East Timor: Potential Issues for Congress

CRS Report for Congress
East Timor: Potential Issues for Congress
Rhoda Margesson
Foreign Affairs Analyst
Bruce Vaughn
Analyst in Southeast and South Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
With the help of a transitional United Nations administration, East Timor emerged
in 2002 as an independent state after a long history of Portugese colonialism and more
recently, Indonesian rule. This followed a U.N.-organized 1999 referendum in which the
East Timorese overwhelmingly voted for independence and after which Indonesian-
backed pro-integrationist militias went on a rampage. Under several different mandates,
the United Nations has provided peacekeeping, humanitarian and reconstruction
assistance, and capacity building to establish a functioning government. On April 28,
2005, the Security Council established a special one-year political mission to last until
May 2006. Many challenges remain, including the need for economic development and
sustained support by the international community. Congressional concerns focus on
security and the role of the U.N., human rights, and East Timor’s boundary disputes with
Australia and Indonesia. Over time, East Timor could potentially gain significant wealth
from energy resources beneath the Timor Sea.
On May 20, 2002, the Democratic Republic of East Timor (Timor-Leste) gained its^st
independence, and on September 27, it became the 191 member of the United Nations.
With the help of the United Nations transitional administration, East Timor’s
independence marked the end of three centuries of Portuguese rule and 24 years of
Indonesian control.¹ Congress may be called upon to address issues related to East Timor
as it considers legislation such as S. 191 and H.R. 886, which examine trade preferences
with least-developed countries, Foreign Operations appropriations and proposed cuts to
the Economic Support Fund, and East Timor’s eligibility for the U.S.-government
financed Millenium Challenge Account in 2006.

¹ Slobodan Lekic, “East Timor’s Historic Vote Hailed as a Success,” Associated Press, Aug. 31,

2001.

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Background
In the 1640s, the Portuguese began to assert control over East Timor. This colonial
presence would last until 1975 when the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East
Timor (FRETLIN) gained ascendancy over the Timorese Union Party, pushed them out
of East Timor in a brief civil war, and declared independence on November 28, 1975.
