Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks

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Iraq’s political system, the result of a U.S.-supported election process, continues to be riven by
sectarianism and ethnic and factional infighting. As 2009 begins, there is renewed maneuvering
by opponents of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to possibly try to replace him. Internal dissension
aside, the Bush Administration has been optimistic that the passage of key laws in 2008, coupled
with the provincial elections to be held January 31, 2009, will sustain recent reductions in
violence. Campaigning for the provincial elections, to be held in all provinces except Kirkuk and
the Kurdish-controlled provinces, has thus far been relatively peaceful and enthusiastic and party
slates appear to be considerably different than those that competed in the January 2005 provincial
elections. See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth
Katzman.

Elections and Constitutional Referendum in 2005..........................................................................1
Permanent Constitution.............................................................................................................1
December 15, 2005 Elections...................................................................................................2
Benchmarks, Reconciliation, and Provincial Elections...................................................................2
Provincial Elections............................................................................................................3
Table 1. Election Results (January and December 2005)................................................................5
Table 2. Assessments of the Benchmarks........................................................................................6
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................9

After about one year of occupation, the United States handed sovereignty to an appointed Iraqi
government on June 28, 2004. In line with a March 8, 2004, “Transitional Administrative Law”
(TAL), the first post-Saddam election was held on January 30, 2005, for a 275-seat transitional
National Assembly (which formed an executive), four-year term provincial councils in all 18
provinces and a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). The election system was proportional
representation/closed list: voters chose among “political entities” (a party, a coalition of parties,
or persons); 111 entities were on the national ballot, of which nine were multi-party coalitions.
Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population) boycotted, winning only 17 Assembly seats, and
only one seat on the Baghdad provincial council. Radical Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, then at
odds with U.S. forces, also boycotted, leaving his faction under-represented on provincial
councils in the Shiite south and in Baghdad. The resulting government placed Shiites and Kurds
in the most senior positions—Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani was
President and Da’wa (Shiite party) leader Ibrahim al-Jafari was Prime Minister. Sunnis were
Assembly speaker, deputy president, a deputy prime minister, and six ministers, including
defense.
The elected Assembly was to draft a constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum
by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any three provinces. On
May 10, 2005, a 55-member drafting committee was appointed, but with only two Sunni Arabs
(15 Sunnis were later added as full members and 10 as advisors). In August 2005, the talks
produced a draft, providing for: a December 31, 2007, deadline to hold a referendum on whether
Kirkuk (Tamim province) will join the Kurdish region (Article 140); designation of Islam “a main ¹
source” of legislation; a 25% electoral goal for women (Article 47); families choosing which
courts to use for family issues (Article 41); making only primary education mandatory (Article
34); and having Islamic law experts and civil law judges on the federal supreme court (Article
89). Many women opposed the two latter provisions as giving too much discretion to male family
members. It made all orders of the U.S.-led occupation authority (Coalition Provisional Authority,
CPA) applicable until amended (Article 126), and established a “Federation Council” (Article
62), a second chamber with its size and powers to be determined by subsequent law (not adopted
to date).
The major disputes—still unresolved—centered on regional versus centralized power. The draft
permitted two or more provinces together to form new autonomous “regions”—reaffirmed in
passage of an October 2006 law on formation of regions. Article 117 allows “regions” to organize
internal security forces, legitimizing the fielding the Kurds’ peshmerga militia (allowed by the
TAL). Article 109 requires the central government to distribute oil and gas revenues from “current
fields” in proportion to population, and gave regions a role in allocating revenues from new
energy discoveries. Disputes over these concepts continue to hold up passage of national
hydrocarbons legislation—Sunnis dominated areas of Iraq have few proven oil or gas deposits,

