The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Schaffer v. Weast Determines Party Seeking Relief Bears the Burden of Proof
CRS Report for Congress
The Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA): Schaffer v. Weast Determines
Party Seeking Relief Bears the Burden of
Proof
Nancy Lee Jones
Legislative Attorney
American Law Division
Summary
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is the main federal
program concerning the education of children with disabilities. It authorizes state and
local aid for special education and related services for children with disabilities and
contains detailed due process protections for children with disabilities and their parents.
On December 3, 2004, President Bush signed “The Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act Improvement Act” (P.L. 108-446), a major reauthorization and revision
of IDEA. One issue which was not addressed in the reauthorization was whether the
parents or the school bears the burden of proof in special education due process
hearings. On November 14, 2005, the Supreme Court resolved a split in the circuits and
held that the burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging a child’s
individualized education program is on the party seeking the relief.
Statutory Provisions
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act1 is both a grants statute and a civil
rights statute. It provides federal funding for the education of children with disabilities
and requires, as a condition for the receipt of such funds, the provision of a free
appropriate public education (FAPE). One of the major ways FAPE is ensured is by the
creation and implementation of an individualized education program (IEP). The IEP is
the blueprint for the education and related services that the local educational agency
(LEA) provides for a child with a disability, together with the goals, academic assessment
1 20 U.S.C. §1400 et seq. For a more detailed discussion of IDEA see CRS Report RL32716,The
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): Analysis of Changes Made by P.L. 108-446,
by Richard N. Apling and Nancy Lee Jones.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
procedures, and placement of the child.2 The statute also contains detailed due process
requirements to ensure the provision of FAPE. Originally enacted in 1975, the act
responded to increased awareness of the need to educate children with disabilities, and
to judicial decisions requiring that states provide an education for children with
disabilities if they provided an education for children without disabilities.3 However, the
statute contains no specific provision relating to which party has the burden of proof in
a due process hearing. Generally when a statute is silent about the burden of proof, the
burden is placed on the party initiating the proceeding.4 However, this is not an absolute
rule and other factors such as policy considerations, convenience, and fairness may
change the allocation of the burden of proof.5
Schaffer v. Weast
The Supreme Court in a 6-2 decision written by Justice O’Connor,6 held that the
burden of proof regarding an allegedly inadequate IEP in an IDEA due process hearing
rests with the party seeking the relief. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion while
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer dissented. The Supreme Court’s decision clarified a split
in the circuits on the issue.
Brian Schaffer, who was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD) as well as other learning disabilities, had attended a private school until the
seventh grade when his mother was told by that school that he should attend a school that
could more adequately accommodate his disabilities. Brian’s mother contacted the local
public school and requested an evaluation to determine his eligibility for special education
and also applied to another private school. The public school found Brian eligible for
IDEA services and proposed an IEP which would give Brian 15.3 hours of special
education and 45 minutes of speech therapy each week. Brian’s parents requested a due
process hearing alleging that the proposed IEP was inadequate due to Brian’s need for
smaller classes and more intensive services, and that he should be placed in a private
school.
The administrative law judge (ALJ), observing that the evidence was close, assigned
the burden of proof to the parents finding that deference was owed to educational
professionals. Ultimately, the ALJ held that the parents had not met the burden of proof
and upheld the school’s proposed IEP. On appeal, the district court agreed with the
parents regarding the burden of proof and remanded the case to the ALJ who then found
that the public school had failed to prove the adequacy of the IEP. About this time the
school district offered the parents a placement for Brian in a high school with a special
learning center. The parents accepted this placement but the suit continued since the
parents sought compensation for the private school tuition. Eventually the case came
2 20 U.S.C. §1414(d).
3 For a more detailed discussion of the congressional intent behind the enactment of P.L. 94-142
see CRS Report 95-669, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Congressional Intent,
by Nancy Lee Jones. Report is archived, and available from author.
4 J. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §337 (5th Ed. 1999).
5 Id.
6 Chief Justice Roberts took no part in the decision.
before the fourth circuit which found that there was no persuasive reason to depart from
the normal rule of allocating the burden to the party seeking relief.7 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the issue regarding the burden of proof.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice O’Connor, first observed that “absent
some reason to believe that Congress intended otherwise,...we will conclude that the
burden of persuasion lies where it usually falls, upon the party seeking relief.”8 Justice
O’Connor then examined various reasons advanced to support the argument that the
burden of proof should be on the school system. First, the Court rejected the argument
that the term “due process” in IDEA should be interpreted in its constitutional sense
which would require the application of a balancing test. Second, it was argued that the
Court should rely on the district court decisions of Mills v. Board of Education9 and
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth10 which were used by
the drafters of the original IDEA statute. Justice O’Connor rejected this argument
accepting the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit that the fact that Congress incorporated a
number of the procedural safeguards from these cases into the statute does not mean that
Congress intended to adopt the ideas that it did not incorporate into the statute.
