Turkmenistan's Political Successi Developments and Implications
Turkmenistan’s Political Succession:
Developments and Implications
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
This report discusses the political succession in Turkmenistan following the death
of long-time authoritarian leader Saparamurad Niyazov in December 2006. Implications
for Turkmenistan and U.S. interests in Central Asia are examined. This report may be
updated. Related products include CRS Report RL33458, Central Asia: Regional
Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.
Introduction
Turkmenistan has made little or no progress in democratization since gaining its
independence in 1991, according to the U.S. State Department. Saparamurad Niyazov
ruled Turkmenistan since 1989, first as head of the Soviet Union’s Turkmen Communist
Party, then as president of independent Turkmenistan. The country’s May 1992
constitution granted Niyazov overwhelming powers to rule by decree as head of state and
government. In December 1999, constitutional amendments made Niyazov president for
life. According to several assessments, he was among the world’s most authoritarian
rulers, and his regime was highly corrupt and responsible for serious human rights abuses.
The regime increasingly restricted contacts by citizens with the outside world. Sizeable
natural gas exports provided major revenue but poverty reportedly was still widespread.1
According to the Bush Administration, the United States has “strategic and economic
interests” in Turkmenistan and “must remain engaged” with the country to gain its
“critical cooperation” in reducing threats to regional stability, including terrorism and
illegal trafficking in drugs, weapons of mass destruction, and persons. Turkmenistan
borders countries of security concern such as Afghanistan and Iran and the country
“serves as a valuable assistance corridor to Afghanistan.” Although the United States has
1 U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2005, March 2006;
Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2006, September 2006; Transparency International.
Corruption Perceptions Index 2006, November 2006.
limited its assistance somewhat to Turkmenistan because of its failure to reform, some
U.S. aid has been used to help Turkmenistan “achieve political stability, independence,
and integration into the global economy” and to promote security cooperation “in the
interests of both countries.”2 Turkmenistan supported U.S.-led coalition overflights for
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, land shipments of supplies for OEF,
and subsequent reconstruction efforts. However, U.S.-Turkmen ties were strained at
times, particularly after Turkmen authorities alleged that U.S. officials (and those of
Russia, Uzbekistan, and Turkey) might have been involved in an alleged 2002 coup
attempt. Turkmenistan also objected to criticism from the United States and others in the
international community about human rights abuses and the failure to democratize.
Niyazov’s Death and the Political Succession
Days after Turkmenistan’s ruling Democratic Party voted to make its head, President
Niyazov, its “eternal” party leader, he died on December 21, 2006, at age 66, ostensibly
from a heart attack. The morning of Niyazov’s death, the State Security Council3 and
cabinet ministers named deputy prime minister and health minister Gurbanguly
Malikgulyyewic Berdimuhammedow the acting president. It was also announced that the
speaker of the Mejlis (legislature) — who constitutionally should have become the acting
president — had been arrested on vague charges. In an address to the nation,
Berdimuhammedow urged citizens to remain calm and announced that Turkmen domestic
and foreign policies would not change. To help ensure peace, air flights and train traffic
into the country were halted and internet links severed, tightening the country’s
international isolation. Defense and security forces reportedly were deployed and citizens
who were viewed as dissidents were warned not to cause trouble.4
The Khalk Maslakhaty (KhM or People’s Council, a supreme legislative-executive-
regional conclave) convened on December 26 and changed the constitution to make
legitimate Berdimuhammedow’s position as acting president. Having long refused
ostensible requests from the late Niyazov to plan a future presidential election, the KhM
quickly approved an electoral law and announced that the next presidential election would
be held on February 11, 2007. Among other provisions, the law states that only citizens
born in Turkmenistan between the age of 40 to 70, who have resided in country for the
past 15 years, and who are officials or members of selected NGOs are eligible to run. The
15-year residency requirement appeared designed to block expatriate politicians from
eligibility, and the minimum age was lowered from before to make Berdimuhammedow
eligible to run. The KhM designated six candidates for the presidential election, one from
each region, all of whom were government officials: Deputy Minister of the Oil and Gas
Industry and Mineral Resources Ishanguly Nuriyev; First Deputy Head of the Dashoguz
regional administration Amanyaz Atajikov; Abadan Mayor Orazmurad Garajaev;
2 U.S. Department of State. Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2007;
and U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia: FY2005 Annual
Report.
