Army Aviation: The RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter Issue

CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS W eb
Army Aviation: The RAH-66 Comanche
Helicopter Issue
Christopher Bolkcom
Specialist i n N ational Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and T r ade Division
Summary
Although i t h as been a h igh Army p riority, a number o f factors h ave complicated
the R AH-66 Comanche program. S i nce i t s i n cept i on, t h e p rogram has b een rest ruct ured
several times–postponing the i nitial operational capability (IOC) and increasing overall
program costs. In l ate 2002, DoD restructured t he RAH-66 program again, cutting t he
number o f aircraft t o b e p rocured i n h alf. This report will be updated
Backgr ound¹
The R AH-66 Comanche is a n ex t generation armed reconnaissance h elicopter. It i s
t h e fi rst hel i copt er desi gn ed and d evel oped s peci fi cal l y for t hi s m i ssi on. The C om anche
is being designed t o stealthily penetrat e enemy ai rspace and cond u c t r eco nnaissance. It
is to incorporate advanced c o m p u t e rs and communications to play a l eading role i n t he
digital, network centric batt l espace, with enough weaponry t o engage a wide range of
targets. Some call t he Comanche the world’s most sophisticated combat helicopter, with²
more lines of software code than ev en the F/A-22 R ap tor. The C om anche’s p ri m ary rol es
woul d b e t o s e e k o u t enem y forces and d esi gnat e t arget s for t h e AH-64 Apache at t ack
helicopter at night, in adverse weat her, and i n battlefiel ds obscured by s moke and dust..
Originally, t he Army envis i o n e d d eveloping and p rocuring 5,023 Comanches t o
replace the Army’s 1960s-era observation, u tility transport, and attack helicopters (OH-6,
OH-58, UH-1, AH-1). Budget constra i n t s a nd force s tructure modifications caused
significant m odifications to the C omanche program . First, t he utility transport version of
the p latform was can c eled and the p rocu rement objective reduced to 1,292 armed
reconnaissance h elicopter s. Second, the FY1993 budget deferred a production d ecision
until 2006 and t rimmed t he number of prototypes from s ix to three. Third, in December

¹ T his report s upercedes CRS Report 96-525 F, Army Aviation: RAH-66 Comanche ,bySteven
R. Bowman. Washington, 1996 (Archive d).
² V e rnon Loeb. “ Fate of Army Chopper On T he Block.” Washington Post . August 31, 2002. p.2.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

1994 DoD t rimmed $ 2 b illion from t he RAH-66 program and dropped another p rototype,

going from t hree to two . Fo urth, i n 1995, the Army restructured t he program t o add 6
“ex perimental operational capability” h elicopters within the reduced budget limits, i n p art
by producing t hem without the armaments suite.
In Apri l 2 000 t h e C om anche p rogram successful l y com p l et ed a seri es of t est s and
was cleared to begi n i t s t w o-year, $3.1 billion Engineering and Manufacturing
Development phase³. Boeing-Sikorsy has built and flown two C omanche p rototypes. The
first p re-production m odel, and t he third C omanche i s b eing built and i s ex p ected to be
flown first in March 2005.⁴ The l ast p lan was for five p re-production aircraft t o b e built
i n t h i s p h ase and eigh t p roduction aircraft were due for d elivery b y 2004 for i niti a l
operational t es ting and eval uation. A t otal of 14 initial operational capability RAH-66s
was p lanned for delivery at t he en d o f 2006⁵ and 1,213 Comanches were t o h ave b een
produced through 2024. On October 21, 2002 it was announced that form er DoD
acquisition chief Pete Aldridge had s igned an acquisition d ecision memorandum (ADM)
gi ving final approval for the l atest restructuring of the R AH-66 program. Under t his n ew
plan, t he total purchase o f C o m anches w ould b e reduced from 1,213 to 650 aircraft.
Seventy t hree aircraft will be produced during Low Rate Ini tial P roduction (LR IP ) i n
different blocks . N i n e E MD aircraft, which will most likel y be used as t rainers, will be
built and d elivered by 2006. The C omanche’s Initial Operating C apability (IOC) will be
achieved i n S eptember 2009, three years l ater than originally planned, and n ine m onths
after t he most recent p lan. The remaining 577 aircraft will be produced under a full rate
production s chedule o f 6 0 aircraft p er year , s tarting i n 2011. The Army h a d w anted to
boost t he production rate t o 9 6 aircraft p er year as part of an effort to cut costs.⁶
This restructuring reduces the C oman che’s p roduction phase from $39.3 billion t o
an estimated $26.9 billion. DoD h as agreed to add $3.7 billion t o t he helicopter’s $3 . 2
billion full-scale d evelopment p rogram. A r m y o fficials estimate that the cost o f each
Comanche, adjusted for inflation, will increase b y 3 3 p ercent – to $32.3 million⁷
Much of the p rogram’s problems h ave b een due to the amount of systems t hat h ave
been developed concurrently. For ex ampl e, the radar, armor, and navigation and
communi cat i o n s ys tems were al l bei ng developed at t he same time.⁸ The l at est
restruct uring will reduce t his concurrence by del aying t he fiel ding of certain capabilities

