NPT Compliance: Issues

CRS Report for Congress
NPT Compliance Issues
Sharon Squassoni
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
President Bush remarked in 2005 that “[Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] NPT
Parties must take strong action to confront the threat of noncompliance with the
NPT...We cannot allow rogue states that violate their commitments...to undermine the
NPT’s fundamental role in strengthening international security.” North Korea and Iran
pose two clear compliance challenges to the treaty. However, some NPT parties are
adamant that the United States and other nuclear weapon states are not complying with
their own obligations to pursue nuclear disarmament. This report, which will be updated
as needed, discusses different views and issues of NPT compliance.
The May 2005 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference failed to
produce any substantive agreements, revealing fissures in the nonproliferation regime at
a time when the United States requires considerable support for its “tailored” approaches
to countries and problems of proliferation concern. In part, the failure to make progress
on the most pressing NPT problems — North Korea, Iran, and nuclear disarmament —¹
is rooted in long-standing differences in how NPT compliance is viewed. As they have
in the past, nuclear weapon states argued that the international regime needed to
strengthen its ability to address the non-compliance of non-nuclear weapon states such as
Iran and North Korea, while non-nuclear weapon states argued that nuclear weapon states
needed to better comply with their obligations to eventually disarm, and to share the
peaceful uses of the atom.
Background
The NPT, which entered into force in 1970, has often been described as a grand
bargain. Under the treaty, non-nuclear weapon states agree to give up pursuit of nuclear
weapons, but not their pursuit of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main
obligations of the non-nuclear weapon states are to foreswear nuclear weapons (Article
II), submit to IAEA safeguards inspections (Article III), and not supply certain nuclear-

¹ See CRS Report RL32857, The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference: Issues
for Congress, and CRS Report RS21592, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

related items unless they are under safeguards (Article III).² The main obligations of the
nuclear weapon states are not to transfer or help non-nuclear weapon states acquire
nuclear weapons (Article I), not to supply certain nuclear-related items unless they are
under safeguards (Article III), to facilitate the exchange of peaceful nuclear energy
technology (Article IV), and to pursue negotiations toward nuclear disarmament (Article
VI).
The bifurcation of states into nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” has led, at times, to
opposing views on many aspects of treaty implementation. For example, some states
would like to focus on whether the nuclear weapon states are complying with Articles IV
(technical cooperation) and VI (nuclear disarmament) of the treaty, while other states
would like to focus on whether the non-nuclear weapon states are complying with Articles
II (obligation not to develop or receive nuclear weapons) and III (safeguards).
The NPT itself is silent on how to assess compliance, how to resolve compliance
disputes, and what procedures to follow in the event of non-compliance. Specifically,
there is no verification of compliance with the obligations in Articles I and II not to
transfer or receive nuclear weapons.³ The treaty contains no language on verification
other than to require states to accept nuclear safeguards (Article III). The Director
General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports on safeguards
implementation every year, and sometimes on specific compliance issues at Board of
Governors meetings.⁴ For Articles IV and VI, the treaty offers no definitions or ways of
assessing whether states are living up to their obligations. Nuclear weapon states, in the
past, have provided information about their nuclear cooperation efforts, their
contributions to the IAEA’s technical cooperation program, and descriptions of their
efforts toward nuclear disarmament. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the parties
agreed to what have become known as the “13 Practical Steps” toward disarmament;
since 2000, the United States has withdrawn its support for some of those steps.⁵
Compliance vs. Verification
All arms control treaties have obligations, but not all have verification measures —
i.e., measures that help nations monitor activities and assess compliance with treaty
obligations. The Biological Weapons Convention, on the one hand, obligates parties not
to develop, produce or stockpile biological agents or toxins, but contains no verification
measures, while the Chemical Weapons Convention spells out verification measures in
detail. Under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union

