Gonzales v. Raich: Congress's Power Under the Commerce Clause to Regulate Medical Marijuana

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

In Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court was presented with a conflict between California’s state
law, permitting the medicinal use of marijuana, and the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA).
The Ninth Circuit had found the federal law unconstitutional “as applied,” concluding that its
enforcement against medicinal users was beyond Congress’s enumerated power to regulate
interstate commerce. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Congress had a rational basis
for concluding that leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would substantially
affect conditions in the interstate market. The Court, in reaching its decision, specifically relied
on Wickard v. Filburn (1942), which held that Congress could aggregate the impact of individual
actors on the interstate market to find a substantial impact on interstate commerce.

The dispute in Gonzales v. Raich involved a conflict between California’s Compassionate Use ¹²
Act and the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA). In August 2002, after federal agents
seized and destroyed the respondent’s medicinal marijuana plants, suit was brought in the
Northern District of California seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief against the U.S. ³
Attorney General preventing the prosecution of medicinal users pursuant to the CSA.
Respondents argued that “as applied” to their specific situations the CSA exceeded Congress’s ⁴
authority under the Commerce Clause and, therefore, was unconstitutional. The district court
denied the motion, concluding that the respondents could not establish a likelihood of success on ⁵
the merits.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on the Court’s recent Commerce Clause decisions in ⁶⁷
United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, (Lopez/Morrison) held that, “as applied” ⁸
to the respondents, the CSA exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. In so
holding, the court constructed a narrow affected class of activity, namely, the “intrastate,
noncommercial cultivation, possession and use of marijuana for personal medical purposes on the ⁹
advice of a physician and in accordance with state law.”
With this narrowly defined class of activity, the court proceeded to apply the four factor ¹⁰
Lopez/Morrison test. With respect to the first factor—whether or not the activity is commercial

¹^C^a^{l. H}^e^a^{lth &}^Sa^f^e^t^y^C^ode^§¹¹³^62.^{5 (}¹⁹⁹⁶⁾⁽^a^ll^ow^ing^the^us^e^of^m^a^r^ijuaⁿ^a^f^o^r^m^e^dic^a^l^pur^pos^e^s^u^pon^the
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³^S^{ee R}^aⁱ^c^{h v.}^A^s^h^c^rof^t^,²⁴^{8 F}^.^S^u^pp.^2d⁹¹^{8 (}^N^.D^.^C^a^{l. 2}⁰⁰³⁾^.
⁴^Id^.^a^t⁹¹^9.
⁵^Id^.^a^t⁹³^1.
⁶^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^Lo^pe^z^{, 5}¹⁴^U^.^S.⁵⁴⁹⁽¹⁹⁹⁵⁾⁽^hol^ding^t^h^a^t^t^h^e^G^un^Fr^e^e^Sc^hoo^{l Z}^one^s^A^c^{t of}¹⁹⁹^{0 di}^{d n}^o^{t e}ⁱ^t^h^e^r^by
^its^e^l^f^,^or^{in t}^h^e^a^g^g^r^e^g^a^t^e^,^s^ubs^taⁿ^tia^lly^af^f^e^c^t^inte^r^s^ta^te^c^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^and,^the^r^e^f^or^e^,^w^a^s^bey^{ond the}^s^c^o^p^e^of^C^ong^r^e^s^s^’^s
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⁷^Uⁿ^ite^d^St^ate^s^v^.^M^o^r^rⁱ^s^oⁿ^,⁵^{29 U}^.^S.⁵⁹^{8 (}²⁰⁰⁰⁾⁽ⁱ^nv^a^lida^ting^t^h^e^Vⁱ^oleⁿ^c^e^A^g^aⁱ^ns^{t W}^o^m^eⁿ^A^c^{t, on t}^h^e^g^r^oun^ds^t^h^a^t^it
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^{as wel}^l^{as an}^y^b^r^o^a^d^e^{r co}^mm^erci^a^l^m^a^r^k^et^f^o^{r m}^a^ri^j^u^an^a—iⁿ^so^f^a^{r a}^s^t^h^{e m}^e^dⁱ^ciⁿ^a^l^m^a^ri^j^u^an^{a at}ⁱ^ssu^{e i}ⁿ^t^hⁱ^s^{case i}^sⁿ^o^t
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^c^o^m^m^e^r^c^ia^{l or}^e^c^onom^ic^{in na}^tur^e^{; (}²⁾^w^h^e^t^he^r^aⁿ^e^x^pr^e^s^s^jurⁱ^s^d^ic^tⁱ^ona^{l e}^l^e^m^eⁿ^{t is}^pr^ovⁱ^d^e^dⁱⁿ^t^h^e^s^t^a^t^ute^to^lim^{it its}
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⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