³ “Comanche Cleared to Begi n Engineering and Manufacturing Development.” Defense Daily.
April6,2000.
⁴ Kent Faulk. “Comanche Helicopter On Last Chance T o Fly.” Birmingham News . J uly 1, 2002.
⁵ T e lephone conversation with J ack Satterfield, Boeing spokesma n; Capaccio, T ony, U.S. Army
T o Make Decision on Helicopter Purchases i n April, Bloomberg News Service , M arch 2, 2000.
⁶ Neil Baumgardner. “Aldridge Inks Comanche Acqui s ition Decision Memorandum, Numbers
Cut T o 650.” Defense Daily. October 21, 2002.
⁷ T ony Ca paccio. “Boeing, UT X See Positive Impac t i n Comanche Cut.” Bloomberg.com.
October23,2002.
⁸ Neil Baumga rdner. “Army Ready t o M ove Forward with Coma nche, Progr am Manage r Says.”
Defense Daily. February 28, 2002.

– t he radar s ys tem, a h igh l evel of control of UAVs, full air-to-air engagement with the
turreted gun system , Link 16 dat alink, and s at ellite communications – t o l at er blocks.⁹
The p rogram was also res tructured t o f ield a companion UAV for t h e Comanche,
which will be developed with funds intended t o u p g r a d e Comanche itself. More
sophisticated sensors and a b etter power dr ive s ys tem will be sacrifice d in lieu o f t he
UAV development. Comanche officials estimate that about $644 million b etween fiscal
ye a r s 2 004 and 2009 will be spent o n t he Comanche’s UAV instead of the p latfo r m
itsel f.¹⁰ The Army h as ex per i m e n t e d with teaming UAVs and both Apache and
C o m anche for s everal years, i n cl udi ng work wi t h t h e R Q-5A Hunter .¹¹ It is currently
unclear whether t he Comanche’s compan ion will be an operational UAV, one currently
in development, or one developed s pecifically for t he job.
If there are no further changes, C omanch e p r i m e contractors Boeing and Sikorsky
would build helicopters through 2019.”¹² However, the final word on Comanche numbers
has not been spoken. Some note t hat wh ile DoD o rigi nally planned t o p rocure
approx imately 1,100 H-60 helicopters, over 2,500 have been procured t o date.¹³ Army
officials claim that 6 5 0 aircraft are t oo few, and t hat t hey require 819 Comanches t o
effectively equip t heir Objective Force wh ich i s hoped t o b e ready b y 2008. Plans call for
fi el di ng det achm ent s o f 1 2 C om an c h e a i r craft t o t he Obj ect i v e Force bri gade-st rengt h
‘units of action,’ accompanied b y eight UAVs.”¹⁴
In May 2002, DoD’s Ins p e c t or General (IG) reviewed t he restructured Comanche
program. The IG report called t he restructuring a constructive approach to reducing risk
and improving t h e p r o gr a m . However, t he IG cautioned t hat continued emphasis i s
required t o ensure t hat i ntegration p roblems d o not emerge in the future t hat could result
i n i n creased cost and s chedul e.¹⁵
The Debate over M i ssion and Capabilities
The R AH-66 Comanche is design ed to replace the agi ng AH-1 and OH-58D
helicopters and to augm ent t he AH-64 Apache attack helicopter. C ritics of t he Comanche
program argue that there i s n o n eed for a high ly sophisticated, v ery l ow observable armed
reconnaissance h elicopt er in today’s t hreat environment. They contend t hat C omanche’s