Third, placing the burden of proof on the schools, it was argued by the parents,
would further IDEA’s purposes by ensuring FAPE. The Supreme Court noted that
assigning the burden of proof to school districts “might encourage schools to put more
resources into preparing IEPs and presenting their evidence.”11 However, this argument
was also rejected by the Court which stated that IDEA “is silent about whether marginal
dollars should be allocated to litigation and administrative expenditures or to educational
services.”12 The expense of litigating a due process complaint was noted and the Court
observed that “Congress has also repeatedly amended the Act in order to reduce its
administrative and litigation-related costs.”13 Examples of attempts to reduce these
burdens where found in the new IDEA requirement in P.L. 108-446 for a resolution
session14 and the new findings concerning resolving differences in positive and
constructive ways.15 Justice O’Connor concluded that the parents “in effect ask this Court
to assume that every IEP is invalid until the school district demonstrates that it is not. The
Act does not support this conclusion.”16
The Supreme Court noted that the most plausible argument advanced by the parents
was that in the interest of fairness, the burden of proof should not be placed on a party
7 377 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2004).
8 Slip op. at 8.
9 348 F.Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
10 334 F.Supp. 1257 (E.D.Pa. 1971).
11 Slip op. at 9.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 20 U.S.C. §1415(f)(1)(B).
15 20 U.S.C. §1400(c)(8)-(9).
16 Slip op. at 9-10.
when the facts are “peculiarly within the knowledge of his adversary.”17 School districts
were seen as having a “natural advantage” regarding the information but Justice
O’Connor did not find this to be determinative since “Congress addressed this when it
obliged schools to safeguard the procedural rights of parents and to share information
with them.”18 The Court noted that IDEA provides parents with the right to review
records, to have an independent educational evaluation, to have details about options
considered by the school district as well as disclosure of evaluations and
recommendations, and to receive attorneys’ fees in the discretion of a court if they prevail.
Justice O’Connor concluded that “[t]hese protections ensure that the school bears no
unique informational advantage.”19
Finally, the Court observed that several states have laws or regulations which always
place the burden of proof on the school district.20 Although the Court noted the
existence of these laws and regulations, the majority held that since there was no
Maryland law or regulation relating to the burden of proof, it was not necessary to decide
whether the allocation of the burden of proof should be left to the states.
Justice Stevens concurred in the opinion of the Court while Justice Ginsburg and
Breyer wrote separate dissents. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens observed that he
joined the majority’s opinion not only for the reasons in Justice O’Connor’s decision but
also “because I believe that we should presume that public school officials are properly
performing their difficult responsibilities under this important statute.”21
Justice Ginsburg dissented from the Court’s majority opinion. She agreed that
ordinarily when the statute is silent, the burden of proof is on the person initiating the
proceeding; however, she emphasized that other factors, such as policy considerations and
fairness, may change the burden of proof. This was the situation in Schaffer, Justice
Ginsburg argued. IDEA was described as imposing an affirmative obligation on public
school systems who had greater expertise and thus were in a better position than parents
to demonstrate the adequacy of the IEP. She opined that “[p]lacing the burden on the
district to show that its plan measures up to the statutorily mandated ‘free appropriate
public education,’...will strengthen school officials’ resolve to choose a course genuinely
tailored to the child’s individual needs.”22
Justice Breyer dissented on different grounds. He found both the majority’s and
Justice Ginsberg’s arguments to be reasonable but stated “My own view is that Congress
took neither approach. It did not decide the ‘burden of persuasion’ question; instead it left
17 Slip op. at 10, citing United States v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 355 U.S. 253, 256, n. 5
(1957).
18 Slip op. at 10.
19 Slip op. at 11,
20 See e.g.., MINN. STAT. §125A.091, subd. 16 (2004); ALA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 4,
§52.550(e)(9)(2003), cited in slip op. at 12.
21 Justice Stevens, concurring at 1.
22 Justice Ginsberg, dissenting at 3-4.
the matter to the States for decision.”23 Justice Breyer noted that IDEA was an exercise
in “cooperative federalism” and that “respecting the States’ right to decide this procedural
matter here, where education is at issue, where expertise matters, and where costs are
shared, is consistent with that cooperative approach.”24
23 Justice Breyer, dissenting at 3.
24 Id. at 5.