3 A presidential advisory body formed by Niyazov after the 2002 coup attempt to discuss national
security threats. It is variously reported to be composed of deputy prime ministers, heads of the
presidential security service and of the defense, foreign, police, and intelligence agencies, the
prosecutor-general, and heads of regions.
4 Turkmenistan: Post-Dictatorship Blues, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Dec. 22, 2006.
Turkmenbashi Mayor Ashirniyaz Pomanov; Head of the Karabekaul district
administration Muhammetnazar Gurbanov; and Berdimuhammedow. The ruling
Democratic Party endorsed Berdimuhammedow as its candidate, thereby seemingly
anointing him as Niyazov’s heir-apparent.
The United Democratic Opposition of Turkmenistan (UDOT), a bloc of expatriate
parties and groups, met soon after Niyazov’s death and proposed Hudayberdi Orazow as
their candidate in the upcoming election. Although this candidacy was ignored by
Turkmen officials, UDOT urged Turkmen citizens to write-in Orazow as their choice for
president.
Beginning his campaign, Berdimuhammedow asserted that the upcoming election
would help mark the “undeviating ... democratization of society, the broadening of
openness and the enlistment of people’s efforts in the administration of the State.” At the
same time, he appeared to acknowledge that at least some of the late Niyazov’s policies
were not popular. He announced that he would restore secondary education to ten years
of study and higher education to five years, boost educational and medical exchange
programs, provide access to the internet “to all Turkmen,” and revise Niyazov’s cuts to
pensions. While promising not to raise taxes, Berdimuhammedow pledged to continue
several popular subsidy programs, including the provision of free natural gas, electricity,
salt, and water, and low-priced bread, housing, and public transport. Perhaps an
admission of widespread unemployment, he stated that job creation would be a priority
and pledged to support small and medium-sized business development. He also
mentioned a commitment to “free labor,” in a country where citizens allegedly are
pressured to help in the harvest.
Berdimuhammedow is widely expected to easily win election. Some observers
suggest that the late Niyazov’s lingering cult of personality would have ensured an
overwhelming and enthusiastic popular vote for Berdimuhammedow as the heir apparent
— in a free and fair race — even without any moves by Berdimuhammedow’s supporters
to restrict the field of candidates and otherwise control the electoral process.
Implications for Turkmenistan
Widespread poverty and unemployment, a recent wheat harvest shortfall, and
governmental weakness and corruption raise concerns about stability. In the weeks before
Niyazov’s death, there were anecdotal reports of bread shortages, but apparently the
interim leaders moved quickly to rectify this source of popular discontent.
Berdimuhammedow appeared to acknowledge widespread agricultural problems when he
ordered a working group to draw up a long-term reform strategy and asserted that “it is
necessary to make the sector viable and profitable both for farmers and the state,” in order
to maximize harvests. In security matters, Berdimuhammedow also appeared to admit
that there were readiness problems when he pledged on January 5 that “we will take every
step to strengthen material and technical provision of our national army and other
law-enforcement bodies.... [I]t is very important ... not [to] have any kind of shortage.
Instead, they should be provided with sufficient food and ammunition.”5 The challenge
