Violence in Uzbekistan: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests
CRS Report for Congress
The 2004 Attacks in Uzbekistan:
Context and Implications for U.S. Interests
Jim Nichol
Analyst in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
This report examines the bombings and other civil unrest that occurred in
Uzbekistan on March 28-April 1, 2004. Implications for Uzbekistan and U.S. relations
and assistance are examined. This report may be updated. Related products include
CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan; and CRS Issue Brief IB93108, Central Asia, updated
regularly.
Backgr ound1
Since gaining independence after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991,
Uzbekistan has been led by its former communist leader, Islam Karimov. It has made
little or no progress since then in democratization, market reforms, and respect for human
rights, and has regressed in some areas, according to many observers. The World Bank
reports that the quality of life for most of the population of twenty-five million — the
largest of any state in Central Asia — has improved little or deteriorated in terms of
healthcare, education, housing, and income. The Karimov government has moved harshly
to stifle dissent by jailing and torturing thousands of alleged political opponents and
Islamic extremists, according to the State Department’s Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices for 2003.
Uzbekistan has suffered several terrorist attacks in recent years aimed at
overthrowing the Karimov government. In 1999, car bombings occurred in Tashkent (the
capital). Several hundred suspects were detained and several dozen were convicted on
charges of belonging to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) terrorist group. In
late 1999 and late 2000, Islamic extremists led by the IMU launched attacks against
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, but were repelled. Another expected attack in 2001 was
presumably pre-empted in part by the IMU’s focus on assisting al Qaeda and Taliban
1 Sources for this report include the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Central
Eurasia: Daily Report; Eurasia Insight; Johnson’s List; the State Department’s Washington File;
and Reuters, Agence France Presse (AFP), Associated Press (AP), and other newswires.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
forces in fighting against U.S.-led coalition forces. The activities of the IMU and other
terrorist groups based in Afghanistan were disrupted by coalition forces, according to the
State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, but Kyrgyzstani and other
observers have warned that the IMU and other groups recently may be regaining strength.
Recent Developments
A series of bombings and armed attacks began in Uzbekistan on March 28, 2004, and
continued through April 1. In the Bukhara region (west of the capital of Tashkent), a
large explosion occurred at a house where bombs were being made, killing a dozen or
more. Reportedly, hundreds of pounds of ingredients for explosives as well as Islamic
extremist literature were discovered there. During the night, police apprehended a suspect
carrying several bombs in Tashkent, and two police posts in Tashkent were attacked. On
the morning of March 29, two suicide bombers blew themselves up at the Chorsu bazaar,
where some anti-Karimov protests had occurred in past weeks. One of the suicide
bombers apparently targeted a group of police at the bazaar, killing or injuring about a
dozen. Some of these police may have been involved in the reported beating death of an
aged shopkeeper the previous day. The attacks continued on March 30 with a car
bombing at a police checkpoint and an armed siege between militants and police near a
residence of President Karimov just north of Taskhent, reportedly killing about two dozen
people. On the night of March 31-April 1, a suspect in Tashkent tried to elude police and
hid in a house, where after a siege he blew himself up. Another explosion in the Bukhara
region occurred on April 1, which Uzbek officials attributed to relatives of the bomber
who was killed in the explosion on March 28.
In response to the attacks, Uzbekistan closed its borders, cancelled public events and
closed schools in Tashkent, and boosted the number of checkpoints and police patrols.
Reportedly many people stayed home or left Tashkent. Uzbekistan’s tightly controlled
media prevented most independent news and the government released little information
on the attacks. The dearth of news appeared to contribute to apprehension among many
citizens. The main sources of information were Russian and foreign broadcasts.