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and favor centralized control of oil revenues. The Kurds want to maintain maximum control of
their own burgeoning oil sector.
With contentious provisions unresolved, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-85%) to try to
defeat the constitution, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11, 2005) providing for a
panel to propose amendments within four months after a post-December 15 election government
took office (Article 137), to be voted on within another two months (under the same rules as the
October 15 referendum.) The Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no”
vote, respectively, but the constitution was adopted because Nineveh province only voted 55%
“no,” missing the threshold for a “no” vote by a two-thirds majority in three provinces.
In the December 15, 2005 elections for a four-year government (in line with the schedule laid out
in the TAL), each province contributed a predetermined number of seats to a “Council of
Representatives” (COR)—a formula adopted to attract Sunni participation. Of the 275-seat body,
230 seats were allocated this way, with 45 “compensatory” seats for entities that would have won
additional seats had the constituency been the whole nation. There were 361 political “entities,”
including 19 multi-party coalitions, competing. As shown in the table, voters chose lists
representing their sects and regions, and the Shiites and Kurds again emerged dominant. The
COR was inaugurated on March 16, 2006, but political infighting caused the Shiite bloc “United
Iraqi Alliance” to replace Jafari with another Da’wa figure, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as Prime
Minister. On April 22, the COR approved Talabani to continue as president. His two deputies are
Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Tariq al-
Hashimi, leader of the Accord Front (Iraqi Islamic Party). Another Accord figure, the hardline
Mahmoud Mashhadani (National Dialogue Council party), is COR speaker. Maliki won a COR
vote for a 37-member cabinet (including himself and two deputy prime ministers) on May 20,
2006. Three key slots (Defense, Interior, and National Security) were not filled permanently until
June 2006, due to infighting. Of the 37 posts, there were 19 Shiites; 9 Sunnis; 8 Kurds; and 1
Christian. Four were women.

The 2005 elections did not resolve the grievances in Iraq’s communities over their new positions
in the post-Saddam power structure. In August 2006, the Administration and Iraq agreed on a
series of “benchmarks” that, if adopted and implemented, might achieve political reconciliation.
Under Section 1314 of a FY2007 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 110-28), “progress” on
eighteen political and security benchmarks—as assessed in Administration reports due by July 15,
2007 and then September 15, 2007—were required for the United States to provide $1.5 billion in
Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Iraq. The President used the waiver provision. The law also
mandated an assessment by the GAO, by September 1, 2007, of the degree to which the
benchmarks have been met, as well as an outside assessment of the Iraqi security forces (ISF).
As 2008 progressed, citing the achievement of almost all of the major legislative benchmarks –
and the dramatic drop in sectarian-motivate violence attributed to the U.S. “troop surge” – the
Bush Administration asserted that political reconciliation was well under way. However, U.S.

officials continue to maintain that the extent and durability of reconciliation will largely depend
on the degree of implementation of the adopted laws. The legislative progress achieved a
breakthrough on February 13, 2008 with passage (unanimously, with 206 members voting) of an
amnesty law, the provincial powers law, and the 2008 national budget. However, a June 2008
study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO-08-837) said the legislative moves have
had limited effect in healing the rifts in Iraqi politics. Iraq’s performance on the “benchmarks” is
in the table below.
During 2008, Maliki’s growing perceived strength helped him rebuild his government, but has
caused some adverse consequences for his political position. The pullout of the Accord Front, the
Sadr faction, and the bloc of former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi in 2007 left the cabinet with
about 13 vacant seats out of a 37 seat cabinet. A March 2008 offensive ordered by Maliki against
the Sadr faction and other militants in Basra and environs ultimately pacified the city, weakened
Sadr politically, and caused some Sunnis and Kurds to see Maliki as more even-handed and non-
sectarian than previously thought. This contributed to a decision by the Accord Front to return to
the cabinet in July 2008. Other cabinet vacancies were filled, mostly by independents, to the point
where the cabinet now only has one vacancy (ministry of Justice). At the same time, U.S. officials
became concerned that Maliki’s growing independence from the United States could lead to
reversals, for example by creating restiveness among the Sunni “Sons of Iraq” fighters who he
has refused to integrate wholesale into the Iraqi Security Forces. The 100,000 fighters nationwide
cooperate with U.S. forces against Al Qaeda in Iraq and other militants. Still, the assumption of
the payments of the Sons by the Iraqi government in November 2008 has been relatively without
incident to date, calming U.S. fears to some extent. Emboldened by his political strength but also
attentive to pressure by Iran, Maliki insisted on substantial U.S. concessions in the U.S.-Iraq
“status of forces agreement” (SOFA) that passed the COR on November 27, 2008 over Sadrist
opposition, and notwithstanding Sunni efforts to obtain assurances of their future security. The
pact took effect January 1, 2009, limiting the prerogatives of U.S. troops to operate in Iraq and
setting a timetable of December 31, 2011 for a U.S. withdrawal.
Maliki’s growing strength is causing concern even among Maliki’s erstwhile political allies. The
Kurds, a key source of support for him, are increasing at odds with his leadership because of his
formation of government-run “tribal support councils” in northern Iraq, which the Kurds see as an
effort to prevent them from gaining control of disputed territories. ISCI, the longstanding main
ally of Maliki’s Da’wa Party, is competing with the Da’wa for provincial council seats, as
discussed below, and accuse him of surrounding himself with Da’wa veterans to the exclusion of
other decision-makers. The competition has prompted reports that several major factions are
considering attempting to bring about a “no-confidence” vote against Maliki. The late December
2008 resignation, under pressure, of Sunni COR Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, who was
perceived as blocking a no confidence motion, could be one outward indicator of the dissension.
Still, Maliki’s opponents are said to be unable, to date, to agree on who would replace him as
Prime Minister – a consideration that was widely judged to have kept Maliki in office in 2006 and