⁹ Baumga rdner. OpCit. “Aldridge Inks Comanche Acquisition Decision M emorandum.”
¹⁰ Erin Winograd. “Army Leaders Adamant T hat 650 Coma nches W on’t M eet Requireme nts.”
Inside the Army. October 28, 2002. p.10.
¹¹ K i m Burge r. “AUSA - Army Eyes Apache to Fill Coma nche Gap.” Jane’s De f e n s e Weekly.
October30,2002.
¹² Robert Wall. “New Comanche Plan Gets Gr een Light.” Aviation Week & Space Technology.
October28,2002.
¹³ Ron Laurenzo. “Comanche’s Looking Up, But Now Come s T he Crunch.” Defense Week. J une

2,2003.

¹⁴ Bur ge r . OpCi t “ AUSA - Ar my Eye s Apa c he t o Fi l l Coma nc he Ga p.”
¹⁵ J ames Asker. “Pentagon Inspector: Latest Comanche Development P l a n Reduces Program
Ri s k.” Aviation Week & Space Technology. May 19, 2003.

capabilities and mission requirements were developed i n response t o a Cold War t hreat
environment t hat no l onger ex ists. C ritics also argue that t h e C o m anche’s role and
capabilities are too s imilar t o t h e A p ache’s t o j ustify t he costs of t he helicopter’s
d e v e lopment and production. They would cancel the R AH-66, and u se the s avings to
upgrade the OH-58 aircraft and t h e AH-64D Apache’s Longbow¹⁶ target acquisition
capabilities. Others say t hat C omanche’s reduced radar s ignature will do little to make it
more survivable than current helicopters. Th ey note t hat i n Iraq, Army and M arine C orps
helicopters were s hot down o r d amaged by IR-guided missiles, rocket -propelled grenades,
and s mall arms fire, none of which u se radars for t argeting.
Proponents o f t he RAH-66 agree t hat t he C o l d W ar t hreat has d isappeared, but
counter that today’s l ow-intensity regi onal conflicts (such as Kosovo and S omalia) p lace
even greater burdens on Army aviation. U.S. Forces must be more deployable, l ess reliant
on forward b ases, and more versatile than they were during t he C o l d War. Supporters
argu e t hat C omanche s atisfies all t hree cr iteria. Fu rtherm o r e , p r oponents argue that
Comanche makes t he whole force more effec tive and will reduce t he Army’s maintenance
burden. This perspective, proponents argue, i s s upported b y i nitial results from an Army
“Anal ysi s o f Al t ernat i v es.” Thi s st udy com p ared at t ack a n d ai r caval ry squadrons
equipped with AH-64D Longbow s a n d OH-58D Kiowa W arriors t o units composed of
Apaches and C om anches. T he force equi pped with Comanches report edl y d em onst rat ed
better situational aw a ren e s s, survivability and l et hality than the other force. The
Comanche provided better s ensing, l et hality, range, agility, s urvivability, and versatility
than the Kiowa units. C omanche also improved t he effectivenes s of t he Longbow when
the t wo ai rcraft were mix ed in attack uni t s . T he RAH-66's s tealth improved Apach e
Longbow’s survivability when coop erat i v e t ac t i c s , t ech n i q u e s a n d p r o ced u r es were used.¹⁷
Claims of reduced maintenance burdens for t h e Comanche, however, are more
controversial t han are cl aims of its effectivenes s¹⁸. P roj ect ed rat i o s o f m ai nt enance m an-
hours t o flight hours h ave v aried over time. The Army hopes t o achiev e a r at i o of 2.6
hours o f m aintenance to every one hour of flight; however, both t he General Accounting
Office and C ongressional Budget Office assert that projected reductions in maintenance
are always optimistic.¹⁹ Additionally, s ome s tudies conclude that the C omanche i s m ore
ex pensive t o fly than the Kiowa W arrior ($2,042/hour vs $1,598/hour), but less ex pensive
than the AH-64D, which can cost as much as $3,622/hour to fly.²⁰
The C om anche’s rol e v i s -a-vi s t h e Apach e i s a continued point of debate. The most
recent reduct i o n i n t he C o m anche program h as i n creased t h e p rom i n ence of t h e AH-64