² Nuclear safeguards is a system of inspections and reports for detecting and deterring diversion
of nuclear material for use in nuclear weapons. For non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT,
this is formalized in full-scope safeguards agreements (INFCIRC/153).
³ Mason Willrich, Non-Proliferation Treaty: Framework for Nuclear Arms Control, Virginia:
The Michie Company, 1969, p. 100.
⁴ The Board of Governors has thirty-five members, whose composition is determined by
procedures outlined in Article VI of the IAEA Statute. See
[http://f40.iaea.org/ worldatom/ Documents/statute.html #A1.6]
⁵ See J. Sherwood McGinnis, “Article VI of the NPT,” May 1, 2003. McGinnis said, “We made
clear last year that the United States no longer supports all 13 steps.”

relied on national technical means (e.g., satellite and overflight photography) to verify
compliance. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty referred to both
national technical means and on-site inspections, and created a Verification Commission
to resolve disputes.
As noted above, the NPT requires comprehensive nuclear safeguards for non-nuclear
weapon states. The purpose of the safeguards is to verify “the fulfillment of [a state’s]
obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear
energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”⁶
Safeguards, briefly, refer to a system of inspections, reports and accounting procedures
designed to detect discrepancies between what a state reports and what inspectors find.⁷
There are no publicly available guidelines for determining how serious a safeguards
violation might be; there is no automatic translation from safeguards violations into NPT
violations.⁸ This may help explain why the IAEA has found many discrepancies, but has
not yet formally found Iran to be in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement.
Article XII of the IAEA Statute contains procedures for reporting non-compliance:
...The inspectors shall report any non-compliance to the Director General who shall
thereupon transmit the report to the Board of Governors. The Board shall call upon
the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds
to have occurred. The Board shall report the non-compliance to all members and to
the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations. In the event of
failure of the recipient State or States to take fully corrective action within a
reasonable time, the Board may take one or both of the following measures: direct
curtailment or suspension of assistance being provided by the Agency or by a member,
and call for the return of materials and equipment made available to the recipient
member or group of members. The Agency may also, in accordance with article XIX,
suspend any non- complying member from the exercise of the privileges and rights of⁹
membership.
A key issue for many NPT member states has been the lack of procedures for the
U.N. Security Council to follow in the event of NPT noncompliance. In the case of North
Korea, the IAEA Director General requested a special inspection in February 1993, which
North Korea refused. The IAEA Board of Governors concluded on April 1, 1993 that the
North Korea was in non-compliance and referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council.
On May 11, 1993, the Council called upon North Korea to comply with the agreement.
The Agreed Framework ultimately was negotiated, virtually suspending North Korea’s
nuclear program for eight years. When confronted by the United States with allegations
of a covert uranium enrichment program in October 2002, North Korea announced it
would withdraw from the NPT in January 2003. On February 12, 2003, the Board of

⁶ Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Article III.1.
⁷ Discrepancies are measured in quantities. A “significant quantity” (significant for nuclear
weapons purposes) is 8kg of Plutonium-239 and 25 kg of Uranium-235.
⁸ Darryl Howlett, John Simpson, Harald Mueller, Bruno Tertrais, Effective Non-Proliferation:
The European Union and the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Chaillot Paper No. 77, April 2005,
Institute for Security Studies, European Union, Paris, p. 17.
⁹ See [http://f40.iaea.org/worldatom/Documents/statute.html#A1.12] for the IAEA statute.

