The National Intelligence Director and Intelligence Analysis
CRS Report for Congress
The Director of National Intelligence and
Intelligence Analysis
Richard A. Best, Jr.
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The 9/11 Commission made a number of recommendations to improve the quality
of intelligence analysis. A key recommendation was the establishment of a Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) position to manage the national intelligence effort and serve
as the principal intelligence adviser to the President — along with a separate director of
the Central Intelligence Agency. Subsequently, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, P.L. 108-458, made the DNI the principal adviser to the
President on intelligence and made the DNI responsible for coordinating community-
wide intelligence estimates. Some observers note that separating the DNI from the
analytical offices may complicate the overall analytical effort. This report will be
updated as new information becomes available.
Background
The fundamental responsibility of intelligence services is to provide information to
support policymakers and military commanders. In reviewing the performance of the U.S.
Intelligence Community prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 9/11
Commission, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
concluded that greater coordination of the nation’s intelligence effort is required to
enhance the collection and analysis of information. Specifically, the 9/11 Commission
recommended that a new position of National Intelligence Director (NID) be established
to ensure greater inter-agency coordination. A number of legislative proposals were
introduced in 2004 to establish such an office separate from the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA).1
1 For further detail on various legislative proposals, see CRS Report RL32600, Comparison of
1520, S. 6, H.R. 4584, Current Law; also, CRS Report RL32601, Comparison of 9/11
Commission Recommended Intelligence Reforms, Collins/Lieberman Draft Bill, S. 2774, H.R.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
The NID was envisioned by the 9/11 Commission as having a number of budgetary
and managerial responsibilities.2 In addition, the occupant of the position would “retain
the present DCI’s role as the principal intelligence adviser to the president.”3 The
Commission also envisioned that the NID who would “be confirmed by the Senate and
would testify before Congress, would have a relatively small staff of several hundred
people, taking the place of the existing community management offices housed at the
CIA.”4 The Commission adds, however, that “We hope the president will come to look
directly to the directors of the national intelligence centers [the National Counterterrorism
Center, and other centers focusing on WMD proliferation, international crime and
narcotics, and China/East Asia] to provide all-source analysis in their areas of
responsibility, balancing the advice of these intelligence chiefs against the contrasting
viewpoints that may be offered by department heads at State, Defense, Homeland
Security, Justice, and other agencies.”5
There is some debate whether the 9/11 Commission envisioned the NID as having
the responsibility for coordinating national intelligence estimates and other community
products. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has been responsible for providing
intelligence to the President, to the heads of departments and agencies of the Executive
Branch, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders, and
“where appropriate” the Senate and House of Representatives and the committees thereof.
The statute provides that “such national intelligence should be timely, objective,
independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources available to the
intelligence community.”6 Draft legislation in the fall of 2004 did include the assignment
of responsibilities for preparing national intelligence estimates to the DNI.
On December 17, 2004, the President approved the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (hereafter the “Intelligence Reform Act”)(P.L. 108-
458). The Act incorporated many of the proposals of the 9/11 Commission, including the
establishment of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) separate from the Director of
the CIA. Although most of the debates prior to passage of the legislation addressed the
DNI’s responsibilities for managing the intelligence budget, the Act also made a number
of changes affecting the preparation of analytical products for consumers at the highest
levels of government. The DNI will serve as head of the Intelligence Community and as
the principal adviser to the President and the National Security Council, and the
Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to the national security.7
2 See CRS Report RL32506, The Position of Director of National Intelligence: Issues for
Congress.
3 U.S., National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission
Report (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2004), p. 411.
4 Ibid., p. 414. (Subsequently, there appears to be a growing consensus to locate the NID outside
the Executive Office of the President.)
5 9/11 Commission Report, p. 411.
6 50 USC 403-3(a)(2).
7 P.L. 108-487, the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2005, signed on December 23, 2004,
provides that the DCI may discharge the functions of the DNI until the DNI is appointed.
National Intelligence Council and National Intelligence Estimates
Under the new legislation, the Office of the DNI will include the National
Intelligence Council (NIC), composed of senior analysts within the Intelligence
Community and substantive experts from the public and private sector.8 The members
of the NIC “shall constitute the senior intelligence advisers fo the Intelligence Community
for purposes of representing the views of the [I]ntelligence [C]ommunity within the
United States Government.” The members of the NIC are to be appointed by, report to,
and serve at the pleasure of the DNI.
The Intelligence Reform Act, provides that the DNI, when appointed, will be
responsible for NIEs and other analytical products prepared under the auspices of the NIC.