Indonesia invaded East Timor on December 7, 1975 and began a period of occupation
during which an estimated 100,000 to 250,000 East Timorese died.² Indonesia’s
annexation of East Timor as its 27^th province was not recognized by the United Nations.
Under the supervision of the U.N.,
East Timor in Briefa national referendum to decide on either
^Area:^{14,609 s}^q^k^m^(s^lⁱ^g^ht^l^y^l^a^rg^{er t}^h^anautonomy within Indonesia or onindependence from it was held in East
^Co^nne^c^tⁱ^c^ut⁾
^Ca^pita^l:^DiliTimor on August 30, 1999. Seventy-
^P^o^pula^t^io^n:^B^e^tw^een^800,000^an^{d 1 m}^illioneight percent of 98.6% of registered
^Pop^u^l^ati^oⁿ^grow^th^rate:^2.11%^{(2004 es}^t⁾voters who voted opted for
^Relig^io^n:^90%^C^a^t^h^olⁱ^c^{, 4%}^Mu^s^lⁱ^m^{, 3%}^prot^es^t^aⁿ^tindependence. This led to widespread
^{(1992 es}^t^.⁾retaliation and destruction by pro-
^La^ng^ua^g^e^:^O^ffi^cⁱ^a^l^,^T^e^t^u^m^aⁿ^d^P^o^r^t^ugue^se^.
^Iⁿ^d^oⁿ^e^sⁱ^a^n,^E^nglⁱ^s^{h a}ⁿ^d^o^t^he^rⁱⁿ^dⁱ^ge^no^us^l^a^ngua^ge^sintegrationist militias backed by
^als^o^s^pok^enelements of the Indonesian military who
^Lⁱ^teracy:^58.6%^{(2002 es}^t^.⁾were in favor of integration with
^G^D^{P grow}^t^h^r^a^t^e^:^1%^{(2004 es}^t^.^{) an}^{d 3%}⁽²⁰⁰⁵Indonesia. More than 1,300 East
^f^o^recas^t)
^G^D^{P per Capita:}^$50⁰^pu^rch^a^sⁱⁿ^g^pow^{er pari}^t^yTimorese were killed, and the displaced
^{(2001 es}^t^.⁾included more than 260,000 in West
^E^c^on^om^y:^ag^ri^cu^l^t^u^{re 25.}⁴^%^{, i}ⁿ^du^s^t^ry^17.2%^,Timor and 200,000 in East Timor.
^s^e^rvⁱ^ces^57.4%^{(2001 es}^t^.⁾Seventy percent of East Timor’s
^Unem^plo^y^m^ent:^20%^(es^t^{. 2003), u}^p^t^o^40%economic infrastructure (such as housing
^a^m^o^{ng ur}^b^a^{n y}^o^ut^h
^Expo^r^t^s:^Co^ffe^e^,^sa^nd^a^l^w^{ood, m}^a^rbl^e^wⁱ^t^h^p^o^t^eⁿ^tⁱ^a^lstock, public buildings, and utilities),
^f^o^r^o^{il, g}^a^{s an}^d^v^aⁿ^{illa ex}^p^o^r^tseighty percent of the schools, and
^Lⁱ^{fe ex}^{pectancy at birth:}^{62 y}^ears^{(2003 es}^t^.⁾virtually all medical facilities were
^Sources^:^C^I^{A W}^o^r^l^{d Fact}^book⁽²⁰⁰⁴⁾^;^U^.^S^.destroyed by the militias. To quell the
^D^e^p^a^r^t^m^e^nt^o^f^St^a^t^e^;^A^u^st^r^a^lⁱ^a^{n G}^o^ve^rⁿ^m^e^nt^,violence and restore order, a U.N.-
^D^e^part^m^eⁿ^t^of^F^o^rei^gⁿ^A^f^f^aⁱ^r^s^an^{d T}^r^ade;^Worl^d
^B^a^nk,^W^o^r^l^{d Development Indicator}^s⁽²⁰⁰⁵⁾sponsored peacekeeping mission
International Force East Timor
(INTERFET) was established (under
Australian command) and deployed on September 20, 1999. Australia has continued to
play a leading role both in U.N. operations and on a bilateral basis with East Timor since