or economic in nature—the court concluded that the narrow class of activity in this case could not ¹¹
be considered commercial or economic in nature. The court next considered whether the CSA
contains an express jurisdictional element that would limit its reach to those cases that
substantially affect interstate commerce. With no stated analysis, and apparently persuaded by the
reasoning of a district court opinion, the court concluded that “[n]o such jurisdictional hook exists ¹²
in the relevant portions of the CSA.”
With respect to whether the legislative history contains congressional findings regarding the
effects on interstate commerce, the court was able to cite findings relating to the effect that ¹³
intrastate drug trafficking activity would have on interstate commerce. While admitting that the
legislative history lends support to the constitutionality of the statute under the Commerce Clause,
the court proceeded to diminish the importance of these findings by arguing that they were not
specific to either marijuana or the medicinal use of marijuana, but rather related to the general ¹⁴
effects of drug trafficking on interstate commerce. In addition, the court referred to language in ¹⁵
Morrison, discussing the limited role of congressional findings. Moreover, the court referenced
Ninth Circuit precedent concluding that the first and fourth prongs of the Morrison test—whether
the statute regulates an economic enterprise and whether the link is attenuated—are the most ¹⁶
significant factors to the analysis.
Finally, with respect to whether the link between the regulated activity and a substantial effect on
interstate commerce is attenuated, the court expressed doubt that the interstate effect of
homegrown medical marijuana is substantial. Citing authority questioning the validity of the ¹⁷
federal government’s claim of an effect on interstate commerce, the court concluded that “this
factor favors a finding that the CSA cannot constitutionally be applied to the class of activities at ¹⁸
issue in this case.”
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari specifically on the question of whether the
power vested in Congress by both the “Necessary and Proper Clause,” and the “Commerce
Clause” of Article I includes the power to prohibit the local growth, possession, and use of ¹⁹
marijuana permissible as a result of California’s law. The Court, in an opinion by Justice
Stevens, reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and held that Congress’s power to regulate

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^Mo^rrisoⁿ^,⁵²^{9 U}^.^S.^a^t⁶^10-¹²^.
¹¹^Raic^h^{, 3}⁵²^F.^{3d a}^t¹²³⁰⁽^s^ta^ting^t^h^a^t^the^“^c^u^lt^iv^a^tion,^p^o^s^s^e^s^sⁱ^{on, a}^nd^us^e^of^m^a^r^ijuaⁿ^a^f^o^r^m^e^dicⁱ^na^{l pur}^pos^e^s^aⁿ^d
^{not f}^o^r^e^x^c^h^aⁿ^g^e^or^dis^t^rⁱ^b^u^ti^on^is^not^pr^ope^r^l^y^c^h^a^r^a^c^t^e^r^iz^e^d^a^s^c^o^m^m^e^r^c^ia^{l or}^e^c^onom^ic^a^c^tiv^it^y^”⁾^.
¹²^Id^.^a^t¹²³¹⁽^c^itin^{g C}^o^uⁿ^ty^of^S^ant^{a Cruz v}^.^As^hc^roft^,²⁷⁹^{F. S}^u^p^p^.²^d¹¹⁹²^,¹²^{09 (}^N^.D^{. C}^a^l.²⁰⁰³⁾⁾^.
¹³^Id^.^a^t¹²³²⁽^c^itin^g^{21 U}^.^S.C^.^§⁸⁰^{1, w}^h^ic^{h s}^t^a^t^e^s^tha^t^“^f^e^d^e^r^a^l^c^ontr^o^{l of}^int^r^a^s^ta^te^incⁱ^de^nts^of^the^tr^a^f^fⁱ^c^{in c}^ontr^o^lle^d
^substa^nc^e^s^{is e}^sse^ntia^{l to}^the^e^f^f^e^c^tiv^e^c^ontrol^o^f^t^h^{e i}ⁿ^t^e^rst^a^t^eⁱⁿ^ci^den^t^{s su}^ch^{as t}^r^af^fⁱ^c.^”).
¹⁴^Id^.^a^t¹²³²^.
¹⁵^Id^.⁽^citiⁿ^g^Mo^rrisoⁿ^,⁵²^{9 U.}^S^.^at⁶¹⁴⁾^.
¹⁶^Id^.^a^t¹²^32-³³⁽^c^itin^{g Un}^ite^d^Sta^t^e^s^v^.^M^c^Coy^{, 323}^F.^3d¹¹¹⁴^{, 1}¹¹⁹⁽⁹^th^Cⁱ^r^.²⁰⁰³⁾⁾^.
¹⁷^Id^.^a^t¹²³³⁽^q^uotiⁿ^g^C^o^na^{nt v}^.^W^a^lte^r^s^,³^{09 F.3}^d⁶²^{9, 64}⁷⁽⁹^th^Ci^r.²⁰⁰²⁾^(st^a^tⁱⁿ^{g t}^h^at^“[^m^]^edⁱ^cal^m^a^ri^j^u^an^a,^w^h^en
^g^r^ow^{n loc}^a^l^l^y^f^o^r^pe^r^s^ona^{l c}^ons^u^m^{ption, d}^o^e^sⁿ^o^t^ha^v^e^aⁿ^y^dir^e^c^t^or^o^b^vⁱ^ous^e^f^f^e^c^t^{on inte}^r^s^ta^te^c^o^m^m^e^r^c^e^.^Fe^de^r^a^l
^e^f^f^o^{rts to re}^g^u^la^te^{it c}^onsi^d^e^r^a^b^ly^blur^the^distinc^tⁱ^oⁿ^be^tw^e^eⁿ^w^h^a^t^{is na}^tio^na^{l a}ⁿ^{d w}^h^a^t^{is loc}^a^l^.”^{) (K}^oz^insk^{i, J.,}
^c^onc^ur^rⁱ^ng⁾⁾^.
¹⁸^Id^.
¹⁹^Goⁿ^z^al^{ez v.}^R^aⁱ^c^h^,^__^{_ U}^.^S.^_^__,¹²^{5 S}^.^C^t^.²¹^{95 (}²⁰⁰⁵⁾^.

