India and Iran: WMD Proliferation Activities
India and Iran: WMD Proliferation Activities
Sharon Squassoni
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Members of Congress have questioned whether India’s cooperation with Iran might
affect U.S. and other efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. India’s
long relationship with Iran and its support of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) positions
on nonproliferation are obstacles to India’s taking a hard line on Iran, yet the Bush
Administration has asserted that U.S.-India nuclear cooperation would bring India into
the “nonproliferation mainstream.” India, like most other states, does not support a
nuclear weapons option for Iran. However, its views of the Iranian threat and
appropriate responses differ significantly from U.S. views. Entities in India and Iran
appear to have engaged in very limited nuclear, chemical and missile-related transfers
over the years, and some sanctions have been imposed on Indian entities for transfers
to Iran, the latest in July 2006. This report will be updated as necessary.
In congressional hearings on the proposed U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement with
India, Members questioned how India’s cooperation with Iran might affect U.S. efforts
to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. India’s long relationship with Iran and
its support of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) positions on nonproliferation are obstacles
to India’s taking a hard line on Iran, yet the Bush Administration has asserted that U.S.-1
India nuclear cooperation would bring India into the “nonproliferation mainstream.”
U.S. law requires recipients of U.S. nuclear cooperation to guarantee the nonproliferation
of any U.S. material or equipment transferred. If a recipient state assists, encourages or
induces a non-nuclear weapon state to engage in nuclear-weapons related activities,
exports must cease. India’s nonproliferation record continues to be scrutinized, as India
continues to take steps to strengthen its own export controls. Additional measures of
Indian support could include diplomatic support for negotiations with Iran; support for
Bush Administration efforts to restrict enrichment and reprocessing; support for
multilateral fuel cycle initiatives, and for the Proliferation Security Initiative.
1 See also, CRS Report RS22486, India-Iran Relations and U.S. Interests.
India’s Record of Support
India, like most other states, does not support a nuclear weapons option for Iran.
However, Indian views of the threat Iran poses and appropriate responses differ from U.S.
views. On September 24, 2005, India voted with 21 other states on International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) resolution GOV/2005/77, which found Iran in noncompliance
with its safeguards agreement. However, the resolution did not refer the matter
immediately to the Security Council, and India apparently was one of several states
pressuring the EU-3 to keep the issue at the IAEA. According to Indian Foreign Secretary
Shyam Saran, India voted for the resolution and against the majority of NAM states which
abstained, because it felt obligated to do so after having pressured the EU-3 to omit
reference to immediate referral to the U.N. Security Council.2 Moreover, the official
explanation of India’s vote seemed designed to highlight India’s differences with the
United States:
In our Explanation of Vote, we have clearly expressed our opposition to Iran being
declared as noncompliant with its safeguards agreements. Nor do we agree that the
current situation could constitute a threat to international peace and security.
Nevertheless, the resolution does not refer the matter to the Security Council and has
agreed that outstanding issues be dealt with under the aegis of the IAEA itself. This3
is in line with our position and therefore, we have extended our support.
Nonetheless, India again voted with the United States on February 4, 2006, when the
IAEA Board of Governors voted to refer Iran’s noncompliance to the U.N. Security4
Council. The Ministry of External Affairs responded to questions about its vote in this
manner:
While there will be a report to the Security Council, the Iran nuclear issue remains
within the purview of the IAEA. It has been our consistent position that confrontation
should be avoided and any outstanding issue ought to be resolved through
dialogue...Our vote in favour of the Resolution should not be interpreted as in any way
detracting from the traditionally close and friendly relations we enjoy with Iran. It is
our conviction that our active role, along with other friendly countries, enabled the
tabling of a resolution that recognizes the right of Iran to peaceful uses of nuclear
energy for its development, consistent with its international commitments and
obligations, while keeping the door open for further dialogue aimed at resolving the5
outstanding issues within the purview of the IAEA.
India’s Prime Minister told the Indian Parliament on February 17, 2006, that “As a
signatory to the NPT, Iran has the legal right to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy
consistent with its international commitments and obligations.” Nonetheless, PM Singh
2 “Press Briefing by Foreign Secretary on the events in UN and IAEA,” New Delhi, Sept. 26,
3 Briefing by Ministry of External Affairs Official Spokesperson on Draft Resolution on Iran in
IAEA, available at [http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2005/Sept/16.htm].
4 See CRS Report RS21592, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments, by Sharon
Squassoni.
5 See [http://www.indianembassy.org/newsite/press_release/2006/Feb/2.asp].
also noted that “It is incumbent upon Iran to exercise these rights in the context of
safeguards that it has voluntarily accepted upon its nuclear programme under the IAEA.”6
India has supported the EU-3 negotiations, despite their ostensible objective of
halting Iran’s pursuit of sensitive nuclear technology (that is, enrichment, reprocessing
and heavy water). In part, this may be because the talks offered a second avenue of
negotiation that did not necessarily lead to U.N. Security Council sanctions, or because
they have offered a viable discussion forum. India welcomed the U.S. decision to join the
talks, stating:
India has all along advocated that issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme ought
to be resolved through dialogue and that confrontation should be avoided. Against this
background, the readiness of the US to join in the dialogue between EU-3 and Iran,7
which India has all along supported, is to be welcomed.
