Banning Fissile Material Production for Nuclear Weapons: Prospects for a Treaty (FMCT)

CRS Report for Congress
Banning Fissile Material Production for
Nuclear Weapons: Prospects for
a Treaty (FMCT)
Sharon Squassoni
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Andrew Demkee and Jill Marie Parillo
Research Associates
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
On May 18, 2006, the United States proposed a draft Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
(FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. The U.S. draft treaty,
would enter into force with only the five established nuclear weapon states. It would
ban new production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for use in nuclear
weapons for 15 years; could be extended only by consensus of the parties; would allow
high-enriched uranium production for naval fuel; and contains no provisions for
verification other than national technical means. The next step is for the CD to adopt
a negotiating mandate, the prospects for which appear uncertain, given continued
linkage by some states of FMCT negotiations with other disarmament talks. The CD
meets again from July 31 to September 15. This report will be updated as necessary.
Background
Efforts to control the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons date back to
the 1946 Baruch Plan.¹ As Cold War enmities solidified, however, attempts to control
fissile material production for weapons were abandoned. “Cutoff” negotiations in Geneva
got a boost from President George H.W. Bush’s announcement in 1992 that the United
States no longer produced fissile material for nuclear weapons and President Clinton’s
1993 call for Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) negotiations. Despite consensus on
a negotiating mandate, member states at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) failed to
start negotiations.

¹ The Baruch plan called for “complete managerial control of the production of fissionable
materials,” after which manufacture of atomic bombs could stop. Reprinted in Nuclear^th^st
Proliferation Factbook, Joint Committee Print, 99 Congress, 1 Session, August 1985.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Some perceive a ban on producing fissile material for weapons as much more relevant
today than it was a decade ago, a view supported by the Bush Administration’s May 18,
2006, proposal. Concern about terrorist access to large stockpiles of fissile material has
only grown since the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs began in the early 1990s and
particularly since September 11, 2001. Revelations about Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan’s
nuclear black market sales of uranium enrichment technology in 2004 have spurred efforts
not only to shut down networks, but restrict even “legitimate” technology transfer. Recent
proposals to strengthen the nonproliferation regime, including those of Mohamed
ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), have
focused on tighter controls on sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies, renewed
disarmament effort, and creative approaches toward states outside the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) — India, Pakistan, and Israel.² An FMCT could play a
pivotal role in implementing that agenda, by helping to gain broad support for new
multilateral arrangements to restrict enrichment and reprocessing, helping to strengthen
consensus among NPT parties, and by achieving a concrete step towards disarmament.
Lastly, an FMCT is viewed by many nonproliferation experts as the sine qua non for
nuclear cooperation with India. At a minimum, President Bush has proposed to make
Indian support for FMCT negotiations a prerequisite for engaging in nuclear cooperation.
Fissile Material
Most nonproliferation experts consider acquiring fissile material to be the key hurdle
in developing nuclear weapons. Such material — plutonium-239, uranium-233, and³
uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 — is produced several ways. Only the isotope U-

235 occurs naturally, but it cannot be used to create a nuclear yield unless it is⁴

concentrated significantly. Pu-239 is created in a nuclear reactor by irradiating natural
uranium (U-238), which absorbs a neutron to decay into Pu-239.⁵ The Pu-239 must then
be chemically separated from highly radioactive fission products to be usable in a nuclear
weapon.⁶ Spent fuel reprocessing plants perform this chemical separation, but it can also
be done on a smaller scale, with remote handling and adequate shielding against radiation
hazards. U-233 is produced in a reactor by irradiating thorium-232, and also requires
chemical separation from fission products. High-enriched uranium (HEU), the ingredient
in the first U.S. nuclear bomb, is produced by concentrating the isotope U-235 in an⁷
enrichment plant. Although HEU is defined as containing 20% or more U-235, weapons-
grade HEU generally requires about 90% U-235.

² Mohamed ElBaradei, “Rethinking Nuclear Safeguards,” Washington Post, June 14, 2006.
³ The U.S. May 2006 proposal does not limit plutonium to just Pu-239, but extends it to all
plutonium except that which contains 80% of Pu-238.
⁴ Natural uranium contains mostly U-238, with very little U-235 (less than 0.7%).
⁵ Plutonium is “created” in a reactor, but banning such creation could virtually eliminate civil
uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, plutonium in spent fuel cannot produce a nuclear yield unless
separated from waste products and therefore “production” tends to be equated with reprocessing.
⁶ The discussion here is limited to nuclear weapons with nuclear yields and excludes radiological
weapons, which simply use radioactive material to contaminate conventional explosives.
⁷ Technologies include gaseous diffusion, electromagnetic isotope separation, laser isotope
separation and gas centrifuge isotope separation (which Iran is developing).