commerce extends to purely local activities that are “part of an economic class of activities that ²⁰
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”
In reaching its conclusions, the Court relied heavily on its 1942 decision in Wickard v. Filburn,
which held that the Agricultural Adjustment Act’s federal quota system applied to bushels of
wheat that were homegrown and personally consumed. Wickard stands for the proposition that
Congress can rationally combine the effects that an individual producer has on an interstate ²¹
market to find substantial impacts on interstate commerce. The Court pointed to numerous
similarities between the facts presented in Raich and those in Wickard. Initially, the Court noted
that because the commodities being cultivated in both cases are fungible and that well-established
interstate markets exist, both markets are susceptible to fluctuations in supply and demand based ²²
on production intended for home-consumption being introduced into the national market.
According to the Court, just as there was no difference between the wheat Mr. Wickard produced
for personal consumption and the wheat cultivated for sale on the open market, there is no
discernable difference between personal home-grown medicinal marijuana and marijuana grown ²³
for the express purpose of being sold in the interstate market. Thus, the Court concluded that
Congress had a rational basis for concluding that “leaving home-consumed marijuana outside ²⁴
federal control would similarly affect price and market conditions.”
Respondents argued that Wickard was distinguishable because in the case of wheat the activity
involved was purely commercial, and the evidence clearly established that the aggregate
production of wheat had a significant effect on the interstate market. Conversely, respondents
claimed that the activity at issue in Raich is non-commercial—the respondents had never
attempted to sell their marijuana—and Congress had made no finding that the personal cultivation ²⁵
and use of medicinal marijuana has a substantial effect on the interstate marijuana market. The
Court, however, noted that the standard for assessing the scope of Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause, is not whether the activity at issue, when aggregated, substantially affects
interstate commerce; but rather, whether there exists a “rational basis” for Congress to have

