The Protection of Classified Information: The Legal Framework

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

Recent incidents involving “leaks” of classified information have heightened interest in the legal
framework that governs security classification, access to classified information, and penalties for
improper disclosure. Classification authority has generally rested with the executive branch,
although Congress has enacted legislation regarding the protection of certain sensitive
information. While the Supreme Court has stated that the President has inherent constitutional
authority to control access to sensitive information relating to the national defense or to foreign
affairs, no court has found that Congress is without authority to legislate in this area. This report
provides an overview of the relationship between executive and legislative authority over national
security information, and summarizes the current laws and regulations that form the legal
framework protecting classified information.

Prior to the New Deal, classification decisions were left to military regulation.¹ In 1940, President
Franklin Roosevelt issued an executive order authorizing government officials to protect ²
information pertaining to military and naval installations. Presidents since that time have
continued to set the federal government’s classification standards by executive order, but with one
critical difference: while President Roosevelt cited specific statutory authority for his action, later ³
presidents have cited general statutory and constitutional authority.
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the extent to which Congress may constrain the
executive branch’s power in this area. Citing the President’s constitutional role as Commander-in-⁴
Chief, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated in dicta that “[the President’s] authority to
classify and control access to information bearing on national security ... flows primarily from
this Constitutional investment of power in the President and exists quite apart from any explicit ⁵
congressional grant.” This language has been interpreted by some to indicate that the President
has virtually plenary authority to control classified information. On the other hand, the Supreme
Court has suggested that “Congress could certainly [provide] that the Executive Branch adopt
new [classification procedures] or [establish] its own procedures—subject only to whatever ⁶
limitations the Executive Privilege may be held to impose on such congressional ordering.” In
fact, Congress established a separate regime in the Atomic Energy Act for the protection of ⁷
nuclear-related “Restricted Data.”
Congress has directed the President to establish procedures governing the access to classified ⁸
material so that no person can gain such access without having undergone a background check.

¹^Se^e^Ha^{rold Re}^ly^e^a^,^The^Pr^e^s^ideⁿ^c^y^and^the^Pe^o^p^le^’^s^Ri^ght^to^Kⁿ^o^w^{, in T}^HE^P^RE^S^I^D^E^{NCY A}^ND^I^N^F^OR^M^A^T^I^ON^P^OL^I^C^Y^1,
^16-^{18 (}¹⁹⁸¹⁾^.
²^Ex^e^c^.^O^r^de^r^N^o^.^8,3⁸¹⁽¹⁹⁴⁰⁾^.
³^Co^mp^a^r^e^Ex^e^c^.^O^r^de^r^N^o^.^10,⁵⁰^{1 (}¹⁹⁵³⁾^wit^h^{, e.}^g^.^Ex^e^c^.^O^r^de^r¹³^,2⁹²⁽²⁰⁰³⁾^.
⁴^U.^S^.^C^ONS^T^{., a}^r^{t. II,}^§^2.
⁵^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^the^N^a^vy^v^.^Eg^aⁿ^{, 48}^{4 U}^.^S^.⁵¹⁸^,⁵²⁷⁽¹⁹⁸⁸⁾⁽^q^uo^tin^g^C^a^f^e^te^rⁱ^a^W^o^r^k^e^r^s^v^.^Mc^Elr^o^y^,³⁶⁷^U^.^S.⁸^86,
⁸⁹⁰⁽¹⁹⁶¹⁾^{. I}ⁿ^a^d^diti^on,^c^our^ts^ha^v^e^a^l^s^o^be^eⁿ^w^a^r^y^{to s}^e^c^ond-^g^u^e^s^s^the^e^x^e^c^u^tiv^e^br^aⁿ^c^hⁱⁿ^a^r^e^a^s^of^na^tio^na^{l s}^e^c^u^r^ity^.