¹⁶ T h e AH-64D Longbow is an upgraded version of the AH-64A which i ncludes a millimeter-
wave Fi re Control Radar target acquisition system and fire-and-forget Hellfire missiles.
¹⁷ Er in Winograd. “Initial Results of Alternatives Analys is Show RAH-66 Contributions.” Inside
the Army. J anuary 24, 2000.
¹⁸ Claims of improved maintenance r equirements are based on proj ections of advanced processes
and t echnologi e s w hich won’t be prove n until the aircraft i s f ielded. In general, more
technologically sophisticated weapon systems are more difficult to maintain than less
sophisticated weapon systems.
¹⁹ CRS Report 96-525, Army Aviation: RAH-66 Comanche .P.3-4.
²⁰ Winograd OpCi t . “Initial Results of Alternatives Analysis Show RAH-66 Contributions.”

Apache. To compensate for fewer Comanches, the Army i s considering improvements t o
Apache, such as a l i fe-ex t ensi o n p rogram or upgrades. Another option m ay be to procure
more Longbow models.²¹ S o m e suggest t h at t h e DAB deci si on reaffi rm s t he Apache’s
p l a c e a s the Army’s attack aircraft, and question whether Comanche should pursue
feat ures such as t h e ex t e r n a l f u e l , Arm am e nts and Munitions System, or an air-to-air
missile capability.²²
Another i ssue i s whether the Army will upgrade Comanche for ‘hea v y’ attack
requirements. In November 2001, Army offi cials s aid t he y were p lanning on a h eavy
vari ant o f t he R AH-66 as a repl acem ent for t h e AH-64D. A s p art o f A rm y t ransform at i o n
pl an, A rm y o ffi ci al s s ai d t hat t he C o m anche coul d p erform t h e at t ack as wel l as t h e arm ed
reconnaissance mission in the future.²³ It is unclear whether t he RAH-66 could m aintain
its stealthy profile while carrying external weapons, however, and some questions whether
Comanche – which currently suffers from weigh t p r o b l e m s – has t he power and fuel
capacity to take on even more weigh t .²⁴ T h e M ari n e C orps i s ex pect ed t o seek a
replacement for its AH-1Z S uper C obra h elicopters around 2020 and it has been suggested
that a j oint program with the Army i s worth investigating.²⁵
Congr essi onal Acti on
Congress strongly supported the Comanche program by consistently meeting or
ex ceeding DoD’s budget requests f o r f u nding. In its report o n DoD’s FY1996 budget
request, t he House Armed Services Committee reproached both t he Army and t he DoD
for t epid commitment to the p rogram, u rging t hat i t b e given a h igher funding priority and
that full-scale p roduction b y 2004 be gu aranteed.²⁶
Summary of Recent Comanche R&D Funding in $ Millions
^FY04^FY03^FY02^FY⁰¹^FY⁰⁰^FY⁹⁹^FY⁹⁸
^D^o^D^R^equ^e^s^t^1,079.3^914.9^787.8^614.0^427.1^367.8^282.0
^A^ppropri^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^s^-^914.9^787.8^614.0^467.1^367.8^282.0
^C^oⁿ^f^eren^ce
In their reports (H.Rept. 108-106, H.R. 1588; and S .Rept. 108-46, S. 1050), House
and S enat e aut hori z ers respect i v el y m at ched t h e Adm i n i s t rat i on’s request for FY04
Comanche funding.

