Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Capabilities: The State Departments Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization
CRS Report for Congress
Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Capabilities:
The State Department’s Office for
Reconstruction and Stabilization
Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs, and
Martin A. Weiss, Analyst in International Trade and Finance
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The State Department’s new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization (S/CRS) is intended to address longstanding concerns, both within
Congress and the broader policy community, over what is seen as inadequate planning
mechanisms for stabilization and reconstruction operations, lack of inter-agency
coordination in carrying out such tasks, and inappropriate capabilities for many of the
non-military tasks required. Effectively distributing resources among the various
executive branch actors, maintaining clear lines of authority and jurisdiction, and
balancing short- and long-term objectives are major challenges for designing, planning,
and conducting post-conflict operations. This report will not be updated.
The State Department’s creation in July 2004 of the Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) responded to increasing calls for the
improvement of U.S. civilian capabilities to plan and carry out post-conflict operations.
These calls were reflected in several bills introduced in the 108th Congress.1
S/CRS is currently comprised of 37 officials from the State Department and other
U.S. government agencies. The Coordinator, Ambassador Carlos Pascual, has been given
1 These bills were: The Winning the Peace Act of 2003 (H.R. 2616 introduced by Rep. Sam Farr
on Jun. 26, 2003); The Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004
(known as the “Lugar-Biden bill,” S. 2127 introduced by Senators Lugar and Biden on Feb. 25,
2004, and its companion measure, H.R. 3996 introduced by Rep. Schiff on Mar. 18, 2004); the
International Security Enhancement Act of 2004 (H.R. 4185, introduced by Rep. Dreier on Apr.
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a broad mandate to develop proposals for improving U.S. government practices and
structures for handling future post-conflict operations, including new civilian capabilities.2
The term “post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization” is broad but is usually
understood to encompass tasks and missions to promote security and encourage stable,
democratic governance and economic growth following major hostilities. In the past,
many of the “stabilization” activities were loosely labeled “peacekeeping.” These include
activities ranging from organizing humanitarian relief efforts, monitoring and enforcing
cease-fires and other arrangements designed to separate contending parties, providing
observers to monitor elections, and establishing or re-creating police or civil defense
forces. Reconstruction involves repairing (in some cases creating) the infrastructure
necessary to support long-term economic growth and development. This infrastructure can
be physical (i.e., roads and schools), or institutional (i.e., legal and tax systems).3
Background
Post-conflict operations are complex undertakings, usually involving the
participation of several United Nations (U.N.) departments and U.N. system agencies, the
international financial institutions and a plethora of non-governmental humanitarian and
development organizations, as well as the military and other departments or ministries of
the United States and other nations. The United States developed its contributions to the
earliest international “peacekeeping” operations of the 1990s on an ad hoc basis, with
little inter-agency planning and coordination, and often with the U.S. military in the lead.
The military was called upon to perform such missions not only for its extensive resources
but also because no other U.S. government agency could match the military’s superior
planning and organizational capabilities. In addition, because of its manpower, the
military carried out most of the U.S. humanitarian and nation-building contribution, even
though some believed that civilians might be better suited to carry out such tasks,
especially those involving cooperation with humanitarian NGOs.
During the 1990s, many analysts began to perceive the need to improve and increase
civilian contributions to peacekeeping operations, especially for those activities related
to planning and conducting operations and to establishing a secure environment. An
important Clinton Administration initiative was the May 1997 Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD) 56, entitled The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex
Contingency Operations. It sought to address inter-agency planning and coordination
problems through new planning and implementing mechanisms. Due to what some
analysts describe as internal bureaucratic resistance, PDD 56’s provisions were never
formally implemented, although some of its practices were informally adopted. The
Administration also attempted to remedy the shortage of one critical nation-building tool,
international civilian police forces, through PDD 71, Strengthening Criminal Justice
2 S/CRS’ activities are to be prospective, dealing with new situations and crises; they will not
include Iraq and Afghanistan.
3 For additional background on various aspects of post-conflict reconstruction and assistance, see
CRS Issue Brief IB94040, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S.
Military Involvement; CRS Issue Brief IB90103, United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for
Congress; and CRS Report RS21819, World Bank Post-Conflict Aid: Oversight Issues for
Congress, by Martin Weiss (archived, available from author, 7-5407).
