Military Forces: What is the Appropriate Size for the United States?
Military Forces: What Is the Appropriate Size
for the United States?
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
For several years, some Members of Congress and many military analysts have
argued that the U.S. Armed Forces are too small to adequately meet all the requirements
arising after the Cold War, particularly with the advent of the Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT). In January 2004, the Department of Defense acknowledged a problem by
temporarily adding 30,000 troops to the authorized active duty end strength of the Army.
Congress addressed the issue by raising ground force statutory end strengths in the
FY2005 defense authorization bill (P.L. 108-375), the FY2006 bill (P.L. 109-163), and
again in FY2007 (P.L. 109-364). In FY2007, the Administration requested a permanent
end strength increase — 65,000 for the Army and 27,000 for the Marine Corps — and
P.L 110-181) the FY2008 defense authorization bill approved the increase. This report
describes the background of these actions, current Administration planning, and assessesth
potential issues for the 110 Congress. This report will be updated.
Background
Throughout the Cold War, end strength of the U.S. active duty force never dropped
below 2.0 million personnel and peaked at over 3.5 million during the Korean and
Vietnam Wars.1 From 1989 to 1999, end strength dropped steadily from 2.1 million to
1.4 million, where it has remained. Force structure dropped even more with active Army
divisions, for example, going from 18 to 10. Expectations that military requirements
would diminish, however, were not realized; U.S. forces deployed to new missions in
such places as the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and, with the recent advent
1 CRS Report RL31349, Defense Budget for FY2003: Data Summary, by Stephen Daggett and
Amy Belasco, for historical personnel levels and for force structure levels. End strength refers
to the number of uniformed personnel at the end of a fiscal year and is a measure of the total size
of the active forces. Force structure counts major combat elements, such as divisions or carrier
battle groups, and does not directly reflect support elements.
of the GWOT, Afghanistan and other far-flung places. The most recent experience of
Operation Iraqi Freedom indicates that U.S. ground forces are stretched thin.
Concerns about increased requirements for a smaller force surfaced over 10 years
ago, initially focused on readiness. A 1994 Defense Science Board report found “pockets
of unreadiness” attributed to turbulence in the armed forces.2 The House Armed Services
Committee discerned problems in the field and challenged Administration assertions that
readiness remained high; by 1997 they asserted that “The post-Cold War defense
drawdown and the expanding demands of manpower intensive peacekeeping and
humanitarian operations ... are placing at risk the decisive military edge that this nation
enjoyed at the end of the Cold War ...” 3 Other studies highlighted problems stemming
from the operating tempo of units (OPTEMPO) and personnel (PERSTEMPO).4 Various
solutions were proposed. Many suggested fewer overseas commitments, but no
Administration stemmed demands for U.S. forces. Congress mandated the Department
of Defense (DOD) to compensate soldiers who were deployed too long or too often, but
September 11, 2001, caused that law to be waived. Technological advances made
transforming U.S. forces more combat effective against conventional forces, but could
not substitute for manpower needed in the unconventional and asymmetric environments
of “stability” operations. In contrast, some charged that the Army, in particular, was
resisting such “constabulary” operations and therefore managed its personnel inefficiently.
The combat phase of the 2003 Iraq War was won quickly with fewer forces than
many analysts expected. The occupation phase, however, soon involved some 220,000
troops. At the first anniversary of combat, DOD staged the “largest troop rotation since
World War II.” All active Army divisions were involved. Indicators that forces were
stretched thin included Reserve Component and Marine Corps units committed for over
a year (shorter tours had been the norm); many personnel came under “stop-loss” orders
that kept them from leaving service, were extended in their tours, or were ordered to
multiple combat tours. Ceremonial companies from The Old Guard5 in Arlington, VA,
were deployed to Djibouti, and no Army division was available as a strategic reserve (air
and naval forces were shifted to cover key contingencies).6 A House bill was introduced
to increase the Armed Forces by 83,700 personnel for five years.7 Various Senators
proposed either adding one Army and one Marine division or permanently increasing the
2 Defense Science Board Task Force on Readiness: Final Report, May, 1994.
3 House Committee on National Security, Military Readiness 1997: Rhetoric and Reality, April
4 CRS Report 98-41, Military Readiness, Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) and Personnel Tempo
(PERSTEMPO): Are U.S. Forces Doing Too Much? by Michael C. Ryan and, GAO/NSIAD-96-
5 One company of the regiment that provides ceremonial and contingency support for the
National Capitol was deployed for the first time since the Vietnam War.
6 Robert Burns, “U.S. plans extra air power on Asia while ground forces focus on Iraq,”
Associated Press, January 19, 2004.
