicts, stabilize nations in transitions from conflict, and foster economic recovery and 96
democratic institutions during the post-conflict period. For many analysts, one indication of the
urgency of increasing the number of federal civilian personnel to perform such tasks was the State
Department’s inability to supply when needed more than 100 specialized, skilled personnel to
staff the PRTs in Iraq, which DOD had to staff temporarily until the State Department could
locate contractors. Many analysts also cite a need for a significant number of USAID permanent
staff. They note that USAID permanent staff now number approximately 2,000, down from some
15,000 during the Vietnam war, and that most USAID work is currently carried out by

93 Colonel Christopher Holshek,The Scroll and the Sword: Synergizing Civil-Military Power,” in Alexander
Woodcock, George Rose, and David Davis, eds., The Cornwallis Group XI: Analysis for Civil-Military Transitions,
Clementsport, Nova Scotia, Canada: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2007, p. 127. In this work, written in 2006,
Col. Holshek stated that Civil Affairs (CA) personnel arehard pressed to support both the burgeoning CMO [Civil
Military Operations] mission and CAO [Civil Affairs Operations] support to interagency nation-building. He states
that Civil Affairs personnel’straditional comparative advantage” in language and cultural knowledge, as well as
nation-building functional specialist proficiency, has eroded over time, although he notes recent initiatives may work to
reverse some of the problem. His current concerns were stated in an e-mail of April 1, 2008.
94 2006 SFRC Report, op. cit., p. 11. The report states thatRotational tours of only six months limit expertise acquired
on-the-job. In several countries, embassy officials say that the time required to bring military personnel up to speed,
monitor their activities, and prevent them from doing damage is not compensated for by contributions they make to the
embassy team.” Ibid.
95 For more information, see CRS Report RL34333, Does the Army Need a Full-Spectrum Force or Specialized Units?
Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
96 A May 22, 2006 DOD memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the secretaries of the military
departments, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders, and many other DOD officials
called for DOD to develop plans to support State Department efforts to obtain resources for S/CRS operations and to
establish a Civilian Reserve Corps and a Conflict Response Fund, as well as to support USAID and other civilian
agencies efforts to obtain resources to deploy civilian experts to security, stabilization, transition, and reconstruction
(SSTR) operations. Memorandum on the Quadrennial Defense Review Building Partnership Capacity Execution
Roadmap, signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England.

DOD has strongly supported the development of the State Department Office of the Coordinator
for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to plan and coordinate such preventive, transitional, 97
and post-conflict activities. Under authority provided by Congress, DOD has transferred funds
during FY2006 and FY2007 to S/CRS for such activities. Nevertheless, some analysts have
criticized S/CRS for failing to fully perform its assigned functions. Some fault a lack of top-level
State Department commitment to its mission and bureaucratic infighting within the State
Department. Others judge that Congress has not provided the State Department with the level of 98
funding necessary to adequately staff and otherwise provide for this office’s operations.
In February 2008, the Bush Administration presented Congress with a $248.6 million request to
fund a Civilian Stabilization Initiative that would strengthen U.S. civilian capabilities to respond
to unanticipated conflict in foreign countries. The initiative’s centerpiece would be a civilian
response corps consisting of civilian federal government employees from several departments
(250 members of an active response corps and 2,000 members of a standby response corps) and a
reserve component of 2,000 citizens from outside the federal government. This corps would
include people with a wide variety of state-building and economic reconstruction capabilities.
Congress appropriated $50 million in seed money for the corps in supplemental State Department 99
appropriations for 2007. Congress provided authority to establish a civilian reserve corps in the
Duncan Hunter NDAA for FY2009 (P.L. 110-417), Title XVI, Reconstruction and Stabilization
Civilian Management.
An area of particular interest to DOD is an increase in U.S. government capacity to train and
equip foreign military and police forces. Some argue that DOD needs to increase its own training
capacity—even if DOD remains in a supporting role. Others argue that Congress should provide
the funds and personnel needed to increase the State Department’s ability to train and equip such
forces worldwide and in the event of future challenges on the scale of Afghanistan or Iraq. (See
Appendix L.)
Current debate in Congress has centered on the development of U.S. government civilian
capabilities. Nevertheless, some analysts urge further examination of the uses and relationships of
private sector civilian personnel to DOD missions. While DOD has attempted over the years to
improve its ability to work in the field with non-profit NGOS, including publishing guidelines 100
jointly with InterAction and the U.S. Institute of Peace in July 2007, some analysts suggest that

97 Soon after S/CRS was created, then Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard B. Myers, in testimony before the Senate
Armed Services Committee (SASC), cited the creation of S/CRS as “an important step” in helping “post-conflict
nations achieve peace, democracy, and a sustainable market economy.In the future, provided this office is given
appropriate resources, it will synchronize military and civilian efforts and ensure an integrated national approach is
applied to post-combat peacekeeping, reconstruction and stability operations. U.S. Congress. Senate Armed Services
Committee, Posture Statement of General Richard B. Myers, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Senate thst
Armed Services Committee Hearing, February 17, 2005, 109 Cong. 1 sess., p. 31. Accessible through the SASC
website; last accessed July 22, 2008.
98 For more information on S/CRS, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions:
Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and
Reconstruction Capabilities, by Nina M. Serafino and Martin A. Weiss, (hereafter referred to as CRS Report
99 This funding was appropriated by Section 3810, P.L. 110-28, U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans Care, Katrina
Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations, 2007. For more information, see CRS Report RL32862, ibid.
100 Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in

further improvements are necessary. Some also point to a need to reexamine the potential role of
for-profit contractor personnel in augmenting or replacing U.S. military forces in humanitarian
and state-building activities.

Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments, issued July 7, 2007 by the U.S. Institute of Peace, InterAction, and DOD.
See; last accessed July 22, 2008.

Table 1. Congressional Action on Selected DOD-Requested New or Expanded Authorities for FY2009 Relevant to Foreign
Assistance Activities Referenced Above
House Action on the Conference Action on the
Proposal for the FY2009 National Defense FY2009 NDAA Senate Action on the FY2009 NDAA FY2009 NDAA
Authorization Act (NDAA) (H.R. 5658) (S. 3001) (P.L. 110-417)
Building the Partnership Capacity of Foreign Section 1206 would extend Section 1204 would extend authority through Section 1206 extends authority
Miltary and Other Security Forces. Make current authority through FY2011 and would increase the annual through FY2011, increases the
permanent the Section 1206 train and equip authority FY2010. authorization to $400 million. It would authorize authorized amount to $350
of the FY2006 NDAA (as amended by the John the use of funds for security forces whose million, and expands the scope
Warner FY2007 NDAA). Increase authorized funding primary mission is counterterrorism, subject to of authority to include building
from $300 million to $750 million. Expand specified the police training restrictions of 22 U.S.C. 2420 the capacity of a foreign
purposes to (1) allow assistance to non-military (Section 660 of the 1961 FAA, as amended.) country’s maritime security
security forces, (2) to train foreign forces to forces.
participate in or to support military and stability
operations that are consistent with U.S. security
interests, and (3) to build the capacity of security
foreces in a country where U.S. forces are deployed in
iki/CRS-RL34639large-scale stability operations.
g/wMaking Permanent and Global the No similar provision. In lieu of the Administration proposal, S. 3001 No similar provision.
s.orCommander’s Emergency Response Program would authorize $75 million for the Combatant
leakfor Urgent Humanitarian and Reconstruction Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF), 10 U.S.C.
Needs in the Field. Codify CERP authority at 10 166a. (Senate Rept. 110-335, accompanying S.
://wikiU.S.C. Chapter 20. Authorize the use of annually 3001.) In its FY2009 DOD budget request, the
httpappropriated CERP funds for the CERP program in Administration requested $100 million in the
Iraq and a similar program in Afghanistan, and for a CCIF specifically to meet unanticipated
similar program to assist the people of a developing humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs.
country where United States forces are operating.
Authorize the Secretary of Defense to waive any
provision of law not contained in this authority.
Provide for DOD and the Department of State to
jointly develop procedures for the exercise of this
authority in order to provide for “expeditious
coordination” between DOD and the State
Support for Special Operations to Combat Section 1208 would codify this Section 1203 would extend this authority Section 1208 extends this
Terrorism. Expand, and indefinitely extend, authority at 10 U.S.C. 127e, through FY2011, raise the limit on annual funding authority through FY2013 and
authority for Special Operations Forces to support raise the spending limit to $35 to $35 million, and add a requirement for the increases the authorized
foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals million, and require the concurrence of the relevant Chief of Mission. funding limit to $35 million.

when such recipients are facilitating or acting in Secretary of Defense to notify
support of operations conducted by U.S. Special the congressional defense

House Action on the Conference Action on the
Proposal for the FY2009 National Defense FY2009 NDAA Senate Action on the FY2009 NDAA FY2009 NDAA
Authorization Act (NDAA) (H.R. 5658) (S. 3001) (P.L. 110-417)
Operations Forces. [ Section 1208 of the Ronald W. committees within 48 hours of
Reagan NDAA for FY2005 (P.L. 108-375) as amended the use of such an authority.
by Section 1202 of the FY2008 NDAA (P.L. 110-181).]
Increase authorized funding limit from $25 million to
$35 million, and require the concurrence of the
relevant Chief of Mission.


Disaster relief and humanitarian assistance have long been considered traditional, albeit
secondary, DOD roles. DOD is one of the three principal U.S. government departments that 102
provides disaster and other humanitarian assistance overseas. DOD humanitarian relief in
disasters and other emergency and recovery situations is often carried out in coordination with or
under the direction of U.S. government civilian agencies. The U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) takes the lead in disaster
assistance; the State Department takes the lead in assisting refugees.
DOD humanitarian assistance also takes place in the context of military operations, some of
which are conducted solely for humanitarian purposes and others in which humanitarian activities
are carried out as a strategic supplement to combat operations or military training exercises. In
many situations, DOD also cooperates and coordinates with international organizations, such as
the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and a wide variety
of non-governmental organizations.
The following sections discuss DOD authorities for and the specific DOD role in humanitarian
assistance. There is a particular emphasis on DOD humanitarian assistance and related civic
action under 10 U.S.C. 401. As used by the U.S. government, the term “humanitarian assistance”
is vague, and the types of assistance provided under that rubric are broader than the humanitarian
assistance provided by non-governmental relief agencies.
DOD is often the first U.S. government agency to respond in cases of natural or manmade
disasters, providing the initial organizational effort for further action by civilian agencies. The
DOD role is most often carried out under the President’s broad authority to provide emergency
assistance for foreign disasters, rather than Title 10 U.S. Code authority to provide disaster

101 Prepared by Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs, and Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in
Humanitarian Policy. Also see CRS Report RL33769, International Crises and Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian
Assistance, Budget Trends, and Issues for Congress, by Rhoda Margesson. This appendix remains the same as in the
original edition of this report; information is current as of August 25, 2008.
102 The USAID and the Department of State provide disaster relief and humanitarian assistance through four main
programs: USAID’s International Disaster and Famine Assistance; the State Department’s, Migration and Refugee
Assistance and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance; and P.L. 480 Title II Food Aid. In addition, although not
the focus of this report, other parts of the U.S. government that support humanitarian assistance include the U.S.
Department of Agricultures Forest Service, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the Department of Health and Human
Services (HSS), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). These agencies contribute technical
assistance to the OFDA as needed in response to humanitarian emergencies.

relief.103 DOD provides assistance in coordination with the Administrator of the USAID, who is
charged with responsibility for coordinating U.S. government and private sector foreign
assistance in cases of disaster.
DOD provides assistance in humanitarian emergencies and recovery efforts under several Title 10
U.S. Code authorities added in the 1980s and 1990s. DOD provides transportation and or/funding
for humanitarian assistance under 10 U.S.C. 2561 and 402, and humanitarian demining assistance
under 10 U.S.C. 407. (The latter is covered separately in Appendix C.)
• 10 U.S.C. 2561—added in 1992 (with its original section number of 2551) and
last amended in 2003—is DOD’s primary authority to transport humanitarian
supplies. It allows DOD to use appropriated funds for humanitarian assistance
“for the purpose of providing transportation of humanitarian relief and for other
humanitarian purposes worldwide.” The Secretary of State determines that this
provision should be used and requests DOD to respond with specific assistance
such as helicopter transport, provision of temporary water supplies, or road and
bridge repair. If possible, military personnel join the USAID OFDA assessment
team to help determine the type of aid DOD can provide. Under this provision,
DOD generally limits its activities to those that stabilize the emergency situation,
such as road or bridge repair, but generally does not undertake projects that
include rebuilding. The law requires an annual report to Congress on the use of
funds. Donated goods can also be shipped on commercial vessels using Section

2561 funds.

• 10 U.S.C. 402—the “Denton Amendment”104 added in 1987 and last amended in
2003—authorizes shipment of privately donated humanitarian goods, including
privately donated disaster assistance, on U.S. military aircraft and ships on a
space-available basis. The donated goods must be certified as appropriate for the
disaster or other situation by USAID’s OFDA and can be bumped from the
transport if other U.S. government aid must be transported.
• 10 U.S.C. 2557—added in 1985 and last amended in 2001—authorizes the
Secretary of Defense to make nonlethal excess DOD supplies available for
humanitarian relief.
DOD also provides substantial emergency humanitarian relief assistance in a wide variety of
other circumstances. Sometimes in cooperation with and under the authorities of other agencies,
DOD provides humanitarian assistance, including food, shelter and supplies, medical evacuation,

103 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2151 et. seq.), as amended, authorizes the United
States to participate in disaster relief efforts and gives the President great flexibility to respond to disasters with a wide
range of government-funded humanitarian assistance. It allows the President to provide disaster assistance,
notwithstanding any other provision of this or any other Act” that would otherwise prohibit or restrict aid and gives
the President the flexibility to decide what specific type of aid to provide. (Sections 491-493; 22 U.S.C. 2292-2292b.)
The decision as to what assistance is considered humanitarian is often made on a case-by-case basis. 10 U.S.C. 404
provides DOD with authority to conduct disaster assistance but, according to DOD lawyers, is generally not used
because of conditions that inhibit a flexible response. For further information, see CRS Report RL33769, International
Crises and Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance, Budget Trends, and Issues for Congress, by Rhoda Margesson.
104 Named after former Senator Jeremiah Denton.

refugee assistance, logistical and operational support, and rehabilitation services. DOD supplies 105
can be provided for humanitarian relief under presidential authority.
In addition to its emergency relief and recovery efforts, DOD conducts humanitarian activities in
the context of military operations and training exercises. The specific purpose of some military
operations is to provide humanitarian relief. Examples of this from the early 1990s are Operation
Provide Comfort to provide humanitarian assistance to the Kurdish population in northern Iraq,
and Operation Provide Relief, to deliver humanitarian supplies to Somalis, as well as the follow-
on Operation Provide Hope, to assist and protect humanitarian workers in Somalia. Currently,
DOD provides humanitarian assistance as part of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
(See Appendix K.)
Special Operations Forces (SOF) carry out humanitarian activities as part of their operations, as
well as part of their training exercises with foreign forces under 10 U.S.C. 2011, according to the
United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Section 2011 authorizes the SOCOM
commander and the regional combatant commanders to spend money and to deploy SOF teams to
train with foreign military forces if the primary purpose is to train U.S. SOF. Recent authoritative 106
published information is not available on an unclassified basis.
In 2006, Congress provided DOD with new authority for small-scale humanitarian relief and
reconstruction assistance by clarifying and expanding the existing Combatant Commanders
Initiative Fund (CCIF). When first authorized in 1991 (10 U.S.C. 166a), the CCIF (then known as
the Commanders-in-Chief or CINC Initiative Fund), provided funds for exercises and military
education and training of foreign personnel, and for “humanitarian and civil assistance.” A 2006
amendment changed civil assistance to “civic assistance, to include urgent and unanticipated
humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance,” and made the latter a priority category,

105 The President has the authority to draw down defense equipment and direct military personnel to respond to
disasters. Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, (22 U.S.C. 2318) allows the draw down of
defense equipment and services to a limit of $100 million in any fiscal year if the President determines that an
unforeseen emergency exists that requires immediate military assistance to a foreign country or international
organization, and the requirement cannot be met under any other provision. Before this provision can be used, the
President must notify the Speaker of the House, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the Appropriations
Committees of both chambers, in writing by issuing a presidential notification. This request is handled by the
Department of State and the National Security Council. Section 506(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, also provides a special drawdown authority for up to $200 million in defense articles and services for
international disaster relief and migration and refugee act assistance (in addition to counternarcotics assistance).
106 Section 2011 authority was codified in 1991 by the NDAA for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (P.L. 102-190, Section
1052), and amended in 1998 by the Strom Thurmond NDAA for Fiscal Year 1999 (P.L. 105-261, Section 1062) to
require prior approval of the Secretary of Defense for exercises under this section. Section 2011 requires an annual
report to Congress, but only the report covering FY1997 was unclassified. In 1999, a controversy developed over
allegations that JCET training missions—then costing some $15.2 million for exercises in over 100 countries—were
conducted with foreign militaries accused of human rights violations. See CRS Report RL30034, Joint Combined
Exchange Training (JCET) and Human Rights: Background and Issues for Congress, by William C. Story, and U.S.
General Accounting Office, Management and Oversight of Joint Combined Exchange Training, GAO/NSIAD-99-173,
July 1999.