Systems in Support of Peace Operations, which, while never implemented by the Clinton
Administration, has been partially put into force by the Bush Administration.4
Improvements in the provision of social and economic assistance are also viewed as
crucial to successful outcomes. Post-conflict populations need “safety net” and poverty
alleviation programs, as well as technical assistance and advice on monetary and fiscal
policy and debt management in order to create an environment conducive to
democratization and economic growth.5 While the popular image of U.S. post-conflict
assistance is the post-World War II Marshall Plan, through which the United States
provided the foreign assistance needed for Europe’s post-conflict reconstruction,
multilateral institutions became increasingly important during the 1990s, when small,
regional conflicts proliferated following the collapse of the Soviet Union. International
organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund now play
crucial roles, working with the U.S. government to provide economic assistance and
technical advice on rebuilding post-conflict economies. (Nevertheless, although the
United States has provided some funding for economic reconstruction multilaterally for
the recent Afghanistan and Iraq operations, most U.S. funding for post-conflict operations
is provided bilaterally.) Many analysts now judge that multilateral assistance is more
effective for the recipient country than bilateral aid for two reasons.6 First, disbursing
funds multilaterally through U.N. agencies or international organizations gives greater
assurance that it will reach recipients than providing aid bilaterally with direct payments
to individual governments or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In addition,
analysts find that bilateral aid is more likely to be apportioned according to the donor’s
foreign policy priorities rather than the economic needs of the recipient country.7
For many analysts and policymakers, the ongoing Iraq operation illustrates a U.S.
government need for new planning and coordination arrangements that would provide a
leadership role for civilians in post-conflict phases of military operations and new civilian
capabilities to augment and relieve the military as soon as possible, and greater
international coordination. The perception of a continuing need for such operations, and
the perceived inefficiencies of the still largely ad hoc U.S. responses have reinvigorated
calls for planning and coordination reform. The Bush Administration’s reluctance to use
military forces for nation-building tasks and the extreme stresses placed on the military
by combat roles in Iraq and Afghanistan have pushed those calls in a new direction, to the
development of adequate civilian capabilities to perform those tasks.
4 See CRS Report RL32321, Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations:
Problems and Proposed Solutions.
5 Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke “Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies,” World
Bank Working Paper, Oct. 2002.
6 Milner, Helen, “Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic Principal Agent Problems,”
available at [http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/seminars/pegroup/milner.pdf], and Schiavo-Campo,
S., “Financing and Aid Arrangements In Post-Conflict Situations,” World Bank Working Paper,
May 2003.
7 Alesina, Alberto and Dollar, David, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” NBER
Working Paper No. w6612, June 1998.
Calls for Change
The perception that international terrorism can exploit weak, unstable states has
convinced many policymakers of the need to strengthen U.S. and international capabilities
to foster security, good governance and economic development, especially in post-conflict
situations. Most recently, the 9/11 Commission and the Commission on Weak States and
U.S. National Security8 have judged weak states, as well as unsuccessful post-conflict
transitions, to pose a threat to U.S. security. Such states often experience economic strife
and political instability that make them vulnerable to drug trafficking, human trafficking
and other criminal enterprises, and to linkage with non-state terrorist groups (such as the
links between the previous Taliban government in Afghanistan and the Al Qaeda terrorist
network). Weak states also are unprepared to handle major public health issues, such as
HIV/AIDS, that can generate political and economic instability.9 These commissions
argued for assistance to the governments of weak states and of post-conflict transitions
regimes to help them control their territories, meet their citizens’ basic needs, and create
legitimate governments based on effective, transparent institutions.
These and other studies recognize a need to enhance U.S. government structures and
capabilities for conducting post-conflict operations.10 Although differing in several
respects, the studies largely agree on five points: (1) the current ad hoc system needs to
be replaced with a permanent mechanism for developing contingency plans and
procedures for joint civil-military operations led by civilians; (2) mechanisms to rapidly
deploy U.S. civilian government and government-contracted personnel need to be put in
place; (3) preventive action needs to be considered; (4) the U.S. government needs to
enhance multinational capabilities to carry out post-conflict security tasks and to better
coordinate international aid; and (5) flexible funding arrangements are needed to deal with
such situations. Major differences concern the placement of a permanent planning and
coordinating structure, the emphasis given to rule of law (i.e., police, judicial and penal
personnel) vs. economic/reconstruction aid, and the attention paid to preventive measures.
S/CRS’ Current Mission and Activities
Congress endorsed the creation of S/CRS in the Consolidated Appropriations Act
for FY2005 (H.R. 4818, P.L. 108-447). Section 408, Division D defined six
8 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
upon the United States, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004; and On the Brink: A
Report of the Commission on Weak States and US National Security, sponsored by the Center for
Global Development, May 2004.
9 Prins, Gwyn, “AIDS and Global Security” International Affairs, vol. 80, Issue 5, 2004.
10 The reports are: (1) Play to Win: The Final Report of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-
Conflict Reconstruction, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the
Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA), 2003 (a book-length version was published in mid-2004,
Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Robert C. Orr, ed.);
(2) Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, CSIS, Mar. 2004; (3)
Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, National Defense University
Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Apr. 2004, (4) On the Brink: Weak States
and US National Security, Center for Global Development, May 2004; and Transition to and
From Hostilities, Defense Science Board, Dec. 2004.
responsibilities for the office, the first five of which respond to the first need — for
readily-deployable crisis response mechanism — stated above. These are (1) to catalogue
and monitor the non-military resources and capabilities of executive branch agencies,
state and local governments, and private and non-profit organizations “that are available
to address crises in countries or regions that are in, or are in transition from, conflict or
civil strife;” (2) to determine the appropriate non-military U.S. response to those crises,
“including but not limited to demobilization, policy, human rights, monitoring, and public
information efforts; (3) to plan that response; (4) to coordinate the development of
interagency contingency plans for that response; and (5) to coordinate the training of
civilian personnel to perform stabilization and reconstruction activities in response to
crises in such countries or regions.” The sixth is to monitor political and economic
instability worldwide to anticipate the need for U.S. and international assistance.