2007.

The Bush Administration and President-elect Obama are placing significant weight on the
January 31, 2009 provincial elections to consolidate the reconciliation process. Provincial
councils in Iraq choose the governor and provincial governing administrations in each province,
making them powerful bodies. The elections had been were planned for October 1, 2008, but
were delayed when Kurdish restiveness over integrating Kirkuk and other disputed territories into

the KRG caused a presidential veto of the July 22, 2008 election law needed to hold these
elections. The draft law provided for equal division of power in Kirkuk (between Kurds, Arabs,
and Turkomans) until its status is finally resolved, prompting Kurdish opposition to any
weakening of their dominance in Kirkuk. Following the summer COR recess, the major political
blocs agreed to put aside the Kirkuk dispute and passed a revised provincial election law on
September 24, 2008, providing for the elections by January 31, 2009. (This is now formally set.)
The revised law stripped out provisions in the vetoed version to allot 13 total reserved seats
(spanning six provinces) to minorities. However, in October 2008, the COR adopted a new law
restoring six reserved seats for minorities: Christian seats in Baghdad, Nineveh, and Basra;
Yazidis one seat in Nineveh; Shabaks one seat in Nineveh; and Sabeans one seat in Baghdad.
U.S. officials have hoped that the elections would bring Sunni Muslims ever further into the
political structure. Sunnis boycotted the January 2005 provincial elections and are poorly
represented in some mixed provinces, such as Diyala. It is also hoped that the elections will help
incorporate into the political structure the tribal leaders (“Awakening Councils”) who recruited
the Sons of Iraq fighters. These Sunni tribalists are hoping to show strength at the expense of the
established Sunni parties. Others see the elections as key opportunity to move Moqtada al-Sadr’s
faction firmly away from armed conflict against the mainstream Shiite parties. That conflict
surged in the March 2008 Basra offensive discussed above. .
As campaigning heats up in January 2009, there are 14,500 candidates vying for the 440
provincial council seats in the 14 Arab-dominated provinces of Iraq. This yields an average of 33
candidates for each seat, which some see as enthusiasm for democracy in Iraq. Voters can choose
an individual candidate, or they can vote for political parties instead. The parties will then choose
who on their slate will occupy seats allotted for that party.
Some of the political tensions and fissures are evident in the candidate lists offered so far. In the
mostly Shiite southern provinces, ISCI and Maliki’s Da’wa are offering competing lists. Sadr
announced in October 2008 that he would not field a separate list in the provincial elections but
support Sadrists on other lists. Sadr’s faction has not yet announced who are the candidates it is
supporting, but the pro-Sadr “Risalyun” (Mission) grouping has filed candidate slates in several
provinces mostly in the south. Two other parties competing are considered Sadrist – the
“Blamelessness and Reconstruction” party and the “Sadr al-Iraq” party. The Shiite independent
Interior Minister Jawad al-Bulani has fielded candidates under his “Constitutional Party” not only
in the Shiite south but also in Sunni areas, suggesting he is trying to portray his party as national
and non-sectarian. The competition in the provincial elections in the south comes amid a move
by many Basra citizens to file a petition, under the 2006 regions law, to form a new region
consisting only of Basra province. Whether or not a formal referendum will take place in Basra
could be determined before the provincial elections, and could thereby favor or hurt such Basra-
specific parties as Fadhila (Virtue), an offshoot of the Sadr faction.