Which States “Produce” Fissile Material for Weapons?
Nine states have produced fissile material for nuclear weapons — the five nuclear
weapon states as defined by the NPT (United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France,
and China), India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. All of these states have
unsafeguarded — that is, uninspected — enrichment and reprocessing plants, but four are
no longer producing fissile material for weapons — United States, United Kingdom,⁸
Russia, and France. The United States stopped producing HEU for weapons in 1964 and
plutonium for weapons in 1988. Russia and the United Kingdom declared their cessation⁹
in 1995; France declared a halt in 1996. China is believed to have halted production, but
has not publicly declared so. It is not clear that Israel or North Korea enrich uranium for
weapons, and India’s enrichment plant reportedly is used to enrich uranium for naval
submarine fuel. North Korea’s relevance in FMCT negotiations is controversial, since
there would be great pressure to place its enrichment and reprocessing plants under IAEA
safeguards by a return to the NPT, rather than as a party to an FMCT. Other non-nuclear
weapon state parties to the NPT reprocess spent fuel (Japan) and enrich uranium
(Netherlands, Germany, Argentina, Brazil, Japan) for commercial purposes. These
capabilities are under IAEA safeguards, which verify that nuclear material is not diverted.
Some states have argued that a treaty should cover existing stocks of fissile material.
The United States has long opposed this approach. The dissolution of the Soviet Union,
and more recently, the September 11, 2001, attacks, have heightened concerns about
terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction materials, bolstering the argument to
include existing stocks in an FMCT. According to 2004 estimates, there are more than
3,700 metric tons of plutonium (1,800 tons) and highly enriched uranium (1,900 tons) in
the world. Much of the plutonium is in civilian reactors or spent fuel ponds, is
safeguarded, and not separated from fission products, and thus poses a lower security risk.
About 235 tons of plutonium in the civil cycle is separated from fission products already.
Military plutonium accounts for just 1/10th of the civilian plutonium, but about 90% of
it is separated. An estimated 1,570 tons of the world’s plutonium are under safeguards,
while 155 tons are in military stocks in the five nuclear weapon states.¹⁰ The situation for
HEU is reversed, with 50 tons under safeguards in civilian programs, 125 tons declared
by the United States is excess to defense needs (and therefore eligible to be safeguarded),¹¹
and 1,725 tons in military programs.
Given that four of the five nuclear weapon states have declared they have ceased
production, and Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom have declared material

⁸ The NPT requires non-nuclear weapon states to accept a system of inspections and record-
keeping — nuclear safeguards — on all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities. The
nuclear weapon states under the treaty — U.S., U.K., China, France and Russia — are not
obliged to accept any nuclear safeguards, but have voluntary safeguards on some civilian
facilities.
⁹ See David Albright, Global Fissile Material Inventories, available at [http://www.isis-
online.org].
¹⁰ See [http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/plutonium_watch2004.html#table3].
¹¹ See [http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/civil_heu_watch2005.pdf].

in excess of defense needs, what remaining barriers exist to including existing stocks in
a treaty? Covering existing stocks in a cutoff treaty could prove highly contentious
because: (1) The stockpiles of the five weapon states range from 4 tons to 145 tons and
are significantly larger than those of India, Pakistan, and Israel; (2) It is unclear whether
a commitment would be mandatory or voluntary; and (3) It is unclear whether the parties
could agree on equitable cuts.
FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament (CD)
In response to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 48/75L, the CD established a
committee in 1995 to begin work on an FMCT. The 66-member negotiating body in
Geneva agreed by consensus to the so-called “Shannon Mandate,” which called for an
“Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally
and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” Canada’s Ambassador Shannon specifically
noted that the mandate did not preclude any delegation from raising issues related to the
scope of the treaty — whether banning future production, covering existing stocks, or
adding management of stocks — during discussions.
Following the conclusion of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations in1996,
FMCT appeared to be the next priority, yet CD member states could not agree on a
program of work. In late 1998, CD members agreed to establish an Ad Hoc Committee,
mostly in reaction to the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests earlier that year, but the CD
was unable to reestablish the Committee in 1999. Within the CD, four basic areas of
work — nuclear disarmament, prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS),
negative security assurances, and a fissile material production cutoff — still compete for
priority. Moreover, several states prefer to link progress in one area to progress in another
area, which some observers call “hostage-taking.” China, for one, has made its agreement
to start FMCT negotiations contingent on the start of PAROS negotiations, and other¹²
states have done the same with respect to nuclear disarmament negotiations. In May
2006, the U.S. delegation told CD members it “sees no need at this time, however, for the
negotiation of new multilateral agreements on nuclear disarmament, outer space, or
negative security assurances.”¹³ In June 2006, a U.S. official told the CD that “...there is¹⁴

no — repeat, no — problem in outer space for arms control to solve.”
¹² See [http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches06/8juneIndia.pdf] for Indian
June 2006 position and [http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches06
/8JuneChina.pdf] for China’s position. The United States and United Kingdom have opposed
PAROS negotiations, despite the existence of an Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS at the CD from

1985 to 1994.