The office is developing proposals on how to enable the U.S. government to more
effectively respond to crises and carry out all these activities. Two of the proposals
concern the development of more integrated and coherent groups of personnel to respond
to crises. The first would create a “Response Readiness Corps” of existing and additional
U.S. government personnel which would facilitate the transition from military to civilian
leadership on the ground and to manage more effectively civilian resources in the post-
conflict environment. It would be comprised of three units: (1) a diplomatic response
group to establish diplomatic operations in crisis response efforts, to participate in peace
negotiations, and to develop relationships with transitional governments and liaise with
international organizations, (2) a technical group to design and manage transitional
security and governance programs, and (3) an advance civilian team of staff from S/CRS
and from diplomatic and technical groups to deploy with military forces at the beginning
of an intervention in order to assume stabilization responsibilities, freeing up military
personnel for other tasks. S/CRS has also begun to work with the Joint Forces Command
on a feasibility study for a “Civilian Response Corps” to assess possible options for the
development of a reserve of retired government personnel, and personnel from state and
local governments, private for-profit companies and non-profit NGOSs to carry out rule
of law and reconstruction activities.
S/CRS has already begun instituting mechanisms to carry out some of its
responsibilities. To monitor potential crises, S/CRS has asked the National Intelligence
Council (NIC) to provide it twice a year with a list of weak states most susceptible to
crisis, and is to choose one or more of them as test cases to prepare contingency plans for
possible interventions. It is also working with the USAID Office of Conflict Management
and Mitigation, which is developing techniques for assessing conflicts that will provide
a high level of detail about a conflict or impending conflict. To better plan and carry out
response efforts, S/CRS is developing a system to collect, analyze, and transmit “lessons
learned.” To address the need for greater interagency, particularly civil-military, planning
and coordination, S/CRS is working with the military to develop, among other things,
civilian-military training exercises for stabilization and reconstruction operations and a
common template for civil-military stabilization and reconstruction planning.
In two related areas necessary to carrying out Congress’ mandates, S/CRS has also
taken a role. First, it has begun to develop ties with other international participants to
coordinate and enhance civilian capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction activities.
S/CRS also is seeking to help State Department regional bureaus, which have the lead on
preventive activities, to develop concepts and proposals for preventive action.
Major Issues for Congress
Funding for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations. Would U.S.
foreign policy interests benefit from a flexible funding mechanism for crisis responses and
what are the oversight consequences? The Bush Administration is likely to again ask
Congress to provide a new, flexible funding mechanism to respond rapidly to developing
crises. The 108th Congress turned down repeated requests for $100 million for an
“Emergency Fund for Complex Foreign Crises”in foreign operations appropriations. In
conference on the FY2005 omnibus appropriations bill, H.R. 4818, Congress deleted a
Senate foreign operations appropriations provision that would have created a State
Department Crisis Response Fund with $20 million of no-year money.11
Inter-Agency Planning and Coordinating Structures. Would the creation
of new government arrangements or entities enhance the United States’ ability to plan and
coordinate such activities? Congress would have to approve any major restructuring of
U.S. government agencies, as well as any possible authorities necessary to carry out new
or reorganized functions. Proposals differ as to which functions belong in the National
Security Council and which would be better served by placement in the Department of
State. In the 108th Congress, Representative Dreier’ bill (H.R. 4185) would have created
an Undersecretary of State for Overseas Contingencies and Stabilization position.
Competing Priorities and Resource Allocations. Since post-conflict
assistance encompasses both short-term stabilization and long-term reconstruction there
is great potential for disputes over resource allocation priorities. Among the questions
are:
!Would investment in preventative activities be successful in averting
civil conflicts that might later require costly interventions?
!What is the optimal distribution of responsibility between civilian and
military actors for establishing immediate security and conditions for
growth in a post-conflict environment, and what resources are required?
!How can policymakers be assured that resources are distributed
effectively?
!What are the appropriate U.S. civilian capabilities needed to undertake
the security and economic challenges and how can funding be best
allocated to optimize training and responsiveness?
!To what extent can international capabilities replace or augment U.S.
resources?
11 The “Lugar-Biden” legislation (S. 2127 and H.R. 3996) proposed a rotating account for
stabilization and reconstruction activities, funded at $100 million with an authorization for
replenishment as needed. (This mechanism appears similar in concept to the Emergency Refugee
and Migration Assistance or ERMA emergency relief account.) This proposal also would have
provided the president with authority to transfer money among foreign operations accounts
without regard to funding limits. The Dreier legislation (H.R. 4185) proposed the creation of
such an account with no-year money, but with no automatic replenishment or transfer authority.