President Karimov asserted in a nationally televised interview on March 29 that the
attacks were aimed against his government, in order to “cause panic among our people,
to make them lose their trust in the policies being carried out..., and to obstruct our ...
work” (FBIS, March 30, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-155). He suggested that “evil” terrorists
had coordinated and planned the operations for months, and claimed that they were
directed from abroad. To investigate the attacks, he announced that he had formed a
commission composed of officials from the Interior (police) Ministry, National Security
Service, and procuracy. He also stated that he had mobilized similar commissions in all
regions, districts, and towns, and called on neighborhood groups and citizens to “unite
like a fist” to “prevent these acts from spreading.” Some believed that Karimov appeared
to sanction the torture of suspects by asserting that the attackers would be brought “into
the light, if need be by pulling their ears.” A Russian newspaper alleged that Uzbek
police, already enraged by being targeted, had been given permission to use force against
suspects (Kommersant, April 1). Perhaps responding to international criticism, Karimov
on April 7 stated that he had cautioned his security forces to stop indiscriminate
detentions (AP, April 7).
Prosecutor-General Rashidjon Qodirov on April 9 announced that a preliminary
investigation had shown that Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT; an Islamic fundamentalist movement
ostensibly pledged to peace, but banned in Uzbekistan), in league with the IMU and other
terrorists, had carried out the attacks. Dismissing views that HT was pacific, he asserted
that seized documents indicated that its goal was the forcible overthrow of the Karimov
government and the establishment of a caliphate. He alleged that secret HT cells had been
operating since 2000 and received instructions and financing from a foreign-based “emir”
whom he would not identify. He reported that large caches of improvised explosive
devices, chemicals for bombs, firearms, and ammunition had been discovered in the
Tashkent and Bukhara regions, and that seized computer files indicated that some HT
members had received training in Pakistan and other countries. He assured Uzbeks that
over 1,000 people had been “interrogated,” and that several dozen had been formally
charged with involvement in the attacks. He stated that the government had made use of
extensive lists it had compiled of suspicious individuals to screen. Several women were
arrested in early April after they protested against the re-arrest of their husbands — who
had been released from prison on amnesty but presumably were still on the lists — in the
wake of the bombings.
The Uzbek branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir allegedly issued a statement on April 2 accusing
the government of having launched a new crackdown on the group after Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Tashkent in late February 2004. Nonetheless, it
denied that its members had retaliated by attacking the government. On April 9, a
previously unknown “Islamic Jihad Group” claimed responsibility for the attacks,
justifying them as blows against an “infidel” Uzbek government that tortured and
imprisoned Muslims.
Implications for Uzbekistan
Theories about the causes of the attacks in Uzbekistan center around strikes against
authority by disgruntled citizens, perhaps supported by international terrorist groups, or
a coup attempt by part of the ruling elite. Some observers who view the attacks as signs
of disgruntlement suggest that some political opponents or religious Muslims who feel
they are not able to worship freely may be targeting their perceived oppressors and
committing suicide to draw attention to their plight. Other observers attribute the attacks
to anger over unrelenting poverty or the recent tightening of border controls over trade
that harmed the livelihoods of many people. Uzbek activist Surat Ikramov, the head of
the Independent Human Rights Initiatives Group in Tashkent, reflected these views by
suggesting on April 6 that the apparent targeting of the police was “a protest against the
regime.” Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid likewise suggested on April 1 that the
attackers may have intended to publicize their cause and gain adherents. On the other
hand, exiled opposition Erk Party head Mohammad Solikh, while deploring the attacks,
argued on April 3 that the attackers may have been hoping to trigger a nationwide revolt
against the “repressive” Karimov. Some observers speculate that such a plan may have
been foiled in part when the explosion in Bukhara on March 28 prematurely exposed it.
Solikh and some other political and religious opponents of the government even have
speculated that the government arranged the attacks in order to justify a new crackdown.
Uzbek officials insisted that the attacks were orchestrated from abroad, arguing in
part that suicide bombings were unusual in Uzbekistan. However, instances of self-
immolation are not unheard of. These usually involve young women in personal distress,
but one case in February 2004 in western Uzbekistan — when police taunted a man even
after he set fire to himself to protest their extortion — may have helped spur the recent
attacks against police, according to some observers. Uzbek Foreign Minister Sodiq
Safoyev and other officials also argued that the attacks represented international terrorism
aimed at governments that support coalition actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
One variant of the theory that elite groups may be battling for political power centers
around Karimov’s alleged illness and contention between the Ministry of Internal (police)
Affairs and the Ministry of National Security. According to this theory, one elite group
or another may have taken advantage of the attacks, if not tacitly supported them, in order
to undermine a competitor for power or to seize power in case the attacks triggered a
popular uprising. However, there is as yet little evidence that major personnel shifts
within the government are occurring.