of corruption was underscored by a report issued in early 2006 by the NGO Global
5 ITAR-TASS, Jan. 5, 2007; BBC, Jan. 6, 2007.
Witness, which alleged that the late Niyazov personally controlled a vast portion of the
wealth generated from natural gas exports. The NGO raised concerns that organized
crime groups were involved in these exports and urged the international community to be
wary of trading with Turkmenistan.6
Some observers have argued that the Turkmen government’s actions since Niyazov’s
death may be harbingers of liberalization. They point out that for the first time in
Turkmenistan’s history, citizens will be offered alternative choices in a presidential
election, even if only government officials are running. The political campaign has
provided some possible signs of a slightly more open climate for political opinion. All
the candidates, while pledging to continue the late “Great Leader’s” policies, nonetheless
speak of reforms they would implement if elected, perhaps indicative of widespread
popular grievances. Gurbanov pledged greater financial support for Hajj travelers (most
Turkmen belong to the Sunni branch of Islam). Pomanov promised greater aid for
agriculture and support for youth and sports activities. Atajikov stated that he would
“once and for all give private land ownership to farmers.”7 These observers also suggest
that Berdimuhammedow’s initial policy announcements may indicate a progressive
political orientation that may result in a less isolationist and authoritarian country. Such
pronouncements include a pledge at a campaign stop on January 5 that if elected, “I will
do my best to turn Turkmenistan into ... a democratic country where people enjoy
freedom and every condition to work and to rest, and where justice, peace and friendship
dom i n at e.”8
Other observers discount such perceptions of liberalization. Berdimuhammedow’s
pledge to continue Niyazov’s policies may not bode well for human rights reforms, they
argue. They also point out that Berdimuhammedow officiated over such policies as the
near-destruction of medical care, despite his own credentials as a dentist. Ominous
human rights developments in recent days include the arrest and disappearance of
environmentalist Andrey Zatoka on December 17 and oppositionist Nurberdi
Nurmamedow on December 23, just after the latter reportedly had been suggested as a
presidential candidate by his supporters. These observers also caution that since
Berdimuhammedow and other officials continue to endorse the Rukhnama (a spiritual
guide allegedly written by Niyazov), religious rights may continue to suffer. Turkmen
media shifted almost seamlessly from exhaustive coverage of Niyazov to reporting on
Berdimuhammedow, perhaps raising the specter of a new “cult of personality,” these
observers warn. Few analysts, however, think that Berdimuhammedow or his
replacement will be able to or want to re-create the late Niyazov’s idiosyncratic regime.9
Some observers have criticized the succession process as a “palace coup,” since
Berdimuhammedow and his supporters orchestrated post hoc changes to the constitution
to give putative legitimacy to his takeover as acting president and his candidacy in the
6 Global Witness. It’s a Gas: Funny Business in the Turkmen-Ukraine Gas Trade, April 2006.
7 ITAR-TASS, Jan. 9, 2007; RFE/RL Newsline, Jan. 10, 2007.
8 “Acting Leader Pledges to Build ‘Democratic’ Turkmenistan,” BBC, Jan. 6, 2007.
9 Felix Corley, “What Hope for Religious Freedom?” Forum 18 News Service, Dec. 21, 2006.
presidential election.10 A few observers suggest that Berdimuhammedow may be only a
figurehead, or is ruling in tandem with the head of Niyazov’s presidential guard, Akmurat
Rejepov. They argue that constitutional changes and other actions have indicated that the
State Security Council headed by Rejepov is now the dominant force, eclipsing the
legislature and presidency.11
Implications for U.S. Policy
The Administration appears to have cautiously considered that Berdimuhammedow’s
Turkmenistan might prove to be less isolationist and authoritarian, that human rights
might improve, and the country might seek to boost trade ties with the outside world,
including by building energy export pipelines. Assistant Secretary of State Richard
Boucher headed the U.S. delegation to the December 24 funeral to signal this U.S. interest
in “a new beginning” to U.S.-Turkmen relations and to offer U.S. assistance in reforms
“if they’re ready.” He called for “a smooth and peaceful transition of power, but stated
that the United States would not “lay down a blueprint” of reforms for Turkmenistan to
follow.”12 He admitted that he did not have great expectations that the prospective
presidential election would be free and fair, but praised Berdimuhammedow’s proposals
to reform education, expand exchange programs, and expand access to the internet as
contributing eventually to a more open society. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on
December 28 voiced similar hopes of revitalized bilateral relations and U.S. interest in
“advanc[ing] a stable, democratic, and prosperous future for Turkmenistan.”13
Boucher stated that the United States “would like to see Turkmenistan be able to
develop its resources, its oil and gas reserves in a market fashion that gets them a market
price for their energy.... that’s where the idea of multiple pipelines, multiple outlets, [and]
multiple options is really a question of how to secure the sovereignty and independence
of the nation.”14 Some observers have warned that instability in Turkmenistan could
disrupt its sizeable gas exports to Russia, and since these supplies permit Russia to export
more of its own gas to Europe, such disruptions could have a ripple effect in Europe.15
10 The Turkmen Ministry of Foreign Affairs denounced such criticism in Russian media as “not
corresponding to reality” and as “provocative.” The Ministry also stressed that “the situation all
over Turkmenistan is calm and stable. Facilities and organizations are functioning normally and
the people are provided with food products, medicines and other necessary services. Wages,
pensions and allowances are being paid in time, and social services are being provided properly.”