1999.

U.N. Operations Since 1999
In brief, the U.N. operations since 1999 have evolved in phases. Security Council
Resolution 1246 (1999) authorized the United Nations Mission in East Timor
(UNAMET), established on June 11, 1999, to organize a national referendum on East
Timor’s status and depending on the outcome, oversee the transition period. After the
violent rampage began, and with Indonesia’s agreement, on September 12, 1999, the

² “Background Notes: East Timor,” U.S. Department of State, Sept. 2004.

Security Council passed Resolution 1264 (1999) to establish INTERFET. On October 19,

1999 Indonesia’s parliament voted to confirm the results of the August referendum.

The United Nations Transitional Authority for East Timor (UNTAET) was
established by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1272 (1999) on October 25, 1999 (and
led by Sergio Vieira de Mello, the UNTAET Administrator) to provide a multi-
dimensional peacekeeping operation to administer East Timor through its transition to
independence. INTERFET initially overlapped with UNTAET until February 2000 when
command of military operations in INTERFET was integrated with UNTAET.
UNTAET’s mandate was broad and included assisting East Timor to 1) recover from the
violence through humanitarian aid and reconstruction assistance; 2) establish a
functioning government; and 3) aid East Timorese who fled or were forcibly transported
to Indonesia West Timor during the violence. In September 2000, three U.N.
humanitarian workers were killed by members of East Timorese militia groups, resulting
in the temporary suspension of U.N. humanitarian activities in West Timor.
On May 17, 2002, Security Council Resolution 1410 (2002) established a successor
mission to UNTAET, the United Nations Mission for Support in East Timor (UNMISET)
for an initial period of 12 months. Subsequent resolutions extended the mandate at six-
month intervals until May 20, 2005. On April 28, 2005 the U.N. Security Council adopted
Resolution 1599 (2005) establishing the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste
(UNOTIL), a special political mission that will remain in East Timor until May 20, 2006.³
Current Developments
Elections. East Timor held its first election on August 30, 2001 under the
supervision of UNTAET to elect a constituent assembly to draft a new Constitution and,
upon independence, to become the new parliament. More than 91% of the electorate
participated. East Timor’s Presidential election was held on April 14, 2002 when Xanana
Gusmao, an independence leader who ran as an independent candidate, decisively
defeated Francisco Xavier do Amaral. Voter turnout in this second election reached 86%⁴
of the electorate. The government is holding local elections in three phases through June
2005. The first phase, conducted by Timorese national authorities, took place in some
districts in December 2004, where voter turnout exceeded 85%. Although generally
viewed by the international community as successful, some difficulties typical of those⁵
associated with the first round of voting were encountered.
Rehabilitation, Poverty Reduction, and Longer-Term Development. East
Timor is the poorest country in Asia and one of the ten poorest in the world. The violence
of 1999 left most of the country’s infrastructure devastated. Poverty is widespread with
many areas lacking electricity, clean water, good roads or adequate communications. The
mountainous terrain is both difficult and infertile. Though the international community
has supported East Timor, its rehabilitation needs sustained efforts aimed at job creation,

³ “Security Council Establishes One-year Political Mission in Timor-Leste,” U.N. Press SC/8371.
⁴ Dwight King, “East Timor Founding Elections and Emerging Party System,” Asian Survey, Oct.

2003.

⁵ See USAID/East Timor at [http://www.usaideasttimor.net].

infrastructure reconstruction and development, and improved health conditions and
literacy rates. Language may be a problem as observers believe Indonesian is a more
widely used working language than the official Tetun or Portuguese.
Significant economic development is required to help the East Timorese people
improve their basic standard of living. Experts predict external assistance will remain
critical in the post-independence phase, particularly for capacity building in governance,
and even as revenue from oil and gas from the Timor Gap increases. Other economic
activity includes coffee and the potential for tourism and fisheries. The United National
Development Assistance Framework 2003-2005 (UNDAF) provides a strategic road map
for U.N. agencies. Other economic challenges include the strengthening of democratic
institutions and emerging civil society, education and training of the nation’s workforce
to develop the new institutions of the state and its economy, the implementation of the
rule of law, and rebuilding infrastructure. The departure of the large U.N. presence and
prospect of a decline in foreign assistance is occurring at a time of rising expectations by
East Timorese. East Timor is a member of the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund and has indicated an interest in ASEAN membership. East Timor gave
$75,000 for the victims of the December Indian Ocean tsunami.
Human Rights. In January 2000, an international commission of inquiry
recommended that an international tribunal be established to consider crimes stemming
from violence that followed the 1999 independence referendum. Instead, the Indonesian⁶
government pursued its own investigation. The Indonesian process has led the United
States and a number of its allies to express their dissatisfaction.⁷ U.N. Secretary General
Kofi Annan has also expressed his displeasure with the outcome of the Indonesian
tribunal and plans to establish an expert commission. The United States has supported
the U.N. plan and thinks that the joint Indonesia-East Timor Commission should not be
the only judicial vehicle used.⁸ The Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) of UNMISET, which
operated separately from the Indonesian investigation, indicted over 380 for alleged
crimes,⁹ convicted 55, and acquitted three for their role in crimes associated with the 1999¹⁰
referendum. According to Amnesty International, 280 of those convicted by the SCU are
believed to be at large in Indonesia.¹¹
Funding: U.S. and International Assistance to East Timor
U.S. Assistance. In 1999-2000, U.S. assistance to East Timor included both
disaster aid to the displaced in East Timor and to the refugees in West Timor, as well as
reconstruction and development assistance in East Timor. Aid was provided primarily
by the Department of State’s Population, Refugee and Migration Bureau; USAID’s Office

