Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing: U.S. Policy Development

^Pr^ep^ar^{ed f}^o^r^M^e^m^b^ers^an^d^Com^mⁱ^t^t^ees^of^C^ong^r^e^ss

As part of the World War II effort to develop the atomic bomb, reprocessing technology was
developed to chemically separate and recover fissionable plutonium from irradiated nuclear fuel.
In the early stage of commercial nuclear power, reprocessing was thought essential to supplying
nuclear fuel. Federally sponsored breeder reactor development included research into advanced
reprocessing technology. Several commercial interests in reprocessing foundered due to
economic, technical, and regulatory issues. President Carter terminated federal support for
reprocessing in an attempt to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons material. Reprocessing for
nuclear weapons production ceased shortly after the Cold War ended. The Department of Energy
now proposes a new generation of “proliferation-resistant” reactor and reprocessing technology.

eprocessing refers to the chemical separation of fissionable uranium and plutonium from
irradiated nuclear fuel. The World War II-era Manhattan Project developed reprocessing
technology in the effort to build the first atomic bomb. With the development of R

commercial nuclear power after the war, reprocessing was considered necessary because of a
perceived scarcity of uranium. Breeder reactor technology, which transmutes non-fissionable
uranium into fissionable plutonium and thus produces more fuel than consumed, was envisioned
as a promising solution to extending the nuclear fuel supply. Commercial reprocessing attempts,
however, encountered technical, economic, and regulatory problems. In response to concern that
reprocessing contributed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, President Carter terminated
federal support for commercial reprocessing. Reprocessing for defense purposes continued,
however, until the Soviet Union’s collapse brought an end to the Cold War and the production of
nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy’s latest initiative to promote new reactor technology
using “proliferation-resistant” reprocessed fuel raises significant funding and policy issues for
Congress. U.S. policies that have authorized and discouraged nuclear reprocessing are
summarized below.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (P.L. 79-585) defined fissionable materials to include plutonium,
uranium-235, and other materials determined to be capable of releasing substantial quantities of ¹
energy through nuclear fission. The act also created the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and
transferred production and control of fissionable materials from the Manhattan Project. As the
exclusive producer of fissionable material, the AEC originally retained title to all such material
for national security reasons.
Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act, authorized the AEC to license commercial reactors,
and eased restrictions on private companies using special nuclear material (fissionable material).
Section 183 (Terms of Licenses) of the act, however, kept government title to all special nuclear
material utilized or produced by the licensed facilities in the United States.
Lewis Strauss, then chairman of the AEC, announced a program to encourage private industry’s ²
entry into reprocessing spent nuclear fuel.
The AEC expressed its intent to withdraw from providing nuclear reprocessing services for spent
nuclear fuel in a Federal Register notice of March 22, 1957.

¹^Iⁿ^t^h^e^a^m^e^nde^{d A}^t^o^m^ic^Ene^r^gy^A^c^{t o}^f¹⁹⁵^{4 (}^P^.L^{. 83-}⁷⁰³⁾^{, t}^h^e^te^r^m^s^p^e^cⁱ^{al nuc}^le^ar^m^a^te^rⁱ^a^l^sup^e^rsed^ed^t^h^{e t}^e^rm
^fis^sⁱ^on^able^m^a^te^rⁱ^al^andⁱⁿ^cl^ud^ed^u^r^anⁱ^u^m^en^ri^ch^edⁱⁿⁱ^s^o^t^op^{e 23}^3,^mat^e^ri^al^t^h^{e A}^E^{C d}^e^t^e^r^mⁱⁿ^ed^t^o^{be sp}^eci^alⁿ^u^c^l^ear^rd^nd
^mat^e^ri^al^,^o^r^an^y^artⁱ^fⁱ^cⁱ^a^l^l^y^en^ri^ch^ed^m^a^t^e^ri^al^.^L^a^w^s^o^f⁸³^C^ong^r^e^s^s^,²^Se^s^sⁱ^on,¹¹^18-²¹^.
²^U^.^{S. H}^o^us^e^of^R^e^pr^e^s^eⁿ^ta^tiv^e^s^{, C}^o^m^m^itte^e^{on Sc}^ie^nc^e^a^{nd T}^e^c^hⁿ^o^log^y^{, Subc}^om^m^itte^e^{on I}ⁿ^v^e^s^tig^a^tions^aⁿ^d
^O^v^e^r^sⁱ^g^h^{t, W}^e^s^t^Va^lle^y^C^oope^r^a^tiv^e^A^g^r^eem^eⁿ^{t H}^e^a^r^ing^,^{p. 23}^{3, J}^u^ly^{9, 198}^1.