Governors once again declared North Korea in further non-compliance, referring the
matter to the Security Council. The Board called upon North Korea to “remedy urgently”
its non-compliance, and fully cooperate with the Agency. The Security Council discussed
the issue in April 2003, but did not take any action.¹⁰
U.S. Ambassador Jackie Wolcott Sanders offered this view of what the U.N. Security
Council could do with respect to Iran in a March 2005 statement:
While the IAEA must continue to have a role in investigating Iran’s past and ongoing
nuclear activities and in monitoring its suspension pledge, the Security Council has
the... authority to require and enforce a suspension of Iran’s enrichment-related and
reprocessing activities. In each of these areas, the Security Council can support and
reinforce the IAEA’s ability to pursue its investigations in Iran until the Agency can¹¹
provide this Board with all the necessary assurances it requires.
On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors passed resolution
GOV/2005/77, which concluded that Iran was in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards
agreement. The resolution is notable because it was not unanimous (consensus is the
norm) and did not immediately refer the issue to the Security Council.¹² The IAEA
Statute requires that once the Board has made a finding of non-compliance, it must report
it to the Security Council. The resolution noted that the Board would address “the timing
and content of the report required under Article XII.C [of the Statute].” Reportedly,
several states wanted to keep the focus of efforts in Vienna, rather than in New York.
Without the support of Russia and China, both of which have veto power at the U.N.
Security Council, a referral to the Security Council could potentially be damaging, rather
than helpful.
According to the IAEA Statute, if inspectors find a state in noncompliance with its
safeguards agreement, they report that to the Director General, who informs the Board of
Governors. In the case of Iran, the DG did not declare Iran to be in noncompliance with
its safeguards agreement, despite numerous discrepancies, but concluded in September
2005, according to GOV/2005/67, that “The Agency is, however, still not in a position
to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran.”¹³ This
opened the way for the Board of Governors to make a noncompliance finding.
Assessing Compliance
Articles I, II. In the Nuclear Nonproliferation Report to Congress (Section 601
report) for 2004, the U.S. Secretary of State described Iran as violating “its Safeguards

¹⁰ Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards, International Atomic Energy Agency. See
[ ht t p: / / www.i aea.or g/ NewsCent er / Focus/ IaeaDpr k/ f a ct _sheet _may2003.sht ml ]
¹¹ Ambassador Jackie Wolcott Sanders, Special Representative of the President for the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Statement to IAEA Board of Governors, Safeguards
Implementation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, March 2, 2005.
¹² Twenty-two Board members voted for; twelve abstained; and one — Venezuala, voted against.
See “International Consensus Against Iran Fails,” Tehran Times, September 25, 2005.
¹³ GOV/2005/67, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, Report by the Director General, September 2, 2005, derestricted September 24, 2005.

Agreement with the IAEA, required under NPT Article III, and...its NPT Article II
nonproliferation obligations.”¹⁴ This position infers that there is some way to find a state
in non-compliance with its Article II obligation not to acquire nuclear weapons.
However, as noted above, the NPT is silent on how to assess Article II compliance, other
than through a presumption that a safeguards violation that is not corrected is evidence
of a state’s bad intentions. U.S. officials may have wanted to stress the seriousness of
Iran’s actions in the absence of the IAEA calling Iran into non-compliance, but that
rationale is probably moot after the September 24^th resolution.
Some press reports have created confusion on the scope of IAEA responsibilities in
verifying compliance with the NPT. In particular, the Director General Mohamed
ElBaradei has been quoted several times that in the case of certain states, he has no
evidence of nuclear weapons programs. While those statements are undoubtedly true,
observers may erroneously conclude that the IAEA must find evidence of a nuclear
weapons program before calling a state into noncompliance. The case of Libya, where
officials turned over documents proving it sought nuclear weapons, may be an exception,
rather than the rule.¹⁵ Despite hard evidence that Libya sought nuclear weapons, the
IAEA Board’s resolution on Libya’s noncompliance simply stated that Libya had not
complied with its safeguards agreement. The legal authority of the IAEA at present is
limited to the range of activities within negotiated safeguards agreements.
President Bush proposed in February 2004 that the IAEA form a verification
committee “to ensure that the IAEA is organized to take action when action is required.”
In June 2005, the IAEA established a Committee on Safeguards and Verification. If the
committee addresses, as DG ElBaradei has suggested, areas such as information sharing,
emerging technologies, enhancing the Agency’s independent analytical capabilities, and
ensuring that the Agency has an adequate and uniform legal authority to conduct credible
verification, it is unlikely to branch out into monitoring weapons-related activities.
Article IV. In addition to stating the inalienable right of all parties to pursue
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Article IV says that “All the Parties to the Treaty
undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange
of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses
of nuclear energy.” There are no standards for measuring whether NPT parties are
meeting these Article IV obligations for the fullest possible exchange. During treaty
negotiations, the conventional wisdom was that the NPT would provide “a favorable basis
for the spread of peaceful nuclear technology,” and the United States recognized in Article
IV a “commitment to action by nuclear Powers...to contribute.¹⁶ However, that
cooperation must also be in conformity with the Articles I and II obligations not to
develop, manufacture, or transfer nuclear weapons technology. Some observers have
questioned whether U.S. nuclear cooperation with India, proposed in July 2005, would