^S^ee,^e.^g^.^,^H^a^ig^v^.^A^g^e^e^,^{453 U}^.^S^.²⁸⁰^{, 2}⁹¹⁽¹⁹⁸¹⁾⁽^“^Ma^tte^r^sⁱⁿ^tim^a^t^e^l^y^r^e^la^te^{d to f}^o^r^e^ig^{n po}^lic^y^a^{nd n}^a^tiona^{l s}^e^c^u^r^ity
^{are rarel}^y^p^r^o^p^e^{r su}^bj^ect^{s f}^o^{r j}^u^dⁱ^ci^alⁱⁿ^t^e^rven^tⁱ^oⁿ^.^”).^T^h^{e Cou}^r^t^h^a^{s su}^ggest^ed^,^h^o^w^ev^er,^t^h^atⁱ^t^mⁱ^gh^tⁱⁿ^t^e^rven^{e w}^h^ere
^C^ong^r^e^s^s^ha^s^pr^ovⁱ^d^e^d^c^o^ntr^a^v^e^ning^le^gⁱ^s^l^a^tion.^Eg^an^a^t⁵³^{0 (}^“^T^h^u^s^,^unle^{ss C}^oⁿ^g^re^{ss spe}^c^ific^ally^h^a^s^prov^ide^d
^othe^r^w^is^e^{, c}^o^{urts tra}^d^it^io^na^lly^ha^v^e^be^eⁿ^re^luc^t^aⁿ^{t t}^oⁱⁿ^tru^d^e^u^p^oⁿ^the^a^u^th^ority^of^the^Ex^e^c^u^tiv^eⁱⁿ^m^ilita^r^y^a^nd
^na^tio^na^{l s}^e^c^u^r^ity^af^f^a^ir^s^.^”⁾⁽^e^m^phasⁱ^s^a^dde^d)^.
⁶^E^P^A^v^.^Mink^{, 4}^{10 U}^.^S.⁷³^{, 8}³⁽¹⁹⁷³⁾^.
⁷^{42 U}^.^S.C^.^§²⁰¹¹^et^seq^{. I}ⁿ^a^d^diti^on,^the^Iⁿ^v^e^ntio^{n Se}^c^r^e^c^y^A^c^{t (}^c^odifⁱ^e^d^a^t³⁵^U^.^S.C^.^§¹⁸¹^et^seq^.⁾^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^zes^t^h^e
^C^o^m^m^is^sⁱ^one^r^of^P^a^te^nts^t^o^k^e^e^p^s^e^c^r^e^t^thos^e^pa^te^nts^{on i}ⁿ^v^e^nti^ons^{in w}^h^ic^{h t}^h^e^g^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt ha}^s^aⁿ^ow^ne^r^s^{hip in}^te^r^e^s^t
^a^{nd t}^h^e^wⁱ^de^s^p^r^e^a^d^k^now^le^dg^e^of^w^h^ic^{h w}^{ould, i}ⁿ^t^h^e^o^pⁱⁿ^io^{n of}^th^e^inte^r^e^s^t^e^d^a^g^eⁿ^cy^{, ha}^r^m^na^tiona^{l s}^e^c^u^r^ity^{. For}^a
^m^o^re^de^ta^ile^{d disc}^ussion^of^the^s^e^a^{nd o}^t^he^{r re}^g^u^la^tory^re^gⁱ^m^e^s^f^o^{r the}^pro^t^e^c^tion^of^se^nsitiv^e^g^o^v^e^rnm^e^{nt inf}^o^rm^a^tion,
^see^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³³⁵⁰^2,^Pr^ote^c^tion^{of N}^a^ti^on^al^Se^c^u^r^ity^Iⁿ^f^o^r^m^at^ion^,^by^J^e^nnif^e^r^K^.^Els^e^a^;^C^R^S^R^e^por^{t R}^L³³³⁰^3,
^"Se^nsitiv^e^B^u^{t U}ⁿ^c^l^assifie^d^"^Iⁿ^for^m^atio^{n a}ⁿ^d^Othe^{r Co}^nt^rols:^Polⁱ^c^y^and^Opti^ons^for^Sc^ie^ntific^an^{d T}^e^c^hnic^a^l
^Informat^ioⁿ^,^by^G^e^ne^vⁱ^e^v^e^J^.^Kⁿ^ez^o.