The Davison Chemical Company, later called Nuclear Fuel Services, began extensive discussions
with the AEC on commercial reprocessing.
The AEC-sponsored Experimental Breeder Reactor (EBR II), constructed at the Argonne National
Laboratory West near Idaho Falls, began operating. Irradiated fuel was reprocessed by “melt-
refi ning.”
The AEC was authorized to issue commercial licenses to possess special nuclear material subject
to specific licensing conditions (P.L. 88-489).
The AEC granted an operating permit for commercial reprocessing to Nuclear Fuel Services for
the West Valley plant, near Buffalo, NY. The plant operated from 1966 until 1972, reprocessing ³
spent fuel from the defense weapons program. Commercial spent fuel was never reprocessed.
Stricter regulatory requirements forced the plant’s shutdown for upgrades. The plant was
permanently shut down in 1976 after it was determined that the stricter regulatory requirements ⁴
could not be met.
The AEC authorized General Electric Company (GE) to construct a spent fuel reprocessing ⁵
facility in Morris, IL.
The AEC invited public comment on a proposed policy in the form of Appendix F to 10 C.F.R. ⁶
Part 50 on siting a fuel reprocessing plant.
EBRII fuel reprocessing and refabrication operations were suspended.

³^U^.^{S. D}^e^pa^r^t^m^e^{nt of}^Ene^r^gy^{, P}^l^ut^oni^um^R^e^c^o^v^e^r^y^f^r^om^Speⁿ^{t Fue}^l^R^e^pr^oc^e^s^sⁱ^ng^by^N^u^c^l^e^a^r^Fue^l^Se^r^v^ic^e^s^a^t^W^e^s^t
^Va^lle^y^,^N^e^w^Y^o^r^k^f^r^o^m¹⁹⁶^{6 t}^o¹⁹⁷²^{, Fe}^b^r^ua^r^y¹⁹⁹⁶^{, h}^ttp:^//w^w^w^.os^ti.g^o^v^/^ope^nne^t/^doc^um^eⁿ^t/^pur^e^c^o^v^/^nf^s^r^e^po.htm^l^.
⁴^C^ong^r^e^s^sⁱ^ona^{l B}^udg^e^t^O^f^fⁱ^ce^,^Nuc^l^e^a^{r Re}^proc^e^ssing^an^{d Pr}^olife^ratⁱ^on:^Alte^rna^tiv^e^Ap^proac^he^{s an}^{d t}^h^eⁱ^r
^I^m^plic^ati^ons^f^o^r^t^h^e^Fe^de^r^a^l^Bu^d^g^e^t^{, Ma}^y¹⁹⁷^7.
⁵⁶⁵^Fe^de^{ral Re}^giste^r⁶²⁷^66-⁶²⁷⁶^{7, O}^c^to^be^r¹⁹^,²⁰^00:^Ge^ne^{ral Ele}^c^tric^Compaⁿ^y^,^Mo^{rris Op}^era^tⁱ^o^{n; No}^{tice o}^f
^D^o^c^k^e^{ting, N}^o^tic^e^of^C^o^ns^ide^r^ati^on^{of I}^s^s^u^anc^e^,^an^{d N}^o^tic^e^of^O^p^p^o^r^t^un^ity^for^{a H}^e^arⁱ^ng^for^t^h^e^Reⁿ^e^w^a^{l of M}^a^te^rⁱ^als
^Lic^eⁿ^s^e^SN^M^-²⁵⁰⁰^for^t^h^e^M^o^r^rⁱ^s^O^p^e^r^atio^{n I}^nde^pe^nde^nt^S^p^eⁿ^{t F}^u^e^l^Stor^age^Iⁿ^s^t^all^a^ti^on^.
⁶^Fe^de^{ral Re}^gⁱ^ste^r^,^J^une^{3, 19}⁶⁹^.