“particularly in a foreign country where the armed forces are engaged in a contingency 107
To this point, it appears that the CCIF has not been used extensively to fund humanitarian
assistance. In response to a Congressional Research Service request in 2007, DOD stated that just 108
under $1 million had been used for humanitarian purposes from FY2005 through FY2007. In
its FY2009 DOD budget request, the Administration is requesting $100 million in CCIF funds for 109
urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction.
Section 401, added to Title 10 U.S. Code in 1986110 and amended several times, authorizes the
U.S. military to perform specific humanitarian and civic action assistance projects. These projects
are (1) medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in areas of a country that are rural
or are underserved, and related education, training, and technical assistance; (2) construction of
rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well-drilling and construction of basic sanitation
facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.
Section 401 establishes several conditions for the projects. They must serve the basic economic
and social needs of the people in the recipient country, and must complement, not duplicate, other
U.S. social or economic assistance. They cannot benefit any individual, group, or organization
engaged in military or paramilitary activity. They must promote the security interests of the
United States and the host nation, and contribute to the operational readiness skills of
participating members of the U.S. armed forces. Moreover, they must be provided in the context
of authorized military operations, exercises, and training deployments.
Section 401 activities are largely carried out under the aegis of the combatant commands as part
of authorized military overseas operations, readiness exercises, and training deployments. The
statute stipulates that the Secretary of State “must specifically approve” providing humanitarian
and civic assistance. In addition, DOD instructions regulating this section require prior approval

107 FY2007 John Warner NDAA, P.L. 109-364, Section 902. Over the past decade at least, Congress has appropriated
$25 million in annual DOD appropriation bills for the CCIF, and additional amounts in FY2005-FY2007 supplemental
appropriations legislation. Three FY2005-FY2007 supplemental appropriations bills provided $25 million each in
CCIF funds for use in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (i.e., Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, P.L. 109-13, hereafter referred
to as FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations); Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense,
the Global War on Terrorism, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006, P.L. 109-234; and the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans
Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Act, 2007, P.L. 110-28.
108 Information provided by the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, e-mail correspondence of
November 7, 2007. The DOD Joint Staff surveyed the combatant commands at CRS’s request and found that CCIF
funds used for these purposes in the last three fiscal years had been limited: the U.S. Southern Command
(SOUTHCOM) used just over $900,000 for medical and veterinary assistance in Haiti in FY2005 and $90,000 to help
fund the travel of medical personnel in conjunction with the USNS Comfort’s calls in 12 South and Central American
nations. The USNS Comfort is a medical ship that serves U.S. military personnel that also provides medical services to
foreign populations when training abroad with foreign medical personnel.
109 DOD Summary Budget Justification, op. cit., p.13.
110 Added by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1987, P.L. 99-661, Section 333. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006, P.L. 109-
163, Section 1201, amended the section to include surgical care and a provision for related education, training, and
technical assistance.

from the Department of State, USAID, and any other relevant civilian agencies for all Section 111

401 activities.

As spelled out in the FY2007 Section 401 report to Congress,112 a host nation government
proposes a project, which the U.S. embassy then endorses and forwards to the combatant
commanders for consideration. Combatant commanders file annual proposal lists and proposals to
meet emergency requirements with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which
coordinates an interagency review to ensure compliance with U.S. policy and relevant legislation.
This review involves representatives from the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
the DOD General Counsel’s office, the Department of State, and USAID. The project must be
approved by the U.S. ambassador to the country where the activity will occur and by the 113
Secretary of State.
DOD has long carried out abroad a wide variety of small-scale humanitarian programs, often in
the context of military civic action (MCA) programs that also involve construction and thth
reconstruction projects. Experts trace the Army’s experience with MCA to 18- and 19-century
engineering and medical activities in the United States and abroad. “By the time of World War II,
a propensity toward military civic action was already part of the fabric of the U.S. soldier,”
according to one study, which then identifies the MCA program in Korea after the Korean War as 114
the “first sustained and concerted U.S. military civic action plan.” This program set forth a
dominant model in military civic action aimed at small-scale construction and reconstruction
projects, in which U.S. military forces assist, but host nation troops do most of the work. MCA th
gained prestige as part of the U.S. military occupation of the Philippines at the turn of the 20
century and was later endorsed by President John F. Kennedy, who viewed it as an appropriate 115
nation-building tool. Although military assistance had been carried out as part of security
assistance programs prior to the 1960s, in 1965, Congress responded to concerns about its role in
international development by placing the first restrictions on the use of such projects “to prevent
overlap” with USAID when that agency was established in 1961 and legislating interagency

111 The drafting of regulations for 10 U.S.C. 401 was mandated by P.L. 103-160, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1994. In
response, DOD issued Directive 2205.2, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Provided in Conjunction with
Military Operations, October 6, 1994, and Instruction Number 2205.3, Implementing Procedures for the Humanitarian
and Civic Assistance (HCA) program, January 27, 1995. Instruction section E(1)(d) states that before the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy issues final approval of Unified Combatant Commanders annual HCA activity plans,
the Under Secretary shall “obtain the approval of the Department of State, the Agency for International Development
(AID), and other Government Agencies, as appropriate.
112 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance and
Humanitarian Mine Action Programs, Fiscal Year 2007, February 2008, p. 2. Section 401 requires that DOD provide
an annual report, due March 1, to the four armed services and foreign affairs committees regarding the activities
undertaken under that authority during the previous fiscal year.
113 In practice, adherence to this procedure has varied. For instance, U.S. officials sometimes suggest possible activities
to host nation government officials for their proposal.
114 John W. DePauw and George A. Luz, eds., “The Role of the Total Army in Military Civic Action and Humanitarian
Assistance: A Synopsis,” in Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action, Carlisle Barracks,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1990, p. 10. Hereafter referred to as The Role of the Total
Army. The $22 million MCA program in Korea after the Korean War (through 1962) emphasized schools, hospitals,
civic buildings, land reclamation, and improvement of public health and transportation facilities, according to this
115 Ibid.

coordination that would involve USAID.116 MCA became controversial during the 1960s, when,
because of its linkage with counterinsurgency in Vietnam, Congress became reluctant to fund 117
it. Nevertheless, Congress did fund some MCA projects abroad after Vietnam that were not
linked to counterinsurgency campaigns, in particular an Africa program in the 1980s. That
program was funded at almost $5 million in FY1985, but funding dropped to just under $2 118
million by FY1989.
During the 1980s, controversy over MCA in Central America, where the United States was
supporting the Salvadoran government’s counterinsurgency campaign, led Congress to authorize
specific activities through a new statute. When Congress added Section 401 to Title 10 U.S. Code
in 1986, it set parameters for humanitarian and civic assistance activities in foreign nations by
specifying activities and establishing conditions, but it also provided DOD with greater flexibility
by granting Title 10 authority for such assistance. Previously, at least some MCA, in particular the
Africa program, was carried out under authorities that put the State Department in the lead, 119
according to one source.
The number of countries in which these activities have occurred has remained fairly constant,
while the regional balance has shifted somewhat. A comparison of FY1995 and FY2006, two
years where humanitarian and civic action activities took place in 43 countries under Section 401
authority, shows that the number of Western Hemisphere, Middle East/Arab, and Asia/Pacific
recipient countries decreased, while the number of countries in Africa and Greater Europe grew.
Two new African countries and four new European locations were selected for Section 401
activities. In FY2007, when the number of countries rose to 46, three new countries from Europe
and the former Soviet Union were selected.
The greatest change has been the substantial increase in the number of projects. From the early
1990s to FY2007, the number of projects multiplied almost eightfold. From FY2005 through
FY2007, the number more than doubled, from 197 to 480. Section 401 costs over the past 14
years for which data are consecutively available (FY1993-FY2006) has ranged from a low of
$4.7 million in FY1998 to a high of $11.03 million in FY2007. Costs have risen over the past two
fiscal years, but not at the same pace as the number of projects, that is, from $7.67 million in

116The Role of the Total Army, op. cit., p. 11. The requirement for interagency coordination on civic action was
added by Section 302 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1965 (P.L. 89-171) which amended the FAA of 1961. In
addition, Section 201 of the 1965 FAA amended 1961 in an attempt to both codify under the FAA and limit the use of
civic action. This provision, now codified as Section 502 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22,
U.S.C. 2302) authorizes the U.S. government to provide assistance to “foreign military forces in less developed
friendly countries ... to construct public works and to engage in other activities helpful to the economic and social
development of such friendly countries.” Section 201of the 1965 FAA also expressed the sense of Congress thatsuch
foreign military forces should not be maintained or established solely for civic action activities and that such civic
action activities not significantly detract from the capability of the military forces to perform their military missions
and be coordinated with and form part of the total economic and social development effort.”
117 Captain Craig L. Smith. “Military Civic Action,” in The DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance
Management. Vol. 8, No. 1, Fall 1985, p. 85.
118 Ken H. Butts,The Africa Civic Action Program, in Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military
Civic Action, John W. DePauw and George A. Luz, eds. and co-authors (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1990), p. 30. Hereafter referred to as The Africa Civic Action Program.
119 The Africa Civic Action Program, op. cit., p. 28. In 1965, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to
include civic action as one of the types of assistance for which the Secretary of State is charged with providing
continuous supervision and general direction....” (P.L. 87-195, Section 622(c), as amended by P.L. 89-171 Section

FY2005 to $11.03 million in FY2007. (These data are taken from the tables at the end of this
appendix, which are compiled from the Section 401 annual reports.)
DOD humanitarian assistance often draws praise when provided in emergency relief situations,
such as natural and manmade disasters, as it is the most flexible operational and policy tool that
can be quickly brought to bear to relieve human suffering. Controversy has arisen, however, when
U.S. military troops provide humanitarian and civic assistance for the longer term (i.e., in non-
emergency or conflict recovery situations). Such longer-term assistance occurs in the course of
military operations and deployments, or when training exercises are conducted extensively in an
area over a prolonged period of time. Then, humanitarian and civic assistance is often used for
political purposes, including maintaining contact with a country, region, or local population;
mitigating tensions; cultivating allies; and promoting democracy.
In the case of humanitarian infrastructure projects and other civic assistance, there are 120
longstanding concerns about suitability and costs that date back to the 1960s. Critics, and even
some proponents, of such assistance have found that projects do not always meet the most urgent
needs of the host country or long-term development goals, and are not sustainable, and thus may
represent a poor use of U.S. funds. Nevertheless, to some analysts, civic action projects fill a gap
where no other U.S. assistance is available.
The use of U.S. military forces to carry out large-scale humanitarian interventions in Somalia and
the Balkans in the 1990s aroused concern both within the military and among civilian
humanitarian aid workers. Many in both camps also were troubled when the military, as the major
presence on the ground, became involved in humanitarian and state-building projects, and
questioned the suitability and desirability of using U.S. military personnel for such activities.
Many asserted that humanitarian and state-building tasks could have been better performed by
experienced civilians with subject area expertise and knowledge about local culture. Military
leaders themselves questioned whether military personnel were the most appropriate personnel to
carry out such activities, particularly as many believed that such activities diverted time and
personnel from the military’s primary functions. Another concern was a lack of effective
coordination. Military culture clashed with the ethos and modes of operations of the civilian
personnel involved from a multitude of agencies—the United Nations and other international
organizations, national governments, and from non-governmental humanitarian groups—and the
resulting distrust and disagreement impeded cooperation.
The concerns raised during the interventions of the 1990s have resurfaced in the context of Iraq
and Afghanistan, along with new issues regarding the effect of the use of military forces on the
work and safety of civilian humanitarian workers in the field. The use of military personnel for
humanitarian and civic assistance projects in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly in the context of
the Provincial Reconstruction teams in Afghanistan, has led to fears that the perception of
humanitarian assistance as an impartial, neutral tool has been jeopardized and that the lives and
safety of civilian humanitarian workers is threatened because they may be perceived as associated
with military efforts. In that context, however, attempts to incorporate civilians into PRTs have

120 See, for instance, Edward Bernard Glick, Peaceful Conflict: The Non-Military Use of the Military (Harrisburg, PA:
Stackpole Books, 1967), as well as Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action, op .cit.

been hampered by the lack of civilian personnel for such tasks. (See the discussion on PRTs in
Appendix K.)
At the same time, concerns again arise as to whether DOD activities are effective and properly
coordinated with civilian agencies to ensure consistency with U.S. foreign policy objectives. The
recent placement of USAID personnel in U.S. regional combatant commands to scrutinize and
help develop proposed humanitarian and civic assistance projects is intended, among other things,
to synchronize USAID and DOD planning efforts and to produce joint policy documents dealing 121
with linkages between defense and development.
A previous concern, which has not surfaced in the current debate, is that the involvement of
military forces in humanitarian aid and small-scale economic projects weakens civilian control
over the military in developing countries by perpetuating stereotypes that military forces are most
effective at meeting basic needs and perhaps by encouraging the use of military forces to perform
functions that more properly performed by civilians. On the other hand, some argue that the use
of U.S. military forces in such activities provides a democratic role model for local military
forces and an opportunity to improve local civil-military relations.
Table A-1. Section 401 Humanitarian Assistance and Civic Action: Costs, Number of
Projects, and Number of Countries, by Fiscal Year
U.S. $ millions Number of Projects
Fiscal Years (current) (approx.) Number of Countries
1990 4.2 not available 38
1991-1992 —
1993 5.49 64 25
1994 6.21 68 45
1995 5.37 66 43
1996 5.69 169 42
1997 5.30 155 35
1998 4.68 142 44
1999 9.25 221 39
2000 6.96 135 45
2001 7.00 NA 43
2002 7.31 166 45
2003 6.82 175 36
2004 7.18 161 42
2005 7.67 197 48
2006 9.22 320 43
2007 11.03 480 46
Source: Data from 10 U.S.C. Section 401 annual required reports.
Note: Data are not available for FY1991-1992.

121 Slide presentation provided by the USAID Office of Military Affairs, October 17, 2007.

Table A-2. Geographical Distribution of Section 401 Humanitarian and Civic
Assistance Activities: Number of Countries, by Region and Fiscal Year
Europe and
Sub-Middle the Former Greater
Fiscal Western Saharan East/Arab Soviet Union Asia/Oceana/Pacific
Year Hemisphere Africa States (FSU) Islands Total
FY1990 16 6 3 0 13 38
FY1992 —
FY1993 18 4 2 1 0 25
FY1994 21 9 2 0 13 45
FY1995 21 7 3 1 11 43
FY1996 21 8 2 0 11 42
FY1997 18 5 2 1 9 35
FY1998 21 6 2 3 12 44
FY1999 17 4 5 4 9 39
FY2000 18 7 3 8 10 45
FY2001 16 8 2 9 8 43
FY2002 15 8 3 11 9 45
FY2003 18 4 2 6 6 36
FY2004 18 8 1 7 8 42
FY2005 18 9 2 8 11 48
FY2006 15 11 2 4 10 43
FY2007a 13 13 3 7 10 46
Source: Data from 10 U.S.C. Section 401 annual required reports.
Note: Data are not available for FY1991-1992.
a. The countries in each of the geographic areas for FY2007 were as follows.
Western Hemisphere: Belize, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Botswana, Central African Republic, Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana,
Kenya, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda, and Zambia.
Middle East/Arab States: Djibouti, Morocco, and Yemen.
Europe and the Former Soviet Union: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kosovo, Moldova,
Mongolia, and Romania.
Greater Asia/Oceana/Pacific Islands: Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Marshall Islands,
Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Thailand, and Vietnam.

DOD is engaged in a number of efforts to improve global health. Information in this section
reflects publicly available information, which is limited. Among the many U.S. government
global health programs, DOD sponsors a number of programs that focus primarily on infectious
diseases and human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS).
DOD regularly publishes information about the international DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention
Program (DHAPP) and the DOD Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System
(DOD-GEIS). It also published information about some humanitarian assistance efforts such as
certain projects funded by the OHDACA account (see Disaster Relief and Humanitarian
Assistance, Including Civic Action for information on OHDACA). However, press accounts and
public events and conferences sometimes refer to other DOD programs related to global health,
though little or no publicly available documentation about such programs is available.
It is unclear which, if any, DOD office has leadership over DOD global health policy. There
appears to be no agency-wide implementing strategy to integrate and coordinate global health
policy across a range of related DOD programs. Some offices and programs appear to create
informal policy within their spheres, but their efforts have not led to institutionalized policy in
most cases, according to current and former DOD officials.
Through GEIS, DOD supports broad emerging infectious disease prevention programs through
extensive partnerships among five DOD overseas laboratories, the military health system, and 123
other U.S. and foreign agencies. In June 1996, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision
Directive NSTC-7, which established a national policy to address the threat of emerging
infectious diseases through improved domestic and international surveillance, prevention, and 124
response measures. The directive expanded DOD’s mission to include support of global
surveillance, training, research, and response to emerging infectious disease threats. The DOD
Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System (DOD-GEIS), which was
developed in response to that directive, facilitates early recognition and control of diseases that 125
threaten national security. DOD-GEIS is designed to strengthen the prevention of, surveillance

122 Prepared by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther, Specialist in Global Health, and Kellie Moss, Analyst in Global Health. This
appendix was updated on December 9, 2008.
123 U.S. Department of Defense, Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System, Annual Report: Fiscal
Year 2007, p. 2. This document can be accessed through
GEIS07AR.pdf; last accessed July 22, 2008.
124 Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-7, at; last accessed July 22, 2008.
NSTC indicates that this presidential directive deals with a national science and technology matter.
125 For more information on GEIS, see and U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S.
Agencies Support Programs to Build Overseas Capacity for Infectious Disease Surveillance, GAO/07-1186, September
2007, at; last accessed July 22, 2008.

of, and response to infectious diseases that are a threat to military personnel and families, reduce
medical readiness, or present a risk to U.S. national security.
The key objectives of DOD-GEIS are to increase DOD’s emphasis on the prevention of infectious
diseases, strengthen and coordinate DOD’s surveillance and response efforts, and create a
centralized coordination and communication hub to help organize DOD resources and link them
with U.S. and international efforts. For example, DOD-GEIS partners with Navy and Army
laboratories, and with the World Health Organization’s Global Outbreak Alert and Response
Network (GOARN) (described in the “International Response” section), to collect avian influenza
isolates from people around the world and share them with the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention and world public health officials for molecular analysis and formulation of influenza 126
DOD-GEIS’s budget has grown substantially over the past decade, from $2.3 million in FY1997
to $52 million in FY2007, including $40 million for pandemic and avian influenza 127
surveillance. In January 2006, Congress directed DOD-GEIS to administer $39 million in 128
FY2006 supplemental funding for avian and pandemic influenza surveillance. Congress 129
provided an additional $40 million for DOD-GEIS avian influenza activities in FY2007.
Throughout 2007, DOD-GEIS claimed significant advances in disease surveillance, including
• better understanding of naturally occurring biological threats (e.g., avian and
pandemic influenza) and to improved vaccination efforts;
• standardization and improvement of malaria diagnostic resources and
strengthening of international efforts to address antimalarial resistance;
• addressing the reemergence of malaria on the Korean peninsula;
• utilizing disease morbidity and mortality surveillance data to monitor possible
infectious disease deaths in US military forces; and
• strengthening surveillance systems in resource-constrained or developing
As an implementing partner of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, DOD plays a
role in fighting the global spread of HIV/AIDS. DOD HIV prevention programs develop and
implement military-specific HIV prevention activities. DOD efforts
• help foreign militaries establish HIV/AIDS-specific policies for their personnel;
• assist foreign militaries in adapting and providing HIV prevention programs;

126 DOD-GEIS FY2005 Annual Report,; last
accessed July 22, 2008.
127 Annual Report: Fiscal Year 2007, op. cit., p. 6.
128 Ibid., p. 2.
129 Ibid., p. 6.