Table 1. Election Results (January and December 2005)
^Bloc/Party^Seats^{(Jan. 05)}^Seats^{(Dec. 05)}
^{United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, Shiite}^{Islamist). Now 85 seats af}^{ter dep}^{arture of Fadilah (15}
^{seats) and Sadr faction (2}^{8 seats)}^{in 20}^{07. Islamic Su}^{preme Cou}^{ncil of Iraq of A}^{bd al-Aziz}^{140 128}
^{al-Hakim has 30; Da’wa Party (2}⁵^{total: Malik}^{i faction, 12, and Anizi faction, 13);}
^independents^(30).
^{Kurdistan Alliance - KDP (24); PUK (22); independe}^{nts (7)}⁷⁵⁵³
^{Iraqis List (sec}^{ular, Allawi)}^{; added}^{Communist and oth}^{er mostly Su}^{nni par}^{ties for Dec.}^{40 25}
^vote.
^{Iraq Accord Fro}^{nt. Main Su}^{nni bl}^{oc; not in Jan. vote. Consists of Ir}^{aqi Islamic Party (IIP,}^{— 44}
^{Tariq al-Hashimi, 26 seats); National Dialogue Council of Khalaf Ul}^{ayyan (7); Ge}^neral
^{People’s Congress of Adnan al-Dulaymi (7); independent}^{s (4).}
^{National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, led by former Baat}^{hist Saleh}^{al-Mutlak) Not in Jan.}^{— 11}
²⁰⁰^{5 vote.}
^{Kurdistan Islamic Gro}^{up (Islamist}^{Kurd) (votes with Kurdistan Alliance)}²⁵
^{Iraqi National Congress (C}^{halabi). Was part of UIA list in Ja}^{n. 05}^v^ote^—⁰
^{Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sun}^{ni); Part of Allawi}^{list in Dec. vote}⁵^—
^{Iraqi Turkome}^{n Front (Tur}^{komen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)}³¹
^{National Independe}^{nt and}^{Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) p}^ro-Sadr³²
^{People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi l}^{ist in Dec. vote}²^—
^{Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Ka}^rbala)²⁰
^{National Democratic All}^{iance (non-sectarian, sec}^ular)¹^—
^{Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)}¹¹
^{Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Umar al-Jab}^bu^{ri, Sunni, se}^cular)¹³
^{Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)}⁰¹
^Yazid^{i list (sma}^{ll Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in norther}ⁿ^Iraq)^—¹
^Notes:^{Number of}^{polling places: January:}^5,20^{0; Decembe}^{r: 6,20}^{0; Eligible voters: 14 million in Jan}^{uary election;}
^{15 million in October re}^fere^ndu^{m and Decemb}^{er; Tur}^{nout: Jan}^ua^{ry: 58%}^{(8.5 million votes)/ October: 6}^{6% (1}⁰
^mill^{ion)/ December: 75%}⁽¹²^milli^on).

