Prison Litigation Reform Act in the Supreme Court's 2006 Term
CRS Report for Congress
Prison Litigation Reform Act in the Supreme
Court’s 2006 Term
Paul Starett Wallace, Jr.
Specialist in American Public Law
American Law Division
Summary
When prisoners sue in federal court to challenge the conditions of their
confinement, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires that they first exhaust
their available administrative remedies by pursuing to completion the prison’s internal
complaint process before moving forward with their civil rights lawsuits. The Court
will decide in three consolidated cases, Jones v. Bock (05-7058), Walton v. Bouchard,
and Williams v. Overton (05-7142), whether the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement insists
that prisoners complete the administrative review process in accordance with applicable
procedural rules. More specifically, (1) whether the PLRA prescribes a “total
exhaustion” rule that requires a federal court to dismiss a prisoner’s federal civil rights
complaint for failure to exhaust his or her administrative remedies whenever there is a
single unexhausted claim, despite the presence of other exhausted claims, (2) whether
the PLRA requires a prisoner to name a particular defendant in his or her administrative
grievance in order to exhaust his or her administrative remedies as to that defendant and
to preserve his or her right to sue them, and (3) whether satisfaction of the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement is a prerequisite to a prisoner’s federal civil rights suit such that
the prisoner must allege and document in his complaint how he exhausted his
administrative remedies, or instead, whether non-exhaustion is an affirmative defense
that must be pled and proved by the defense. These cases are important because the
Supreme Court’s decision will determine the procedures for handling the tens of
thousands of inmate civil rights cases filed every year. Oral arguments for these cases
were heard on October 30, 2006.
Congress enacted the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), the
predecessor of the PLRA, in 19801 in order to limit the flow of prisoner litigation under
1 P.L. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 (1980), 42 U.S.C. §§1997-1997j (1976 & Supp. IV). See also, CRS
Report 98-999, Prison Litigation Reform Act: Survey of Post- Reform Act Prisoners’ Civil Rights
Cases; and CRS Report 96-468, Prisoner Civil Rights Litigation and the 1996 Reform Act, both
by Dorothy Schrader and both archived.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (2000)2 and provide a balance in deference to the authority of state
officials and the rights of those incarcerated. Prior to 1980, the incarcerated were not
required to exhaust their administrative remedies.3 CRIPA applied only to 42 U.S.C. §
CRIPA did not require mandatory exhaustion, although judges had the authority to require
plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies when “appropriate and in the interests
of justice.”5
In 1996, the civil rights of inmates were again the subject of Congressional
legislation with the passage of an amendment to the CRIPA, the Prisoner Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA).6 The PLRA was not passed as a committee bill, but rather was
attached as a rider to the Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Appropriations Act of 1996.7
2 This section states: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken
in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” See generally Sheldon H. Nahmod,th
Civil Rights And Civil Liberties Litigation: The Law Of Section 1983 (4 ed. 2004) (discussing
what section 1983 is and how it provides civil rights protection against state officials).
3 Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 507-508 (1982)(“This legislative history
supports the conclusion that our prior decisions, holding that exhaustion of state administrative
remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under §1983, did not misperceive the statutory intent.
... Congress addressed the question of exhaustion under §1983 when it recently enacted 42 U.S.C.
§1997e ... In §1997e, Congress ... created a specific, limited exhaustion requirement for adult
prisoners bringing actions pursuant to §1983.”). See also, Jennifer Winslow, The Prison
Litigation Reform Act’s Physical Injury Requirement Bars Meritorious Lawsuits: Was It Meant
To?, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1655, 1670 (2002) (stating that in 1964, in Cooper v. Pate, the Supreme
Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1871protects the fundamental rights of inmates [378 U.S.
546 (1964)]. Following the Cooper decision, inmates began filing suits for civil rights violations
at an increased rate).
4 Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1976 & Supp.IV).
5 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1976 & Supp.IV). See also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 149-50
(1992)(noting that CRIPA’s exhaustion requirement was not mandatory).
6 P.L. 104-134, Act of April 26, 1996 amending 42 U.S.C. § 1997 among other sections. In the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Congress established that “[n]o action shall be brought
with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a
prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.” 110 Stat. At 1321-71, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a) (1994 &
Supp. II). Congress’ intent to limit lawsuits filed by inmates were not limited to conditions of
their confinement but included such issues as they quality of medical care and prison food.
7 Title VII of H.R. 3019. As a result, floor statements appear to address the legislative intent
more exclusively than would otherwise be the case, especially where the floor statements in favorth
of the bill were uncontested. See Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263, 1266 at n.2 (10 Cir. 1997)
citing Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (indicating the limitednd
legislative history available for PLRA), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 124 F.3d 162 (2 Cir 1997).
