Uzbekistan's Closure of the Airbase at Karshi-Khanabad: Context and Implications

CRS Report for Congress
Uzbekistan’s Closure of the Airbase at
Karshi-Khanabad: Context and Implications
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
In late July 2005, Uzbekistan terminated an agreement permitting U.S. forces to use
the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) airbase in the southern part of the country to support
coalition military operations in Afghanistan. U.S. forces left the base by late November
2005. Major concerns include whether cooler security ties with Uzbekistan will set back
the U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism and other U.S. interests in Central Asia. This
report may be updated. Related products include CRS Report RS22161, Unrest in
Uzbekistan, by Jim Nichol.
Introduction: The U.S. Basing Agreement with Uzbekistan
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States negotiated status
of forces agreements (SOFA) and other security accords with several Central Asian states
in order to use their airstrips for what became the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan reportedly made a number of requests during SOFA
negotiations, including for U.S. security and assistance pledges and for a primary focus
on humanitarian and search-and-rescue missions rather than air attack or air refueling
(although the Uzbeks allowed some special operations missions). The U.S.-Uzbek SOFA
was signed on October 7, and the air campaign against Afghanistan began an hour later.¹
The U.S.-Uzbek SOFA provided for use of Uzbek airspace and for up to 1,500 U.S.
troops to use a Soviet-era airbase (termed Karshi-Khanabad or K2) 90 miles north of the
Afghan border near the towns of Karshi and Khanabad. In exchange, the United States
provided security guarantees and agreed that terrorists belonging to the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan (IMU) who were fighting alongside Taliban and Al Qaeda forces would be

¹ The State Department. Fact Sheet, Nov. 27, 2002; Supporting Air and Space Expeditionary
Forces, RAND, 2005. Some classified US-Uzbek cooperation against the Taliban and Al Qaeda
had been carried out before Sept. 11, 2001.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

targeted.² No U.S. base monetary reimbursements were specified.³ The duration of the
SOFA was open-ended, but included a provision that it could be terminated by either
party with a 180-day notice. According to some reports, problems in negotiating the
Uzbek SOFA further spurred the United States to seek alternative airfield access at the
Manas International Airport in Kyrgyztan.⁴
Air Force Secretary James Roche has stated that K-2’s missions were “special
operations, combat search and rescue, and theater lift,” and other sources have mentioned
intelligence functions. The Air Force reported in early 2005 that C-130s flying out of K2
carried an average of about 60 passengers and about 50 tons of cargo per day to Bagram,
Kandahar, and other locations in Afghanistan, and that about 1,000 Army and Air Force
personnel were deployed there, excluding contractors. More than 40,000 U.S. Air Force
flights departed and landed at K2 since late 2001, according to the U.S. Embassy.⁵
Emerging Strains in U.S.-Uzbek Relations. Uzbekistan was the only Central
Asian state that joined the “coalition of the willing” in February-March 2003 that⁶
endorsed U.S.-led military operations in Iraq (Kazakhstan joined later). However, U.S.-
Uzbek relations became strained in 2004-2005. A partial U.S. aid cutoff in FY2004
because of Uzbek human rights violations and President Karimov’s growing fears that the
United States was fostering democratic “revolutions” in Soviet successor states added to
these strains. Among other strains, Uzbek officials had expected ample compensation for
use of K2 and complained that such compensation was delayed and inadequate, including
a 2003 U.S. “reimbursement of services” payment of $15.7 million in coalition support
funds for the use of K2 through December 2002. Congress in May 2005 approved $42.5
million in military construction funds (FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations,

² An Oct. 12, 2001, U.S.-Uzbek statement on combating terrorism called for both sides to consult
in the event of a threat to Uzbekistan’s security. During Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s Mar.