²⁰^Id^.^a^t²²⁰⁵⁽^c^itin^{g Pe}^re^{z v}^.^Unite^{d St}^ate^s^,⁴⁰^{2 U}^.^S.¹^46,¹^{51 (}¹⁹⁷⁰⁾⁾^.^T^h^e^fⁱ^na^{l outc}^o^m^e^w^a^s^6-^{3 w}^{ith J}^u^s^tic^e^Ste^v^eⁿ^s
^w^r^iting^f^o^{r him}^s^e^l^f^a^{nd Justic}^e^s^S^oute^r^{, Ke}ⁿⁿ^e^d^y^,^Bre^y^e^r^{, a}^{nd G}ⁱ^nsburg^.^Justic^e^Sc^a^lia^{, v}ⁱ^a^a^se^pa^ra^t^e^opi^nioⁿ^,
^c^onc^ur^r^e^d^on^ly^{in the}^C^o^ur^t’^s^j^u^d^g^m^e^nt.^S^{ee i}^d^.^a^t²²¹⁵^{. J}^u^s^tic^e^O^’^C^onn^or^dis^s^e^nte^d^a^{nd f}^ile^{d a}ⁿ^o^pⁱⁿ^io^{n t}^h^a^t^b^o^th
^C^h^ie^f^J^u^s^tic^e^R^e^hnqu^is^{t a}ⁿ^d^J^u^s^tⁱ^c^e^T^hom^a^s^joine^dⁱⁿ^pa^r^t^.^S^{ee i}^d^.^a^t²²^21.^Iⁿ^a^dditⁱ^oⁿ^{, J}^u^s^tic^e^T^h^o^m^a^s^f^ile^{d his}^owⁿ
^dis^s^e^nting^opi^nioⁿ^.^S^{ee i}^d^.^at²²²⁹^.
²¹^Wi^cka^rd^v.^Fⁱ^l^b^u^rⁿ^{, 3}¹⁷^U^.^S.¹¹¹^{, 1}²⁵⁽¹⁹⁴²⁾⁽^hol^ding^t^h^a^t^{, e}^c^oⁿ^o^mⁱ^c^a^c^tiv^it^y^,^r^e^g^a^r^d^le^s^s^of^its^na^tur^e^{, c}^aⁿ^be
^re^g^u^la^te^{d by}^Cong^re^s^s^if^the^a^c^tivity^“^a^s^s^e^rts^a^s^ubs^ta^ntia^{l im}^pa^c^t^{on in}^te^rs^ta^te^c^o^m^m^e^rc^e^...”^).
²²^Raic^h^{, 1}²⁵^S.Ct.^a^t²²⁰⁷^,^n.²⁹^.^T^h^e^Court^note^d^tha^t^the^w^h^ile^th^e^m^a^rijuaⁿ^a^m^a^r^k^e^t^{is a}ⁿ^ille^g^a^{l or illic}^{it m}^a^rk^e^t^{, this}
^f^a^c^t^a^ppe^a^r^s^{to be}^of^no^le^g^a^{l or}^c^ons^tit^uti^ona^{l s}ⁱ^gⁿ^if^ic^aⁿ^c^e^a^s^C^ong^r^e^s^s^’^s^pow^e^r^a^r^g^u^a^b^ly^eⁿ^c^o^m^p^a^s^se^s^both^la^w^f^{ul a}^nd
^unla^w^f^u^{l inte}^rsta^te^m^a^rk^e^t^s.^S^{ee i}^d^.⁽^c^iti^{ng Lo}^pe^z^{, 5}^{14 U}^.^{S. a}^t⁵⁷^1,⁽^K^e^nne^dy^{, J}^{., c}^onc^ur^rⁱ^ng⁾⁽^s^ta^ting^tha^t^“^[ⁱ^]ⁿ^the
^L^o^{ttery Ca}^se^,¹⁸⁸^U.^S^.³²¹⁽¹⁹⁰^3),^t^h^{e C}^o^u^r^t^rej^ect^ed^t^h^{e argu}^m^eⁿ^t^t^h^at^Con^g^{ress l}^acked^[^t^h^e^]^p^o^w^{er t}^o^p^r^ohⁱ^bⁱ^t^t^h^e
ⁱⁿ^t^e^rst^a^t^e^m^o^ve^men^t^o^f^l^o^t^t^e^ry^tⁱ^c^ket^s^b^ecau^{se i}^t^h^a^d^po^w^e^{r o}ⁿ^l^y^t^o^regu^l^a^t^e^,ⁿ^o^t^t^o^p^r^ohⁱ^bⁱ^t^.^”).
²³^Raic^h^,¹²^{5 S}^.^C^t^{. at}²²⁰⁷^.
²⁴^Id^.⁽^s^ta^ti^ng^tha^t^“^w^e^ha^{d n}^o^dⁱ^f^fⁱ^culty^c^onc^ludi^ng^tha^t^C^ong^r^e^s^s^ha^{d a}^r^a^tio^na^{l ba}^sⁱ^s^f^o^r^be^lie^vⁱ^ng^t^h^a^t^{, w}^h^eⁿ^vⁱ^e^w^e^d
^{in t}^h^e^a^g^g^r^eg^a^t^e^,^le^a^v^ing^hom^e^-^c^ons^um^e^d^w^h^e^a^t^outsⁱ^de^the^r^e^g^u^la^t^o^r^y^s^c^hem^e^w^ould^ha^v^e^a^s^ubs^taⁿ^tia^{l inf}^l^ue^nc^e^oⁿ
^pric^e^a^{nd m}^a^rk^e^t^c^onditio^{ns. He}^re^too^,^Co^ng^re^{ss ha}^{d a}^ra^tio^na^l^ba^{sis f}^o^{r c}^onc^ludⁱ^ng^tha^t^le^a^v^ing^hom^e^-^c^onsum^e^d
^m^a^rijuaⁿ^a^ou^tside^f^e^de^ra^{l c}^ontro^l^w^{ould sim}^ila^rl^y^a^f^f^e^c^t^pric^e^a^nd^m^a^rk^e^t^c^onditio^ns.”⁾⁽ⁱⁿ^t^e^r^na^{l c}^ita^tions^om^itte^d).
²⁵^Id^.