⁶ Paul Barber, “Military Impunity Undermines Democracy,” The Jakarta Post, Aug. 19, 2004.
⁷ “Several Countries Concerned About Trials of East Timor Rights Abusers,” Organization of
Asia-Pacific News, Aug. 25, 2004.
⁸ “US Calls for UN Inquiry on Timor,” BBC News, Dec. 23, 2005.
⁹ “East Timor’s Foreign Min Opposes Intl Rights Tribunal,” Dow Jones, Sept. 8, 2004.
¹⁰ See S/2005/99, pp. 6-8 (paragraphs 24-32).
¹¹ Amnesty International [http://www.amnesty.org].

of Foreign Disaster Assistance and Food for Peace, and the Department of Defense. The
USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) focused on community-based initiatives, the
media and civil society. Since 2001, the United States has continued to provide
substantial bilateral assistance to East Timor as outlined in the chart below. In addition
to security initiatives, U.S. aid programs in East Timor have the goal of building a viable
self sufficient free market economy, developing basic public services (such as health),
supporting good governance through an emerging democratic political system and post-
conflict democracy initiatives. U.S. assistance has helped the economic and political
development of East Timor by supporting independent media, civil society organizations,
and political parties as well as strengthening the electoral process, building judicial
institutions, and strengthening governmental capacity. East Timor has been designated a
“threshold country” for Millennium Challenge Account assistance in 2006. This
designation is intended to be an added incentive for countries to reform. East Timor has
submitted a proposal to strengthen its less competitive areas. East Timor remains
vulnerable — and in the opinion of many experts — in need of sustained bilateral,
multilateral, and regional support.
U.S. Assistance to East Timor, FY2001-FY2006
(dollars in 000s)
FY2005FY2006
Account F Y 2001 F Y 2002 F Y 2003 F Y 2004 est. request
Economic 24,945 25,000 24,838 22,367 21,824 13,500^a
Military 1,796 1,050 2,109 2,579 1,292 1,800
Peacekeeping 8,500 8,000 3,250 1,050 1,000 —
Peace Corps06121,2191,3201,4021,583
Tot a l s 35,241 34,662 31,416 27,316 25,518 16,883
^Sources^:^{U.S. Dep}^a^rtm^eⁿ^t^o^f^{State, USA}^I^{D, U.S. Dep}^a^rtm^eⁿ^t^o^f^Ag^rⁱ^cu^ltu^{re. See also}^C^R^{S R}^e^p^o^r^t
^R^L^31362,^U^.^{S. For}^eⁱ^{gn Ai}^{d t}^o^Eas^t^and^Sout^h^Asⁱ^a^:^Sel^ect^ed^Reci^pi^ent^s^{, by}^T^h^om^as^L^u^m^.^T^h^{e U.S. h}^a^s
^al^s^o^provⁱ^d^{ed s}^m^al^l^am^ouⁿ^t^s^of^f^{ood ai}^{d i}ⁿ^s^e^l^ect^{ed y}^ears^uⁿ^d^{er P.L}^.^{480 g}^r^an^t^s^;^t^h^es^{e f}ⁱ^g^u^r^es^{are n}^o^t
ⁱⁿ^clu^d^edⁱⁿ^th^{e ab}^o^v^{e to}^tals.
^a.^T^h^e^A^d^mⁱⁿⁱ^s^t^ratⁱ^oⁿ^’^s^requ^es^t^f^o^r^ES^F^f^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^F^Y^{2005 w}^a^s^at^t^h^{e s}^a^m^e^l^e^v^e^l^as^F^Y^2006.^H^o^w^e^v^e^r,
^C^o^ngr^e^ssⁱⁿ^creas^{ed t}^h^{e appropri}^a^tⁱ^oⁿ^f^o^{r ES}^F^f^uⁿ^dⁱⁿ^g^f^o^{r Eas}^t^Tⁱ^m^o^{r i}ⁿ^F^Y^{2005 t}^o^l^e^v^e^l^s
^sⁱ^gⁿⁱ^fⁱ^can^tly^abov^{e th}^{e requ}^es^t.
Challenges and Potential Issues for Congress
Continuing U.N. Presence. U.S. Officials maintain that East Timor should
reduce its reliance on direct assistance from the United Nations, though with continuing
support from the United States and the international community, particularly to strengthen
democratic institutions, infrastructure, economic development, and the training of security
services.¹² Although it has now been extended, some in Congress were concerned about
statements from U.N. officials that a U.N. presence, including peacekeepers, should
remain in East Timor for another year. Supporters of a continued U.N. role argued that
East Timor was not ready for the U.N. departure as the institutions of state are fragile.
There is a perceived need to improve security services and the judiciary, and to ensure
greater institutional transparency and the rule of law. East Timor had also requested that
the U.N. maintain a small presence after May 2005.