Allied-General Nuclear Services began constructing a large commercial reprocessing plant at
Barnwell, SC.
GE halted construction and decided not to pursue an operating license for its Morris reprocessing ⁷
facility. Instead, GE applied for and received a license to store spent fuel.
The AEC determined that any decision to permit nuclear fuel reprocessing on a large scale would
require an environmental impact statement under Section 101(2)(c) of the National
Environmental Policy Act (U.S.C. 4332(2)(c)).
The Energy Reorganization Act (P.L. 93-438), October 11, 1974, split the AEC into the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Energy Research and Development Administration
(ERDA). The responsibility for licensing nuclear facilities was transferred to the NRC.
Exxon applied for a license to construct a large reprocessing plant but received no final action on
its license application.
In an October 28 nuclear policy statement, President Ford announced his decision that
^t^h^{e reproces}^sⁱ^ng^an^{d rec}^y^clⁱⁿ^g^of^pl^u^t^onⁱ^u^m^s^h^o^u^l^dⁿ^o^t^proce^e^{d u}ⁿ^l^ess^t^h^{ere i}^s^s^oun^d^r^e^a^s^oⁿ
^{to con}^c^lu^{de t}^h^{at t}^h^e^w^o^{rld comm}^un^it^y^caⁿ^e^f^f^e^c^tiv^e^l^y^o^v^er^com^e^th^e^as^s^o^{ciated ri}^s^k^s^of
^prolif^eration^{... th}^at^th^e^Un^ited^States^s^h^o^u^{ld n}^o^loⁿ^g^e^{r re}^g^a^{rd reproces}^sⁱⁿ^g^o^f^us^{ed nu}^clear
^f^u^e^l^{to pro}^d^u^{ce plu}^t^on^ium^as^{a n}^eces^s^a^r^y^aⁿ^{d in}^evⁱ^t^{able s}^t^{ep in}^th^{e nu}^{clear fu}^{el c}^y^{cle, an}^d
^t^h^at^w^e^sh^oul^{d pu}^rs^u^e^reproces^sⁱⁿ^g^aⁿ^{d rec}^y^clⁱⁿ^gⁱⁿ^t^h^e^f^u^t^u^{re on}^l^yⁱ^f^t^h^e^y^{are f}^o^uⁿ^d^t^o^be⁸
^coⁿ^s^is^ten^t^wⁱ^th^o^u^rⁱⁿ^terⁿ^a^tioⁿ^a^{l o}^b^j^ectiv^es.
With that announcement, agencies of the executive branch were directed to delay
commercialization of reprocessing activities in the United States until uncertainties were
resolved.

⁷^Com^p^trolle^{r G}^e^ne^ra^l,^Fe^de^{ral Fa}^c^ilitie^{s for S}^t^ori^ng^Spe^nt^Nuc^l^e^a^r^Fue^l^—Are^the^y^Ne^e^d^e^d^?^J^u^ne²⁷^,¹⁹^79.
⁸^G^e^r^a^{ld R}^.^For^d^Pr^e^s^ideⁿ^tia^l^D^o^c^u^m^e^nts^,^v^o^{l. 12}^{, n}^o^.⁴⁴^{, p}^p^.¹⁶^26-¹⁶²^7,¹⁹⁷⁶^.

In an April 7 press statement, President Carter announced, “We will defer indefinitely the
commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium produced in the U.S. nuclear power ⁹
programs.” He went on to say, “The plant at Barnwell, South Carolina, will receive neither
federal encouragement nor funding for its completion as a reprocessing facility.” (It was actually
Carter’s veto of S. 1811, the ERDA Authorization Act of 1978, that prevented the legislative ¹⁰
authorization necessary for constructing a breeder reactor and a reprocessing facility.)
The NRC issued an order terminating the proceedings on the Generic Environmental Statement ¹¹
on Mixed Oxide Fuel and most license proceedings relating to plutonium recycling. It stated,
however, that it would reexamine this decision after two studies of alternative fuel cycles were
completed.
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 95-242), March 10, 1978, amended the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 to establish export licensing criteria that govern peaceful nuclear exports by the
United States, including a requirement of prior U.S. approval for re-transfers and reprocessing;
and a guaranty that no material re-transferred will be reprocessed without prior U.S. consent.
President Carter signed Executive Order 12193, Nuclear Cooperation With EURATOM (45
Federal Register 9885, February 14, 1980), which permitted nuclear cooperation with the
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) to continue to March 10, 1981, despite the
agreement’s lack of a provision consistent with the intent of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act
requiring prior U.S. approval for reprocessing. This cooperation was extended through December ¹²
31, 1995, by a series of executive orders. It has since expired and been replaced by a new
agreement.
President Reagan announced he was “lifting the indefinite ban which previous administrations ¹³
placed on commercial reprocessing activities in the United States.”