⁸^Couⁿ^te^rinte^l^lⁱ^g^e^nc^e^a^{nd Se}^c^u^rity^Enha^nc^e^m^eⁿ^{t A}^c^{t of}^1994,^T^itle^V^III^of^P^.^L^.¹⁰^3-3^{59 (c}^odifⁱ^e^d^a^t^{50 U}^.^S.C.^§⁴³⁵^et
^seq^.)^{. C}^o^ng^r^e^s^s^ha^s^a^l^s^o^r^e^quir^e^d^s^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^c^r^e^g^u^la^tions^r^e^g^a^r^d^ing^pe^r^s^onne^{l s}^e^c^u^r^ity^pr^oc^e^d^ur^e^s^f^o^r^e^m^ploy^e^e^s^of^the
^N^a^tiona^{l Se}^c^u^rⁱ^ty^A^g^eⁿ^cy^{, P}^.^L^.⁸⁸^-²^90,⁷⁸^Sta^t^.¹^68,^c^odifⁱ^e^d^a^t⁵⁰^U^.^S.C^.^§§⁸^{31 -}⁸^35.^C^o^ng^r^e^s^s^ha^s^a^l^s^o^pr^o^h^ib^ite^d
^the^D^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^D^e^f^e^ns^e^f^r^o^m^g^r^aⁿ^ting^or^r^e^ne^wⁱ^ng^s^e^c^u^r^ity^c^l^ea^r^a^nc^e^s^f^o^r^of^fⁱ^ce^r^s^{, em}^ploy^e^e^s^{, or}^c^ontr^a^c^t^pe^r^s^on^ne^l
^w^{ho ha}^d^be^eⁿ^c^onv^ic^te^d^of^a^c^r^im^e⁽^a^{nd s}^e^r^v^e^d^a^t^le^a^s^{t one}^y^e^a^r^pr^is^{on tim}^e⁾^a^{nd f}^o^r^c^e^r^ta^{in o}^t^he^r^r^e^a^s^ons^{, w}^{ith a}
^w^aⁱ^v^e^r^possible^oⁿ^ly^{in “}^m^e^r^{itorious c}^a^s^e^s^,”^P.L^.¹⁰^6-3⁹⁸^§^{1, Div}^.^A^,^T^itle^X^,^§¹⁰⁷¹^(a^{), 1}¹⁴^Sta^t^.¹⁶⁵^4,¹⁰^U.S.C^.
^{§ 9}^86.

Congress also directed the President, in formulating the classification procedures, to adhere to ⁹
certain minimum standards of due process with regard to access to classified information. These
include the establishment of uniform procedures for, inter alia, background checks, denial of ¹⁰
access to classified information, and notice of such denial. The statute also explicitly states that
the agency heads are not required to comply with the due process requirement in denying or
revoking an employee’s security clearance where doing so could damage national security,
although the statute directs agency heads to submit a report to the congressional intelligence ¹¹
committees in such a case.
With the authority to determine classification standards vested in the President, these standards ¹²
tend to change whenever a new administration takes control of the White House. The
differences between the standards of one administration and the next have often been dramatic.
As one congressionally authorized commission put it in 1997:
^T^h^{e r}^u^les^g^o^v^e^rⁿⁱⁿ^g^h^o^w^b^e^s^t^to^p^r^o^t^{ect th}^eⁿ^a^tioⁿ^’^s^secr^et^s,^w^h^ile^stillⁱⁿ^su^rⁱⁿ^g^t^h^{at t}^h^e
^Am^ericaⁿ^pu^blic^h^a^s^acce^s^s^t^oⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^ation^oⁿ^t^h^{e operation}^s^o^f^it^s^g^o^v^e^rnm^eⁿ^t^{, pas}^t^aⁿ^d
^p^r^esen^{t, h}^a^v^e^s^hⁱ^f^ted^aloⁿ^g^with^t^h^{e p}^o^{litical ch}^aⁿ^g^e^{s in}^W^a^shⁱⁿ^g^t^oⁿ^{. O}^v^er^th^{e las}^t^fⁱ^f^t^y
^y^ears^,^wⁱ^t^h^th^{e e}^x^ception^{of th}^{e Kenn}^ed^y^A^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^ratioⁿ^,^{a n}^e^w^ex^ec^u^tⁱ^v^{e order on}
^classi^fⁱ^catioⁿ^w^a^{s i}^s^s^u^ed^each^ti^m^e^oⁿ^{e o}^f^t^h^{e p}^o^{litical p}^a^{rties reg}^aⁱⁿ^ed^coⁿ^t^ro^{l o}^f^th^e
^Ex^ecu^tⁱ^v^e^Bran^ch^{. T}^h^es^{e h}^a^{ve of}^ten^been^{at v}^a^rian^ce^wⁱ^t^h^on^{e an}^oth^e^{r ... at tim}^es^ev^eⁿ¹³
^rev^e^rsⁱⁿ^g^ou^t^rⁱ^g^h^t^t^h^{e pol}ⁱ^cⁱ^e^s^of^t^h^{e prev}ⁱ^ous^order.