The aftermath of the attacks has witnessed tighter censorship of media and other
increased human rights abuses, according to some observers. They note that the
government tightened limits on foreign media reporting and particularly criticized Russian
reporting that might be more accessible to Uzbeks. They warn that by blaming HT,
Karimov may aim for even harsher repression of religious and political dissidents.
Prisons already contain nearly 6,000 alleged members of HT and others punished for
religious and political reasons, according to the State Department’s Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 2003. Evidence of new repression included Ikramov’s report
on April 6 that large-scale detentions appeared underway, including of whole families.
The nongovernmental organization Human Rights Watch on April 14 condemned alleged
arbitrary arrests and torture by Uzbek security forces in the wake of the attacks.
Most countries and international organizations have appeared to sympathize with
Uzbekistan’s efforts to apprehend the attackers, and few publicly have criticized alleged
abuses of human rights during these efforts. More generally, Uzbekistan’s reform failures
led the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to announce on April 6 that
it would sharply limit its lending to Uzbekistan. It cited the failure to register opposition
political parties, the continuing torture of detainees and prisoners, media restrictions, and
inadequate payments to cotton farmers.
Implications for U.S. Interests
According to the State Department, Uzbekistan “is a key strategic partner in the
Global War on Terror,” and “consistently support[s] U.S. foreign policy goals.” However,
it also states that Uzbekistan’s poor human rights record complicates bilateral relations
(Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations for FY2005). In her testimony on
April 8 to the Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice emphasized that pre-9/11 Administration initiatives included
increasing counterterrorist aid to Uzbekistan. Major U.S. concerns in the wake of the
violence in Uzbekistan include increased instability that could affect the security and
future of the coalition base at Karshi Khanabad (K2), reduce coalition access to
Afghanistan by air or ground transport, and heighten the danger of the leakage through
or from Uzbekistan of Soviet-era weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology or
know-how. Before the attacks, the Washington Post (March 25) had reported that the
Administration might be evaluating Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan for long-term
access to military facilities for emergency training and staging by rapid-reaction forces.
The attacks in Uzbekistan might affect this evaluation. During his February 24, 2004,
visit to Uzbekistan, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated that there were no plans
for permanent U.S. bases in Central Asia, but that issues of U.S. basing strategy
worldwide had been discussed, including possible “operating sites ... where the United
States and coalition countries could periodically and intermittently have access and
support.”
The U.S. government eschewed early judgments about the attacks but seemed to
defer to Uzbekistan’s view that international terrorists threatened the peace. After the first
bombings on March 29, the White House condemned the loss of life and vowed to
cooperate with Uzbekistan and “other partners in the global war on terror ... to defeat
terrorists wherever they hide and strike.” The U.S. Embassy, on heightened alert status
as a result of earlier threats, suspended some operations. The State Department issued a
new public announcement on March 30 warning U.S. citizens that the IMU, al Qaeda, and
the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement remained active in the region and that the groups
“have expressed anti-U.S. sentiments and may also attempt to target U.S. Government or
private interests in Uzbekistan.” On March 30, Secretary Powell called the Uzbek foreign
minister and offered U.S. aid in the investigation of the attacks. The State Department
on March 31 seemed to downplay reports of police abuses during the terrorist
investigation by stating that “we’ve got to ... balance the need for respecting rights,
liberties and the rule of law and moving decisively against terror,” but also added that “it
doesn’t need to be an either/or proposition.” President Bush phoned Karimov on April
and also stressed that the search for the attackers should comply with the rule of law.
The United States, Russia, and the regional states have raised concerns that the
attacks in Uzbekistan could have implications for wider destabilization in Central Asia.