2002 U.S. visit, a Declaration on Strategic Partnership reaffirmed this vague pledge and a U.S.

pledge to boost military cooperation, to include “re-equipping the Armed Forces” of Uzbekistan.
³ According to Lt. Col. Kurt Meppen, the terms of the SOFA were “vague,” permitting broad U.S.
leeway on the use of air fields, airspace and soil. U.S.-Uzbek Bilateral Relations: Policy Options,
in Anatomy of A Crisis, Silk Road Paper, February 2006.
⁴ Deborah E. Klepp. The U.S. Needs a Base Where? How the U.S. Established an Air Base in the
Kyrgyz Republic, National Defense University, 2004. Perhaps in contrast to the more visible air
operations, Uzbekistan more easily accommodated special operations. See Senate Armed
Services Committee. Subcommittee on Emerging Threats. Statement by General Charles R.
Holland, Mar. 12, 2002. Uzbekistan also provided a base for German units at Termez and a land
corridor to Afghanistan for humanitarian aid via the Friendship Bridge at Termez.
⁵ U.S. Embassy in Uzbekistan. Press Release, Sept. 7, 2005. Lt. Col. Meppen mentions “over
10,000” Air Force sorties. He states that “U.S. aircraft would overfly Europe, refuel mid-air over
the Black Sea with U.S. tankers flying from Romania, cross the Caucasus states of Georgia and
Azerbaijan, span the Caspian Sea north of Iran, then cross into Central Asia.... After offloading
cargo at Bagram, the C-17’s would fly to [K2], refuel, and ... retrac[e] the original ingress route....
The air corridor ... became the key to maintaining combat capability in Afghanistan, and [K2]
was the critical refueling and logistics nexus.”
⁶ According to RAND, K2 provided some unspecified operational assistance for Operation Iraqi
Freedom. RAND, 2005.

P.L.109-13, H.Rept. 109-72) for upgrading runways and taxiways at K2, but the project
was delayed by increased strains in relations.⁷
The Termination of the SOFA. Although the Administration initially responded
cautiously to civil violence in May 2005 in Uzbekistan’s city of Andijon — where many
witnesses and others claimed that the Uzbek government killed hundreds of unarmed
civilians — the State Department soon endorsed international calls for a credible
investigation of the killings. This and other U.S. criticism of human rights abuses in
Uzbekistan appeared to contribute to restrictions placed by the Karimov government in
mid-June on night flights and on C-17 and other heavy cargo lift out of K2.⁸
On July 5, 2005, the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed a
declaration issued during a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO; a
regional security body composed of Russia, China, and all the Central Asian states except
Turkmenistan) that called for coalition members supporting operations in Afghanistan “to
decide on the deadline for the use of the temporary infrastructure and for their military⁹
contingents’ presence in those countries.” Despite signing the declaration, none of the
Central Asian countries that hosted U.S. and other coalition bases called for immediately
closing them, and some observers speculated that the states were seeking higher rents for
the bases. However, the day after refugees who fled from Andijon to Kyrgyzstan were
flown to Romania on July 28, 2005, Uzbekistan delivered a demarche to the U.S. embassy
in Tashkent requesting that U.S. use of K2 end within six months. Besides anger at the
United States for supporting the refugee move, Uzbek legislators in late August contended
that U.S. operations at K2 should end because they attract international terrorism, damage
the environment, and are no longer necessary since Afghanistan is stable. They also
accused the United States of fomenting the overthrow of the government and of failing¹⁰
to reimburse the country for $168 million spent to support K2.
On November 21, 2005, the United States officially ceased anti-terrorism operations
(to support Afghanistan) at K2. The Uzbek government reportedly also informed
Belgium, Spain, Netherlands, and Sweden in mid-November that their basing and
overflight privileges would be suspended, after the European Union denied travel visas
to Uzbek officials who were implicated in violence in Andijon. In January 2006,
Uzbekistan reportedly threatened to end the German role at Termez, including because
U.S. troops were transiting through the base, and demanded more foreign assistance from
Germany (the country is said to pay 3 million euros per year for basing privileges).

⁷ Beginning in late 2003, the Uzbeks submitted six draft leases for K2, according to Lt. Col.
Meppen. He states that “U.S. negotiators were mystified by Uzbekistan’s repeated attempts to
extract monetary concessions, particularly after explaining ... that in other theaters, sovereign
nations paid ... for American troops to stay on their soil.” After rejecting these draft leases,
CENTCOM and the Air Force decided in April 2005 that alternatives to K2 might be necessary.
⁸ Los Angeles Times, June 13, 2005. For details, see CRS Report RS22161, Unrest in Uzbekistan.
⁹ Washington Post, July 15, 2005, p. A19.
¹⁰ FBIS, September 19, 2005, Doc. No. CEP-27220; The Independent (London), Sept. 30, 2005.
NATO in late May issued a statement that it “condemn[s] the reported use of excessive and
disproportionate force by the Uzbek security forces.” Press Release, May 24, 2005. Karimov
subsequently accused NATO of complicity in events in Andijon and warned that “it is trying to
get into and strengthen its presence in Central Asia.” FBIS, July 5, 2005, Doc. No. CEP-8002.