Various congressional committees have investigated ways to bring some continuity to the
classification system and to limit the President’s broad powers to shield information from public ¹⁴
examination. In 1966, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), creating a
presumption that government information will be open to the public unless it falls into one of
FOIA’s exceptions. One exception covers information that, under executive order, must be kept ¹⁵
secret for national security or foreign policy reasons. In 2000, Congress enacted the Public ¹⁶
Interest Declassification Act of 2000, which established the Public Interest Declassification
Board to advise the President on matters regarding the declassification of certain information, but
the Act expressly disclaims any intent to restrict agency heads from classifying or continuing the
classification of information under their purview, nor does it create any rights or remedies that ¹⁷
may be enforced in court.

⁹^{50 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁴³⁵⁽^a⁾^.
¹⁰^Id^.
¹¹^Id^.^at^§⁴³⁵⁽^b⁾^.^T^h^{e Ho}^u^s^{e Con}^f^eren^{ce Rep}^o^r^t^t^h^at^acco^m^p^anⁱ^e^d^t^hⁱ^s^l^e^gi^sl^atⁱ^oⁿⁱⁿ¹⁹⁹⁴^su^ggest^{s t}^h^a^t^Coⁿ^g^ress
^unde^r^s^t^o^o^d^t^h^a^t^the^lⁱ^ne^de^fⁱ^ning^t^h^e^bo^un^da^rⁱ^e^s^of^e^x^e^c^u^tiv^e^a^{nd le}^gⁱ^s^l^a^tiv^e^a^u^thor^ity^{in this}^a^r^e^a^is^b^l^ur^r^y^a^t^be^s^t^{. T}^h^e
^coⁿ^f^erees^mad^e^exp^lⁱ^cⁱ^t^ref^e^r^eⁿ^c^e^t^o^t^h^e^Eg^an^c^a^s^e^,^e^x^pr^e^s^sⁱ^ng^theⁱ^r^de^sⁱ^r^e^tha^t^t^h^e^le^gⁱ^s^l^a^tionⁿ^o^{t be}^unde^r^s^t^o^o^d^t^o
^affect^t^h^{e P}^r^esi^d^en^t^’^{s au}^t^h^ori^t^y^wⁱ^t^h^regard^t^o^secu^ri^t^y^cl^ear^an^ces.^Se^e^H.^R.^R^EP^{. 103-}⁷⁵^{3, a}^t⁵⁴^.
¹²^S^{ee R}^e^p^o^r^t^o^f^t^h^{e C}^o^mmi^ssi^oⁿ^oⁿ^P^r^o^t^ectⁱⁿ^g^an^{d R}^e^du^ciⁿ^g^Go^vernmen^t^S^ecrecy^{, S. D}^OC^.^N^O^.¹⁰^5-^2,^a^t¹¹⁽¹⁹⁹⁷⁾^.
¹³^Id^.
¹⁴^Se^e^,^e^.^g.^{, Av}^ai^la^bility^{of I}ⁿ^forma^t^ion^{from Fe}^de^ra^l^De^partmeⁿ^ts^aⁿ^d^Ageⁿ^cⁱ^e^s^{: He}^{arings Be}^fore^the^House
^Co^mmi^t^t^{ee o}ⁿ^Go^vern^m^en^t^Op^eratⁱ^oⁿ^s^{, 85}^th^C^ong^{. (}¹⁹⁵⁵⁾^.
¹⁵^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 5}⁵²⁽^b)⁽¹⁾^.^T^h^e^Su^pr^e^m^e^C^our^t^ha^s^ho^nor^e^d^C^o^ng^r^e^s^s^’^{s de}^f^e^r^e^nc^e^{to e}^x^e^c^u^tiv^e^br^aⁿ^c^h^de^te^r^m^ina^tionsⁱⁿ
^t^hⁱ^s^area.^E^P^A^v.^Mⁱⁿ^k^,⁴¹⁰^U.^S^.⁷³⁽¹⁹⁷³⁾^.^Con^g^ress,^coⁿ^cern^e^d^t^h^at^t^h^{e execu}^tⁱ^v^{e b}^r^an^ch^m^a^y^h^a^v^e^d^ecl^ared^so^m^e
^doc^um^eⁿ^{ts to}^be^“ⁿ^a^tio^na^{l se}^c^u^rit^yⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^a^tion”^tha^t^w^e^re^{not v}^ita^l^to^na^tio^na^{l se}^c^u^rity^{, a}^dde^{d a}^re^q^uⁱ^re^m^e^{nt tha}^t^suc^h
^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion be}^“^p^r^o^pe^r^l^y^c^l^a^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^{ed p}^u^r^s^ua^nt^to^aⁿ^e^x^e^c^u^tiv^e^or^de^r^.^”^{5 U}^.^S^.^C^.^{§ 5}⁵²⁽^b)⁽¹⁾⁽^B⁾^.