Such concerns were discussed at a regular meeting of the U.S.-Russia Working Group on
Counter-Terrorism on March 31-April 1, with the Russian emissary stating that the
attacks illustrated the need for closer U.S.-Russian anti-terrorism cooperation. The two
sides issued a statement calling for the Central Asian states to create a financial action
task force to combat money laundering that finances terrorism. The Central Asian rapid-
reaction anti-terrorism forces formed by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
apparently did not respond to the attacks, but the CIS Antiterrorism Center announced that
it would study the suicide bombings for future prevention. Russian President Vladimir
Putin reportedly will discuss enhanced antiterrorist cooperation with the visiting Uzbek
president in mid-April. After the attacks in Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz government stepped
up arrests of HT members.
Heightened concerns in the United States that authoritarianism in Uzbekistan could
be contributing to the growth of Islamic extremism as a channel of dissent led some
policymakers to call for cutting aid that might bolster the regime. However, other
concerns about WMD proliferation led the Administration at the end of 2003 to waive
restrictions on most anti-terrorism aid to Uzbekistan under authority provided by the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2003 (P.L. 107-314). The Administration
indicated that Uzbekistan had not satisfied Congressional requirements to respect human
rights, as contained in Sec.1203(d)(6) of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Act of
1993 (P.L. 103-160), making the waiver necessary. CTR funds have been used in
Uzbekistan to dismantle a Soviet-era chemical weapons research facility and eliminate
active anthrax spores at a former test site. Other CTR aid helps keep Uzbek weapons
scientists employed in peaceful research. Research reactors, uranium mines, and milling
facilities in Uzbekistan also pose proliferation concerns.
After the attacks in Uzbekistan, the State Department stressed the need for continued
U.S. strategic engagement, and pointed out that Secretary Rumsfeld’s recent February
2004 visit had not only involved security cooperation but also his call for the creation of
a multiparty democracy. The State Department’s Performance Plans for FY2004 and
FY2005 envisage raising Uzbekistan’s levels of democratization and respect for civil
liberties (as scored by Freedom House, a human rights organization), but these goals
appear elusive, according to some observers. These observers argue that as long as the
United States gives substantial assistance to Uzbekistan, it will ignore calls for
democratization (Financial Times, April 1). The Washington Post (April 1) also warned
that if Karimov “perpetuate[s] his police state with U.S. support,” the country would
continue to breed terrorists and that anti-Americanism among Uzbeks would increase.
Congressional concerns about human rights conditions in Uzbekistan have been
reflected in legislation and other action. In FY2002, Congressional conferees directed the
State Department to assure it that defense and financial aid was not being used by the
Uzbek government to violate human rights (H.Rept. 107-345; H.Rept. 107-593). In
FY2003 and FY2004, Congress forbade FREEDOM Support Act assistance to the central
government of Uzbekistan unless the Secretary of State determined and reported that
Uzbekistan was making substantial progress in meeting commitments to respect human
rights, establish a multiparty system, and ensure free and fair elections, freedom of
expression, and the independence of the media (P.L. 108-7; P.L. 108-199). Congress
received such assurances and determinations of progress in FY2002-FY2003, but such a
determination may not be possible for FY2004. Planned FREEDOM Support aid to
Uzbekistan for FY2004 is $36 million, of which some portion may need to be
reprogrammed from central government to civil society or other areas if a determination
of progress is not possible.
The State Department must also soon determine whether Uzbekistan is making
progress in implementing religious freedom reforms under provisions of the International
Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-292). The act calls for a range of possible
diplomatic or economic sanctions against “countries of particular concern” that have been
designated as hostile toward minority or non-approved religions and do not reform
(alternatively, the President may waive action on national security grounds).
Among other congressional action, a delegation visited Uzbekistan in early April
2004, where Rep. David Dreier impressed upon Uzbek officials that the attacks
highlighted the need for greater political and economic freedom in the country (U.S.
Embassy, Tashkent, Press Release, April 5). Uzbek Foreign Minister Safoyev reportedly
stressed to the delegation that cutting off aid would be a mistake and asserted that
Uzbekistan was making progress on human rights and economic reforms.