Currently, when an inmate files a suit in federal court to challenge the conditions of
his confinement, the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that he first exhaust his
available administrative remedies by completing the prison’s internal complaint process
before moving forward with his civil rights lawsuit. The Supreme Court agreed to clarify
whether, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, “mixed” inmate civil rights lawsuits
contesting prison conditions and containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims must
be dismissed in toto.8 The United States Courts of Appeal are divided on the issue of total
exhaustion now. Courts in the Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits maintain that plaintiff’s
entire suit must automatically be dismissed if he has not totally exhausted all of his/her
administrative remedies with respect to each aspect of the claim.9 Other courts, in the
Second, Sixth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, have rejected the total exhaustion rule.10
Williams and Walton present the additional question of whether “the PLRA requires
a prisoner to name a particular defendant in his or her administrative grievance in order
to exhaust his or her administrative remedies as to that defendant and to preserve his or
her right to sue them.”11 Jones presents a third question: “whether satisfaction of the
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is a prerequisite to a prisoner’s federal civil rights suit
such that the prisoner must allege in his complaint how he exhausted his administrative
remedies (or attach proof of exhaustion to the complaint), or instead whether non-
exhaustion is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved by the defense.”12
This question has divided the lower federal appellate courts as well.13
During his remarks on the floor, Congressman LoBiondo specifically mentioned overruling
McCarthy by imposing strict exhaustion requirements on federal prisoners seeking relief under
Bivens through the enactment of PLRA. See 141 Cong. Rec. 35623 (1995).
8 Jones v. Bock (05-7058), cert. granted, 126 S.Ct. 1462 (2006); consolidated with, Walton v.
Bouchard and William v. Overton (05-7142), cert. granted jointly, 126 S.Ct. 1463 (2006). See
also, Brief for Petitioners at i, Jones v. Bock, 126 S.Ct. 1462, 1463 (2006)(Nos. 05-7058 and 05-
7142) (Petitioners’ Brief); Brief for Respondents at i, Jones v. Bock, 126 S.Ct. 1462, 1463
(2006)(Nos. 05-7058 and 05-7142) (Respondents’ Brief).
9 Bey v. Johnson, 407 F.3d 801, 809 (6th Cir. 2005); Graves v. Norris, 218 F.3d 884, 885 (8th Cir.
10 Ortiz v. McBride, 380 F.3d 649, 656 (2d Cir. 2004); Spenser v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d. 721, 726
(6th Cir. 2006)(holding that Bey had overlooked an earlier, binding precedent that permittedth
partial exhaustion); Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1175-176 (9 Cir. 2005); Kikumura v.th
Osagie, 461 F.3d 1269, 1289 (10 Cir. 2006)(In keeping with the Ross Court’s policy-based
analysis and the analogy it drew between habeas and the PLRA, we decline Defendants’
invitation to extend the PLRA’s total exhaustion rule to the circumstances presented in this case).
11 Petitioners’ Brief at i; Respondents’ Brief at i.
12 Id.
13 Affirmative defense: Handberry v. Thompson, 446 F.3d 335, 342 (2d Cir. 2006); Westefer v.
Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 577 (7th Cir. 2005); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936 (9th Cir. 2005);th
Anderson v. XYZ Correctional Health Services Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 678-81 (4 Cir. 2005);th
Nerness v. Johnson, 401 F.3d 874, 876 (8 Cir. 2005); and Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 112th
(3d Cir. 2002); contra Bey v. Johnson, 407 F.3d 801, 805 (6 Cir. 2005) (plaintiff bears theth
burden of proving exhaustion); and Fitzgerald v. Corrections Corp., 403 F.3d 1134 (10 Cir.
Although the three cases arose out of the same Michigan three step administrative
grievance process and are being heard together, the issue divergence is attributable to their
somewhat individualistic fact patterns. Jones, who suffered back injuries in a car accident
while he was in prison custody, sued because he was assigned a job that required him to
do physical labor and that resulted in further injury and an adverse work evaluation.14 At
the initial stage of the grievance process, Jones named the officer who provided the
evaluation, officer “Opanasenko, Health Care, Classification, Deputy Warden, and
Warden.”15 In subsequent administrative proceedings, he identified the Warden by name,
but for the first time identified the classification official and Deputy Warden by name
when he filed his civil rights complaint in district court.16 Jones asserted in his complaint
that he had exhausted his administrative remedies, but only later moved to attach
supporting documentation with regard to some of the defendants (documentation which
the defendants had already provided in their reply).17 The Sixth Circuit held that Jones’
complaint must be dismissed for failure to exhaust because (1) he had not, at any point,
included sufficient documentation of exhaustion with regard to all defendants (total
exhaustion), and (2) he had not included sufficient documentation of exhaustion in his
original complaint with regard to any of the defendants (insufficient pleading).18
Williams filed suit because he was denied surgery on his right arm and hand to
remove disfiguring tumors and was denied a single cell assignment to accommodate his
handicap.19 Although he named the defendants in the underlying accommodation
grievance, he had not named personally any of the defendants sued when he filed the
underlying surgical grievance.20 The Sixth Circuit held that failure to name the
defendants through the course of the grievance proceedings rendered Williams’ surgical
claim unexhausted and required dismissal of his accompanying exhausted accommodation
claim as well.21
Walton, who is Black, alleged that he was the victim of racial discrimination because
he received a greater discipline for assaulting a corrections officer than White inmates he
said had committed similar acts.22 At the first stage of his administrative proceedings
Walton charged a particular assistant deputy warden by name.23 Advised that a different
assistant deputy warden had in fact ordered the disciplinary action, Walton charged
“corrupt administration[] heads, warden, et[] al[.]” in subsequent grievance proceedings.24