⁹^Ji^{mmy Cart}^er^Lⁱ^b^r^ar^y^,^Reco^rd^{s of}^t^h^{e S}^p^eech^W^rⁱ^t^e^{r’s Off}ⁱ^c^e^,^S^t^a^t^emen^t^oⁿ^N^u^cl^ea^{r P}^o^{wer P}^o^lⁱ^c^y^,^A^p^{ril 7, 1}⁹⁷⁷^.
¹⁰^J.^Mⁱ^ch^ael^M^a^rtⁱⁿ^ez,^T^h^e^J^our^nal^{of P}^o^lic^y^Hⁱ^s^t^or^y^{, “}^T^he^C^a^r^t^e^r^A^d^mⁱ^nis^t^r^a^{tion a}ⁿ^{d t}^h^e^Ev^ol^utioⁿ^o^f^A^m^e^r^ic^aⁿ
^N^u^c^l^e^a^r^N^onpr^olif^e^r^a^tion^Polic^y^,¹⁹⁷^7—¹⁹⁸¹^,”^v^o^l^.¹⁴^,^no^{. 3}^,²⁰⁰²^.
¹¹^A^llie^d-Ge^ne^ra^{l Nuc}^l^e^a^r^Se^rv^ic^e^s^v^.^Unite^{d S}^t^a^t^e^s^{, no}^{. 8}⁷^-1⁹⁰^{2 i}ⁿ^t^h^e^Su^pre^m^e^{Court of}^the^Uni^t^e^d^S^t^a^t^e^s^{, P}^e^ti^tio^{n f}^o^r
^W^r^{it of}^C^e^r^tior^a^rⁱ^{, O}^c^tobe^r^te^r^m^{, 198}^8.
¹²^EO¹²²^95,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{24, 19}⁸¹^{; E}^O¹²³⁵^{1, Ma}^r^c^h^9,¹⁹⁸²^{; EO}¹²⁴^09,^Ma^r^c^{h 7}^,¹⁹⁸³^;^EO¹²⁴^63,^Fe^br^ua^r^y^{23, 1}⁹⁸⁴^;
^EO¹²⁵⁰^6,^Ma^r^c^{h 4,}¹⁹⁸⁵^{; EO}¹²⁵⁵⁴^{, Fe}^b^r^ua^r^y^{28, 1}⁹⁸⁶^;^EO¹²⁵⁸⁷^{, Ma}^r^c^h^9,¹⁹⁸⁷^{; EO}¹²⁶²^{9, Ma}^r^c^{h 9,}¹⁹⁸⁸^{; EO}
¹²⁶⁷⁰^{, Ma}^r^c^h^9,¹⁹⁸⁹^{; EO}¹²⁷⁰⁶^,^Ma^r^c^{h 9}^,¹⁹⁹⁰^;^EO¹²⁷^53,^Ma^r^c^{h 8,}¹⁹⁹¹^{; EO}¹²⁷⁹^1,^Ma^r^c^{h 9}^,¹⁹⁹²^{; EO}¹²⁸⁴^0,
^Ma^r^c^{h 9,}¹⁹⁹³^{; EO}¹²⁹⁰^{2, Ma}^r^c^h^8,¹⁹^94;^EO¹²⁹⁵⁵^,^Ma^r^c^h^9,¹⁹^95.
¹³^“^A^nnouncⁱⁿ^g^a^Se^rie^s^of^Polic^y^Initia^tiv^e^s^on^N^u^c^l^e^a^r^Ene^r^g^y^,”^P^u^b.^P^a^pe^rs⁹⁰^{3 (O}^c^t^o^b^e^r^8,¹⁹⁸¹^{) i}ⁿ^Allie^d-Ge^ne^ral
⁽^c^onti^nue^d.^..)