7 H.R. 3696. Note, an increase in one service might create demands in another, e.g., another Army
division could require more Air Force tactical air control parties and training sorties.
Army by 10,000 soldiers.8 No decreases to end strength have been proposed. Whether
from internal or external pressure, in January 2004, DOD responded.
Administration End Strength Initiative
Before the House Armed Services Committee on January 28, 2004, Chief of Staff
of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker, testified that he had been authorized by the
Secretary of Defense to increase end strength of the Army by 30,000 personnel on a
temporary, emergency basis.9 He argued that a permanent, legislated increase would be
unwise and unnecessary. He asserted that a permanent increase would create a burden on
planned defense budgets in the out years, citing $1.2 billion annually for each increase of
10,000 troops. Some ongoing programs were presented as, over time, providing a more
efficient and usable force structure within current Army end strength.
General Schoomaker began making organizational changes shortly after he became
Chief of Staff in August 2003. He ordered divisions to create more combat “modules”
by forming four new brigades from their existing three brigades and divisional support
forces. Once implemented, this would provide 10 additional brigade-equivalent
maneuver elements for the rotation base. Including planned Stryker brigades could
eventually raise the number of brigades available from 33 to 48.10 He is pursuing a “unit
manning” policy, rather than rotating individuals to deployed units. He would also shift
from the “Cold-war” mix of combat capabilities to one geared to the less technologically-
advanced enemies, joint operations, and stability-type operations now faced. Examples
included reducing air defense, artillery, and ordnance unit strength and increasing military
police, civil affairs, and transportation capabilities.
The Army and DOD also sought other ways to glean manpower efficiencies.
General Schoomaker noted that 5,000 soldier positions were converted to civilian in 2003
— making more soldiers available for deployment — and he anticipated finding 5,000
positions in 2004. This raised issues about the numbers of civilians and contractors
needed by the Services. Another organizational initiative has been “re-balancing” the mix
of Active Duty and Reserve Component forces to increase fairness and flexibility in
deploying the total force and to allow initial deployments with fewer reserve forces.
Other measures may have potential to reduce military manpower requirements over time,
such as reposturing U.S. forces overseas and base closings and realignments mandated by
the 2005 BRAC round.
Other than the above measures, Secretary Rumsfeld resisted any efforts to increase
the overall size of U.S. military forces — even as the Iraq War lengthened beyond three
years and sustainment of adequate forces there remained difficult. No other major war
8 Joseph C. Anselmo, “Pentagon Plans for Bigger, Better Army With ‘Spike,’” CQ Weekly,
January 31, 2004, p. 270.
9 Federal News Service, “Operation Iraqi Freedom Force Rotation Plan,” HASC Hearing, January
28, 2004, p.9. “Emergency” refers to increased military requirements resulting from the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. “Temporary” was defined as the duration of the current
emergency situation in Iraq or four years.
10 This includes several non-divisional, independent brigades and armored cavalry regiments.
Costs may be $9.9 billion from FY2004-FY2007. Inside the Army, February 9, 2004, p. 6.
has been prosecuted by the United States without an increase in force size. Shortly after
Secretary Rumsfeld’s resignation, however, President Bush said, “he plans to expand the
overall size of the “stressed” U.S. armed forces to meet the challenges of a long-term
global struggle against terrorists.”11
Permanent End Strength Increase
On January 19, 2007, after having resisted previous congressional calls to
permanently increase the end strengths of the Army and Marine Corps, the Department
of Defense announced that it would seek approval to increase the permanent end strengths
of the active Army by 65,000 and the active Marine Corps by 27,000.12 This increase in
troop strength is intended to eventually ease the significant strains that have been placed
on the Army and Marine Corps that have been at war in Afghanistan since 2001 and in
Iraq since 2003. The Army plans to create six additional brigade combat teams (BCTs)
and two additional Patriot missile battalions, and the Marines plan to create an additional
regimental combat team (RCT) from the increased end strength.13 These additional troops
will also permit both services to fill shortages in existing organizations and create other
smaller units that are in high demand. P.L.110-181, the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2008, authorizes this permanent end strength increase.
Force Size and Composition Considerations
Various considerations could influence the future debate. The “right” size and
composition for the military addresses military requirements now and in the future. The
Administration acknowledged stresses on the force, but long interpreted the situation as
a “spike” in requirements that would return to a lower, more manageable “plateau.”
Critics counter that the war on terrorism and occupation of Iraq could endure for many
years and that the continuing potential for sudden, major crises, such as in Korea, requires
a robust U.S. military force.14 One’s view of the future determines one’s idea of
acceptable risk.