• train foreign military personnel to implement, maintain, and evaluate HIV
prevention programs;
• assist foreign countries in developing military-specific interventions that address
high-risk HIV attitudes and behaviors; and
• integrate with and make use of foreign military contacts, other U.S. government
programs, and those managed by allies and the United Nations.
From FY2000 through FY2009, DOD funds total some $73.9 million for HIV/AIDS prevention
programs. The Department of State transfers additional funds to DOD through the Global 130
HIV/AIDS Initiative.
Table B-1. DOD Funding for Global HIV/AIDS Prevention Programs, by Fiscal Year,
(current U.S. $ millions)
FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
10.0 9.9 14.0 7.0 4.3 7.5 5.2 0 8.0 8.0
Source: DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program, FY2000 Funding Data,
background/Pages/BackgroundInfo.aspx, and FY2001 through FY2009 data compiled by CRS from annual
appropriations acts.
Table B-2. PEPFAR Funding Transfers to DOD Global HIV/AIDS Prevention
Programs, FY2004 through FY2008
(current U.S. $ millions)
FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 Total
14.0 33.0 49.0 70.0 92.0 258.0
Source: Prepared by CRS from correspondence with Karin Fenn, Program Support Officer, OGAC, January 23,
2008, and from conversation with Eric Myser, Budget Officer, OGAC, December 9, 2008.
DOD activities in global health are the subject of increasing public discussion and research. Some 131
argue that DOD’s role in global health is ambiguous. Others express concern about the possible 132
“securitization,”of health (i.e., the use of U.S. government resources for health by DOD rather
than through more standard civilian channels, such as USAID or non-governmental
organizations). The lack of public information about the organization and operation of some DOD
global health programs may raise questions about the scope and funding of such programs. It may
also raise questions about their coordination and integration with not only other similar programs

130 For more information on U.S. Department of State transfers to DOD, see CRS Report RL33771, Trends in U.S.
Global AIDS Spending: FY2000-FY2008, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther.
131 Dr. Steven Morrison, Director of CSIS Global Health Policy Center, quoted in S. Ward Casscells, DOD Military
Health System Blog, “Promoting Peace by Promoting Health,” December 8, 2008,
132 Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne, quoted in Ibid.

in civilian agencies, but also with other DOD activities, such as stability operations and capacity-
building of foreign militaries.

The Department of State, USAID, and DOD participate in the DOD Humanitarian Mine Action
(HMA) Program, through which the United States trains personnel of other nations to deactivate 134
land mines and other explosive remnants of war. The authority for this program is 10 U.S.C.


HMA falls under two offices administratively. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict is responsible for policy, planning, and oversight. The
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which is subordinate to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, is responsible for administrative program management. Program funding is
from DOD’s Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation. When
DOD is designated to conduct the training, the assistance is provided by U.S. Special Operations
Forces and supervised by the regional military Combatant Commander. This DOD program
complements the efforts of the Department of State’s Office of Weapons Removal and 135
Abatement, which provides financial, technical, and educational assistance to a wide range of
foreign governmental and non-governmental organizations, and administers federal grants to
selected humanitarian land mine-related projects.
Generally, a nation will request demining assistance through the U.S. embassy to the State
Department. An interagency U.S. Government Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) Sub-group
on Humanitarian Mine Action then conducts an in-country evaluation and either approves or
disapproves the nation’s request to join the HMA program. The Humanitarian Mine Action Sub-
group comprises representatives from the National Security Council, Department of State,
USAID, Defense Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency. If approved, the PCC Sub-
group designs a demining/land mine education program to meet the requesting nation’s needs.
The National Security Council established the U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program in 1993. In
1995, DOD established its Humanitarian Mine Action Program, and in 1998, the Department of
State followed, creating the Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs. In October 2003,
Congress established the interagency humanitarian demining program, consolidating previously
initiated U.S. demining programs. These administration and congressional actions were
responding to several years of increasing international attention to the toll on civilian populations
from land mines deployed during military operations and never deactivated or retrieved. To
facilitate DOD participation in this program, Congress directed that the Secretary of Defense

133 Prepared by Steve Bowman, Specialist in National Defense. This appendix remains the same as in the original
edition of this report; information is current as of August 25, 2008.
134 For a description of the program, see; last accessed July 22, 2008.
135 See; last accessed July 22, 2008.

[c]arry out a program for humanitarian purposes to provide assistance to other nations in the
detection and clearance of landmines. Such assistance shall be provided through instruction,
education, training, and advising of personnel of those nations in the various procedures that 136
have been determined effective for detecting and clearing landmines.
In directing this effort, Congress specified that any funds authorized for the program were to be
used for (1) activities to support the clearing of land mines for humanitarian purposes, including
education and technical assistance; (2) providing equipment and technology by transfer or lease
to a foreign government participating in a land mine-clearing program; and (3) contributions to
non-governmental organizations experienced in land mine clearance. To ensure that DOD’s
humanitarian participation was restricted to training and technical assistance, Congress further
directed that the Secretary of Defense ensure that no member of the U.S. armed forces
participating in this program
engages in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of landmines unless for the
concurrent purpose of supporting a United States military operation ... or a military operation
that does not involve the Armed Forces of the United States.
HMA funds the training of host nation personnel to deactivate mines and also provides a limited
amount of “seed” equipment to enable a nation to develop and maintain its own demining/mine 137
education efforts. These HMA activities are seen to benefit DOD objectives by contributing to
combatant commanders’ regional cooperation strategies and providing U.S. military personnel 138
unique in-country training opportunities.
Through HMA funding, DOD also supports the Humanitarian Demining Training Center at Ft. 139
Leonard Wood, MO, and the Mine Action Information Center at James Madison University, 140
Harrisonburg, VA. These facilities provide training and analysis relating to humanitarian
demining for both the military and civilian communities. HMA funding also supports the 141
Humanitarian Demining Research and Development Program, which is managed by the Army
Research, Development, and Engineering Command.
Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 401, no later than March 1 each calendar year, the DSCA provides a report
of activities during the previous fiscal year, including those of the Humanitarian Mine Action
program, to the House Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Affairs and the Senate
Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations.

136 FY1995 NDAA, P.L. 103-337, Section 1413. This section amended 10 U.S.C. 401, which covers humanitarian civic
assistance, to include the demining program. In 2006, Congress deleted the demining provisions from section 401 and
created a specific section, 407, for the program (FY2007 John Warner NDAA, P.L. 109-364, Section 1203 ).
137 DOD demining equipment transfers have been limited to no more $10 million annually worldwide.
138 Fact Sheet, “Humanitarian Mine Action Program, Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
139 See; last accessed July 22, 2008.
140 See; last accessed. July 22, 2008.
141 See; last accessed July 22, 2008.

As the figures below indicate, HMA funding is relatively low compared with other assistance
programs and has decreased significantly since FY2000, although the number of countries 142
receiving HMA assistance is substantial. Since 2000, HMA has assisted some 30 countries.
Table C-1. DOD Humanitarian Mine Action Funds Expended,
by Fiscal Year, FY2000-FY2007
(current U.S. $ millions)
FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 Total
22.5 10.8 8.4 6.2 2.7 4.2 4.2 4.2 63.1
Source: Annual 10 U.S.C. 401 reports.
Table C-2. Countries Assisted with DOD HMA Funding, by Fiscal Year,
FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07
19a 15a 13 11 11 8 11 12
Source: Annual 10 U.S.C. 401 reports.
a. Central America is listed as one country.
DOD’s HMA program has not been a source of controversy.

142 The countries receiving HMA assistance from FY2000 through FY2007 were Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan,
Lebanon, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Oman, Peru, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Thailand, Tunisia, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe. Assistance was also provided to Central American countries; however, DOD does not enumerate them
individually in its annual report. In FY2007, five new countries received HMA assistance: Angola, Benin, Colombia,
Laos, and Senegal.

The U.S. Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS) is the principal vehicle through which the U.S.
government makes sales of weapons and associated equipment and training to friendly foreign 144
nations. Most of these sales are made on a cash basis—that is, the purchasing country enters
into a contract specifying the price to be paid for specific items of military equipment being
obtained. The U.S. government then procures the defense items from the U.S. manufacturer (if
not provided from Defense Department stocks), receives the payment from the foreign buyer, and
passes it to the manufacturer in accordance with the terms and deadlines specified in the contract.
The U.S. government monitors the procurement process from the signing of the contract until the
items purchased are all delivered. Purchases through the FMS program can be provided to
individual purchasers with funds requested and appropriated in the annual Foreign Operations
Appropriations legislation. This element of the FMS program is termed Foreign Military 145
Financing (FMF); it permits loans or forgiven payments to countries that may have difficulty
paying for needed weapons, military equipment, and related items.
The annual budget justification for Foreign Operations is formulated primarily by the State
Department, with input on specific country accounts or prospective arms sales provided by DOD.
From its inception, DOD has handled the implementation of the FMS cash and credit and an
earlier grant Military Assistance Program (MAP), used essentially before 1976.
Determining which nations are to receive military assistance from either program, as a matter of
national policy, has been primarily the responsibility of the State Department. The Arms Export
Control Act (AECA) specifies which conditions must be met before a country can purchase
defense articles from the United States. In essence, a country must be eligible to purchase under
existing U.S. law (i.e., if a statute forbids sales to a specific country, that country is ineligible to 146
make a purchase). The President also determines a country’s eligibility, taking into
consideration U.S. security interests. If a country is eligible, in the contract for sale of the items
that it may purchase, the country must give binding commitments to use the articles purchased
only for such things as legitimate self-defense and internal security, and not to retransfer items
sold to it to third-parties without prior U.S. government consent.
The responsibility for implementing FMS programs rests with the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency (DSCA). The DSCA Security Assistance Officers (SAOs) who manage the programs on
the ground are located in U.S. embassies.

143 Prepared by Richard F. Grimmett, Specialist in International Security. This appendix remains the same as in the
original edition of this report; information is current as of August 25, 2008.
144 Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended (PL. 90-629),
145 AECA, as amended (Section 23), 22 U.S.C. 2763.
146 AECA, as amended (Section 3), 22 U.S.C. 2753.

FMS had its origins in the beginning of the Cold War, primarily as an effort to help war-torn
allied countries in Europe build up their military defenses and thus support the new North
Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) ability to help contain Soviet Communist expansion in
that region. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (P.L. 81-329) authorized the FMS
program, and a grant Military Assistance Program (MAP), as means to provide needed military
equipment and training to U.S. allies in need of such military support and aid. Much of the
equipment transferred under this original authority was excess stocks of World War II vintage
equipment, which was less expensive but still valuable for helping restore the military capabilities
of key U.S. allies. The core rationales for military assistance at the inception of the Cold War can
be summarized as follows:
• To enhance the ability of allied and friendly countries to defend themselves
against external aggression or internal subversion by Communist or unfriendly
• To enhance bilateral security relationships to deter aggression against allied and
friendly nations.
• To express tangible U.S. support for political actions of allied and friendly
nations that the United States sought to encourage.
The first rationale was essentially a military one. The other two were both political and military in
nature. Over time, the focus and nature of military assistance was modified somewhat. As their
economies grew, industrialized nations allied to the United States gradually stopped receiving
grant military aid and began to pay cash for major weapons systems purchased from the United
States under the FMS program, and by the 1970s, the grant MAP program was phased out.
Nevertheless, using the FMS cash program, as well the FMF financing program, to support the
security interests of American friends and allies overseas has remained a constant theme in
justifying this form of military aid. The nature of the threat to U.S. allies and friendly states
around the globe may have changed, but the goal of using arms sales as an instrument to further
U.S. interests through enhancing the military capabilities and security such countries has not.
Initially, only the more industrialized allies of the United States participated in the FMS program,
while the grant MAP program provided military aid to a much larger number of less developed
and less affluent countries friendly to the United States throughout the world. The original nations
eligible for military assistance under the 1949 NDAA were NATO members, Turkey, Greece,
South Korea, Iran, the Philippines, and Taiwan. Today most of these same nations, excluding Iran,
which is ineligible for the program, generally pay cash for military purchases under the FMS
program. The principal goals of FMS remain the same, except the number of nations making
purchases has increased, with Middle Eastern nations, in particular major oil-producing states,
becoming significant buyers from the late 1970s to the present. As noted above, states such as
Israel and Egypt, which reached a U.S.-backed peace agreement in 1979, have been and continue 147
to be leading recipients of FMS sales and FMF credits.

147 In 1954, pursuant to the Mutual Security Act (P.L. 83-665), the United States established the authority for the
Foreign Military Sales program to provide loans and credits to facilitate the purchase of U.S. military equipment by
allied and friendly nations. Previous to that time sales were made on a cash basis only. In 1961, with the enactment of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), a consolidation of all previous military and economic foreign aid
programs and authorities was achieved, and the original MAP program was placed under this acts aegis. Subsequently

The primary countries to receive the greatest share of FMF since the late 1970s have been Israel
and Egypt. Most recently, in FY2006, for example, Israel received slightly over $2.257 billion in
FMF financing, for which repayment was waived. During FY2006, Egypt received $1,287 billion
in waived FMF financing. The entire FMF appropriation for FY2006 was about $4.45 billion for
all recipients.
There have not been any significant controversies over the management of the FMS cash or FMF
financing programs between the Defense and State Departments over the years. There is a clear
delineation of responsibilities and authorities, and the implementation of the programs has
generally worked smoothly. Both departments would generally agree that they would wish more
funding to be available to provide defense articles to countries deemed needy but that may have
limited financial resources with which to purchase U.S. weaponry.
Within the past two years, DOD has argued that traditional State Department security cooperation
programs, such as FMS/FMF, lack the flexibility necessary to respond to rapidly changing
environments. In a FY2009 budget document, DOD stated that traditional security assistance
“takes three to four years from concept to execution,” indicating that was too long to meet 148
emerging threats and to take advantage of emerging opportunities. The long lead time led DOD
to request its own train and equip authority. (See Appendix I.)

in 1968, the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-629), created a separate legislative authority for the Foreign
Military Sales program. In 1976, the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-
329) consolidated all authorities relating to U.S. Foreign Military Sales were consolidated in the Arms Export Control
Act, created the authority for a new grant International Military and Education Program as a distinct military assistance
program and placed it within the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and began a phase-out of the original
MAP program.
148 U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request: Summary Justification, February 4, 2008, p. 102.

The International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) falls under the policy
authority of the State Department, is funded through the annual Foreign Operations
Appropriations legislation, and is implemented by DOD through the Defense Security 150
Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Authorized by 22 U.S.C. 2347, IMET provides opportunities for
foreign military personnel to attend a variety of U.S. military educational institutions and training
courses. The policy decisions regarding which foreign nations will be permitted to participate in
IMET programs, and the funding levels provided to them, are made primarily by the State
Department, with input from DOD.
IMET was an outgrowth of the original Military Assistance Program (MAP) created by the 151
Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (P.L. 81-329). In 1976, the enactment of the
International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329) created the
grant IMET as a program separate from the original MAP program, which was being phased out,
to provide exclusively for various forms of military training to friendly foreign nations. The 1976
Act also placed IMET’s statutory authority in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.
In 1990, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees initiated a statutory change based on
their view that changing world political-military circumstances warranted a new direction for the
traditional IMET program, one that would bring an increased emphasis on enhancing the skills
and professionalism of both civilian and military leaders and managers of foreign military
establishments. The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY1991 (P.L. 101-513, signed
November 5, 1990) directed the Defense Department to establish a program within IMET
focused, in particular, on training foreign civilian and military officials in managing and
administering military establishments and budgets; creating and maintaining effective military
judicial systems and military codes of conduct, including observance of internationally
recognized human rights; and fostering greater respect for the principle of civilian control of the
military. Congress earmarked $1 million of the FY1991 IMET appropriation to establish this
program. This initiative is called Expanded IMET, or E-IMET, and each year the Defense
Department has broadened the program. Although Congress did not earmark IMET funds to
support this program after FY1991, it has in report language noted an expectation that the
financial investment in E-IMET be increased. Congress further broadened the program to include

149 Prepared by Richard F. Grimmett, Specialist in International Security. This appendix remains the same as in the
original edition of this report; information is current as of August 25, 2008.
150 Section 541 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (P.L. 87-195).
151 The original MAP program was used to provide, on a grant basis, military equipment and military training to allied
and friendly nations to assist them in restoring their military capabilities in the post World War II period. The grant
MAP program was gradually phased out as more friendly nations were capable of purchasing military equipment and
training (as part of weapons purchases or as an independent item), and as their economies damaged by World War II
were restored to health.

participation by members of national legislatures who are responsible for oversight and
management of the military, and “individuals who are not members of a government.” Because E-
IMET is a sub-element of the overall IMET program, it is funded as part of the annual IMET
appropriation, contained in the Foreign Operations Appropriations legislation.
The IMET program funds a variety of training programs conducted by the Defense Department at
a variety of venues. The Service War Colleges and the National Defense University’s (NDU’s)
National War College programs are attended by U.S. and foreign senior military and civilian
equivalents. These programs focus on service/national security policy and the politico-military
aspects of Service/Defense policies and programs. The Services and the Joint Staff (for the NDU)
annually provide invitations to the governments of foreign friends and allies for foreign student
participation. The senior service schools remain a significant element of IMET-sponsored
training. The specific schools and their locations are as follows: National Defense University, Fort
McNair, Washington, D.C.; Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA; Navy War College,
Newport, RI; and Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.
The U.S. military services offer numerous programs and courses categorized as professional
military education (PME). Foreign students are assigned to programs based on their military rank
and specific responsibilities in their country’s military. Programs are conducted at Service
Command and Staff Colleges, including basic and advanced officer training in specialized areas
such as finance, ordnance, artillery, and medicine. For more senior officers, some training may
occur at U.S. senior service schools. A representative listing of the schools involved include the
Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS; Army Logistics Management College,
Fort Lee, VA; U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA; and Air Force Institute of
Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH. PME programs and the senior service school
programs combined account for approximately half of the annual IMET appropriation.
The majority of IMET-sponsored training is conducted in the United States at DOD and U.S.
military service schools, with U.S. military personnel. Therefore, English language proficiency is
required. To help foreign students improve their English language skills, DOD has assigned the
English language training mission to the Defense Language Institute English Language Center
(DLIELC), located at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. DLIELC provides resident English
language training in state-of-the art facilities. In addition, DLIELC conducts English language
training surveys to evaluate foreign government programs and will assign instructors as a
“detachment” to the host country to personally assist in the establishment and maintenance of
their English language training program. In FY2006, over 110 separate countries were
participating in some grant IMET training program. During FY2006, the appropriation for grant 152
IMET was over $81 million.
The E-IMET initiative is accomplished through educational programs in the United States offered
by DOD and U.S. military service schools, by Mobile Education Teams visiting host countries,
and by funding military participation in overseas conferences. Although IMET funding can be
used for such an initiative (overseas seminars) under the auspices of the E-IMET program when
such activities are deemed appropriate, the emphasis and preference is for a longer training

152 IMET funding data for FY2006 and previous years, by individual country, can be found at the DSCA website at; last accessed July 22, 2008.

experience in the United States that maximizes the students’ exposure to the American way of
Beginning in FY1991, DOD launched E-IMET by refining some existing programs and initiating
new courses through the military departments. Further, new educational programs were
established to address the topics of military justice, human rights, and civil-military relations. The
bulk of this effort is accomplished through three schools: Defense Resource Management
Institute, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, CA; Center for Civil-Military Relations, 153
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA; and the Naval Justice School, Newport, RI.
There have not been any significant controversies over the division of management tasks of the
IMET programs between the Defense and State Departments over the years. There is a clear
delineation of responsibilities and authorities, and the implementation of the programs has
generally worked smoothly. Both departments generally agree that they wish additional funding
could be available to facilitate providing training to nations allied or friendly to the United States
as a means of broadening military to military contacts between them and the United States.
As with the Foreign Military Sales/Foreign Military Financing program, DOD has argued
recently that IMET lacks the flexibility necessary to respond to rapidly changing environments.
The DOD global train and equip authority that Congress provided in Section 1206 of the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163), and extended through 154
FY2008, was intended to provide a quicker response in such circumstances. (See Appendix I.)