¹³ Stephen G. Rademaker, Acting Assistant Secretary for International Security and
Nonproliferation, “Rising to the Challenge of Effective Multilateralism,” at
[http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/ rm/66419.htm] .
¹⁴ See [http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches06/13JuneUS.pdf].

Major FMCT Issues
Although negotiations have been stalled for more than a decade, the CD has
convened informal meetings to examine issues of FMCT scope, duration, and verification,
and entry-into-force.¹⁵ Several issues could generate debate, but are likely to be fairly
non-controversial, including how to define fissile material (all plutonium except reactor-
grade, or just Pu-239?) and production (in a reactor or in a reprocessing plant?), and
provisions for entry into force and duration. The most difficult issues to resolve are likely
to be whether the scope should include existing stocks, what kinds of activities would not
be prohibited, and whether verification measures are necessary and if so, what kind. Until
2004, when the United States announced that an FMCT was inherently unverifiable, many
observers assumed IAEA safeguards would play a role, with modifications made for
inspections in nuclear weapon states. The U.S. position may not be accepted by a
significant number of CD members.
U.S. Proposal
On May 18, 2006, the U.S. delegation to the CD proposed a draft negotiating
mandate and FMCT text. The negotiating mandate excludes reference to effective
verifiability of a treaty, in line with the U.S. position that an FMCT cannot be adequately
verified. The proposal seeks to prohibit the production of “fissile material for use in
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or use of any fissile material
produced thereafter in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”¹⁶ Key
elements of the U.S. draft include a 15-year duration, which could only be extended by
consensus of the parties; a scope limited to future production, with an exception for
production of naval fuel; an entry-into-force provision limited to the five nuclear weapon
states; and no provisions for verification. U.S. officials have stated that verification¹⁷
would “rest with the parties using their own national means and methods.”
The U.S. proposal raises a few issues. Requiring consensus to extend the treaty
may present a very high threshold. Also, the requirement for the treaty to enter into force
with just the five nuclear weapon states, rather than all states with unsafeguarded
enrichment and reprocessing plants, may mean that key states that are producing fissile
material may be left out — India, Israel, and Pakistan. This would reduce the effect to
merely making the status quo (if it is true hat China has stopped producing) legally
binding for a limited duration. However, it is also possible that other NPT nuclear
weapon states could refuse to ratify until India or Pakistan did. Third, allowing
production of HEU for naval reactors creates a particular loophole in the absence of
verification measures. Some states could produce HEU for weapons, unfettered even by
declarations. Finally, one of the few areas of agreement among states in the 1995
negotiating mandate was the need for effective verification, so some may view the U.S.
approach as undermining what little agreement had been reached.

¹⁵ These include workshops in 1995, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004, and 2006.
¹⁶ See [http://geneva.usmission.gov/Press2006/0518DraftFMCT.html] for the U.S. draft FMCT.
¹⁷ Ibid. Such national means generally are limited to remote monitoring, including from satellites.

No state has opposed FMCT negotiations, but China has repeated its desire to
reach “a comprehensive and balanced program of work.” India’s ambassador to the CD
reported on May 17, 2006, that India supported verification in the FMCT, and that
“absence of a verification mechanism may engender lack of confidence in compliance,
with the treaty, encourage willful non-compliance, and lead to allegations and counter-
allegations of noncompliance.”¹⁸ Pakistan’s ambassador to the CD quipped that a fissile
material treaty “sans verification sans stocks will be sans treaty.”¹⁹
Issues for Congress
Congress may be interested in the progress of FMCT negotiations in the context
of India’s July 18, 2005, commitment to work with the United States to conclude a
multilateral FMCT. India’s support for FMCT is one of the key determinations the
President must make, according to the Administration’s proposed legislation on U.S.-
India nuclear cooperation (H.R. 4974/S. 2429).²⁰ It is not clear if Indian support for a
verifiable FMCT conflicts with support for U.S. efforts, but this position could raise
questions about how hard India will work to achieve U.S. goals in the CD.
The Senate would have the opportunity to advise and consent to U.S. ratification
of an FMCT. Should the CD adopt the U.S. approach, several questions may arise:
^!Given historic difficulties in estimating fissile material production, can
U.S. intelligence capabilities provide confidence in a global ban,
particularly with respect to China? How difficult is it to distinguish
between “allowed” enrichment for naval fuel and illicit enrichment for
nuclear weapons?
^!If the treaty enters into force with just the five nuclear weapon states, will
it satisfy nonproliferation objectives?
^!Will key states such as Pakistan, India, China, and Israel agree to national
technical means as the only verification approach?

¹⁸ See [http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches06/17MayIndia.pdf].
¹⁹ See [http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches06/statements%2016%20may/

16MayPaki stan.pdf].

²⁰ See CRS Report RL33016, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress, by
Sharon Squassoni. Both the House and Senate committee mark-ups of India legislation contain
the Administration’s language on the FMCT determination.