14 Petitioners’ Brief at 11-2.
15 Id. at 12.
16 Id. at 13.
17 Id. at 14.
18 Jones v. Bock, 35 Fed.Appx. 837 (6th Cir. 2005).
19 Petitioners’ Brief at 16-9.
20 Id.
21 Williams v. Overton, 136 Fed.Appx. 859 (6th Cir. 2005).
22 Petitioners’ Brief at 21-2.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 22.
The Sixth Circuit held that Walton’s failure in his initial grievance to identify either by
name or position the defendants ultimately sued (other than the assistant deputy warden)
required dismissal of his entire suit even if his grievance against the assistant deputy
warrant who approved the disciplinary action were considered exhausted.25
The PLRA has resulted directly in effective yet controversial results. Although the
intended goals of the PLRA to reduce the quantity of prisoner litigation have been
realized,26 critics of the PLRA express concern that the exhaustion of the administrative
remedies requirement is too strict.27
The petitioners — Jones, Williams, and Walton — in conjunction with prisoner
rights advocate groups, argue that mandatory dismissal of a prisoner’s entire complaint
on a technicality is contrary to the plain language and legislative intent of the PLRA and
imposes substantial, arbitrary barriers to access to the courts.28 They contend that the
Sixth Circuit’s requirement that each prisoner include specific documentation of how he
exhausted administrative remedies is a judicially created fiction and likewise at odds with
the intent of Congress.29 Petitioners also assert that the Sixth Circuit’s rule “freezing the
universe of potential defendants” at the beginning of the grievance process suffers from
the same defects and is inconsistent with the Court’s past characterization of the
informality of the grievance process.30
The Michigan Department of Corrections, on the other hand, argued that the Sixth
Circuit’s adherence to the total rule accords with the legislative intent and plain meaning
of the PLRA.31 Their argument follows that by drafting the PLRA, Congress used specific
language to signify that an entire suit must be dismissed from court if all administrative
remedies had not been pursued prior the commencement of the action.32 Therefore, they
argue that automatic dismissal of an insufficiently exhausted complain is in line with that
25 Walton v. Bouchard, 136 Fed.Appx. 846 (6th Cir. 2005).
26 The federal court system has experienced a dramatic decrease in prisoner cases -from 41,679
inmate civil rights/prison condition petitions in 1995 to 24,614 petitions in 2005, Administrative
Office of United States Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts, Table C-2A (1998,
27 See, To Plead or Not to Plead: Does the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Exhaustion
Requirement Establish a Pleading Requirement or an Affirmative Defense? 39 U.C. DAVIS
L.REV. 247, 272 (2005)(“Applying a highly technical pleading requirement invites prisoners to
make mistakes in the administrative grievance process and in pleading their cases to the courts.
These mistakes would cause valid litigation to be dismissed if an intolerant pleading requirement
was utilized”).
28 Petitioners’ Brief at 26-7; Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Jones v. Brock and Williams v. Overton, Nos. 05-7058 and 05-7142 at 1
(Amici Curiae Brief).
29 Petitioners’ Brief at 24-5; Amici Curiae Brief at 1.
30 Petitioners’ Brief at 25-6; Amici Curiae Brief at 1-2.
31 Brief for Respondents, Jones v. Brock and Williams v. Overton, Nos. 05-7058 and 05-7142, at
32 See id. at 11.
purpose.33 The Department of Corrections also argues that the total exhaustion rule does
not impose an undue hardship on prisoners because cases dismissed on PLRA grounds
are dismissed without prejudice, which allows prisoners to refile their complaints in
federal court once they have exhausted all remedies.34
The federal courts receive close to 25,000 inmate civil rights suits a year.35 Congress
enacted the PLRA to ease the burdens of such suits impose upon the courts and upon
prison authorities while nevertheless assuring the survival of meritorious claims. The
three challenged procedures — total exhaustion, inmate pleading requirements, and
defendant specific exhaustion — all operate to ease the burdens on the courts and prison
authorities. The question before the Court is whether any or all of them impermissibly
do so at the expense of meritorious claims and contrary to the PLRA.
33 Id. at 12.
34 Id. at 1.
35 Supra note 27.