¹⁶^P^.^L^.¹⁰^6-⁵⁶⁷^,^tit^le^VI^I^,^D^e^c^.²⁷^,²⁰⁰^0,¹¹⁴^Sta^t^.²⁸^56,⁵⁰^U^.^S.C^.^§⁴³^{5 n}^o^te^.
¹⁷^Id^.^§§⁷^{05 a}ⁿ^d⁷⁰^7.

The present standards for classifying and declassifying information were last amended in March, ¹⁸
2003. Under these current standards, the President, Vice President, agency heads, and any other
officials designated by the President may classify information upon a determination that the
unauthorized disclosure of such information could reasonably be expected to damage national ¹⁹
security. Such information must be owned by, produced by, or under the control of the federal
government, and must concern one of the following:
• military plans, weapons systems, or operations;
• foreign government information;
• intelligence activities, intelligence sources/methods, cryptology;
• foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential
sources;
• scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;
• federal programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
• vulnerabilities or capabilities of national security systems; or
• weapons of mass destruction.²⁰
Information is classified at one of three levels based on the amount of danger that its unauthorized ²¹
disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause to national security. Information is classified
as “Top Secret” if its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause
“exceptionally grave damage” to national security. The standard for “Secret” information is
“serious damage” to national security, while for “confidential” information the standard is
“damage” to national security. Significantly, for each level, the original classifying officer must ²²
identify or describe the specific danger potentially presented by the information’s disclosure.
The officer who originally classifies the information establishes a date for declassification based
upon the expected duration of the information’s sensitivity. If the office cannot set an earlier
declassification date, then the information must be marked for declassification in 10 years’ time ²³
or 25 years, depending on the sensitivity of the information. The deadline for declassification ²⁴
can be extended if the threat to national security still exists.
Classified information is required to be declassified “as soon as it no longer meets the standards ²⁵
for classification,” although there is a presumption that classified information continues to meet

¹⁸^Ex^e^c^.^O^r^de^r^N^o^.^12,⁹⁵^{8, a}^s^a^m^e^nde^{d by}^Ex^e^c^.^O^r^de^r^N^o^{. 1}³^,²⁹²⁽²⁰⁰³⁾^,⁶⁸^F.R^.^15,³¹^{5 (}^M^a^r^c^h²⁸^,²⁰⁰³⁾^.
¹⁹^Ex^e^c^.^O^r^de^r^N^o^.^12,⁹⁵^{8 (}^a^s^a^m^eⁿ^de^{d by}^Ex^e^c^.^O^r^de^r^N^o^{. 1}³^,²⁹²⁽²⁰⁰³⁾⁾^,^{§ 1}^.^1.^T^h^e^una^u^t^h^o^rⁱ^z^e^d^dⁱ^s^c^los^u^r^e^of
^f^o^r^e^ig^{n g}^o^v^e^rⁿ^m^e^{nt inf}^o^r^m^a^{tion i}^s^pr^e^s^um^e^d^{to da}^m^a^ge^na^tiona^{l s}^e^c^u^r^ity^.^Id^.^a^t^§^1.¹⁽^b)^.
²⁰^Id^.^a^t^§^1.4^.^In^a^d^d^itio^{n, w}^h^eⁿ^c^l^a^ssifⁱ^e^d^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion w}^h^ic^{h is inc}^o^r^pora^t^e^d^,^pa^ra^p^h^ra^se^{d, re}^sta^t^e^d^,^or^g^e^ne^ra^te^{d in a}
ⁿ^e^w^f^o^r^m^,^t^h^atⁿ^e^w^f^o^r^m^m^u^st^b^e^cl^assi^fⁱ^ed^at^t^h^{e sam}^e^l^e^vel^{as t}^h^{e o}^rⁱ^gⁱⁿ^al^.^Id^.^a^t^§§^2.^{1 -}^2.^2.