The three statutory responsibilities of the NIC have been to:
! produce national intelligence estimates for the Government, included,
whenever the Council considers appropriate, alternative views held by
elements of the intelligence community;
! evaluate community-wide collection and production of intelligence by
the intelligence community and the requirements and resources of such
collection and production; and
! otherwise assist the [DNI] in carrying out responsibilities established in
law.9
The DCI historically, and the DNI in the future, has a unique responsibility for the
quality of intelligence analysis for consumers at all levels of government. While a
number of agencies produce analytical products, the most authoritative intelligence
products of the U.S. Intelligence Community are published under the authority of the DCI
and potentially the DNI. NIEs are the primary, but not the sole, form in which the
Intelligence Community forwards its judgments to senior officials, and they are the only
one prescribed in statute. NIEs are produced at the NIC’s initiative or in response to
requests from senior policymakers.
NIEs are sometimes highly controversial. They are designed to set forth the best
objective judgments of the Intelligence Community, but they occasionally are more
closely related to policy rationales than some analysts would prefer. An NIE produced
in October 2002 on Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction has
been much criticized; a more recent NIE on prospects for Iraq has been the source of
significant media attention.10
8 50 USC 403-3(b).
9 50 USC 403-3(b)(2).
10 On the 2002 NIE see U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Intelligence
Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, S.Rept. 108-301, July 9, 2004; on the
more recent NIE, see Douglas Jehl, “U.S. Intelligence Shows Pessimism on Iraq’s Future,” New
York Times, September 16, 2004, p.1. Neither of these NIEs has yet been made public; earlier
NIEs are occasionally released; see, for instance, Donald P. Steury, ed., Intentions and
Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950-1983 (Washington: Center for the Study
Although the importance of particular NIEs to specific policy decisions may be
debatable,11 the NIE process provides a formal opportunity for the Intelligence
Community’s input to policy deliberations. Arguably, it is the responsibility of
policymakers to seek the input of the Intelligence Community, but most observers would
argue that the DNI should not be reticent in presenting intelligence information and
judgments on major policy issues when difficult decisions are under consideration.
National Intelligence Officers
The most recent chairman of the NIC is Ambassador Robert L. Hutchings, who had
previously served in the State Department and in academic institutions.12 In addition,
there are senior analysts, known as National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), for Africa, East
Asia, Economics and Global Issues, Europe, Intelligence Assurance, Latin America,
Military Issues, Near East and South Asia, Russia and Eurasia, Transnational Threats,
Warning, and Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation. The NIOs, who do not
receive Senate confirmation, come from a variety of government agencies, inside and
outside the Intelligence Community, and from the private sector.
National Intelligence Officers supervise the production of NIEs and other
community-wide products. Typically, an analyst in one agency is designated by the
relevant NIO to prepare a draft analytical product; the draft then is reviewed by relevant
analysts throughout the Community. Subsequently, if approved by the leadership of the
Intelligence Community (the National Foreign Intelligence Board) and the DCI, the draft
has been circulated to policymakers in the Executive Branch and, on occasion, to
Members of Congress. NIEs set forth the best information and judgments of the
Intelligence Community and are usually directed at significant issues that may require
policy decisions.
The NIOs have worked for the DCI in his capacity as head of the Intelligence
Community rather than in his capacity as director of the CIA. (In the future they will
report to the DNI.) Thus, NIEs and related analytical products have not been CIA
products; they have represented the consolidated views of the Intelligence Community
(with alternative views held by elements of the Intelligence Community noted, in
accordance with the statutory mandate13).
It may be reasonably assumed that the NIC will continue to depend heavily on the
resources of the CIA. The CIA contains the most extensive analytical capability across
the board on all subjects that might concern national policymakers, as well as
considerable capability to support military commanders and mid-level desk officers. The
CIA was originally designed to be “central,” without obligations to support departmental
objectives as has been considered to be the case with the intelligence arms of the military
services and the State Department. In some areas, however, other agencies have more
extensive capabilities and can make an equal or greater contribution to NIEs and other
of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1996).
11 See CRS Report RS21696, U.S. Intelligence and Policymaking: the Iraq Experience.
12 For a listing of the NIOs and a description of the NIC’s functions, see [http://odci.gov/nic/].
13 50 USC 403-3(b)(2)(A).
products designed to express the judgments of the entire Intelligence Community. Some
critics, moreover, charge that CIA on occasion develops an agency “position” that tends
to discourage alternate perspectives.14
Alternative Views and Concerns About Politicization
On many topics, there are inevitably different perspectives, and according to many
observers, policymakers are best served by rigorous presentations of alternative
positions.15 At the same time, however, some NIEs reflect an effort to craft language that
all agencies can agree on and thus to avoid airing differences that might draw agencies
into policy arguments between and among government departments. Agency managers
understand that too close involvement in a policy argument by intelligence analysts can
make their analyses unwelcome across the board. In addition, they well understand that
analysis is an uncertain science and art and that even the best analysts can miss
developments that loom large in retrospect and leave their agencies open to harsh
criticism or retribution.