¹² United States Mission to the United Nations, Press Release #28, Feb. 28, 2005.

Human Rights. United States’ relations with East Timor have been closely
associated with U.S. relations with Indonesia and Jakarta’s former control over East
Timor. Congress has expressed concern with the legacy of past human rights abuses in
East Timor by the Indonesian military and Indonesian military backed militias. This has
led Congress to restrict military-to-military contact between the United States and
Indonesia.(For additional information see CRS Report RL32394, Indonesia: Domestic
Politics, Strategic Dynamics and American Interests, by Bruce Vaughn.) Looking to its
future, the East Timorese government appears ready to put its past behind it in order to
have a productive relationship with Indonesia. Indonesia has a population of some 230
million as compared to East Timor’s 800,000 to one million. On December 14, 2004, East
Timor and Indonesia established a Truth and Friendship Commission. East Timor’s new
Catholic Bishop reportedly opposes this solution to past abuses.¹³ U.S. policy supports a
U.N. Commission of experts to look into past human rights abuses but also believes that
the Truth and Friendship Commission is a valuable initiative. In April 2005, in a
conciliatory gesture during his visit to East Timor, Indonesian President Yudhoyono
visited the site of the Dili massacre of 1991. One possible issue for Congress, is to assess
how these developments may impact existing human rights legislation regarding
Indonesia.
Boundary Disputes. East Timor has been seeking to settle its boundaries with
both Indonesia and Australia. In April, East Timor reached agreement with Indonesia on
96% of its land borders. Settling the maritime boundaries with Australia is critical to
future division of an estimated tens of billions in oil and gas deposits beneath the ocean
floor. East Timor has argued that the maritime boundary should lie at the midpoint
between the two countries while Australia is arguing that it should lie at the end of its
continental shelf. Under the previously negotiated boundary with Indonesia, the boundary
was set closer to the then Indonesian controlled territory of East Timor than the midpoint
between East Timor and Australia. Australian Foreign Minister Downer indicated that
Australia, which did much to facilitate East Timor’s independence, and East Timor had
reached “substantial agreement on all major issues” during talks in Dili in April 2005 and
that the details of the agreement would be settled in the near future. The agreement is
thought to include an additional $A2 to $A5 billion for East Timor. In return, it is thought
that East Timor will agree to not raise the issue of the sea boundary for some time.¹⁴ The
U.S. position is that this is a bilateral issue between East Timor and Australia.
Representative Barney Frank and Senator Jack Reed initiated a letter urging Australia to
“to establish a fair” boundary with East Timor in March 2005.¹⁵
U.N. Reform. Many experts see the U.N. mission in East Timor as successful and
confirm that UNTAET’s mandate was unprecedented in scope with a wide range of power^th
granted to the transitional administrator. As U.N. reform gains attention in the 109
Congress, it is likely that the legitimacy of this claim and the East Timor experience will
be examined further, drawing out lessons learned and focusing on the contributing factors,
which could perhaps be applied elsewhere.

¹³ “Timorese Church Opposed to Deal,” Townsville Bulletin, Feb. 8, 2005.
¹⁴ “Australia, East Timor Strike Deal,” Organization of Asia-Pacific News, Apr. 29, 2005.
¹⁵ Nigel Wilson, “US Calls for Fair Timor Deal,” The Australian, Mar. 11, 2004 and “Congress
Urges Expeditious Talks on Permanent Maritime Boundary” [http://www.etan.org].