²¹^Id^.^a^t^{§ 1.2}^.
²²^Id^.^C^l^a^s^sⁱ^f^y^ing^a^u^thorⁱ^tie^s^a^r^e^s^p^e^cⁱ^fⁱ^c^a^l^l^y^pr^ohib^ite^{d f}^r^om^c^l^a^s^sⁱ^f^y^ing^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion f}^o^r^r^e^a^s^ons^ot^he^r^thaⁿ^pr^ote^c^tⁱⁿ^g
^na^tio^na^{l s}^e^c^u^r^ity^{, s}^u^c^h^a^s^{to c}^o^nc^e^a^l^vⁱ^ola^tions^of^la^w^or^a^v^{oid e}^m^ba^r^r^a^s^s^m^e^nt.^Id^.^a^t^{§ 1}^.⁷⁽^a⁾^.
²³^Id^.^a^t^{§ 1.5}^.
²⁴^Id^.^a^t^{§ 1.5(}^c⁾^.
²⁵^Id^.^a^t^{§ 3.1(}^a⁾^.

these standards. The original classifying agency has the authority to declassify information when ²⁶
the public interest in disclosure outweighs the need to protect that information. On December
31, 2006, and every year thereafter, all information that has been classified for 25 years or longer
and has been determined to have “permanent historical value” under Title 44 of the U.S. Code
will be automatically declassified, although agency heads can exempt from this requirement ²⁷
classified information that continues to be sensitive in a variety of specific areas.
Agencies are required to review classification determinations upon a request for such a review ²⁸
that specifically identifies the materials so that the agency can locate them. This requirement
does not apply to information that has undergone declassification review in the previous two ²⁹
years; information that is exempted from review under the National Security Act; or information
classified by the incumbent President and staff, the Vice President and staff (in the performance
of executive duties), commissions appointed by the President, or other entities within the ³⁰
executive office of the President that advise the President. Each agency that has classified ³¹
information is required to establish a system for periodic declassification reviews. The National
Archivist is required to establish a similar systemic review of classified information that has been ³²
transferred to the National Archives.
Access to classified information is generally limited to those who demonstrate their eligibility to
the relevant agency head, sign a nondisclosure agreement, and have a need to know the ³³
information. The need-to-know requirement can be waived, however, for former Presidents and
Vice Presidents, historical researchers, and former policy-making officials who were appointed by ³⁴
the President or Vice President. The information being accessed may not be removed from the
controlling agency’s premises without permission. Each agency is required to establish systems ³⁵
for controlling the distribution of classified information.
The Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO)—an office within the National Archives—is
charged with overseeing compliance with the classification standards and promulgating directives ³⁶
to that end. ISOO is headed by a Director, who is appointed by the Archivist of the United
States, and who has the authority to order declassification of information that, in the Director’s ³⁷
view, is classified in violation of the aforementioned classification standards. In addition, there
is an Interagency Security Classifications Appeals Panel (“the Panel”), headed by the ISOO
Director and made up of representatives of the heads of various agencies, including the
Departments of Defense, Justice, and State, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency, and the ³⁸³⁹
National Archives. The Panel is empowered to decide appeals of classifications challenges and

²⁶^Id^.^a^t^{§ 3.1(}^b)^.
²⁷^Id^.^a^t^{§ 3.3}^.
²⁸^Id^.^a^t^{§ 3.5}^.
²⁹^{50 U}^.^S.C^.^§^§⁴^03-^5c^,⁴⁰^3-^5e^,⁴³^1.
³⁰^Ex^e^c^.^O^r^de^r^N^o^.^12,⁹⁵^{8 (}^a^s^a^m^eⁿ^de^{d by}^Ex^e^c^.^O^r^de^r^N^o^{. 1}³^,²⁹²⁽²⁰⁰³⁾⁾^,^{§ 3}^.^5.
³¹^Id^.^a^t^{§ 3.4}^.
³²^Id^.
³³^Id^.^a^t^{§ 4.1}^.
³⁴^Id^.^a^t^{§ 4.4}^.
³⁵^Id^.^a^t^{§ 4.2}^.