concluded as such.²⁶ The Court, applying this deferential standard, concluded that “Congress had
a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of ²⁷
marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA.” Moreover, the Court affirmed that “Congress
was acting well within its authority to ‘make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper’ to ²⁸
‘regulate Commerce ... among the several States.’”
Despite having concluded that under the “rational basis test” Congress had acted within its
constitutional authority when it enacted the CSA and applied it to intrastate possession of
marijuana, the Court nevertheless had to distinguish Lopez and Morrison, the Court’s more recent
Commerce Clause decisions. The Court concluded that the CSA, unlike the statutes in either
Lopez (Gun Free School Zones Act) or Morrison (Violence Against Women Act), regulated
activity that is “quintessentially economic,” therefore, neither Lopez or Morrison cast any doubts ²⁹
on the constitutionality of the statute. The Court specifically rejected the reasoning used by the
Ninth Circuit, concluding that “Congress acted rationally in determining that none of the
characteristics making up the purported class, whether viewed individually or in the aggregate,
compelled an exemption from the CSA; rather, the subdivided class of activities defined by the ³⁰
Court of Appeals was an essential part of the larger regulatory scheme.”
In supporting its conclusions, the Court noted that, by characterizing marijuana as a “Schedule I”
narcotic, Congress was implicitly finding that it had no medicinal value at all. In addition, the
Court returned to the fact that medicinal marijuana was a fungible good, thus making it
indistinguishable from the recreational versions that Congress had clearly intended to regulate.
According to the Court, to carve out medicinal use as a distinct class of activity, as the Ninth
Circuit had done, would effectively make “any federal regulation (including quality, prescription,
or quantity controls) of any locally cultivated and possessed controlled substance for any purpose ³¹
beyond the ‘outer limits’ of Congress’[s] Commerce Clause authority.” Moreover, the Court
held that California’s state law permitting the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes cannot be
the basis for placing the respondent’s class of activity beyond the reach of the federal
government, due to the Supremacy Clause, which requires that, in the event of a conflict between ³²
state and federal law, the federal law shall prevail.
Finally, the Court responded to the respondent’s argument that its activities are not an “essential
part of a larger regulatory scheme” because they are both isolated and policed by the State of ³³
California and they are completely separate and distinct from the interstate market. The Court
held that not only could Congress have rationally rejected this argument, but also that it
“seem[ed] obvious” that doctors, patients, and caregivers will increase the supply and demand for ³⁴
the substance on the open market. In sum, the Court concluded that the case for exemption can

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be distilled down to an argument that a locally grown product used domestically is immune from
federal regulation, which has already been precluded by the Court’s decision in Wickard v. ³⁵
Filburn.
Justice O’Connor’s dissent focused on the lack of evidence indicating that medicinal marijuana
users have a discernable or significant effect on the interstate market which Congress sought to ³⁶
regulate. Moreover, Justice O’Connor, emphasizing the system of “joint sovereignty” espoused
by James Madison, argued that this overreaching by the federal government deprives the States of
their ability to make their own independent political judgments with respect to the validity of ³⁷
medicinal marijuana laws.
Both Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion and Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion focused on the
scope and import of the “Necessary and Proper” clause. Justice Scalia’s opinion argued that
because Congress could rationally have concluded that regulating such intrastate activity would
have undercut its objective of prohibiting the sale of marijuana on the interstate market, it was ³⁸
necessary to extend the scope of the CSA to encompass this behavior. On the other hand, Justice
Thomas’s dissent argues that the “Necessary and Proper Clause” as originally understood cannot ³⁹
be used to expand the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers. According to Justice Thomas, by
allowing Congress to regulate such intrastate, non-commercial activity the Court has effectively
granted the federal government a general police power over the entire country that subverts the ⁴⁰
Constitution’s basic principles of federalism and dual sovereignty.
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⁴⁰^Id^.^a^t²²^33-³⁴⁽^T^hom^a^s^{, J}^{., dis}^s^e^nting⁾