¹⁴ Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 601 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, As
Amended by the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 For the Year Ending December

31, 2004. p. 8.

¹⁵ See CRS Report RS21823, Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction. The IAEA Board
of Governors resolution, GOV/2004/18, can be found at [http://www.iaea.org].
¹⁶ Willrich, op. cit., p. 128 and 136. See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Documents on Disarmament 1968, Goldberg statement, May 31, 1968, p. 416.

contradict the principles the United States itself has set out for Article IV cooperation —
that is, compliance with Articles I and II of the treaty. U.S. officials have argued to make
India an exception to nonproliferation norms in order to strengthen nonproliferation.¹⁷
Article VI. Similarly, there are no measures in the NPT to verify compliance with
the Article VI obligation to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament
and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control.” In 1967, U.S. negotiators argued that “it would not be feasible to
incorporate specific obligations [toward disarmament] in the treaty itself. The differences¹⁸
that have prevented agreement on these measures have not yet been resolved.” The
1995 and 2000 Review Conferences identified “practical” steps toward disarmament but
there are still disagreements about the legal status of those steps and their implications for
non-compliance. Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker remarked in April 2005
that “the 13 steps do not encapsulate the obligations of Article VI in the NPT. The
obligations of Article VI are encapsulated in Article VI.”¹⁹ The United States has reported²⁰
on Article VI implementation, highlighting those steps it has taken to reduce the number
of nuclear warheads in its deployed forces. Other states, however, complain of U.S.
noncompliance because the United States continues to conduct research and development
on new types of nuclear weapons and, as yet, has not accepted much deeper reductions
in its nuclear forces.
Legislation in the 109th Congress
The 109^th Congress remains interested in NPT compliance issues, particularly those
related to Iran and North Korea. Members introduced the following legislation:
^!H.Con.Res. 133, Non-Proliferation Treaty Enhancement Resolution of
2005, urges universal adoption of safeguards-strengthening measures and
implementation of disarmament steps;
^!H.R. 665, Omnibus Nonproliferation and Anti-Nuclear Terrorism Act of
2005, calls upon the President to report to Congress on measures to close
the perceived NPT Article IV “loophole”;
^!H.R. 3184, Small Quantities Protocol Act, calls on IAEA member states
with a Small Quantities Protocol to also sign, ratify, and implement the
Additional Protocol and provide access by IAEA inspectors;
^!H.Res. 373, Recognizing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and
calling on the President to engage in nonproliferation strategies
designed to eliminate these weapons of mass destruction from United
States and worldwide arsenals, called upon the President to comply with
Article VI obligations under the NPT.

¹⁷ See CRS Report RL33016, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress.
¹⁸ Willrich, op. cit., p. 162.
¹⁹ Wade Boese and Miles Pomper, “The U.S. Approach to the 2005 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty Review Conference: An ACT Interview with Assistant Secretary of State Stephen
Rademaker,” April 19, 2005, [http://www.armscontrol.org/interviews/20050419_Rademaker.asp]
²⁰ The United States and other states have produced reports on their actions and policies in
support of Article VI, which are available at [http://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/index.html]