Concern is often expressed about the extent to which intelligence products can
become “politicized,” i.e., be drafted to support or undermine certain policy options. A
charge of politicization is difficult to prove and is often dependent upon a reader’s
subjective viewpoint. Most observers believe that analysts make a conscientious effort
to avoid policy advocacy, but note that they are fully aware of policy disputes and may
have their own views that may, subconsciously or otherwise, influence their products.
There is, according to some observers, a tendency to avoid making intelligence judgments
that directly conflict with policy options that have been chosen. Observers caution that
placing intelligence analysis at the center of policy disputes can undermine the
effectiveness of the analytical contribution; they suggest that intelligence can best serve
by informing policy debates, but analysts cannot be expected to provide definitive
judgments that will resolve disputes that may involve a myriad of different factors, some
far removed from intelligence questions. In addition, observers note that it should be
recognized that policymaking sometimes involves making judgments based on incomplete
intelligence or on a willingness to accept risks and uncertainties beyond the ken of
analysts. Analysis can have a subjective quality to some degree and can be undermined
by unreasonable expectations.
The Intelligence Reform Act provides several provisions designed to ensure that
analysis is well-prepared and not politicized. In addition to having authority to establish
an Office of Inspector General, the DNI is to assign an individual or entity to ensure that
agencies conduct alternative analyses of information and conclusions in intelligence
products (section 1017). The DNI is also to assign an individual or entity to ensure that
intelligence products are “timely, objective, independent of political considerations, based
on all sources of available intelligence, and employ the standards of proper analytic
14 See S.Rept. 108-301, pp. 27-29.
15 The views of different agencies as reflected in the October 2002 NIE, Iraq’s Continuing
Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, are discussed in U.S., Senate, Select Committee on
Intelligence, U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, S.Rept.
tradecraft” (section 1019). Another section requires that the DNI assign an individual to
address analysts’ concerns about “real or perceived problems of analytic tradecraft or
politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objectivity in intelligence analysis” (section
Other Analytical Products: the President’s Daily Brief (PDB)
Left uncertain are responsibilities for preparing the written brief on current
intelligence that is prepared daily for the President and a very few other senior officials.
The President’s Daily Brief (PDB), along with the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief
(SEIB) that has a somewhat wider distribution, have been prepared by CIA’s Directorate
of Intelligence (DI) and are considered that directorate’s “flagship products.”
Nonetheless, should the DNI be responsible for daily substantive briefings at the White
House rather than the CIA Director, it might be considered appropriate that the DNI staff
draft the PDB and the SEIB, based on input from the CIA and other agencies. The
number of analysts who actually prepare the PBD/SEIB is not large, but their work
reflects ongoing analysis in the CIA and other parts of the Intelligence Community. Some
might argue, moreover, that close and important links between CIA desk-level analysts
and the PDB would be jeopardized should the briefs be prepared outside of the CIA.
In addition, there are myriads of other analytical products: reports, memoranda,
briefings, etc. that are prepared on a routine basis. The Intelligence Reform Act does not
transfer extensive analytical efforts to the NID; leaving such duties to existing agencies;
the NIC will be responsible for assessments that set forth the judgments of the Intelligence
Community as a whole.
Issues for Congress
The Intelligence Reform Act provides that the DNI will assume responsibilities for
managing the NIC. The DNI will be support by the NIC staff (probably numbering less
than 100 positions). This gives the DNI the capability to oversee the preparation of NIEs
and to ensure that the views of all agencies have been taken into consideration in inter-
agency assessments. A major change will be the fact that the NIOs and their staff will
work for one person (the DNI) while CIA analysts will report to a separate Director of the
CIA. Congress may ultimately assess whether these changes, as they are implemented,
have improved the efforts of the Intelligence Community and its analytical products.
The future responsibility for the production and presentation of the PDB/SEIBs is
uncertain. They are currently prepared by CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence, and that
responsibility could be continued. On the other hand, if the DNI, rather than the CIA
Director, is to conduct the daily briefing for the President and senior White House
officials, it might be argued that the DNI and the DNI’s immediate staff should have
responsibility for the document that provides the basis for the daily briefings.