Other considerations may also influence the debate. Predicted federal deficits may
create pressures to restrain the overall budget, and competition between sectors may call
forth “guns versus butter” tensions. Within DOD, competition for funding will continue;
many will argue that personnel costs must be constrained so that research and
11 Peter Baker, “U.S. Not Winning War in Iraq, Bush Says for First Time: President Plans to
Expand Army, Marine Corps To Cope With Strain of Multiple Deployments,” Washington Post,
December 20, 2006, p. 14.
12 Department of Defense (DOD) Press Transcripts, DOD News Briefing with Under Secretary
of Defense David Chu, Lieutenant General Stephen Speakes, and Lieutenant General Emerson
Gardner from the Pentagon, January 19, 2007.
13 Department of Defense (DOD) Press Transcripts, DOD News Briefing with Under Secretary
of Defense David Chu, Lieutenant General Stephen Speakes, and Lieutenant General Emerson
Gardner from the Pentagon, January 19, 2007.
14 Joseph C. Anselmo, “Pentagon Plans for Bigger, Better Army With “Spike”,” Congressional
Quarterly Weekly, January 31, 2004, p. 270. For a discussion of the Korean contingency, see
CRS Report RS21582, North Korean Crisis: Possible Military Options, by Edward F. Bruner.
procurement for the transformational weapons of the future will be adequate.15 Some may
be influenced by implications of the end strength debate for particular military
installations and defense industry employers.
Another consideration is can we “grow the force” to create the additional Army and
Marine units that the Administration has been authorized. While the Army and Marine
Corps are currently meeting their recruitment goals, it has been reported that many young,
promising Army officers are leaving at an increasing rate and that significant junior
officer and non-commissioned officer (NCO) shortages are likely in the future.16 Without
these junior officers and NCOs, the Army may not be able to stand up the six additional
infantry BCTs and support units that it has been authorized to create.
What Kind of Forces Do We Need? Specific types of forces needed will be
defined by perceptions of future requirements, recent experiences, and response to current
stresses. Congress influences the type of forces to be acquired by allocating end strength
among the four Services. Further refinements occur as specific weapons systems and
materiel are developed and procured, and through the oversight process.
Substantial ground combat forces will likely be needed, as efforts in Afghanistan
and Iraq have no defined end point and other nations of concern, such as Iran, Syria, and
North Korea, retain a potential for future armed confrontation. Combat campaigns in both
Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated the value of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF).
SOF strength is being increased and is particularly important to the War on Terrorism, but
that strength is accounted for within the Services that contribute their personnel to SOF17
units. In Iraq the ability of U.S. mechanized infantry and armored forces to survive and
prevail against both regular and nonconventional enemy forces, even in urban areas, was
striking. To reinforce success, some advocate maintaining and increasing units armed
with Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles.18
Are Specialized Units Needed?19 There have been a number of recent
proposals to create specialized units to meet the operational challenges of
counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training/advisory operations, but the Army insists
that its current force structure is adequate to meet these challenges, and that the dynamic
and unpredictable nature of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan precludes the effective
use of these specialized units. The Marines have recently established a Marine Corps
Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG) to “coordinate, form, train, and equip Marine
15 See CRS Report RL32238, Defense Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
16 Andrew Tilghman, “The Army’s Other Crisis,” Washington Monthly, July 12, 2007.
17 Ann Scott Tyson, “Plan Seeks More Elite Forces to Fortify Military,” Washington Post, Jan
18 For more detail, see CRS Report RL31946, Iraq War: Defense Program Implications for
Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
19 For more detail, see CRS Report RL34333, Does the Army Need a Full-Spectrum Force or
Specialized Units? Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
Corps advisor and training teams for current and projected operations.”20 Debate
continues inside and outside of DOD if forces should continue to be responsible of a “full
spectrum” of military operations or if specialist units should be created to address an
increasingly complex global security environment?
Will the 2008 Review of Roles and Missions Result in a Larger or
Different Force? Section 941 of the Conference Report for H.R. 1585, the Fiscal Year
DOD to conduct a quadrennial review of its roles and missions beginning in 2008.
While this review is foremost a means to identify core mission areas and service
capabilities, it may also examine force requirements, particularly forces applicable to
counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training and advisory missions. The review might
also recommend joint or service-specific actions to better address these potential core
mission areas — to include the formation of units specifically designed to address these
mission areas or change the current “mix” of forces that are needed for a current and
potential future operations.
20 Information in this section is from Cpl. Margaret Hughes, Marine Corps Forces Command,
Marine Corps News, November 14, 2007.
21 Information in this section is taken from a House Armed Services Committee Press Release
“Agreement Reached on H.R. 1585, The Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization
Conference Report,” December 6, 2007.