Convinced that the project could not proceed on a private basis and that reprocessing was ¹⁴
commercially impracticable, Allied halted the Barnwell project.
President Reagan approved the United States Policy on Foreign Reprocessing of Plutonium
Subject to U.S. Control as National Security Decision Directive 39 (June 4, 1982). Although
specific details of the directive have not been declassified, the policies approved pertain to the
nonproliferation and statutory conditions for safeguards and physical security for a continued
commitment by Japan to nonproliferation efforts.
In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (P.L. 101-510, Sec. 3142),
Congress declared under Findings and Declaration of Policy that
^[a]t^t^h^{e pres}^en^t^tⁱ^m^e^{, t}^h^{e U}ⁿⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^esⁱ^s^obs^ervi^ng^{a de f}^act^o^m^o^rat^o^ri^um^oⁿ^t^h^{e produ}^ctⁱ^oⁿ
^of^fⁱ^ssⁱ^l^e^m^a^t^e^ri^al^s^,^wⁱ^t^hⁿ^o^produ^ctⁱ^oⁿ^of^hⁱ^gh^l^y^en^rⁱ^c^h^e^d^u^r^anⁱ^u^m^f^o^rⁿ^u^c^l^e^a^r^w^e^a^p^oⁿ^s^sⁱⁿ^c^e
^{1964. Wh}^{ile th}^e^Unⁱ^t^{ed S}^t^at^es^h^a^s^cea^s^e^{d operation}^o^f^al^{l of its reactors}^u^s^ed^f^o^{r t}^h^e
^produ^ctⁱ^oⁿ^of^pl^u^t^oni^um^f^o^{r nu}^cl^ear^w^eapon^s^,^t^h^{e S}^o^vⁱ^et^Uⁿⁱ^oⁿ^cu^rren^t^l^y^operat^e^s^as^m^a^ny
^asⁿⁱⁿ^e^reactors^f^o^{r th}^{e production}^of^plutonⁱ^u^m^f^o^{r nu}^clea^r^w^eapon^s^.^”^A^l^s^o^{, un}^{der S}^ec.
^3143—^Bi^l^a^t^e^ral^M^o^rat^o^ri^u^m^oⁿ^Produ^ctⁱ^oⁿ^of^Pl^u^t^onⁱ^u^m^an^d^Hⁱ^gh^l^y^Eⁿ^ri^ch^{ed U}^r^anⁱ^u^m^f^o^r
^Nu^{clear W}^eapon^s^an^{d Dis}^pos^{al of}^Nu^{clear St}^o^c^kpⁱ^l^e^s,^t^h^e^l^a^w^ur^ge^d^“a^{n e}ⁿ^d^b^y^b^o^t^{h t}^h^e
^Uⁿⁱ^t^e^{d S}^t^at^es^aⁿ^{d t}^h^{e S}^o^vⁱ^et^Uⁿⁱ^oⁿ^t^o^t^h^{e produ}^ctⁱ^oⁿ^of^pl^u^t^onⁱ^u^m^aⁿ^{d h}ⁱ^g^h^l^y^en^ri^c^h^ed
^u^r^anⁱ^u^m^f^o^{r nu}^clear^w^eapon^s^.
(In its fullest sense, plutonium production implies reprocessing.)
President G. H. W. Bush disapproved Long Island Power Authority’s attempt to enter into a
contract with the French firm Cogema to reprocess the slightly irradiated initial core from the
decommissioned Shoreham reactor.
President G. H. W. Bush halted weapons reprocessing in a policy statement on nuclear
nonproliferation declaring: “I have set forth today a set of principles to guide our nonproliferation
efforts in the years ahead and directed a number of steps to supplement our existing efforts. These
steps include a decision not to produce plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear ¹⁵
explosive purposes....”

^(...c^on^tin^ue^d)
^Nu^cl^ea^{r S}^e^rvi^{ces v.}^Unⁱ^t^e^d^S^t^at^es^.
¹⁴^L^e^tte^{r to Ja}^m^e^{s B. Edw}^a^{rds, Se}^c^r^e^t^a^r^y^of^Ene^r^gy^,^f^r^o^m^Bria^{n D. F}^o^rc^e^,^A^llie^{d Corp}^ora^tio^{n, Oc}^to^be^r^15,¹⁹⁸¹^.
¹⁵^P^r^esi^d^en^t^’^{s st}^at^em^en^t^,^T^h^{e W}^hⁱ^t^e^Ho^u^s^e,^Of^fⁱ^{ce o}^f^t^h^{e P}^r^{ess S}^ecret^ar^y^,^W^a^shⁱⁿ^gt^oⁿ^,^DC,^Jul^y¹³^,¹⁹⁹²^.