153 A detailed series of links to the wide variety of entities that carry out IMET training, and to frequently asked
questions about each of them, can be accessed through the DSCA website under the heading International Training
Management at; last accessed July 22, 2008.
154 The FY2007 John Warner NDAA, P.L. 109-364, Section 1210, amends Section 1206 to extend the authorization
period, among other purposes.

DOD has multiple roles and responsibilities in the area of counternarcotics (CN). It is the single
lead federal agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime movement of illegal
drugs toward the United States and plays a key role in collecting, analyzing, and sharing
intelligence on illegal drugs with U.S. law enforcement and international security counterparts. In
addition, Congress authorizes DOD to offer CN assistance to train and equip foreign countries in
their efforts to build institutional capacity and control ungoverned spaces used by drug traffickers.
Although DOD is a provider of international CN assistance, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
vests responsibility for coordinating all U.S. counter-drug assistance with the Secretary of State
(Section 481, P.L. 87-195, as amended; [22 U.S.C. 2291]). U.S. officials describe interagency
coordination between DOD and the State Department on CN assistance as highly varied, ranging
from ad hoc coordination based on personal networks across agencies to weekly planning
meetings formally chaired by the National Security Council. Differences in interagency
coordination are often attributable to differences in priority of certain countries and issues.
U.S. concern about the national security implications of narcotics trafficking first emerged in the
late 1960s. In a 1971 press conference, President Richard Nixon famously coined the term “war
on drugs” and identified illicit drugs as “public enemy number one.” As a result of frustration at
the perceived failure of federal anti-narcotics measures to date, many policy makers, including
some Members of Congress, began to call for the inclusion of the U.S. military in anti-drug 156
efforts in the 1970s. Pressure for U.S. military involvement increased throughout the 1980s, as
U.S. officials grew concerned that law enforcement personnel were unprepared and ill-equipped
to effectively combat well-armed drug cartels and operate in conflict situations in drug source
Such calls and pressure for DOD involvement in CN activities raised particular concern among
several top DOD officials in the 1980s, including former Secretaries of Defense Caspar
Weinberger and Frank Carlucci, who strongly objected to the U.S. military’s continued and 157
increasing involvement in drug-related activities. Both officials, whose objections reflected an
attitude pervasive throughout DOD, perceived anti-drug efforts as law enforcement concerns that
would be detrimental to the U.S. military’s primary mission. In 1985, Weinberger reportedly
wrote that “reliance on military forces to accomplish civilian tasks is detrimental to military 158
readiness and democratic processes.” In 1988, Carlucci reportedly stated that staffing the front

155 Prepared by Liana Sun Wyler, Analyst in International Crime and Narcotics. This appendix remains the same as in
the original edition of this report; information is current as of August 25, 2008.
156 Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), The U.S. Military and the War on Drugs in the Andes (Washington,
D.C.: 1991). Representative Jack Davis and other Members of Congress reportedly drew on the termwar on drugs to
demand a greater role for the military, stating,When you have a war, who do you call in to fight the war? You call the
military in.”
157 Coletta Youngers, “The War in the Andes: The Military Role in the U.S. International Drug Policy, WOLA Briefing
Series: Issues in International Drug Policy, Issue Brief #2, December 14, 1990.
158 Quoted inThe Pentagon’s War on Drugs: The Ultimate Bad Trip,” The Defense Monitor, Vol. 21, No. 1, March

line of the country’s drug war “is not the function of the military.”159 Nevertheless, DOD
increasingly participated in interdiction operations in the early 1980s and sporadically engaged in
training, equipping, and transporting foreign anti-narcotics personnel in the mid-to late 1980s.
In the 1980s, subsequent administrations and Congress greatly expanded DOD’s authorities and
role in CN assistance. (See Table F-1.) Under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. Bush,
DOD emerged as a prominent actor in U.S. CN assistance to Latin America. President Reagan
issued National Security Directive 221 (NSD-221), which declared narcotics trafficking a U.S.
national security concern, and directed U.S. military forces to “support counter-narcotics efforts
more actively.” President Bush issued National Security Directive 18 (NSD-18), which explicitly
directed the Secretary of Defense to redefine the Pentagon’s mission to include CN as one of its 160
main priorities. Congress provided DOD with its first major authority in 1989, identifying
DOD as the lead federal agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of
illegal drugs (Sec. 1202, P.L. 101-189; 10 U.S.C. 124).
As U.S. CN engagement in the Andean region continued through the 1990s, Congress extended
DOD’s authorities to include a broad range of train and equip assistance. Under the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 1991 (Sec. 1004, P.L. 101-510), Congress
authorized DOD to provide CN-related training and transport of law enforcement personnel to
foreign law enforcement agencies; notably, Section 1004 authorities are not limited to specific
countries and do not establish spending restrictions for these new authorities. Congress also
authorized DOD to equip foreign CN personnel under the NDAA for FY1998 (Sec. 1033, P.L. 161
105-85). Section 1033 currently enables DOD to assist 18 countries’ CN efforts by providing
non-lethal protective and utility personnel equipment, including navigation equipment, secure and
non-secure communications equipment, radar equipment, night vision systems, vehicles, aircraft,
and boats.
Table F-1. Timeline of Major Congressional Authorities and Executive Directives
Related to CN
Year Authorities Description
1986 NSD-221 President Ronald Reagan directs U.S. military forces to “support counter-
narcotics efforts more actively.”
August NSD-18 President George H. Bush directs the Secretary of Defense to expand
1989 DOD’s support of U.S. CN efforts and to permit DOD personnel to conduct
training for host government personnel and operational support activities.
November Sec. 1202, P.L. 101-Congress authorizes DOD to serve as the lead agency of the federal
1989 189; 10 U.S.C. 124 government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit
of illegal drugs.

1992, and The War in the Andes, op cit.
159 Quoted in Lee Feinstein, “Fighting the Next War,Mother Jones, July/August 1990.
160Defense Chief Imposes a Deadline In Pentagon’s War on Drug Flow,” New York Times, September 19, 1989.
161 These countries include Colombia, Afghanistan, Bolivia, Ecuador, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Guatemala, Belize, and Panama.

Year Authorities Description
1990 Sec. 1004, P.L. 101-Congress authorizes DOD to provide certain types of CN activities, including
510; 10 U.S.C. 374 foreign assistance training.
1996 Sec. 1031, P.L. 104-Congress authorizes DOD to provide specified kinds of CN equipment to
201 Mexico.
1997 Sec. 1033, P.L. 105-85 Congress authorizes DOD to provide specified kinds of CN equipment to
Peru and Colombia.
2001 Sec. 1021, P.L. 107-Congress amends Section 1004 of P.L. 101-510 (cited above) to authorize
107 DOD to provide linguistic intelligence analysis services in support of CN
2002 Sec. 305, P.L. 107-206 Congress authorizes DOD to use CN funds designated for Colombia to be
available for a unified campaign against both narcotics trafficking and
2003 Sec. 1021, P.L. 108-Congress amends Section 1033 of P.L. 105-85 to authorize DOD to provide
136 additional CN-related train and equip foreign assistance to Afghanistan,
Bolivia, Ecuador, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
2003 Sec. 1022, P.L. 108-Congress authorizes DOD to provide counterterrorism support to law
136 enforcement personnel that are also conducting CN activities.
5 U.S.C. 371 note
2006 Sec. 1022, P.L. 109-Congress amends Section 1033 of P.L. 105-85 to authorize DOD to provide
364 additional CN-related train and equip foreign assistance to Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Guatemala, Belize, and Panama.
2008 Sec. 1022, P.L. 110-Congress amends Section 1033 of P.L. 105-85 to authorize DOD to provide
181 additional CN-related train and equip foreign assistance to Mexico and the
Dominican Republic.
Congress has also supported efforts to restrict DOD’s role in CN assistance. Reacting to reports in
the 1990s of U.S. CN funds supporting countries with a history of human rights problems,
Senator Patrick Leahy sponsored a provision in the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and 162
Related Appropriations Act, 1997, to prohibit the State Department from providing
international narcotics control assistance to countries for which the Secretary of State had
credible evidence of committing gross human rights violations. In 1998, Congress approved the
Leahy provision to apply to DOD, and both provisions have been attached to all subsequent DOD
appropriations vehicles. The State Department and DOD provisions, however, differ notably in
the scope of CN assistance covered; whereas the State Department restriction covers training and
assistance programs, the DOD restriction covers only training programs. This distinction may 163
allow DOD to provide CN assistance to countries that the State Department may not.

162 The FY1997 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 104-208, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Appropriations Act, 1997, Title II.
163 Center for International Policy,Limitation on Assistance to Security Forces (TheLeahy Law’),” September 2,
2003, available at; last accessed July 22, 2008.

Table F-2. DOD CN Funding by U.S. Combatant Command,
FY2005 and FY2006
(current U.S. $ millions)
FY2005 1.9 256.2 3.8 2.2 1.8 39.2 305.1
FY2006 2.5 165.3 1.2 3.5 3.7 15.7 191.9
Source: Adapted from Department of Defense, Foreign Counterdrug Activity Report, FY2005 and FY2006, and
Counternarcotics Afghanistan/Central Asia Program Report.
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
Table F-3. Top 10 DOD CN Assistance Recipients,
FY2005 and FY2006
DOD FY2005 Assistance DOD FY2006 Assistance
Country (current U.S. $ millions) Country (current U.S. $ millions)
Afghanistan 224.5 Afghanistan 108.1
Netherlands Antilles 16.4 Pakistan 28.7
Ecuador 14.7 Tajikistan 10.7
Tajikistan 9.6 Colombia 10.4
Pakistan 7.7 Kyrgyzstan 8.8
Colombia 5.5 Kazakhstan 6.0
Kyrgyzstan 5.3 Bahamas 3.5
Turkmenistan 4.9 Oman 3.1
Oman 4.2 Ecuador 2.7
United Kingdom 3.3 Kenya 2.3
Source: Adapted from Department of Defense, Foreign Counterdrug Activity Report, FY2005 and FY2006, and
Counternarcotics Afghanistan/Central Asia Program Report.

DOD continues to provide CN assistance to Colombia and the Andean region, primarily under
Section 1004 and Section 1033 authorities. Over the years, DOD CN goals in Colombia have
evolved to include combating paramilitary and terrorist groups in conjunction with drug
trafficking organizations. U.S. military assistance to Colombia and the Andean region, however,
has raised several concerns relating to the effectiveness of CN foreign assistance in reducing drug
availability in the United States; the potential unintended consequences of strengthening Latin

164 For background on Plan Colombia and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, see CRS Report RL32774, Plan
Colombia: A Progress Report and CRS Report RL33370, Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding
Programs: FY2007 Assistance, both by Connie Veillette.

American military capabilities; and the shift, over the years, from a primary focus on halting the
flow of drugs to a new focus on counterterrorism.

DOD CN support, in the form of training, equipment, intelligence sharing, and transportation, is
part of a broader U.S. strategy to combat drugs and terrorism in Afghanistan. The NDAA for
FY2004 (Sec. 1021, P.L. 108-136) added Afghanistan to the list of countries eligible for transfers
of non-lethal DOD CN equipment under Section 1033 authorizations. The NDAA for FY2007
further extended DOD CN assistance authorizations to include the provision of individual and
crew-served weapons of .50 caliber or less and ammunition for these weapons for Afghanistan’s
CN security forces (Sec. 1022, P.L. 109-364). According to DOD officials, Afghanistan has
benefitted from CN assistance made available by Section 1022, which allows DOD to provide
counterterrorism support in conjunction with CN activity.
DOD’s role in CN in Afghanistan has generated a variety of critics, ranging from those who seek
to broaden DOD’s CN responsibility to those who view DOD’s CN activities as a diversion from
the U.S. military’s stability and counterterrorism operations in the country. According to the
Senate Report for the NDAA for FY2006 (S.Rept. 109-69), DOD requested authorization from
Congress “to provide assistance in all aspects of counterdrug activities in Afghanistan, including
detection, interdiction, and related criminal justice activities.” Legislation enacted, however, has
yet to authorize DOD to provide CN assistance beyond the scope authorized in Sections 1004
(1990), 1033 (1997), and 1022 (2003). Further emphasizing congressional resistance to
expanding DOD CN authorities, the House Report for the John Warner NDAA for FY2007
(H.Rept. 109-542) states that DOD “must not take on roles in which other countries or other
agencies of the U.S. government have core responsibility.”
On October 22, 2007, President George W. Bush and President Felipe Calderon of Mexico jointly
announced plans to begin the Mérida Initiative—a multi-year, $1.4 billion bilateral commitment
to reduce drug trafficking and other criminal activities in Mexico, as well as to contribute toward
strengthening the institutional capacity of Mexican security forces. In June 2008, Congress
appropriated $400 million of $465 million in FY2008 and FY2009 Merida Initiative funds for 166
Mexico (Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, P.L. 110-252, Section 1406(a)). This funding
is in addition to current levels of foreign assistance to Mexico. According to a 2007 U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, DOD spent a total of $58 million for equipment 167
and training for CN support to the Mexican military from 2000 to 2006. It remains unclear to
what extent the new Mérida Initiative will affect current levels of DOD CN assistance to Mexico.

165 For a detailed discussion of U.S. CN policy in Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and
U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
166 Of the $400 million, Congress specified that Mexico could receive up to $352 million in FY2008 supplemental
funds and up to $48 million in FY2009 bridge fund assistance. In its FY2009 budget request, the Administration asked
for $450 million in FY2009rida Initiative funds for Mexico; Congressional action on the FY2009 budget request is
in progress. For more information on therida Initiative, see CRS Report RS22837, Merida Initiative: U.S. Anticrime
and Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and Central America, by Colleen W. Cook and Clare Ribando Seelke.
167 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Drug Control: U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics
Efforts, but Tons of Illicit Drugs Continue to Flow into the United States, GAO-07-1018, August 2007.

Independent of the Administration’s supplemental funding request for the Mérida Initiative,
Section 1022 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181)
extends Section 1033(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 to make
available train and equip authorities to Mexico (and the Dominican Republic).
As authorities expand, analysts continue to critique DOD’s role in CN assistance. Proponents of
DOD’s expanded role generally argue that narcotics trafficking poses a national security threat to
the United States and that the military is especially equipped with the resources and skills to help
foreign governments counter powerful drug trafficking organizations. Many analysts also
acknowledge that although DOD and civilian agencies have seemingly overlapping and
redundant authorities, the absence of DOD’s participation in CN assistance would be detrimental
to the effectiveness of U.S. programs. Opponents, by contrast, insist that CN foreign assistance is
not a military mission and that the training of military elements in foreign countries may have
serious political and diplomatic repercussions abroad.
Critics of DOD’s role in CN assistance also fear that the balance between military and civilian
participation in CN may disproportionately favor the military. For example, longstanding
concerns over the perceived reliance on the military to provide CN assistance have resurfaced,
with new plans to remodel by 2018 the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), DOD’s
regional combatant command for Central and South America. SOUTHCOM has long played a
key role in DOD CN assistance planning in the Andes region, and in DOD’s new vision,
SOUTHCOM’s participation in non-traditional military activity, including CN assistance, will
likely expand. DOD planners envision a broader interagency role for SOUTHCOM, akin to the
new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), which includes building foreign governments’ security 168
capacity and improving accountable governance as part of its core mission.
Supporters of the 2018 plan perceive this change as an opportunity to enhance interagency
coordination of international programs among military and civilian agencies, rather than a zero-
sum game. Other analysts, however, are wary that SOUTHCOM’s new strategic direction will
further militarize U.S. foreign policy in the region. In addition, an expanded role for DOD in CN
assistance may antagonize U.S. foreign partners. This has already been the case with the
government of Mexico, which reportedly resisted U.S. efforts to place the country under
SOUTHCOM’s (or any other combatant command structure) area of responsibility (AOR) in
order to make the point that it does not want the U.S. military involved in what it considers to be 169
its internal affairs. Only in 2002 was Mexico incorporated into the newly created
NORTHCOM, which also includes the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, and
surrounding waters. Even today, Mexico’s military CN cooperation under NORTHCOM remains
limited; as noted above, the highly publicized Mérida Initiative does not include a role for direct
DOD support.
In addition to concerns about the balance between military and civilian roles in CN assistance,
some analysts have voiced concern over the difficulty in reconciling DOD and State Department

168 SOUTHCOM, “Command Strategy 2018,” accessible at
0UI0I1177092386.pdf; last accessed July 22, 2008.
169 Testimony of Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, Admiral Thad Allen, before the Senate Appropriations
Subcommittee on Homeland Security on September 7, 2006.