Table 2. Assessments of the Benchmarks
^{July 12,}^{Subsequent Actions an}^{d Ass}^{essments - May 20}^{08 Admini}^stration
^Benchmark²⁰⁰⁷^Admin.^GAO^{(Sept. 0}⁷⁾^{Sept. 1}^{4, 2}⁰⁰⁷^{Admin. Repo}^rt^{report, June 2008 GAO repo}^{rt, International Compa}^{ct wi}^{th Iraq}^{Review in June 200}^{8, and U.S. Embassy Weekly Status Re}^ports
^Report^{(and vario}^{us p}^{ress sour}^ces)
^{1. Forming Constitutional Review}^(S)^unmet^S^{CRC continues debating}⁵⁰^amen^{dments regarding}^{federal vs. regi}^{onal powers}
^{Committee (CRC) and completin}^{g review}^satisfactory^{and presidential powers; K}^{urds w}^{ant Kirkuk issu}^{e settled before}^finalizing
^{amendments. Su}^{nnis wa}^{nt p}^{residential council to have en}^hanced^p^owers
^{relative to prime minister. Some progress on}^tech^{nical, judicia}^{l iss}^{ues. Deadlines}
^{for final recommendations re}^peat^{edly extended.}
^{2. Enacting}^{and impleme}^{nting laws on De-}^(U)^unmet^S^{“Justice and Ac}^counta^{bility Law” passed Ja}^{n. 12, 2}⁰⁰^{8. Allows about 3}^0,00⁰
^{Baathification}^unsatisfact.^fourth^{ranking Baat}^{hists to regain}^{their jobs, and 3,5}^{00 Baat}^{hists in}^{top three}
^{party ra}^{nks would rec}^{eive pe}^{nsions. But, could allow for judic}^{ial prosecution of}^{all ex-Baathists and to firing of ab}^{out 7,00}^{0 e}^{x-Baathists in post-Saddam security}
^{services, and bar}^{s ex-Saddam sec}^{urity pe}^{rsonnel f}^{rom regaining jobs. Some}
^{reports s}^{uggest some De-Baathification officials using the new}^{law to purge}
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RS21968}^politica^{l enemies or settle scores.}
^g/w^{3. Enacting}^{and impleme}^{nting oil l}^{aws that}^U^unmet^U^{Framework and th}^{ree impleme}^{nting laws stalled over KRG-central}^government
^s^.or^ensu^{re eq}^{uitable distribution of r}^esources^{disputes; only framework}^{law has}^{reached COR to date. Reven}^ue^being
^le^ak^{distributed equitably, and}²⁰⁰⁸^b^{udget adopted Febr}^uary^{13, 2}⁰⁰⁸^maintains^17%^reve^nue^{for KRG. Some rep}^{orts in Decembe}^{r 2}⁰⁰⁸^sugg^este^{d KRG-}
^://wiki^{Baghdad compromise is close on framework and}^reven^{ue s}^{haring i}^mplementing^law.
^h^ttp
^{4. Enacting}^{and impleme}^{nting laws to form}^S^{partly met}^S^{Regions law passed October}²⁰⁰^{6, with relatively low threshold (petition by}
^{semi-autonomous regions}^{33% of}^{provincial council mem}^be^{rs) to start p}^{rocess to form}^new^{regions, but}
^{main blocs agreed that}^{law would take effect A}^{pril 20}^08.^Novembe^{r 20}^08:
^{petition by 2}^%^{of Basra r}^esidents^{submitted to IH}^{EC (anothe}^{r way}^{to start}
^{forming a region) to convert Bas}^r^a^{province into a single}^province^“region.
^{Signatures of 8}^%^{more r}^e^q^{uired by mid-Janua}^{ry 2}⁰⁰⁹^{to trigger}^re^ferendu^m.