CEP20061229950018
11 Slavomir Horak, “Turkmenistan’s Succession: Welcome to Berdymuhammedow’s World,”
Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Jan. 10, 2007.
12 On December 21, 2006, the U.S. Embassy in Turkmenistan expressed condolences and stated
that the “United States hopes for a peaceful, smooth, constitutional succession.”
13 U.S. Department of State. Interview of Assistant Secretary ... Boucher by Najia Badykova of
VOA-Russia, January 5, 2007; U.S. Embassy, Ashkhabad. Interview of Assistant Secretary ...
Boucher with Dimitri Kirsinov of ITAR-TASS, Jan. 5, 2007; Secretary of State ... Sends Her
Condolences on President Niyazov’s Death, Dec. 28, 2006.
14 Interview by Najia Badykova of VOA-Russia.
15 Golnaz Esfandiari, “Turkmenistan: Could Niyazov’s Death Lead To Political Struggle,
(continued...)
Such a risk, as well as the possible opportunities of a Turkmenistan more oriented toward
the world economy, might contribute to a greater EU focus on Turkmenistan as part of
an energy diversification strategy. Turkmenistan’s Minister of Oil, Gas and Mineral
Resources Gurbanmyrat Atayew on December 28 reassured foreign gas customers that the
country was fulfilling its commitments on natural gas exports “without delay and in full
volume.” Berdimuhammedow on January 5, 2007, indicated an interest in enhancing
Turkmenistan’s sovereignty by diversifying its energy export routes, including by building
proposed trans-Caspian and Turkmen-Pakistan pipelines.
Some observers have criticized the Administration for not pushing harder on the
interim Turkmen government to include opposition candidates in the election, and for not
moving to find and freeze any possible personal assets of Niyazov in the United States.
They also have urged the Administration to insist on progress in democratization and
respecting human rights as conditions for closer relations.16 Underlining these concerns,
U.S. analyst Martha Olcott has warned that Berdimuhammedow may be insincere in
promising reforms. She argues that his aim may be to get Western governments to pay
less heed to exiled opposition politicians and to gain support “for a very nondemocratic
constitution modified in a very nondemocratic way, and to validate an election in which
the electoral process was flawed from the beginning.”17
These critics also warn that Turkmenistan’s participation in the Global War on
Terrorism might change. Niyazov had supported U.S.-led coalition operations in
Afghanistan against the Taliban and al Qaeda. A more pro-Russian leadership may join
Russia in calling for ending U.S. and allied access to bases in Central Asia. Niyazov also
had appeared successful in preventing Islamic extremists from infiltrating from
neighboring Iran and Afghanistan or otherwise gaining adherents. However, political
instability in Turkmenistan could increase the threat of Islamic terrorism, according to
some observers.18
Congress has raised concerns about Turkmenistan’s poor record of democratization
and respect for human rights in hearings and other legislative action. The 110th Congress
possibly might consider whether to boost or change the focus of U.S. assistance if the
Berdimuhammedow government pursues reforms. Alternatively, sanctions or other forms
of disapproval might be debated if the Berdimuhammedow government’s human rights
and democratization efforts remain inadequate. Other concerns may include the
continuation of U.S.-Turkmen anti-terrorism assistance, the possible extension of
humanitarian aid to address purported Turkmen food shortages and other urgent quality-
of-life needs, and the possible impact of Turkmenistan’s regime change on Western
energy security.
15 (...continued)
Instability?” RFE/RL, Dec. 21, 2006; Jeremy Bransten, “Turkmenistan: Energy Analyst Discusses
Impact Of Niyazov’s Death,” RFE/RL, Dec. 21, 2006.
16 Kate Watters, A New Era for Turkmenistan? International Relations Center, Jan. 9, 2007.
17 Ilan Greenberg, “Turkmen Leader Proposes Vast Change to Lift Isolation,” New York Times,
Jan. 5, 2007, p. A9.
18 “A Bad Father of the Turkmen,” Economist, Jan. 6, 2007.