CN policy planning. Some observers claim that DOD’s CN planning processes differ from the
State Department’s and may make cross-agency policy coordination and evaluation of assistance
programs difficult. For example, unlike the State Department, DOD programming strategies are
not developed on a country-by-country basis; instead, planning is based on capabilities, because
most of DOD’s CN programs (e.g., ROTHRs, CBRNs, and aerial and surface platforms) cover
geographic regions that span several countries. This difference in planning strategies is also
reflected in the way CN funds are disbursed. DOD funds are allocated by function rather than by
country. The State Department annually provides Congress with CN assistance program
summaries by country and function; in contrast, no equivalent DOD document is regularly

DOD and the Department of State both devote financial and personnel resources to assisting 171
foreign governments’ anti-terrorism and counterterrorism activities. The foreign
counterterrorism assistance goals of these departments seek to enhance the capability of the host
nation to prevent terrorism. The State Department conducts an Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA)
program, through which it trains, equips, and advises foreign police forces and other security 172
officials. DOD currently plays no role in this program, according to State Department officials.
DOD participates in two counterterrorism programs with the State Department and other
agencies: the State Department-led, interagency Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership
(TSCTP) and the State Department’s Regional Strategic Initiatives (RSI). DOD also provides
counterterrorism assistance through the DOD Building Global Partnerships Train and Equip
Section 1206 authority, which is discussed in a separate appendix. (See Appendix H.) DOD has
its own Counterterrorism Fellowship Program.
DOD also supports the counterterrorism activities of civilian agencies under 10 U.S.C. 374,
which authorizes the Secretary of Defense to provide personnel to operate equipment and provide 173
transportation to federal law enforcement agencies in activities in and with foreign nations.

170 Prepared by John Rollins, Specialist in Terrorism and National Security, and Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in
International Security Affairs. This appendix remains the same as in the original edition of this report; information is
current as of August 25, 2008.
171 The term anti-terrorism refers to defensive measures taken to minimize vulnerability to terrorism, while
counterterrorism refers to offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.
172 The ATA was established in 1983 in response to the bombings of U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. The
State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism provides funding and guidance for the program; the
State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Anti-Terrorism Assistance implements and manages
program operations. The ATAs mission is to assist foreign nations’ anti-terrorism activities by providing training,
equipment, and advice to foreign countries to enhance the anti-terrorism skills and capabilities of foreign law
enforcement and security officials, establish security relationships between U.S. and foreign officials, and share
modern, humane, and effective anti-terrorism techniques. To accomplish these goals, ATA personnel train foreign
civilian security and law enforcement officials in various anti-terrorism tasks. Terrorism experts conducting ATA
training include U.S. federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies; police associations; and private security firms
and consultants. (For more information, seeAnti-Terrorism Assistance Program, Department of State website, last
accessed July 22, 2008, at Annual appropriations for the Anti-
Terrorism Assistance Program from FY2002 through FY2007 total $756 million. By fiscal year, this breaks down as
follows: $157 million in FY2002; $91 million in FY2003; $97 million in FY2004; $135 million in FY2005; $131
million in FY2006; and $145 million in FY2007. These figures include annual appropriations and any applicable funds
received through emergency supplemental funds. Also see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Department of
State: Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs Follow Legal Authority, but Some Activities
Need Reassessment, Washington DC, GAO-04-521, April 30, 2004.
173 Section 374 was added to Title 10 U.S. Code in 1981 and was subsequently amended several times. It also permits
DOD to provide the specified support to civilian law enforcement agencies for counternarcotics purposes and for the
rendition of terrorist suspects to the United States. Beginning with the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2004 (P.L. 108-136,

Prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States devoted relatively few resources to
U.S. counterterrorism foreign training and equipping activities, and most of the assistance was
provided to a country after an incident had occurred. Post-9/11 counterterrorism assistance to
foreign governments has significantly increased and is often provided to countries that have not 174
experienced a catastrophic terrorist incident. Although the U.S. government carries out a wide
variety of counterterrorism activities to support foreign governments, the major State Department
and DOD foreign assistance-type programs focus specifically on various aspects of detecting,
deterring, combating, and solving terrorism-related activities by training and equipping foreign
military and security forces to deal with terrorist threats. Some of these programs include other
components as well. CT programs sometimes include economic and social components,
especially when conducted in ungoverned areas or weak states where terrorists may seek safe
haven or recruit new members.
DOD participates in at least four CT programs. Three are discussed below. The Section 1206
program is covered in a separate appendix because that authority can be used for purposes other
than counterterrorism. (See Appendix H.) The U.S. government also has more broadly focused
programs that include a train and equip counterterrorism component, but these are not covered 175
The Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a State Department-led interagency
initiative to deal with the threat of violent extremism and terrorism in the Sahel and Maghreb
regions. Its main components include development, military, counterterrorism, and public
diplomacy. Many agencies cooperate on the program. These include DOD; the Departments of
State, Justice, Homeland Security, and the Treasury; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and
USAID. The TSCTP’s goals are to build military and law enforcement capacity, foster regional
cooperation, counter radicalization, and enhance public diplomacy. A wide variety of programs
are used to achieve these goals, including development programs to, among other objectives,
improve health and education and promote good governance.
TSCTP is a successor program to the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), a U.S. security assistance
program that the State Department administered from 2002 to early 2004, and funded at about
$7.75 million annually. The PSI’s mission was to train and equip at least one rapid-reaction
company of approximately 100 armed forces in each of the four Saharan nations of Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, and Chad. U.S. Marines and Army Special Forces trained these companies of

Section 1022), Congress has annually renewed an authorization for the DOD joint task forces that support law
enforcement agencies conducting counterdrug activities to also support counterterrorism activities.
174 For the purposes of this appendix, counterterrorism assistance is defined as U.S. training and equipping activities
provided to a foreign government for purposes of addressing international terrorism related issues. This section of the
paper does not address the U.S. counterterrorism training and equipping activities occurring in Iraq or Afghanistan, as
these issues are addressed in a separate section of the report.
175 U.S. programs that are, in part, designed to provide some level of anti-terrorism and counterterrorism training and
equipment include the Iraqi Freedom Fund, the State Department’s Terrorist Interdiction Program, DOD
counternarcotics activities, and other related activities.

approximately 100 each in basic marksmanship, planning, communications, land navigation, and
patrolling, and the United States provided participating countries with equipment such as night 176
vision goggles and specially equipped sports utility vehicles. The PSI was succeeded in 2005
by the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), with substantial DOD support. The
TSCTI and, in 2006, the follow-on TSCTP were expanded to include more Sahel countries and to
provide strategic advice and support for increased U.S. public diplomacy efforts. The program 177
now also includes Algeria, Nigeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Senegal.
The DOD component of the TSCTP is named Operation Enduring Freedom—Trans-Sahara. DOD
continues to provide the basic infantry training offered under the PSI. It has also incorporated
“more advanced counterterroism capabilities such as improving communications systems and 178
developing mechanisms for regional intelligence sharing.” In addition, since the PSI, “the
TSCTP has fielded Military Information Support Teams (MIST) and Civil Military Support
Elements (CMSE)” as part of the public diplomacy effort to “generate support for the United
States and for moderate Islamic viewpoints while reducing sympathy and support for 179
terr orism....”
When TSCTP was established in 2007, plans called for DOD and the State Department to provide
an combined estimated budget of $100 million per year. According to the State Department, these
two agencies now contribute a combined total of approximately $150 million to support TSCTP
activities, with DOD contributing two-thirds and the State Department and USAID contributing 180
the remainder. Plans call for this level to remain constant through FY2011.
The State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) has developed
eight regional interagency strategy groups to assess the threats posed by terrorists and to develop
strategies, plans, and policy recommendations to counter them. These groups are chaired by
ambassadors. Through these groups, networked interagency country teams develop a common
understanding of the strategic situation in a region. They then design complementary programs
and pool resources to eliminate terrorist safe havens and to address conditions fostering terrorist
recruitment. RSI groups exist for the Eastern Mediterranean, the Western Mediterranean, East
Africa, the Trans-Sahara, Southeast Asia, Iraq and neighboring states, South Asia, and the 181
Western Hemisphere. DOD contributes to the RSI panoply of programs through Section 1206

176 Lianne Kennedy Boudali, The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, a paper published in April 2007 by the
Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, NY, p. 15. According to another source, PSI
training was provided through a series of Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) missions under Title 10 U.S.
Code authority. CSIS Task Force Final Report 2007, op. cit., p. 3.
177 The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, op.cit, p. 4.
178 The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, op.cit, p. 5.
179 Ibid.
180 E-mail correspondence with the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 11 and May
19, 2008.
181 The East African Regional Security Initiative (EARSI) is the successor to the State Department’s East African
Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), to which DOD contributed through the DOD Counterterrorism Fellowship

authority and the DOD Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (below), according to the State 182
In January 2002, DOD established the Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program
(CTFP) with $17.9 million appropriated by Congress. The initial program was to fund foreign
military officers’ attendance at U.S. military education institutions and selected regional centers 183
for non-lethal training.
In 2003, an authorization for CTFP was codified (10 U.S.C. 2249c), expanding the program to
civilians and other venues, and setting an annual authorization limit of $20 million. This
authorization permitted DOD to pay costs associated with the attendance of foreign military
officers, foreign ministry of defense officials, and foreign security officials at U.S. military 184
educational institutions, regional centers, conferences, seminars, and other training programs.
There is no stipulation in the Title 10 U.S. Code statute that such education and training be non-
lethal. An amendment to that statute in 2006 raised the authorized limit to $25 million and 185
extended the range of permitted venues to foreign and civilian institutions, centers, and events.
The program has four objectives: educating foreign military and civilian personnel who are
directly involved in the war on terrorism; creating and maintaining a human counterterrorism
network with shared values and common language; providing countries with the intellectual
means to create, sustain, and grow counterterrorism capabilities and capacities; and
influencing countries to cooperate more fully in U.S. and coalition efforts to combat 186
terrorism. Through this program, DOD supports the TSCTP program and Regional
Strategic Initiatives.
The changes in the program over time have raised some concerns. Some question whether
enhanced program activities may duplicate other U.S. counterterrorism efforts, although some
argue that the expansion of the program is a result of the maturation of the mission. Some security
analysts question the lack of specific language regarding non-lethal training in the CTFP
permanent authority. If lethal training activities are now a part of CTFP objectives, some security
observers question how this new focus differs from that of the International Military Education
and Training program. (See Appendix E.)
An issue of concern is whether the DOD and the State Department (and other agencies)
adequately coordinate their programs. DOD and civilian agencies have over the past few years
developed new means, such as the RSI, to coordinate programs. Within the State Department,

182 E-mail correspondence with the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 11, 2008.
183 Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist
Attacks on the United States Act, 2002 (P.L. 107-117, Section 8125).
184 FY2004 NDAA, P.L. 108-136, Section 1221. An annual report on the program is required by December 1.
185 Section 1204, John Warner NDAA for FY2007 (P.L. 109-364).
186 Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program briefing slides. Accessed at
2005solic/moore.ppt#256,2, Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP); last accessed July 22,

some view cooperation on counterterrorism as a model for DOD-State Department cooperation.187
Others believe that there is still considerable room for improvement. Regarding the TSCTP, a
recent CSIS report acknowledges progress in interagency cooperation, particularly in the field, 188
but finds that such cooperation is “strongly dependent on individual personalities.”
Impediments to improved coordination and execution of counterterrorism programs include the
separate policy development and implementation by relevant agencies, combatant commands,
U.S. embassies, and USAID missions; differences in institutional culture among DOD, the State
Department, and USAID; and the differences in perspectives created by the regional focus of the
DOD combatant commands and the bilateral focus of the State Department and U.S. country 189
teams, according to that report.
Concerns are also raised that DOD and the State Department share an overarching strategic
framework and strategic priorities. The CSIS report finds “a lack of coherent strategic vision and
authoritative planning” on counterterrorism matters across DOD, the State Department, and 190
USAID. Another report faults the TSCTP for failing to fulfill its “rhetorical commitment to a
holistic, integrated response” addressing the economic, social, and political sources of instability.
“Although U.S. government players agree that CT strategy should focus eighty percent on
development and governance activities, and only twenty percent on military effort, actual budgets
have been closer to the reverse, making it difficult for the program to address underlying, chronic 191
sources of underdevelopment and poor governance.”
If the counterterrorism assistance programs are not coordinated with respect to the overarching
strategy of the United States, the departments providing services and advice may inadvertently
negatively influence a foreign country’s efforts to support U.S. national security policies. Other
interagency concerns that may have U.S. policy implications include the commonalities in
procedures and training offered by DOD and State Department training personnel, the sharing of
useful national security information gleaned from host country training activities, and how U.S.
foreign policy goals are conveyed to host country representatives. The training and services
offered have a significant impact on a foreign country’s tactical and strategic approach to
addressing terrorism within its borders and in the surrounding region. If U.S. federal government
counterterrorism organizations are not coordinating with the ATA’s counterterrorism activities,
conflicting U.S. policy signals may be given to the host country and resources may be used in an
inefficient manner.
A lack of transparency for such interagency programs that draw on multiple authorities and
multiple budget accounts may also be a concern. Reporting requirements for each of the
component programs vary and there may be no reporting requirement for some components.
Thus, no one source presents to Congress a comprehensive account of multiple counterterrorism

187 E-mail correspondence with the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 11, 2008.
Also see Appendix H.
188 CSIS Task Force Final Report 2007, op. cit., pp. 3-4.
189 CSIS Task Force Final Report 2007, op. cit., p. 4.
190 CSIS Task Force Final Report 2007, op. cit., p. 5.
191 The Pentagon and Global Development, op. cit., p. 10.

In the FY2006-FY2008 annual DOD authorization bills, Congress provided DOD with authority
to train and equip foreign military forces to perform counterterrorism, as well as military and
stability operations. This “Section 1206” authority, as it is known, enables DOD to use DOD
funds to conduct or support train and equip programs such as those usually provided under State
Department security assistance authorities and budgets. As with State Department security
assistance programs, activities carried out under Section 1206 authority are administered by the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
During the first two years of Section 1206 funding, DOD appeared to exercise a strong lead in
planning and carrying out activities. The State Department has played a larger part since DOD 193
and State Department guidance was issued in 2007. According to DOD officials, for the most
recent (FY2008) planning cycle, which began in August 2007, the programs have been
coordinated through a joint State Department-DOD review. U.S. embassies and Combatant
Commands can offer proposals to each other for concurrence, after which the proposals are
disseminated to appropriate offices in DOD and the State Department, including the legal 194
offices. State Department and DOD officials vet the proposed recipients for human rights
violations. Proposals selected as priority activities are sent to the appropriate congressional 195
committees for reprogramming approval at least 15 days before beginning an activity.
In 2005, as part of its FY2006 budget submission, DOD requested this train and equip authority
to enhance its ability to meet urgent needs and respond to emerging threats, particularly emerging
terrorist threats. Most of the funding thus far has been used for counterterrorism programs. First
established in through the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2006 (P.L. 109-
163), this authority was amended and extended in 2007. It is now in effect through the end of
The FY2006 NDAA Section 1206 provided the President with authority to direct the Secretary of
Defense to conduct or support programs to build the capacity of foreign military forces to
perform counterterrorism operations or to participate in or support military and stability

192 Prepared by Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs. This appendix remains the same as in the
original edition of this report; information is current as of August 25, 2008. For updated figures, see the main text,
above. Also see CRS Report RS22855, Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006: A Fact
Sheet on Department of Defense Authority to Train and Equip Foreign Military Forces, by Nina M. Serafino, for
additional information.
193 Author’s interviews with DOD officials, December 2007.
194 Author’s interviews with DOD officials, December 2007.
195 Section 1206 authority requires a 15-day advance notification to the congressional defense, foreign affairs, and
appropriations committees before initiating each program, with information on the selected countries, budgets,
timelines, sources of funding, and planned expenditures of funds.

operations in which U.S. armed forces participate. Section 1206 authorized the provision of
training, supplies, and equipment for those programs. The Secretary of Defense could transfer
monies from the defensewide operations and maintenance account to fund the programs. The
Secretaries of State and Defense were required to jointly formulate any program, and the
Secretary of Defense to coordinate with the Secretary of State in their implementation. Congress
set the original funding limit, for FY2006, at $200 million, although only about half of this was
actually obligated. Congress also set strict conditions for these programs. Section 1206 required
that these programs observe and respect human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the “legitimate
civilian authority” within a country. Section 1206 could not be used to provide any type of
assistance otherwise prohibited by any provision of law, nor to provide assistance to any country 196
otherwise prohibited from receiving such assistance under any other provision of law.
Through the John Warner NDAA for FY2007 (P.L. 109-364), Congress amended the FY2006
Section 1206 provisions to extend the authority through FY2008, raise the funding limit to $300
million, and permit the Secretary of Defense to draw from all DOD operations and maintenance
accounts to fund the program. Congress also changed the manner in which programs are initiated.
Although the original FY2006 Section 1206 provisions required a presidential decision to initiate
a program, the FY2007 legislation permitted the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of
the Secretary of State, to authorize the training. Congress also added a requirement for the
Secretary of Defense to notify Congress when a decision was reached to initiate a program.
Congress denied a May 2007 DOD request to expand and make permanent Section 1206 197
authority. In this request, DOD asked for authority to train and equip not only foreign military
forces, but also foreign security forces. The request proposed raising the limit on annual spending
to $750 million. It also proposed authority to waive any restrictions applicable to assistance for
military and security forces. DOD funds could be used not only by DOD, but also could be
transferred to the Department of State or any other federal agency to conduct or support activities.
In its action on FY2007 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 110-28), Congress declined to provide
Administration’s request for $300 million in additional funding for Section 1206 programs in
In its FY2009 budget request of February 4, 2008, DOD asked for $500 million for Section 1206
capacity-building purposes. Three days later, as part of its proposed NDAA for FY2009, DOD
submitted the Building Global Partnerships Act to make permanent Section 1206 by codifying it 198
at Title 10 U.S. Code, Chapter 20. This proposal is similar to DOD’s May 2007 request. DOD

196 Section 1206 of P.L. 109-193 also required the President to submit a report, due January 6, 2007, that would assess
U.S. laws governing capacity-building programs for foreign governments and train and equip programs for foreign
military forces, and recommending changes to those laws, as well as to the organization and procedures of the DOD
and the State Department. The report was also to include a statement of the resources and funding mechanisms required
to ensure adequate funding for such programs. Section 1206(f) 2006 NDAA Report, op. cit..
197 The HASC Report 110-146 on the FY2008 NDAA, op. cit., stated that in “the last two years, Congress has clearly
and strongly discouraged further legislative proposals to expand or make permanent DOD’s ‘train and equip’
authorities” absent a required report [the Section 1206(f) FY2006 NDAA Report, op. cit.] and “an established track
record of success.” (p. 401.) The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) report accompanying its version of the bill
noted that SASC was restricting FY2008 funding for Section 1206 activities to the previously authorized $300 million,
rather than the $500 million requested by the Administration. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Forces, thst
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Report to accompany S. 1547, 110 Cong., 1 sess., S.Rept.
110-077, p. 317.
198 Provisions regarding the extension, expansion, and codification of Section 1206 authority are contained in Section
1301 of the Administration’s proposed FY2009 NDAA, available at; last accessed July

again requested a permanent annual authorization of up to $750 million to build foreign national
military and other forces. As in the 2007 proposal, these other forces would include
“gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense, infrastructure protection, civil defense, homeland
defense, coat guard, border protection, and counterterrorism forces....” In a slight difference from
current practice, DOD and the State Department (not the secretaries of Defense and State) would
jointly formulate programs, and the Secretaries of Defense and State would jointly coordinate
implementation. The February 2008 proposal differed from the earlier request in that it would not
in itself waive restrictions elsewhere in law, but would grant waiver authority to the President and
the Secretary of State.
In FY2006, DOD used Section 1206 authority to carry out nine projects to improve
counterterrorism capabilities in 11 countries. DOD obligated a little over $100 million for those
programs. In FY2007, DOD used Section 1206 authority to carry out programs in over a score of
countries or groups of countries. These programs cost almost $280 million. Most provided
equipment, with associated training. Most equipment and virtually all training to date has been 199
provided by contractors, according to DOD officials.
In FY2006, DOD assisted Chad and Nigeria in developing an information-sharing system to
disrupt and attack terrorist networks in the trans-Saharan region. Nigeria also received assistance,
along with Sao Tome and Principe, to establish a regional maritime awareness capability. Other
countries that received assistance to build maritime capabilities were Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the
Dominican Republic, and Panama. Section 1206 provided funds to enhance the Lebanese Armed
Forces’ ability to control Lebanon, to enable the Yemeni Armed Forces to prevent cross-border
arms trafficking and suppress terrorist activity, and to enhance Pakistan’s ability to control its
borders and to train and equip Pakistani Marines.
In FY2007, new programs included a 15-country African Maritime Security program, as well as
maritime programs in Djibouti, Malaysia, Pakistan, and the Philippines, and a multinational
maritime program involving various Caribbean Basin countries. Bahrain received assistance to
help develop a coastal patrol boat capability.
New FY2007 programs also were carried out to enhance intelligence capabilities in eight African
countries, and to build counterterrorism and stability operations capabilities in Albania, Georgia,
Kazakstan, Macedonia, and Ukraine. Yemen received funds for a new program to enhance border
security. Mexico received a small amount of counterterrorism assistance. Section 1206 funds
were used to support the East Africa Regional Security Initiative, as well as multinational civil-
military operations training conducted under the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership.
Obligations for FY2008 Section 1206 projects are underway. Obligations for projects in
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Georgia, Lebanon, and the Philippines totaled some $24.8 million as of May

20, 2008.