Energy Secretary Watkins announced the permanent closure of the Hanford, WA, PUREX
reprocessing plant in December.
President Clinton issued a policy statement on reprocessing stating that “[t]he United States does
not encourage the civil use of plutonium and, accordingly, does not itself engage in plutonium
reprocessing for either nuclear power or nuclear explosive purposes. The United States, however,
will maintain its existing commitments regarding the use of plutonium in civil nuclear programs ¹⁶
in Western Europe and Japan.”
On November 29, 1995, a new nuclear cooperation agreement with EURATOM was submitted to
Congress. Although the Clinton Administration determined it met all the requirements of Section
123 a. of the Atomic Energy Act, some Members believed it did not meet the requirement of prior
consent for reprocessing. The agreement entered into effect in 1996 without a vote.
President Bush’s National Energy Policy included the recommendation that “[t]he United States
should also consider technologies (in collaboration with international partners with highly
developed fuel cycles and a record of close cooperation) to develop reprocessing and fuel
treatment technologies that are cleaner, more efficient, less waste intensive, and more ¹⁷
proliferat ion-resist ant.”
As part of the ongoing Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI), the Department of Energy
announced that it will initiate work toward conducting an engineering scale demonstration of the
UREX+ separation process (operation planned for 2011) and developing an advanced fuel cycle
facility capable of laboratory development of advanced separation and fuel manufacturing
technologies. UREX refers to the process of chemically separating uranium from spent nuclear
fuel. The AFCI is intended to develop proliferation resistant nuclear technologies in association
with the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) for expanding nuclear power in the United
States and around the world. The Department of Energy later requested an expression of interest
from domestic and international industry in building a spent nuclear fuel recycling and ¹⁸
transmutation facility that would meet GNEP goals.

¹⁶^F^act^S^h^eet^—Non^p^r^o^lⁱ^f^eratⁱ^oⁿ^Aⁿ^d^E^x^p^o^r^t^Con^t^rol^P^o^lⁱ^c^y^,^T^h^{e W}^hⁱ^t^{e Ho}^u^s^e,^Of^fⁱ^c^e^o^f^t^h^{e P}^r^{ess S}^ecr^et^ar^y^,
^Se^pte^m^be^r^{27, 1}⁹⁹³^.
¹⁷^R^e^por^t^of^the^N^a^tio^na^{l Ene}^r^g^y^Polic^y^D^e^v^e^lopm^eⁿ^t^G^r^oup,^Ma^y²⁰⁰¹^.
¹⁸⁷¹^Fe^de^{ral Re}^giste^r⁴⁴⁶^73-⁴⁴⁶⁷^{6, A}^u^g^u^s^t^7,²⁰⁰⁶^,^N^o^tic^e^of^Re^qu^e^s^{t for}^Ex^pr^e^s^sⁱ^on^of^Iⁿ^te^r^e^s^tⁱⁿ^a^C^ons^ol^id^ate^d
^F^u^el^T^r^ea^t^m^en^t^Cen^t^{er t}^o^Su^pp^o^r^t^t^h^{e Gl}^ob^al^Nu^cl^ea^r^Eⁿ^erg^y^P^a^rt^nershⁱ^p^.

In July 2007, DOE announced that four consortia had been selected to receive up to $16 million
for technical and supporting studies to support GNEP (AREVA Federal Services, LLC;
EnergySolutions, LLC; GE-Hitachi Nuclear Americas, LLC; and General Atomics). DOE
followed with an August announcement that it was making $20 million available to conduct
detailed siting studies for public or commercial entities interested in hosting GNEP facilities. The
original GNEP partnership—China, France, Japan, Russia and the United States—expanded to
include Australia, Bulgaria, Ghana, Hungary, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Slovenia, Ukraine, South Korea, Italy, Canada, and Senegal by year end.
^Aⁿ^t^h^ony^Aⁿ^dre^w^s
^Specialis^{t i}ⁿ^En^er^gy^aⁿ^{d En}^er^gy^Iⁿ^f^r^a^s^tru^c^t^u^re
^P^o^licy
^aan^dre^w^s^@^cr^s^.^l^o^c.g^o^v^,^7-⁶⁸⁴³