In September 2006, however, India joined other NAM states in a statement issued
at the Havana NAM summit on Iran’s nuclear program. The statement “reaffirmed the
basic inalienable right of all states, to develop research, production and use of atomic
energy for peaceful purposes without any discrimination and in conformity with their
respective legal obligations. Therefore, nothing should be interpreted in a way as
inhibiting or restricting this right of States to develop atomic energy for peaceful
purposes. They furthermore, reaffirmed that States choices and decisions in the field of8
peaceful uses of nuclear technology and its fuel cycle policies must be respected.”
Two other U.S. nonproliferation policies that may help underpin a solution to the
Iran crisis are related to restrictions on the nuclear fuel cycle — a ban on transferring
enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that are not already technology
holders, and steps toward multilateralizing the nuclear fuel cycle so that sensitive
technologies are not as widespread. A key new U.S. initiative in this area is the Global
Nuclear Energy Partnership, or GNEP. India, under the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement
with the United States, committed to refrain from transferring enrichment and
reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them, as well as to support
international efforts to limit their spread. India’s future support for those policies,
however, may be predicated on India being considered one of those technology holders.
A recent statement from President Bush on GNEP did not recognize India as such a
technology holder:
My administration has announced a new proposal called the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership. Under this partnership, America will work with nations that have
advanced civilian nuclear energy programs — such as Great Britain, France, Japan,
and Russia — to share nuclear fuel with nations like India that are developing civilian
nuclear energy programs...The strategy will allow countries like India to produce more
electricity from nuclear power, it will enable countries like India to rely less on fossil
6 Prime Minister’s Suo Motu Statement on Iran, New Delhi, February 17, 2006
[ ht t p: / / www.i ndi anembassy.or g/ newsi t e / pr e ss_r e l e ase/ 2006/ Feb/ 7.asp] .
7 See [http://meaindia.nic.in/pressbriefing/2006/06/01pb01.htm].
8 Iran Republic News Agency, “118 countries back Iran’s nuclear program” Iran Times, Sept.
fuels, it will decrease the amount of nuclear waste that needs to be stored and reduce9
the risk of nuclear proliferation.
Another tool that may be utilized by those desiring to prevent Iran from developing
nuclear weapons is the Proliferation Security Initiative. On November 2, 2005, Under
Secretary of State R. Nicholas Burns told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that
“Indian support for the multi-national Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) would be a
boon to the participating nations’ goal of tracking and interdicting dangerous terrorist and
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) cargoes world-wide. We hope India will choose to10
join PSI.” In April 2006, Secretary of State Rice told the House International Relations
Committee that the United States was pressing India to announce its intention to
participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative. Both the House (H.R. 5682) and Senate
(S. 3709) bills to create an exception for India from relevant provisions of the Atomic
Energy Act refer to the desirability of getting India to join PSI, but do not make it a
prerequisite for cooperation. Prime Minister Singh told the Parliament in August 2006
that the “Proliferation Security Initiative is an extraneous issue...Therefore, we cannot
accept it as a condition for implementing the July Statement. Separately, the Government
has examined the PSI. We have certain concerns regarding its legal implications and its
linkages with the NPT.”
Finally, efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons rely on coordinated
export controls and strong national export control systems. India has agreed to harmonize
its export controls with the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group under the July 18,
2005 Joint Statement. India also passed a new law in May 2005, the Weapons of Mass
Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Bill.
According to Indian officials, the Act prohibits the “possession, manufacture,
transportation, acquisition, development of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons or11
biological weapons by non-state actors.” It would prohibit the export of any good or
technology from India “if the exporter knows it is intended to be used in a WMD
program.” The U.S. Commerce and State Departments have not yet assessed India’s
export control law and regulations,12 which were promulgated in response to U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1540 requiring all states to take actions to criminalize
proliferation, particularly to non-state actors.
Some observers have stated that India does not have the necessary regulations in
place to implement the law, and that India’s resources for implementation are remarkably
limited.13 A third issue is whether India will follow through in imposing penalties on
violators of export control laws and regulations.
9 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060222-2.html]
10 R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, “Hearing on U.S.-India Civil
Nuclear Cooperation Initiative,” Remarks as prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, November 2, 2005, available at [http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2005/55969.htm].
11 See [http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc647.pdf].
12 Questions for the Record Submitted to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice by Senator Richard
Lugar (#1), Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 5, 2006.
13 Conversation with David Albright, Institute for Science and International Security.
India’s Nonproliferation Record
In its semi-annual, unclassified report in 2000 to Congress on the acquisition of
technology relating to weapons of mass destruction, the CIA identified India, along with
Iran and Pakistan, as a “traditional recipient of WMD and missile technology” that could
emerge as a new supplier of technology and expertise.14 The unclassified report also
noted that “private companies, scientists, and engineers in Russia, China, and India may
be increasing their involvement in WMD- and missile-related assistance, taking advantage
of weak or unenforceable national export controls and the growing availability of
technology.” In 2001, the unclassified CIA report noted that “We are increasingly
concerned about the growth of ‘secondary proliferation’ from maturing state-sponsored
programs, such as those in India, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan.”