Implications for Uzbekistan and Regional Security
Many observers judge that Uzbekistan’s security relations with the United States
appear seriously set back by it’s decision to terminate the K2 basing agreement and to
curtail other military cooperation with the United States. According to a 2004 U.S.
Defense Department assessment, then-Uzbek Defense Minister Qodir Gulomov had been
“very intent upon Westernizing” the armed forces, including increasing interoperability
with NATO forces, building a non-commissioned officer corps, and restructuring
recruitment and retention.¹¹ However, such plans appeared scuttled in recent months as
Uzbekistan solidified ties with Russia and China as the predominant suppliers of
equipment and training that bolsters Karimov’s rule. This trend was bolstered after the
European Union on October 3 imposed arms export and visa sanctions on Uzbekistan.
In mid-November 2005, Russia and Uzbekistan signed a Treaty on Allied Relations that
calls for both sides to have access to each other’s military installations and for mutual
defense consultations in the event of a threat to either party. Gulomov was replaced as
defense minister in late 2005 by an intelligence official.¹²
Like Russia, China has backed Uzbekistan fully in declaring that events in Andijon
are a matter of Uzbekistan’s internal affairs, and hence off-limits to international inquiry.
Examples of closer Uzbek-Chinese ties include Karimov’s visit to China in late May and
the signing of an accord on Chinese investment in the Uzbek energy sector. Perhaps
marking growing security cooperation, China and Russia held their first military exercises
in China in August 2005, which were observed by Uzbekistan and other Central Asian
members of the SCO. Some observers question the capabilities of Russia and China to
adequately address terrorist threats in the region, given their inadequate efforts before
U.S.-led coalition operations began in Afghanistan.¹³
Implications for U.S. Interests
U.S. Policy. Since signing cooperative security agreements with the Central Asian
states, the Administration has averred that the United States seeks no “permanent” basing
presence in the region. However, it also has argued that regional access will be needed
as long as “conditions in Afghanistan require it,” as well as “for future contingencies and
to be involved in training and joint exercises ... for the long term.”¹⁴ The Overseas Basing
Commission (OBC), in its May 2005 Report, concurred with the Administration that
existing bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have been useful for supporting OEF. The
OBC has considered that there could be some possible merit in establishing CSLs (a
military facility with few or no U.S. troops, but which may contain pre-positioned
equipment and contract personnel) in the region, but has urged Congress to seek further

¹¹ Department of Defense. Background Briefing on Uzbekistan, Feb. 24, 2004. See also the
Uzbek government’s Looking toward the Future, The Armed Forces, [http://www.uzbekistan.uz].
¹² Eurasia Insight, Nov. 15, 2005.
¹³ In August 2002, Karimov had praised the U.S. role in reducing the terrorist threat, as opposed
to “our allies who were turning a blind eye.” FBIS, Aug. 31, 2002, Doc. No. CEP-45.
¹⁴ Deputy Assistant Secretary B. Lynn Pascoe, Presentation at the Yale Center for the Study of
Globalization, Sept. 20, 2002.

inter-agency vetting of “what constitutes vital U.S. interests in the area that would require
[a] long-term U.S. presence.”¹⁵
Democratization and the Global War on Terrorism. According to the
Administration, recent events in Uzbekistan brought two policies the United States has
pursued in tandem — combating global terrorism and supporting democratization and
human rights — into conflict. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns on August 2, 2005,
asserted that the Administration “made a clear choice, and that was to stand on the side
of human rights,” even though the Administration “knew” that the Uzbek government
would then demand that K2 be vacated. Other observers suggested that the
Administration appeared less prepared for the Uzbek demand. Uzbekistan not only
requested that K2 be vacated, but curtailed other anti-terrorism cooperation, including
military-to-military exchanges and training. These programs also aimed to inform Uzbek
troops about civil-military relations in a democracy. Uzbekistan suspended other U.S.-
funded democratization programs, including those carried out by the Peace Corps, the
U.S.-funded International Research and Exchanges Board, and the Eurasia Foundation.
The Defense Department argued that the closure of K2 created some logistical
problems but did not markedly affect coalition operations in Afghanistan or other aspects
of the Global War on Terrorism. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld made a sudden trip to
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on July 25-27, 2005, and announced that he had obtained
assurances that these countries would continue to support coalition operations in
Afghanistan, thus seemingly highlighting the flexibility of a “lily pad” approach to foreign
military basing and the continuation of major U.S. influence in the region. Some¹⁶
operations at K2 were transferred to Manas and some to Bagram, Afghanistan. The
United States may even gain regional influence, according to some observers. They point
to recent statements by U.S. and Kazakh officials about boosting bilateral ties as evidence
that Kazakhstan continues to vie with Uzbekistan for regional dominance. They also
argue that the United States may gain more moral credibility in the Islamic world. Other
observers are less sanguine that the closure of K2 will have minimal effects on U.S.
strategic interests. They argue that the future of U.S. and coalition basing in Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan may not be assured, including because both the states had endorsed the July
2005 SCO call for Afghanistan-related bases to be closed. They warn that the closure of
K2 might thus mark the first success of a Russian and Chinese push to consolidate their¹⁷
influence and largely eliminate the U.S. security presence.
Congressional Concerns. Many in Congress long have voiced concerns about
how U.S. assistance is used by the Uzbek government. Since FY2003, annual foreign
operations appropriations acts have disallowed aid to the government of Uzbekistan
unless the Secretary of State reports that Uzbekistan is making substantial progress in
democratization and respect for human rights. In FY2004, the State Department indicated
that up to $18 million in military and economic aid to Uzbekistan could be withheld
because of lack of such progress. International Military Education and Training (IMET)