^{July 12,}^{Subsequent Actions an}^{d Ass}^{essments - May 20}^{08 Admini}^stration
^Benchmark²⁰⁰⁷^Admin.^GAO^{(Sept. 0}⁷⁾^{Sept. 1}^{4, 2}⁰⁰⁷^{Admin. Repo}^rt^{report, June 2008 GAO repo}^{rt, International Compa}^{ct wi}^{th Iraq}^{Review in June 200}^{8, and U.S. Embassy Weekly Status Re}^ports
^Report^{(and vario}^{us p}^{ress sour}^ces)
^{5. Enacting}^{and impleme}^{nting: (a) a law to}^{S on (a)}^overall^{S on (a) and (c)}^{Draft law stipulating powers}^{of p}^{rovincial governments adopted F}^ebrua^{ry 1}^3,
^{establish a highe}^{r electoral commission, (b)}^{and U on}^{unmet; (a)}²⁰⁰^{8, took effect A}^{pril 20}^{08. Req}^{uired implementing election law a}^dopted
^{provincial elections law; (c) a law}^{to specify}^{the others}^met^September²^{4, 20}^{08: (1) Provides for provincial elections by Ja}^nua^r^y^31,²⁰^09;
^{authorities of provincial bodies, and (d) set}^{(2) postpones elections in Kirk}^uk^{and the t}^{hree KRG}^province^{s; (3}^{) shu}^nts
^{a date for provincial elections}^{broader issue of stat}^{us of Kirk}^uk^{and disputed ter}^{ritories to a parliamentary}
^{committee to report by}^Marc^h³^{1, 20}^{09; (4)}^{provides open list/pr}^oportional
^represe^{ntation voting, which allows voting for individual candidates; (5)}
^{stipulates 2}^5%^{quota for wome}^n;^{(6) bans}^{religious symbols on ballots. Under}
^{amending law, some seats now se}^{t aside for Christian, Yazidi}^{, Shabak, and}
^{Sabean minorities.}
^{6. Enacting}^{and impleme}^{nting legislation}^{no rating}^unmet^{Same as July}^{Law to amnesty “}^{non-terrorists”}^{among 25,0}⁰⁰^Ira^{q-held detainees}^passed
^{addressing amnesty}^{for forme}^{r in}^surgen^ts^Februar^{y 1}^{3, 20}^{08. O}^f¹^7,00^{0 a}^p^{proved for release (mostly Sun}^nis^{and Sadrist}
^{Shiites), only a few hundred r}^{eleased to date. 19,00}^{0 detainees}^{held by U.S. not}
^{affected, but}^{will be transfe}^{rred t}^o^{Iraqi control unde}^{r SOFA whic}^{h took effect}
ⁱ^{ki/CRS-RS21968}^Janua^{ry 1,}²⁰^09.
^g/w^{7. Enacting}^{and impleme}^{nting laws on}^{no rating}^unmet^{Same as July}^{Basra operation, discussed above, viewed by Bus}^{h Administration a}^s^move
^s^.or^milit^{ia disarmament}^{against militias}^{. On April 9, 2}⁰⁰^{8, Maliki demanded all mi}^lit^{ias disband as}
^le^ak^{condition for their parties to pa}^rt^{icipate in provincial elections. Law on militia}
^demobilizat^{ion stalle}^d.
^://wiki^{8. Establishing}^political^{, media, ec}^onomic,^S^met^met^{No change. “}^Exec^{utive Steering}^{Committee” works with U.S.-}^led^forces.
^h^ttp^{and services committee to s}^u^p^{port U.S.}
^“surge”
^{9. Providing three trained a}^{nd re}^ady^S^{partly met}^S^{No change.}^{Eight b}^{rigades assigne}^{d to assist the su}^{rge. Surge}^{now ended.}
^{brigades to sup}^{port U.S. surge}
^{10. Providing Iraqi commande}^rs^with^U^unmet^{S to purs}^ue^{No significant cha}^{nge. Still some}^{U.S. concern over the}^{Office of t}^he
^{authorities to make decisions, without}^{extremists U on}^{Commander in Chief (}^{part of Mal}^{iki’s office) control}^{over appoint}^{ments to the}
^politica^{l intervention, to purs}^{ue a}^ll^politica^l^{ISF - favoring Shiites. Sti}^ll^{, some polit}^ically^{-motivated lea}^{ders remain in ISF. But,}
^{extremists, including Su}^{nni insu}^rg^{ents and}^interfere^nce^{National Pol}^{ice said to include more Sunnis in}^{command jobs and}^{rank a}^{nd file}
^{Shiite mil}^itias^{than one}^{year ago.}
^{11. E}^nsu^{ring Ira}^{qi Security Forces}^(ISF)^U^unmet^{S on military, U}^{Administration interpreted Basra}^{operation as effort}^by^{Maliki to e}^{nforce law}
^{providing even-ha}^{nded enforcem}^{ent of law}^{on police}^even-ha^{ndedly, but acknowledges}^{continued militia influence and in}^{filtration in}
^{some units.}

^Kenⁿ^eth^Katz^m^aⁿ
^Specialis^{t i}ⁿ^{Middle Eas}^t^ern^Aff^a^irs
^k^k^a^t^z^m^a^n@^crs^.^l^o^c.g^o^v^,^7-⁷⁶¹²