22, 2008.
199 Author’s e-mail correspondence with DOD official, May 20, 2008.

Section 1206 funding has been one of the most controversial DOD foreign assistance-type
programs. The December 2006 Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) report “Embassies
as the Command Post in the Anti-Terror Campaign” rejected this grant of special authority to
DOD and recommended that the Secretary of State “insist that all security assistance, including 200
Section 1206 funding, be included under his/her authority....” Based on visits to embassies in
2006, SFRC staff found that plans for Section 1206 programs “were not receiving the same
embassy input as bilateral programs,” and that, in some cases, the embassies were not even being
informed of plans for Section 1206 activities until well into or after the selection process. In
addition, the report stated that, for the most part (except in the cases of Lebanon and Pakistan),
Section 1206 activities do not address emergency situations and could be handled, as are other 201
security assistance programs, through the normal budget process.
Some sources indicate that there have been some improvements in planning and coordination
since the SFRC report was issued. A 2007 GAO report echoed the SFRC finding of a lack of
coordination in formulating FY2006 proposals. The GAO stated, however, that the “combatant
commands and embassies we contacted reported better coordination in the formulation of fiscal
year 2007 proposals,” which they attributed to “having more time to develop proposals and more 202
explicit guidance from State and DOD.” A 2008 DOD document describes DOD and State
Department coordination on Section 1206 programs as “rapidly becoming the gold standard for
interagency cooperation to meet emerging threats and opportunities because of the revolutionary 203
way it is managed.”
Some analysts have questioned the utility of placing Section 1206 programs under DOD when the
program relies heavily on private contractors. The new interagency process has expedited the
project selection process, which may increase the possibilities for using U.S. military personnel
for some Section 1206 training. FY2006 and FY2007 Section 1206 activities were selected
toward the very end of the fiscal years, leaving just enough time to obligate the funds through
contracts with private companies. These companies could then implement the project in the
following fiscal year. Scheduling assignments for U.S. military troops requires that activities be
approved well before the end of the fiscal year, according to one DOD official, as military 204
personnel must complete activities in the fiscal year or years for which funds are allocated. The
FY2008 selection process is well underway. Provisions in the House and Senate versions of the
FY2009 NDAA, which would permit the use of appropriated funds over multiples years, would
also facilitate Section 1206 training by U.S. military personnel.
The question of whether State Department leadership on foreign policy is challenged by DOD
Section 1206 authority remains open for some analysts. According to a December 2007 report by
the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “the decision to provide the Department

200 2006 SFRC Report, op. cit., p 3.
201Rather, it [Section 1206 funding] is seen as a new source of money for long-desired components in a military
relationship. Old wish lists were dusted off and used to justify submitting a request for Section 1206 funding. Military
officials in the embassies involved see the programs as a ‘preventive effort, an investment in bilateral and intra-
regional cooperation.” 2006 SFRC Report, op. cit., p. 12.
202 GAO Section 1206 letter, op. cit., p. 3.
203 Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request Summary Justification, op. cit., p. 103.
204 Author’s telephone conversation with a DOD official, July 2007.

of Defense with its own security assistance pipeline carries policy risks....” The report instead
recommended building “a larger State Department budget with increased and more flexible 205
counterterrorism funding.” CSIS did support, however, the DOD proposal to extend Section

1206 training to foreign security forces.

205 CSIS Task Force Final Report 2007, op. cit., pp. 9-10. The report recognizes the difficulties in establishing flexible
funding mechanisms. “In principle, there is no reason that the administration could not proposeand Congress fund—
a contingency fund within the FMF account to respond rapidly to unforeseen contingencies by training security forces
in counter-terrorism and stability operations. In practice, however, Congressional resistance to funding such State
Department ‘slush funds,’ and the comparative ease of getting resources for DOD, creates a temptation to re-jigger
authorities rather than budgets.” p. 11.

The State Department launched its Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) in mid-2004 to
train and equip foreign military and security forces to participate in international peacekeeping
operations. Officials in the Department of Defense (DOD) Office of Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) played a major role in promoting the initiative, working with the
State Department on the proposal. GPOI’s primary purpose is to provide 75,000 soldiers from
developing nations with training in peacekeeping skills by the end of the decade. An ancillary
purpose is to stimulate a broad international effort to foster an international deployment and
logistics support system to transport and maintain them. GPOI also provides some assistance to
the Italian Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU).
Overall responsibility for GPOI rests with the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs. The Bureau’s Office of Policy, Plans, and Analysis (PM/PPA) works closely with the
DOD to plan and implement GPOI through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
and the military Combatant Commands. In Africa, training is largely carried out by private sector
personnel employed under a State Department contract, but elsewhere, U.S. military personnel
provide most of the training. The State Department’s Africa Bureau continues to play the major
role in developing and overseeing the implementation of programs in Africa. DOD provides a
military officer to serve as Deputy Director of COESPU.
GPOI was established to significantly expand and improve the State Department’s special
peacekeeping train and equip program in Africa. From 1996 through 2004, the United States
provided field and staff training in peacekeeping skills and techniques, and related non-lethal
equipment, to potential African peacekeepers, first through the African Crisis Response Initiative
(ACRI) and then through its successor program, the African Contingency Operations Training
and Assistance (ACOTA). GPOI was designed as a worldwide program, with a continuing
emphasis on Africa through ACOTA.
The impetus behind GPOI (and its predecessor Africa programs) was the widely perceived need
to improve international capabilities to control devastating conflicts. Leaders of the Group of 8
(G8) major industrial countries endorsed the GPOI goal to create 75,000 peacekeepers by 2010 in
the June 2004 summit meeting at Sea Island, Georgia. In his September 21, 2004, address to the th
opening meeting of the 59 session of the U.N. General Assembly, President George W. Bush
stated that the world “must create permanent capabilities to respond to future crises.” He pointed,
in particular, to a need for “more effective means to stabilize regions in turmoil, and to halt

206 Prepared by Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs. For more information on this initiative,
see CRS Report RL32773, The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M.
Serafino. This appendix remains the same as in the original edition of this report; information is current as of August
25, 2008.

religious violence and ethnic cleansing.” The Clinton Administration was prompted to create the
ACRI program by a similar perception.
In mid-2005, the State Department initiated the “Beyond Africa” GPOI component, providing
training and related equipment to militaries in Central America, Europe, and Asia. As of the end
of 2007, GPOI had funded the training of some 40,000 potential peacekeepers around the world.
The overwhelming majority, some 96%, were from 20 countries and one regional organization in
sub-Saharan Africa. The remainder came from 21 countries, primarily in Asia, the Pacific Islands,
and Central America.
The State Department funds GPOI as a line item in its Peacekeeping (PKO) account.207 Initial
plans called for a five-year budget (FY2005-FY2009) of $660 million. Funding from FY2005-
FY2008 totals $374.5 million. If Congress provides the full FY2009 request, FY2005-FY2009
funding will total $487.7 million.
Table I-1. GPOI Funding, by Fiscal Year, FY2005-FY2009
(current U.S. $ millions)
FY05 (actual) FY06 (actual) FY07 (actual) FY08 (actual) FY09 (request) Total
96.7 100.4 81.0 96.4 110.2 484.7
Source: Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, June 16, 2008.
Although its purposes are generally supported, GPOI’s implementation has been problematic and
has drawn criticism from some Members of Congress. In the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181), Congress called for a Government Accountability Office
(GAO) report that would address continuing concerns. These are (1) the extent to which
contributing and participating countries maintain records and databases, (2) the quality and
sustainability of the training of individuals and units, (3) the extent to which those trained are
equipped and remain equipped to deploy in peace operations, (4) the capacity of participating
countries to mobilize those trained, (5) the extent to which trained individuals are deployed, and
(6) the extent to which contractors are used and the quality of their work. The report, released in
June 2008, judged that the State Department and DOD “have made some progress in achieving
GPOI goals in three principal areas: training and equipping peacekeepers, providing equipment
and transportation for deployed missions, and building peacekeeping skills and infrastructure, but 208
challenges remain in meeting these goals.” It then recommended that the State Department (1)
“improve oversight of nonlethal equipment delivery to partner countries,” (2) “develop methods
to assess the overall outcomes of the training program,” (3) “ensure that trainees are properly

207 For the programs first year, about 80% of GPOI funding was provided through the Defense budget. A small amount
of GPOI funding provides a U.S. contribution to the Italian government’s multinational Center of Excellence for
Stability Police (COESPU), which trains gendarmes (i.e., police with military skills). Through FY2008, the COESPU
contribution was funded by the PKO account. Of the FY2009 request, $106.2 million would be funded by the PKO
account and $4.0 million, for COESPU, would be funded by the State Department’s International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account.
208 U.S. General Accounting Office, Thousands Trained but United States is Unlikely to Complete All Activities by
2010 and Some Improvements are Needed, GAO/08-754, June 2008 p. 2.

screened for human rights violations,” and (4) in consultation with DOD, “assess the estimated
resources and time frames needed to complete activities to help achieve the G8 goals for 209
developing African countries’ capabilities to maintain peacekeeping operations on their own.”

209 Ibid., p. 5.

DOD is one of the three principal U.S. agencies that carries out threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs. DOD is responsible for the central program that secures and
eliminates weapons: the multiple-part Cooperative Threat Reduction program (CTR). The State
Department is responsible for the program that provides research grants to former Soviet
scientists and engineers in an effort to keep them from selling their knowledge to other nations.
The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for developing projects to improve accounting
and security at research facilities that house nuclear materials.
Congress established the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program in
November 1991. A failed coup in Moscow in August 1991 and the subsequent disintegration of
the Soviet Union had raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons.
Congress responded by transferring $400 million in FY1992 DOD funds to assist with the safe 211
and secure transportation, storage, and dismantlement of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons.
Congress appropriated an additional $300 to $500 million per year for DOD’s CTR program
between FY1993 and FY2007. The total budget for U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction
programs in the former Soviet Union, which includes programs in DOE and the State 212
Department, has grown to around $1 billion per year.
For several years in the early 1990s, virtually all the funding for U.S. threat reduction and 213
nonproliferation assistance to the former Soviet Union came from the DOD budget.
Contractors working for DOD implemented most of the projects and received most of the
funding. Other agencies, including DOE and State Department, participated in some of the CTR
programs, particularly when their experts were needed to design a project, but DOD served as the
executive agent for the funding, with contracts let through the DOD contracting process.

210 Prepared by Amy F. Woolf, Specialist in National Defense. This appendix remains the same as in the original
edition of this report; information is current as of August 25, 2008.
211 This program was authorized through an amendment to the implementing legislation for the Conventional Armed
Forces In Europe (CFE) Treaty (P.L. 102-228). The Amendment, sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar,
established the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 (105 Stat. 1693).
212 For a detailed description of the full range of programs, see CRS Report RL31957, Nonproliferation and Threat
Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union, by Amy F. Woolf.
213 Congress also established the State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) in 1992, in part to
ensure that the State Department would play a role in providing nonproliferation assistance to the former Soviet Union.
(The fund was established by Section 504 of the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasia Democracies and Open
Markets Support Act of 1992, P.L. 102-511, better known by its short title, the FREEDOM Support Act.) However, the
budget for NDF has remained relatively small (around $15-$30 million per year) and, unlike CTR, which has funded
long-running, ongoing programs, NDF it has served more to provide emergency funding and assistance when
nonproliferation challenges emerge.

The State Department played the lead role in negotiating the umbrella agreements between the
United States and former Soviet states that were needed before the United States could fund
programs in these states. Further, after passage of the FREEDOM Support Act in 1992 (P.L. 102-
511), the State Department Coordinator for assistance to the former Soviet Union was supposed
to help coordinate planning for CTR projects across the several agencies. For several years, a
deputies committee consisting of participants from DOD, DOE, the State Department, and the
National Security Council (NSC) met periodically (sometimes as often as once a month) to
discuss priorities for U.S. threat reduction assistance, to identify possible projects that might
receive funding from the program, and to coordinate efforts by the agencies to support these
programs. The frequency of these meetings declined, however, by the middle of the decade, as the
process became more routine and many ongoing projects were well-established within the budget 214
The organizational structure and funding profile for U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction
assistance changed in FY1996, when financial and administrative responsibility for some of the
programs and projects moved to DOE and the State Department. Specifically, the State
Department took over responsibility for the Science and Technology centers in Moscow and Kiev,
which provided research grants to former Soviet scientists and engineers in an effort to keep them
from selling their knowledge to other nations. DOE took over responsibility for the Materials
Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program, which was developing projects to
improve accounting and security at research facilities that housed nuclear materials. This division
of labor allowed each agency to take responsibility for those programs that best reflected its
expertise: DOD maintained control of programs that sought to secure and eliminate weapons,
DOE took control of those that sought to secure nuclear materials that were not in weapons, and
State took over those that worked directly with nuclear specialists in the FSU.
DOD and DOE both supported this change in funding and administration. For DOD, the change
reduced tensions in both Congress and DOD about the use of DOD funds for foreign aid or
foreign assistance programs, leaving DOD with responsibility for the core CTR weapons
elimination efforts. For DOE, the change allowed the agency to expand the contacts it had
established between its own labs and scientists and those in the former Soviet Union, and to move
quickly on its priorities without the need to go through cumbersome DOD contracting procedures.
On the other hand, some in State and the NSC argued against this division. Some in the State
Department questioned whether funding for the Science Centers would come at the expense of
other State Department priorities. Some in the NSC argued that the division would undermine
efforts to maintain central control over the priorities and funding. The division of programs
proved to be a financial boon to the whole threat reduction and nonproliferation effort, with
funding increasing to around $1 billion per year across the three agencies by the end of the
decade. Much of this increase was due to the expansion of DOE’s programs, both at materials
facilities and at storage facilities for nuclear warheads.
Initially, many in Congress saw U.S. assistance under the Nunn-Lugar amendment as an
emergency response to impending chaos in the former Soviet Union. Even after the sense of

214 According to one source, the exchanges at these meetings were often “heated” as the participants sought to set
priorities among projects that would receive U.S. funding. See, for example, Jason D. Ellis and Todd Perry, “Nunn-
Lugars Unfinished Agenda,” Arms Control Today, October 1997.

immediate crisis passed in 1992 and 1993, many analysts and Members of Congress remained
concerned about the potential for diversion or a loss of control of nuclear and other weapons.
Russia’s economy was extremely weak, and press accounts reported that nuclear materials from
Russia were appearing on the black market in Western Europe. Consequently, many began to
view CTR as a part of a long-term threat reduction and nonproliferation effort. Former Secretary 215
of Defense William Perry referred to CTR as “defense by other means,” as the program helped
eliminate Soviet weapons that had threatened the United States and contain weapons and
materials that could pose new threats in the hands of other nations.
In response to this relatively narrow mission, the initial Nunn-Lugar legislation was tightly
focused on the transport, storage, and destruction of weapons of mass destruction. For example,
the United States has provided extensive assistance with destruction and dismantlement projects.
These were designed to help with the elimination of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons and
their delivery vehicles. These projects helped Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan remove
warheads, deactivate missiles, and eliminate launch facilities for nuclear weapons covered by the
START I Treaty. Chain of custody projects were designed to enhance the safety, security, and
control over nuclear weapons and fissile materials. These projects provided Russia with bullet-
proof Kevlar blankets, secure canisters, and safer rail cars to transport warheads from Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan to storage and dismantlement facilities in Russia. The CTR program
also funded several projects at storage facilities for nuclear weapons and materials, to improve
security and accounting systems and to provide storage space, at a new facility at Mayak, for
plutonium removed from nuclear warheads when they are dismantled. Demilitarization projects
encouraged Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to convert military efforts to peaceful purposes.
The focus of CTR funding has changed over the years. Much of the work on strategic offensive
arms reductions has been completed, and the United States has allocated a growing proportion of
the funding to projects that focus on securing and eliminating chemical and biological weapons
and securing storage sites that house nuclear warheads removed from deployed weapons systems.
The DOE programs that seek to improve security and accounting for nuclear materials and some
nuclear warheads have also expanded and accelerated. Further, Russia has received most of the
funding in recent years, as the participants have completed most projects in the other nations. In
recent years, the United States has also increased funding for projects that seek to secure borders
and track materials, in an effort to keep weapons of mass destruction away from terrorists. This
has included some border security and export control programs funded through the State
This shift in funding has occurred, in part, because many observers began to view U.S. assistance
to the former Soviet states as a part of the effort to keep weapons of mass destruction away from
terrorists. In 1996, experts testified to Congress that Russian nuclear and chemical facilities, with
their crumbling security and lack of accounting procedures, could provide a source for terrorists
seeking nuclear or chemical materials. In response, Congress expanded the programs that
provided security at facilities with nuclear materials and suggested that more attention be paid to
security at facilities with materials that could be used in chemical or biological weapons. Since
September 11, 2001, virtually all analysts who follow U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation
assistance have made the link between the possible quest for weapons of mass destruction by
terrorists and the potential for thwarting them by helping Russia protect its weapons, materials,