Reported Transfers to Iran
Entities in India and Iran appear to have engaged in very limited nuclear, chemical and
missile-related transfers over the years. There are no publicly available indications of
activities related to biological weapons. In the early 1990s, when Iran actively sought nuclear-
related assistance and technology from many foreign sources, India appears to have played
only a minor role in contrast to other states. India signed an agreement in November 1991
to provide a 10-megawatt research reactor to Tehran, but cancelled under pressure from the15
United States. Nonetheless, India reportedly trained Iranian nuclear scientists in the 1990s.
More recently, India’s Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh stated in December 2003 that India16
“has and would continue to help Iran in its controversial bid to generate nuclear energy.”
From 1998 to 2003, the United States has imposed nonproliferation sanctions on
several different Indian entities for chemical and biological-weapons related transfers to17
Iraq. In 2004, the United States imposed sanctions on two Indian scientists for nuclear-
related transfers to Iran: Dr. C. Surendar (sanctions on Dr. Surendar were lifted in
December 2005) and Dr. Y.S.R. Prasad. Both scientists were high-ranking officials in
the Nuclear Power Corporation of India, Limited (NPCIL). Indian officials protested,
stating that cooperation had taken place under the auspices of the IAEA Technical
Cooperation program. Other reports suggest that the scientists, who had served as
Chairman and Managing Director of the NPCIL, which runs India’s power reactors,
passed information to Iran on tritium extraction from heavy water reactors.18 In December
2005, sanctions were imposed on Sabero Organic Chemicals Gujarat Ltd. and Sandhya
Organic Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. for transfers of chemical-related items to Iran. In July 2006,
14 Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of
Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000.
15 See [http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/2867.html]
16 “India Denies Nuclear Cooperation with Iran,” Agence France Presse, December 13, 2003.
17 This discussion taken from a response to Questions for the Record Submitted to Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice by Senator Richard Lugar (#2), Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
April 5, 2006.
18 John Larkin and Jay Solomon, “As Ties Between India and Iran Rise, U.S. Grows Edgy,” Wall
Street Journal, March 24, 2005.
sanctions were imposed on two more chemical manufacturers in India for transfers to Iran
— Balaji Amines and Prachi Poly Products.
In the chemical area, there is one confirmed transfer of 60 tons of thionyl chloride,
a chemical that can be used in the production of mustard gas, from India to Iran in March
India does not appear in the CIA’s unclassified nonproliferation report to Congress as a
supplier of chemical-weapons-related exports to Iran since the report began publication
in 1997. India signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993 and deposited its
instrument of ratification until 1996.
Other Considerations
One consideration in assessing a country’s nonproliferation record is the extent to
which its export control and procurement system helps limit or eliminate illicit transfers.
David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, has
argued that three factors contribute to a flawed nonproliferation record for India in the
nuclear area: a poorly implemented national export control system; an illicit procurement
system for its own nuclear weapons program, and a procurement system that may
unwittingly transfer sensitive information about uranium enrichment.20 When asked
formally to respond to Albright’s allegations, the Administration stated it would be happy
to discuss the allegations in a classified session with Members of Congress.21
Albright has suggested that the illicit procurement system in India has led entities
to mislead suppliers about the ultimate destination of their goods. Such a system could
be used to mask onward proliferation. From February 2003 to April 2006, the
Department of Commerce opened 63 cases of possible Export Administration Regulations
violations by U.S. firms exporting to India; 33 of those cases are still open.22 In response
to Senator Lugar’s question for the record on investigations since 1998 into potential
violations of U.S. export laws, the State Department reported that in one case, a U.S. firm
exported technical information to an entity in India associated with its missile program.
In another case, a U.S. firm with a subsidiary in Singapore committed 36 violations of the
Export Administration Regulations by exporting various life sciences research products
to entities in the Indian Department of Atomic Energy and Indian Department of Defense.
In another case, a U.S. firm attempted the unlicensed export of biotoxins to North Korea
via a firm in New Delhi.
19 Thionyl chloride is a Schedule 3 chemical under the Chemical Weapons Convention. It has
military and civilian uses, and is widely used in the laboratory and in industry.
20 David Albright and Susan Basu, “Neither a Determined Proliferation Nor A Responsible State:
India’s Record Needs Scrutiny,” Institute for Science and International Security, April 5, 2006,
available at [http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/indiacritique.pdf]. See also
Albright and Basu, “India’s Gas Centrifuge Program: Stopping Illicit Procurement and the
Leakage of Technical Centrifuge Know-How,” March 10, 2006, available at [http://www.isis-
online.org/ publications/southa sia/indianprocurement.pdf].
21 Questions for the Record Submitted to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice by Senator
Richard Lugar (#3), Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 5, 2006.
22 Ibid.