¹⁵ Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States.
Interim Report, May 9, 2005.
¹⁶ Washington Post, Sept. 17, 2005, p. A18; New York Times, Aug. 2, 2005, p. 3.
¹⁷ BBC Monitoring Central Asia, Sept. 26, 2005; Los Angeles Times, Sept. 16, 2005.

and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs, which are conditioned on respect for
human rights, were among those affected. The State Department reprogrammed or used
notwithstanding authority to allocate some of the affected aid, so that about $8.5 million
was ultimately withheld. During an August 2004 visit to Uzbekistan, Gen. Myers
criticized the cutoff of IMET and FMF programs as “shortsighted” and not “productive,”
since it reduced U.S. military influence. Reportedly, he stated that Defense Department
nonproliferation aid would amount to $21 million in FY2004 and pointed out that
fourteen patrol boats worth $2.9 million were being transferred. For FY2005, reportedly
about $20 million in foreign operations appropriations were withheld because of lack of
progress in democratization and respect for human rights.¹⁸
Among recent legislative proposals, some in Congress support cutting off all aid to
Uzbekistan, while others call for increasing aid to non-governmental organizations that
carry out democratization and human rights activities. H.Con.Res. 187 (Ros-Lehtinen)
and H.R. 3189 (Christopher Smith) call for conditioning aid on democratization and
respect for human rights, and the House Appropriations Committee has urged that no
FMF aid be provided to Uzbekistan (H.Rept. 109-152, H.R. 3057). H.R. 3545
(Delahunt), introduced in late July 2005, calls for amending the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 to add conditions on aid to Uzbekistan. The bill also restricts arms exports and
visas for Uzbek officials involved in human rights abuses.
In September 2005, the Defense Department informed Congress that it intended to
provide Uzbekistan $23 million to “pay the bill” for the use of K2 from January 2003
through March 2005. In response, Senators Biden, DeWine, Graham, Leahy, McCain,
and Sununu sent a letter to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld urging that this planned payment
be disbursed only after Uzbekistan renewed antiterrorism cooperation with the United
States They also warned that a quick payout might give the impression that the United
States “overlooks massacres” and rewards a “dictator” who evicts U.S. forces. H.Res.
475 (Delahunt), introduced on September 29, 2005, called for suspending the payment
and for U.S. support for trying Karimov in the International Criminal Court. On October
5, 2005, an amendment to Defense Appropriations for FY2006 (H.R. 2863) was approved
for a one-year hold on the payment. In introducing the amendment, Senator McCain
called it a means to censure Uzbekistan for terminating U.S. access to K2 while “our
troops in Afghanistan are still fighting the Taliban [and] our mission [is] clearly
unfinished.”¹⁹ Despite this concern, the Defense Department transferred the payment in
November 2005. The amendment later was removed in conference (H.Rept. 109-360;
P.L. 109-359). Among other legislation, the Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs
Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-114) rescinded funds for repair of runways at K2. In
addition, the conferees (H.Rept. 109-305) called for Congress to be informed of changes
to the USCENTCOM Master Plan for basing U.S. forces within USCENTCOM’s Area
of Responsibility.

¹⁸ In contrast, P.L. 107-314 (Sec. 1306) gave the president authority in FY2004-FY2005 to waive
conditions on Comprehensive Threat Reduction assistance (one condition is a requirement to
observe internationally recognized human rights). In both years, the President explained that
Uzbekistan’s human rights problems necessitated a waiver. P.L. 109-163 (Sec. 1303) indefinitely
extends this presidential authority, renewable annually.
¹⁹ Congressional Record, Sept. 29, 2005, p.H8643; Oct. 4, 2005, p. S10918; Oct. 5, 2005, p.
S11077.