215 See U.S. Department of Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction, April 1995, Washington D.C., p. 1.

and knowledge.216 In early 2003, the Administration stated that it had “expanded the strategic 217
focus of the CTR program” to support the war on terrorism. In its budgets presented from
FY2004 through FY2007, it increased funding for several export and border control programs in
DOD, State, and DOE; for the State Department programs designed to stem the leaking of
knowledge out of the former Soviet Union; and for a DOD effort to find and recover radiological
sources—a type of military device that could provide terrorists with nuclear materials for use in a
dirty bomb. All of these initiatives focus more on stemming proliferation than on eliminating
nuclear weapons in the former Soviet states. However, the Bush Administration has not
completely altered the focus of CTR; in February 2005, at a summit meeting in Bratislava,
Slovakia, Presidents Bush and Putin agreed to accelerate some of the efforts to secure Soviet-era 218
nuclear weapons. This agreement has led to increased funding for both DOD and DOE efforts
to secure nuclear warheads.
Many analysts who follow the nonproliferation programs continue to express concerns about the
lack of coordination among DOD, DOE, and the State Department in setting priorities and
allocating funding. Many have suggested that the White House create a position of
nonproliferation czar so that there would be a single individual in the government with the
responsibility for setting priorities and coordinating implementation of all threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs.
Congress has addressed a number of issues over the years as it has reviewed CTR projects and
authorized funding for continuing programs. Some of these have focused on specific programs,
such as the development of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye, Russia, one of
that country’s seven chemical weapons storage sites. Questions about the goals of this effort and
Russia’s contribution to it led Congress to withhold funding in FY2000 and to restrict it in other
years. Congress has also addressed questions about the role that CTR plays in advancing U.S.
national security objectives. Some have argued that the United States should increase funding to
secure weapons and materials in Russia at a more rapid pace, while others have argued that this
funding can actually undermine U.S. security if it frees up funds for Russia to add to its defense
budget and weapons acquisition efforts. There have also been some disputes, over the years,
about whether certain programs should be funded through DOE or through DOD, although those
disputes have waned as the two agencies have worked together to share lessons learned and best
Some Members of Congress, particularly in the House, have questioned whether funds should be
allocated to the CTR program from the DOD budget as the programs shift away from efforts to
eliminate Soviet-era nuclear weapons and toward efforts to secure borders and prevent the loss of

216 Senator Sam Nunn has stated thatpreventing the spread and use of nuclear biological, and chemical weapons and
materials should be the central organizing principle on security for the 21st century.” Remarks by Former U.S. Senator
Sam Nunn, Chairman, Nuclear Threat Initiative. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. International
Nonproliferation Conference. November 14, 2002.
217 U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates. Former Soviet Union Threat
Reduction Appropriation, February 2003, p. 1.
218 The While House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint Statement by President Bush and President Putin on Nuclear
Security Cooperation,” press release, February 24, 2005, accessible through; last
accessed July 22, 2008.

WMD materials and knowledge. This controversy has been evident in recent years, as both the
President and the Senate have supported efforts to allow the CTR program to allocate a portion of
its funds to programs outside the former Soviet Union. For example, in 2003, the Bush
Administration requested the authorization to spend up to $50 million in CTR funds outside the
former Soviet Union in the FY2004 Defense Authorization Bill. The Senate offered its
unqualified support for this measure. The House, in contrast, argued that these types of programs
would be better managed by the State Department than the Defense Department. It authorized the
transfer of up to $78 million in CTR funds to the State Department Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund for use in threat reduction efforts outside the former Soviet Union. The
Conference Committee, in its report on the FY2004 Defense Authorization Bill (P.L. 108-136),
approved the President’s request. However, in deference to the House concerns, the committee
language indicates that this funding should be used only for short-term projects; it also states that
the President should determine whether DOD is the agency that is most capable of implementing
the planned project. The conferees stated that they would expect the President to assign the
project to the most appropriate agency. The United States has exercised the option of spending
CTR funding outside the former Soviet Union only once, in mid-2004, when DOD provided
assistance to Albania for the elimination of chemical weapons, but DOD has, in subsequent years,
retained the authority to obligate funds outside of the former Soviet Union.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD has assumed economic reconstruction and state-building
responsibilities not usually associated with its military obligations. Civilian agencies—in
particular, the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID)—have more traditionally taken the lead in providing such assistance. The State
Department plays a key role in overseeing democratization programs in developing and crisis
countries. State also has had the lead in setting the broad direction of U.S. policy toward these
countries. USAID, the agency with the greatest expertise and experience in international
development, historically has taken the lead in designing and implementing programs intended to
stimulate economic growth and encourage the expansion of democracy. However, in Afghanistan,
and particularly in Iraq, the civilian agencies have found themselves at times subordinate to DOD
in fulfilling these roles. DOD has the lead role in economic reconstruction of the national
infrastructure in Iraq. In Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD also provides assistance for local-level
economic reconstruction and state-building through the Commander’s Emergency Response
Program (CERP) and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).
A January 20, 2003, presidential directive that established the Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) in DOD formally put that Department in charge of post-invasion
planning and assistance in Iraq. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), established by the
President in May 2003 to replace ORHA, was also a DOD entity, its Administrator, Paul Bremer,
reporting to the Secretary of Defense. The CPA made all decisions regarding the political and
economic aftermath of the invasion and determined the direction of U.S. assistance.
The first U.S. foreign assistance efforts to address Iraq’s economic, political, and social needs
were appropriated through the Office of the President under a new Iraq Relief and Reconstruction
Fund (IRRF), which was established by the FY2003 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act in March 2003 (P.L. 108-11). Early assistance programs were largely managed by USAID
and the Department of State. Of the $2.5 billion in reconstruction funding provided under that
Act, DOD was made responsible for 21%, largely to implement oil and electric power
infrastructure programs. In the November 2003 FY2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act (P.L. 108-106), Congress approved a large replenishment of the IRRF ($18.4 billion), of
which DOD ultimately was responsible for 75%, or about $13.4 billion. While roughly $4 billion
of that sum went to DOD for security-related programs, half of the entire appropriation ($9.2
billion) was placed by the President in DOD hands to implement non-security-related activities.

219 Prepared by Curt Tarnoff, Specialist in Foreign Affairs. This section was updated December 8, 2008.

Most of the DOD economic reconstruction programs involved the design and construction of
large-scale economic infrastructure—roads and bridges, oil and pipeline facilities, electrical
power plants, railroad and telecommunications networks, water and sanitation plants, and the like.
Instead of choosing the Army Corps of Engineers (which did not believe it had sufficient capacity
to oversee or staff such a large effort) or USAID (which the CPA believed lacked the
organizational capacity), the CPA decided to contract out management and oversight
responsibilities for each construction sector’s projects to private contracting firms. The CPA
established a Program Management Office (PMO) to oversee the managers of these programs. In
mid-2004, following the dissolution of the CPA, the President, issuing National Security Policy 220
Directive (NSPD) 36, transformed the PMO into the Project and Contracting Office (PCO), a
temporary Army organization. Although the State Department was now in charge of Iraq policy,
and a new State-run Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) was established to set
overall priorities and requirements for most aid programs, the PCO continued to be responsible to
DOD as well as State. On December 4, 2005, the PCO merged with the Army Corps of
Engineers/Gulf Region Division (ACE-GRD), and the ACE/GRD was formally identified as the 221
successor organization to the PCO in May 2007.
Although its role in economic assistance in Iraq has been generally limited to infrastructure
construction, in the latter half of 2006, DOD, without State or USAID participation, began to
develop a program intended to create employment opportunities for Iraqi citizens and stimulate
the economy by rehabilitating some of the roughly 200 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that
composed a large part of the Iraqi economy prior to the U.S. occupation. Despite State
Department skepticism, the Administration requested $100 million to fund this endeavor under
the Iraq Freedom Fund DOD appropriations account in the FY2007 emergency supplemental
(P.L. 110-28). Congress approved $50 million. Although press reports suggested that results were
disappointing, another $100 million was requested for this endeavor for the FY2008 Global War
on Terrorism supplemental appropriation and $50 million in the FY2009 annual appropriations 222
Press and expert accounts suggest that the State Department’s views and extensive pre-war 223
research on post-war Iraq planning were ignored by DOD. Many observers believe that the first
year of the reconstruction program, during which DOD was largely in charge of policy and

220 White House, National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) 36, “United States Governmental Operations in Iraq,
May 11, 2004.
221 SIGIR, Fact Sheet on the Roles and Responsibilities of U.S. Government Organizations Conducting IRRF-funded
Reconstruction Activities, 07-008, July 26, 2007.
222 In addition to opposition on free market grounds, skeptics questioned the extent to which violence would be reduced
as a result of expanded employment and suggested that the SOEs might become targets for insurgents, and that
investments in the SOEs might provide opportunities for corruption and political manipulation. Barney Gimbel,
Mission Impossible, Fortune, September 17, 2007; “U.S. Falters in Bid to Boost Iraqi Business, Washington Post,
August 24, 2007. As of spring 2008, about 29 factories have been restarted, but only 10,000 jobs have reportedly been
created versus the original DOD employment goal of 150,000 by September 2008.
223 There are many sources for this criticism. For example, interviews with experts and officials conducted for the PBS
Frontline report “Truth, War, and Consequences, accessible through, last accessed July 22, 2008,
and interviews conducted by the United States Institute of Peace under its Iraq Experience Project.

program development, was marked by ineptness.224 According to the Special Inspector General
for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), under the CPA, large Iraqi-owned financial resources that might
have been turned to valuable use went unaccounted for. In many cases, audits have found that
infrastructure programs under CPA/DOD/Army Corps of Engineers management were not
appropriately monitored and that a number of programs were poorly constructed and funds were 225
wasted. The post-occupation division of labor between the Army and State Department in the
PMO and IRMO may have ensured a continued lack of coordination between assistance entities.
In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the CERP has provided DOD-appropriated funds to U.S. military
commanders on the ground with which to conduct reconstruction activities, mostly in rural areas.
At the time it was launched, there was limited or no civilian presence to conduct development
programs. The CERP’s purpose has been to facilitate the stabilization of an area in the wake of a
military operation by gaining the support of local populations. In both countries, the CERP
supports a wide range of activities, from school construction to rehabilitation of electrical and
water supply to condolence payments. The program is highly flexible and is not weighed down by
the bureaucratic encumbrances of other assistance programs. Major subordinate commanders
have authority to approve grants up to $500,000. Grants provided have been credited with helping
the military better exercise its security missions, while at the same time meeting immediate
neighborhood development needs. Roughly $3..6 billion in CERP funding has been made
available in Iraq as of the fall of 2008..
In June 2003, the CPA authorized the operation of the CERP in Iraq, at first using Iraqi resources.
In the November 2003, FY2004 emergency supplemental appropriations act, funds were
appropriated for the CERP in Iraq and establishment of a similar program was authorized for
Afghanistan. Subsequent appropriations and defense authorization bills continued to authorize
and appropriate funds for the CERP for both Iraq and Afghanistan.
The CERP is a flexible tool meant originally to address security concerns. Therefore, it often was
used on an ad hoc basis by military commanders to meet immediate short-term stabilization
needs. It has been criticized for not being part of a larger development strategy and not being
synchronized with civilian assistance program plans. More recently, CERP projects in Iraq are
larger than previously—on average $140,000/project as of 2007 versus $67,000/project in
FY2004—and are the main source of U.S. infrastructure assistance in areas such as water and
sanitation, and road construction. According to the SIGIR, in many cases, it is being used to
perform tasks that should be taken on by local and provincial governments, and, by doing so, it 226
undermines the capacity-building purpose of PRTs. In the Duncan Hunter National Defense

224 See, for example, Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone, Knopf, 2006.
225 See, for example, SIGIR, Audit of Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries through the National Budget
Process, Audit 05-004, January 30, 2005, and other SIGIR audits,; last accessed July 22, 2008.
226 SIGIR, Review of the Effectiveness of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, 07-015, October 18,
2007, p. 23-34. Hereafter referred to as SIGIR, Review of PRT Effectiveness.

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (P.L. 110-417), Congress restricted the use of CERP by
setting a maximum cost of $2 million per project.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are civil-military teams located in enclaves throughout
Afghanistan and Iraq. The first PRTs were created by a December 2002 U.S. initiative. Some are
staffed by the United States, others by coalition partner countries. These teams extend the
authority of national governments by accelerating reconstruction and assisting with stabilization
Although there are multiple models of PRTs in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the basic premise for
all is the integration of civilian and military organization personnel in order to meet stability
objectives in a defined region. The military in both cases provides protection to civilian officials,
allowing civilian specialists a degree of outreach to the provincial and local governments, and
local non-governmental organizations and Afghans, that otherwise would be impossible. Civilian
employees provide expertise on reconstruction and facilitate political solutions to local problems
that the military is less able to do well. U.S.-run PRTs in general and most of the PRTs in southern
Afghanistan focus mainly on counter-insurgency. In Afghanistan, some PRT stabilization efforts
include training Afghan security forces.
The PRTs in Afghanistan have three goals: (1) stability/security, (2) extending the reach of the
central government and strengthening local government, and (3) reconstruction. Of the 26 PRTS 227
in Afghanistan, 12 are U.S.-run and 14 are run by coalition partner countries. Virtually all,
including those run by the United States, are now part of NATO’s International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. They vary in size and makeup of personnel.
U.S. PRTs are composed of 50 to 100 U.S. military personnel, including DOD civil affairs
officers, and representatives from civilian agencies, including USAID, and the State Department,
as well as representatives from Afghanistan’s Interior Ministry. Many U.S. PRTs in conflicted
areas are located on forward operating bases of 300-400 U.S. combat troops.
The initial guidance for U.S.-run Afghanistan PRTs, agreed to by senior civilian and military
leaders and approved by the U.S. Deputies Committee of the National Security Council in June
2003, assigned DOD responsibility for improving security in areas of operation, logistical
support, and force protection for all PRT members. The Department of State was made
responsible for political oversight, coordination, and reporting. USAID was appointed the lead
agency for reconstruction. However, in certain parts of the country, the military element in
Afghanistan PRTs appears to have taken a more forward role in reconstruction efforts than is the
case with PRTs in Iraq. According to an interagency assessment of the Afghanistan PRTs, despite
the guidance providing leadership to civilians on governance and reconstruction, “PRT culture, 228
people, and resources were predominantly military.” Especially where PRTs were co-located

227 Bruce Rogers, Jim Hope and Robert Kemp, PRTs in Afghanistan: A Report from the Inside, Foreign Service Journal,
July-August 2008, p. 32.
228 Department of State, USAID, Department of Defense, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An
Interagency Assessment, June 2006.

with combat units, on occasion the commander would reportedly take on a political as well as
military role.
There are currently 14 PRTs (3 of which are led by other coalition countries) and 13 ePRTs 229
(embedded PRTs) in Iraq. The U.S.-led PRTs are made up of between 35 and 100 members,
including representatives from the Embassy, the Project Contract Office (Army Corps of
Engineers), USAID, military, and other agency staff. PRTs have been co-located on existing U.S.
military bases. The ePRTs, in which civilian teams are embedded in Brigade Combat Teams, are
smaller. Most are concentrated in Baghdad or Anbar Province, where significant military action is
taking place. Although the PRTs appear to focus efforts on expanding U.S. assistance outreach to
the provinces and strengthening local government, the ePRTs envision that, as U.S. and Iraqi
military forces secure an area, ePRT staff will work with local Iraqis to further stabilize the area
by drawing on all available spigots of U.S. and Iraqi government funding to create jobs and meet 230
other basic needs.
DOD’s role in the PRTs, therefore, is chiefly to provide security and logistical support. DOD,
however, was originally reluctant to divert the necessary manpower from other responsibilities.
PRTs in Iraq were authorized by Cable 4045 (October 2005), issued jointly by the U.S. Embassy-
Iraq and by the U.S.-led military coalition Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I), under which the
U.S. Embassy was called upon to support the establishment of PRTs at State Department sites and 231
MNF-1 was called upon to support them at military sites. As the PRTs were being established,
the division of responsibilities and obligations between DOS and DOD were not well defined. As
a result, according to the SIGIR, “lines of authority and coordination between the U.S. Embassy
and military components were never spelled out and agreed upon, and the operational support
mechanisms the PRTs are dependent upon at military bases—i.e. facilities, life support, 232
communications, management services, and supplies—were not settled upon.” DOD agreed to
provide protection to the PRTs in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that took effect in 233
February 2007 and finalized operational requirements and responsibilities.
A key determinant of PRT success in the first year was the presence of a brigade commander who
supported the PRT mission. Such was the case in Mosul, according to the SIGIR, whereas in
Anbar, a lack of support signaled civilian difficulty obtaining transportation and other resources,
and civilian exclusion from meetings with government officials. According to the SIGIR, in some
PRTs, there was occasionally a difference in views regarding the use of reconstruction assistance,

229 There are also four Provincial Support Teams (PSTs), much smaller in size than PRTs and aimed at providing
advice to provincial officials. These are being meshed with existing PRTs or transformed into PRTs. SIGIR, Quarterly
Report to Congress, July 30, 2008.
230 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq,
SIGIR-06-034, October 29, 2006 (hereafter referred to as Status of the PRT Iraq Program); Status of the Provincial
Reconstruction Team Program Expansion in Iraq, SIGIR-07-014, July 25, 2007; and SIGIR Review of PRT
Effectiveness, op. cit.
231 Reference to Cable 4045 is in SIGIR, Review of PRT Effectiveness, op. cit., p. 5.
232 SIGIR, Status of the PRT Iraq Program, op. cit., p. 8.
233 SIGIR, Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program Expansion in Iraq, SIGIR-07-014, July 25, 2007, p.

with commanders expressing “frustration” over PRT failure to create employment by funding
state-owned enterprises (see above).
The February 2007 MOA helped resolve a number of coordination concerns, but the role of DOD
in providing assistance has continued to be greater than intended, in part because of shortfalls in
civilian staffing at the PRTs. Until civilians with specialist skills in local governance and
agriculture, for example, could be provided by the Department of State, over 100 DOD-supplied 234
personnel were made available on a temporary basis.
Many refer to the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan as a model for DOD-civilian cooperation in
foreign aid, and U.S. government officials and others have pointed to successes in stabilizing
some areas as at least in part the result of PRT activity. Nonetheless, some have faulted PRTs for a
lack of an overarching concept of operations (a common range of services and a unified chain of
command), and for failing at times to coordinate with each other and exchange information on
best practices. In addition, it appears that DOD maintains a preponderant weight in PRT decision
making as the sole supplier of security, which allows civilians to undertake project site visits and
meetings with local leaders, and as a significant supplier of assistance through the well-funded
CERP program. The interagency assessment found that, in Afghanistan, subordination of PRTs to
combat units threatened to dilute a core focus of the PRT—to strengthen the government of
Afghanistan’s capacity to address issues underlying instability and support for the insurgency. In
Iraq, according to the SIGIR, there are reports that CERP use undermines civilian efforts to
strengthen local government. Absent a clear set of objectives and performance measures
fashioned for each individual PRT, as the SIGIR has repeatedly proposed, the coordinated efforts
of disparate agencies composing the PRTs in Iraq are likely to be dependent on the personalities
of team members and the level of teamwork they are able to cobble together.