³⁶^Id^.^a^t^{§ 5.2}^.
³⁷^Id^.^a^t^{§ 3.1(}^c⁾^.
³⁸^Id^.^a^t^{§ 5.3}^.

to review automatic and mandatory declassifications. If the ISOO Director finds a violation of
Executive Order 12,958 (as amended) or its implementing directives, then the Director must
notify the appropriate classifying agency so that corrective steps can be taken. Officers and
employees of the United States (including contractors, licensees, etc.) who commit a violation are ⁴⁰
subject to sanctions that can range from reprimand to termination.
Generally, federal law prescribes a prison sentence of no more than a year and/or a $1,000 fine
for officers and employees of the federal government who knowingly remove classified material
without the authority to do so and with the intention of keeping that material at an unauthorized ⁴¹
location. Stiffer penalties—fines of up to $10,000 and imprisonment for up to 10 years—attach
when a federal employee transmits classified information to anyone that the employee has reason ⁴²
to believe is an agent of a foreign government. A fine and a 10-year prison term also await
anyone, government employee or not, who publishes, makes available to an unauthorized person,
or otherwise uses to the United States’ detriment classified information regarding the codes,
cryptography, and communications intelligence utilized by the United States or a foreign ⁴³
government.
^J^eⁿⁿⁱ^fe^r^K^.^E^l^se^a
^L^e^gⁱ^s^l^at^iv^{e A}^t^torn^e^y
^j^e^ls^ea@^crs^.^loc.g^o^v^{, 7-}⁵⁴⁶⁶

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
³⁹^Id^.^at^§⁵^.³⁽^b⁾⁽¹⁾^{- (3) F}^o^{r exa}^m^p^l^e,^an^au^t^h^o^rⁱ^{zed ho}^l^d^er^o^f^cl^assi^fⁱ^edⁱⁿ^f^o^rm^atⁱ^oⁿⁱ^s^al^l^o^w^e^d^t^o^ch^al^l^eⁿ^g^{e t}^h^e
^c^l^a^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^s^t^a^t^us^of^s^u^c^hⁱⁿ^f^o^r^m^a^{tion if}^the^hol^de^r^be^lie^v^e^s^tha^t^s^t^a^t^u^s^is^im^pr^ope^r^.^Id^.^a^t^§^1.^8.
⁴⁰^Id^.^a^t^{§ 5.5}^.
⁴¹¹⁸^U^.^S^.^C.^§¹⁹²⁴^.^A^g^en^ci^{es o}^f^t^eⁿ^req^uⁱ^r^{e em}^p^l^o^y^{ees t}^o^si^gnⁿ^oⁿ^-^di^scl^o^su^{re agree}^m^en^t^s^p^rⁱ^o^{r t}^o^ob^t^aⁱⁿⁱⁿ^{g access t}^o
^c^l^a^s^sⁱ^fⁱ^e^d^inf^o^r^m^a^{tion, the}^v^a^lidit^y^o^f^w^h^ic^{h w}^a^s^uphe^ld^by^the^Sup^r^em^e^C^our^{t in}^Sn^ep^{p v.}^Unⁱ^t^e^d^Sta^t^es^{, 4}^{44 U}^.^S.⁵⁰⁷
⁽¹⁹⁸⁰⁾^.
⁴²^{50 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁷⁸^3.
⁴³^{18 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁷⁹^{8. T}^h^is^pr^ov^is^io^{n i}^s^pa^r^t^of^the^Es^pioⁿ^a^g^e^A^c^{t (}^c^odifⁱ^e^d^a^t¹⁸^U^.^S^.^C^.^§§⁷⁹^{2 -}⁷⁹⁹⁾^{, w}^h^ic^{h g}^e^ne^r^a^lly
^pr^ote^c^t^s^a^g^aⁱ^ns^{t the}^una^u^t^h^o^rⁱ^z^e^d^tr^aⁿ^s^m^is^sⁱ^{on of}^a^m^u^c^h^br^oa^de^r^c^a^t^e^g^or^y^of^“ⁿ^a^tiona^{l de}^f^e^ns^e^”^inf^o^r^m^a^tion,
^pr^e^s^c^r^ibing^fⁱ^ne^s^a^{nd a}^pr^is^oⁿ^te^r^m^o^f^{up t}^o¹⁰^y^e^a^r^s^.