²¹ Bur ge r . OpCi t . “ AUSA - Ar my Eye s Apa c he t o Fi l l Coma nc he Ga p.”
²² Winograd. OpCi t . “ Ar my Leaders Adama nt T hat 650 Coma nches W on’t M eet Requireme nts.”
²³ Neil Baumgardner. Heavy Comanche t o Replace Apache, Ar my Officials Say. Defense Daily.
Nove mb er 13, 2001.
²⁴ Tony Capaccio. Boeing, United T ech Comanche Copter’s Cost, Weight Hit b y GAO.
Bloomberg.com. M ay 18, 2001.
²⁵ K i m Burge r. “US Army Cuts Comanche Buy.” Jane’s Defense Weekly. October 16, 2002. p.3.
²⁶ U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on National Security, National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, 104^th Cong., 1^st Sess., H.R. 104-131, J une 1, 1995. P.91.

Potenti a l I ssues for Congr ess
In light of the facts and argu ments p resented above, C ongress may wi s h t o p ursue
the following lines of inquiry:
C omanche i s t he Army’s only m ajor aviation d evelopment p rogram. The Comanche
Operational R equirements Document d es cribes the R AH-66's contribution t o future
Army warfigh t i n g missions. It s tates t hat “Aviation capabilities add increas ed
deployability, versatility, l et hality, flex i bility, m o b ility, ex t ended coverage and
sustainment t o M aneuver, Fi re Support, Ai r Defense...”and o ther mission areas. If
the C omanche buy is reduced, what effect will this have on long-term capabilities?
How m uch does C omanche contribute t o com bat power vis-a-vis t he light armored
vehi cl es t h at t h e al s o A rm y w ant s ?
$6.8 billion h as been spent o n t he Comanche through FY03.²⁷ W ill a purchase o f 650
hel i copt ers b e a s uffi ci ent ret urn on t his R &D investment?
S om e s ay t h at i n recent confl i ct s , fi x ed wi ng ai rcraft have pl ayed a m ore p rom i n ent
role, t han Army attack helicopters. Might improved v ersions of the AC-130 and A-
10, or the S TOVL variant o f t he J o int S trike Fighter, b e m ore effective p roviders of
Close Air Support t o Army ground forces than the R AH-66?
The need for C omanche has been challenged on the bas is that its capabilities do not
differentiate it suffici ently from Apache t o m erit its development. However, turning
this argu ment around, some would assert that the C omanche i s well-suited t o b e t he
Apache’s repl acem ent as t he Arm y’s prem i er at t ack hel i copt er and t he Arm y’s best
platform f o r future growth and developmen t i n t his area. Subsequently, one could
an t i c i pat e a helicopter force s tructure composed solely of heavy lift (CH-47),
battlefiel d utility (UH-60), and scout/attack (RAH-66) ai rcraft. W hat are the m erits
of this force s tructure?
C onsideration of ex port i ssues is part and parcel of any military program. How m uch
might Comanche ex ports contribute t o s us tai n i n g t he aviation i ndustrial b ase and
balancing U .S. t rade? As a new platform, and one less overtly designed for attack
than the Apache, m i ght the C omanche b e o ffered for ex port t o a larger number o f
countries than the AH-64? Conversely, due t o i t s l o w observable features might
Comanche ex ports need to be limited t o our cl osest allies?

²⁷ S e l e cted Acquisition Report ( SAR) Summary T a bles. ( As of J une 30, 2002)De partme nt o f
Defense, OUSD(A&T ) , Sys tems Acquisition. [h ttp:// www.acq.osd.mil/ara/am/ sar/index.html ].