234Pentagon Agrees to Help Fill State Department’s Iraq Reconstruction Jobs on Temporary Basis,” New York Times,
February 20, 2007.

In Afghanistan and Iraq today, based on decisions by the Administration and authorities granted
by Congress, DOD plays the lead U.S. government role in providing training assistance to Iraqi
and Afghan security forces, including police and other civilian forces, as well as military forces.
Both the extent of DOD’s role, and funding appropriated for these purposes, have grown over
Congress has also provided DOD with several categories of funding and authorities to allow
international partners to contribute to the coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan—including
both providing some partners with resources directly to enable their participation, and
reimbursing other partners for support provided. DOD takes the lead in implementing these
Several key foreign security assistance programs, including Foreign Military Financing and
International Military Education and Training, managed by the Department of State and
implemented by DOD, provided some forms of “train and equip” assistance to foreign partners.
The driving reasons for assigning DOD the lead role in training and equipping Iraqi and Afghan
security forces were apparently the sheer size and scope of the tasks at hand, the presence of
capable if not specialized DOD personnel on-site, and the urgency that left no time to deliberately
develop capabilities in other U.S. government agencies. DOD did not seek expanded train and 236
equip authority until the Administration judged that other approaches were not working.
The legislation authorizing DOD to provide “train and equip” support and appropriating funds for
that purpose is both specific and limited. The legislation is enacted on an annual basis, and it
refers strictly to Iraq and Afghanistan. Specific requests for resources and authorities were
initiated by the executive branch, based on input from practitioners in the field.
The legislation requires “the concurrence of the Secretary of State.”237 That language is generally
understood, by staff at both agencies, to mean that initiatives cannot proceed without State

235 Prepared by Catherine Marie Dale, Specialist in International Security. This appendix remains the same as in the
original edition of this report; information is current as of August 25, 2008.
236 A similar dynamic characterizes the development of the CERP, discussed in a separate section, proposed by the
military command in Iraq only after the magnitude of requirements on the ground, and inability of civilian U.S.
government agencies to address them in a timely fashion, became apparent.
237 See FY2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-106, Section 1107, and subsequent legislation.

Department approval. Coordination mechanisms for seeking that approval—from the Secretary or 238
her designated representative—are reportedly in place and actively utilized.
Initially, train and equip authority was granted for support to “the New Iraqi Army and the 239
Afghan National Army.” Subsequent legislation expanded the focus to include the “military
and security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan,” which could include police and other civilian 240
services. The scope of the assistance initially included “assistance, including equipment, 241
supplies, services, training and funding.” Later, the scope was broadened to also include 242
“facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction.”
Funds appropriated for train and equip missions in Iraq and Afghanistan have grown substantially
over time, from $150 million in the FY2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L.
108-106, of November 6, 2003, to $9.7 billion ($5.9 billion for Afghanistan and $3.8 billion for
Iraq) in the FY2007 U.S. Troop Readiness, Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Act, P.L. 110-28, of
May 25, 2007.
Security forces training efforts in Iraq were initially spearheaded by the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA), led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, which served from its appointment in May
2003 until June 28, 2004, as the legal executive authority of Iraq. DOD, as CPA’s higher
headquarters, had overall responsibility for the effort. The military command in Iraq during the
formal occupation, the Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), reported to its own higher
headquarters, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), but served in direct support to CPA.
The scope of the challenge has been extensive because none of Iraq’s pre-war security forces or
structures were left intact or available for duty after major combat operations ceased. Iraq pre-war
planning erroneously assumed that at the end of “major combat,” Iraqi police would be available, 243
as needed, to help provide security for the Iraqi people. Instead, in the immediate aftermath of
major combat, coalition forces found that civilian law enforcement bodies had disappeared.
Meanwhile, U.S. military pre-war planning had also assumed that Iraqi military units would be
available for recall and reassignment after the war, as needed. Military plans counted on the
“capitulation” of Iraqi forces and included options for using some of those forces to guard borders 244
or perform other tasks. Instead, on May 23, 2003, the CPA issued Order Number 2, dissolving
all Iraqi military services, including the Army. That decision foreclosed the option of unit recall to

238 Interviews with State Department officials, Washington DC, November 2007.
239 See FY2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-106, Section 1107.
240 See FY2005 Ronald W. Reagan NDAA, P.L. 108-375, Section 1202, and subsequent legislation.
241 See FY2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-106, Section 1107.
242 See FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 235-237.
243 This assumption was explicitly stated at the February 2003, post-war planningrock drill” held by the new
Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), at National Defense University.
244 Information from CFLCC and V Corps planners, 2002 and 2003. See also Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard
E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story and the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, New York: Vintage Books, 2006.

support security or reconstruction activities, or to serve as building blocks for a post-Saddam 245
In August 2003, CPA directed the creation of the New Iraqi Army, under the authority of the CPA 246
Administrator or “a civilian member of the CPA reporting directly to the Administrator.” Iraqi
police training, too, was initially a CPA function, under the leadership of former New York Police
Commissioner Bernard Kerik, who reported to the CPA Administrator. He was supported by a
skeleton staff in Baghdad and by resources from the State Department’s Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). That arrangement quickly proved insufficient to
the task at hand.
In early September 2003, at the recommendation of military commanders and with strong support
from DOD, CPA launched the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), a “security and emergency
service agency for Iraq,” for which the CPA Administrator delegated responsibility to the senior 247
military commander on the ground. The ICDC was essentially a military initiative, designed to
leverage the coalition’s most copious resource—the “boots on the ground” of CJTF-7—to recruit
and train Iraqi units to temporarily fill the security vacuum.
By early 2004, it was apparent to senior U.S. civilian and military leaders on the ground in Iraq
that the sheer magnitude of the task demanded significantly greater resources. Moreover, under
the system of divided responsibilities, there was a lack of consistency across Iraq in the creation
of each force, and in strategic-level coordination among the forces. Accordingly, on May 11,
2004, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 36, which, among
other matters, assigned the mission of organizing, training, and equipping all Iraqi security forces 248
(ISF) to CENTCOM. This mission included both directing all U.S. efforts and coordinating all
supporting international efforts. It explicitly included Iraq’s civilian police, as well as its military 249
forces. CENTCOM, in turn, created the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
(MNSTC-I), a new three-star headquarters that would fall under the Multi-National Force-Iraq 250
(MNF-I), to bring together all Iraqi security forces training under a single lead in Iraq.
Since December 2004, the MNSTC-I Commander has been dual-hatted as the Commander of the
NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I). With participation by 15 NATO members, including the
United States, and one non-NATO country, NTM-I provides training, both inside and outside Iraq, 251
to Iraqi forces; assistance with equipping; and technical assistance.

245 CPA Order 2, “Dissolution of Entities,” available at
20030823_CPAORD_2_Dissolution_of_Entities_with_Annex_A.pdf; last accessed July 22, 2008. Note that the date of
the Order is given incorrectly on the CPA website table of contents, but is correctly printed on the Order itself.
246 See CPA Order 22, “Creation of a New Iraqi Army, 18 August 2003, available at
regulations/20030818_CPAORD_22_Creation_of_a_New_Iraqi_Army.pdf; last accessed July 22, 2008.
247 See CPA Order 28, “Establishment of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, September 3, 2003, available at; last
accessed July 22, 2008.
248 See White House, National Security Presidential Directive 36, “United States Government Operations in Iraq, May
11, 2004, available at Federation of American Scientists website,,
last accessed July 22, 2008.
249 See NSPD-36, op. cit.
250 In May 2004, CJTF-7 split into a higher, four-star headquarters, MNF-I, and a lower, three-star headquarters, MNC-
I, (see above).
251 See; last accessed July 22, 2008. Countries

On October 1, 2005, MNSTC-I was given the additional responsibility of mentoring and helping
build capacity in the Ministries of Defense and Interior.
The organization and focus of train and equip efforts in Afghanistan, too, has evolved over time.
Regime removal left both a domestic security vacuum and a complete lack of truly national
structures to support national-level governance. The December 2001 Bonn Agreement recognized
the need to help the new Afghan authorities “in the establishment and training of new Afghan 252
security and armed forces.” Several months later, at a conference in Geneva on Afghanistan
security, contributing states agreed to support the rebuilding of Afghan security forces and
organized their efforts into five “pillars”—including the Afghan National Army under U.S. lead,
and the police sector under German lead. In 2002, the United States created the Office of Military
Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A), as part of the military command structure in Afghanistan,
with the mandate to train the Afghan army. Germany assumed the lead for its pillar—the police
training effort. It soon became apparent, however, that pressing security needs called for greater
resources than Germany alone could provide. In 2003, to improve the effort, the State 253
Department’s INL, with contractor support, began training serving policemen and new recruits.
In 2005, based on input from relevant agencies, the Administration decided to shift U.S.
responsibility for police training in Afghanistan to DOD. The OMC-A was renamed the Office of
Security Cooperation-Afghanistan, still part of the military command structure in Afghanistan,
and it assumed U.S. responsibility for training the entire Afghan security sector, including the
Afghan National Police. Responsibility for policy guidance on police training remained with the 254255
U.S. Chief of Mission and State’s INL retained contract management authority.
In April 2006, the modalities for cooperation between State and Defense Department
representatives on the ground changed, when the U.S. military command structure in Afghanistan 256
was adjusted. At that time, OSC-A was redesignated the Combined Security Transition
Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and assigned directly to U.S. Central Command, rather than to

participating include 15 NATO members (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania,
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States), as well as
Ukraine. Key current foci include gendarmerie-type training and helping build an Iraqi non-commissioned officer
252 Representatives of major Afghan factions participating in the U.N. Talks on Afghanistan, held in Bonn, Germany,
after the October 2001 U.S.-led multilateral coalition intervention, signed the Bonn Agreement setting forth the terms
of a transitional government and authorizing an international peacekeeping force in Kabul. Agreement on Provisional
Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, Annex I, para.2,
available at; last accessed July 22, 2008.
253 See Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness, by the Inspectors General of the
Department of State and the Department of Defense, November 2006, available at
organization/76103.pdf; last accessed July 22, 2008.
254 The U.S. Chief of Mission is the U.S. Ambassador, or in that official’s absence, the highest ranking official in the
U.S. embassy.
255 Ibid.
256 Early in 2007, the three-star-led Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan was deactivated.

a military command in Afghanistan.257 The U.S. embassy in Kabul provided CSTC-A with policy
Since 9/11, Congress has provided DOD with several categories of funding and authorities in
order to enable international partners to contribute, in various ways, to the coalition efforts in Iraq
and Afghanistan. The primary impetus for seeking these authorities has been military exigency to
support coalition operations: the need for the unique access that some states, by virtue of
geography, can provide; the desire for additional troop strength to support the efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan; and the need for some unique capabilities, such as language skills and cultural
familiarity, and other niche capabilities, such as Estonia’s specialization in explosive ordnance
disposal. Some observers stress that a policy imperative—to build coalition forces with as many
participants as possible in order to shore up the legitimacy of coalition efforts—has also played a 258
key role.
This section addresses two categories, commonly known as “coalition support” and “lift and
sustain.” “Coalition support” provides funds to DOD to reimburse international partners for their
support. “Lift and sustain” allows DOD to provide resources to international partners, without
which they would be unable to participate in the coalition effort.
The legislation supporting these efforts is enacted annually. Since late 2003, coalition support 259
legislation has required the “concurrence of the Secretary of State.” As it is for train and equip,
this requirement is understood to mean formal agreement, and inter-agency mechanisms are in 260
place to support coordination. “Lift and sustain” legislation does not include such a
Substantively, the earliest coalition support legislation designated as recipients only Pakistan and 261
Jordan, but more recent legislation has added “... and other key cooperating nations.” All of the
legislation provides for reimbursing those states for logistical and military support to U.S.

257 The mandate of the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan isto plan, program and implement
structural, organizational, institutional and management reforms of the Afghanistan National Security Forces required
to defeat the insurgency, provide internal security, extend and enforce the rule of law, set conditions for economic
development and gain the trust and confidence of the citizens of Afghanistan.” CSTC-A remains part of a broader
international effort. It works in concert with the German Police Project Office and the European Union Police Mission
in Afghanistan on police training, and with the Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams from the NATO-led International
Security Assistance Force on Army training. See the CSTC-A website at; last accessed July 22,
258 In the case of Iraq, the decision not to pursue a second UN Security Council Resolution explicitly sanctioning
military action may have sharpened interest, in some quarters, in seeking additional international legitimacy through
robust coalition participation. See United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/1441 (2002), November 8, 2002.
In it, the Council “decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations, decides to afford Iraq
a final opportunity to comply,” and recalls “that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious
consequences as a result of its continued violations,” but stops short of authorizing military action.
259 See FY2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-106, Title I, Chapter 1 (117 Stat. 1210) and
subsequent legislation.
260 Interviews with State Department officials, Washington, D.C., November 2007.
261 See first the FY2002 Defense Appropriations Act, P.L. 107-117, Section 304, January 10, 2002, and then the
addition ofkey cooperating nations in the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003, P.L. 108-11,
Section 1310.

military operations.262 The lift and sustain legislation allows DOD to provide “supplies, services,
transportation (including airlift and sealift), and other logistical support to coalition forces 263
supporting military and stability operations in Iraq.”
Congress has appropriated over $1 billion annually for coalition support efforts.264 Congress
supports “lift and sustain” in turn, by providing that DOD may use funds available for operation 265
and maintenance for lift and sustain efforts. In practice, coalition support has directly supported
major border operations by the government of Pakistan, along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, 266
as well as Jordanian efforts along the Jordan-Iraq border. The assistance has also reportedly
supported some states in the region that do not wish their involvement in the coalition efforts to
be known. Lift and sustain, in turn, has allowed Poland to bring its forces to Iraq, sustain them 267
throughout their deployment, and lead the Multi-National Division Center South. Lift and
sustain has also supported Georgia’s deployment to Iraq of a full brigade of 2,000 soldiers, who
are currently manning checkpoints between al Kut and the Iraq-Iran border.
DOD’s role in coalition partner assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan has been relatively
uncontroversial. It is possible that DOD’s coordination role with international partners in these
cases could set precedents for future security partnerships more broadly. It may be more likely,
however, that DOD’s coalition partner assistance role in these two cases will serve as a precedent
only for possible future coalition military operations—not for the routine conduct of security
assistance or security cooperation.
DOD’s role in train and equip assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan has sparked much more
debate—within DOD, among U.S. government agencies, and in the broader policy community.
Most observers expect that in the future, U.S. efforts to help build the capacity and improve the
capabilities of the security forces of various partner states are likely to grow, even if nation-268
building-style missions on the scale of Iraq are not very likely. There is much less agreement
among agencies and observers about who ought to bear what share of the burden.
Some argue that the Department of State, and in particular INL, should be much better resourced,
in terms of personnel and funding, to meet possible future demands. Current resources simply do

262 See Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003, P.L. 108-11, Section 1310, and subsequent
263 See FY2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-106, Section 1106, and subsequent legislation.
264 Up to $1.4 billion in the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-11, April 16, 2003; up to
$1.15 billion in the FY2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-106, November 6, 2003 ... and
then up to $900 million in the FY2007 Defense Appropriations Act P.L. 109-289, September 30, 2006; up to $200
million in the FY2007 U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability
Appropriations Act, P.L. 110-28, Title I, Chapter 3, May 25, 2007.
265 See FY2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-106, Section 1106, and subsequent legislation.
266 See Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) justifications for war funding requests, for example
http://www.defen co mp troller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_supplemen tal/
FY2007_Emergency_Supplemental_Request_for_the_GWOT/pdfs/operation/21_DSCA_Supp_OP-5.pdf; last accessed
July 22, 2008.
267 Ibid.
268 This expectation is reflected prominently in both DOD’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and in the 2006
National Security Strategy.

not allow INL to tackle training missions on the scale of the recent Iraq or Afghanistan
experiences. Building up a greater capacity in the State Department would allow it to assume a
greater share of the responsibility in a similar future contingency.
Others argue that DOD needs to increase its own training capacity—even if DOD will remain in a
supporting role for future training missions. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates identified “the
standing up and mentoring of indigenous army and police” as “a key mission for the military as a 269
whole.” Some DOD officials and outside defense experts have argued that the training mission
is so important that DOD should establish and maintain dedicated training units, to capitalize on 270
recent operational experiences.
These two approaches (i.e., increasing training capacity at the Department of State and at DOD)
are not mutually exclusive. Both might be considered appropriate by analysts who expect a larger
overall future requirement for U.S. train and equip assistance.

Nina M. Serafino, Coordinator Catherine Dale
Specialist in International Security Affairs Specialist in Military Operations and Policy, 7-7667, 7-8983
Richard F. Grimmett Rhoda Margesson
Specialist in International Security Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy, 7-7675, 7-0425
John Rollins Tiaji Salaam-Blyther
Specialist in Terrorism and National Security Specialist in Global Health, 7-5529, 7-7677
Curt Tarnoff Amy F. Woolf
Specialist in Foreign Affairs Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy, 7-7656, 7-2379
Liana Sun Wyler Steve Bowman
Analyst in International Crime and Narcotics, 7-6177

269 U.S. Department of Defense. Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, the “Landon Lecture delivered at
Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, November 26, 2007. Accessed through
speeches; last accessed July 22, 2008.
270 See for example John Nagl, “Institutionalizing Adaptation: Its Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps, Center
for a New American Security, June 2007, available at
Nagl_AdvisoryCorp_June07.pdf; last accessed July 22, 2008.

This report was originally prepared at the request of Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and is made available for general congressional distribution with